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## **The Uneven Institutionalization of a Party System: Brazil<sup>1</sup>**

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Along with El Salvador and Mexico, Brazil is one of the few Latin American countries that have more institutionalized party systems today than they did a generation ago. When the Mainwaring and Scully (1995) volume was published, Brazil's party system was characterized by high electoral volatility, the electoral tailspins of the parties that governed the country from 1982 until 1990, the meteoric rise of a populist who won the 1989 presidential election, frequent party switching of politicians, and weak linkages between voters and parties. In recent years, the party system has been characterized by fairly high stability (and low electoral volatility) in presidential and lower chamber elections. Two parties, the leftist Workers' Party (PT, Partido dos Trabalhadores) and the center-right Brazilian Social Democratic Party (PSDB, Partido da Social Democracia Brasileira), have dominated the last six presidential elections (since 1994), consistently filling out the top two spots, thereby providing considerable structure and stability to the system as a whole, including in programmatic terms. During a generation of the collapse of many major parties and the weakening of party systems in many Latin American countries, the Brazilian case is an isolated exception of increasing institutionalization.

In at least three respects, however, this institutionalization has been [limited?] uneven. First, aggregate electoral stability has been high for the presidency and the Chamber of Deputies, but not for gubernatorial contests. Second, the individual level and organizational underpinnings of systemic level stability are themselves fairly modest.

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Party rootedness in society and the strength of party organizations are uneven. One of the linchpins of the party system, the PT, had strong roots in society at least until 2015, with many party identifiers, and a strong, penetrating organization. In contrast, the other parties have weaker roots in society (and far fewer party identifiers) and less robust organizations. Thus, at the level of individual parties, there is a gap between the institutionalization of the PT and the rest. This fact has important consequences for systemic level stability: the position of the PT as one of the main actors in the system is safer than that of any of the other major parties. While petistas formed a group large and loyal enough to place the PT as a competitive candidate in presidential elections until 2015, no other party is linked to a similar contingent of voters. In theory, other parties need to mobilize voters *de novo* in each electoral cycle, making them more susceptible to electoral losses.

This chapter documents the change from an inchoate to a relatively institutionalized party system and then attempts to explain why it happened. Notwithstanding burgeoning scholarly interest in party system institutionalization since 1995, there have been relatively few efforts to explain how institutionalization occurs. In part, this is because there are few clear-cut cases of the institutionalization of democratic party systems in third and fourth wave democracies; in contrast, there are several good books on the opposite phenomena: party system collapse (Morgan 2011; Seawright 2012; Tanaka 1998) and/or party collapse (Lupu forthcoming b).

Our explanation of growing party system institutionalization focuses on two primary factors. First, in Brazil, economic stabilization was a key factor in the institutionalization of the party system. Between 1980 and 1994, chronic triple and quadruple inflation that peaked at 2948% in 1990 and zero net economic growth led to massive defections of politicians and huge electoral losses for three successive governing parties and coalitions (the Democratic Social Party, PDS (Partido Democrático Social); the Party of the Brazilian Democratic Movement, PMDB; and the Party of National Reconstruction, PRN). The massive setbacks of these parties opened the doors for others—and also

provoked a profound reorganization of the party system. Economic stabilization and some other positive policy results (some economic growth, a sharp reduction in poverty, and an amelioration of income inequalities in the 2000s) under the governments of the PSDB (1995-2003) and the Workers Party (PT) from 2003 to the present positioned these two parties as the major players in the party system. By this means, it helped bring about greater institutionalization.

Second, changes in the formal rules of the game have supported party system institutionalization. Some early changes (just after the 1988 constitution was approved) boosted party discipline relative to the constitutional congress of 1987-88 (Figueiredo and Limongi 1999). Greater party discipline helped build more cohesive party identities and loyalties. The 1995 Law of Political Parties, which regulates many aspects of parties, vastly increased public funding for parties, enabling them to build more solid organizations. It also altered the criteria for allocating free television and radio campaign time in a way that strongly favors established parties. The change from nonconcurrent to concurrent presidential and congressional elections in 1994 substantially increased hurdles for political outsiders. In 2002, a law abolished the birthright candidate rule (*candidato nato*), by which any elected politician automatically had the right to run for reelection. The birthright candidate law meant that incumbent politicians did not need the support of parties to run for re-election, and hence they could more easily turn their backs on the leadership. These institutional changes promoted party system institutionalization.

Comparison with other cases suggests that it was beneficial to institutionalization in Brazil that the party system consistently offered viable contenders with clearly contrasting programmatic preferences. As Lupu (forthcoming and this volume), Morgan (2011), and Seawright (2012) have argued, a narrowing of programmatic differences was a highly important facilitating condition (and perhaps even a necessary one) for party collapse. This factor does not explain change over time in Brazil because programmatic differences were greater in 1989, when the PT was much more radical,

than in the 2000s. However, the sharp programmatic differences among parties gave voters a sense that they could choose something very different within the existing system if other options failed them. Programmatic differentiation thereby lowered the risk of systemic collapse.

We argue in the conclusion that the Brazilian party system provides important evidence for understanding party system institutionalization. The growing institutionalization of Brazil's party system shows a process that mirrors dynamics of party system deinstitutionalization and collapse, providing support for the argument made in Chapter 15 that processes of institutionalization and deinstitutionalization have symmetrical causes. The stabilization of the economic situation created the condition for the migration of voters from the failing parties to a partisan alternative – in contrast with the Venezuelan and Peruvian experience where economic failure led to massive support to political outsiders (Lupu this volume; Morgan 2011; Seawright 2012) – and the relative economic success of the policies implemented both by the PSDB and the PT kept voters “within the system,” avoiding the search for extra-systemic options as non-partisan candidates. Similarly, the PSDB and PT provided clear alternative programmatic options to voters, again sustaining partisan actors as the main political alternatives in national elections.

The deterioration of economic conditions, the adoption of more liberal economic policies by President Rouseff in the beginning of her second term, and the impact of new massive corruption scandals during the same period may undermine the conditions that have anchored the institutionalization of Brazil's party system so far, promoting higher instability in the future.

### **Brazil's Contemporary Parties**

After 21 years of military rule (1964-85), Brazil returned to democracy in March 1985. The first nine years of democracy were characterized by a new Constitution (1988), years of three and four digit inflation rates, and an impeached president (Fernando Collor de Mello in 1992). Since an

economic stabilization plan in 1994 tamed inflation, the country has enjoyed a deepening of democracy, a reduction of poverty, and an amelioration of long-standing stark inequalities.

Created in 1980, the Workers' Party (PT, *Partido dos Trabalhadores*) was initially spearheaded by leftist activists and politicians; the “new” union movement that had mobilized in the late 1970s in greater São Paulo, mainly in the automobile industry; and grassroots Catholic activists. It was initially a small, fairly ideological self-proclaimed socialist party with somewhat radical tendencies, with roots primarily in the state of São Paulo.<sup>2</sup> It enjoyed steady electoral growth from its first election in 1982 until 2002, when Luis Inácio (Lula) da Silva was elected president. It also expanded its organization. Building upon the mobilization of a series of grassroots networks – particularly those connected to the Catholic Church's base ecclesial communities (Trejo and Bizzarro Neto 2014) – the PT became a national organization by the end of the 1990s, penetrating the Brazilian territory with more than two thousand local branches.

Even though it was still a relatively small party, in 1989, when the first popular elections for president since 1960 took place, PT candidate Lula came in second place and made it to the runoff, where he lost with 47% of the valid vote. Lula also finished second in presidential voting in 1994 and 1998. Over time, the PT became more pragmatic, more willing to form electoral alliances that it once would have spurned, and more programmatically and ideologically moderate (Amaral 2013; Hunter 2010; P. Ribeiro 2010). The 2002 election was an inflection point in these regards; in order to enhance his chances of winning and governing successfully, Lula signaled a clear move toward the center during his campaign (Meneguello and Amaral 2008).

Lula served two terms as president, from 2003 through 2011. During his presidency, Brazil achieved considerable success in reducing poverty and inequality. During these years, the PT's social base changed toward the poor states and poor and less educated voters (Hunter and Power 2007;

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<sup>2</sup> On the PT's early years, see Keck (1992) and Meneguello (1989).

Mainwaring, Torcal, and Somma forthcoming; Singer 2009; Soares and Terron 2008; Terron and Soares 2010; Zucco and Samuels 2010). Whereas previously it had fared best in the country's most developed states and among the more educated, since 2006, the PT has fared best in the poor northeastern and northern states and among the less educated. In 2010, the PT's candidate, Dilma Rousseff, was elected president, winning decisively (56 to 44%) in the second round over PSDB candidate José Serra. She was reelected in 2014, again winning against a PSDB candidate (Aécio Neves, former governor of Brazil's second largest state, Minas Gerais) in the closest presidential election in Brazil's history (51.6% to 48.4%).

The other party that since 1994 has either won the presidency (1994 and 1998) or finished second and made the runoff (2002-2014) is the PSDB. The PSDB emerged in 1988 as a center-left splinter from the PMDB (*Partido do Movimento Democrático Brasileiro*, Party of the Brazilian Democratic Movement) (Roma 2002). In 1994, it moved to the center or center-right (Power and Zucco 2009: 230) to enhance presidential candidate Fernando Henrique Cardoso's chances of winning—which he did in a first round landslide. Cardoso repeated the first round landslide in 1998. The PSDB fared best among better-educated and wealthier voters and in larger cities in the 2002-2014 period and in the 1989 presidential election and 1990 congressional elections. During Cardoso's presidency, from 1994 until 2002, it had strong support from poorest areas of the country (the bases of *governismo*) (Zucco 2008), while the educated middle class tended to vote for Lula.

The PMDB (*Partido do Movimento Democrático Brasileiro*, Party of the Brazilian Democratic Movement) was created in 1966 as the official opposition party to the military government. During military rule, there were regular elections for the national congress and for state and municipal assemblies, as well as for mayor of most cities other than capitals. The military banned the parties that existed from 1946 through 1964 but fostered the creation of a new governing party, ARENA, and an official opposition party, which was known as the Movimento

Democrático Brasileiro (MDB, Brazilian Democratic Movement) until the party and electoral system reform of 1979. The stronghold of the MDB was urban Brazil and the wealthier states of the south and southeast.<sup>3</sup> In 1982, the military allowed for the first direct elections of state governors since 1965, when it had annulled results that it did not like. The PMDB won most of the states in the country's south and southeastern regions, including the politically and economically powerful states of São Paulo and Minas Gerais. PMDB opposition governors then prominently helped spearhead growing opposition to the military, paving the way for the transition to democracy in 1985.

The PMDB swept to extraordinary victories in the 1986 congressional and gubernatorial elections, but scores of members of congress elected on the party's label in 1986 defected to other parties in the next few years. The PMDB has never fielded a competitive presidential candidate, but it remains one of the country's largest parties in the national congress and in winning state gubernatorial posts. Since the 1990s, reversing the pattern under military rule, it has fared best in the northeast and north and among poorer voters. Ideologically and programmatically, among members of congress the PSDB and PMDB have been largely indistinguishable since 1994 (Lucas and Samuels 2010), anchoring the center or center-right of the spectrum.

The PMDB had diluted its brand, strongly associated with redemocratization, by the end of José Sarney's government (1985-1990), and it governed during a period of hyperinflation and economic turmoil. While the incorporation of several political elites formerly associated with the authoritarian regime and the party members' behavior during the Constitutional Assembly diluted the party's association with democracy and renovation, Sarney's disastrous economic policies severely impacted the party's support among the general public. The failure of Ulysses Guimarães's candidacy in the 1989 presidential elections, when he received 4.5% of the votes, the decrease in the

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<sup>3</sup> On the MDB, see Kinzo (1984; 1988) and Melhen (1998). On the PMDB, see Ferreira (2002: 135-211), Bizzarro Neto (2013), and Maciel (2014).

party's support in national lower chamber elections between 1986 and 1990 (48.1% to 19.3%, respectively),<sup>4</sup> and the steep decline in the level of partisanship with the PMDB in the period are important consequence of this dilution.<sup>5</sup>

The party's organizational strength at the subnational level, inherited from the dictatorship period, helped the PMDB leaders to preserve their access to important resources and voters, which facilitated the party's survival even after its brand had diluted (Bizzarro Neto 2013; Maciel (2014). The PMDB survived despite conditions that Lupu (2013, 2015, Chapter X in this volume) argues would have led to a breakdown: brand dilution and bad governing performance.

For the first two decades of the democratic regime, there was a fourth major party, the Democrats (DEM). This party was founded with the name *Partido da Frente Liberal* (Party of the Liberal Front, PFL) in 1984-85, when many leaders of the party that had supported the military dictatorship defected. By casting their votes for opposition presidential candidate Tancredo Neves, the PFL helped bring about an orderly end to the dictatorship, paving the way for a new period of democracy that began in March 1985. A center-right party with traditional electoral strongholds in northeastern Brazil, the PFL formed a coalition with the PSDB in the 1994 and 1998 presidential elections (both won by Cardoso of the PSDB) and again in 2006 and 2010.<sup>6</sup> After Cardoso left power and the PT began to displace the PFL in the Northeast, in 2007, the party changed its name to DEM (Democrats) and transitioned to a younger leadership in Lula's second term in office. As recently as 2006 it was still the fourth largest party in congressional elections, but its erosion has

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<sup>4</sup> Georgetown Political Database for the Americas, 1990 Legislative Elections for the Chamber of Deputies. [Internet]. Georgetown University e Organização dos Estados Americanos. Em: <http://pdba.georgetown.edu/Elecdata/Brazil/legis1990.html>. 2 de fevereiro 2002.

<sup>5</sup> Mainwaring 1999 reports that between 1978, when the transition to democracy had just started, 61% of the voters in the city of São Paulo reported identifying with the PMDB. In 1989, toward the end of Sarney's government, this number had fallen to 14%. Although levels of partisanship with the PMDB tend to be, in aggregate, larger in São Paulo than in other parts of the country, we believe that the decline in the levels of identification was ubiquitous.

<sup>6</sup> On the PFL, see Ferreira (2002: 47-134), Tarouco (1999), R. Ribeiro (2011).



accelerated in recent years. Nonetheless, the PFL/DEM has been Brazil's most important conservative party in the post-1985 democracy.

In national legislative and subnational elections, these four parties collectively win about half of the vote. There is also a large and diverse group of medium-sized parties, which we define as parties receiving from 3% to 8% of the seats in the Chamber of Deputies and winning governorships in at least one state in recent elections. These parties stand at both the right and at the left of the ideological spectrum, and together they comprise the “lower clergy” (*baixo clero*), or backbenchers, of Brazilian politics.<sup>7</sup> On the right, the PP (Progressive Party), PTB (Brazilian Labor Party), PR (Party of the Republic), PSD (Social Democratic Party), and PSC (Social Christian Party) depend on state resources for their electoral and organizational survival (Melo and Câmara 2012). The first two parties date from redemocratization while the latter three emerged more recently, mainly as vehicles for some opportunistic conservative elites who support the PT-led government in Congress. The PSC has strong links with neo-Pentecostal churches (M. Machado 2012).

The importance of medium-sized parties is mirrored on the left side of the political spectrum. The PDT was founded as the personalist vehicle of Leonel Brizola, a populist warhorse from the 1946-1964 period and self-styled heir to Getúlio Vargas. Brizola's electoral appeal lasted well into the 1990s, making the PDT an important player in the first years of the democratic regime. He narrowly finished third in the 1989 presidential election, just behind Lula of the PT. After Brizola's death in 2004, the PDT was replaced as the second most important leftist party by the PSB, the Brazilian Socialist Party. The PSB enjoyed strong electoral support in the northeast of the country, where it absorbed many of the voters and the elites of more traditional parties such as the PFL/DEM (R. Santos 2002). The Partido Popular Socialista (Popular Socialist Party, PPS) and Partido Verde (PV, Green Party) are center-left parties that have systematically won more than a

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<sup>7</sup> This ideological ordering of Brazilian parties follows Zucco (2011).

dozen representatives in the country's legislature and have played important roles in presidential elections. While the PPS, the result of the reorganization of the Brazilian Communist Party in 1991-1992, has been a junior partner of the PSDB and DEM in the opposition to PT-led governments, the PV had a viable presidential candidate in 2010 with Marina Silva.<sup>8</sup> Marina won 19.3% of the votes in the first round (until 2014, the best performance of any third-place presidential candidate since 1955) and was largely responsible for preventing an outright victory by Dilma Rousseff in the first round. Marina's decision to leave the party in 2013, however, undermined the PV's connection with her electorate and may weaken the party's ability to mobilize voters who identify with environmental causes. She joined the PSB and became the party's presidential candidate after the sudden death of the party's original candidate and main leader, Eduardo Campos, in a plane crash just after the campaign for presidency in 2014 had started. She boosted the party's support, again running third, below PT and PSDB candidates.

Appendix 1 lists the parties that are currently represented in the Chamber of Deputies, the national lower house.

One of the defining features of the congressional Brazilian party system in the contemporary democratic regime has been its extreme fragmentation (Ferreira, Batista, and Stabile 2008; Mainwaring 1999; F. Santos 2008; Silva 2013). The combination of proportional representation, large district magnitudes (from 8 to 70 deputies per state), federalism with the absence of thresholds for parliamentary representation, the low barriers to creating new parties, and the distribution of political resources to any organization that reaches these low barriers facilitates fragmentation in proportional elections (i.e., for the national Chamber of Deputies, state assemblies, and municipal assemblies). The fact that coalitions of several parties can collectively reach the already low electoral

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<sup>8</sup> Marina Silva is a historical leader of environmental movements in the Amazon forest in Brazil. She was Lula's Environment Minister until 2008 and left the government – and the PT – to run for president in 2010.

threshold makes it even easier for parties to win seats with low vote totals (Machado 2005; Carreirão and Nascimento 2010; Mignozzetti, Galdino, and Bernabel 2012). As of 2014, thirty-two parties were registered with the Electoral Justice<sup>9</sup> and at least another dozen have petitioned for formal recognition.<sup>10</sup> Twenty-one have at least one representative in the Chamber of Deputies.

Table 1 shows the ten most important of these parties, which together win approximately three-quarters of the vote in PR contests. We rank their electoral potency according to their average performance in the most recent elections for federal deputy (2014) and municipal councils (2012).<sup>11</sup> Of these ten parties, two were founded under military rule (the PMDB and PP, which trace their roots to 1966) while six date to the democratic transition between 1980 and 1985 (PT, PDT, PTB, and PSB, plus arguably the PR which is heir to the defunct Liberal Party). The PSDB was born shortly thereafter, during the Constituent Assembly in 1987-1988, which produced the regime's current constitution. As befits an institutionalized party system, only one of the ten leading parties is a true newcomer: the PSD, founded in 2011 as a vehicle for center-right former oppositionists to move into alignment with the Dilma government. Table 1 shows the extreme fragmentation of the party system in proportional elections; the largest parties in municipal council elections receive only a tenth of the national vote.

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<sup>9</sup> <http://www.tse.jus.br/partidos/partidos-politicos>

<sup>10</sup> [http://pt.wikipedia.org/wiki/Anexo:Lista\\_de\\_partidos\\_pol%C3%ADticos\\_no\\_Brasil](http://pt.wikipedia.org/wiki/Anexo:Lista_de_partidos_pol%C3%ADticos_no_Brasil)

<sup>11</sup> To provide a fair assessment of electoral potency on the ground throughout Brazil's 27 states and 5565 municipalities, we examine only these contests which are purely proportional and have very low barriers to entry. This ensures that no party is "disadvantaged" by its failure to field viable presidential, gubernatorial, or mayoral candidates.

Table 1

<i>Party</i>	<i>2012 City Councils (%)</i>	<i>2014 Chamber of Deputies (%)</i>	<i>Mean of 2012 and 2014 (%)</i>	<i>Rank</i>
PT	10.4	13.9	12.2	1
PMDB	10.5	11.0	10.8	2
PSDB	8.5	11.4	10.0	3
PSB	6.1	6.4	6.3	5
PP	6.3	6.6	6.5	4
PR	4.8	5.8	5.3	7
DEM	4.4	4.2	4.3	10
PDT	6.0	3.6	4.8	8
PTB	5.2	4.0	4.6	9
PSD	5.8	6.1	6.0	6
<b><i>Cumulative Share of Votes</i></b>	<b>68</b>	<b>73</b>	<b>70.5</b>	<b>--</b>

Percentages refer to party's share of total valid votes cast. Source: Tribunal Superior Eleitoral.

The main Brazilian parties show remarkable consistency in terms of their left-right ideological placement. The left has been anchored by the PT, the center by the PMDB and PSDB, and the right by the PFL/DEM. Although the ordinal placement of parties has been stable, the system as a whole has seen increasing ideological moderation accompanied by a gradual shift to the right. Table 2 shows the reputational left-right placement of each of the main parties as recorded in the Brazilian Legislative Surveys, which have been carried out in each legislature elected under democracy. The PFL/DEM has held a consistent position on the right, and most other parties have drawn closer to it (Power and Zucco 2012). Both the PSDB and PT shifted sharply to the right after they won the presidency, in 1994 and 2002 respectively. The net result has been a narrowing of the overall ideological range of the party system and a reduction in the ideological distances between the

key power contenders, especially the PSDB and PT. On the 10 point ideological scale, the gap between the furthest left (always the PT) and the furthest right parties fell sharply from 6.99 in 1990 to 4.39 in 2013. The relative stability of the left-right continuum is matched by rising stability in patterns of electoral competition, as we discuss in the next section.

**Table 2. Reputational Ideology: Left-Right Placements of the Major Parties, 1990-2013**

<i>Party</i>	<i>1990 placement (BLS Wave 1)</i>	<i>2001 placement (BLS Wave 4)</i>	<i>2013 placement (BLS Wave 7)</i>	<i>Total movement relative to 1990</i>
PT	1.51	2.27	3.86	2.35 right
PMDB	5.10	6.19	6.19	1.09 right
PSDB	3.98	6.30	6.32	2.34 right
PSB	2.23	2.85	4.12	1.89 right
PP	8.50	8.65	7.55	0.95 left
PR	7.20	6.94	6.98	0.22 left
DEM	8.02	8.59	8.25	0.23 right
PDT	3.15	3.46	4.21	1.06 right
PTB	6.88	6.96	6.52	0.36 left
PSD	--	--	6.65	--

Notes: parties are placed (by non-members only) on an ideological scale where 1 is left and 10 is right. PP appears in the surveys as PDS in 1990 and PPB in 2001; PR appears as PL in 1990 and 2001; PSD was created only in 2011. Source: Brazilian Legislative Surveys, available at <http://thedata.harvard.edu/dvn/dv/zucco>.

### **The Uneven Stabilization of Electoral Competition**

This section describes the stabilization of electoral competition in presidential and lower chamber elections and notes the ongoing high levels of volatility in elections for governors. We also note the concentration of the vote on two candidates in presidential elections, the exceptional fragmentation of the party system in the lower chamber, and the intermediate situation in gubernatorial elections: low fragmentation at the state level but high fragmentation when we aggregate to the national level. The differences in the party system across these three levels are so great that it makes sense to distinguish between the presidential and the congressional party systems.

Alternatively, one could argue that Brazil has had a bifurcated party system: exceptionally fragmented in the national congress yet with low fragmentation in presidential voting (Meneguello 2011).

### **Presidential Elections**

The presidency is by far the most powerful position in Brazil, so we analyze it in greater detail than the congressional party system. Our discussion of presidential elections emphasizes a shift from 1) high volatility (1989-94) 2) high fragmentation (1989) and 3) the electoral victory of an outsider populist in 1989 to 1) the stabilization of electoral tendencies; 2) the concentration of the vote on two leading candidates; and 3) the consistent dominance of the PT and PSDB since 1994. The second and third points have been closely linked in Brazil since 1994, but we treat them separately. They are discrete in principle and usually in reality; in highly fragmented congressional party systems, voting for the presidency is usually concentrated on two or three leading candidates but these candidates do not always come from the same two or three parties. Combined, these three points show the institutionalization of the presidential party system.

*From High Volatility (1989-94) to Stabilization (1994-2014).* The president and the other most powerful political positions in Brazil—state governors and mayors of large cities (those with at least 200,000 registered voters)—are elected in majority runoff systems. For these posts, two candidates get to the second round if no candidate wins a majority of the valid vote in the first round.

Table 3 shows the results of first round presidential voting, organized by the party of the candidate who spearheaded different coalitions. (The table includes only parties that won at least 5% of the vote on at least on one occasion.) The second row from the bottom shows the sharp drop in electoral volatility, from 60.7% (very high) for the 1989-94 electoral period to an average of 25% in

the five elections since then, with a high of 33.8%. Moreover, the top two contenders have always been the same parties since 1994.

*From Fragmentation to Concentration of the Vote.* The third row from the bottom of Table 3 shows the effective number of presidential candidates. This number is calculated in the same way as the effective number of parties: by squaring each candidate's percent of the vote, summing these squares, and dividing one by the sum of the squares. The 1989 presidential election was marked by great fragmentation of the vote in the first round. The effective number of presidential candidates was 5.45. Populist Fernando Collor de Mello, who created a party (the PRN, *Partido da Reconstrução Nacional*) to run for office, won 30.5% of the valid vote, and Lula came in second with 17.2% even though the PT was still a minor and weakly nationalized party.

The fragmentation of the vote for the presidency declined sharply after 1989. The average has been 2.70 in the five subsequent elections, and the numbers have fluctuated little, from a low of 2.41 in 2006 to a high of 3.17 in 2002—another important component of the stabilization of presidential elections.

**Table 3. Presidential Election Results (% of valid vote) and Effective Number of Presidential Candidates (1989-2014)**

Year	1989	1994	1998	2002	2006	2010	2014
PRN	30.5	0.6					
PT	17.2	27.0	31.7	46.4	48.6	46.9	41.6
PDT	16.5	3.2			2.6		
PSDB	11.5	54.3	53.1	23.2	41.6	32.6	33.5
PDS	8.9	2.8					
PL	4.8						
PMDB	4.7	4.4					
PRONA		7.4	2.1				
PCB/PPS	1.1		11.0	12.0			
PSB				17.9			21.3
PSOL					6.9		1.5
PV	0.2		0.3			19.3	0.6
Others	4.8	3.1	1.9	0.5	0.3	1.2	1.4
Total	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	

<b>ENPC</b>	<b>5.45</b>	<b>2.65</b>	<b>2.53</b>	<b>3.17</b>	<b>2.41</b>	<b>2.75</b>	<b>3.02</b>
<b>Electoral volatility</b>	<b>--</b>	<b>60.7</b>	<b>17.6</b>	<b>33.8</b>	<b>30.4</b>	<b>19.5</b>	<b>24.2</b>
<b>Vote share new parties</b>	<b>51.1</b>	<b>0.0</b>	<b>0.7</b>	<b>0.0</b>	<b>7.0</b>	<b>0.0</b>	<b>0.0</b>

Source: IPEADATA and Tribunal Superior Eleitoral.

Why despite great fragmentation of the party system in the congress, beginning with the 1994 election has voting for the presidency consistently been fairly concentrated on two or three (2002, 2010, 2014) viable candidates? The electoral system in presidential and gubernatorial voting provides strong incentives for strategic decision-making among party leaders about whether to run candidates (Cortez 2009). If a party can extract benefits from a coalition partner by not running a presidential candidate who is unlikely to be competitive, it has every reason to follow this path. In particular, if a party cannot field a presidential candidate who has a strong chance of being among the top two finishers, it has strategic incentives to negotiate other benefits. By supporting a viable presidential candidate from another party, it might win important concessions such as cabinet positions or an agreement that the coalition's lead partner will support its candidates for governor in some states.

Likewise, to increase the likelihood that they will have an attractive option in the runoff (if there is one), strategic voters have incentives to support a candidate who has a chance of making it to the second round. In an era of ubiquitous public opinion surveys, by election day, it is almost always easy for voters to discern which presidential candidates are viable. In sum, with these incentives for strategic candidate entry and strategic voting, one would expect there to be usually no more than three viable candidates.

*From Outsider Victory to PT/PSDB Duopoly.* The third highly important change, also associated with increasing institutionalization, is that the same two parties, the PT and PSDB, have consistently come in first or second in the last six presidential elections. The route to the presidency has been



through the same well-established parties. In contrast, in 1989, Fernando Collor de Mello created a new party, the PRN (Partido da Reconstrução Nacional) in his successful presidential bid.

Since 1994, the PSDB and PT candidates have dominated presidential elections. The PSDB candidate won in the first round in 1994 and 1998 and lost in the runoff in 2002, 2006, 2010 and 2014. The PT was the runner-up in 1994 and 1998 (as well as 1989) and won in 2002, 2006, 2010, and 2014. The two parties' candidates have won 81% (1994), 85% (1998), 70% (2002), 90% (2006), 80% (2010), and 75% (2014) of the first round presidential vote in the last five elections. Table 4 shows the second round results of presidential voting.

**Table 4. Results of Presidential Elections, Second Round, 1989-2014**

<b>Party</b>	<b>1989</b>	<b>2002</b>	<b>2006</b>	<b>2010</b>	<b>2014</b>
PRN	Collor, 53.0%	-	-	-	-
PT	Lula, 47.0%	Lula, 61.3%	Lula, 60.8%	Dilma, 56.0%	Dilma 51.6%
PSDB	-	Serra, 38.7%	Alckmin, 39.2%	Serra, 44.0%	Neves 48.4%

Except in 2002, the gap between the PT and PSDB, on the one hand, and third place finishers, on the other, has been consistently large: 19.6% in 1994, 20.7% in 1998, 5.3% in 2002, 34.7% in 2006, 13.3% in 2010, and 12.2% in 2014. There has been no major outsider candidate since Collor won in 1989. In 1994, outsider Enéas Carneiro won 7.4% of the valid vote; since then, no outsider has come close to Carneiro's percentage.

This combination of an exceptionally fragmented party system in congress and the consistent dominance of the same two parties over many (six) presidential elections is rare and perhaps unique in the history of presidential democracies. In other presidential democracies with highly fragmented congressional party systems, no set of two parties has consistently dominated presidential elections.

This consistent dominance by two parties in presidential elections is a contrast to Brazil's democracy of 1946-64. During that earlier period of democracy, the party system was much less fragmented in congress, *and* four different parties (the PSD, the PTB, the UDN, and the PDC) at least once either won the presidency or came in a close second. Each of the three largest parties had at least one winning presidential candidate (if we count Jânio Quadros's party in 1960 as the UDN), and each was unable to field its own candidate on at least one occasion.

It is not only the consistent dominance by the PSDB and the PT that has stabilized the system. As Limongi and Cortez (2010), and Melo and Câmara (2012) have noted, party *coalitions* in presidential elections have also been fairly stable. The PT and other leftist and center-left parties have always anchored one coalition, augmented since the 2002 election with at least one center-right party in every contest. In four of the last five presidential elections, all except for 2002, the PSDB and PFL/Democrats have spearheaded the other coalition. In 2002, when the PSDB/PFL coalition did not hold together, the PSDB had its weakest first round electoral performance since 1989. Among the four parties profiled in the first section of this chapter, the PMDB has been the only one outside this generally stable set of coalitions. After dismal showings by its own candidates in 1989 and 1994, the PMDB sat out the 1998 and 2006 presidential contests and joined the PSDB coalition in 2002 and the PT coalition in 2010 and 2014. Table 5 shows the coalitions in presidential elections.

**Table 5. Coalitions running presidential candidates 1994-2014**

1994	1998	2002	2006	2010	2014
PSDB/PFL	PSDB/PFL/ PPB/PTB/ PSD	PSDB/PMDB	PSDB/PFL	PSDB/DEM/ PTB/PPS/PMN/ PTdoB	PSDB/PMN/SD/ DEM/PEN/PTN/ PTB/PTC/PTdoB
PT/PSB/PCdoB /PPS/PV/PSTU	PT/PDT/PSB /PCB/PCdoB	PT/PL/ PCdoB/ PMN/PCB	PT/PRB/ PCdoB	PT/PMDB/PDT /PCdoB/PSB/PR /PRB/PTN/PSC /PTC	PT/PMDB/PSD/ PP/PR/PROS/ PDT/PCdoB/PRB
PMDB/PSD	PPL/PL/PAN	PPS/PDT/ PTB	PSOL/PCB/ PSTU	PV	PSB/PRP/PPS/ PPL/PHS/PSL
Prona	PTdoB	PSB/PGT/ PTC	PSL	PSDC	PSOL
PDT	PMN	PSTU	PDT	PRTB	PSC
PPR	PSDC	PCO	PSDC	PSOL	PV
PRN	PSN			PCO	PRTB
PSC	PTN			PSTU	PSTU
	PSC				PSDC
	PSN				PCB
	Prona				PCO
	PV				

Source: TSE

### **Lower Chamber Elections: Stabilization with Extreme Fragmentation**

Our discussion of the party system in the lower chamber emphasizes two points: the plunge in electoral volatility starting in 1994 and the extraordinarily high level of fragmentation. Table 6 shows the results in votes for the main parties in lower chamber elections, 1982-2014. In the 1980s, electoral volatility in voting for the Chamber of Deputies was very high: 35.4% for the 1982-86 electoral period and 35.6% for 1986-90. The 1980s were a decade of great turmoil in the party system.

**Table 6. Vote Share of Brazilian main parties, lower chamber elections since 1982**

Party	Founded	1982	1986	1990	1994	1998	2002	2006	2010	2014
PP <sup>1</sup>	1966	43.2	7.8	8.9	9.4	11.3	7.8	7.1	6.5	6.6
PMDB <sup>2</sup>	1966	43.0	48.1	19.3	20.3	15.2	13.4	14.5	13.0	11.1
PDT	1979	5.8	6.5	10.0	7.2	5.7	5.1	5.3	5.0	3.6
PTB	1979	4.5	4.5	5.6	5.2	5.7	4.6	4.7	4.2	4.0
PT	1979	3.6	6.9	10.2	12.8	13.2	18.4	14.9	16.9	13.9
DEM <sup>3</sup>	1985		17.7	12.4	12.9	17.3	13.4	10.9	7.5	4.2
PR <sup>4</sup>	1985		2.9	4.3	3.5	2.5	4.3	4.4	7.5	5.8
PSB	1985		0.9	1.9	2.2	3.4	5.3	6.2	7.0	6.4
PSDB	1988			8.7	13.9	17.5	14.3	13.7	11.9	11.4
PSD	2011									6.1
Others		0.0	4.7	18.8	12.6	8.2	13.4	18.3	20.5	26.9
<b>ENPv<sup>5</sup></b>		<b>2.6</b>	<b>3.6</b>	<b>9.8</b>	<b>8.5</b>	<b>8.1</b>	<b>9.3</b>	<b>10.6</b>	<b>11.2</b>	<b>14.1</b>
<b>Volatility</b>		<b>-</b>	<b>35.4</b>	<b>35.6</b>	<b>18.0</b>	<b>15.3</b>	<b>14.9</b>	<b>10.4</b>	<b>11.2</b>	<b>17.6</b>
<b>Vote share, new parties</b>		<b>13.8</b>	<b>26.3</b>	<b>11.5</b>	<b>0.3</b>	<b>0.6</b>	<b>0.0</b>	<b>1.4</b>	<b>0.0</b>	<b>11.9</b>

Source: Data from the TSE

<sup>1</sup> Aliança Renovadora Nacional (ARENA)/Partido Democrático Social (PDS)/Partido Progressista Reformador (PPR)/ Partido Progressista (PP)

<sup>2</sup> Movimento Democrático Brasileiro (MDB) / Partido do Movimento Democrático Brasileiro (PMDB)

<sup>3</sup> Partido da Frente Liberal (PFL) / Democratas (DEM)

<sup>4</sup> Partido Liberal (PL) / Partido da República (PR). The PR is result of the fusion between the PL and the PRONA.

<sup>5</sup> Effect number of parties, votes.

Since 1994, mirroring the stabilization of presidential elections that began in the same election, Brazil has moved from a volatile to a stable system in aggregate votes for the Chamber of Deputies. Electoral volatility for the Chamber of Deputies fell sharply to 18.0% for 1990-94, 15.3% for 1994-98, 14.9 % for 1998-2002, and 10.4% for 2002-06. It increased again during the 2006-10 period (11.2%), reaching 17.6% between 2010 and 2014. For these last six elections, Brazil's electoral volatility is close to the average for the advanced industrial democracies and well below average for Latin America.

In addition, the set of contenders stabilized from 1994 on, as is seen in the precipitous drop in the vote share of new parties (the bottom row of Table 6). In 1986 (the PFL) and 1990 (the PSDB) powerful new contenders emerged, winning 17.8% and 8.7% of the vote, respectively. In contrast, no party created since 1990 became a major contender until the formation of the PSD in 2011. Except for the PSD and the PSDB (created in 1988), all major parties were born in the first half of the 1980s or earlier (the PMDB dates from 1966). The PSD was formed in 2011 and became the fourth largest party in the Congress, taking many of its new leaders from the Democrats and the PSDB. Except for the PSD, the vote share of new parties has consistently been very low.

The congressional party system remains extremely fragmented. The effective number of parties in votes for the Chamber of Deputies has increased monotonically since 1982, reaching 14.1 effective electoral parties in 2014. Since 1990, the largest vote share that any single party has won for the Chamber of Deputies was the PMDB's 20.3% in 1994. In 2014, the largest party was the PT, with only 13.9% of the vote. Brazil's effective number of parties in 2014 was much higher than any election in the 618 electoral periods in 67 countries in the Mainwaring/España/Gervasoni dataset on electoral volatility (Mainwaring, Gervasoni, and España-Nájera 2010).

For state assemblies and the Chamber of Deputies, voting even at the state level results in a high effective number of parties in all 27 states (Ferreira et al. 2008: 443-446). In 2010, the least fragmented state assembly based on the effective number of votes was Santa Catarina with an ENP of 7.2, and the mean for all 27 states was 11.4 (Rebello 2012). At the state level, there has been a huge contrast in party system fragmentation between gubernatorial results and the proportional elections (state assembly and the Chamber of Deputies). The combination of low electoral volatility and extremely high fragmentation is unusual; high fragmentation tends to boost electoral volatility (Roberts and Wibbels 1999).

## **Party Competition for State Governors: Persistently High Volatility**

State governors are powerful actors in Brazil—especially governors of large and wealthy states such as São Paulo, Minas Gerais, Rio de Janeiro, and Rio Grande do Sul. Next to the presidency, these are the most powerful elected positions in Brazil. Brazil is a federal country, and states have ample resources and legal competencies (Abrúcio 1998; Samuels 2003; Samuels and Mainwaring 2004; Souza 1997). Like the president, governors are elected in a two-round system if no candidate wins a majority in the first round, with the two candidates with the most votes facing off in the runoff.

In contrast to what has occurred in presidential and lower chamber elections, gubernatorial contests continue to be marked by persistently high electoral volatility. In this respect, the institutionalization of the party system has been uneven. Mean electoral volatility for the 27 states was 67.8% from 1990-94, 56.3% from 1994-98, 48.8% from 1998-2002, 52.1% from 2002-06 (Melo 2010: 27), and 48.8% for 2006-10. Party switching by major gubernatorial candidates accounts for an important share of this volatility (Cortez 2009: 130; Melo 2010: 29).

At the aggregate national level, many parties compete for and win state governorships.<sup>12</sup> Table 7 shows the number of state governorships won by party since 1982. In sharp contrast to the situation in presidential elections, since 1990, in every election at least six different parties have captured at least one state. Since then, no party has ever won more than 9 of 27 states. Thus, the near duopoly that has existed on the presidency since 1994 does not exist at the country-wide level in the competition for governors. The last column shows the “effective number of governors” at the national level; the number is consistently much higher than the effective number of presidential candidates. The PT and PSDB combined have never won more than 37.7% of the vote; this zenith

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<sup>12</sup> For more detailed analyses of party competition for state governorships, see Cortez 2009; Limongi and Cortez (2010); Melo (2010: 24-35); [Meneguello \(2013: 506-518\)](#).

occurred, oddly, in 2002, when the two parties had a lower share of the first round presidential vote than in any election since 1989. The PSB, PMDB, and PFL/Democrats, the latter two of which have never fielded a major presidential candidate and have not even presented a candidate since 1994 and 1989, respectively, win a meaningful number of states. In 2014, the PMDB won seven states, more than any other party, and the PSB won three..

**Table 7. State Governors Elected by Party (N) and Effective Number of Governors (1982-2014)**

Party	1982	1986	1990	1994	1998	2002	2006	2010	2014
ARENA/ PDS/ PPR/PPB/PP	12	0	1	3	2	0	1	0	1
PMDB	9	22	7	9	6	5	7	5	7
PT	0	0	0	2	3	3	5	5	5
PSDB	-	-	1	6	7	7	6	8	5
PSB	-	-	0	2	2	4	3	6	3
PFL/DEM	-	1	9	2	6	4	1	2	0
PDT	1	0	3	2	1	1	2	0	2
PTB	0	0	2	1	0	0	0	0	0
PTR	-	-	2	-	-	-	-	-	0
PRS	-	-	1	-	-	-	-	-	0
PSC		-	1	0	0	0	0	0	0
PSL	-		-	-	0	1	0	0	0
PPS	-	0	0	0	0	2	2	0	0
PMN	-	-	0	0	0	0	0	1	0
PSD	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	2
PCdoB	-	-	0	0	0	0	0	0	1
PROS	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	1
<b>Total</b>	<b>22</b>	<b>23</b>	<b>27</b>	<b>27</b>	<b>27</b>	<b>27</b>	<b>27</b>	<b>27</b>	<b>27</b>
# parties that won at least one state	3	2	10	8	7	8	8	6	9
<b>Effective # of Governors</b>	<b>2.1</b>	<b>1.1</b>	<b>4.8</b>	<b>5.1</b>	<b>5.2</b>	<b>6.0</b>	<b>5.7</b>	<b>4.7</b>	<b>6.1</b>

Source: Nicolau 1996, and Tribunal Superior Eleitoral.

As one would expect given the fragmentation of the congressional party system and Cox's M + 1 rule, coalitions are the rule in gubernatorial elections (Meneguello 2013: 506-518). Presidential coalitions shape gubernatorial elections; state-level coalitions for gubernatorial elections tend to follow the same lines as the presidential coalitions. The PSDB and PFL frequently join forces, as do

the PT, PSB, PDT, and PC do B (Limongi and Cortez 2010: 32-35; Melo and Câmara 2012: 84-86). This consistency in coalitions between the presidential election and gubernatorial elections stems in part from ideological compatibility (Melo and Câmara 2012), and in part from the strategic bargaining described earlier: Coalition Partner A, realizing it is unlikely to field a competitive presidential candidate, supports Coalition Partner B in the presidential election; B support A's gubernatorial candidates in certain states.

Consistent with what has occurred in presidential elections since 1994, at the state level fragmentation in gubernatorial elections has been modest (Cortez 2009).<sup>13</sup> Melo reports a mean effective number of gubernatorial candidates of 2.57 from 1990 to 2006 (Melo 2010: 26). In the 2010 elections, the mean was 2.36, while in the 2014 elections it was 2.55. Thus, the high dispersion of seats and votes for governors at the national level results exclusively from aggregation issues; low fragmentation in each state coexists with high fragmentation when results are aggregated to the national level.

### **Connections between Voters and Parties**

In this volume, we moved away from conceptualizing party roots in society as a dimension of party system institutionalization. Nevertheless, as we showed in Chapter 2 and as many previous scholars have also argued (Green et al. 2002; Lupu; Seawright 2012), strong connections between voters and parties generally underpin stable electoral competition. Although “stabilization without roots” (Zucco 2014) is empirically plausible and indeed is a reasonable characterization of the Brazilian case, PSI is likely to be more secure if parties do have deep roots in society.

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<sup>13</sup> This is consistent with Cox's M+1 rule and with Sartori's (1986) older argument that the constraining effects of restrictive electoral rules occur at the district level. See Chhibber and Kollman (2004) and Cox (1997) on aggregation issues from the district to the national level.



Although there is fairly broad agreement among scholars that the Brazilian party system has institutionalized at the system level, there is disagreement about the strength of connections between voters and parties. Most leading scholars argue that these linkages are weak (Ferreira, Batista, and Stabile 2008; Ferreira, Braga, and Pimentel 2007; Limongi and Cortez 2010; Silveira 1998; Zucco forthcoming). Some have explicitly argued that these linkages do not explain system-level stability (Limongi and Cortez 2010). Others argue that these linkages are somewhat stronger than skeptics have posited (Braga and Pimentel 2011; Braga, Ribeiro, and Amaral 2012).

We largely agree that Brazilian parties do not have deep roots in society (or to put it conversely, most voters do not have strong attachments to parties). Party identification has dropped to fairly low levels, and voters evince considerable cynicism about parties (Pavão 2015). However, we qualify this conventional wisdom in two ways. First, the PT is an exception to the idea that parties have weak roots in society. It has developed strong connections to a sizable constituency. From early on, it developed formidable roots in society, both among its voters (although they were relatively few in number in the early to mid-1980s) and among labor unions and organized social movements. Even as the PT moderated and attracted less ideological, less educated, and poorer voters from 2002 onwards, it retained a strong identity and organizational distinctiveness as a party that actively seeks strong connections to civil society and invites grass roots involvement. None of the other Brazilian parties approximate this model of party organization (Roma 2009; Samuels and Zucco 2014a). In the 2000s, the PT expanded its traditional strong roots in society to regions where the party was electorally weak before 2002—the poor states of the northeast. Its huge advantage in party identifiers until 2015 has been an important element of its consistent competitiveness in presidential elections. In turn, its consistent competitiveness in presidential elections has been a component in stabilizing the Brazilian party system.

Following the dominant approach in the comparative literature (Green et al. 2002; Lupu 2015), and with the support of recent evidence from Brazil (Samuels and Zucco 2014b), we use party identification as an important indicator of party roots in society. Figure 1 shows levels of party identification in Brazil since 1989. Compared to other Latin American countries, until 2015, Brazil was around the average (Lupu forthcoming a). It was also close to average among a larger sample of countries (Dalton and Weldon 2007). Where Brazil differs from most of these countries is that since 2002, the decisive majority of party identifiers are drawn to a single party.<sup>14</sup>


Figure 1 shows the PT's gaping advantage in party identification in recent years. In 2012, 27% of survey respondents reported that they identified with the PT. During the 2000s, the PT diluted its brand *and* still boosted the number of party identifiers—perhaps surprisingly in light of Lupu's (2013) findings about brand differentiation and partisanship. All other parties combined accounted for only 19%, and the PMDB was second with only 5%.

In a context of great party system fragmentation and few identifiers beyond the PT, 27% of party identifiers constituted a large advantage. If the 27% who identify with the PT vote for its presidential candidate, it was guaranteed to have one of the two or three viable contenders for the presidency (using an operational definition that a candidate who comes within 10% of the second place finisher is viable, provided that there be no first round winner).

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<sup>14</sup> The ideological/programmatic content of party identifiers in Brazil is not consistently strong (Carreirão 2008; Samuels 2006). That is, the linkage between voters' party identification and their programmatic positions is not tight, contrary to what Downs's (1957) theory and subsequent contributions to spatial and directional party competition predict. But even without strong ideological/programmatic content, party identification could orient a voter toward a party.

**Figure 1. Party ID in Brazil (1989-2010)**



Source: Kinzo (2005) with data from Datafolha; from 2003 to 2010, annual average of party ID reported in Datafolha surveys elaborated by Braga, Ribeiro and Amaral (2012). Data for 2011 – 2015 extracted from Datafolha website.

Partisan identification with the PT fell sharply in the 2013-2015 period. In the aftermath of the wave of massive street protests that emerged in June 2013, with millions taking the streets to protest for the improvement of public services, identification with the PT declined by 11 percentage points (29% to 18%). In the beginning of 2015, party identification with the PT fell again, to 12%. The beginning of Dilma Rousseff's second term combined the emergence of a big corruption scandal

with a general impression that the president had betrayed her campaign promises. This formula has proven toxic for levels of party identification elsewhere in Latin America (Lupu 2013).

High individual level instability in party ID in the 2010 panel study<sup>15</sup> and the precipitous drop in PT party identification in the last few years indicate that party identification in Brazil does not constitute a solid and stable political identity, in contrast to what Green et al. (2002) show for the U.S. Even so, among PT identifiers some evidence suggests considerable individual-level stability in presidential voting from one election to the next. In the 2010 national election survey, 762 individuals reported having voted for Dilma in 2010 and also having voted for a specific candidate in 2006. Among them, 733 (96.2%) reported voting for Lula in 2006. Only 29 (3.7%) said that they voted for a candidate other than Lula. Although there was probably considerable error in individuals' recollection of how they voted in 2006, it is still likely that there was fairly high stability of the vote for Dilma. Moreover, Samuels and Zucco (2014) show through a well-crafted survey experiment that PT and PSDB identifiers use party labels to help form their opinions of controversial political issues.

Even though the panel data show limited individual level stability in party ID, in 2002, 2006, and 2010, PT sympathizers voted overwhelmingly for their party's presidential candidates—suggesting that party ID is meaningful. The 2002, 2006, and 2010 Brazilian national election survey asked “Does some political party represent your beliefs?”<sup>16</sup> Some 37% in 2002, 28% in 2006, and 39% in 2010 of the respondents responded affirmatively. The follow-up was “Which party best represents your beliefs?” Both questions have been used in lieu of the traditional one about party

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<sup>15</sup> The 2010 panel survey showed high individual level volatility in party identification. Of 275 individuals who reported a party identification in Wave 1 of the survey who were also interviewed in Wave 2, only 135 expressed the same party identification. Among PT identifiers, stability was higher. Ninety-six individuals showed a stable party ID and 71 changed. Although this still shows low individual-level stability over time, only 11 PT identifiers switched to another party (60 did not express a party ID in Wave 2).

<sup>16</sup> This is V41 in the 2010 survey. In Portuguese, the question was “Existe algum partido político que representa a maneira como o(a) sr(a) pensa?”

identification. As has occurred with the more traditional party identification question, the PT dwarfed all other parties *combined* with 23% of the respondents in 2002, 18% in 2006, and 25% in 2010. Among PT identifiers who voted in the first round, between 79% and 85% cast their ballot for the PT presidential candidates in 2002, 2006 and 2010.<sup>17</sup> PT identifiers have overwhelmingly supported the party's presidential candidates.

PT identifiers have given the party a consistent solid base in presidential elections. Based on the national election survey results of 2002, 2006, and 2010, respondents who felt represented by the PT consistently gave 19 to 20% of the total valid first round vote to their party's presidential candidates. In a fragmented party system, having a solid base of 20% of the valid vote would have sufficed in every presidential election since redemocratization to make the PT at least the runner-up.

**Table 8. PT Sympathizers and First Round Presidential Vote, 2002-10 and PSDB 2010**

	PT		PSDB	
	2002	2006	2010	2010
PT (PSDB) represents respondent's beliefs (V41)	23.1	17.6	24.5	5.7
Some other party represents respondent's beliefs (V41)	14.1	10,3	14.4	33.2
% who voted for PT first round presidential candidate among those who felt represented by PT	80.7	84.7	79.4	75.5
% of valid responses who a) reported that the PT represents their beliefs <i>and</i> b) that the voted for PT presidential candidate in the first round	19.2	19.0	20.3	4.5
% who like PT (V45)	25.6	21.6	27.7	7.8
Respondent likes some other party (V45)	22.0	9.5	19.6	39.5
% who voted for PT first round presidential candidate among those who like PT	84.2	95.9	81.9	74.1
% of valid responses who a) reported that they like the PT <i>and</i> b) that they voted for PT presidential candidate in the first round	24.1	22.8	23.7	6.1

Source: ESEB 2002, 2006, 2010.

In sum, between 2002 and 2010 the PT had a substantial and fairly stable base of support. A

<sup>17</sup> In 2010, 10.5% said that they voted for Green Party candidate Marina Silva, a former PT leader, and 0.9% reported voting for another former PT member, the PSOL candidate. Thus, most PT supporters who did not vote for Dilma supported a former PT member.

conservative estimate based on Table 8 is that this solid base consisted of 20 to 25% of voters in presidential elections. In a highly fragmented party system for positions other than the presidency, this base is large enough that if the PT runs a decent candidate, it should get to the second round. Dilma Rousseff's candidacy in 2010 supports this argument. She had never run for elected office previously, and she had a non-populist profile. She won because of her party and Lula's support.

In sum, the PT's strong roots in society qualify the claim that stabilization at the aggregate level has occurred despite weak party rootedness in society. The PT has strong roots among a significant part of the electorate, and these roots help explain its performance in presidential elections.

If this argument about a committed base providing an important advantage in presidential elections is correct, then the PT's position as a leading contender should be more secure than the PSDB's. The results of the last four presidential elections, especially 2002 and 2014, support this hypothesis. In 2014, until a few days before the first round, it appeared unlikely that PSDB candidate Aécio Neves would make the second round. PSB candidate Marina Silva enjoyed a commanding and consistent lead over Neves until a few days before the first round balloting.

According to the national election surveys and other public opinion surveys, the PSDB's base of solid supporters is much narrower than the PT's. If we follow the same procedure we did for the PT and estimate the solid base as the percentage of individuals who said that they felt represented by or liked the PSDB *and* voted for José Serra in the first round in 2010, it was only around 5 or 6% of the electorate. Like PT supporters, PSDB supporters are highly likely to vote for the party's presidential candidate, but far fewer individuals report that the PSDB represents their beliefs or that they like the PSDB. In 2010, PSDB supporters formed a larger slice of the electorate than any party except the PT, but it was not nearly enough to ensure having a strong presidential contender.

Except for the PT, the numbers of party identifiers have been meager since 2002. The low numbers beyond the PT make it difficult to explain the comparative electoral performance of other parties on the basis of their party identifiers. Nevertheless, even the low numbers of identifiers for the PSDB and PMDB give both parties a minor advantage over contenders other than the PT.

Our second qualification to the claim that parties have weak roots in society is that this argument might understate the degree to which voters have formed relatively stable images about the PT and PSDB, leading to an individual-level underpinning of party system institutionalization that is not captured by party identification. Braga and Pimentel (2011) advanced this discussion by turning from the traditional question about spontaneous party identification to a newer question, asked in the 2002, 2006, and 2010 Brazilian post-election surveys, about how much voters like the main parties. They correctly argue that a voter might not state that he or she identifies with a party yet still might be disposed for or against it. Using this question, they show that how much voters like different parties has a powerful impact on their vote.<sup>18</sup> We build on their insight by modify their models in one important way: by controlling for party identification.

The survey response scale to this question runs from 0 (the respondent does not like the party at all) to 10. Although our models differ from theirs, we obtain similar results, shown in Table 9. The dependent variable is the respondent's presidential vote in 2002, 2006, and 2010. In Models 1, 3, and 5, we regress vote choice in the first round of the three elections. In Models 2, 4, and 6, we do the same with second round vote choices. To facilitate comparison, vote choice for the PT's candidates is always coded as 1. In models 1, 3 and 5, we assign 0 to all other candidates. In models 2, 4, and 6, only the PSDB candidate is assigned 0 as its code.

The main independent variable for all models is the difference in the levels of how much respondents like the PT and the PSDB. This independent variable captures not only a strong

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<sup>18</sup> See also Carreirão (2007: 325-329).

positive identification with a party, but also a negative identification—for example, a voter who does not identify as a PT partisan, but who consistently votes for the party and reports liking it, or a voter who does not identify as a PSDB partisan, but who maintains a clear anti-PT position. Given that respondents were asked how much they like both parties on an eleven-point scale, we subtracted the respondents’ answer about the PSDB from the same value for the PT. On average, this difference was of 1.4 points in favor of the PT in the three surveys. We control the effects of our main independent variable by adding respondents’ age, sex, level of education,<sup>19</sup> and partisanship.<sup>20</sup> By including partisanship as a control variable, we are testing Braga and Pimentel’s (2011) argument that voters might have attachments to or against parties that are not captured by partisanship.

**Table 9. Logistic Regression results of Vote Choice for how much respondents like parties**

	2002		2006		2010	
	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3	Model 4	Model 5	Model 6
Difference	0.045 ***	0.041 ***	0.053 ***	0.049 ***	0.052 ***	0.044 ***
(Like PT minus PSDB)	0.002	0.002	0.004	0.004	0.003	0.004
Age	-0.002 +	-0.001	-0.001	-0.002 +	0.001	0.001
	0.001	0.001	0.001	0.001	0.001	0.001
Some HS	-0.040	-0.050 +	-0.036	-0.066 +	-0.002	-0.057
	0.025	0.026	0.039	0.039	0.042	0.043
Some College	0.023	-0.071 +	-0.152 **	-0.157 **	-0.074	-0.251 ***
	0.038	0.042	0.058	0.057	0.073	0.052
Woman	-0.027	-0.029	-0.058 +	-0.085 **	0.003	-0.056
	0.022	0.023	0.032	0.032	0.035	0.038
PT Partisan	0.134 ***	0.248 ***	0.083 **	0.142 ***	0.120 **	0.135 *
	0.025	0.030	0.032	0.030	0.042	0.055
PSDB Partisan	-0.156 **	-0.074 +	-0.050	-0.050	-0.149 **	-0.056
	0.053	0.041	0.073	0.077	0.055	0.052
Intercept	0.638 ***	0.481 ***	0.698 ***	0.729 ***	0.443 ***	0.385 ***
	0.041	0.041	0.060	0.060	0.071	0.071

<sup>19</sup> A three-category variable. The reference level is “Less than High-School”. This was the only way to make the information of education of respondents comparable across the three waves of the survey.

<sup>20</sup> We thank David Samuels for suggesting this design. We included two dummies to control for partisanship with the PT and the PSDB. Respondents answering PT / PSDB to the question “O senhor diria que há um Partido que representa a maneira como o senhor pensa?” were coded as one while all other respondents were coded as 0.




Psedo-R2	0.313	0.310	0.329	0.318	0.386	0.325
N	1633	1637	714	732	1398	1411


\*  $p < 0.1$ , \*\*  $p < 0.05$ , \*\*\*  $p < 0.001$ . Beta coefficients. Standard Errors in italics.

The results are substantively and statistically powerful, suggesting that the way citizens view parties strongly relates to their vote. The more respondents liked the PT and disliked the PSDB, the more likely they were to vote for Lula in 2002 and 2006 and Dilma in 2010, in both rounds. Figures 2 and 3 present the predicted probabilities for voting for the PT's candidate in the first and second rounds of the three elections, respectively. Braga and Pimentel (2011) claim based on an analysis similar to the presented in Table 9 that voters have stronger connections to parties than many other scholars have detected. One important unresolved issue, however, is the possibility of reverse causation—that is, that their vote choice determines how much they like the parties, rather than vice versa. Still, the results open the possibility that many voters have positive or negative views of some parties that help explain the individual level foundations of system level stability.

**Figure 2. Predicted Probabilities of Voting for the PT by Difference in Liking the PT and the PSDB (1st Round)**



**Figure 3. Predicted Probabilities of Voting for the PT by Difference in Liking the PT and the PSDB (2nd Round)**



### **Party Organization**

Although we no longer view party organization as a dimension of system institutionalization, considerable evidence suggests that solid party organization should facilitate PSI. For this reason, we briefly analyze the growing solidity of party organizations.

In the period of great turbulence (and weakness) in Brazil's party system, 1985-94, the major parties except for the PT were loose federations of free-wheeling politicians. During those years, party switching was rampant among members of the catch-all parties, reflecting low allegiance of

politicians to their party.<sup>21</sup> Many politicians of the catch-all parties had a long history of switching from one party to another; some had been members of five or six parties. Rampant party switching among elected officials indicated that individual politicians, not party organizations, were the key actors. If politicians are not loyal to their parties, it is unlikely that party labels will convey the consistency that is necessary to build clear party brands in the electorate.

During the constitutional congress of 1987-88, party discipline was very low except on the left (Mainwaring and Pérez-Liñán 1997). Again, this indicated the deep if temporary autonomy of politicians with respect to their parties. Except during electoral campaigns, party organizations at the local level were listless. Parties were generally bereft of financial resources and hence very limited in their activities; campaign donors primarily gave to individual candidates rather than parties. Elected politicians reigned supreme in the catch-all parties; neither the national leadership of the parties nor local level party members and activists have much de facto decision-making authority.

A few of the earlier characterizations of Brazil's catch-all parties still hold today. Party switching in the Congress remained rampant until 2007 (on average 29.7% of federal deputies changed parties at least once in a given legislature). In 2007, the Supreme Electoral Court (Tribunal Superior Eleitoral, the country's highest level electoral court) changed its interpretation of the law and started punishing elected officials who changed parties with a loss of their mandate (Freitas 2012).

The migration trends after 1994, though, followed different logics. While in the first period (1983-1995) most of the migration was from the established parties towards new organizations, marking the reconfiguration of the party system that followed the end of the dictatorship (Nicolau 1996; Araujo 2000), after 1995 party switchers mostly targeted the established parties. Similarly, the

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<sup>21</sup> Analyzing data for the state of São Paulo, Meneguello and Bizzarro Neto (2012) found that more than 50% of all candidates in the 1982-1986 elections ran again under a different party label in the 1988-1996 period. See also Samuels XXXX.

timing of migration patterns changed: while in the first years migration happened as an answer to contextual features (economic crisis, impeachment), after 1995 it started to follow a regular calendar, in which parties played a central role. About 70% of the switches have happened in the periods before elections and before the assignment of seats in congressional committees, both crucial for parties since they define access to electoral and congressional resources. This evidence supports Freitas's argument that Brazilian parties are not hostages of individual politicians, arguing that a more accurate interpretation places parties closer to the center of the stage, when trying to attract politicians to their delegations in order to maximize partisan resources (Freitas 2012: 980).

In important respects, the catch-all party organizations in Brazil have experienced changes over the last two decades, all in the direction of greater organizational solidity. Because of changes in institutional rules, party discipline among the catch-all parties became tighter after the constitutional congress of 1987-88 (Figueiredo and Limongi 1995). A 1995 law (the *Lei Orgânica de Partidos Políticos*) sharply increased public financing of parties, enabling them to carry out more activities. It also provided them with other resources as guaranteed free access to television and radio advertising every year.

In addition, the 1995 law and the scope and constancy of Brazilian elections in the period have created incentives for the main parties to nationalize their local bases (Speck and Campos 2014).<sup>22</sup> From 1982 to 2012 the nine main Brazilian parties listed above became national organizations, with extensive territorial penetration (Figure 4). In 2012, they had on average local organizations in 81.4% of the 5565 municipalities in the country<sup>23</sup> (an average of 4531 local organizations). Although some authors have argued that beyond the PT, those local units are mere


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<sup>22</sup> On the nationalization of Brazil's main parties, see Braga (2006).

<sup>23</sup> Measured by the number of cities in which the parties run at least one candidate to the cities' councils. The application of this measure to count party organization at the local level is shared by Samuels and Zucco (forthcoming b). Source: TSE.

“legal fictions,” with no actual partisan activity,<sup>24</sup> some recent scholarship has modified this view. Pedro Ribeiro (2014), and Meneguello, Amaral and Bizzarro Neto (2014), relying on two different surveys conducted in the state of São Paulo with party rank-and-file members and party middle-level elites, respectively, demonstrated that overwhelming majorities of the party activists report the existence of regular activities at the local level in all the main parties, particularly the PT and the PSDB. In addition, as Samuels and Zucco (2014a, Forthcoming) demonstrated, the establishment of local party units has positive impacts on parties’ electoral results, suggesting that those units do convey some kind of partisan resource explored by candidates during electoral races.

**Figure 4. Municipalities with local organization (% of the total)**



Source: IPEADATA and TSE

<sup>24</sup> Samuels and Zucco (forthcoming b: 19). In contrast, Guarnieri (2011) demonstrates that historically the PT and the PMDB have both relied extensively on local directorates instead of provisional commissions to organize their local units. Samuels and Zucco argue that the PT behaves differently from other parties, arguing that party leaders deliberately provide incentives for local organization in directorates. Bizzarro Neto (2013), has demonstrated that those incentives were part of the organizational structure of the PMDB in São Paulo as well, and that such incentives play an important role in the survival of the party’s remarkable organizational network even many years after its electoral decay in the state.

The PT has always been a stark exception to the organizational norms of the other Brazilian parties (Keck 1992; Meneguello 1989; Meneguello, Amaral, and Bizzarro Neto 2014; P. Ribeiro 2014; Samuels 1999; Samuels and Zucco 2014a, forthcoming). The party demanded strong allegiance among its politicians. On several occasions, it expelled PT members of congress from the party because they refused to toe the line on important controversial issues. Party switching among elected PT officials was rare. Elected PT officials contributed a substantial part of their salaries to the party to help finance the organization. Even during the constitutional congress, party discipline was ironclad. Whereas all the catch-all parties were created top-down by politicians, the labor movement, Catholic Church activists, and other local level activists played a major role in forging the PT. Local organizations were often the site of intense discussions and extensive grassroots involvement.

Despite its programmatic moderation over time, the PT retained considerable organizational distinctiveness. In contrast to the situation with the catch-all parties, local PT branches continue to engage civil society and to be sources of real involvement in the party. A high percentage of PT members also participate in social movements.<sup>25</sup> However, this involvement has also changed over the years, becoming less intense and more professionalized, with growing dominance in electoral campaigns of professional surveys and marketing firms as opposed to the activist led campaigns of the 1980s (Amaral 2014; P. Ribeiro 2010; Roma 2009; Samuels and Zucco 2014a). The very different geneses of the catch-all parties and the PT have continued to play out to the present, but the organizational differences are less stark today than was the case at the dawn of democracy as the PT

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<sup>25</sup> Roma (2009: 163, Table 4) reports that according to one survey, in 1997, 84% of PT members also participated in a social movement.

became more professionalized and less driven by ideological passion and the other parties became more organizationally solid (Roma 2009; Samuels and Zucco 2014a).<sup>26</sup>

### **Explaining Institutionalization**

Our second goal in this paper is to explain this transformation to a more institutionalized party system. One of the keys to the shift from an inchoate party system in the 1985-94 period to greater institutionalization since then was economic stabilization. From 1980 until 1994, the Brazilian economy lurched from one crisis to the next, and the country was plagued by chronically high inflation.

Economic stabilization affected the party system for at least two reasons. Bad economic performance pummeled the approval ratings of presidents João Figueiredo (1979-85), José Sarney (1985-90), and Fernando Collor de Mello (1990-92). Brazil experienced fourteen consecutive years (1981-94) of triple digit inflation, peaking at 2948% in 1990.<sup>27</sup> During this long period, in net terms the economy was stagnant (though with sharp year-to-year fluctuations); according to the World Bank estimates, per capita GDP in 2005 constant dollars was slightly lower in 1994 than it had been in 1980.

Bad economic performance helps explaining the fracturing of the PDS in 1984 and its steep electoral demise in 1986, the sharp electoral decline of the PMDB/PFL coalition in 1990, and the near disappearance of the PRN after 1992. The sharp demise of these governing parties contributed greatly to party system volatility. Almost all of the decline side of the high electoral volatility for the Chamber of Deputies in 1986 and 1990 came from the PDS (1986) and the PMDB/PFL coalition

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<sup>26</sup> This is consistent with Panebianco's (1988) argument that the genesis of parties strongly shapes their subsequent organizational paths.

<sup>27</sup> Estimates of the World Bank in 2005 constant US dollars, on line.

(1990), respectively. Figueiredo's government triggered massive defections by politicians from the PDS to the PFL, and Sarney's government catalyzed massive defections away from the PMDB.

Besides its effects on parties' electoral performance in congressional elections, the constant crisis and its impact in presidents' popularity also increased uncertainty during presidential elections. Pinto (2013) recently demonstrated that presidential popularity varies in large degree due to changes in the country's economic performance (rates of inflation, unemployment and public debt) in the 1995-2010 period. In a similar piece, Campello and Zucco (2013) expanded the analysis to the period starting in 1987 and demonstrated that presidential popularity was highly sensitive to changes in international economic indicators, specifically, commodity prices and US interest rates.

Given its nodal position in the Brazilian political system, the presidency is always a potential source of systemic instability (Lima 1999), and during the 1986-1994 period it increased the fluidity of the party system. A clear contrast between the two periods is seen in Table 3 above. Looking at the share of votes cast for incumbent parties' candidates, Ulysses Guimarães, the PMDB's candidate in 1989 four years into the disastrous Sarney government, and Carlos Antonio Gomes, the 1994 candidate of Fernando Collor's 1989 party, the PRN, two years after Collor's impeachment, and received only 4.6% and 0.6% of the votes in 1989 and 1994, respectively. Fernando Henrique Cardoso was reelected in 1998 with 53.0% of the votes and Jose Serra, the PSDB's candidate in 2002, received 23.2% of the vote in the presidential race. Although the decrease in Cardoso's popularity in his term led voters to punish the PSDB in 2002, this punishment was more moderate than the one observed before economic stabilization. This PSDB was the first post-1985 party to govern the country reasonably well, making the party a stable option for the country's government in the views of a large number of voters.

Economic stabilization and its aftermath (moderate growth from 2003 to 2013, a steep drop in the poverty rate, and income redistribution in the 2000s) enabled Brazil to move away from



permanent crisis to re-establishing itself as a solid country. In Brazil, in contrast to what occurred in many Latin American countries, economic stabilization led to significant short term increases in real wages—a fact that helps explain the vast popular support for the stabilization plan (Mendes and Venturi 1994) and the dramatic turn toward Cardoso in the 1994 electoral campaign. Economic stabilization in 1994 occurred simultaneously with the beginning of markedly lower electoral volatility. Rather than defecting from the governing parties of the 1994-2014 period, voters rewarded them, fostering the institutionalization of the party system. For the 1994-98 electoral period, electoral volatility plummeted relative to what it had been in the previous three cycles.

Economic stabilization also catapulted Cardoso to the presidency in 1994 and 1998, and as a result, it put the PSDB on the map as a major player. After fifteen years of chronically high inflation (1979-94) and thirteen years of little overall growth (1981-94), stabilization under the PSDB's government gave the party a leg up over other contenders in presidential elections. If the stabilization plan had failed, it is highly unlikely that Cardoso would have won a landslide second term. It is unlikely that the PSDB would have consistently been one of the top two contenders in subsequent presidential elections; we are aware of no other cases of a highly fragmented congressional party system in which two parties consistently dominated presidential elections for such an extended time.

In turn, the consistent domination by the PT and PSDB in presidential elections fostered the institutionalization of the congressional party system. The presidency is the cornerstone of the political system. Because of the dominance of the PT and PSDB in presidential elections, the dynamics of electoral competition since 1994 have focused primarily on their rivalry (Cortez 2009; Limongi and Cortez 2010; Melo 2012; Meneguello 2011). The presidential competition induced a “nested” logic over the system as a whole (Melo and Câmara, 2012) because the PT and PSDB

coordinated electoral strategies across different levels of elections in order to maximize their presidential candidates' prospects (Cortez 2009; Meneguello 2011).

In some Latin American countries, including Argentina and Peru, economic stabilization in the wake of hyperinflation did not lead to party system institutionalization. In Peru, economic stabilization occurred shortly before party system collapse; President Fujimori (1990-2000) oversaw stabilization and purposefully fostered the collapse of the party system of 1980-90 (Tanaka 1998). In Argentina, stabilization in the 1990s splintered the Peronist party because President Menem's (1989-99) policies diverged radically from the party's historical programmatic commitments (Stokes 2001) and produced massive unemployment from 1995 on. A continuation of Menem's economic policies led to a crushing repudiation of the Radical Party's failed government of 1999-2001. The Brazilian experience diverged from these other cases in two critical respects. First, in the short term, stabilization in Brazil helped boost income, especially of the poor, so it was very popular. As already noted, stabilization was critical in Cardoso's election in 1994 and his reelection in 1998. For this reason, economic stabilization helped solidify the PSDB's position in the party system. Second, economic stabilization in Brazil was not accompanied by a muting of programmatic differences in the party system.

In sum, economic stabilization had a profound effect in institutionalizing Brazil's party system. Subsequent economic growth, poverty reduction, and income redistribution under Lula (2003-11) reinforced the effects of stabilization by solidifying the PT's pivotal role in presidential competition and in the party system as a whole. It helped boost PT party identification. The counterfactual is what would have happened if Lula's presidency had been a failure. Given that the 2006 election was competitive even after four years of significant economic growth, income redistribution, and poverty reduction, it is unlikely that an underperforming Lula would have won reelection. Moreover, it is uncertain that the PT would have solidified its position as part of a

duopoly that has dominated presidential elections, and the doors for other contenders to become competitive in presidential elections would have opened. This does not imply that the party system would have reverted to the very high degree of fluidity of the period from 1982 to 1994, but it is unlikely that it would have achieved the level of institutionalization that it has.

*Programmatic Differentiation.* In combination with reasonably successful PSDB and PT governments, clear programmatic differentiation between the PT and the PSDB-led coalition helped foster party system institutionalization. In Brazil, voters who became disaffected with the coalition that implemented stabilization had a clear and viable option within the system—the PT. The combination of economic stabilization without economic distress *and* clear programmatic differentiation distinguished Brazil from all cases of deep party system erosion and collapse.

In countries in which programmatic distinctions among the major parties became blurred, voters were more likely to get disgruntled with the entire system in periods of economic distress (Lupu forthcoming b; Morgan 2011; Roberts 2014; Seawright 2012). In Bolivia from 1985 on and Peru after 1990, voters who repudiated the economic policies associated with orthodox stabilization lacked an alternative within the system. In both countries, differences among the main parties became blurred over time. Instead, voters flocked en masse to new contenders, destabilizing the old party systems. In Colombia, likewise, the programmatic blurring among parties that occurred from the National Front on ultimately was an important ingredient in discrediting the traditional parties (see the chapter by Albarracín, Gamboa, and Mainwaring).

Programmatic differentiation did not ensure party system institutionalization, nor does sharp programmatic differentiation by itself explain increasing institutionalization in the Brazilian case after 1994. In Brazil, the party system offered voters very distinctive choices from 1982 on, yet high volatility and considerable turmoil prevailed until 1994. But sharp programmatic divisions in conjunction with the fact that the PT, the most important opposition to the PSDB government, did

not govern at the national level until 2003, meant that dissatisfied voters did not turn against the entire system. Consistent programmatic differentiation distinguishes all contemporary Latin American cases of fairly high institutionalization (Brazil, Chile, El Salvador, Mexico, Uruguay) from all cases of party system collapse (Bolivia, Ecuador, Peru, and Venezuela) and from most cases of deep deinstitutionalization (Colombia and Argentina).

*Changes in Formal Institutional Rules.* In the 1980s and 1990s, an extensive literature on Latin America emphasized the impact of formal rules of the game on actors' behavior and, as a result, on political outcomes (Linz and Valenzuela 1994). In the last decade, a new literature has questioned this earlier work, emphasizing that formal rules often do not have their anticipated consequences and that informal rules are often more powerful in the context of weak formal institutions (Helmke and Levitsky 2006; Levitsky and Murillo 2014; Weyland). However, formal rules sometimes have deep consequences. This is especially true when major political actors *must* follow the rules of the game, either because otherwise outcomes would be stacked against them or because enforcement mechanisms would punish them.

Several changes in institutional rules helped foster party system institutionalization in Brazil. The constitutional congress of 1987-88 passed measures that led to higher party discipline on roll-call votes from 1989 on (Figueiredo and Limongi 1995).<sup>28</sup> Except for the PT, party discipline on roll-call votes never reached comparatively high levels, but it rose significantly relative to the constitutional congress. These changes made the political system more manageable, and they paved the way for building more solid party identities.

As mentioned above, in 1995, the Law of Political Parties greatly increased public funding for parties and gave them ample free television time during electoral campaigns. In 2010, the value of public funds distributed to Brazilian parties was 160 million reais (more than \$100 million

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<sup>28</sup> On party discipline during the constitutional congress, see Mainwaring and Pérez-Liñán 1997.

dollars). In addition, all parties have access to free television and radio time for political advertising. In values of 2010, the price paid by the government for this time (with tax waivers) was 850 million reais. Combining these two figures, in 2010 public funding for parties slightly surpassed one billion reais (625 million dollars, as of 2010), not counting the value of free access to radio time.<sup>29</sup>

With more resources, party organizations became more robust. The distribution of these public funding supports the “cartelization” of the party system: 99% of the resources are distributed proportionally, based on a party’s share of seats in the Chamber of Deputies in the last election, and 1% is distributed evenly to all parties. Moreover, the parties have free office space in the national congress, plus mailing and telephone privileges for these offices. Brazilian parties have changed from being resource poor to resource rich. One important and evident first consequence of such changes was that they allowed parties to establish and maintain regular bureaucracies, both at the national and subnational levels in some cases.

Since 1995, the laws regulating access to campaign time on television and radio have favored the main parties and coalitions at the expense of political outsiders and coalitions or parties with few seats in congress. No candidate may buy time for political ads on television or radio; the only legally permissible TV and radio ads are those allocated for the free campaign time. In 2014, this was an hour and forty minutes (50 minutes, twice a day) during the first round on TV and another hour and forty minutes on radio for six weeks (August 19 to October 2). Every TV and radio station in Brazil must broadcast the campaign ads during this period. During the runoff round for the presidential and gubernatorial elections, television and radio stations devoted an hour and twenty minutes (40 minutes twice a day) for campaign ads for three weeks.

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<sup>29</sup> Source: <http://www.contasabertas.com.br/website/arquivos/8532>. For an overview of public financing of political parties in Brazil, see Braga and Bourdokan (2010). No national level estimates of the value of free campaign time on radio stations are available.

TV and radio time is allocated mostly on the basis of the size of a party or coalition's delegation in the Chamber of Deputies as of the previous election. Without access to television or radio, political outsiders would be very hard pressed to successfully campaign for the presidency or for governor in a large state. Brazilians report that TV and radio are their most important sources of political information.

The current rules for access to free TV and radio time are more favorable to established parties than the rules were in 1989, when the allocation of time was based on the share of seats in the Chamber of Deputies one year before the election. The current rules favor parties that already existed four years earlier, so an outsider cannot win access to substantial TV and radio time by virtue of members of congress switching to his/her party as the presidential election approaches.

In 1997, congress approved a constitutional amendment that allowed for immediate presidential reelection (once), shortened the presidential term from five years to four, and made presidential and congressional (and also gubernatorial and state assembly) elections concurrent. For party system institutionalization, the change from non-concurrent to concurrent elections was important. With non-concurrent elections, as occurred in the presidential contest of 1989, governors, gubernatorial candidates, members of congress and candidates for congress, and state legislators and candidates had weaker incentives to invest heavily in the campaign. Their own political positions were not at stake. As a consequence, party machines were less invested in the campaigns. With concurrent elections, almost everyone in the parties has a high stake in the presidential outcome. Moreover, with concurrent elections, there are economies of scale in investing time and resources into campaigns across different levels. As Carerras (2012) showed, the meteoric rise of a political outsider such as occurred with Fernando Collor in 1989 is considerably less likely with concurrent elections.

In 2002, the congress/Supreme Court abolished a rule known as the *candidato nato* (birthright candidate) (Morgenstern 2004). Under the birthright candidate rule, every incumbent politician had the right to run for his or her same position in the next election. As a result, even politicians who were not aligned with the party leadership in their states had the right to become candidates, formalizing a situation in which individual politicians had great autonomy and the party leaders (except in the PT) were in a weak position. The abolition of the birthright candidate rule gave party leaders more power over the rank and file politicians.

Fourth, as also noted above, in 2008, a new interpretation of the law by the Supreme Electoral Court stripped elected officials who switched parties after being elected of their mandates. With this new legal ruling, politicians had powerful incentives to change their behavior. This change increased the leverage of the party leadership over rank and file elected politicians; the latter could no longer flaunt their independence because of their ability to switch parties. Constant party switching reduces the value of party labels, and as a result, it should make it harder to build party labels in the electorate. A subsequent (2011) Supreme Electoral Court ruling allowed elected politicians to form a new party without losing their mandate, partially reversing the effect of the end of the birthright candidate rule. Still, forming a new party takes collective action whereas party switching was an individual decision; in this respect, the change in rules made it more costly to leave the party on which a politician was elected.

In and of themselves, these changes in institutional rules might not have produced huge effects on party system institutionalization. But they reinforced the effects created by economic stabilization and growth and by programmatic differentiation.

## **Conclusion**

Over the last two decades, Brazil's party system became more institutionalized even as party systems in many other Latin American countries experienced partial deinstitutionalization (Argentina, Colombia) or collapse (Bolivia, Venezuela, Ecuador, and Peru). Electoral competition became much more stable from 1994 on. The system changed from one in which multiple new parties emerged on the scene and became important contenders (1980-89) to one in which new parties have enjoyed scant success (1990-present); from one in which governing parties suffered huge defeats and defections (1984-94) to the PT/PSDB duopoly which has lasted a long time; from one in which a populist outsider created a party and capture the presidency (1989) to one in which presidential contests have been dominated by two solid parties (1994-present). In a historically unprecedented manner, two parties have established a regular duopoly in presidential elections despite what is one of the most fragmented congressional party systems in the history of world democracies. Party organizations are more solid today than they were in the second half of the 1980s and early 1990s. Party discipline increased; party switching decreased radically; parties enjoyed a substantial infusion of public funding, enabling them to undertake far more activities than they could between 1985 and 1994.

But party system institutionalization occurred somewhat unevenly, as Zucco (2014) argued. Aggregate level system stability occurred even though only one party, the PT, developed strong roots in society. Institutionalization was also uneven across party organizations; the PT developed a more robust organization than other parties.

Economic stabilization was highly important to the institutionalization of the Brazilian party system. Unlike in some other countries, the initial phase of stabilization was not associated with economic hardship—much to the contrary. In the 2000s, moderate economic growth, steep declines in poverty, and some income redistribution helped further cement the PT and PSDB's positions in the party system. The fact that Brazil's party system consistently offered voters significant



programmatic alternatives reduced the likelihood of massive defections away from the system and increased the probability of institutionalization.

In addition, changes in institutional rules helped foster party system institutionalization.

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**Appendix 1: Brazilian Political Parties in 2014**

<i>Party</i>	<i>ize</i>	<i>Orientation and Background</i>	<i>Ideology Score</i>
<b>Workers' Party (PT)</b> , founded 1980	8	Prior to 2002: left-wing; grew out of labor unrest in late 1970s; strong support from intellectuals, workers, state employees; best organized party in Brazilian history. Since 2003: centrist turn, alliances with right parties, pragmatic economic policy, expanding support in Northeast	3.86
<b>Party of the Brazilian Democratic Movement (PMDB)</b> , founded 1966	2	Front party opposing military regime of 1964-1985; currently centrist, decentralized, functions as catchall support party for Lula and Dilma governments; has held vice-presidency under Dilma	6.19
<b>Social Democratic Party (PSD)</b> , founded 2011	5	Liberal center, vehicle for centrist politicians (mostly from DEM, but some from PTB, PP, PSDB) to leave firm opposition parties and engage in negotiations with Dilma/PT government	6.65
<b>Party of Brazilian Social Democracy (PSDB)</b> , founded 1988	4	Progressive faction of PMDB in 1980s; originally Western European-style social democratic; champion of 1990s promarket reforms; supports parliamentarism; principal force of the modernizing center	6.32
<b>Progressive Party (PP)</b> , founded 1966, renamed 2003	0	Conservative: formerly ARENA and then PDS, the promilitary party in 1964-1985; shrank drastically in 1980s; has changed names four times	7.55
<b>Party of the Republic (PR)</b> , founded 2006	2	Center-right, based on merger of former Liberal Party (PL) and PRONA party. Founded as PL in 1985.	6.98
<b>Democrats (DEM)</b> , founded 1984, renamed 2007	8	Formerly PFL; conservative, pragmatic, clientelistic "party of power"; as core leaders supported every president from 1964 to 2002, military or civilian; usually allies with PSDB	8.25
<b>Brazilian Socialist Party (PSB)</b> , founded 1985	5	Center-left party, generally supported PT governments until 2013; strong base in Northeast, especially Pernambuco	4.12
<b>Republican Party of</b>	1	Opportunistic, centrist "party for rent," supported by Pentecostal pastors and also by	NA

<b>Social Order (PROS)</b> , founded 2013		the political machine of the Gomes brothers in Ceará	
<b>Solidarity (SD)</b> , founded 2013	1	Pragmatic center-left party, linked to <i>Força Sindical</i> labor central, allied with PSDB against PT government	NA
<b>Democratic Labor Party (PDT)</b> , founded 1980	8	Center-left; created by Leonel Brizola (1922-2004); on-again, off-again partner of PT in 1980s and 1990s; mostly limited to Rio de Janeiro and Rio Grande do Sul	4.21
<b>Brazilian Labor Party (PTB)</b> , founded 1980	7	Center-right; clientelistic; “party for rent” that supports most presidents; after 2003, grew as repository for opportunistic center-right politicians wishing to support Lula	6.52
<b>Communist Party of Brazil (PC do B)</b> , founded 1962	5	Defected from PCB in 1962 during Sino-Soviet split, later pro-Albanian until end of Cold War; after 1989 mostly satellite of PT; dominated national student union. Since 2003: centrist turn and pragmatic ally of PT presidents	2.86
<b>Social Christian Party (PSC)</b> , founded 1985	2	Center-right “party for rent” loosely linked to Christian doctrine and to Assembly of God churches; identified with socially conservative causes	NA
<b>Brazilian Republican Party (PRB)</b> , founded 2005		Christian and conservative; founded by Lula’s vice president José Alencar (1931-2011) with support from pastors linked to Universal Church of the Kingdom of God (IURD)	NA
<b>Green Party (PV)</b> , founded 1986		Center-left, pragmatic environmentalists, active in local politics; held environment ministry under Cardoso and culture ministry under Lula	4.63
<b>Popular Socialist Party (PPS)</b> , founded 1922, renamed 1992		Descended from Moscow-line Brazilian Communist Party (PCB); abandoned Leninism and supported Gorbachev in 1980s; later center-left; in Lula years moved considerably rightward to ally with PSDB-led opposition	4.72
<b>Party of Socialism and Liberty (PSOL)</b> , founded 2004		Former radical left faction of PT, founded by dissidents unhappy with centrist policies; key leaders were expelled from PT in 2003	1.73

Size refers to seats in Chamber of Deputies on May 15th, 2014. Parties here comprise 504 of 513 chamber seats (98%), with four micro-parties excluded from the table. Reputational ideology: parties are placed (by non-members only) on an ideological scale where 1 is left and 10 is right.

Ideology data from Brazilian Legislative Survey 2013 (7th wave), available at <http://thedata.harvard.edu/dvn/dv/zucco>.

## Removed

In the second round, Collor won with 53% of the valid vote. The candidates of the two largest parties in congress, the PMDB (4.7%) and the PFL (0.8%), fared dismally.

Volatility rose to 33.8% in the next presidential cycle. In 2002, the PSDB candidate, José Serra, won only 23.2% of the first round vote, a decline of nearly 30% relative to Cardoso's performance in 1998. Conversely, the PT increased its first round share from 31.7% to 46.4%, and the PSB, which had not previously fielded a presidential candidate, won 17.9% by running the governor of Rio de Janeiro, Anthony Garotinho.

In the 2006 presidential election, the PSDB-led coalition rebounded to capture 41.6% of the first round vote, leading volatility to drop to 30.4%. The PPS and PSB, which combined won 29.9% of the vote in 2002, did not run candidates in 2006. The PPS informally supported the PSDB candidate (Geraldo Alckmin) and the PSB informally supported Lula.

Finally, volatility dropped to 19.5% in 2006-10. The biggest loser in 2010 was the PSDB, down 9% to 32.6%, and the biggest winner was the center-left Partido Verde (PV, Green Party). Its candidate, former PT leader Marina Silva, captured 19.3% of the first round vote; the party had not fielded a candidate since 1998.

These strategic incentives for party leaders and voters inform Cox's "M + 1" rule: M (the district magnitude, that is, the number of seats in the district) + 1 is the maximum number of viable candidates in a given election (Cox 1997: 99-122; Cortez 2009). In the first round of presidential elections, the district magnitude is two (that is, two candidates can get elected to the runoff), so the largest number of viable candidates should usually be three.

The M+1 rule does not establish a lower boundary for the number of viable candidates, but it helps explain the concentration of the vote on two or three first round presidential candidates. From this perspective, the unusual result is not the concentration on two candidates in the elections since 1994 (with the partial exception of 2002, when the gap between the second and third place finishers was only 5.9%), but rather the dispersion in 1989. In 1989, if our operational definition of a viable candidate is one who comes within 10 percentage points of the second place finisher if no candidate wins a majority, there were five viable candidates, reflecting the disarray of the party system at that time.

Cox's M + 1 rule cannot explain why two *specific* parties have consistently been the two top contenders for the presidency since 1994. Melo (2010: 22-23) and Melo and Câmara (2012: 82-87) advance a path dependence argument. Limongi and Cortez (2010: 36) make a similar claim in explaining the dominance of the PT and PSDB in presidential elections: "Electoral processes have great inertial power." They argue that stabilization has occurred because elite agreements have consistently generated a similar structure of party competition in every election since 1994.<sup>30</sup>

This path dependence argument offers valid points, but it is not specific enough, and it misses two microfoundations for the PT's continuing electoral viability. In the context of an exceptionally fragmented congressional party system, the steady dominance by two parties in five consecutive presidential elections is the exception rather than the norm. Path dependence (or electoral inertia) must be explained in greater specificity. Moreover, although strategic party decision-making about candidate entry and coalition partners has undoubtedly created the structure

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<sup>30</sup> In 2002 the PFL quit the government coalition in March and declined to support Serra in October, so the elite agreements were not consistent that year.

within which voters make decisions about which candidates to support, these strategic decisions are influenced by party leaders' prior perceptions of the electoral prospects of their own parties' and other potential candidates for president and governor.

By microfoundations, we mean that the PT's status as a consistent top-two finisher is connected to its linkages to individual voters through 1) Lula's enormous personal electoral appeal (Hunter 2010); and 2) the party's huge advantage in terms of party identification over all other contenders from 2002 on. We develop this point in the later section on voter/party connections.

Since 2006, the PT's successes in governing at the national level also help explain the party's consistent ability to be a viable contender in presidential elections. A growing economy, declining poverty accomplished in part through highly visible anti-poverty policies, declining inequalities, and Lula's status as the incumbent almost guaranteed that he would be a leading presidential contender in 2006. His governing successes during his second term gave the PT a large edge in 2010.

We agree that path dependence helps explain why having been a competitive presidential candidate in 1989 gave Lula an advantage in 1994. But Latin American democratic history is littered with candidates who were competitive in one election and vanished in the next. Lula's personal charisma, his national fame as a labor leader and president of the PT, and the credibility the PT gained by being a consistent opposition to the failed presidencies of José Sarney (1985-90) and Fernando Collor de Mello (1990-92) help explain why the PT was consistently a major contender in 1994, 1998, and 2002.

Why has the PSDB consistently been one of the two top contenders? In 1994, Cardoso won largely on the basis of having tamed runaway inflation as Finance Minister, a position he assumed in 1993. Inflation dropped from 2477% in 1993 to 916% in 1994 and 22% in 1995, and it has remained steadily low for the past 20 years (on average 6.5%). Before the economic stabilization plan went into effect in July 1994, Lula held a commanding lead in public opinion surveys. In June 1994, five months before the election, 41% of survey respondents intended to vote for Lula, compared to only 19% for Cardoso. After the implementation of the economic stabilization plan in July, Cardoso's candidacy took off and he rose from 19% to 44% of the vote intentions between June and September (Mendes and Venturi 1994).

Economic stabilization went a long way toward getting Cardoso reelected in 1998. He ended his first term with solid public approval ratings; 35% of respondents evaluated his government as excellent or very good, 37% as fair, and only 25% as poor or very poor.<sup>31</sup> In a fragmented multiparty system, these ratings established him as the candidate to beat in 1998; if everyone who regarded his government as excellent or very good and a significant minority of those who rated it as fair voted for him, he was going to be difficult to defeat. His government put the PSDB on the map as a party that could govern Brazil.

The fact that the PSDB government achieved economic stabilization after prolonged rampant inflation and otherwise governed the country reasonably well gave it an advantage over competitors other than the PT, which has also governed the country reasonably well. The PSDB was the first party to govern Brazil competently after redemocratization. Even though Cardoso ended his second term with much lower public approval ratings,<sup>32</sup> his presidency gave the PSDB national visibility in presidential elections. It made it likely that the PSDB candidate in 2002, José Serra, would be viable (as he in fact was). And it gave the PSDB an ongoing advantage in national visibility in presidential elections. This argument that the PSDB built its advantage in presidential elections

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<sup>31</sup> Data from a Datafolha national survey. [http://datafolha.folha.uol.com.br/po/ver\\_po.php?session=21](http://datafolha.folha.uol.com.br/po/ver_po.php?session=21)

<sup>32</sup> At the end of his term, 26% of respondents in a national public opinion survey of 14,559 Brazilians ranked Cardoso excellent or good, 36% fair, and 36% poor or very poor. Datafolha carried out the survey December 9-11, 2002. [http://datafolha.folha.uol.com.br/po/ver\\_po.php?session=21](http://datafolha.folha.uol.com.br/po/ver_po.php?session=21)

through reasonably effective governance after a prolonged period (1980-94) of triple and quadruple digit inflation, stagnant per capita GDP, increasing crime, and frequent high-level corruption scandals provides a more specific explanation for why path dependence has occurred. This argument is consistent with a great deal of comparative work that has shown that parties that govern relatively well tend to be rewarded electorally, and vice versa (Fiorina 1981; Seawright 2012).

The PSDB has also been advantaged in presidential elections by its consistently strong performance in statewide races in São Paulo and to a lesser extent in Minas Gerais. These are the two largest states and contain 22% and 11% of the national electorate, respectively. The PSDB won the governorship of São Paulo in 1994 with the late Mario Covas and has held the office ever since. In every presidential election between 1989 and 2010, the party nominated a candidate who previously had won a statewide election for governor or senator in São Paulo (Covas, Cardoso, Alckmin, and Serra). Simply due to the state's size, a sitting governor of São Paulo is a natural candidate in almost every presidential election. In Minas Gerais, the PSDB has lost the governorship only once since 1994 (in 1998, when former President Itamar Franco ran), and supplied a former governor as the party's presidential candidate in 2014 (Aécio Neves). Even after losing the presidency in 2002, the PSDB has typically governed a large swath of the electorate responsible for nearly half of Brazil's GDP. If its subnational base had been in smaller, less developed states, it is unlikely that it would have survived so well after its departure from the presidency in 2002.

Because the PSDB's consistently solid electoral performance in presidential elections is conditional on fielding attractive candidates and on governing well, we do not view the PSDB as having an insuperable medium term future competitive advantage in presidential elections. The dominance of the PSDB (and to a lesser degree the PT) in presidential elections is conditional, not necessarily a long term feature of the Brazilian presidential party system. The PT/PSDB duopoly was almost shattered in 2002 and 2014, and it will probably break at some point in the next generation, even if temporarily.

Many scholars have highlighted the challenges of party building or party system institutionalization in third and fourth wave democracies (Mainwaring and Zoco 2007). Recently, Levitsky et al. have focused on *party* building—a subject closely related to ours (Levitsky, Loxton, and Van Dyck forthcoming).

*Voter Connections to Parties, 1986-94.* In a subsequent draft, we intend to show that the strong connections of many voters to the PT, and some minimal connectedness of many other voters to a party, is a contrast to the upheaval in voter connections to parties from 1986 until 1994. During the military dictatorship, many citizens developed party identifications (Balbachevsky 1988, 1992; Caldeira 1986), but the party system turmoil of the 1980s disrupted this process. From 1985 until 1989, party identification with the PMDB declined steeply. In the 1989 presidential election, even voters who proclaimed an identification with a given party were likely to choose a presidential candidate from a competing party.

Because the presidency is the core of the political system, the stabilization of the presidential party system has shaped electoral competition at the subnational level, particularly the competition for state governors (Braga, Ribeiro, and Amaral 2012; Limongi and Cortez 2010; Melo 2010; Melo and Câmara 2012; Meneguello 2011). Less settled is why this stabilization occurred and why the PT and PSDB have been the dominant actors.

New electoral rules in 1979 allowed new parties to emerge, and a plethora eventually joined the fray. Conversely, the established parties got pummeled at the polls. The party that supported military rule, the PDS (previously known as ARENA), won 43.2% of the lower chamber vote in

1982 but was reduced to a minor party with 7.8% in 1986. The PMDB won 48.1% in 1986 but only 19.3% in 1990.

Some states have experienced not only limited dispersion of the vote in gubernatorial elections but also—mirroring the presidential contests since 1994—a steady dominance of two main parties. Cortez and also Meneguello and Bizzarro Neto have argued that São Paulo has seen a process of “presidentialization of the state competition,” reproducing the PT/PSDB duopoly (Cortez 2009; Meneguello and Bizzarro Neto 2012). The same has happened in somewhat different fashion in Minas Gerais, the country’s second most populous state. In the states of Paraná and Rio Grande do Sul, the gubernatorial elections have been “half” presidentialized, with a similar coalitional dynamic, even though the PT has not been competitive in Paraná or the PSDB in Rio Grande do Sul. In Bahia, the PT and the Democrats have anchored statewide competition, again approximating a “presidentialized” pattern. The PT and PSDB have consistently done well in some of the largest and richest states, which strengthens their ability to run competitive presidential candidates.

By 1999, the PT surpassed the PMDB as the party with the highest level of party identification, with 14% of respondents compared to 12%. From then on, its advantage over its competitors grew substantially. By 2003, when Lula assumed the presidency, the PT had more party identifiers than all of its competitors combined, and enjoyed a huge advantage, 22% to 8%, over the second place PMDB. The corruption scandals in Lula’s first term provoked a modest decline in PT identifiers, from 22% in 2003-2004 to 17-19% in 2006-2007. After that, the PT further extended its advantage.

Consistency in surveys between first and second round presidential vote shows a similar story: voter preferences do not fluctuate erratically from one moment to the next, especially among PT voters. In the 2010 national electoral study (a panel study), 95.7% of respondents who said they voted for Dilma Rousseff in the first round reported choosing her in the runoff (only 3.6% said they chose Serra). 92.5% of those who said they voted for Serra in the first round repeated this choice in the second round; only 6.5% switched to Rousseff.

However, we otherwise agree with Zucco that aggregate level stabilization has occurred despite relatively weak party rootedness in society.

Although this is a very important and insightful piece, for this particular statement the authors do not present much empirical evidence. The only empirical evidence they bring concerns the different kinds of units each party has in different cities, which does not speak directly to this point. Using data for 2012, they argue that the PT is not as “cartorial” (notary public parties) as the other main parties because the PT relies more extensively on local directorates than provisional commissions to build its local network of party branches. They correctly state that directorates are more complex local units than provisional commissions (while the first needs to follow a series of prerequisites, including the demonstration that some activities at the local level happened, the second is a provisional organization of few members nominated by the state party). However, the differences between PT and the others in this realm are not as pronounced as they suggest.

The PDS declined from 43.2% of the vote for the Chamber of Deputies in 1982 to 7.8% in 1986, accounting for all of the volatility stemming from a drop in the vote share. The PMDB and PFL dropped from 65.9% of the lower chamber vote in 1986 to 31.7% in 1990, accounting for the lion’s share of parties that lost vote share. The PDS and the PMDB never came close to recovering the percentage they enjoyed before Figueiredo and Sarney presided over bad governments. By the



time of the 1989 presidential election, voters defected en masse from the established parties and flocked to Collor, a populist who railed against the establishment (although he came from it) and Lula.