Setting Aside Spots on the Ballot: A Simulation-Based Approach to Measure Quota Effectiveness

Quotas have been a key part of electoral systems since the 1990s. The literature has shown that their effectiveness depends on how they are designed (e.g., placement mandates and minimum thresholds). However, we still lack a comprehensive understanding of how much their success relies on their design compared to voter and elite preferences. Similarly, we do not know how quotas interact with different components of electoral systems to influence the interparty and intraparty incentives these systems produce. I plan to expand the simulation framework I co-developed in our book on interparty and intraparty incentives. I will create a new index to assess quota effectiveness using an in silico environment, which helps avoid the limitations of real-world data. This project will contribute to the literature on electoral systems and representation and help practitioners design more effective quotas.