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Keywords: secularism, modernization theory, religious competition, religious pluralism

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ABSTRACT

In the last decade, scholars have begun to elaborate the diverse ways religion manifests in democracies. We draw on theories related to modernization, secularism, and religious competition, as well as survey data from the Comparative National Elections Project, to explain individual-level and country-level variation in religious politicking—religious leaders’ and organizations’ engagement in electoral campaigns. At the country level, though human development depresses the rate at which citizens receive political messages from religious organizations and clergy, both secularism and religious pluralism boost it. At the individual level, “civilizational” differences across religious groups are muted and inconsistent. However, across the globe, citizens with higher levels of education are consistently more likely to receive political messages—an effect that is stronger where religious politicking is more common. A case study of Mozambique further confirms the insights obtained when we unpack modernization and secularization theories.

RESUMEN

En la última década, se ha comenzado a reconocer las diversas manifestaciones de la religión en las democracias. Basándonos en teorías relacionadas con la modernización, el secularismo y la competencia religiosa y en datos de encuestas del Comparative National Elections Project (Proyecto Comparado de Elecciones Nacionales), buscamos explicar la variación entre individuos y entre países en el politiquero religioso—esto es, el involucramiento de los líderes y de las organizaciones religiosas en las campañas electorales. Al nivel nacional, el desarrollo humano reduce la frecuencia con que los ciudadanos reciben mensajes de las organizaciones religiosas y de los clérigos, pero tanto el secularismo como el pluralismo religioso aumentan esa frecuencia. Al nivel individual, las diferencias de “civilización” entre los grupos religiosos son imperceptibles o inconsistentes. Sin embargo, por el mundo entero los ciudadanos con niveles más altos de educación tienen mayor probabilidad de recibir mensajes políticos, un efecto que se refuerza en los países donde el politiquero religioso es más común. Un estudio de caso de Mozambique confirma los hallazgos que resultan de examinar las teorías de la modernización y la secularización.

INTRODUCTION

Why do clergy in some countries talk more about elections from the pulpit than in others? Why do religious associations contact members about upcoming elections more frequently in the United States than in Taiwan? This paper investigates the sources of variation in “religious politicking”—the direct engagement of clergy and religious associations in elections. In contemporary times, religious intervention in politics has sometimes resulted in critical shifts towards democracy—for instance, in the form of liberation theology in Latin America (Woods, 2003) and Catholic resistance to Soviet occupation in Eastern Europe (Grzymala-Busse, 2015; Wittenberg, 2006). In democracies, the effect of religious politicking is more complicated, especially when secular legal arrangements impinge on religious politicking. Yet in the last decade, significant scholarship—rejecting a reductionist “clash of civilizations” premise—has shifted from questioning the compatibility of religion and democracy to exploring how they interact (Huntington, 1993; Fox, 2006; Kuru, 2009; Stepan, 2000).

Religious politicking manifests in diverse ways within democracies. Sometimes, clergy directly endorse candidates, such as when the Reverend Jesse Jackson told reporters in 2007 that presidential candidate Barack Obama “has my vote” (Clark, 2007). Other endorsements are more subtle, such as when the Indonesian imam Abdullah Gymnastar counseled his congregation against voting for a non-Muslim during a Jakarta gubernatorial campaign involving a prominent Christian candidate, Ahok; or when U.S. evangelical pastor Gus Booth told his congregation, “if you are a Christian, you cannot support a candidate like Barack Obama or Hillary Clinton for president” (Goldman, June 20, 2008; Emont, April 18, 2017). Further, democracies vary significantly in the extent of religious politicking. In some, such as Mozambique and Brazil, it is commonplace for religious leaders to endorse politicians, or even run for office; in others, such as Argentina, religious endorsements are practically unheard of.

While religious engagement in politics is well studied in the context of authoritarian regimes (e.g., Sarkissian, 2015; Wittenberg, 2006), religious politicking is understudied in democracies other than the United States (in the U.S., see, for instance, Djupe and Calfano, 2013; Putnam and Campbell, 2012). We seek to contribute to the study of religious politicking across democracies, using data from 24 surveys in 18 countries included in the Comparative National Elections Project between 1993 and 2012. In those surveys, respondents were asked

about two aspects of religious politicking: exposure to political messages from religious associations and from clergy, respectively.

Exploring the conditions under which religious actors are perceived to take part in the electoral fray allows us to test several prevalent arguments put forth in the literatures on political behavior, modernization, and religious competition. First, taking advantage of the fact that we have individual-level data, we investigate the socioeconomic correlates of self-reported exposure to religious politicking, as well as whether there are consistent civilizational or theological differences across world religions. Second, we take up modernization theorists' claim that, at the country level, development, democracy, and legal secularism diminish the role of religion in public life—and revisionist theories maintaining, in contrast, that these three forces actually lead to *rising* levels of religious politicking. Third, we test claims within the religious competition literature that religious pluralism leads to religious increased intervention in politics.

The Comparative National Elections Project (CNEP) provides a novel perspective on religious politicking. A large body of prior work examines religious politicking within single countries—an approach that yields richly detailed analysis of micro-level dynamics, yet cannot fully assess the role that national context plays. Meanwhile, another body of work takes a state-centric perspective. Treating the state as the unit of analysis has obvious merit, in that the state naturally sets the parameters within which religious groups can interact with democracy, yet such analyses have tended to ignore citizens' own experiences of how their religious and political leaders interact. By utilizing cross-national data involving self-reports from citizens on the ground, we develop new measures of religious politicking that validly represent the observations of citizens themselves. At the same time, this approach enables us to integrate individual-level determinants of exposure to religious politicking into a state-level explanation of the phenomenon. A final case study of Mozambique—our case with the highest levels of religious politicking—enables us to bring together the country- and individual-level forces.

Our results shed new light on religious politicking. On the one hand, they suggest that exposure to religious politicking is, in at least one important way, similar to other forms of political mobilization and engagement. In particular, education consistently increases the probability of exposure to religious elites' political messages, in a wide variety of national contexts—likely due to a combination of self-selection and deliberate targeting by elites. On the

other hand, our results suggest that civilizational approaches—especially ones emphasizing differences between Christians and Muslims—overstate group-level differences.

The results also shed new light on the country-level determinants of exposure to religious politicking, confirming some aspects of modernization and religious competition theories, yet refuting others. We find a strong negative relationship between human development and religious politicking, despite the United States' status as an influential outlier with high levels of both human development and religious politicking. Yet both secularism and religious pluralism *boost* religious politicking. In other words, in societies with unregulated and competitive religious marketplaces, religious institutions participate more actively in the electoral fray. Thus, the results confirm the value of unpacking modernization theory.

Finally, our data enable us to assess how national-level forces condition the impact of individual-level variables. Cross-level hierarchical models reveal that education *only* affects citizens' likelihood of exposure to religious politicking in certain kinds of countries—namely, secular ones, and ones with lower levels of human development and religious repression. In countries that are generally less propitious for religious politicking, education has little impact on exposure to clergy and religious association engagement in politics.

EXPLAINING RELIGIOUS POLITICKING

What leads private religious actors to take part in the political fray? And what forces affect whether individual citizens receive the political messages sent by religious leaders? We conceptualize religious politicking as a form of strategic communication: (a) a messenger (the clergy member or religious association) transmits a message about politics; and (b) a citizen receives it. To explain religious politicking, we assess the factors that influence both steps in the process. In the first step, clergy and religious associations implicitly or explicitly assess the costs and benefits of this form of communication. On the benefit side of the tally, many sincere religious and political objectives—from promoting environmental stewardship to stopping abortion—motivate religious messengers. Such objectives vary dramatically by religious tradition as well as local and national context. Yet religious institutional concerns also motivate political speech. Perceived religious restrictions fuel grievances against the state, while religious competition can trigger religious groups to seek access to policy tools and political allies.

Engaging in religious politicking also imposes wide-ranging costs on the message sender. Even in the most frictionless environments, religious politicking entails opportunity costs, as the clergy member or religious association devotes limited sermon time to his or her message. Yet there are other potential costs. First, citizens in some contexts may disapprove of religious messages, potentially affecting the religious group's attendance and membership levels. In politically divided congregations and polarized electoral environments, electoral messages risk alienating congregants who disagree. Religious politicking may also sometimes violate citizens' norms regarding the secular division of labor between religious and political elites. Second, religious traditions vary in their tolerance for clergy and other religious actors' engagement in electoral politics. For instance, particularly since the 1980s, the Roman Catholic Church has generally frowned on clergy engagement in elections; by contrast, Protestant churches have exhibited more widely varying stances on religious politicking. Third, religious politicking can run afoul of state actors. Some states actively repress or seek to control religious groups' speech about politics, but even in states with high levels of religious liberty, religious engagement in politics can alienate allies in government.

In the second step, some citizens are more likely to receive religious messages about elections than others. Given the strategic and costly nature of religious politicking, clergy and religious associations target citizens perceived as most likely to respond favorably to their messages. And even absent strategic targeting, some citizens are more likely to be exposed to, comprehend, and remember the political messages they receive. Drawing on the preceding logic, the next section discusses determinants of exposure to religious politicking operating at the individual, group, and country levels.

Which Citizens?

We expect that exposure to religious messages will be distributed non-randomly within countries and religious communities. A large number of single-country case studies examine political cues from clergy—yet there is surprisingly little prior research on which citizens are most likely to receive such messages. Our view of religious politicking as a system of strategic communication guides our reflection on which citizens are likely to receive such messages.

To the extent they can target their messages at all, we expect that strategic message senders will focus on recipients perceived as more persuasible and more likely to take action. This

assumption leads to two predictions. The first seems almost too obvious to mention: clergy and religious associations will target members of their own groups, and particularly highly engaged ones. Such targeting is analogous to clientelistic brokers' preference for mobilizing individuals within their own parties (Stokes et al., 2013). Second, they will focus on citizens with more education. Prior work confirms that many forms of mobilization tend to target those with higher levels of socioeconomic status and resources, both in the US and cross-nationally (e.g., Brady, Verba and Schlozman, 1995; Verba, Nie and Kim, 1978). This bias towards mobilizing wealthier and better-educated citizens may well express mobilizers' prejudice or innate preference for those groups; but it is also strategic. Citizens with more resources—from cognitive resources, to social capital, to time, to tools such as cars and Internet connections—respond more readily to calls to action. They also more readily in turn mobilize others.

Yet even when pastors, imams, or priests try to rally the faithful, they may fail to get their points across. Some citizens will simply be more *aware* of the political messages religious leaders send than others; that is, they will be more likely to register, comprehend, and remember what they hear. Zaller's (1992) "Receive-Accept-Sample (RAS)" model provides a helpful framework for thinking about the determinants of effectively *receiving* political communications from clergy and religious associations. Conveniently, the predictions from this approach dovetail with those from the prior paragraph: we expect that more frequent attenders and those with higher levels of education will be more aware of the political stances that religious leaders take. Thus, we hypothesize that:

H1. Across country contexts, more highly educated citizens and citizens who attend services more frequently will be more likely to report exposure to religious politicking.

Still, it is worth mentioning that the opposite relationship is also possible: education could instead *decrease* exposure to religious politicking. As prior research shows, human development is *negatively* associated with religiosity cross-nationally—a relationship we confirm in our dataset. Still, even if the poor are over-represented in the pews, we expect that the wealthy and well-educated citizens in their midst will be most likely to receive, register, and report religious politicking.

Which Religious Groups?

Beyond individual-level studies, so-called “civilizational” approaches provide perhaps the most common explanation of religious politicking: that there is something about certain religious groups that makes them more prone to engage in electoral politics. Proponents focus on the activities of different world religions or branches of the Christian tree, arguing that different groups’ widely varying levels of political engagement result from features inherent in those religions (Huntington, 1993). Thus, the argument goes, doctrine and traditions of scriptural interpretation lead evangelical, Pentecostal, and Muslim leaders worldwide to engage more frequently in politicking than leaders of other religious groups. Such interpretations may not be inherent in holy religious texts themselves, yet within religious traditions, interpretive communities diffuse common understandings of the political content of holy texts. If “civilizational” approaches explain levels of religious engagement in politics, we hypothesize that:

H2. Across country contexts, evangelicals and Muslims will be more likely to report exposure to religious politicking.

Critics argue that civilizational approaches fail in two ways, however (Kuru, 2009). First, such explanations dramatically *under*-predict variance in the behavior of actors sharing the same religious tradition. Second, they substantially *over*-predict variance between actors from different traditions. As Dowd argues, a religious actor’s political and social context shapes his or her political behavior more strongly than does the religious tradition: “there is something about certain times and places that prompts people, regardless of faith tradition or denomination, to apply their religious traditions to politics” (Dowd, 2015, 2).

Which Countries?

Thus, we examine the role of context. What aspects of time and place matter most?

Secularization theory (also sometimes called modernization theory in this literature) provides a starting point for an integrated contextual explanation. Based heavily on European case studies, scholars have argued that modernization produces secularization—that is, that religion’s role in public life and the political sphere declines organically over time as development and democracy rise, and as democratic states adopt secular constitutional frameworks (Huntington, 1968;

Berger, 1979, 1967; Norris and Inglehart, 2011; Bruce, 2002). However, the reality of enormous cross-national variation in religious engagement in public life has led to a vast literature debating both the accuracy of the predictions of secularization theory, as well as the mechanisms that could explain a modernization-secularization link (Gaskins, Golder and Siegel, 2013; Karakoç and Başkan, 2013; Stark, 1999; Toft, Philpott and Shah, 2011). We attempt to bring clarity to this debate through two key arguments. First, understanding how modernization impacts the public role of religion requires unpacking what we mean by modernization. Different aspects of modernization—among them human development, democracy, and secularism—may well have different impacts on religious politicking. (While *secularization* refers to the declining role of religion in public life, *secularism* refers to a legal, constitutional framework in which the state is independent of and neutral toward religious institutions.) Moreover, religious pluralism is an often-overlooked consequence of modernization that we argue has downstream effects on religious politicking. Second, we hold that understanding religious politicking requires attention to the micro-level incentives of individual religious actors. Various aspects of modernization shape the costs and benefits of religious politicking. Thus, we argue for both disaggregating the concept of modernization and integrating secularization theory with an actor-oriented approach.

The subsections that follow address three aspects of modernization and religious competition that could encourage or discourage religious groups and leaders from taking sides in electoral contests: development, regime characteristics, and religious pluralism.

Human Development

A core claim of secularization theory has been that economic growth and human development lead to declining religiosity, and to a declining role for religion in public life. This premise has been sharply attacked for its Western-centric focus, as scholars have noted that not all developed countries become more secular, and some poor states remain highly secular (Berger, 2012; Casanova, 2011; Chaves, 1994; Fox, 2006). Nonetheless, recent cross-national studies reaffirm the negative relationship between development and religiosity (e.g., Bruce, 2002; Norris and Inglehart, 2011). Norris and Inglehart (2011) outline the individual-level mechanisms supposed to underlie this aggregate-level relationship. They argue that “existential insecurity” caused by poverty and instability leads to higher to levels of religiosity: “the experiences of growing up in less secure societies will heighten the importance of religious values, while conversely experiences of more secure conditions will lessen it” (17). Higher religiosity in developing

countries would not necessarily and automatically lead to higher religious politicking; one can certainly attend religious services without exposure to political content. Nonetheless, we expect that low development will be linked to religious politicking. The relationship is partially mechanical, as highly religious people have more opportunities for exposure. But high religiosity in a society also changes norms, fostering greater tolerance for—or even expectations of—religious groups’ engagement in the public sphere. As a consequence, political leaders are more likely to deploy religious claims and mobilization strategies strategically (McCauley, 2017). In addition and more generally, campaigns in developing countries rely heavily on word of mouth and on local opinion leaders, given low literacy rates and uneven reach of newspapers or even, in some settings, television (e.g., Conroy-Krutz, 2016; Smith, 2018). In such contexts, clergy and religious associations may play a more important role in conveying information to and mobilizing citizens. Thus, we hypothesize that:

H3. At the country level, as human development rises, exposure to religious politicking will fall.

Nonetheless, other recent work argues for more complex relationships. Gaskins, Golder, and Siegel (2013), for instance, claim that religious groups often become more publicly engaged even as religious adherence falls.¹ In line with secularization theory, they postulate a “substitutability of secular and religious goods,” leading to a negative correlation between development and religiosity (Gaskins, Golder and Siegel, 2013, 1126). Nonetheless, they claim that secularization does not necessarily lead to a decline in religious politicking:

Those who remain religious in the face of growing development are increasingly likely to be more conservative and differentiated in their social attitudes relative to the rest of society. This fact, combined with the decline in the overall size of the religious community... may make it easier for religious individuals to overcome collective action problems and achieve disproportionate influence (1126).

Similarly, Fox (2006) argues that “it is precisely in those states where modernity has most undermined the traditional community that religious elements within the state are most likely to try and legislate religious morals and traditions that were previously enforced at the social level” (526). Following this line of reasoning, human development might *boost* religious politicking—

¹ Yet another recent reinterpretation of secularization theory focuses on inequality, rather than development *per se*.

at least among a shrinking minority—even as religiosity dropped. If so, our second hypothesis will be disconfirmed.²

Regime Characteristics

Several regime characteristics—including democracy, state secularism, and government repression of religion—may impact religious engagement in politics. Secularization theory bundled democracy, secularism, and decreased religiosity together in a syndrome of modernization, without a consensus on the direction of causality (Huntington, 1968; Berger, 1979). Once again, though, revisionist approaches argue that these forces do not necessarily all evolve together as modernization progresses. We concur with recent scholars: understanding the effect of regime characteristics requires more precise analysis of contextual forces (Dowd, 2015; Grzymala-Busse, 2015; Philpott, 2007; Toft, Philpott and Shah, 2011).

Both secularism and religious repression may affect religious leaders' incentives to engage in electoral politics. Secularism increases the potential benefits and lowers the costs of religious politicking. In contrast to the predictions of secularization theory, scholarship on the “supply-side” of religious economies suggests that secularism—framed as deregulation of the religious market—heightens religious activity in a polity (Finke and Iannaccone, 1993). When the state is neutral, all religious groups may acquire grievances and incentives leading to religious politicking. Dominant religious groups may fight for market advantages, while minority and historically disadvantaged ones may struggle for a level playing field (Karakoç and Başkan, 2013; Smith, 2019; Toft, Philpott and Shah, 2011). Meanwhile, state neutrality also decreases the potential costs of religious politicking.

Religious repression, in turn, reflects *de facto* state practices toward religious groups. Repression may have two countervailing effects (Grzymala-Busse, 2015; Koesel, 2014). It can intensify members' grievances, pushing them into political—often radical or extremist—activities (Stark and Finke, 2000; Toft, Philpott and Shah, 2011). Yet it can also reduce religious engagement in *electoral* politics, even while boosting extremist political behavior. When religious repression raises the costs of engagement in electoral politics, actors may substitute to more radical forms of engagement. Our hypotheses are agnostic with respect to these two potential countervailing effects. Thus, we hypothesize that:

² An alternative interpretation is that among religious citizens, the proportion exposed to clergy politicking will rise in highly developed countries. Our analysis does not support this hypothesis.

H4. Secularism increases religious politicking.

H5a. Religious repression decreases religious politicking.

H5b. Religious repression increases religious politicking.

Does a country's level of democracy influence religious politicking? The literature once again yields mixed expectations. As noted above, democracy was thought to be part of the package of modernization that led to secularization. However, revisionist theories argue that democracy instead increases religious engagement in politics. For instance, Toft, Philpott, and Shah (2011, 49) maintain that the spread of global democracy has contributed to a historical juncture in which “major religious actors throughout the world enjoy *greater capacity for political influence* today than at any time in modern history-and perhaps ever.” The argument is that democracy decreases potential costs of religious politicking.

Nonetheless, we suspect that this debate has been muddied by conflating democracy with other covarying characteristics of states. Empirically, democracy is positively correlated with secularism, and negatively with religious repression. We suspect that many of the effects attributed to democracy are instead due to these two other characteristics. In addition, we need to keep in mind that democracy is strongly positively correlated with human development, which itself likely impacts religious politicking. Thus, theoretically and empirically identifying the effect of democracy requires also taking into account secularism, religious repression, and human development. After controlling for these three traits, and assuming a country holds contested elections, we see no reason to expect that levels of democracy as such affect religious politicking.

Religious Pluralism

A comprehensive explanation of the relationship between modernization and religious politicking should also incorporate religious pluralism. Peter Berger, an early proponent of secularization theory, later reconsidered the modernization-secularization link: “It turns out that modernity does not necessarily produce a decline of religion; it does necessarily produce...a historically unprecedented situation in which more and more people live amid competing beliefs, values and lifestyle” (2012, 313).

How does pluralism affect religious politicking? Scholars of religious economies show that religious diversity fosters inter-group competition for everything from members, to resources such as preferential access to real estate, to special legal recognition (Finke and Stark,

1998; Gill, 2008; Smith, 2019; Trejo, 2012). Competition—as well as grievances stemming from perceived state bias or favoritism—shape the perceived costs and benefits of religious politicking. Sometimes religious actors ally themselves with political camps to recruit members, helping to explain religious-political coalitions in the United States and Brazil (Audette and Weaver, 2016; Smith, 2019). Groups can also use electoral politics to seek allies in government, or to change a political system they perceive as treating them unfairly. Dowd argues that “as societies become more religiously diverse, leaders of growing religious minorities promote political activism to reduce the privileges of long-dominant religious majorities, and leaders of long-dominant religious majorities encourage political activism in an attempt to preserve cultural and religious hegemony” (2015, 44-45). We hypothesize:

H6. As religious pluralism rises, so will religious politicking.

Empirically, case studies hint that competition increases religious politicking (Akdede, 2010; Finke and Iannaccone, 1993; Gill, 2008; Iannaccone, 1992; Smith, 2019; Trejo, 2012). Trejo (2012), for instance, demonstrates that subnational competition between Catholics and evangelicals in Mexico led Catholic clergy to champion indigenous rights. Similarly, both Gill (2008) and Smith (2019) find that Catholic-evangelical competition in Latin America shaped both groups’ political stances. Ultimately, religious groups’ electoral activism could have feedback effects on democracy itself (Akdede, 2010).

Individuals within Contexts

Finally, we expect that context conditions the impact of individual-level variables. Education may be more strongly correlated with exposure to religious politicking in some countries than in others. In particular, we suspect that personal characteristics matter little in countries where very little religious politicking happens. Thus, we hypothesize that:

H7. Country-level characteristics associated with more religious politicking also intensify the impact of education.

DATA

We test these hypotheses using cross-national survey data from the Comparative National Elections Project, as well as election-level and country-level data from a variety of sources. The Comparative National Elections Project (CNEP) is a collaborative endeavor involving 48

surveys of elections in 26 democracies throughout the world between 1990 and 2016. In 24 surveys in 18 countries between 1993 and 2012, respondents were asked about exposure to political messages from both religious associations and clergy, respectively. The multi-level data enable us to explore both individual and state-level explanations of religious politicking.

We have two dependent variables. *Clergy candidate support* is an indicator coded ‘1’ for those who responded in the affirmative to the question, “During religious ceremonies, did the religious leader tend to favor a particular political party or candidate?” This variable was measured in only seven surveys. The second dependent variable, *religious association information*, is derived from a battery of questions on associational membership included in 23 surveys. Individuals who reported belonging to a “religious association” were asked, “Did you receive some information about the last electoral campaign from this organization?”³ The indicator is coded ‘1’ for individuals who reported receiving such information.

These two variables capture distinct aspects of the larger phenomenon. *Clergy candidate support* examines religious leaders’ partisan behavior within the walls of their own communities—the type of political communication most commonly described as “religious politicking.” However, staking out a partisan position can be relatively risky for religious leaders, and as such, it is perhaps unsurprising that this activity was not measured in many countries. By contrast, *religious association information* captures a wider range of political communication, ranging from providing ostensibly nonpartisan information on voting procedures and candidate stances, to encouragement to turn out. This latter variable also enables us to examine religious politicking in a larger set of countries and elections.

While the variables do capture different aspects of religious politicking, responses are closely related. In the six surveys including both variables, the election-level correlation between the two is .72. Thus, in the Appendix and in some analyses within the text, we present results for a summary index of *religious politicking*, which is coded ‘1’ for all individuals who report either form of exposure to political messages. The summary index of *religious politicking* is present in all 24 elections in our dataset—including in the United States 2004, which is the only election where *religious association information* is not measured.

³ Question translations vary in minor ways from survey to survey. This represents the text from the 2004 Mozambique survey.

Our sample has some obvious limitations. The 24 elections we study are not drawn from a random sample of elections around the world; instead, the countries and elections were non-randomly selected by the principal investigators, undoubtedly partially on the basis of idiosyncratic criteria such as professional contacts. This could potentially lead to over-representation of cases that are politically salient, or that are better connected to Western research networks, with unclear implications for the sample's representativeness. Furthermore, since one criterion for inclusion is that a case be democratic, the sample underrepresents elections in majority Muslim countries.

Nonetheless, the CNEP incorporates a highly diverse set of countries across the globe, including rich and poor countries, and ones on every continent. This is by far the largest and most comprehensive dataset to incorporate measures of religious politicking of which we are aware. As such, despite the caveats, the CNEP makes possible unprecedented insight into the nature of religious engagement in elections worldwide. Moreover, we have every reason to believe that the selected elections are representative of similar elections within their respective regions and period.

Another concern relates to the characteristics of the individual-level sample. The data rely on citizens' self-reports of clergy and religious association behavior, rather than more direct measures of religious politicking. Signals between religious leaders and faithful citizens inevitably decay. Some citizens may simply fail to notice or deliberately ignore political messages from religious actors; others may fail to report what they experience. Moreover, measurement error is likely to be heterogeneous across the population, with more attentive and sophisticated citizens exhibiting lower levels of error in reporting. Thus, at the individual level, the dependent variable must be interpreted in terms of perceptions and self-reports.

Our election-level variables are reported in Table 1. To examine *religious repression* and *democracy*, we use Varieties of Democracy (V-Dem) measures for Liberal Democracy and Repression of Religious Organizations (Coppedge et al., N.d.); we code an indicator variable for *secularism* based on Kuru (2009). The measure of *human development* relies on the United Nations Development Programme's Human Development Index (HDI) (*Human Development*

Data, 1990-2015, N.d.).⁴ Finally, *religious pluralism* is a measure of the effective number of religious groups in each election, estimated based on the distribution of the survey data. Each of these election-level variables is subsequently converted to run from 0 to 1, based on observed values within the data.

TABLE 1

ELECTION-LEVEL MEASURES (ON ORIGINAL SCALES)

	<i>HDI</i>	<i>Secularism</i>	<i>Religious Repression</i>	<i>Liberal Democracy</i>	<i>Religious Pluralism</i>
Chile 1993	.713	Secular	3.02	5.56	1.686
Spain 1993	.783	Est. (Catholic)	3.21	4.87	1.389
Uruguay 1994	.709	Secular	3.11	5.05	1.447
Bulgaria 1996	.702	Est. (Orthodox)	2.54	4.04	2.161
Greece 1996	.777	Est. (Orthodox)	3.17	3.69	1.000
Italy 1996	.805	Est. (Catholic)	2.98	4.23	1.603
Hong Kong 1998	.816	Secular	N/A	N/A	2.283
Hungary 1998	.754	Secular	2.81	5.01	2.736
Greece 2004	.839	Est. (Orthodox)	3.19	3.69	1.093
Indonesia 2004	.629	Secular	2.08	4.38	1.264
Mozambique 2004	.341	Secular	1.26	4.33	4.019
South Africa 2004	.609	Secular	2.63	5.11	4.715
Spain 2004	.837	Est. (Catholic)	3.26	4.87	1.638
Taiwan 2004	N/A	Secular	2.73	4.76	3.422
Uruguay 2004	.753	Secular	3.29	5.05	2.779
USA 2004	.895	Secular	3.12	4.17	4.952
Portugal 2005	.793	Est. (Catholic)	3.25	5.7	1.334
Hungary 2006	.809	Secular	2.69	5.01	2.514
Italy 2006	.862	Est. (Catholic)	2.99	4.23	1.170
Mexico 2006	.731	Secular	2.12	4.37	1.980
Argentina 2007	.792	Est. (Catholic)	2.48	4.58	1.538
Indonesia 2009	.656	Secular	1.94	3.12	1.261
South Africa 2009	.630	Secular	2.57	5.11	3.541
Spain 2011	.871	Est. (Catholic)	3.28	4.87	1.598
Mexico 2012	.753	Secular	2.01	4.37	1.556

Individual-level variables include religious affiliation, religiosity, age, gender, education, and income. In some electoral surveys, such as South Africa 2005 and 2009, the CNEP measured upwards of 30 religious affiliations. We collapsed Christian religious denominations into

⁴ HDI is based on three dimensions: healthy lifespan, standard of living, and knowledge. In analysis presented in the Appendix, we also assessed the impact of inequality on religious politicking, using the V-Dem measure of “High Income Inequality” (Coppedge et al., N.d.).

Catholic, Protestant, evangelical (including Pentecostal), and Orthodox. We collapsed all Muslim denominations into ‘Muslim,’ given a lack of diversity among Muslims within the countries studied. Respondents who indicated no religious denomination were coded as ‘None.’

Religiosity was based on questions within each country asking how frequently respondents attended religious or worship services. Responses within each country were rescaled to run from 0 to 1, and respondents who replied that they did not know were coded as missing. Age is measured in numbers of years (rescaled from 0 to 1) and gender as a dichotomous indicator in which ‘1’ indicates women and ‘0’ men. Education and income are measured on scales that vary from country to country, which are standardized to run from 0 to 1 within each country.

RESULTS AND DISCUSSION



To what extent do citizens in democracies around the world receive political messages from their religious organizations and clergy? Figure 1 presents the distribution of the two dependent variables. The seven cases in the top pane represent the elections where *clergy candidate support* was measured; the 23 cases in the bottom pane include every election in our data set except the 2004 United States election, where the variable in question was not asked.⁵

In the subset of electoral surveys where both dependent variables were included, levels of religious politicking are fairly consistent using the two measures. Mozambique's 2004 election presents the highest levels of religious politicking; 11.0% of Mozambicans said that they had received electoral information from religious organizations, while 12.7% said their clergy had tended to favor a candidate. Meanwhile, levels of religious politicking are quite low on both measures in Portugal 2005, Taiwan 2004, Argentina 2007, and South Africa 2004. In South Africa's 2009 election, however, there is a sizable gap between results for the two dependent variables. Though 9.8% of South Africans reported receiving electoral information from a religious association, only 3.3% said their clergy had favored someone.

⁵ Here we present the rates of receiving electoral information among *all* citizens, not just those belonging to religious organizations or who attend houses of worship. In the Appendix we present equivalent figures limited to citizens who belong to religious organizations or attend houses of worship. The second-level distributions are surprisingly consistent across the two measures. This paper relies on the distribution among *all* citizens, both to reduce selection bias and to substantially increase our sample size, since very few citizens attend houses of worship in some countries.

FIGURE 1

LEVELS OF REPORTED RELIGIOUS POLITICKING, BY COUNTRY



Source: Comparative National Elections Project. Whiskers represent 95% confidence intervals.

Beyond this subset of six cases where we have overlap, the 2004 election in the United States stands out as being among those with the highest levels of religious politicking; 10.4% of Americans thought their clergy had supported a candidate in sermons. Indonesia's 2004 election also had fairly high levels of religious engagement in the electoral campaign, with 7.8% of citizens reporting that they had received political information from a religious organization. Meanwhile, in the remaining election cases, few citizens reported that their religious organizations promoted campaign information.

Individual- and Group-Level Determinants of Exposure to Religious Politicking


Which kinds of people are most likely to say they are exposed to religious politicking? In the Appendix, we present a series of hierarchical logistic regression models assessing individual-level determinants of the two primary dependent variables, as well as of the summary index. Results strongly support our first hypothesis. Not surprisingly, people who attend religious services more frequently are much more likely both to receive political information from religious associations and to be aware of clergy supporting a candidate. Moving from the minimum to maximum levels of religious attendance is associated with more than a tripling of the likelihood of reporting any form of religious politicking.

Less obviously, education also has a consistent positive effect on the likelihood of exposure to religious politicking.⁶ Figure 2 presents the predicted probabilities of an individual reporting political messages from clergy and religious associations, respectively, by educational level. Given dramatic variation in educational systems across the countries studied, we standardize education to run from 0 to 1 within each country, so that it represents a measure of status relative to one's fellow citizens, but not relative to citizens in other countries. The figure makes it evident that people with more education are more likely to report being exposed to both kinds of political messages. Moving from minimum to maximum levels of education is associated with a 69% increase in the likelihood of reporting any form of religious politicking, based on the summary index.

⁶ In the Appendix, we present a figure depicting country-by-country analysis incorporating other demographic variables, including age, income, and gender. Because these variables are available inconsistently in the various studies, it is impossible to include all of them together in a single pooled model. The effects of these other demographics vary substantially across contexts, yet the overall pattern is of statistical insignificance.

FIGURE 2

LEVELS OF REPORTED RELIGIOUS POLITICKING, BY EDUCATIONAL LEVEL




Are some religious groups consistently more likely to engage in religious politicking?

Figure 3 presents the predicted probability of reporting the two types of political messages, based on the aforementioned models found in the Appendix. Though the regression models reveal some statistically significant differences between Catholics (our baseline group) and other religious groups, the overall pattern provides only mixed support for the second hypothesis. Consistent with H2, evangelicals report higher levels of clergy support for candidates—a finding echoed in models predicting the summary index. By contrast, H2 appears not to be supported with respect to Islam. Islam is associated neither higher nor lower levels of religious politicking than Catholicism—though Muslims are *less* likely than adherents to other major world religions to receive political messages from civic associations, and somewhat more likely than Catholics to have clergy who favor candidates.

FIGURE 3

**LEVELS OF REPORTED RELIGIOUS POLITICKING,
BY RELIGIOUS AFFILIATION**



Not surprisingly, the nonreligious report low levels of exposure to religious politicking—an effect that holds even after controlling for frequency of religious attendance. Finally, Confucians, Buddhists, and Taoists likewise say they receive very little political information from religious associations, an effect largely explained by the groups’ low frequency of religious attendance. The predicted rates of clergy support for candidates among Buddhists and Taoists are high, yet given small numbers of people in these samples, the 95% confidence intervals are very large, and nearly incorporate 0.

Contextual Determinants of Religious Politicking

Which aspects of context explain the greatly varying levels of religious politicking cross-nationally? In Figure 4 we present the bivariate correlations between our five election-level

variables, on the one hand, and the two primary dependent variables as well as the summary index of religious politicking, on the other.⁷ Data have been aggregated at the country-election level, so that values represent the mean within each case. Circles represent the Pearson correlation coefficients between the mean level of *religious association information* and each potential explanatory variable. Meanwhile, triangles and squares represent the equivalent correlations between the independent variables and the mean levels of *clergy candidate support* and the *religious politicking* index, respectively. Hollow symbols represent coefficients that fail to meet a $p < .05$ level of statistical significance, while filled symbols represent coefficients that are statistically significant at this level.

For four of the five contextual variables, we find substantial consistency in results across the three dependent variables. Figure 4 displays sizable negative correlations between religious politicking and liberal democracy and human development, and sizable positive ones between the dependent variables and secularism and religious pluralism. By contrast, results vary for the final contextual variable—yet on the whole it appears that the correlation between religious repression and religious politicking may be nearly exactly zero. With only seven cases, none of the correlations involving clergy support for candidates are statistically significant. However, the other two dependent variables are significantly related to human development, liberal democracy, secularism, and religious pluralism.


Table 2 presents results from hierarchical logistic regression models regressing the indicator for religious organization contacting on the election-level variables, controlling for religious affiliation at the individual level. (Given the small number of elections, we are not able to estimate multi-level models using clergy support for candidates as the dependent variable; a similar table using the index of religious politicking as the dependent variable is presented in the Appendix.) The table presents only the coefficients for the second-level variables; full results are presented in the Appendix. The first five columns introduce each second-level variable individually, and broadly confirm the results from the bivariate correlations at the election-level:

⁷ In the Appendix, we discuss results including a measure of inequality. However, the analysis incorporating this measure is hampered by the lack of data from the United States on the measure of religious contact. Though the measure of inequality is statistically significant in analysis excluding the United States, the U.S. is an important case because it has among the highest levels of religious politicking in our data but moderate levels of inequality in cross-national context. In various analyses using the summary index, the coefficient for the Gini index becomes statistically insignificant.

liberal democracy and human development decrease exposure to religious group political messages, while secularism and religious pluralism increase it.

FIGURE 4

RELIGIOUS POLITICKING AND COUNTRY-LEVEL EXPLANATORY FACTORS



The final column of Table 2 introduces all five second-level independent variables together. The results appear to indicate that liberal democracy is *not* significantly associated with religious politicking, once human development is controlled; and that religious pluralism becomes statistically insignificant controlling for secularism. However, given the relatively low number of second-level cases, the results in that column should be taken with some caution. The reversed sign on the coefficient for religious pluralism is likely a result of high multicollinearity among the variables in this small set of cases.⁸ In the Appendix, we estimate two election-level

⁸ The Appendix presents correlations among the contextual variables; human development and democracy are highly correlated, as are religious pluralism and secularism.

models regressing the election-level means of *religious politicking* and *religious association information* on all five second-level independent variables. The results should, once again, be interpreted with caution because of the small number of cases. Still, in these multivariate models, the only statistically significant determinants of religious engagement in politics are human development and religious pluralism. Thus, taken as a whole, the results from this section suggest that low human development, secularism, and religious pluralism all encourage religious leaders and groups to take part in electoral campaigns.

TABLE 2

**CONTEXTUAL DETERMINANTS OF RECEIVING POLITICAL INFORMATION
FROM RELIGIOUS ASSOCIATIONS**

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
Liberal Democracy	-4.281** (1.291)					-0.910 (1.635)
Human Development Index		-6.066** (1.598)				-5.556** (2.002)
Repression of Religious Groups			1.420 (1.837)			1.996 (1.316)
Secularism				2.965** (0.659)		1.629** (0.632)
Religious Pluralism					3.217* (1.522)	-2.324 (1.217)
Observations	32,319	32,050	32,319	32,319	33,305	31,070
Countries	22	22	22	22	23	21

NOTE: Results from multilevel logistic regression models. Individual-level controls for religious affiliation not shown. Standard errors in parentheses. Coefficients are statistically significant at * $p < .05$; ** $p < .01$.


Source: Comparative National Elections Project

Finally, context interacts in intriguing ways with the individual-level determinants of religious politicking. Above, we found that education boosts perceived religious politicking—an effect we argued was due to some combination of uneven mobilization and differential reception of messages. However, as Figure 5 shows, the strength of the education-politicking link varies systematically across our countries (see full models including all five contextual variables in the Appendix). The impact of education is higher in secular (as opposed to non-secular) countries;

and in ones with low (rather than high) human development, democracy, and religious repression. As human development and democracy increase, the positive correlation between education and religious association information drops. (The figure only presents results for human development, given the strong correlation between human development and democracy, as well as our finding above that democracy has little correlation with religious politicking once we control for human development.) And religious repression also limits the role of education in perceived religious politicking. Finally, only in secular countries is education positively correlated with self-reported religious politicking. All of these results suggest that education matters most in the contexts that are most propitious for religious politicking.

FIGURE 5

COUNTRY CONTEXT SHAPES THE IMPACT OF EDUCATION ON EXPOSURE TO RELIGIOUS POLITICKING



Case Study: Religious Politicking in Mozambique's 2004 Elections

To contextualize these results, we develop a case study of Mozambique's December 2004 presidential election, which has the highest overall index of *religious politicking* in our data. That election pitted the wealthy businessman Armando Guebuza of the incumbent Frelimo party against the former guerrilla leader Afonso Dhlakama of the Renamo party—an election that Guebuza won by 64 percent to 32 percent. Electoral observers noted several serious irregularities on

election day, but they also described the election as largely peaceful and ultimately declared confidence in the results (Carter Center, 2005). The prominence of religious engagement in the election is striking, as the campaign ostensibly had little to do with religion, and religion is largely uncorrelated with partisanship in Mozambique (Pereira, 2008).

Looking a bit more deeply, however, one finds numerous ways Mozambican religion shapes politics and society. Today, Mozambique has no majority religion but several large minority religions that operate and compete on relatively even footing: Catholicism, Protestantism, Pentecostalism, Islam, and traditional religions. During five centuries of Portuguese colonial rule, however, the Roman Catholic Church controlled the education system for Africans, and often compelled conversion to Catholicism. The Catholic Church's association with the old regime drives religious politics to this day.

Independence was won in 1975 largely through the efforts of Frelimo, a socialist nationalist movement dominated by upper-class Protestants (Pereira, 2008). With independence, Frelimo established a secular state, but mutual antagonism persisted between Frelimo and the Catholic Church, which Frelimo perceived as “having actively collaborated and identified itself with the Portuguese colonial regime” (Morier-Genoud and Anouilh, 2013, 185). By 1977, the regime had plunged into a civil war against anti-communist Renamo rebels who were sponsored by Southern Rhodesia and South Africa (Nuvunga and Salih, 2013; Carbone, 2005). Although the war lacked religious origins, it acquired a religious hue. Frelimo persecuted the Catholic Church and confiscated properties of various religious groups, while Renamo “tried to capitalize on Frelimo's attack on religion” by portraying itself as more supportive of Islam, Catholicism, and traditional religions (Morier-Genoud and Anouilh, 2013; Pereira, 2008, 192). Spurred to end religious repression, local Catholic leaders invited the lay Catholic community of Sant’Egiddio in Rome to mediate the end to the civil war in 1994. The Catholic Church thus sought to assume the role of arbiter of national unity. With the first democratic elections in 1994, Frelimo won a majority over Renamo that it has held in every subsequent election (Azevedo-Harman, 2015; Carbone, 2005).

In 2004, religious identity and institutions took supporting roles throughout the 40-day campaign. Despite the lack of correlation between religion and partisan identity among Mozambican citizens, Guebuza's status as a Presbyterian and Dhlakama's as a Catholic crystallized long-standing religious cleavages at the elite level. As clergy and religious

associations chose candidates to endorse, they likely felt tugged towards coreligionists. Meanwhile, religious groups also took roles in election administration and observation. The Christian Council, the Islamic Council, and the Catholic Bishops Conference joined together with civic associations to form a consortium called the Electoral Observatory to promote a clean election, while a prominent Methodist pastor served as the chair of the Electoral Commission (Carter Center, 2005; da Silva, 2015).

Mozambique, which has been described as a “low-information democracy” (Manning, 2010, 163), exemplifies the confluence of forces that can foster religious engagement in electoral politics. Given the country’s very low levels of development and literacy, elections tend to be mediated through interpersonal discussion and local opinion leaders—allowing religious leaders and associations a good deal of sway. Meanwhile, secularism *enables* religious politicking, as no religious group fears state reprisals, and religious pluralism *encourages* it. Despite the prominence of nonreligious cleavages in Mozambican politics, religious leaders have taken different sides in public disputes, driven by a combination of political ideals and institutional concerns.

At the individual level, Mozambique also demonstrates the diverse roles religious affiliation and education can play in determining the likelihood of an individual reporting religious politicking. In the context of the Catholic Church's deliberate decision to remove itself from politics following the first democratic elections (Cruz e Silva, 2008), Catholics reported the fewest incidents of religious politicking. In fact, only 1.6% of Catholic respondents had received political information from a religious association, reflecting the Church's weak lay associations. By contrast, the highest levels of religious politicking were found among Muslims and evangelicals, likely a result of these groups’ distinctive histories within Mozambique, as well as their internationally disseminated doctrine and practice. Finally, education was positively correlated with exposure to religious politicking—indicating that even in the context of Mozambique's “low-information democracy,” clergy and religious citizens seek to mobilize their highly educated compatriots first (Manning, 2010, 163).

CONCLUSION

In the lead-up to the United States' 2006 congressional primary, Pastor Mac Hammond sparked a public outcry and eventual IRS inquiry when he invited evangelical Christian and Republican congressional candidate Michelle Bachmann to speak at his church in Minnesota, and, from the pulpit, told his congregation, “We can't publicly endorse as a church—and would not—any candidate, but I can tell you *personally* that I'm going to vote for Michele Bachmann” (Putnam and Campbell, 2012, 332). In contrast to the controversy generated by Hammond's endorsement is the indifferent response of Mayor Jzef Grochowski of the Polish town of Kulesze Kocielne to the involvement of clergy in politics on the eve of the 2015 parliamentary elections. While “the priest does not tell people which political party to support...he advises us to vote for a politician who is a good Catholic, from a party that represents the ideals of the church”—which, he implied, obviously meant voting for the conservative Law and Justice Party (Smith, 2015).

Informal social interactions shape electoral behavior across the globe (Gunther et al., 2015; Zuckerman, 2005). Nonetheless, this regularity conceals great diversity in the ways social ties affect elections: *which* ties matter and *how* they matter. One source of variation relates to religious leaders and activists: some people and places are much more likely to be exposed to religious politicking than others. What accounts for this variation?

Utilizing a cross-national survey incorporating individual- and country-level data, we have addressed prominent explanations of religious politicking. Civilizational approaches claiming that some religious groups take to politics as a natural result of inherent doctrinal positions or immutable cultural traits prove insufficient. Instead, religious politicking is a response to environmental opportunities and constraints. Our findings partially support modernization theorists' predictions. While liberal democracy is statistically insignificant in multivariate analysis, the process of development tends to diminish religion's role in politics. And when policymakers adopt secular constitutional frameworks, they paradoxically encourage religious politicking. Finally, our results support the argument within the religious competition literature that religious pluralism leads to increased engagement in politics. And at the individual level, although individuals with more education are less religiously engaged, they are more likely to be targets of religious mobilization, and the impact of education is stronger in countries where religious politicking is more common.

Potential limitations to the study revolve around the nature of our country sample, and the reliance on individual self-reports. These limitations point toward avenues for further research. Most intriguingly, cross-national surveys of clergy could not only provide more direct measures of religious politicking, but also enable a better understanding of clergy motivations. Furthermore, survey experiments could enable researchers to examine how clergy respond to various incentives (Calfano, Michelson and Oldmixon, 2017; Smith, 2019). A final set of questions remains for future research. Does this form of social influence shape election outcomes? Does it matter differently in different times and places? Answering these questions will further illuminate the greatly varying forms of religious socialization around the world.

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APPENDIX

Descriptive Statistics: Exposure to Political Messages Among Religious Attenders

In Figure A1 and Figure A2, we present the distribution of exposure to political messages from religious associations and clergy within the subset of respondents who report ever attending religious service. While levels of exposure rise slightly using this alternative measurement, cross-country comparisons remain quite similar. In the remainder of the analysis, we report results for all respondents, not simply those attending religious service. This is important for consistency, since the proportion attending worship services varies substantially across countries.

Level of Exposure to Summary Measure of Religious Politicking

In Figure A3, we present an election-level average measure of religious politicking, based on each election's mean values of reported exposure to religious association and clergy messages. While this measure loses detail and risks conflating two different types of religious politicking, it has one distinct advantage: it incorporates all 24 countries, including the important case of the United States. On this summary measure, the U.S. is among the countries with highest levels of religious politicking, surpassed only by Mozambique 2004.

Individual- and Group-Level Determinants of Religious Organization Contact

Table A1 presents results from a series of hierarchical logistic regression models assessing how religious participation, education, and religious affiliation all shape the likelihood of exposure to political messages from religious associations and clergy.⁹ Roman Catholics are treated as the baseline category, so each coefficient should be interpreted as the extent to which the given group is more or less exposed to political messages than Roman Catholics.¹⁰

Education and religious affiliation consistently have sizable effects on exposure to clergy messages. We also find substantial differences between religious groups in exposure to political messages from religious leaders. Not surprisingly, the non-religious report much lower levels of exposure than do Catholics—an effect that holds even after controlling for frequency of religious attendance. Confucians, Buddhists, and Taoists likewise report very low levels of receiving political information from religious associations, though the effect of adherence to these two religious groups becomes statistically insignificant once we control for frequency of religious attendance.

More interesting are the effects for Protestants, evangelicals, and Muslims. Consistent with H1, Protestants and evangelicals are exposed to significantly higher levels of religious politicking than are Catholics. However, the effect of Protestant affiliation is only significant in the model of exposure to religious association messages, and disappears after controlling for frequency of religious attendance. By contrast, the effect of evangelicalism is only statistically significant in the model of exposure to clergy messages, and holds after controlling for religious

⁹ Equivalent fixed effects logistic regression models produce virtually identical results.

¹⁰ The religiously unaffiliated would make an uninformative baseline, since their levels of exposure to political messages are much lower than every religious group, and coefficients would not indicate clearly the differences among various religious groups.

participation. In the models of the summary index, Protestantism and evangelicalism both significantly predict exposure to either type of message; the effect of evangelicalism remains statistically significant even after controlling for religious attendance. Thus, engagement in electoral politics does appear to be a distinctive feature of evangelical groups, and to a lesser extent Protestant ones.

Turning to Islam, our results partially contradict H1, which had predicted a positive effect of this religious affiliation. By contrast, we find that Muslims are less likely than adherents to other major world religions to receive political messages from civic associations. At the same time, they are significantly more likely than Catholics—but less likely than evangelicals—to hear about elections from the pulpit. In models of the summary dependent variable, we find no statistically significant difference between Catholics and Muslims.

Figure A4 examines the role of other demographics in predicting who reports messages from either clergy or religious associations. This analysis involves single-country models because the other demographic variables are missing in scattered other countries. Across the models, there are no other consistently statistically significant effects.

Alternative Models Assessing Contextual Determinants of Religious Politicking

Table A2 presents multilevel models assessing the contextual determinants of the index of religious politicking. The model is identical to the multilevel models of religious association information found in the main text, with the exception of the change in the dependent variable. Results from the first five models are very similar to those found in the main text. However, in the pooled model incorporating all five contextual variables, there are no statistically significant contextual variables—likely a result of complex multicollinearity among the variables.

Next, Table A3 presents an election-level OLS model, applying multiple regression to the data analyzed using bivariate correlation coefficients in the main text. Here, we find that religious pluralism and human development are the two significant determinants of the summary index of religious politicking.

Correlations Among Country-Level Variables

In Table A4, we present the correlations among the country-level independent variables. We find strong correlations between liberal democracy and human development; and between religious pluralism and secularism. As discussed in the text, these correlations could introduce some multicollinearity into regression models incorporating all five country-level variables.

Cross-Level Hierarchical Model of Contact from Religious Organizations

Table A5 presents a series of multilevel hierarchical models involving cross-level interactions between education and each contextual variable in turn. Key results are presented in the final figure in the main text. The model shows significant interactions between education and four of the five contextual variables: liberal democracy, human development, religious repression, and secularism.

Inequality as a Determinant of Religious Politicking

As discussed in several footnotes within the paper, one plausible alternative hypothesis is that inequality matters, rather than the level of development as such. We develop a measure of inequality based on V-Dem (Varieties of Democracy). Though the results are ambiguous, on balance they suggest that inequality is not a key determinant of religious politicking. The Pearson correlation coefficient between inequality and religious association messages is 0.46 ($p = .03$). The inequality index is also statistically significant in a multilevel model of religious association messages with a single country-level variable. Including both inequality and human development index in one multilevel model, however, leads both variables to become statistically insignificant, likely in part because inequality and human development are correlated at $r = -.44$ ($p = .04$).

However, the measure of religious association messages excludes the United States. The U.S. is an important case for examining the role of inequality, since the country has among the highest levels of religious politicking in our data but moderate levels of inequality in cross-national context. The measure of clergy politicking incorporates the United States. Using this measure, the country-level correlation between inequality and politicking is -0.14 ($p = 0.76$). Developing a summary measure of religious politicking that is present in all cases, as discussed earlier in the Appendix, we find that the correlation between politicking and inequality is 0.34 ($p = 0.12$). Similarly, the effect of inequality is not statistically significant in country-level OLS models predicting levels of religious politicking; this holds in both bivariate and multivariate analysis.

FIGURE A1
EXPOSURE TO POLITICAL MESSAGES FROM RELIGIOUS ASSOCIATIONS
(RELIGIOUS ATTENDERS ONLY)





FIGURE A2
EXPOSURE TO POLITICAL MESSAGES FROM CLERGY (RELIGIOUS ATTENDERS ONLY)



**FIGURE A3
DISTRIBUTION OF RELIGIOUS POLITICKING**




TABLE A1
INDIVIDUAL-LEVEL DETERMINANTS OF CONTACT FROM RELIGIOUS ORGANIZATIONS

	Clergy	Clergy	Clergy	Association	Association	Association	Any Message	Any Message	Any Message
Religious Attendance		1.219** (0.145)	1.240** (0.149)		1.964** (0.199)	2.035** (0.265)		1.596** (0.117)	1.572** (0.129)
Education			0.782** (0.209)			0.534 (0.314)			0.698** (0.183)
None	-1.129** (0.201)	-0.737** (0.230)	-0.681** (0.236)	-2.501** (0.317)	-1.194** (0.399)	-1.202** (0.463)	-1.297** (0.145)	-0.775** (0.188)	-0.706** (0.198)
Protestant	0.203 (0.151)	0.151 (0.153)	0.132 (0.161)	0.317* (0.135)	0.219 (0.147)	0.197 (0.185)	0.327** (0.106)	0.174 (0.114)	0.123 (0.131)
Evangelical	0.980** (0.172)	0.821** (0.175)	0.867** (0.180)	0.262 (0.358)	-0.052 (0.458)	0.031 (0.507)	0.879** (0.148)	0.651** (0.157)	0.731** (0.165)
Orthodox	-0.322 (0.609)	-0.373 (0.611)	-0.332 (0.613)	0.238 (0.459)	0.158 (0.459)	0.341 (0.454)	0.148 (0.375)	0.065 (0.376)	0.203 (0.372)
Muslim	0.571** (0.193)	0.524** (0.200)	0.681** (0.207)	-0.343 (0.181)	-0.711** (0.249)	-0.423 (0.265)	0.055 (0.144)	-0.015 (0.169)	0.254 (0.180)
Other	0.062 (0.207)	0.098 (0.211)	0.130 (0.244)	-0.429* (0.211)	-0.359 (0.225)	0.275 (0.352)	-0.140 (0.154)	-0.116 (0.163)	0.129 (0.213)
Buddhist	0.542 (0.482)	0.866 (0.481)	0.937 (0.490)	-1.581** (0.551)	-0.091 (0.653)	-0.638 (0.783)	-0.268 (0.334)	0.557 (0.395)	0.513 (0.426)
Taoist	0.574 (0.501)	0.937 (0.501)	1.028* (0.510)	-1.773* (0.831)	-0.508 (0.890)	-0.655 (0.886)	-0.178 (0.394)	0.558 (0.440)	0.576 (0.449)
Constant	-3.144** (0.360)	-3.917** (0.341)	-4.270** (0.411)	-4.916** (0.446)	-6.439** (0.502)	-7.123** (0.584)	-4.600** (0.423)	-5.684** (0.490)	-6.238** (0.582)
Observations	9617	946	8239	33305	26885	21107	35193	28762	22982

FIGURE A4
INDIVIDUAL-LEVEL DETERMINANTS OF CONTACT FROM
RELIGIOUS ORGANIZATIONS
(SINGLE-COUNTRY RESULTS)




TABLE A2
MULTI-LEVEL MODEL OF RECEIVING ANY POLITICAL CONTACT

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
Liberal Democracy	-3.775** (1.442)					-2.864 (2.252)
Human Development Index		-4.873** (1.731)				-0.854 (2.497)
Repression of Religious Groups			1.862 (1.804)			2.271 (1.643)
Secularism				2.499** (0.742)		0.950 (0.854)
Religious Pluralism					3.231** (1.237)	1.332 (1.231)
Observations	34207	33938	34207	34207	35193	32958

TABLE A3
OLS MODEL: DETERMINANTS OF RELIGIOUS POLITICKING

	(1) Religious Politicking Index	(2) Religious Association Information
Liberal Democracy	-0.028 (0.050)	-0.012 (0.029)
Human Development Index	-0.119* (0.057)	-0.132** (0.039)
Religious Repression	-0.007 (0.036)	0.013 (0.023)
Secularism	-0.011 (0.019)	0.002 (0.011)
Religious Pluralism	0.088** (0.029)	-0.013 (0.025)
Observations	22	21

NOTE: Standard errors in parentheses. * $p < .10$, * $p < .05$, ** $p < .01$ Source: Comparative National Elections Project.

TABLE A4
CORRELATIONS AMONG COUNTRY-LEVEL VARIABLES

	Liberal Democracy	Human Development	Religious Repression	Religious Pluralism	Secularism
Liberal Democracy	1.000				
Human Development	0.747 (0.000)	1.000			
Religious Repression	0.328 (0.127)	-0.009 (0.969)	1.000		
Religious Fractionalization	-0.189 (0.387)	-0.346 (0.106)	0.217 (0.320)	1.000	
Secularism	-0.450 (0.031)	-0.465 (0.029)	0.192 (0.379)	0.538 (0.008)	1.000

NOTE: Pearson correlation coefficients. P-values in parentheses. N = 24.
Source: Comparative National Elections Project.

TABLE A5
CROSS-LEVEL MODEL OF RECEIVING CONTACT FROM RELIGIOUS ORGANIZATIONS

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)
Education	1.420** (0.372)	1.261** (0.392)	3.054** (0.888)	-1.157 (0.974)	0.611 (0.379)
Liberal Democracy	-2.989* (1.523)				
Educ. × Liberal Democracy	-1.864** (0.714)				
Human Development Index		-4.779** (1.771)			
Educ. × HDI		-1.314† (0.754)			
Repression of Religious Groups			4.977† (2.539)		
Educ. × Relig. Repression			-4.173** (1.498)		
Secularism				1.698† (0.874)	
Educ. × Secularism				1.954† (1.005)	
Religious Pluralism					3.161† (1.707)
Educ. × Relig. Pluralism					0.181 (0.700)
No Religion	-2.088** (0.366)	-2.382** (0.354)	-2.164** (0.369)	-2.126** (0.367)	-2.546** (0.350)
Protestant	0.201 (0.173)	0.210 (0.168)	0.208 (0.173)	0.192 (0.173)	0.217 (0.166)
Evangelical	0.335 (0.383)	0.362 (0.382)	0.282 (0.384)	0.374 (0.382)	0.368 (0.383)
Orthodox	0.359	0.322	0.442	0.450	0.389

TABLE A5
CROSS-LEVEL MODEL OF RECEIVING CONTACT FROM RELIGIOUS ORGANIZATION

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)
	(0.452)	(0.458)	(0.444)	(0.436)	(0.447)
Muslim	-0.039 (0.213)	-0.050 (0.211)	-0.037 (0.212)	-0.068 (0.211)	-0.071 (0.209)
Other	-0.070 (0.336)	0.000 (0.333)	-0.084 (0.335)	-0.114 (0.335)	-0.086 (0.323)
Confucian		-2.121* (1.059)			-2.006† (1.051)
Buddhist	-1.414† (0.767)		-1.466† (0.765)	-1.479* (0.752)	-2.155** (0.668)
Taoist	-1.520† (0.870)		-1.565† (0.867)	-1.569† (0.856)	-1.909* (0.825)
Constant	-3.045** (1.162)	-1.928 (1.279)	-8.641** (1.674)	-6.193** (0.747)	-6.344** (0.699)
Observations	26157	25787	26157	26157	27143

NOTE: Standard errors in parentheses. † $p < .10$, * $p < .05$, ** $p < .01$ Source: Comparative National Elections Project.