Luis Schiumerini (PhD, Yale University), a Kellogg Institute Visiting Fellow and postdoctoral research associate with the Notre Dame Department of Political Science, studies how democratic representation operates in developing countries. He uses methods of causal inference to investigate the conditions under which citizens can effectively engage in electoral accountability, participate in mass protests, and form preferences for redistribution.

At Kellogg, Schiumerini will complete the book manuscript “Blessing and Curse: Incumbency and Democratic Accountability in Latin America,” which explores why incumbent politicians enjoy an electoral advantage in some political settings but suffer from a disadvantage in others. He shows that incumbency systematically shapes elections when citizens select candidates by evaluating the incumbent’s record in office, but fail to discount how external constraints, such as fiscal transfers and commodity shocks, condition the performance of incumbents. The book project draws on natural and original survey experiments and elite interviews carried out during a year of fieldwork in Brazil, Argentina, and Chile.

Schiumerini’s work has appeared in the Journal of Conflict Resolution and Perspectives on Politics. A 2016–17 Postdoctoral Prize Research Fellow at Nuffield College, University of Oxford, he is a research associate of the Center for the Politics on Development at the University of California Berkeley and a board member of the Argentine Panel Election Study 2015.

Schiumerini has worked as an electoral and institutional reform analyst in the Office of Electoral Affairs of the Government of Buenos Aires and as a consultant for the Center for the Implementation for Equity and Growth Policies (CIPPEC) in his native Argentina.

Current Research

Blessing and Curse: Incumbency and Democratic Accountability in Latin America