THE ANDEAN INDIGENIST PROGRAM, 1951–1975: INTEGRATION, DEVELOPMENT, STATE FORMATION, AND WOMEN

MERCEDES PRIETO

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THE ANDEAN INDIGENIST PROGRAM, 1951–1975:
INTEGRATION, DEVELOPMENT, STATE FORMATION, AND WOMEN

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ABSTRACT

This paper examines the Andean Indigenist Program (AIP) sponsored by the International Labour Organization (ILO), other United Nations agencies, and the Andean states as a response to their need to administer rural Andean populations. The paper argues that development, as a globalized mode of administration of indigenous peoples, overlaps both the old national concerns about political integration of such peoples and the protection of indigenous workers advocated by the ILO. In this sense, development is a discourse with multiple layers; it is not merely a novel cultural artifact produced in the framework of the Cold War but a product of long global and national debates over the governance of indigenous peoples. At the same time, this convergence of integration, social protection, and development sparked concerns about indigenous women that guided actions to confine them as mothers in the home while also educating them and offering them a public role as subjects empowered to receive and reproduce locally the policies of the program and the national state—a process that was resisted and challenged by women themselves. The AIP is not only a product of global discourses but embodies interventions through discursive imagery and bureaucratic mechanisms installed in state apparatuses to foster social protection in rural areas. Its effectiveness as a mechanism for the administration of populations comes from an encounter between the economy and processes of self-subjection to the state through what came to be called “community development.”

RESUMEN

Este trabajo examina el Programa Indigenista Andino (PIA) auspiciado por la Organización Internacional del Trabajo (OIT), otras agencias de las Naciones Unidas y los estados andinos como una respuesta a la necesidad de administrar las poblaciones rurales e indígenas andinas. Argumenta que el desarrollo, como un modo globalizado de administración de la población indígena, se yuxtapone tanto sobre la vieja preocupación de la integración política de esta población como con la idea de protección de los trabajadores indígenas propugnada por la OIT. En este sentido, el desarrollo es un discurso de múltiples capas; no es solo un nuevo discurso cultural producido en el marco de la Guerra Fría, sino que aparece como un producto de largos debates globales y nacionales sobre la gobernanza de las agrupaciones indígenas. Al mismo tiempo, esta convergencia de integración, protección social y desarrollo propició, una problematización de las mujeres indígenas que informó acciones dirigidas a su maternalización y confinamiento en el hogar, pero también a su escolarización y participación comunitaria para constituirlas en sujetos aptos de recibir y expandir localmente los deseos del programa y el estado, proceso resistido y disputado por las mujeres. El PIA no fue sólo una retórica global, sino que encarnó intervenciones locales a través de imaginarios discursivos y mecanismos burocráticos implantados en los aparatos estatales en la búsqueda de formas de protección de la población indígena de áreas rurales. Su eficacia como mecanismo de administración de las poblaciones se sustenta en el encuentro entre el objetivo de crecimiento económico y el proceso de auto-sujección al estado a través de lo que se llamó “desarrollo de la comunidad.”
This paper explores the discourses and practices of the Andean Indigenist Program (AIP), one of the earliest development initiatives implemented by the United Nations, led by the International Labour Organization (ILO) with the collaboration of many of its newly created agencies. The program, which also promoted the participation of host states and beneficiary communities, sought new forms to administer indigenous populations. It was an intervention that combined the discourses of integration, social protection, and development of indigenous groups.  

Three issues will be discussed: (a) the conflicting languages used in the design and deployment of the initiative; (b) the effects of the program on the process of state expansion into rural indigenous communities in the Andean highlands; and (c) the interventions’ impact on the lives and bodies of women, seen as the main intermediaries between communities and external agents. The discussion includes a detailed review of the guiding concepts of the program and a chronology of its operation in the three countries visited from the outset by the AIP—Bolivia, Ecuador, and Peru—as well as its attempt to expand to the frontiers of the Andes, using Chile as a case in point.  

In the initial phase of the program, the United Nations agencies negotiated the conditions for its implementation with each Andean state. These exchanges created, in turn, the conditions for the expansion of the state administration into the indigenous countryside. At the same time, the deployment of the program’s actions led the AIP to recognize the need to recreate the indigenous family in order to assign to it the roles of domesticating and “maternalizing” women. In addition, the program proposed educational activities for women, a precondition in order to delegate to them several functions in the local operation of the state. It is in this wide scenario that indigenous women intersect with several social processes, including state formation, cultural and political integration, and economic development—all in all, a controversial and clearly disputed interventionist dynamic.

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1 It is important to mention that, in the Andean region, the technology of development had gone through various earlier trials before the AIP attempted to offer a comprehensive proposal to guide state interventions. These include, among others, the efforts by the Catholic Church (Fitzpatrick-Behrens 2012), Cornell University (Pribilsky 2010), and the Rockefeller Foundation (Guthrie 2009). The notions of technical cooperation *in situ*, community development, and economic growth were important elements with their own particular genealogies; the AIP brought them all together.

2 This study will leave aside AIP’s interventions concerned with orienting indigenous migrations from the highlands to low mountain areas in San Juan del Oro in Tambopata, Peru, and Cotoca, near Santa Cruz, Bolivia. I concentrate on actions deployed in the highland areas of the Andes.
My point of departure is the documents that detail the design of the program, followed by materials from its implementation phase, with particular attention to several evaluation exercises. The latter record not only the disputed language of the program but also the interaction of its stakeholders during the setup of its various strategies. I complement these sources with interviews with several surviving actors of the international enterprise in Ecuador and Chile. Taken as a whole, these sources portray a multifaceted series of debates, trials, adjustments, and negotiations needed to get the program started. They also reveal multiple layers in the discourse used to refer both to its object of desire—its target population—as well as to its intention and effects—the meanings of international intervention—thus adding to the complexity of the social initiative.

Studies that have delved into the history of development have given special attention to the links between development and several global happenings: the processes of decolonization and the challenges it posed to the ex-metropolis (Cooper 1996; Cooper and Packard 1997); the onset of the United Nations system (Maurel 2012; Guthrie 2015); the geopolitics of the so-called Cold War period (Rodriguez-Piñero 2005; Pribilsky 2010); and the financial dynamics of global capitalism (Harper 2000). Other studies have explored the contributions of development to the formation of a globalized power grid with the collaboration of social scientific discourse (Escobar 1995; Ferguson 1997; Gupta 1998; Mitchell 2002; among others), to social stratification and gender inequalities (Boserup 1970; Babb 1980 [1976]; among many others), and to variations of coloniality (Mohanty 2003 [1984]; Parpart and Marchant 2003; Radcliffe 2006; Radcliffe, Laurie, and Andolina 2006; among others). Less attention has been given to the ways in which development, as a global discourse, became intertwined with national states, although an interest in development bureaucracies, both global and local, has persisted for several decades and continues active today (e.g., Ferguson 1990; Harper 2000; Gupta 2012). I believe, however, that development is also part of the formation process of national states—and of the subjection and administration as well as the resistance of local populations that state power implies—a process that has given rise to intellectual debates, amnesias, and negotiations that have not been fully documented and analyzed (Prieto 2015). My review of the AIP assumes an encounter of development, state subjection and local disputes—a field for debate suggested by Frederick Cooper and Randall Packard (1997).
This essay argues that the AIP represents a global discourse with several layers in which several ideas converge—development, integration, and protection—in order to pressure a renewal of the state and its bureaucracy in rural settings. It argues that the efficacy of the program’s proposal rested in the conflation of the notions of economic development and community development; it was this combination that opened the way to imagine new forms of delegation in the operation of the state. Likewise, the renewed local presence of the state sought women as a pivotal actor who must be trained and cultivated to receive, manage, and share changes in indigenous everyday life along the modernizing models of the program. This role as intermediaries of change converted women into local delegates of the program and state action. Such a role, however, was not only a controversial proposal but a disputed assignment between indigenous women and female bureaucrats.

THE PRODUCTION AND EVOLUTION OF THE AIP

An early issue in the agenda of the International ILO was the question of “indigenous workers” in colonial territories (Rodriguez-Piñero 2005; Guthrie 2015). The creation of the Committee of Experts on Native Labor in 1926 is a reference point for the future AIP. This committee was formed to investigate and regulate the living and working conditions of original inhabitants of colonized areas, a concern that was later extended to original populations in independent countries. Indeed, in 1936, ILO’s First Regional Conference of the Americas requested information about the situation of indigenous workers from member governments, a clear signal that it was contemplating possible actions to deal with the deteriorating working and living conditions of native populations (Rens 1961, 1963; OIT 1961; Martínez Cobo 1982: 9); the organization was on track to develop strategies for the social protection of this particular group of self-employed workers.

During a meeting held in La Paz in 1951, the Expert Commission on Indigenous Work decided to conduct a special survey to determine the situation of indigenous workers in the Andean region. The Commission concluded that identifying the problematic factors that affected indigenous lives would allow governments, aided by the specialized agencies of the

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3 Interest in original indigenous peoples expanded to the global stage. This same Commission approved a worldwide study. Thus, both old and emerging nations compiled information about living and working conditions of indigenous peoples, which served to prepare a global report on the subject (ILO 1953).
United Nations, to attempt a program of change. The Andean region had been selected as a laboratory to experiment with a program of “integration”—sometimes called “social protection”—but also of “development” of indigenous peoples. The objective was to systematically observe the conditions of possibility of such an effort and, in particular, document the changes caused by intentional strategies to integrate indigenous groups into modern nation-states. The task was assigned to a mission\(^4\) deployed to Bolivia, Peru, and Ecuador. This group had plenty to do: deepen the initial diagnostic studies; propose a program of change; and agree with the national governments on what actions would be undertaken, how they would be organized and financed, and where they would take place (Naciones Unidas 1953a).

**The Mission to the Andes**

The mission that travelled to the Andes was composed of specialists of many nationalities, in a variety of disciplines, associated with different academic and public institutions. They were all male; women were hired only to provide secretarial support. Chart 1, which summarizes the origin and professional fields of the mission’s members, shows that it was a mixed group: it was not a techno-bureaucracy with roots in the main social scientific disciplines but a group with a humanist inclination (lawyers, educators, and anthropologists) that originated mainly in Latin America. Indigenists with various specialities and anthropologists made up the core of the mission group—confirming the relationship of the academic discipline of anthropology with the origins of development (Ferguson 1997). Some of the Latin American members had been trained in the United States (for example, Ecuadorian Aníbal Buitrón) or had links with North American institutions such as the Rockefeller Foundation (for example, Enrique Sánchez de Losada). The mission’s chief, Ernest Beaglehole, had formative experiences in a variety of locations (New Zealand, Great Britain, and the United States). This transnational background preempted potential objections from national governments, weary of external meddling with their problems and sovereignty. And, of course, the mission’s composition contributed to shaping its analytical presuppositions and discourse. The concepts underlying the program emerged, in turn, from the experiences of the United States and New Zealand with their “own” native populations; lessons

\(^4\) Initially called the “Joint Mission for the Andean Highlands” (Misión Conjunta para el Altiplano Andino), it later became the Andean Indigenist Mission (Misión Indigenista Andina).
from the revolutions in Mexico and Guatemala; and a variety of global practices in the fields of labor relations, agriculture, health, and education.

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**CHART 1**

**ORIGIN AND TRAINING OF MEMBERS OF THE ANDEAN MISSION**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Latin America</th>
<th>Others</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Humanities</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sciences</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>4</td>
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</table>

Source: Naciones Unidas (1953a).
*The data exclude support personnel.

The mission’s journey started in Mexico—where it was welcomed by renowned indigenists—with a visit to the Mezquital Valley and Chiapas. In Guatemala, the group observed the implementation of novel health programs (Naciones Unidas 1953a: 9). In Bolivia, Peru, and Ecuador, given the need to enlist the collaboration of the governments, the visit paid particular attention to meetings with public officials. Members also met with specialists on Andean indigenous groups in order to assess critical issues and problems in each country and enrich the mission’s initial diagnosis; they also visited potential sites for the implementation of the future program.

In 1953, the mission handed the United Nations and the ILO a detailed report that included the results of their diagnostic work and recommendations for a future program. This document became the basis for the negotiations with each country. It proved to be a two-prong exercise: first, it compiled the state of knowledge about the region and each nation, a necessary input to design interventions that could adjust to local realities; second, it served as an instrument to establish a general accord among the commission’s members regarding the concepts that should guide the proposed program. Concepts such as “integration,” “development,” “integrality,”
among others, had been part of the repertoire of some of its members and would become central building blocks of the strategy (Naciones Unidas 1953a, 1953b). The debates within the mission had as an obligatory reference point the ILO’s guidelines regarding labor relations among native peoples and the mechanisms needed to protect them in the midst of cultural and social changes with respect to both individual dignity and personal fulfillment (Beaglehole 1953: 66).

The Mission’s Report: Assumptions and Points of View

The report prepared by the mission is a complex document two volumes long. Upon analysis, it is plausible to argue that the first volume summarizes what appear to be the agreements among its members and the second, the complex or unresolved issues that confronted the group. The document includes individual positions, at times at odds with each other, on topics derived from the task’s imagined objectives. Disagreement was undoubtedly present in the group’s discussions.

The issues brought out by the report are related to two subjects: first, the definition of “original” or “indigenous” populations in the Andes; and second, the causes of the segregation or isolation (geographic, historical, cultural, economic, and social) these groups suffered. Segregation or isolation (the report used the term “apartness”) was precisely the phenomenon that the AIP sought to eradicate by deploying strategies of “integration”—also, as mentioned, referred to as “social protection” or “development.” Before analyzing this central objective of the program, it is important to review four other dimensions of its production: its regional scope, its conception as a laboratory for observation, and its integral and participatory perspectives.

Regional scope. The mission’s proposal assumes that even though the Andean region was made up of independent nations, these shared the same historical, economic, and cultural matrix. The group of experts linked the problems facing Andean indigenous groups to common denominators of which history was the overall explanatory element: the region shared the Inca Empire, Spanish colonial rule, and a Republican elite that excluded the indigenous world from its nation-building efforts. Such a backdrop allowed the program the use of a regional standpoint (Naciones Unidas 1953a: 36).

5 Several authors took on the idea that the Inca Empire was the historical matrix of the present-day Andean region. Alfred Métraux (1969) and Jef Rens (1961), for example, insisted that the greatness of the Empire should be used to bolster the present. In contrast, it is interesting to note that the design of the AIP did not take into account factors of the economic situation: economies devoted to the exploitation of raw materials, low per-capita income (the latter is
Laboratory and practical actions. The commission’s proposal called for interventions that would be locally validated through practical actions oriented toward change. It foresaw the establishment of “bases of action,” conceived as laboratories, from which the program would deploy its resources to the target population. To make observation a reality, all actions were to be systematically registered and evaluated, thus creating the evidence needed for discovering lessons and assessing the possibilities of replication or expansion. The diagnostic research identified the social scenarios to be transformed: family-household, labor-production, and community-territory; the tools for change were actions in the fields of education, health, housing, technology, training, productive diversification, and, later, financial credit.

“Integrity” and “simultaneity.” The idea of a laboratory was also linked to integrity and simultaneity, two concepts belonging to a systemic view of culture. This analytic gaze, derived from functional anthropological thought, sees culture as an integrated and organic system of meanings. Given that all cultural functions are interconnected, affecting one component has repercussions in others. This idea of an integrated culture supposes that, in order to modify an element, whatever changes must be, in a sense, compensated for, so as to maintain social equilibrium and avoid dysfunctions. Isolated actions would have, according to the argument, negative effects—mainly ineffectiveness—for indigenous peoples and the nations as a whole, which would, in turn, provoke “discouragement and lack of interest” in interventions (Naciones Unidas 1953a: 5, 40).

Participation and community development. The authors of the AIP did not see it as a program “to benefit” indigenous populations but as an initiative that would stimulate the desires for betterment and statization in them, leading eventually to their integration into the national society as users of social protection services. In this framework, “participation” was seen as a mechanism that would transfer the program’s content and purposes to the conscious agenda of the groups themselves (Naciones Unidas 1953a: 37). Participation, then, was the basic ingredient of both “community development” and the effort and commitment of the program’s multidisciplinary field teams. These teams would have to exercise respect, avoid discriminatory

only mentioned in a footnote, Naciones Unidas 1953a: 34); difficult balance of payments, emerging inflation in countries such as Bolivia; among others (Stephen Urbanski 1962). The lack of centrality assigned to economic aspects in the design of the program departs from the implantation of development as described by Escobar (1995) for Colombia.
attitudes, understand the community’s inner workings, and constantly promote involvement. The objective was to provoke communities themselves into defining their interests and needs but, most importantly, into taking charge of the administration of the services provided by the program.

**Rhetorical and Geographical Displacement: A Chronology**

As mentioned before, the language used by the Andean initiative was unstable and fluid. Indeed, an analysis of the statements used by the initial mission’s members and the actors who followed—functionaries who acted as negotiators with the regional governments, international technical assistance experts and their national counterparts—allows us to recognize two main moments in the program’s rhetoric. The first moment is guided by an overarching objective: the integration of indigenous peoples into nation-states. The second moment shifts to a more instrumental objective: changing the living conditions of indigenous peoples in the framework of national economic development. The latter movement tended to refer and call attention to the peasant and rural condition of indigenous groups, more so than to their credentials as original peoples.

**Integration of indigenous original peoples.** The initial approach of the program was integrationist. The desires for integration expressed by the mission’s members appear as an ongoing proposal that was slowly fleshed out in each country as the diagnostic study put forth the problems affecting the original Andean population mainly in term of “apartness” or segregation (also translated into Spanish as isolation). This notion of apartness is supported by observations of several factors: a rugged territory, hard on inhabitants and limiting agricultural production and marketing; lack of agricultural land combined with subjection to the hacienda land-owning system; anachronistic, low-productivity farming methods and labor use with little or no relevance to the nations’ economies; nutritionally inadequate frugal diets with no links to internal markets; lack of access to education and health care; survival of native languages; mistreatment and discrimination by the non-indigenous population; and absence from the political system at all territorial levels. In other words, indigenous groups were absent from the social practices that determine recognition and identity in mainstream national culture. The mission, however, acknowledged that apartness did have attributes of value that should be
protected during integration. Of special interest was an idea of original “community,” based on kinship, because of its connotations of solidarity, mutual aid, and collective work (United Nations 1953a).

Integration depended in many ways on erasing this long list of problematic consequences of indigenous segregation. Thus, the mission’s proposal maintains a civilizing tone, albeit softened by the recognition of positive values of indigenous cultures—associated with the supposed greatness of the Inca Empire. The factors that require change can be grouped around the three scenarios of intervention, already mentioned: labor-production, family-household, and community-territory. These objects of intervention translated into strategies that included: diversification of productive activities; improving productivity and organization of the labor force; schooling and introduction of the national language; promoting healthy bodies and hygienic practices in household and public spaces; reordering community life with new civil practices—e.g., sports and women’s groups; and new forms of political deliberation and decision-making about local problems and needs.

The idea of integration, however, had different sub-meanings for the group of specialists. The ILO’s functionaries, for example, saw it in terms of the guidelines of the Declaration of Philadelphia of 1944. A few years after the initial mission, Jef Rens (1961), Adjunct Director of the ILO, insisted that the notion as used by the AIP reflected the humanist approach contained in the Declaration. In his view, this doctrine recognized particular cultural values in indigenous peoples and sought to protect those values and overtake prejudices against them. A two-pronged strategy was needed to achieve this objective: first, an effort by indigenous groups themselves to improve their conditions; and second, acceptance of indigenous peoples as fellow citizens by the non-indigenous population (Rens 1961: 432). The Andean members of the Mission, on the other hand, saw the road to acceptance into the nation-state as an opportunity to push a civilizing agenda as a precondition to full integration (language training, hygiene, etc.).

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6 This approach to integration recognizes that every human being has the opportunity to gain a living by his own means, for himself and his family, and be protected from adversity and poverty—a view contained in the ILO’s Declaration of Philadelphia.
Such nuances aside, the mission’s core shared a “ventriloquist” form of access to the indigenous world; beyond the extended belief in participation and detection of felt needs, it did not truly recognize the role of indigenous public voices in the definition of the intervention’s agenda. For example, the mission’s report—drawing a lesson from Bolivia—expressly mentions that the road to integration via electoral participation was inadequate; in that country, the right to vote for the mostly illiterate indigenous population had not, in their assessment, altered segregation (Naciones Unidas 1953a: 33).

Documents contained in the appendix to the mission’s report reinforce the idea that the agreed-upon statements presented to the governments had been the subject of considerable debate. Again, the concept of integration was the main topic of discussion. On one side, the mission’s chief, New Zealander Ernest Beaglehole (1953), together with Englishman David Blelhoç (1953), argued that integration would be stimulated by economic development and improvements to the conditions of employment of indigenous groups in the context of—a hoped for—increasing industrialization. Thus, they emphasized the need for professional and technical training, formation of cooperatives, and increasing agricultural productivity. On another side, Latin American specialists tended to prioritize a cultural view of discriminatory practices that, in their opinion, had resulted in indigenous persons of both sexes becoming apathetic and conservative beings. To contend with this reality, interventions must, in a civilizing effort, modify such behaviors and attitudes; and it follows that the favored scenario for achieving such changes would be schooling (Ó. Núñez del Prado 1953; Rubio Orbe 1953).

The landowning structure—large properties in the hands of an oligarchy—was a particularly complex issue. The mission as a whole saw the hacienda system as an anachronism that threatened integration. They recognized, however, that reforming this system depended on sovereign political decisions in each nation; they anticipated that Bolivia, in the midst of land reform, would in time provide indications for other countries. In other words, the mission’s proposal was neither in favor nor against land or agrarian reform.8

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7 By “ventriloquist” I refer to the fact that, in many ways, AIP functionaries use the voice of indigenous men and women to justify their integration. “Ventriloquism” in the Andes has been explored particularly in reference to the administration of indigenous population in the landowning system (Guerrero 2010).

8 We have left out of our analysis the different agrarian reform processes and the social conflicts that accompanied these initiatives.
The mission’s specialists also agreed on the need to articulate the different dimensions of change—cultural, social, and economic—in order to avoid dysfunctional effects; changes should act together as “Siamese twins that live in harmony” (Beaglehole 1953: 52). They also agreed on the apparatus that could facilitate the optimal encounter of all dimensions: “community development.”

Community development was seen as a mechanism that promoted both understanding and willingness to participate among segregated populations. It was a practice in use in many and diverse settings including, for example, the United States, (Erasmus 1969), India (Gupta 1998), the Caribbean (Girvan 1993), and Africa (Parker 1962). It had been used with a variety of objectives—general welfare, access to resources, labor productivity—but also to organize and administrate target populations. This intervention technology had been praised and promoted during the Third Inter-American Indigenist Congress held in La Paz in 1954 (Comas 1954: 21). Praise was motivated by two characteristics of the mechanism: it promised an organized or “planned” course of change, and it created conditions to elicit the will of potential local partner populations; in other words, it could open a step-by-step process of negotiation together with an effort to communicate the idea of change—all in all, an elaborate ventriloquist form of detecting impulses or needs of target communities.

The United Nations was in the process of systematizing experiences with community development. The organization wanted to showcase processes in which local populations join forces with their national government to better their living conditions and grow ties with mainstream society that allow them to contribute to the country’s development (Ander-Egg 2006: 35). However, the model, which assumes that local communities have a latent interest in change, faced a problem: how to persuade these communities to accept and work for changes. That is why the mission proposed that initial “bases” in each Andean nation should meet a specific criterion: communities in which “endogenous” change was already in progress; i.e., they should be places where changes—in production and in educational centers, for example—were

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9 Community development actions expanded notably during the 1950 and 1960s, not only in Andean countries but in all of Latin America (Labastida 1967). Interest in the model among states and international agencies peaked in 1970 with the Declaration of Santiago, which states that for true community development to take place it is imperative to modify existing social structures (“Acta final” 1970). By this time, criticisms had accumulated about the model’s efficacy and intentions, methodological implementation, links to economic development, and consequences for reformist policies.
taking place by their own initiative. National political authorities, however, were not convinced by the strategy.

**Development: an encounter between economy and population.** In the 1960s, the AIP was subjected to an evaluation by the actors responsible for the program (OIT 1961; ILO 1962; Rens 1961, 1963), in which voices of outside stakeholders were also heard (Comas 1959; IEAG 1960). However, there were no voices of indigenous men or women. In general, the commentaries by a group of intellectuals are mixed; all highlight, as expected, both successes and failures in what, at the time, was still considered a pilot exercise.

The official voices of the ILO announced that the program’s most important achievement was having awakened the desire of indigenous communities to overcome their current reality; that is, a transformation in their collective spirit that recognized that changing their precarious living conditions was indeed possible (OIT 1961: 97–98). The ILO staff and external experts, on their part, gave a positive evaluation to several features of the program: its integrated approach, the climate of cooperation among field teams, the combination of local mobilization and newly introduced “technics of modern life,” the expansion of the educational system, acceptance of the program by governments, and its role in the transformation of national plans and social goals. However, they also observed with concern the political instability that resulted in frequent personnel changes in the social policy apparatus, as well as funding problems—low remuneration of national personnel and insufficient budget contributions to the program (ILO 1962: 104–106; Rens 1963). Also, as I discuss later, at that time the program’s female field staff questioned the efficacy but first and foremost the ways used to approach indigenous women (Vásquez and Villavicencio 1965). Other external criticisms focused on several dimensions: the fact that the program was not working with “true” original peoples, the lack of diversification of productive activities (IEAG 1960), and insufficient “acculturation” of partner indigenous groups (Comas 1959).

Another controversial issue surrounding the results of the program had to do with the use of a particular strategy of community development: what began to be referred as “self-help.” Observers argued that this approach had trapped the program in local dynamics and depoliticized its interaction with communities (Huizer 1967), both hurdles to achieving integration. Aníbal Buitrón (1961: 62), an Ecuadorian anthropologist at UNESCO who had followed the program
from its beginnings, believed that an important segment of the Andean indigenous population, particularly those enclosed by the *hacienda* system since colonial times, did not have the conditions to become partners in a process of community development. This group was deeply suspicious and fearful of foreign influences—an element of their widely assumed “resistance to change.” In addition, Buitrón pointed out that community development, particularly changes in the local economy, required an adequate flow of financial resources that was not being provided; he believed that for the mission’s interventions to work they should be part of an extensive and well-funded national or regional economic development program (Buitrón 1965: 53).

Years later, *América Indígena*, a journal published by the Inter-American Indigenist Institute, devoted an issue to the concept and experiences of community development, already broadly questioned as an unsuccessful model. Participants in the debate were mainly anthropologists from the Americas (United States, Canada, Mexico, and the Andes). The debate was motivated by the recent work of Charles Erasmus (1969), who argued that community development was reinforcing the existence of “reduced” subjects, incapable of improving their living conditions; these social subjects were dependent on state bureaucracies and international organizations, thus delaying any potential revolutions. Other authors had also highlighted the ideological and utopian nature of community development (Davis 1969), while several practicing specialists from South America were insisting on its educational and inclusionary value (García 1968). Meanwhile, radical anthropologists were re-evaluating the alleged “resistance to change” of indigenous and peasant populations, arguing that this behavior was a deliberate protective political action. Peasants were, according to this view, resisting changes proposed by community development programs because, as with the *haciendas*, these initiatives were run by states controlled by elites that had traditionally exploited them; “peasant distrust” was directed at all external interventions (Huizer 1973).

Several tendencies during the early 1960s led Latin American governments to integrate community development initiatives—among them the AIP—into nationwide economic development programs. These included the evaluation of and debate about community development efforts (ILO 1962: 106).
development, a climate in favor of agrarian reform spreading in many countries, and economic policies favoring import substitution. Governments were responding to the criticisms of community development, especially of its incapacity to create links with national economic growth; they were also, at the same time, preparing the ground for incipient agrarian reform initiatives.

Concurrently, the political climate of the decade was receptive to rumors and suspicions about the “imperialist” motivations of the AIP. Questions arose about the program’s infringement of national sovereignty. Andean governments seized the opportunity not only to integrate community development into their national development plans but also to take direct control of the AIP. The program was, first, affiliated with national integration programs and, later, to new peasant or rural development programs. This convergence of the concepts of community and economic development opened, in turn, an encounter among economy and population; the new evolving model proposed linkages between economic growth, social welfare, and everyday cultural practices of all population groups.

With such changes, the idea of development planning gained particular attention. At the same time, the role of international technical assistance changed from organizer to consultant, although it continued to act as an intermediary in fund-raising for ongoing programs (Rens 1983: 56). The new period of national growth required governments not only to have field personnel but to establish local actions with national development objectives: employment, productivity, food security, among others. There was, however, another important transmutation in the new wave of development interventions. Original peoples now appear as part of present-day demographic categories: peasants or rural inhabitants. In particular, original indigenous peoples came to be defined as all those groups that required integration into the nation-state (Rens 1963).

Beyond this rhetorical displacement, the idea of integration remained very much alive; it became the central topic in the discussions of the V Congress of the Inter-American Indigenist Institute held in Quito in 1964. Participants, however, accepted that integration was a policy issue within national development plans (Aguirre Beltrán 1965; Narváez and García 1965;
Huizer 1967). In many ways, at this moment, integration and development became equivalent concepts.12

All three central Andean countries requested Inter-American Development Bank (IDB) loans in order to link the AIP to their national economic development plans. It is difficult to establish with certainty the program’s flow of resources in each country. Chart 2 summarizes the data reported by the ILO. These data show that during the initial years of the program—its experimentation phase—United Nation’s agencies provided most of the funds, mostly in the form of payment of experts and use of special funds (pre-investment) as well as small donations from private sources (businesses and labor organizations). Later, when the program stepped into its expanding phase, international loans—classified by the ILO as part of the “national budget”—became the main source of funding. During the 1969–1973 period, Ecuador was the country that invested the most resources; in the previous period, 1963–1968, Peru showed the greatest interest in the program. Bolivia was the country with the least—and decreasing—flow of funds; after the initial bases were in place, no new funding sources appeared and the country decided not depend on loans.

The AIP’s articulation with national development plans was different in each country. In Ecuador, the program was allowed to extend to the whole highland region. In Peru, loans were used to deepen involvement in the communities selected for the experimental phase of the program (ILO 1970). These differences in expansion and re-orientation of the program were a sign of the end of the experimental nature of the program, although the ILO kept up a campaign in search of contributions and donations. The campaign used the original rhetoric of the Andean mission: that the indigenous population of the Andes lived in precarious conditions, isolated, and absent from national life (OIT 1961: 3–4)—and images very similar to the one Mitchell (2002) reconstructs when describing the implantation of development in Egypt.

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12 Later on, the concept of integration was subjected to its most damaging critique by the region’s anthropologists in the Declaration of Barbados (1971). This document accused states of promoting ethnocide and genocide among indigenous peoples through their integration initiatives.
The encounter between economic development and the social and cultural reality of Andean nations reinforced the image of dual societies composed of two distinct sectors: indigenous, rural, and agrarian dependent groups in contrast to a growing modern society symbolized by the city and industry. This was the core of modernization theories in vogue regionally and worldwide (Scott 2011). According to this paradigm, development interventions in rural settings should be directed at closing the gap between the two sectors—by introducing modern institutions and displacing traditional social arrangements. Within this framework, agrarian reform became the main protagonist of change. However, the AIP was recognized for its ability to engage difficult indigenous rural groups with community development actions. Development, as a general statement and goal, was slowly established as a necessary component of governmentality in indigenous communities.\(^{13}\)

\(^{13}\) Foucault (1991).
The expansion of development into Andean frontiers. During the time of expansion and re-orientation of the AIP’s bases of operation in the central Andes, the program was expanded to the countries that share an Andean frontier: Colombia (1960), Argentina and Chile (1961) and, finally, Venezuela (1964). The program remained in these countries until 1970.

This expansion responded to several factors: the desire for cooperation and technical assistance by the governments of those countries; the universalization of development experiences; the United Nations’ commitment to extend its cooperation network, including relocating experts from changing settings; the imagery of the Inca Empire in regional development discourse—a reality that for some commentators could be revived in the present (Métraux 1962, 1969). Though expansion to neighboring countries was a natural step for the Andean initiative, it is also true that the ILO wanted access to new areas in light of the transfer of many of its tasks to national agencies. For example, three international specialists who had been working in Ecuador were transferred to the Chilean program located in Arica.

The expansion benefited from the experience accumulated in the central Andes, in particular that of clearly defined administrative procedures. In Chile, the program partnered with an existing regional development agency, the “Junta de Adelanto de Arica,” established with the purpose of integrating so-called peoples of the interior. In this case, the rhetoric of development was already in place; what the local institution lacked was the technology to effectively connect indigenous groups with a dynamic of economic development. The peoples of the interior were communities of Aymara origin located on Chile’s northern border with Peru and Bolivia. This population had been subjected to a strong and violent process of nationalization (chilenización) since the beginning of the twentieth century. Chilean authorities, however, doubted these people’s sense of belonging to the country, given that the state had yet to provide them with basic social services, particularly health care. For Chilean authorities, this population was “Chilean”—i.e., it was not indigenous—but it remained isolated from the nation-state and exhibited “traditional” practices. The AIP’s contributions were concentrated in regional development plans and focused primarily on the material isolation of border communities. Its main proposal to integrate the target population into regional development focused on practical communication: constructing new access roads.
NEGOTIATIONS WITH NATION-STATES

Active and voluntary participation of states and their governments was an indispensable requisite both for the mission’s diagnostic study and for the design of a proposal and its implementation. The region’s governments, in the midst of considerable instability, gave signals that societies had begun to question what has been called “oligarchic domination” (Ansaldi and Giardomo 2012; Quintero 1986), while a nationalist and modernizing ideology was taking hold. Bolivia was emerging from a popular, nationalist revolution that evolved into a civilian government (1952–1956). Ecuador, for its part, with a history of precarious democratic government, was at the moment under conservative rule (1952–1956), still concerned with the reconstitution of the nation after a sizable territorial loss in an armed conflict with Peru. Meanwhile, Peru itself was under a moderate reformist military rule, known as the Ochenio (1948–1956), set on the expansion of state services. Thus, it is interesting to observe, first, that attention to national integration spanned the region and, second, that the Andean mission negotiated with diverse political regimes—revolutionary, elected, and authoritarian, a diversity that would continue during the period of implementation of the AIP. Andean States were in the process of reinforcing and expanding their welfare interventions in rural areas, particularly enrolling local populations in educational programs (Larson 2011) and exploring ways to organize health care delivery based on biomedical concepts.

Governments were required to request technical assistance from UN agencies. In addition, they had to commit to an active role during the planning phase of the country project. Finally, they were expected to share institutions, personnel, and resources (Naciones Unidas 1953a: 41). These features meant that the AIP was implanted within the bureaucratic apparatus of each country; this, in turn, resulted in many experiments, adjustments, or establishment of special institutional arrangements focused on the welfare of the indigenous and rural population.

For instance, the response of the Bolivian government to the mission’s proposal was the creation of what was called the Center for Peasant Rehabilitation, an agency under the existing Ministry of Peasant Affairs responsible for the agrarian reform process. The new center was responsible for acting in the post–agrarian reform phase and was headed by an international expert nominated by the government from a roster proposed by the United Nations; this expert, in turn, worked alongside a national coordinator named directly by the president of the republic.
The agency also had collective bodies with advisory and executive functions. For its part, the government of Ecuador, at the start of the program, did not consider necessary the creation of new agencies or collective bodies. Instead, it proposed that the initiative should be led by two independent national think tanks—the Ecuadorian Indigenist Institute and the Ecuadorian Institute of Anthropology and Geography. Both organizations had, according to the Government, trained professionals capable of selecting the required staff of international experts and national functionaries. In time, Ecuador established a relatively autonomous agency, the Ecuadorian Andean Mission, to operate the program under the supervision of the Ministry of Social Welfare and Labor. In the case of Peru, the Government opted for naming an inter-ministerial committee to supervise proposed activities, headed by a Peruvian director working within the Ministry of Labor. In sum, Bolivia and Ecuador used the AIP as an opportunity to create new public institutions, while Peru located it within existing institutional dynamics.

Governments also participated in the selection of locations where the program’s bases would operate, as well as in determining the objectives and types of actions in each one. Mission experts initially believed that the program should be launched in settings where change was taking place due to endogenous factors. Political authorities, however, had the opposite view: interventions should take place in locations that had no interest in change, in settings with social or political conflicts, or communities suffering from demographic pressure on their resources. In Peru the final consensus was, first, to concentrate efforts in areas with large indigenous populations known for their history of social conflict (Rénique 2004) and, second, support ongoing planned occupation programs to alleviate the strong demographic pressure in some areas. The selection of program locations in Ecuador was similar: areas with strong indigenous presence immersed in political conflicts, such as Riobamba, a central Andean city that had recently lived through an indigenous revolt. And, in the case of Bolivia, the pilot project was located in a zone also in conflict (Schweng 1962; Soliz 2015) but with newly obtained resources—redistribution of lands previously belonging to haciendas—with the objective of promoting their economic growth.

The first base of the AIP was established in Pillapi, Bolivia, in 1953. The next year, it was Peru’s turn with a base in Puno, which later expanded into the districts of Chucuito, Camicache,

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14 See “Correspondencia entre el Jefe de la Misión y los gobiernos de Bolivia, Ecuador y Perú” 1953.
and Taraco. These were followed by a base in Riobamba, Ecuador, in 1956.\textsuperscript{15} Beyond differences of opinion about locations, the governments shared the premise that all activities should be directed at integrating indigenous communities into the national life by contributing to their social and economic progress and improving household living conditions. The government of Bolivia, however, translated integration as “rehabilitation,” thus underlining the civilizing nature of the program. Such Bolivian language fits well with the idea of “mission” that Ecuador had emphasized and that, in time, became the dominant designation of the program in all three countries.

**Starting the Program**

The AIP’s actions in Ecuador and Peru were located in so-called free communities; that is, indigenous groups that possessed small plots of land, established links with the haciendas as free laborers, and lived in “deplorable” conditions. In Bolivia, in contrast, the program started in a peasant context, also with precarious social conditions but with recent access to new land as a result of the agrarian reform.

Equipped with the flexible notions of integration and community development, international experts and national professionals established the centers of action (or “bases”) in Pillapi, Riobamba, and Puno, the selected pilot locations. The bases did not have a previously defined structure. They were organized ad hoc (Rens 1961: 15), although each had a chief—at first, an international expert—and a team of specialists—of national or foreign provenance—to carry out the main tasks in the program’s areas of intervention: professional or technical training; a so-called fundamental education,\textsuperscript{16} agricultural production and animal husbandry; health and sanitation; community participation; and home-making. Specialists included educators, physicians, nurses, agronomists, veterinarians, anthropologists, and social workers; there were also carpenters, mechanics, artisans, and organizers of cooperatives. Each international expert had a national counterpart to train during his or her mission. At the same time, due to the

\textsuperscript{15} In Bolivia, these bases followed: Playa Verde in Oruro, Otaví in Potosí, and Cotoca in Santa Cruz. In Ecuador, bases were created in the capital cities of all the highland provinces, except Carchi. And, in Peru, the base at Puno was divided into three parts (Chucuito, Camicache, and Taraco) and later followed by San Juan del Oro in Tambopata; under the Plan Nacional de Integración de la Población Indígena, it later expanded to Cuzco, Ayacucho, Junín, and Ancash (OIT 1961).

\textsuperscript{16} The idea of fundamental education had high impact; it was proposed by UNICEF as a way to get communities to commit to education and social advancement.
experimental nature of the program, each base had to create an information system, a task shared by the professional team or, in some cases, delegated to the resident anthropologist. Team members would visit the field sporadically, following a rotation system created to make sure all of them had contact with each and every participating group or community. In some cases, field personnel would stay for short periods in indigenous communities.

Andean states had traditionally delegated their authority in rural areas to landowners (Guerrero 2010)—what was known as the gamonal order. By the time the AIP was implanted, this order had begun to crumble and states sought new ways to replace it. The new imagery about the role of the state in rural settlements was accompanied by the establishment of a specialized bureaucracy entrusted with the integration of indigenous groups. In Bolivia and Ecuador, as mentioned, welfare institutions and bureaucracy had no systematic presence in rural areas. Whatever existed was located in provincial (Ecuador) or departmental (Bolivia) capitals, many of which did not have the obligation to cater to rural inhabitants—although a few isolated schools had been established. In contrast, Peru had developed a more complex and dense bureaucracy to deal with political and welfare issues in rural areas; in fact, rural education had reached the district level, and health services were present in departmental and provincial cities. Thus, the AIP’s functionaries in Puno were able to work with this incipient welfare state apparatus, while those in Pillapi (a former hacienda) and the Riobamba region had no actual welfare state referent. Indeed, in Bolivia and Ecuador this absence of a public bureaucratic apparatus devoted to social welfare in rural areas set the stage for the dynamics of state formation—which would soon ensue and accompany the implantation of the AIP in each nation.

Bases had three levels of action: professional training centers; training of field workers or “promoters”; and direct attention to households, productive units, and communities. The professional training units exclusively recruited indigenous males and prepared them to be mechanics, carpenters, and craftsmen. Both indigenous men and women were recruited to be trained as promoters or auxiliaries; they were taught subjects such as community work, leadership, management, and cooperative organization, as well as project monitoring. Lastly, direct attention to subjects was geared, in communities, to the establishment of schools, craft workshops, demonstrative farms, collective organization (e.g., women’s groups), visits to homes, motivating and instructional talks, and meetings to discuss operational issues. This set of actions
was expected to converge into a dynamic of social change; i.e., community development (see Figure 1).

**FIGURE 1**

**ORGANIZATION OF THE BASES OF OPERATION OF THE AIP**

Education was the spearhead of the program in all three nations. More than design criteria and the principle of integrated and parallel actions, education was clearly in the repertoire of manifested indigenous interests; indeed, local communities showed great ability to take advantage of this resource the program offered them. The initial interest in the program was concentrated in construction or refurbishing of school buildings and training of teachers. Our three case studies show, however, that incorporation of women into education, in spite of incentives, was slow and complex. With schools as a vantage point, the other program components advanced slowly.

The program demanded professional resources that were only just beginning to emerge in the Andean nations, and the personnel available had little or no experience in rural fieldwork. This is why the AIP adopted an additional and important task: training field workers in agricultural extension, agricultural economics, fundamental education, anthropology, and social work. It used several mechanisms to fill the void: scholarships to study in Mexico and the United States, support to local universities, short courses in several Latin American countries, and hands-on training.
Interventions also needed managerial skills; these were mostly attained by constant instruction of counterpart personnel by resident foreign experts. In all cases, it must be noted that the incorporation of women into the operational bureaucracy was slow and cumbersome. Furthermore, women were restricted to a particular set of tasks: home-making and hygiene, health, and community organization.

This professional corps also fostered the adoption of a new language to characterize its work—“expertise,” “field experience,” etc.—qualities that fused, with nuances in each country, with pre-established bureaucratic practices,¹⁷ most of them patronizing as shown by Mariaemma Mannarelli (2017) in her analysis of the AIP in Peru. But there were new and curious ways of relating to indigenous groups resulting from functionaries residing in communities and developing personal and affective relations with locals, as Mercedes Prieto and Carolina Páez (2017) show in their Ecuadorian case study of the AIP. Indeed, the presence of public functionaries in communities led to a decentering of “urban” (small towns or parishes) power vis-à-vis surrounding communities: rural, dispersed groups came to the attention of public bureaucracies but also of the Catholic Church (Mencías 1962; Casagrande and Piper 1969).¹⁸ Similarly, the AIP in Bolivia, studied by María Lourdes Zabala (2017), shows the lack of understanding of some international experts about the post-revolutionary political context, while others opted to follow the government’s agenda of well-known traditional clientelist practices—as found in Peru. All in all, our three case studies appear to depart from the anti-politics development model proposed by Ferguson (1990). In each nation, national bureaucracies maintained different types of links with both local and national politics; in addition, indigenous populations resisted and negotiated in different terms the implementation of activities offered by the program.

The first years of the program were highly unstable. Base chiefs complained frequently about personnel absences due to health issues or lack of interest, delays in receiving allotted resources, and the pressures exercised by particular interest groups through local institutions or officials.¹⁹ Similarly, there were continuous complaints about the lack of interest of indigenous

¹⁷ An image of this bureaucracy in Puno at the end of the twentieth century is described by Rénique (2004).
¹⁸ It is important to note that the Catholic Church worked closely with the AIP in Ecuador and Peru.
¹⁹ See Blanchard (1959); Paniagua (1956); and Luscombe (1956–57).
partners, both men and women, and their suspicions and resistance, as will be discussed below. In fact, in the set-up of the program’s paraphernalia, the most complex issue was the engagement and participation of local people—the program’s avowed necessary condition for achieving desired results and instituting new forms of governmentality. Many functionaries were surprised by the predicament of subjecting local groups to the administration of the state. They had never imagined, even by pre-defined procedures, the need to consult communities about their preferences, needs, or opinions.

The program deployed three practices of interaction with the local people. First, it recruited as trainees in extension work indigenous men and women who were expected to act voluntarily as links between the base team and their communities. These local functionaries became program delegates of sorts within communities, a practice that reminds us of the old colonial practice of indirect rule. Second, the program fostered local labor contributions for construction of public works (schools, roads, bridges, water systems, irrigation, etc.); such contributions were also deemed to be voluntary but mimicked mingas, the legendary pre-colonial institution of collective work. Finally, the day-to-day deployment of trained program field workers, which was seen as a means to create closeness and intimacy with the target population and a window through which to understand their needs and wishes. Teachers, social workers (in some places also called promoters of good home-making), and household visitors, most of them women, were put in charge of the process.

The public institutional fabric and bureaucracy, together with the work of community intermediaries, became an important factor in the operation of the program. In each country, though, we find particular discourses of development and integration and emerging new state forms and bureaucracies. There are at least three forms of incipient bureaucracies in contact with indigenous populations. A first form falls within the reciprocation of favors as described by Mauss (1990 [1925]) in his theory of gift exchange—what I would call patronage—which is found mainly in Puno. A second dynamic, characterized by program personnel with a mix of attitudes of dedication, respect, or indifference towards the indigenous world, is embodied by social workers who lived for short periods in the area of intervention and tended to see themselves as reformers—a situation found mainly in Riobamba. In a third modality, also

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20 In Ecuador, this lack of trust toward the program ended at the beginning of the 1960s after the death of two of its functionaries (Rens 1963; Cañizares and Pérez 1983).
patronizing, functionaries represented the conflictive political agenda of the government and reproduced existing tensions with indigenous and peasant groups, which is observed mainly in Pillapi.

These types of public representation occurred in different mixtures that changed as time went by. But all of them relied on representatives of indigenous communities acting as intermediaries or local extensions of the state (Prieto 2015). Thus, none of these forms resembles Max Weber’s (2006) conception of bureaucracy in Western societies. However, all three forms were effective in approaching everyday life in indigenous communities, even if they were erratic, self-interested, condescending, overly intimate, or unpleasant to target groups. In the end, the new bureaucracy could be described as close but indifferent (Herzfeld 1992); as erratic yet, at the same time, systematic; and as actors engaged in a gift circulation system. Such attitudes and behaviors, among other effects, generated both threats and opportunities for locals (Das and Poole 2004: 10), as well as resistance and impasses in communicating with local actors.

Adjustments Along the Way

Before closing this section, it is important to insist that the AIP, during its second phase of embedment in each country, suffered changes both in its institutional affiliations and designations. Such changes reflect the need to link the AIP to the incipient “national” development plans. In Bolivia, the program became part of the National Rural Development Plan implemented by the Ministry of Rural Affairs (previously Peasant Affairs). Peru formulated the National Plan for the Integration of Indigenous Population, which brought together several ongoing initiatives including the AIP and the well-known Vicos Project sponsored by Cornell University. Ecuador represents the most erratic evolution: it first established the National Integration Program, which soon changed its name to the Campaign for the Integration of the Peasantry to National Life and then again to the Plan for the Modernization of Rural Life. Only when, in the 1970s, it came to be known as the National Program for Rural Development, did the

21 The case of Arica, Chile, exhibits a hybrid between the Government’s political interests, embodied in the public bureaucracy, and the commitment of the program’s social workers.

22 Lina Buchely (2014), from the vantage point of Latin America, studies the critiques of Max Weber regarding his theory of bureaucracy and questions the alleged rational, unitary, meritocratic, and apolitical character of public bureaucracy. Her questioning is based on ethnographic studies that underscore the political, self-interested, and discretion capabilities of public functionaries, as well as decentered, chaotic, and often corrupt decisions and actions.
program finally cut its links to United Nations agencies. This was also a time when the ILO had begun to promote rural development and had recovered its interest in rural labor relations (Ahmad 1970), leaving community development behind.

**THE AIP, THE STATE, AND WOMEN**

This section reveals how the convergence of the discourses of integration, protection, and development sparked concerns about indigenous women that, in turn, guided actions to confine them as mothers in the home but also offered them educational and communal activities so as to transform them into apt subjects to share and expand locally the agenda espoused by the program and the national state. Such actions were unstable and contested, a process marked by multiple strategies of persuasion but also violence. This process had two discernable movements tending to decenter the exclusively domestic roles assigned to women: first, several indigenist staffers criticized the treatment given to participating women; second, the women themselves—the targets of the AIP—contested the placement the program designed for them.

The studies of the program in Bolivia, Ecuador, Peru, and Chile show that indigenous women were problematized by the AIP at the point of their intersection with the intervention, i.e., with integration-development (Prieto 2017). In other words, the discourse links integration-development, state, and gender. This issue was first raised by the pioneering work of Arturo Escobar (1995), who argued that, in the mid-1970s, the vocabulary and strategy concerning “women in development” revealed the “indigenous or rural women question”—i.e., their invisibility in productive labor—while actions taken in the name of development opened up debates that sought to subject them to a global power/knowledge regime. The study of the AIP, however, calls into question this periodization and adds two important observations. First, indigenous women are shown to have been problematized by female practitioners inside the program for their maternal inability to take care of future generations, for their conservatism and resistance to change, but also because of their political potential. On the other hand, this problematizing and subsequent corrective actions were not fully successful in subjugating women, neither to the state nor to a global power/knowledge regime. Indigenous women, and the indigenous population in general, would go on to preserve some autonomy as well as spaces for political action.
The Place of Women

The formulation of the AIP by the members of the mission, as described previously, identified some of the problems faced by Andean indigenous women and established the household/family as the place in which women should act and to which they should be confined. It highlighted the limitations indigenous women exhibited at fulfilling their maternal roles as well as their conservatism and resistance to change, all of which created a complicated field of intervention (Naciones Unidas 1953a: 29, 30). The UN report traces these issues back to the home—conflated with the family—and to the bodies and minds of indigenous people. Indigenous peoples’ lack of access to education, to sanitary practices and medical services, and to a modern organization of the household, the report argues, limited indigenous women’s role as educators of new generations and administrators of the home. This, in turn, was reinforced by an image of indigenous women’s essential conservatism, which conspired against proposed changes. In a way, the insistent argument about the conservatism of women suggests they were—actual and potential—influential actors in the political life of their communities, an idea later developed by AIP officials.

The appendices to the commissioners’ report recount some of the issues concerning women in more detail: they insist on their monolingual condition, lack of education, and leading role in the teaching of children, especially their daughters. These appendices also detail the pressures indigenous women faced from within their own communities, which tended to limit their enrollment in the educational system or contribute to their dropping out early. Moreover, the report observes an unsanitary and unhealthy home and communal ecology, both causes of high child and maternal mortality. This last perception is complemented by the verification of low calorie and low protein intake, which weakened women’s bodies. Furthermore, the authors of the report explicitly assume and promote a nuclear family organization, with strong paternal authority, and a gendered division of labor that would preclude overburdening women’s physical efforts (Ó. Núñez del Prado 1953: 107, 126; Rubio Orbe 1953: 154; Alcocer 1953: 225). Efforts

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23 It is interesting to note that the conditions of women’s access to work in general, and to haciendas in particular, are not problematized at all. In fact, women were discussed only as mothers, not at all as workers in this context. See the discussion found in the global document on indigenous populations (ILO 1953) and on the agenda of indigenous organizations at the time (Prieto 2015).
to change this reality, however, clashed with what the report describes as women’s conservatism, i.e., their opposition to change.

The problems identified by the commission were taken into account in the design of the set of actions for each of the areas of intervention. Thus, proposals to address the education of women, for example in Ecuador, included granting resources to schools to improve female enrollment (Prieto 2015) as well as promoting the hiring of women schoolteachers (Rubio Orbe 1953: 190). In health care, proposals included establishing a health services network to provide preventive medicine and clinical treatment, training community health promoters or auxiliaries, providing school breakfast and food complements, as well as organizing presentations and talks about better nutrition (Alcocer 1953: 235). In terms of social participation and organizing, the proposal recommended establishing community centers for mothers as well as encouraging their participation in the daily life of the community. Thus, the proposals drove women further into the home but simultaneously expanded their connections and sociability through schools and community life (Zabala 2017).

On the other hand, women were completely excluded from interventions relating to production and work—increasing productivity, diversification, and access to productive resources, etc.—the apparent intention being that they should avoid these activities because excessive effort could undermine their reproductive abilities—and might risk threatening male authority.

The sum of these proposed actions and omissions leads us to argue that the AIP intended to promote a “modern” home, one that housed a nuclear family; a home run by educated mothers but under the authority of fathers. This reinforces the observation made a few years later by Esther Boserup (1970) about development’s discriminatory effect on women: their economic role is ignored, and they are excluded from productive work and access to productive resources. However, this view, and that of similar works, does not analyze why the global discourse of integration-development pursues and requires the domestication of women who, in the Andes, were far from confined to domestic work in their potential range of activity; efforts in the name of this discourse were directed at placing them in renovated homes with a strong maternal orientation. The women’s confinement to the home was imagined as the way to civilize and truly
integrate indigenous populations; i.e., to create both the conditions for the “rule of the fathers” (Elias 1998) and the individuation of subjects required by the modern state.\textsuperscript{24}

**Decentering the Place of Women**

The program’s rhetoric had particular applications in each national endeavor, a response, in each country, to the limits of the program’s own structure and dynamics, the organization of the local state bureaucratic system, and the characteristics of the family and women’s roles in indigenous society. The program officers at the grassroots had trouble executing their own agenda. For example, it was difficult to recruit female personnel. This was especially important in keeping with the premise that women’s issues should be addressed by women; it was risky for men to enter the home. Nonetheless, little by little, women schoolteachers, nurses, and social workers joined the program. In 1959, for example, it was estimated that of the 37 AIP officials in the Puno team, 8 percent were foreigners, 35 percent were Peruvian but not from Puno, and just over half were unskilled workers from Puno and its surroundings. In turn, only 14 percent of the latter were women: three had attended college and two had not; one of them was a local midwife trained by the AIP.\textsuperscript{25} The daily work of professional women in the program’s grassroots depended on male doctors, agronomists, and teachers. Female social workers needed to induce an interest in the local population for the program’s actions as a whole, while reaching women to advance their specific agenda with them. Despite their efforts, as mentioned earlier, program officials complained about indigenous women’s resistance to the AIP (OIT 1961: 38).

In this context, female officials within the AIP, following indigenist positions, made explicit the need for the program to work with women systematically in all actions because of their relevance as political agents in their communities (Vásquez and Villavicencio 1965).\textsuperscript{26} They understood the supposed resistance to change as a political action that called into question the program’s foundational principles. Their solution was to make women the subject of a central

\textsuperscript{24} This desire reminds us of postwar efforts in the United States and Europe to return women to the home, an aspect that still needs further study.

\textsuperscript{25} Schoolteachers are not included in this estimate because, at the administrative level, they answered to the Ministry of Education (Blanchard 1959: No. 6).

\textsuperscript{26} This is similar to Florencia Mallon’s (2005) finding among Mapuche women.
component of development programs and to reinforce their role as mediators between the communities and state institutions.\(^{27}\)

From the 1930s onwards, the question of indigenous women had been considered by a small but pioneering group of indigenists.\(^{28}\) This phenomenon has been studied by observing, in Ecuador, the importance of women in establishing rural schools supported by a pro-indigenous communist movement (Prieto 1978; Becker 2004) and, in Peru, the role of the women in the Tahuantinsuyo group (Rénique 2004; Zegarra 2009). In 1949 in Cusco, at the Second Inter-American Indigenist Congress, a debate on the issues facing indigenous women resulted in several resolutions in favor of their education and literacy, which should result in women “better performing [their] role in the family, as wife and mother” (“Acta final” 1949: 15–16). For these women intellectuals, the debate was not just about access to basic schooling but also about access to higher education in order for women to achieve proper “professional preparation to benefit their community” (Márquez de Duarte 1949: 308) and, above all, to benefit future generations. The Congress also proposed the implementation of community service and resolved to expand childcare services as a means to allow adult women to study (“Acta final” 1949: 19).

Later on, and following the experience of Bolivia, indigenist policies toward women were expanded, calling on governments to recognize their rights as citizens (Comas 1954: 18, 31). These concerns were systematically expanded and explored in the 1960s and 1970s.

In this way, indigenist policies that favored women gave female teachers and social workers associated with the AIP and other government institutions an opportunity to decenter the exclusively domestic space the program had conceived for indigenous women—and focus on the sources of power they possessed and their essential role as interpreters of local politics. This notion regarding the political function of women was reinforced through the years with the observation of their crucial roles in the sexual division of labor, in family and community decision-making and, a very important dimension, as keepers of their communities’ cultural heritage. Development programs that sought to domesticate women were openly criticized for creating a power imbalance in family and community life (Vásquez and Villavicencio 1965;

\(^{27}\) This resistance should also be seen against the backdrop of agrarian conflicts—the fight for dignified salaries, land, public services, and democracy.

\(^{28}\) Marisol de la Cadena (1998) has argued that indigenist artists and thinkers were mostly male with a fundamentally masculine view of the indigenous problem. However, it is necessary to reconsider this perspective taking into account the emergence, since the beginning of the twentieth century, of indigenists, including women, who fought for the education of indigenous men and women.
Fortún 1972; Vásquez 1974; D. I. Núñez del Prado 1975). These critiques were voiced in the name of indigenous women in a ventriloquial dynamic.

The AIP, as mentioned previously, oriented itself to bettering the enrollment of women in schools, as well as enabling them, among other behaviors, to deal with biomedical childbirth, homemaking based on a diet of local and processed foods, and an improved home with spaces segregated according to their function. At the same time, the program recruited local women to serve as mediators between their communities and the state. Such a role required training indigenous women as social promoters and health auxiliaries and midwives. This type of intervention had different results in each country. In Peru, recruitment for social promoters targeted mainly mixed-race males, or cholos, under the belief that they represented Indians in transformation and, thus, could be effective intermediaries between the dominant mestizo culture and indigenous communities (“El papel de los promotores sociales” 1962; Martínez 1965).  

Similarly, in Peru, training and placement of community midwives was eventually discarded; they were replaced by trained nurses or auxiliaries. In contrast, Bolivia and Ecuador trained both men and women as social promoters and, in the Ecuadorian case, these women (together with midwives) played a key role in both re-signifying the program’s content and intermediating new forms of state presence. In Bolivia, however, trained midwives did generate tensions between program-trained health workers and traditional practitioners—deepening the existing strains between state action and Aymara politics.

In Ecuador, women from the participating communities remember the violent aspects of the program as well as the opportunities it opened for them. They highlight, for example, the estrangement resulting from being sent to an urban boarding school, which pulled them away from their families and community; the changes brought about in their use of time by new nutritional habits and the introduction of processed foods; the need to devote time to cleaning their houses; and, finally, the new attitudes toward body care, health, and pregnancy (Prieto and Páez 2017). At the same time, they remember that the program failed to confine them to the home; they were constantly veering away from the program’s offerings, and their training as social promoters and midwives helped them develop a community health policy that hybridized the program’s biomedical proposals, rejected “improved” living spaces and sewing machines as

29 However, there is a significant literature that argues that cholos were characterized by exploitative, racist, and condescending practices toward indigenous persons.
resources for women, and took a selective approach to the food sources and other knowledge from the repertoire distributed by the program. These challenges to the program had, in the case of Ecuador, the effect of promoting “partial state” subjects, men and women who combined both autonomous and public means to administer their daily lives (Prieto 2015). Denise Arnold and Juan de Dios Yapita (1996), referring to Bolivia, however, have underscored that these policies, by emphasizing maternal roles, may have devalued indigenous women’s skills in other areas such as animal husbandry, textile making, and rituals. While I agree with this observation, I also recognize that, at the same time, these women opened up new fields of action and, above all, a conversation about different ways of integration into the nation-state.

CONCLUSIONS

The narrative surrounding the AIP shows us that its *mis-en-scène* used two lines of interpretation and ordering of indigenous populations. On one hand, the ILO’s long-standing preoccupation was with the working conditions of indigenous peoples who, as akin to indentured workers, were inadequately represented in the working class; on the other, the ILO wished to create appropriate conditions for the integration of indigenous populations, a long-standing issue for political elites in the Andean nations. The AIP was a process that began in the interwar period and in which some Western countries—including the United States—pursued moral leadership. In other words, the protection of original peoples is not an issue solely linked to the United States, nor is it a product of the Cold War. The interwar period was a time when world powers acknowledged original peoples and became concerned about their limited participation in national labor markets and in the political realm. The result was the design, much later, of a flexible umbrella of interventions—what I have called “integration-development”—that could be assembled according to national or local realities.

It is also important to understand the genealogy of the idea of integration-development, in a context of diverse debates, until it became an alternative form of governmentality in indigenous or rural populations. I have shown that, in the Andean nations, development was framed together with notions such as integration and rehabilitation, which had been in debate since the beginning of the twentieth century. I have also shown that the notion of development as it appeared on the international stage was not accepted in the region; it is an idea that was adjusted in each
country—as were rehabilitation or integration for that matter—and only acquired its full potential when the two faces of development—economic growth and political subjection—were linked by the technology of community development. Indeed, community development was the mechanism that succeeded in transferring to indigenous groups the capacity to connect themselves to incipient public social services.

At the same time, the rhetoric of development-integration provided a context for problematizing indigenous women because of their supposed limitations in dealing with childbirth in a modern fashion, focusing on the welfare of future generations, and respecting male authority. The AIP wanted to create the conditions for an effective civilizing exercise that would subject the population to state policies, an objective challenged both by female bureaucrats and by indigenous women. On one hand, female program staffers widened women’s field of action by recognizing their public role in communal life and their potential as mediators between their communities and the national state. On the other hand, in the Ecuadorian case, while indigenous women resisted certain elements of the program, they did take advantage of the opportunity to refashion some of its offerings.

The AIP promoted the expansion of a public bureaucratic system entrusted with the social protection of the indigenous and rural populations, with particular attention to women. Within the state, this system was exceptional because of several practices including, for instance, intimate and intermittent relations between functionaries and the target population, as well as the distribution of goods and services under the modality of gift exchanges or patronage.

Intermediation fell on select groups of community members, of both sexes, in ways that resembled the old colonial forms of indirect rule. But it is interesting that women, given their social and cultural location and their role as home-makers, were entrusted with capabilities to rearrange or transform family life and indigenous bodies. The AIP itself was the creator of this conflicting role for women by promoting “modern” families and childbirth. However, as I have suggested, women themselves resisted aspects of the proposal and became the translators of the discourse of integration-development, which gave them the opportunity to reserve communal spaces with autonomy from state direction.

I have suggested that this process of expansion of public institutions took place through varied forms of bureaucratic organization or innovation: a patronage network of favors and gifts that trafficked, closely and vigilantly, in loyalties (patron-client relations), either individual or
public (in the form of a public agenda). In this scenario, states appear decentered and must delegate their power to a wide network of officials who strive to legitimize their representation (Krupa 2010; Krupa and Nugent 2015). This dynamic of state formation is far from proposals made by feminist analysts that have focused on the welfare state and observe a tendency toward a “feminization” of state power, signaled by both growth in the number of female bureaucrats and “feminization” of their clients (Brown 2006 [1992]; Pateman 2006). The AIP reveals, in contrast, that public policies toward women did not, at that moment, result in feminization of the public apparatus. Instead, I find a masculinized dynamic of encapsulation or reduction of women’s field of action into limited or secondary public functions—part of the wider process of creating particular enclaves for the delegation of state power.
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