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RESILIENCE AND CHANGE: THE PARTY SYSTEM
IN REDEMOCRATIZED CHILE*

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ABSTRACT

Recent literature on the Chilean party system has noted that its characteristics changed under the impact of Pinochet's long dictatorship. The right allegedly became a tool for maintaining his regime's "legacies," and this generated a binary pattern of electoral competition between "pro-authoritarian" and "prodemocratic" forces after the return to democracy. The literature has also stressed that levels of identification with the nation's parties have plummeted, thereby questioning the extent to which the Chilean party system is an institutionalized one. And yet all analysts acknowledge, without being able to explain, that the distribution of voter options for the main parties from one election to the next has continued to be largely stable.

But the key characteristic of an institutionalized party system is precisely the continuity of freely expressed voter choices for its principal components. As a result, the main focus of this paper is to explain the reasons for this continuity, which has even leapfrogged the dictatorship. Using historical process-tracing evidence and a new survey conducted by its authors, the paper argues that the long standing social cleavages and ideological polarities that generated the party system still influence electoral outcomes given that they created deeply ingrained political subcultures in the society. Chilean voters have always had low levels of identity with specific parties configured as they have been into a very complex multiparty system. And yet voters are well aware of which parties correspond most closely with the political subculture to which they feel the greatest sense of attachment. The paper shows, therefore, that the allledged rupturing effects of the dictatorship on the party system have been greatly overblown. And it argues, in sum, that the Chilean party system continues to be a highly institutionalized one whose morphology still reflects its long standing patterns of division.

The paper concludes with an analysis of recent changes in electoral laws. It examines the consequences of the now abolished binomial system used to allocate party representation in the lower house of congress, thereby suggesting how such representation could change in the near future. It also examines how the introduction of voluntary voting has generated a small measure of volatility to the voting results. And it discusses the reasons why, exceptionally, the Christian Democratic Party has experienced a protracted contraction of its vote.

RESUMEN

La literatura reciente sobre el sistema partidario chileno ha sugerido que la larga dictadura de Pinochet alteró su morfología. La derecha se convirtió en una herramienta para mantener sus "legados," generando así una competencia electoral binaria entre fuerzas "pro-autoritarias" y "pro-democráticas" después del retorno a la democracia. La literatura también ha señalado que los niveles de identidad política con los partidos del país se han desplomado, lo cual la ha generado dudas respecto al nivel de institucionalización de su sistema partidario. Pero todos los analistas concuerdan con el hecho, sin poder explicarlo, de que la distribución de los apoyos electorales por los partidos principales se ha mantenido básicamente estable de una elección a otra.

La característica principal que configura la institucionalización de un sistema de partidos consiste, sin embargo, precisamente en la continuidad del voto libremente expresado por sus principales componentes. El principal objetivo de este artículo es, por lo tanto, el de explicar esta continuidad, que incluso se entronca con los patrones de votación anteriores a la dictadura.
Recurriendo a un análisis de filiación histórica y a una nueva encuesta dirigida por sus autores, el presente trabajo señala que los clivajes sociales y sus polaridades ideológicas largamente relacionadas —que generaron el sistema de partidos— aún influyen en determinar los resultados electorales actualmente ya que produjeron subculturas políticas claramente acrisoladas en la sociedad chilena. El sistema multipartidario del país es de una gran complejidad, y por lo mismo los electores siempre han tenido niveles bajos de identificación con partidos específicos. No obstante, igual tienen un alto sentido respecto a qué partidos se alinean más estrechamente a la subcultura por la cual sienten el mayor grado de afinidad. El artículo muestra, por lo tanto, que los supuestos efectos rupturistas de la dictadura sobre el sistema partidario han sido grandemente sobredimensionados, y argumenta, en cambio, que el sistema partidario chileno sigue teniendo una alta institucionalización cuyo origen se desprende de sus patrones divisorios largamente establecidos.

El artículo concluye con un análisis de los efectos de cambios recientes en la legislación electoral. Precisa las consecuencias sobre la representación partidaria del ya abolido sistema binominal, adelantando por lo mismo cómo esta podría cambiar. Discute además el efecto inesperado de la nueva voluntariedad del voto en producir un pequeño brote de volatilidad en los resultados electorales, y analiza las razones por las cuales, excepcionalmente, el Partido Demócrata Cristiano ha experimentado una contracción paulatina de su apoyo electoral.
A party system with clearly defined issue polarities has been a long-standing feature of Chile’s political life, and Mainwaring and Scully (1995) considered it one of the few “institutionalized” such systems in Latin America. If parties are formed, strengthened and sustained both through the creation of like minded political groups in legislatures as well as through regular and repeated electoral contests, Chile constitutes a textbook case. Its legislative institutions date back to the dawn of the Republic, and their membership was generated through electoral contests held at least once every three years since 1823. From the 1890s six to eight major parties and a variable number of smaller ones have competed in national elections, and the great majority of presidents, congressmen, and mayors have been associated with them.

The breakdown of Chilean democracy in 1973, as General Augusto Pinochet, with the complicity of the Nixon administration, deposed the government of Salvador Allende (1970–1973), created the greatest crisis the nation’s parties have ever faced. Pinochet closed the congress and outlawed those that had supported Allende’s coalition (Socialists, Communists, Radicals, and minor Christian Left and Social Democratic groups). He also “suspended” the activities of the Christian Democratic Party (PDC)\(^1\) and of the rightist National Party—the label adopted by the Conservative and Liberal parties of nineteenth-century origin and a smaller rightist group when they merged in 1966. In March 1977 Pinochet banned all party activities with the purpose of dismantling those of the PDC. Nonetheless, centrist and leftist party activists reemerged as important players when massive monthly protests began against the Pinochet regime in May of 1983 (A. Valenzuela and J. S. Valenzuela 1986). Although the protests did not dislodge Pinochet from power, he lost a 1988 plebiscite that was intended to give him a further eight years in office following the dictates of “transitory articles” in the 1980 Constitution that he himself had enacted. Under such circumstances, the same constitutional provisions required holding open presidential and congressional elections within a year. Having relabeled itself the Concertation of Parties for Democracy, the coalition of center and leftist parties created to defeat Pinochet also won the 1989 elections while running against the candidates of an alliance of the right.\(^2\) The latter had reemerged from the dictatorship divided into two main parties: National Renewal (RN); and the Union of Independent Democrats (UDI). Given that the Chilean transition did not create a new democracy, as the Christian Democrat Patricio Aylwin assumed

\(^1\) We use Spanish-language initialisms for all party labels. They all appear in Table 1.

\(^2\) This coalition has changed its name, but not its main composition, several times. Its longest lasting one was “Alliance for Chile.” For the sake of clarity we refer to it as the “Alliance” here.
the presidency in March of 1990 for a four-year term, but consisted, instead, of a process of redemocratization, the Chilean polity rapidly reacquired a key component of consolidated democratic regimes: the notion that electoral processes were to be, once again, the “only means” to reach positions of governmental power.\(^3\) This characteristic is also a central feature of party system institutionalization (Mainwaring and Scully 1995, 14).

Chile’s party system has been largely structured since the return of competitive politics around the two coalitions that were formed to support or oppose Pinochet’s bid to continue his rule. This coalitional arrangement was powerfully reinforced by a “binomial” electoral formula imposed by the dictatorship on party leaderships in May 1989 for congressional elections. It created districts that elected only two representatives, obligated partisan lists to run only two candidates per district, and assigned both seats to the winning list only if it obtained twice the vote of the runner up list.\(^4\) As a result, parties had strong incentives to run their candidates as part of two larger inter-party agreements whose lists elected almost all members of congress in the post-transition period. Nonetheless, smaller parties and movements have presented candidates in all elections since 1989, even congressional ones, capturing between a tenth and a quarter of the vote. And after municipal elections were reinstated through a constitutional amendment in 1992, the main parties that form part of the Concertation have usually created two pacts to put forward their candidates for municipal council seats.

In this paper we examine the recomposition of the party system during the Pinochet years and its characteristics after the quarter of a century that has elapsed since the return to elected government in 1990. A key feature of a party system’s institutionalization is the relative stability of electoral outcomes. Hence, a main focus of this paper is to explain this phenomenon. We also address scholarly debates on the post-dictatorship configuration of the party system, the determinants of voter choices, the consequences of the abrogation of obligatory voting in 2012, and the effects of the binomial electoral system. We draw much of our evidence from a survey conducted through face-to-face interviews with 1,470 respondents from a random sample of

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\(^3\) See J. S. Valenzuela (1985, 31–34) for a discussion of the importance of this notion for democracy.

\(^4\) This is equivalent to applying a D’Hondt proportional representation formula with a district magnitude of two. And yet a D’Hondt system does not necessarily require, as did the binomial mechanism, that the parties present only two candidates per district.
major urban areas of the country in January and February 2014, soon after the conclusion of the second round of the 2013 presidential election.\textsuperscript{5}

**CONTINUITIES IN VOTER OPTIONS**

If a main feature of a party system’s institutionalization is the relative stability of the vote for its various ideological and programmatic tendencies, then not only has this characteristic been an attribute of the Chilean party system since the 1930s but it also leapfrogged Pinochet’s nearly seventeen years of dictatorial rule. Thus, during the 1937 to 1973 period the average right, center, and left proportions of the vote in lower house legislative elections were 29.6\%, 30.4\%, and 24.2\% respectively.\textsuperscript{6} The same vote shares in the elections between 1992 and 2016—as can be seen in Table 1—were 32\%, 25.5\%, and 25.9\%. Moreover, the sum of the vote for the major parties that make up these three tendencies both before and after the dictatorship has been about the same with an average of a little over 80\% of the total.\textsuperscript{7} We resort to the municipal elections in the period after the return to democracy for these calculations, because the binomial rules used in the post-transition legislative elections do not provide an accurate view of the actual levels of electoral support for the parties. By compelling the parties to join larger inter-party electoral pacts that could only field two candidates per district, such rules prevented them from freely presenting their own choices everywhere they wanted to do so and led them to receive the votes of their coalitional partners in those districts where their own militants did appear on the ballot.\textsuperscript{8}

By contrast, the D’Hondt proportional formula used in the post-transition municipal elections, which have district magnitudes of six, eight, or ten, is comparable to the one used in the

\textsuperscript{5} The survey, concluded in February 2014, was administered by the Institute of Sociology of the Pontifical Catholic University of Chile. It is representative of the nation as a whole, as only about 10\% of Chileans live in rural areas.

\textsuperscript{6} Our calculations from legislative election results are contained in A. Valenzuela (1985, 58–61). We omit the left’s vote in 1949, 1953, and 1957 since it was weakened by a Cold War-era removal of members of the Communist Party from the electoral rolls and a ban on the presentation of candidates under its party label.

\textsuperscript{7} “Major parties” are those that received on average more than 5\% of the vote and presented candidates in all of the elections in each period (albeit discounting the results of the left in the years noted in the previous footnote). During the 1937 to 1973 period we consider both the National Party and the Falange Nacional to be “major parties” on the right and center respectively: the first as an extension of the Conservatives and Liberals; and the second as a precursor of the PDC. It is difficult to estimate the size of the social Christian and traditionalist Conservative votes before 1957, although the former should be classified as centrist and the latter rightist. Hence, the averages for the 1937 to 1973 period are, strictly speaking, approximations. The Socialist vote before 1973 adds all Socialist factions to the left total when they ran separately. In the post-1992 period the leftist tendency includes the votes for the Party for Democracy. The party labels on the right are different between the two periods, but they share the same overall tendency. The Radical Party label changed partially after 1994.

\textsuperscript{8} Carey (2002, 228) warned against using Chilean legislative elections for calculating party vote shares given the binomial rules.
legislative elections prior to 1973. Table 1 also shows that the electoral results for each one of the parties have been quite consistent over time since 1992, with the significant exception of the PDC vote—an issue to which we return below.

Another indicator of a party system’s level of institutionalization is the relative consistency of voter options as they are expressed in different electoral contests that take place simultaneously. Again, in this respect the Chilean system scores highly. For instance, on November 17, 2013, parliamentary and regional council elections were held together with the first round of the nation’s presidential contest. The eventual winner of the presidential election, Michelle Bachelet, won 46.7% of the vote in the first round, while her coalition’s candidates obtained 47.7% in lower house contests and 46.7% (exactly the same score as Bachelet’s!) in the regional council elections. These results did not occur as a result of people simply voting down-ballot following the same column on a single sheet of paper, because each race had its own ballot and the names of the presidential candidates did not appear on the parliamentary or regional council ones. Moreover, the lack of crossover voting did not result from the dearth of alternative candidacies. There were eight additional lists, mainly leftist ones, in addition to those of the two major coalitions in both the legislative and regional council campaigns. Bachelet also won 62.2% of the vote in the second round, a percentage that is basically equal to the 62.6% of the vote obtained by all the candidates in her coalition—relabeled “New Majority” (NM) after the parties of the Concertation formally added the Communists to their fold—plus those of all other lists with center and leftist programmatic positions in the lower house elections.

The candidate of the rightist Alliance for Chile, Evelyn Matthei, underperformed in the first round of the 2013 presidential election, receiving only 25% of the vote while her coalition obtained 36.2% in the lower house election and 32.3% in the regional council one. This was exceptional. Her candidacy got a late start because two prior rightist candidates had to withdraw from the race under a cloud due to, in the first case, financial irregularities, and in the second, mental health problems. But Matthei did recover the right’s share of the parliamentary vote in the second round of the presidential contest by obtaining 38.3%.
### TABLE 1

**PERCENTAGES OF THE VOTE FOR MAJOR PARTIES DIVIDED INTO RIGHT, CENTER, AND LEFT TENDENCIES IN MUNICIPAL COUNCIL ELECTIONS, 1992–2016**

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<tr>
<td>UDI</td>
<td>13.2</td>
<td>12.8</td>
<td>16.0</td>
<td>18.8</td>
<td>15.1</td>
<td>17.1</td>
<td>16.1</td>
<td>15.6</td>
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<tr>
<td>RN</td>
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<td>18.5</td>
<td>15.5</td>
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<td>16.1</td>
<td>15.7</td>
<td>17.7</td>
<td>16.4</td>
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<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>29.6</td>
<td>31.3</td>
<td>31.5</td>
<td>33.9</td>
<td>31.2</td>
<td>32.8</td>
<td>33.8</td>
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<td><strong>CENTER:</strong></td>
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<td>PDC</td>
<td>28.9</td>
<td>26.0</td>
<td>21.6</td>
<td>20.3</td>
<td>14.0</td>
<td>15.1</td>
<td>12.8</td>
<td>19.8</td>
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<td>PRSD</td>
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<td>6.5</td>
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<td>5.2</td>
<td>5.7</td>
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<td>5.7</td>
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<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>33.8</td>
<td>32.5</td>
<td>26.8</td>
<td>24.9</td>
<td>19.2</td>
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<td>PPD</td>
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<td>3.2</td>
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<td>6.4</td>
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<td>5.2</td>
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<tr>
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<td>25.8</td>
<td>24.7</td>
<td>28.5</td>
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<tr>
<td>Total Major Party Vote</td>
<td>87.7</td>
<td>91.3</td>
<td>84.2</td>
<td>84.6</td>
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<td>82.1</td>
<td>78.9</td>
<td>83.4</td>
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</table>

**Notes:**
*The figures include the percentage of the vote obtained by “independents” only if they were associated with major party lists, as defined in footnote 8.

The labels are: UDI, Union Independent Democrats; RN, National Renewal; PDC, Christian Democratic Party; PRSD, Social Democratic Radical Party; PPD, Party for Democracy; PS, Socialist Party; PC, Communist Party.

**Source:**
Calculated from Chilean Electoral Service (SERVEL) figures: https://historico.servel.cl (accessed May 2014) and http://servel.elecciones.cl (accessed October 2016).

### PARTY IDENTITIES AND MEMBERSHIPS

Following pioneering studies of American electoral behavior in the postwar decades, analysts have long associated relatively constant patterns of voting with high proportions of voters who identify with specific parties. As a result, party identity questions became standard tools in the political polling repertoire deployed in all democracies. But acquiring and maintaining a sense of identification with a specific party is likely to be more infrequent in multiparty than in biparty systems, especially in relatively homogeneous national societies, such as Chile, in which individual parties rarely obtain more than a quarter of the votes.

The national surveys of the Santiago-based Centro de Estudios Públicos (CEP) have regularly asked Chileans whether they “identify” with, “sympathize” with, or “feel close” to a
specific party. While many democracies have shown declining levels of party identification for reasons that are unclear (Angell 2007, 200–201), the results of the CEP surveys raise eyebrows. They show that identification with parties in Chile dropped from a high of nearly 80% in December 1993 to a low of about 35% in October of 2013.9 And yet the bulk of this decline resulted from a decrease in the number of respondents who said that they identified with the PDC (Navia and Osorio 2015, 815–816). The levels of partisan identity for the other parties remained quite low and mostly stable.

Many among the 45% of voting-age respondents who “identified” with the PDC in the December 1993 CEP survey, however, must have interpreted the party identity question in ways that did not relate to their voting preferences. Voting was then compulsory, and PDC candidates obtained only 27.1% of the vote in congressional elections that took place that very same month. If more people “identify” with a party than vote for it, then a standard party identification question can hardly provide a reliable guide for the stability of voting patterns. The CEP’s question at that time most probably captured the appreciation many Chileans felt for President Aylwin’s leadership of the then still recent transition out of the dictatorship.

In discussing Chilean party identity data from 1957 to 2012, Navia and Osorio dismissed the over-inflated numbers that favored the PDC in the immediate post-transition years, as well those that were registered in the politically polarized late 1960s and early 1970s, and concluded that the claim that the nation’s parties have “always enjoyed high levels of identification is not supported by public opinion data” (2015, 823). Still, the Latin American Political Opinion Project (LAPOP) 2010 survey’s question on this dimension—which showed that only 11.6% of Chileans identified with parties (Luna and Zechmeister 2010, 170)—did generate an excessively low estimate. The low level of this result stems perhaps from the inappropriate wording of the question (“at this moment, do you sympathize with a political party?”), given that party identities are supposed to refer to considerably longer-term attachments.10 Luna and Altman (2011) used this figure to characterize the nation’s party system as being “uprooted” while at the same time recognizing, but being unable to explain, the stability of its voting trends.

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9 We have examined all CEP surveys, four yearly, over this period.
10 For a discussion of the difficulties of translating the American party identification question and the importance of the time frame it conjures up in a political context—the French—with much similarity to the Chilean one see Converse and Pierce (1986, 72–77).
In our survey we avoided asking a straightforward party identity question. Instead, we asked respondents whether “during the last twenty years” their “sympathies” had leaned more toward the center-left or the center-right coalition, “with one or the other...or with neither?” The two coalitions were mentioned by 44.6%, while 7.9% noted that their sympathies had varied over time and 34.1% said that they did not sympathize with either one. We also asked which party they would favor if voting were to become legally obligatory once again but they did not know any of the candidates. Half of all respondents (49.7%) indicated they would vote for a party—with 45.7% choosing a specific one from a non-exhaustive list. In sum, while these answers are more robust than those recorded by the LAPOP survey, it would still seem that a clear sense of party identity may contribute only partially to the stability of voting patterns in Chile, limited as such identification probably is to the most militant portions of the population.

And such militancy does surely exist. In August 2016 the Chilean Electoral Service had nearly 930,000 individuals on file as registered in parties.\textsuperscript{11} This figure represents 6.6% of the total voting-age population (registration to vote is currently automatic at age eighteen) and about 15% of the total number of votes cast in the presidential election of 2013. It also represents an increase in party memberships of nearly 309,000 since 2006.\textsuperscript{12} Moreover, two-thirds of the party members are in the seven principal parties (including the Communists) that have formed part of the two main national coalitions that have dominated Chile’s political life since the return to democracy. Other registrants are in parties that have small proportions of the vote, some of which are active only in specific regions of the country. An indication of the relative vitality of this aspect of party life in Chile can be appreciated by the fact that in long-established European democracies the average proportion of party members over all \textit{registered voters} (not the total voting-age population) had declined to only 5.7% circa 2008 (Van Biezen, Mair, and Poguntke 2012, 29, 33). A new government mandated process of registration is underway, however, and these figures may diminish in Chile as well as a result, at least temporarily.

\textsuperscript{11} Figure provided by the SERVEL at the authors’ request.
\textsuperscript{12} The 2006 figure appears in \textit{El Mercurio}, February 22, 2015, D9.
VOTER PERCEPTION OF CHILEAN PARTY SYSTEM TENDENCIES

Exceptionally in the Americas, the Chilean party system developed out of historically determined symbolic, cultural, religious, programmatic and ideological differences of the same sort that configured what Klaus von Beyme called “spiritual families” in European politics (Ware 1996, 21–47). An awareness among voters of these differences can be seen as adding a deeper layer of identities that contributes to the relative stability of the nation’s voting patterns. As a high school teacher said emphatically when we pressed her to reveal her voting preferences, “Look: I will never vote for the right!” The process leading from such meta-attachments to specific polling day choices can lead some voters, like this high school teacher, to sort through what they view as the more palatable candidates (for whatever reason) within the spectrum of opinion they favor. The relative stability of voter choices may actually mask, therefore, the fact that some voters oscillate to and from kindred parties in different directions, and this would also explain, at least in part, why low levels of identification with specific parties does not affect that stability. A general sense of voter self-placement within the scaffolding of party system divisions therefore contributes to a deeper social rootedness of the system that is easily overlooked by analysts. Navia and Osorio’s (2015, 834) conclusion that “ideology” has been “an important determinant of political identification in Chile” aims in the right direction, although it falls short of capturing the much broader scope of what underlies the nation’s political divisions. Rather than being based narrowly only on ideologies, such divisions are more akin to shared political sensibilities, even subcultures, based on a broad spectrum of identities built on family legacies, social belongings, and perceptions of the nation’s history that set boundaries to voter choices.

The historical configuration of the Chilean party landscape occurred as a result of conflicts that reflected a religious versus secular divide as well as programmatic differences over socioeconomic, welfare, and labor policies (J. S. Valenzuela 1985, 1995; Scully 1992). The Conservative, Liberal, and Radical Parties all emerged in the mid-nineteenth century over different conceptions of the proper role of the Catholic Church and its teachings in the state and society, while the Communist (PC) and various Socialist (PS) parties were formed during the early decades of the twentieth century with industrial strife and the emergence of labor as well as entrepreneurial organizations.

With the rise of the second set of parties related to what was called the “social” as opposed to the “religious question,” the older ones also had to position themselves in what then became the new left-right axis in the party system. Its first issues were whether or not to legalize unions and collective bargaining. The Radicals opted to identify more closely with white-collar workers, public sector employees, and teachers, becoming active in the leadership of their associations. The Liberals drifted further to the right in socioeconomic policies as well as to a discreet proximity to the Church after they spearheaded the separation of Church and state. And the Conservatives split into two factions: a rightist “traditional” and a centrist “social Christian” one. The latter actively participated in shaping the nation’s labor laws as its militant circles sponsored mutual aid societies, educational programs, and even some unions (J. S. Valenzuela and Maza Valenzuela 2000). This division of the Conservative party generated breakaway groups, most notably the National Falange created by its social Christian youth wing in the mid-1930s. The party finally broke apart in 1957 as its president, who identified with the social Christian faction, joined other such groups (including the National Falange) to form the PDC. The members of the “Traditionalist” faction—as it called itself—retained the Conservative Party label in what became both a much more rightist party in terms of the socioeconomic axis of division and a more conservative one in its understanding of Catholic social doctrine. Similarly, the new parties of the left that emerged over the “social question” had to define their views along the older Catholic/secular axis. They assumed starkly secular positions.

All these parties were formed in association with party generative social cleavages in the sense that they were linked to conflicts that also involved important organized segments of civil society. While this is evident in terms of the religious/secular as well as the socioeconomic policy divisions, it is also true of the conflict between the Traditionalist and the Social Christian factions of the Conservative Party. This conflict evolved as a set of opposing policy positions over property rights, markets, social welfare measures and the rights of workers, peasants, and their unions, and it expressed itself through many organizations linked to Church networks in different social strata. Traditionalist Conservatives also expressed doubts about the wisdom of mass suffrage in the 1920s (J. S. Valenzuela and Maza Valenzuela 2000, 218), and in the 1960s right-wing Catholic groups such as the Society for the Defense of Tradition, Family, and Property assigned greater importance to property rights than to democratic institutions. These differences also spilled over into scriptural interpretations and conceptions of Catholic social
doctrine. They influenced the choices middle- and upper-class Chilean Catholics made regarding which parish to attend and which religious schools to choose for their children. The creation of the Christian Democratic Party crystallized further the traditionalist versus social Christian division as it became expressed in two different major party formations. The Conservatives who remained in the party were sharply opposed to the PDC government of Eduardo Frei Montalva (1964–1970) as it sponsored an agrarian reform, a rural worker unionization law, and health programs that facilitated access to contraceptives. Frei’s administration coincided with the rise of a more progressive post-Conciliar Chilean Church that favored the PDC rather than the Traditionalist Conservatives (Smith 1982, 115; Scully 1992, 149–150).

As parties and party factions emerged through these conflicts, they also reinforced the overall matrix of political-ideological choices in the country. Given the fact that the religious and class-related issue polarities can have various gradations between their most extreme positions, and that the religious polarity is bifurcated in its pro-religious side between progressive and conservative inclinations, the resulting matrix of political and symbolic positionings or tendencies combining all three dimensions of division has always been complex. Some of these possible combinations are unlikely to correspond to any viable parties. This would be the case with, for instance, a combination of leftist socioeconomic programs and very conservatively orthodox religious views. However, the opposite combination, namely rightist socioeconomic views with secular stances on value-laden social issues, is quite possible. While it has not been expressed as clearly in the post-transition configuration of the party system as it was in previous ones, *Amplitud*—a new party formed in 2014—hopes to fill this void by calling itself both “liberal” and “of the center right.”

Political leaders often remind the public of the connection between their parties and specific positionings in the overall symbolic and ideological matrix that undergirds the party system. They do so by referring to their progressive, secular, liberal, or “laic” (in the French sense of this term) positions—or their Christian inspiration—as well as their left, center, or right (and combinations thereof) orientations. Such references provide cues to voters regarding party positions that do not need to be elaborated fully.

If Chilean electoral stability does stem partly from voter attachments to the political tendencies formed by the historic divisions that shaped the party system from its beginnings, then voters should be aware of the differences between the parties along these lines of
differentiation. To examine this our survey asked respondents to indicate on a scale of one to seven how close—or distant—they thought the seven major parties were to—or from—"the rich" and “the Catholic Church.” These simple indicators reflect the main class and religious versus secular cleavages. Table 2 summarizes the results by showing which paired relationships between the parties’ average scores on both scales generated statistically significant differences between them and which did not. It is based on survey respondents who said they voted in the second round of the 2013 presidential election.

### Table 2

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N=691.

Note: The letter “s” signifies statistical significance at least at the .05 level, and “ns” non-significance. The section of the table below the bold face diagonal refers to perceptions of the parties’ relative proximity to or distance from the Church, and the one above it refers to the same regarding the rich. For a listing of party labels see Table 1.

Regarding the Church, survey respondents correctly viewed the UDI, RN, and the PDC as the parties that were closest to it. Thus, the paired contrasts between the average scores assigned to them all failed to reach statistical significance. The same is true with the scores on the opposite side of this polarity assessing the relationships between the Church and the Radical,
Valenzuela, Somma, and Scully

Socialist, and Communist Parties. And—as expected—the differences between the scores across these two sets of parties were all statistically significant. The one result that stands out is that the Party for Democracy’s (PPD) average score is statistically significant when paired with that of all the other major parties. This has to do with the recent formation of the PPD during the transition back to democracy—a process we analyze below. The PPD therefore does not have a prior history associating it with anticlericalism (which explains why its distance from the secularist parties is significant), and yet it is also seen as more secular given its proximity to the so-called progressive subgroup of parties (for which its average score is sufficiently distant from that of the PDC, RN, and the UDI to trigger statistical significance as well).

The results regarding the relative proximity of the parties to the rich show that survey respondents view the two parties of the right as closest to them, with average scores for each whose differences are not statistically significant. Conversely, respondents viewed the parties of the left as distant from the rich, with scores that fail to reach statistical significance when contrasting the PPD and the PS, and the PS and the PSRD. All the other paired contrasts were significant. This is not surprising regarding the differences between the scores of the parties of the right and those in the Concertation, nor those of the Communists with all other parties. However, it is noteworthy that the perception of the position of the Christian Democrats with respect to the rich produced an average score that is also statistically significant when paired with that of all the other parties. Hence, with their middling score the Christian Democrats are viewed as a more centrist party than the social democratic PS and PPD, and more so even than the Radicals.14 This result helps explain the dwindling support for the PDC over the years shown in Table 1. Given that its alliances have been with secular parties that are also to its left, this isolates the party like no other within the matrix of symbolic positionings that buttresses the party system, thereby limiting its ability to obtain occasional support from the soft vote of its coalition partners. At the same time, it also makes the PDC more vulnerable to defections to the right by some of its leaders and supporters given both their religious commitments and their occasional uneasiness with the more leftist discourse of the party’s coalition partners. In recent years, for example, the PDC lost votes as a breakaway group joined a small party, the Partido Regionalista de los Independientes (PRI) (del Pozo et al. 2012, 151–163). At present the PRI

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14 In Table 1 we placed the Radicals as a centrist party given its historic trajectory and the references of its leaders to this positioning. The lack of statistical significance of its average score with that of the Socialists has to do with the latter’s currently much more moderate leftist profile.
forms part of the rightist coalition, although the key PDC leader who led the breakaway group died and others have returned to the center-left coalition as independents.

In sum, Chilean voters do perceive the differences between the major parties along the two historical party generative dimensions. And new parties that emerge are also quite readily located by commentators and the general public within the two quadrants of the party system’s divisions, where they therefore compete mainly with other parties in the same spectrum of opinion.

A NEW AND BIPOLAR PARTY SYSTEM?

The notion that the Chilean party system has more continuities than discontinuities with its pre-dictatorship past (Scully and Valenzuela, 1993) has been disputed by other analysts. Tironi and Agüero (1999) noted that the party system’s old divisions are no longer salient, having been subsumed under a new democratic versus authoritarian “cleavage” that replicates the pattern first established by the 1988 plebiscite. Their analysis inspired a significant body of literature discussing whether the post-transition party system does indeed have a new dual morphology or not. And, more recently, James Loxton (2016, 6–7) has argued that the Chilean right has undergone a fundamental transformation. Its parties are new, he notes—in particular the UDI—having been created by officials of the Pinochet dictatorship in order to preserve its legacy.

The fact that our survey respondents clearly differentiate the parties according to their relative proximity to or distance from both the Church and the rich does indicate that there is something more to the party system in people’s perceptions than just an authoritarian versus democratic divide. But we return to this matter below. What follows is a process-tracing analysis of how the parties, especially those of the right, and the party system reacted to and changed under the military regime. The focus here is, of course, on party leadership and militant actions: there were no elections for representative bodies of any kind during the dictatorship.

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15 See, among others, J. S. Valenzuela (1999); Torcal and Mainwaring (2003); Joignant and López (2005); López and Morales (2005); J. S. Valenzuela, Scully, and Somma (2007); Angell (2007, chaps. 8, 9); Navia, Morales, and Briceño (2009, chaps. 2, 7, 8, 10); Toro, Morales, and Piñeiro (2011); Gamboa, López, and Baeza (2013); Raymond and Barros Feltch (2014).
Parties after the Breakdown of Democracy

Severely repressed by the dictatorship, the two main parties of the left evolved in opposite directions. The Socialists abandoned their revolutionary 1960s discourse in favor of a commitment to social democracy and forged an alliance with the PDC (Walker, 1990; Ortega Frei, 1992; Lagos 2013, 390), while the Communists turned away from their long-standing opposition to the use of violence in politics. This change of direction by the PC and its initial resistance to join efforts to register voters for the 1988 plebiscite cost it the loss of many militants and followers (Lagos 2013, 573, 585) and about half its electorate. By contrast, the PS was better able to retain the loyalty of its militants and voters (Lagos 2013, 391–396), and its mean electoral support approximates the 12% it obtained on average prior to 1973.16

The PPD arose given the impossibility of registering the PS and the PC legally as parties before the 1988 plebiscite because they were framed as upholding “totalitarian” doctrines. Following the terms of the dictatorship’s 1987 law on political parties, such legal registration was a prerequisite for party leaders to have access to television messaging during the plebiscite campaign as well to place poll observers on voting day. Hence, working with a PS faction, the then future President Ricardo Lagos (2000–2006) led an effort to gather the signatures that were needed to register an “instrumental party” for all opponents of the dictatorship to participate fully in the plebiscite with a single legal vehicle in order to defeat it (Lagos 2013, 582–583, 588–593).

If the plebiscite had in reality been a founding moment for a new authoritarian versus democratic divide, Lagos’ effort, which barely succeeded, would not have had such difficulty. The enactment of the law on parties stimulated a resurgence of pre-existing party identities among Pinochet opponents (Lagos 2013, 591–595)—not a rush to unite under a single venue, as might have occurred in a country without such long-standing party profiles. Thus, Christian Democrats and Radicals, whose principles were deemed to be acceptable by the authorities, rapidly took advantage of the 1987 law to register their own parties legally, while for several months the Communists used Lagos’s initiative to reactivate their base in opposition to both Lagos’s initiative and the plebiscite—although they subsequently did support the “no” option. And with their ban lifted after President Aylwin’s election, the PS and the PC quickly registered legally as well with their own labels.

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16 The average party vote percentages here and in subsequent paragraphs have been calculated from A. Valenzuela (1985, 58–61). The same means for the 1992–2016 period appear in Table 1.
But after becoming a legally registered party before the plebiscite, the PPD gradually became a political home—not just an “instrumental” tool—for militants who had previously been in small Christian left and social democratic groups and for former Socialists, Communists, Radicals, and even a few former rightists (Lagos 2013, 592, 597–599). The PPD therefore did not dissolve as the old parties of the left obtained their legal status. Hence, in 1992 the PS leadership forced its militants who had also been in the PPD from its earliest days to choose between the two parties. As a result, the PS retained closer links than the PPD to the labor movement and a higher proportion of secular-leaning militants derived from its historical factions. Thus, on a five-point ascending religiosity scale, PS members of the 2001–2005 legislature ranked 1.5, while those of the PPD scored 2.27 (Ruiz Rodríguez 2006, 93).

The Radical Party divided twice over its decisions to join—and then to remain within—Allende’s Popular Unity coalition, thereby losing half of its late-1960s electorate by 1973. In 1994 the core party group reunited with the second one of its former breakaways, adding the Social Democratic qualifier to its name—hence its PRSD initialism. The party’s discourse remains attached to its sesquicentennial history with a secularist orientation. Its average vote share since 1992 is slightly above that of all three of its splinters in the 1973 lower house election.

After its leaders disagreed over their response to the military coup, the PDC came together as an opposition force, generating defections by its rightist factional militants and figures. Key party members were sent into exile, and former President Frei Montalva was assassinated by agents of the dictatorship. The party’s average vote since 1992 has been about 9% lower than that which it received in legislative elections from 1961 to 1973, when its center-right component was larger.

Having clamored for a military intervention to depose Allende, the right willingly “suspended” the National Party’s activities as demanded by the newly formed governing junta. The party consisted of an uneasy combination of traditionalist Conservatives, Liberals, and other smaller groups, and with the cessation of its activities it splintered into different social networks linked to entrepreneurial associations, think tanks, newly formed private universities, and conservative religious circles. With the exception of a few short-lived ministers, Pinochet drew from the ranks of right-wing politicians to fill only minor government positions. The right’s electorate had dipped during the 1960s as the Christian Democrats had surged—a tendency that
had mostly reversed by 1969. After the return to democracy the right’s electoral support has hovered around its historic averages of the 1930 to 1960 period.

After assuming the “presidency” of the military junta, Pinochet sought someone to devise a legitimating framework for his unprecedented regime. He found that person in Jaime Guzmán, who became “the principal ideologue and political inspiration” of the military regime (Allamand 1999, 38). Guzmán wrote Pinochet’s key speeches during the 1970s and was “the principal architect” of the permanent articles of the 1980 Constitution (Fontaine 1991, 253).

At age twenty-seven Guzmán was already an important political figure in 1973. An orthodox Catholic and an admirer of Franco’s regime in Spain, his maternal grandfather had been a Conservative Party Senator from a prominent landholding family. Guzmán joined the party’s youth wing at age thirteen (Guzmán 2008, 139, 143) when it was reduced to its Traditionalist faction. He was viscerally opposed to the Frei Montalva government—particularly its agrarian reform. He held the post-Conciliar Church in disdain, wrote articles for right-wing magazines, and sparred publicly with the progressive-leaning Cardinal-Archbishop of Santiago, Raúl Silva Henríquez, who later confronted the dictatorship over its human rights violations.

Guzmán did not join the National Party with his fellow Conservatives. Instead, he started his own political group and ran successfully for the presidency of the Catholic University Student Federation in 1967. The following year he became the key rightist commentator in a television program devoted to political affairs (Huneeus 2000, 332–336). He argued at the time that democracy had to be “protected” in underdeveloped countries because its voters could be “manipulated” by Marxists.

Guzmán’s views had no chance of ever being supported by more than minority of Chileans. The military regime gave him, therefore, a unique opportunity to try to reshape the nation’s political institutions following his precepts. Guzmán’s early proximity to the regime allowed him to place many of his like-minded associates in official positions—a move facilitated by the National Party’s recess (Allamand 1999, 49, 54-56; Huneeus 2000, 328–332). In the late 1970s he began to consider founding a new political party with them (Montecinos et al. 2001, 66). At the time the prospect of easing into a five-year transition out of military rule as envisioned in non-permanent articles added to the constitution by a “Council of State” led by former President Jorge Alessandri (1958–1964), a senior mentor to Guzmán, appeared to be likely. However, Pinochet and his advisors replaced all such articles with new ones that named
him “President” for an additional eight years at the helm of a regime that was designed to remain essentially the same with the exception of a new constitutional tribunal (J. S. Valenzuela 1998, 154–162). Alessandri bitterly rejected this substitution, and relations between Guzmán and Pinochet also became distant.

Protests against the military regime began in May 1983, leading Pinochet to name Sergio Onofre Jarpa, the former head of the National Party, as minister of the interior in what was seen as an “opening.” This reactivated partisan organizing on the right. Andrés Allamand, a leader of the National Party’s youth at the time of the coup, began working with Jarpa to create a party that would be called “National Union.” In turn, Guzmán returned to the idea of forming his own party with the UDI label, while Avanzada Nacional, a small group that Pinochet seemed to prefer, also resurfaced (Allamand 1999, 35, 56-57). Although Jarpa’s political initiatives were unsuccessful, Guzmán continued thereafter to speak publicly as a leader of the UDI (see Avetikian 1986, 19–23, 28–30, 65–67), and Allamand did the same invoking the National Union label.

Discussions about forming a single party of the right were rekindled by the enactment of the 1987 law on parties, and the right’s various leaders (except those in Avanzada Nacional) agreed to unite under the RN label. However, as internal party elections were taking place later that year with two lists that reflected the split between Guzmán’s associates and the rest, Guzmán suddenly asked for a co-equal federation between the two groups and derailed the electoral process. This led to his expulsion from RN (Allamand 1999, 142–147). Consequently, the right came out of the dictatorship with two main parties with new labels, neither one of which was sponsored or in any way promoted by Pinochet.

Guzmán reactivated his connection with Pinochet during the campaign for the 1988 plebiscite (Huneeus 2000, 155, 331). The application of the permanent articles of the constitution was supposed to begin at that point, and by supporting the “yes” Guzmán was, strictly speaking, defending his own—not Pinochet’s—formal-institutional creation and legacy. Guzmán had added antidemocratic provisions to the permanent articles that reflected his long-standing notion that democracy had to be “protected.” He probably hoped that they would help retain his impact on Chilean institutions well into the future.

While the UDI’s commitment to the 1980 Constitution was unwavering, this was not so with RN. Its leaders had signed a “National Accord” in 1985 with the Christian Democrats and
other parties opposed to Pinochet. It called for the formation of a provisional government and for the election of a constituent assembly (Godoy 1999, 90–91). And after Pinochet’s defeat, RN joined the parties that had backed the “no” in a partially successful effort to remove the most egregiously antidemocratic provisions from the constitution through negotiations with the military regime. Moreover, Sebastián Piñera, the most important RN leader after the return to democracy, voted “no” in the 1988 plebiscite while publicly defending this option at the time. The UDI did eventually alter, nonetheless, its position on the undemocratic features that remained in place after the post-plebiscite changes to the constitution. Its legislators joined those of all other parties in supporting reforms proposed by President Lagos in 2005 that eliminated all of them.17

Although RN claims to draw inspiration from “Christian humanism,” it has been open to a variety of center-right tendencies—much like the pre-1973 National Party. By contrast, Guzmán sought to anchor the UDI firmly in religiously orthodox principles. For instance, in 1988 he wrote that “the defense of the right to life of the unborn child constitutes for the UDI a fundamental principle that we will defend with all our might in the upcoming democracy” (cited in Santoni 2013, 209). And to this end, Guzmán prevailed on Pinochet in 1989 to replace legislation that had permitted abortion for “therapeutic” reasons with language that bans it in all circumstances—even when a woman’s pregnancy threatened her life.18 On the five-point ascending religiosity scale mentioned above, UDI congressmen in the 2001–2005 legislature averaged 3.71, while those in RN averaged 3.00. By comparison, PDC legislators rated 3.22 (Ruiz Rodríguez 2006, 93).

New appointments in the Church under John Paul II turned it in a conservative direction, and Opus Dei and the Legionnaires of Christ expanded their influence among well-off Chileans who were generally supportive of the Pinochet regime (Mönckeberg, 2003; Thumala Olave 2010). These changes helped to invigorate the UDI, which followed the lineage of the traditionalist segment of the Conservative Party that Guzmán had identified with in his youth. Consequently, not only did a left to right and a secular versus religious division remain in place

17 Guzmán would perhaps have hindered this evolution, but he was assassinated in 1991.
18 As Guzmán wrote in 1974, “a mother must have her child...even if in carrying it, she dies” (cited in Hormazábal 2015).
as underlying sources of differentiation in the party system among its militants, but a conservative/progressive distinction within its religiously inclined quadrant did as well.¹⁹

Determinants of Voter Choices

If the overall continuity of Chilean electoral outcomes is largely explained by the enduring effects of the divisions that have long framed the party system, then the perceptions of party positions in relation to the rich and the Church encapsulated in Table 2 should indeed help shape voter options. However, the figures in that table may simply reflect what survey respondents think they know about the parties while, as the Tironi and Agüero (1999) thesis would have it, a division between those who preferred authoritarianism and those who remained committed to democracy may have a much stronger effect on how they vote. In what follows we put these alternatives to statistical tests with different segments of our survey’s subjects.

If our survey respondents view the parties of the right as being “closer to the rich” and, therefore, by implication, those of the left as closer to the poor, we can venture that those who see themselves as relatively richer or poorer will choose to vote in accordance with this perception. Hence, we used survey respondents’ socioeconomic positions as measured by a combination of their income and educational attainment as an indicator for this dimension, even though we are aware of the fact that many people who are well off materially may also be leftist and vice versa.

Similarly, if some parties are perceived to be closer to the Church than others, then survey respondents who are themselves more religious can be assumed to vote more for such parties than those who are thoroughly secular—and vice versa. For this purpose we developed a religiosity index based on questions in our survey regarding religious beliefs and practices. All respondents, even self-identified atheists, were asked a set of basic questions, to which we added

¹⁹ Although this distinction plays out in socioeconomic policies, it also affects choices related to value-laden social issues. During the Lagos government, PDC legislators rewrote the Chilean civil marriage law, legalizing divorce. This was opposed by the UDI and part of RN. President Piñera proposed a new law on civil unions for gay and other nontraditional couples. All parties except the UDI approved it. And legislation proposed by Bachelet’s government to decriminalize abortion to save the life of the mother, when extra-uterine life cannot be sustained, and in cases of rape or incest has been opposed by the UDI and RN, while PDC congressmen have divided over the issue (Hormazábal 2015). The PDC’s declaration of principles opposes abortion, but it also calls for drafting guidelines to deal with “complex medical” situations that may arise (see the PDC’s 2007 Fifth Programmatic Congress).
others that reflect levels of religiosity in different traditions. We then standardized the resulting scores into a single zero to one scale.\textsuperscript{20}

And to test for the effects of attitudes toward democracy and authoritarianism we posed a question (no. 47) that attempts to capture this distinction in an abstract, value judgment sense. It asked respondents to indicate their agreement with one of three sentences: first, “a democracy is the best form of government”; second, “it is better to have a government with strong authority that will be subjected neither to elections nor to popular pressures”; and third, “such forms of government make no difference.” And we followed this question up with another one (no. 48) that aims at capturing attitudes towards the two types of regimes in a historically contingent sense. It asked respondents to indicate “regardless of what you think in general about the forms of government,” whether it is better to “always maintain a democracy” even if there is “a profound political crisis,” or whether in such cases it is better “to resort to an authoritarian government.”

Table 3 presents the results of logistic regressions with support for the main parties of the two coalitions as the dependent variable. We draw the data for this table from the above-mentioned question regarding voting preferences for the nation’s parties in case voting were to become, once again, obligatory. It includes only those respondents who chose a party that belongs to one of the two major coalitions, regardless of whether they voted or abstained in the 2013 election. Its control variables are gender (women equal 1), age (as a continuous variable), and religious identity (whether respondents self-identified as Protestants or as irreligious, with Catholics as the reference category).

\textsuperscript{20} The indicators and their values used to construct the religiosity index may be examined in the appendix to this paper.
TABLE 3

DETERMINANTS OF VOTING PREFERENCES FOR PARTY COALITIONS

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<td></td>
<td>(0.117)</td>
<td>(0.131)</td>
<td>(0.152)</td>
<td>(0.152)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
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<td>0.095</td>
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<td></td>
<td>(0.350)</td>
<td>(0.370)</td>
<td>(0.330)</td>
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<tr>
<td>Irreligious</td>
<td>0.346</td>
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<td>(0.366)</td>
<td>(0.436)</td>
<td>(0.416)</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Religiosity Index</td>
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<td>2.846***</td>
<td>2.657***</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.566)</td>
<td>(0.636)</td>
<td>(0.580)</td>
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<tr>
<td>Keep Democracy®</td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>2.528***</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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<td></td>
<td>(0.337)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Question 47:®®</td>
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<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>- Prefer Authoritarian Rule</td>
<td>1.941***</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>(0.387)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- Makes No Difference</td>
<td>1.333***</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>(0.390)</td>
</tr>
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</table>

N 579 527 505 523
pseudo R² 0.04 0.08 0.25 0.18

Notes:
Binary logistic regressions with UDI/RN=1, and DC/PPD/PRSD/PS/PC=0. Standard errors in parenthesis.
®® Reference category: prefer democracy.
* p < 0.05; ** p < 0.01; *** p < 0.001.

The results in Table 3 show that socioeconomic position, religiosity, and attitudes toward democracy—as reflected in both pertinent questions—all have effects in the expected directions on voter choices for the parties as they are aggregated to reproduce the two major coalitions. Options for the New Majority parties are more prevalent among individuals who have lower socioeconomic status, lower religiosity, and seemingly more prodemocratic attitudes—and vice versa. All of these results easily meet the highest level of statistical significance. Model 4 in the table also shows that voters who agree with the notion that having a democratic or an
authoritarian regime “makes no difference” are more likely to support the parties of the Alliance than those of the New Majority (NM), although this relationship is weaker than that between opting for the Alliance and expressing support for the notion that authoritarian regimes are better than democracies. Running model 4 with a fictitious coalition of the right that has the Christian Democrats in it while leaving only the parties of the left in the NM coalition weakens all of the significant results (model not shown here). This outcome indicates that PDC voters line up better with the parties of the left than those of the right: creating the fictitious coalition reduces the sharpness of the distinctions between the two actual ones. Still, the religiosity index produces less robust results than the two other variables given that the NM includes the more religiously inclined PDC voters with the more secular ones of the left. Gender and age have no effects, and being Protestant or irreligious does not have any influence beyond those captured by the religiosity index.

Table 4 also addresses the determinants of voting for the center-left versus the right, but it does so with the reported voting options of our survey respondents in the presidential election of 2013. Its models 1 and 2 draw from the results of the primary election in June and capture the differences between the profiles of voters who selected Michelle Bachelet from the field of candidates in the NM coalition, and those—added together—who participated in the competition between the RN and UDI candidates. This was the first time primary elections for the presidency were held under the direct control of the Electoral Service, and a quarter of the electorate participated in them. Bachelet easily won the NM nomination, while the candidate of the UDI narrowly won over that of the Alliance. He then had to step aside, as noted earlier, and was replaced by Evelyn Matthei of the same party. And models 3 and 4 draw from the results of the second round of voting in December between Bachelet and Matthei. The variables in Table 4 are the same as those in Table 3, except for the omission of our abstract survey question on the democratic versus authoritarian regime distinction. Its coefficients (not shown here) basically repeat those given by the contingent one.
TABLE 4

DETERMINANTS OF VOTER ELECTION CHOICES IN THE PRESIDENTIAL ELECTION OF 2013

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
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<th>(1)</th>
<th>(2)</th>
<th>(3)</th>
<th>(4)</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Women</td>
<td>0.419</td>
<td>0.613</td>
<td>0.103</td>
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<td></td>
<td>(0.310)</td>
<td>(0.331)</td>
<td>(0.243)</td>
<td>(0.259)</td>
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<td>Age</td>
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<td>0.001</td>
<td>0.003</td>
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<td></td>
<td>(0.0101)</td>
<td>(0.0105)</td>
<td>(0.00796)</td>
<td>(0.00891)</td>
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<tr>
<td>SES</td>
<td>0.799***</td>
<td>0.907***</td>
<td>0.848***</td>
<td>1.009***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.184)</td>
<td>(0.201)</td>
<td>(0.148)</td>
<td>(0.165)</td>
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<tr>
<td>Protestant</td>
<td>0.041</td>
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<td></td>
<td>(0.411)</td>
<td>(0.423)</td>
<td>(0.309)</td>
<td>(0.348)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Irreligious</td>
<td>0.353</td>
<td>0.599</td>
<td>0.188</td>
<td>0.224</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.485)</td>
<td>(0.542)</td>
<td>(0.394)</td>
<td>(0.456)</td>
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<tr>
<td>Religiosity Index</td>
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<td>1.767***</td>
<td>2.015***</td>
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<td></td>
<td>(0.637)</td>
<td>(0.716)</td>
<td>(0.496)</td>
<td>(0.536)</td>
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<td>Keep Democracyº</td>
<td>2.256***</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.361)</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>N</td>
<td>436</td>
<td>413</td>
<td>617</td>
<td>586</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pseudo R²</td>
<td>0.13</td>
<td>0.26</td>
<td>0.12</td>
<td>0.223</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Notes:
Binary Logistic Regressions with Bachelet=0 and her opponents=1. Standard errors in parenthesis.
Models 1 and 2: A contrast between Bachelet (PS) voters and those for Allamand (RN), plus Longueira (UDI), in the June primary elections.
Models 3 and 4: Second round voting in December between Bachelet (New Majority) and Matthei (Alliance).
* p <0.05, ** p <0.01, *** p<0.001.

The results in Table 4 are very similar to those of Table 3. A significant finding shown by the models in both tables is that the strength of the metrics for the socioeconomic and religious factors tend to increase slightly, not diminish, with the introduction of the variables that capture the distinction between what seem to be the prodemocratic or pro-authoritarian views. In sum, the tables show that survey respondents choose the parties they support to a significant extent given personal socioeconomic status characteristics and degrees of religiosity that dovetail with the differences that they perceive among the parties in Table 2 and that their views regarding the value, intrinsic or instrumental, of the two types of regimes also have an impact on such choices.
This exercise seemingly confirms, therefore, both alternative theses. And yet, what does the democratic versus authoritarian divide really mean? If its terms do really reorganize the Chilean party system in a new way, then why did a majority of the voters of the “authoritarian” segment opt to support Piñera—the leader who voted for the prodemocratic “no” side at what was supposedly the founding moment of this polarity—over the “yes” advocate Joaquín Lavín of the UDI in the first round of the presidential election of 2005? Similarly, why did all legislators of the right vote in favor of discarding Guzmán’s “protective” institutions from the constitution in 2005 in order to make it fully compatible with a democratic regime? And these actions by the leaders of the right are in fact quite compatible with the Chilean public’s current opinion of the Pinochet years. A 2013 Barómetro CERC survey showed that only 9% of its respondents viewed them as “good or only good.” And when asked whether Pinochet was “a dictator” or “one of the best heads of state of the twentieth century,” 76% chose the former while only 9% opted for the latter.

Our evaluative and contingent regime preference questions elicited from all respondents to our survey basically the same overall level of support for the democratic options (71% and 73.2% respectively) and low levels of agreement with the authoritarian ones (11% and 17.7% respectively). And a bivariate crossing of the two questions showed that 92.7% of all respondents who preferred a democratic form of government insisted on keeping it under a “severe crisis,” while 84.3% of the minority of respondents opting for an authoritarian regime thought that it should be maintained under such circumstances. These are, overall, solid numbers expressing a preference for democracy, and the responses to the second, contingent question are quite consistent with the first one. But both Tables 3 and 4 are not drawn, as noted, from the overall sample of respondents, which includes slightly more than half of subjects who did not vote in 2013. They stem, instead, from subgroups that have higher levels of politicization, whose opinions are therefore more sharply divided in ways that express in starker terms the country’s political divisions.

21 The three votes against the 2005 reforms were cast by designated senators who had been former commanders of the armed forces. They lost their seats because of them.
23 Respondents who saw no difference between the two regime forms split roughly into thirds—including those who opted to say they did not know which one to choose—when asked which regime would be preferable in times of “severe crisis.”
Given Evelyn Matthei’s poor performance in the first round of the presidential election of 2013, her votes were probably drawn disproportionately from people who were strongly committed to the right. Their views on our two questions regarding regime types are therefore instructive, because they can be expected to be among the most favorable to the authoritarian options. And yet a majority of 59% of our survey respondents who said that they backed Matthei in the first round of voting opted for democracy in answering the first, evaluative question on the two regime types, while 51.7% chose to retain democracy as well in times of crisis. By contrast, Bachelet supporters and those of the other leftist candidates in that same round of the election backed the democratic options in both questions by an average of 83.5%. There is a clear difference between these answers, but it lies in the size of the majorities in favor of the democratic options. And it is this gap, not a polarity between the views of prodemocratic and pro-authoritarian supporters, that produces the results shown in Tables 3 and 4. While this does not support the notion that there is indeed a new democratic versus authoritarian cleavage in Chilean party politics, the difference in the size of the prodemocratic majority between rightist voters and the rest requires an explanation.

Questions about democracy or authoritarianism are not abstract ones for the Chilean public. Even the most unsophisticated voter can be expected to be perfectly aware of how the political tendency he or she is supporting reacted to the “worst crisis” scenario faced by the country when its democracy collapsed. Normally, if the two questions are understood correctly, the first one would be answered only with an abstract value judgment, without also thinking of the Chilean crisis which the second one, when posed, will inevitably conjure up in the respondents’ minds. However, it is unlikely that all respondents will only think abstractly even when answering the first question. The specter of the past will also color, to an unknown degree, an abstract democracy versus authoritarian question in Chile in ways that do not occur in countries without such a vivid experience or inter-generational received memory of democratic regime collapse and dictatorship. Moreover, every Chilean voter knows that the Pinochet regime was one of the right: it implemented the right’s market-driven economic and social policies against the state-centered socialist model pursued by Allende. And when center to leftist Chileans answer the regime preference questions, both their support for democracy in an abstract, evaluative sense and their rejection of the military coup of 1973 as a “solution” to Chile’s worst crisis aggregate to produce among the highest preferences for democracy in the
world. By contrast, for right-leaning Chileans their preference for democracy is tempered by an awareness of the fact that the parties they support have their base in the sector of opinion that was most militantly in favor of forcibly displacing the Allende government. This means that the operative antecedent date for this difference of opinion harks back to the Chilean crisis of 1973—and not to the “yes” or “no” option in the 1988 plebiscite that purportedly generated the new “authoritarian versus democratic” cleavage. This is confirmed by data in the same 2013 Barómetro CERC survey mentioned previously that recorded the rock-bottom levels of assessment of Pinochet himself and of his dictatorship’s years in power. Its subjects were asked to choose between the following two phrases referring to the military coup of 1973: “it liberated Chile from Marxism” or it “destroyed democracy.” The first was chosen by 69% of UDI and 53% of RN supporters, while 79% of PDC, 87% of PPD, and 85% of PS supporters opted for the second. This result also suggests that for Chilean rightist opinion the 1973 crisis was essentially a dispute over socioeconomic policies, not the value of democracy itself. Hence, the support of rightist voters for a presidential candidate who cast a “no” in the 1988 plebiscite and the agreement of rightist legislators to the 2005 constitutional reforms that fully redemocratized Chilean institutions de jure were not anomalies. Moreover, the “protective” mechanisms to safeguard those socioeconomic policies through the constitution no longer had the same effect when center-leftist governments could start to appoint designated senators and army commanders. And they seemed moot, anyway, given the fact that the scope of disagreement over socioeconomic policies had narrowed since the late 1960s.

**RECENT CHANGES IN ELECTORAL INSTITUTIONS**

Two important changes in electoral laws with potential implications for the future of the party system and the stability of electoral results have been enacted in recent years. The first is a change to voluntary voting, and the second is the abrogation of the binomial electoral system.

**The Impact of Voluntary Voting**

This reform, introduced at the onset of Sebastián Piñera’s government, instituted an automatic process of voter registration with a voluntary vote, substituting the voluntary registration but obligatory voting left in place by the dictatorship. It accelerated a drop in the number of voters as
a percentage of those eighteen and over that had already been dwindling as many in the new age cohorts opted not to register. The first election held with the new norms was the municipal one of 2012, when voter participation declined by 9.2%. A further 23.8% drop occurred in the next such contest held in 2016.24 And the first parliamentary election under the new voting rights law, held in 2013, recorded 7.8% fewer votes than the previous one in 2009.25

Changing from obligatory to voluntary voting may increase the volatility of electoral results—and create even more variation in the composition of legislatures and councils given the small margins of victory in many contests—as voters who are aligned with different segments of opinion feel differentially motivated, given the circumstances of the moment, to show up at the voting booth.

The drop in the number of voters during the 2013 congressional election furnished an important indication of this effect. Bachelet’s reelection to the presidency, which occurred at the same time, motivated center-left supporters to go to the polls, while the listless Matthei campaign discouraged those who normally support the center-right. Bachelet’s NM coalition increased the size of the center-left’s representation in the 120-seat lower house from 57 to 70 (including three seats for “independents” linked to it, two of whom were former student leaders who gained prominence during recent demonstrations in favor of tuition-free tertiary education).26 By contrast, the number of seats controlled by the right dropped from 58 to 48. All these loses were sustained by UDI, while RN gained a seat.

The number of valid votes cast in the congressional election of 2013 declined by nearly four hundred thousand in comparison to the previous contest, but this figure conceals the extent of the electorate’s reshuffling. Extrapolating from the voting options of our survey respondents in 2009 and 2013, the addition of those who voted in 2009 but abstained in 2013, and of those who did not vote in 2009 but did do so in 2013, is equal to about a fifth of the total number of 6,616,000 valid votes cast in 2009. And unlike the larger prior losses of valid votes between 1993 and 1997 as new generations of Chileans opted in greater numbers not to register to vote, the decline in the number of votes between 2009 and 2013 was not evenly distributed: the

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24 About 35% of all Chileans over eighteen voted in 2016. This is equivalent to the turnout among registered voters in the 2014 municipal council elections in the United Kingdom.
25 We include valid, blank and annulled votes in these percentages. Chilean electoral results are available at www.electionresources.org/cl/deputies.php?election=2013, and pertinent variations thereof.
26 Two other young former student leaders, members of the Communist Party, were also elected.
Alliance lost 620,900 votes while the New Majority gained 33,500.\textsuperscript{27} Crossing our survey’s question regarding which parties respondents would choose if voting “became obligatory once again” with another asking whether or not they had voted in the congressional election of 2013 shows that 33.4\% of those who chose the UDI and RN had abstained from voting in 2013, while the same figure for PDC, PPD, and PS supporters was 26.5\%—a nearly 7\% difference. If the Alliance’s rate of abstention had been equal to that of the New Majority according to these figures, it would have been able to retain nearly two hundred thousand more of its 2009 votes in 2013 than it did. The survey also indicates that those who voted after having abstained in 2009 were nearly four times as likely to be supportive of the New Majority rather than the Alliance. Moreover, those who switched their support from one coalition to another between 2009 and 2013 did so in favor of the New Majority by a factor of about ten to one—although their numbers were only about 3\% of all valid votes in 2009.\textsuperscript{28}

The 2016 municipal election also produced a small asymmetrical change, but in the opposite direction, in the partisan composition of those who voted. While the number of valid votes for the seven major parties declined by 13.2\% in relation to the previous municipal election, the NM coalition accounted for nearly three-quarters of that drop. This was enough to give the right a slight advantage in the number of mayors, although the NM retained its majority of seats in the municipal councils.

And yet, voters who abstain from casting ballots do not necessarily change their inclinations to vote one way or the other. Hence, the increase in volatility that stems from voluntary voting does not necessarily reflect shifts in the overall political attachments of the population. This can normally be seen over several electoral cycles, as former abstainers who vote and former voters who abstain even out the expression of political preferences.

Among the factors that may discourage voter turnout for parties are allegations of corruption in their leadership ranks. The first legal norms regarding campaign funding were enacted in Chile in 2003, establishing some public funding for them, regulating donations, and setting spending limits (Fuentes 2011). During the last three years revelations of illicit funding for parties and campaigns have resulted in judicial investigations that have been at the forefront of

\textsuperscript{27} Smaller parties outside the two major coalitions gained nearly 102,000 votes, in part by taking advantage of free publicity given by the state to their first-round presidential candidates.

\textsuperscript{28} Using communal socioeconomic data, Morales (2015) noted that UDI support dropped more heavily in poorer urban areas, although this cannot be interpreted as referring to individual characteristics.
of news reports. Top UDI leaders as well as the head of a new Progressive Party that has drawn votes from the center left were indicted before the 2016 municipal contest. However, such proceedings did not impact the electoral support obtained by these parties.

The Electoral Regime

The binomial electoral system congealed the party alliances that supported the “yes” and the “no” in the 1988 plebiscite. Critics of this unusual system have argued that it was designed to favor the rightist coalition by disproportionately enhancing its congressional representation (Polga-Hecimovich and Siavelis 2015). However, this effect was small. Leaving aside the abnormal 1989 election, in the six lower house elections from 1993 to 2013 the ratio of seats to votes for the Concertation/NM was on average 1.08 and for the Alliance 1.13.²⁹ Both coalitions’ positive results were of course generated at the expense of the minor lists that also fielded candidates.

Given the binomial system’s stricture limiting candidate lists to only two per district, the relative proportionality of the vote to seat allocations for individual parties in the two major coalitions played out differently. With a few exceptions for minor parties, the Alliance could basically list a candidate from each one of its two principal parties in most districts, and therefore an overrepresentation of the party that obtained the most votes was unavoidable. In the first three elections, beginning in 1989, this effect worked in favor of RN (with a seat to vote ratio of 1.31), and in the last three it worked in favor of the UDI (with the same ratio at 1.32).³⁰ The 2001 election was a draw.

By contrast, with four major parties—or five in the New Majority—plus a variable number of smaller ones, no single party in the center-left coalitions could present its candidates everywhere. As a result, the process of creating the lists of candidates for congressional offices had to become a key mechanism to manage interparty relations within the center left. This meant in practice that the proportionality of the distribution of seats in congress for the center-left voting block was manufactured by party leaders, not voter choices.³¹ And all these negotiations

²⁹ Our calculations with SERVEL data. More than 1 equals overrepresentation—and vice versa.
³⁰ Idem.
³¹ Hence, proportionality indexes such as Gallagher’s are misleading when applied to Chilean legislative elections. For analysis of how the candidacies were determined in the Concertation, see Siavelis (2005).
and compromises resulted in overrepresenting the parties with the fewest votes, i.e., the opposite effect of what occurred in the Alliance. This meant that the parties with the larger vote share, in particular the Christian Democrats, had to bear a greater cost in terms of lost representation and local party activation in order to sustain the center-left coalition. This may also have contributed to the party’s slow attrition of its electoral support over the years.

These different outcomes can be illustrated by calculating how many deputies the parties in the two main coalitions would have elected if the 2013 regional council election had been that year’s legislative one. Both elections were held at the same time, and the legislative districts aggregate to fit exactly into the regional council ones. The council elections were conducted with a d’Hondt proportional formula with full slates of candidates per party in each district, and their magnitudes can be assumed to be the sum of all the deputies each region elects—a number that ranges from two to thirty-two. As expected, this simulation showed that within the Alliance the UDI would have lost five seats—an indication of its overrepresentation—and RN would have gained four. In turn, the NM would have lost eight seats, overall, to candidates from other lists. Two would have gone to the Alliance, thereby increasing its representation, while six would have gone to other lists that claim to be “progressive.” Those losses would have affected only the Radicals and the Communists, i.e., the smallest vote getters in the NM coalition, thereby revealing their relative overrepresentation. While both of these parties elected six deputies each with the binomial system in 2013, the Radicals would have obtained only one and the Communists three.

What worked well for coalition management from a national political perspective for the center to leftist parties was detrimental, however, for local district party organizations and militants, because more than half of them were unable to work for their own party’s candidates in legislative contests. Moreover, the national game plan of distributing target numbers of seats to the different parties in the coalition often led to pairing strong candidates, frequently the incumbents—who have more than an 80% rate of reelection and an outsized influence in their parties—with weaker ones (Siavelis 2005). This further discouraged local party activation in favor of candidates who were expected to lose. These practices have probably contributed to raising public disaffection with politics.

The binomial regime was finally eliminated in 2015 after years of attempts to do so that fell short of the four-sevenths majority needed in both houses of congress for this purpose.
Valenzuela, Somma, and Scully 31

(Campos 2009). The key vote to reach that majority in the Senate was provided by Amplitud, the breakaway party from RN. The new electoral law introduces an open list proportional representation system using a d’Hondt formula much like the one Chile had before 1973, except that voters will not be able to opt, as was formerly the case, for a straight party list vote. All parties will be able to present one more candidate than there are seats to be filled.

The senate will have 50 seats distributed among the nation’s fifteen regions, each one of which will elect between two and five senators depending on their population. This means that Metropolitan Santiago will continue to be underrepresented. The lower house will be composed of 155 seats distributed among twenty-eight districts, each one of which will elect between three and eight deputies. The parties may form electoral pacts which will be treated as a single party in a first round of seat allocations, with the specific winners within them to be determined in a second d’Hondt formula distribution. Only up to 60% of all candidates presented nationwide on a party’s lists may be of the same gender.

Given the relatively low district magnitudes, the effects of the d’Hondt formula will be muted. There will still be some electoral gain from running candidates for the lower house of congress through interparty coalitions, but they are unlikely to take the form of just two main ones as is currently the case. Voters will have a greater choice among candidates linked to the seven major parties, which will probably favor the reactivation of party life all across the board. The new electoral law also lowers the number of signatures needed to form a new party to just .25% of the total number of votes in the previous electoral cycle, thereby facilitating the creation of new parties.

CONCLUSIONS

Despite its suppression by an antiparty dictatorship, the Chilean party system reemerged after the return to democracy much like it had been before: a multiparty system with a similar number of core parties—seven presently—and many smaller ones—about two dozen at this point. And it retained a characteristic stability, overall, in the distribution of electoral support for its major political tendencies and parties, a central feature of institutionalized systems.

The resilience of this stability—which endured long years of electoral closure—reflects the long-standing divisions in Chilean society along religious and class lines that created the party system. After emerging, party and party-faction leaders reinforced through their
pronouncements and policy choices what eventually became sets of partially overlapping as well as exclusive political subcultures among voters, each with historically tinged symbols and narratives. The relative stability of the intergenerational continuities of Chilean electoral results stems to some degree from a straightforward sense of party identification among some voters, but more generally it results from an on-going process of matching between the predispositions of different segments of the electorate as defined by their subcultural sensibilities, with candidates who seek to channel them into votes for their parties. This matching generates a form of social rootedness of the Chilean party system that extends beyond the various parties’ links to civil society associations. And it can occur—not that it always does—at a level that is beyond many voters’ conscious awareness—as in-depth qualitative interviews are best suited to reveal. For instance, voters often explain their choices by noting that they focus on the personal qualities of the candidates. But after conducting a long interview with one such voter, a small businessman in a Southern town, a clear pattern emerged: he had always voted for RN candidates at all levels. And yet he was utterly surprised to discover this fact, although his clearly rightist programmatic inclinations and low religiosity did indeed coincide best with support for RN.

This explanation for the stability of voting patterns is consistent with the fact that our survey respondents answered so readily our questions regarding the closeness of each of the major Chilean parties to the Church and to the rich. Nowhere else in the Americas could both of these questions be asked generating such high response rates and clarity in the results. And this reflects as well the notion that the party system was not recomposed by the impact of the military regime following a pro-democratic and pro-authoritarian divide. While our statistical models registered a differential impact of pro-authoritarian attitudes on voting options, it bears repeating that this stems from rightist voters’ awareness of the fact that they, or their forebears and families, generally opted to support the coup against President Allende. Hence, the difference in attitudes toward what appear to be regime types reflect instead a strand of historical memory in the rightist subculture that refers to the political contingencies of 1973—not to a new divide in the party system generated by the 1988 plebiscite. Moreover, the Pinochet regime reinforced the deeper cultural substructure embedded in the party system’s long history by simply being, in fact, the expression of the most rightist and religiously conservative force in the nation’s politics.

It was in this sense their government, executing their economic policies after “saving” the country from “a Communist dictatorship.”

A partial exception to the stability of voting patterns has been the secular decline of support for the PDC. But as the largest party in the Concertation and in its successor New Majority coalition, it shouldered the primary costs of what we referred to as coalition maintenance by not running candidates in many legislative districts due to the strictures of the binomial formula. Thus, the PDC leadership has not only been in a long-standing alliance with secular-leaning parties to its left, but it has also repeatedly and unavoidably forced some of its local constituencies to vote for congressional candidates from such parties. This scenario was likely to foster a constant leakage of regular but soft PDC voters to the right, a notion reinforced by the fact that crossover voting between the two coalitions, though small, has occurred with greater frequency between the parties of the right and the PDC (Navia and Saldaña 2009). The new electoral law may assist the PDC in recovering its losses by permitting the party to present its own full slates of candidates in all lower house legislative districts, thereby allowing it to better reassert its identity whatever coalition it creates with other parties. And yet the electoral gains from the party’s ability to better project its identity may be limited by growing levels of secularization in Chilean society and by its weaker links to a more conservative Catholic Church.

Despite having a similar morphology in terms of its composition and familial identities to its pre-dictatorial past, the current party system is, nonetheless, quite different from what it was before. It has changed primarily because the left has largely become a social democratic force with a much stronger commitment to democracy and a clear acceptance of the operation of an open market economy. In sum, the party system is no longer polarized by the insertion of the Cold War into the nation’s politics.
APPENDIX

THE RELIGIOSITY INDEX

The religiosity index was constructed with questions applied to the whole sample as well as with those that were asked only of Catholics or Protestants. The following table contains the questions, the groups to which they were directed, and the values from 0 to 3 that were assigned to each answer.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>English version of the question in summary form</th>
<th>Applied to all</th>
<th>Applied only to Catholics</th>
<th>Applied only to Protestants</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>
| At home, how often—if at all—do you read the Bible or Biblical passages drawn from other sources? | -Several times a week=3.  
-Once a week=2.  
-Sometimes=1.  
-Less than that=0. | | |
| On average, how often—if at all—do you pray in whatever form you may choose to do so? | -More than once per day=3.  
-Once per day=2.  
-Several times a week=1.  
-Less than that=0. | | |
| How religious do you consider yourself to be: very religious, quite religious, a little religious, or not religious at all? | -Very religious=3.  
-Somewhat religious=2.  
-A bit religious=1.  
-Not religious at all=0. | | |
| How often, if at all, do you go to church services (not including baptisms, weddings, or funerals)? | -Several times a week=3.  
-Once a week=2.  
-At least once a month=1.  
-Less than that=0. | | |
| When you pray, do you usually commend yourself to a particular saint? | -At least one saint=1.  
-No saint=0. | | |
| How often, if at all, do you go to a sanctuary dedicated to the Virgin Mary or to a saint? | -More than once a year=2.  
-At least once a year=1.  
-Less than that=0. | | |
| Are you in the habit of praying to the Virgin Mary at publicly displayed images of her? | -Each time I can=2.  
-Sometimes=1.  
-Never=0. | | |
| Do you usually pray the rosary? | -Yes=3.  
-No=0. | | |
| Have you made a request of a saint to whom you are devoted? | -Yes=1.  
-No=0. | | |
| Have you received the sacrament of confession? | -During the last year=3.  
-During the last two years=2.  
-Less than that=0. | | |
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Question</th>
<th>Yes Score</th>
<th>No Score</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Last year, did you participate at least once in services devoted to the Month of Mary?</td>
<td>Yes=1.</td>
<td>No=0.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>In your lifetime, have you ever received the gift of tongues or have you had any other corporeal manifestation of the Holy Spirit?</td>
<td>Yes=3.</td>
<td>No=0.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>In your household, before eating a meal do you usually say grace?</td>
<td>Yes=1.</td>
<td>No=0.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>How often, if at all, does your family meet for a devotional moment of prayer and Bible reading?</td>
<td>Daily=3</td>
<td>Less than that=0.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Do you participate in any way in street preaching?</td>
<td>Weekly=3.</td>
<td>Less than that=0.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Do you participate in the activities of church groups aside from regular services or Sunday school?</td>
<td>Weekly=1.</td>
<td>Less than that=0.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Have you ever been a Sunday school teacher?</td>
<td>Yes=2.</td>
<td>No=0.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

As shown in the table, four questions were used for all respondents, but the indexes for Catholics and Protestants were complemented by questions designed to reflect their specific religious traditions and practices. We do not have index indicators for religions other than Catholics and Protestants (i.e., Jews, Muslims, and others) because they comprise very few cases. We use the term “Protestants” to refer to all Christian strands whose historical background stems from the reformation and who are commonly called “Evangélicos” in Chile. Most of them are Pentecostal. As their tradition did not originate, however indirectly, from the reformation, Mormons were also only asked the first four questions.

The scores assigned to each question’s answer (from 0 to 3) reflect their importance in terms of religiosity. We added up the corresponding scores for each individual to create an overall measure of religiosity. Then we divided it by the maximum possible score for the corresponding group (25 for Catholics and Protestants, and 12 for the irreligious and for other religious identities). The “irreligious” are those who, when asked about their religion, declared that they had “no religion” or “none in particular.” The religiosity index thus runs from 0 (minimum religiosity) to 1 (maximum religiosity).
REFERENCES


