Executive-led State erosion in Ecuador

The research explores whether a non-democratic government can further undermine state capacity. In Ecuador, President Correa (2007-2016) increased intergovernmental transfers for Decentralized and Autonomous Governments (GADs) only to subsequently delay, deviate or influence such transfers, including decisions on how and where to allocate funding priorities. I seek to explain how the executive changed the composition of intergovernmental transfers, influenced service provision and interfered with political appointments to undermine the autonomy of local mayors and consolidate his own political power instead. The project seeks funding to update existing, collect new data, and consolidate a unique dataset of fiscal transfers, service provision and political careers at the local level in Ecuador. The research is directly connected with the Kellogg Institute and O’Donnell’s work, to explain whether low quality democracies undermine weak states. This project seeks to provide insightful research findings to better understand patterns of democratic backsliding and the workings of organized criminal groups in Latin America.