Imperfect Evaluations and Incumbency Effects


Why do incumbent politicians in the developing world enjoy an electoral advantage in some political settings but suffer from a disadvantage in others? In my book project, I argue that incumbency can be a blessing or curse when citizens select candidates by evaluating the incumbent’s record in office, but fail to discount how external constraints, such as fiscal transfers and commodity shocks, condition the performance of incumbents.

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Speakers / Related People
Luis Schiumerini

Luis Schiumerini is an assistant professor of political science at Notre Dame, where he was a postdoctoral research associate with the Department of Political Science and a 2017-2018 Kellogg Institute Visiting Fellow. His research focuses on the political economy of citizenship in the developing world...
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