Supporters or Bystanders? The Military’s Role in Democratic Backsliding in Latin America

This research investigates why militaries in Latin America respond differently during episodes of democratic backsliding, with some supporting autocratic leaders while others withdraw their backing and contribute to leadership ousters. I argue that the military’s actions hinge on a strategic calculation that balances the costs to their institution, their corporate interests, and the dynamics of executive attempts to consolidate power. As leaders in the region pursue strategies to concentrate power, they often attempt to personalize control over the military, politicizing the officer corps to ensure loyalty. However, these efforts can provoke resistance if the military perceives its interests or autonomy to be threatened. By examining cases such as Venezuela, Peru, Bolivia, and Brazil, this project seeks to uncover the mechanisms that drive the military’s choices and how these decisions shape the trajectory of democratic erosion. Ultimately, the study aims to provide an understanding of the role militaries play in either enabling or resisting autocratization, offering insights into the conditions under which democratic institutions can be protected or undermined.