



**KELLOGG INSTITUTE**  
FOR INTERNATIONAL STUDIES

*exploring* DEMOCRACY *and* HUMAN DEVELOPMENT

Working

**AUTHORITARIAN SUCCESSOR PARTIES WORLDWIDE:  
A FRAMEWORK FOR ANALYSIS**

**JAMES LOXTON**

**411**

**June  
2016**

paper



*exploring* DEMOCRACY *and* HUMAN DEVELOPMENT

The Kellogg Institute for International Studies  
University of Notre Dame  
130 Hesburgh Center for International Studies  
Notre Dame, IN 46556-5677  
Phone: 574/631-6580  
Web: [kellogg.nd.edu](http://kellogg.nd.edu)

The Kellogg Institute for International Studies at the University of Notre Dame has built an international reputation by bringing the best of interdisciplinary scholarly inquiry to bear on democratization, human development, and other research themes relevant to contemporary societies around the world. Together, more than 100 faculty and visiting fellows as well as both graduate and undergraduate students make up the Kellogg community of scholars. Founded in 1982, the Institute promotes research, provides students with exceptional educational opportunities, and builds linkages across campus and around the world.

**The Kellogg Working Paper Series:**

- Shares work-in-progress in a timely way before final publication in scholarly books and journals
- Includes peer-reviewed papers by visiting and faculty fellows of the Institute
- Includes a Web database of texts and abstracts in English and Spanish or Portuguese
- Is indexed chronologically, by region and by research theme, and by author
- Most full manuscripts downloadable from [kellogg.nd.edu](http://kellogg.nd.edu)

**Contacts:** Elizabeth Rankin, Editorial Manager  
[erankin3@nd.edu](mailto:erankin3@nd.edu)

**AUTHORITARIAN SUCCESSOR PARTIES WORLDWIDE:  
A FRAMEWORK FOR ANALYSIS\***

**James Loxton**

**Working Paper #411 – June 2016**

**James Loxton** is a lecturer in comparative politics in the Department of Government and International Relations at the University of Sydney. He received his PhD from Harvard University in 2014. He is the co-editor (with Steven Levitsky, Brandon Van Dyck, and Jorge I. Domínguez) of *Challenges of Party-Building in Latin America* (Cambridge University Press, forthcoming). He has published articles in *Democratization* and the *Journal of Democracy* and has contributed chapters to volumes published by Cambridge University Press and the Johns Hopkins University Press. A former visiting fellow at the Kellogg Institute for International Studies at the University of Notre Dame, he is currently finishing the edited volume (with Scott Mainwaring) “Life after Dictatorship: Authoritarian Successor Parties Worldwide.”

\*I am deeply grateful to the Kellogg Institute for International Studies for its funding and institutional support for the April 2015 conference “Life after Dictatorship: Authoritarian Successor Parties Worldwide.” I would like to thank all the participants at that conference for their comments on this paper. I would also like to thank Scott Mainwaring and Steve Levitsky for their mentorship and extraordinary generosity.

## ABSTRACT

A surprising feature of democratization in many countries is that large numbers of people, after gaining the right to choose their leaders through free and fair elections, vote for political parties with deep roots in dictatorship. *Authoritarian successor parties*—or parties that emerge from authoritarian regimes but that operate after a transition to democracy—are one of the most common features of the global democratic landscape. In nearly three-quarters of all third-wave democracies, prominent authoritarian successor parties have emerged, and in over one-half of third-wave democracies, they have been voted back into office. They are major actors in Africa, Asia, Europe, and Latin America. To date, however, their prevalence has not been adequately appreciated, and they have not received the attention that they deserve. This paper aims to launch a new scholarly research agenda on authoritarian successor parties as a worldwide phenomenon. To this end, it provides an original definition and operationalization of authoritarian successor parties that can travel across regions; presents new data on the global prevalence and influence of authoritarian successor parties; and develops a new set of concepts and vocabulary to facilitate cross-regional dialogue (such as *authoritarian inheritance* and *authoritarian baggage*). The paper considers and provides tentative answers to four broad questions: What explains the prevalence of authoritarian successor parties? Why are some more successful than others? What are the strategies that they can employ to deal with the past? And in what ways can they harm—or help—democratic regimes?

## RESUMEN

Un aspecto sorprendente de la democratización en muchos países es que muchas personas, después de conseguir el derecho de elegir a sus líderes a través de elecciones libres y limpias, votan por partidos con raíces profundas en dictaduras. *Los partidos de origen autoritario*—es decir, partidos que surgen de regímenes autoritarios, pero que operan después de una transición a la democracia—son uno de los elementos más comunes del panorama democrático mundial. En casi tres cuartos de las democracias de tercera ola, han surgido partidos de origen autoritario prominentes, y han vuelto al poder por vía democrática en más de la mitad de todas las democracias de tercera ola. Son actores importantes en África, Asia, Europa, y América Latina. Sin embargo, hasta la fecha, su prevalencia no ha sido reconocida de manera adecuada, y no han recibido la atención que merecen. Este estudio busca lanzar una nueva agenda de investigación sobre los partidos de origen autoritario como un fenómeno mundial. Con este fin, provee una nueva definición y operacionalización de los partidos de origen autoritario que pueden viajar entre regiones; presenta nuevos datos sobre la prevalencia mundial e influencia de los partidos de origen autoritario; y elabora un nuevo conjunto de conceptos y vocabulario para facilitar el diálogo interregional (como *herencia autoritaria* y *lastre autoritario*). El estudio considera y ofrece respuestas tentativas a cuatro preguntas: ¿Qué explica la prevalencia de los partidos de origen autoritario? ¿Por qué algunos tienen más éxito que otros? ¿Cuáles son las estrategias que pueden emplear para lidiar con el pasado? ¿Y de qué maneras pueden dañar—o ayudar— a los regímenes democráticos?

A surprising feature of democracy in many countries is that large numbers of people, after gaining the right to choose their leaders through free and fair elections, vote for political parties with deep roots in dictatorship. Since the third wave of democratization (Huntington 1991), *authoritarian successor parties* have become prominent actors in Africa, Asia, Europe, and Latin America (Loxton 2015). In several countries, former authoritarian ruling parties (e.g., Social Democracy of the Republic of Poland, SdRP; African Party for the Independence of Cape Verde, PAICV; Taiwan's Kuomintang, KMT; Mexico's Institutional Revolutionary Party, PRI) and parties founded by high-level authoritarian incumbents shortly before or shortly after a transition to democracy (e.g., Spain's People's Party, PP; Bolivia's Nationalist Democratic Action, ADN; Ghana's National Democratic Congress, NDC; Tunisia's Nidaa Tounes) have been voted back into office. Many of these parties grew out of regimes responsible for large-scale human rights abuses. Nevertheless, they have remained key political actors after democratization and enjoy substantial electoral support.

In this paper, I provide an overview of the concept of authoritarian successor parties and develop a framework for analyzing them as a worldwide phenomenon. In the first section, I offer a minimalist definition that can travel across regions and thus allow for broad comparative analysis. In the second section, I show that authoritarian successor parties are one of the most common features of democratization: not only have they been present in a large majority of third-wave democracies, but they were also voted back into office in over one-half of all third-wave democracies. In the third section, I ask why authoritarian successor parties are so widespread and argue that much of this is due to *authoritarian inheritance*: they may inherit valuable resources from the old regime that, paradoxically, help them to flourish under democracy. In the fourth section, I consider the flipside of the ledger—*authoritarian baggage*, or the liabilities of an authoritarian past—and examine the various strategies that parties may employ in order to offset these liabilities. In the fifth section, I ask why some authoritarian successor parties are more successful than others and outline a number of hypotheses that may affect their electoral performance and longevity. Finally, I examine the effects of authoritarian successor parties on democracy and argue that these are *double-edged*. While they can be harmful to democracy in a number of ways, they may also have a number of more salutary effects.

## DEFINING AUTHORITARIAN SUCCESSOR PARTIES

Authoritarian successor parties can be defined as *parties that emerge from authoritarian regimes, but that operate after a transition to democracy* (Loxton 2015).<sup>1</sup> There are two parts to this definition. First, these are parties that operate *after* a transition to democracy. This means that ruling parties of existing authoritarian regimes are excluded, even if the regime in question holds somewhat competitive elections, as in the case of “competitive authoritarian” (Levitsky and Way 2010) or “electoral authoritarian” (Schedler 2006) regimes. To be sure, many authoritarian successor parties begin their lives as authoritarian ruling parties. However, after democratization, they become—if they survive—authoritarian successor parties. To illustrate, we can say that Mexico’s PRI was an authoritarian *ruling* party until the country’s transition to democracy in 2000; thereafter, it became an authoritarian *successor* party. An important implication of this part of the definition is that to win votes, party leaders cannot rely on the “menu of manipulation” (Schedler 2002) used by electoral authoritarian regimes, such as coercion, fraud, or the massive abuse of state resources. Authoritarian successor parties can, and often do, enjoy success under democracy. To be considered authoritarian successor parties, however, they must broadly abide by the democratic rules of the game.<sup>2</sup>

Second, authoritarian successor parties emerge from authoritarian regimes. This can happen in one of two ways, corresponding to two distinct subtypes of authoritarian

---

<sup>1</sup> For an earlier use of the term “authoritarian successor party,” see Roberts (2012). Scholars have used various labels for such parties. In the context of the post-communist world, they have used terms such as “ex-communist parties” (Ishiyama 1997), “communist successor parties” (Ishiyama 1999a, 1999b; Bozóki and Ishiyama 2002), “post-communist parties” (Kitschelt et al. 1999), and “successor parties” (Grzymala-Busse 2002). In other contexts, they have used terms such as “continuist parties” (Haggard and Kaufman 1995), “old regime parties” (Tucker 2006; Ziblatt n.d.), “formerly hegemonic parties” (Langston 2006), “former dominant parties” (Friedman and Wong 2008), “ex-authoritarian parties” (Jhee 2008), “formerly authoritarian parties” (Slater and Wong 2013), and “authoritarian legacy parties” (Kitschelt and Singer n.d.).

<sup>2</sup> In practice, it can sometimes be difficult to determine with absolute certainty whether this condition has been met, given borderline cases of democracy and the existence in some countries of “pluralism by default” (Way 2015), in which unstable democratic and competitive authoritarian regimes oscillate. In Appendix I and Appendix II, I rely on Geddes, Wright, and Frantz’s (2014a) Autocratic Regimes Data Set to score regimes as democratic or authoritarian. If an authoritarian successor party returns to power democratically and then carries out a self-coup or oversees a transition to authoritarianism in some other way, it ceases to be an authoritarian successor party.

successor party. The first are *former authoritarian ruling parties*. Many authoritarian regimes in the twentieth century—both civilian and military—used “official” parties as instruments of rule.<sup>3</sup> In some regimes, this involved a formal “one-party” arrangement, in which all parties but the ruling party were legally proscribed; in others, it occurred through a “hegemonic party” system, in which opposition parties theoretically could contest for power but in which competition was severely constrained.<sup>4</sup> Following transitions to democracy, such parties often continued to exist (though they sometimes changed their names), thus becoming authoritarian successor parties. Examples include Poland’s SdRP, the Hungarian Socialist Party (MSZP), the Czech Republic’s Communist Party of Bohemia and Moravia (KSCM), the Mongolian People’s Party (MPP), Taiwan’s KMT, South Korea’s Democratic Justice Party (DJP), Indonesia’s Golkar, Cape Verde’s PAICV, the Movement for the Liberation of São Tomé and Príncipe/Social Democratic Party (MLSTP/PSD), Mexico’s PRI, Brazil’s Democratic Social Party (PDS), and Panama’s Democratic Revolutionary Party (PRD). (See Appendix II for a complete list of prominent authoritarian successor parties since the third wave.)

The second subtype are what I call *reactive authoritarian successor parties*. As the name suggests, these are parties created in *reaction* to a transition to democracy. They are new parties created by high-level authoritarian incumbents in anticipation of an imminent transition or by former incumbents shortly after a transition. By high-level incumbents, I mean figures such as heads of state, ministers, and key members of the security apparatus.<sup>5</sup> While such parties have received less scholarly attention than former

---

<sup>3</sup> There is a large literature on the role of parties in authoritarian regimes. See, for example, Geddes (1999); Smith (2005); Brownlee (2007); Gandhi (2008); and Levitsky and Way (2012).

<sup>4</sup> On the distinction between “hegemonic” and “one-party” arrangements, see Sartori (1976).

<sup>5</sup> In dictatorships that survive for long periods of time, much of the population is often implicated in the regime in some way. Indeed, even Lech Walesa, one of the heroes of Poland’s pro-democracy movement and its first democratically president after the fall of communism, is alleged to have acted as an informant for the communist regime in the 1970s. (See Joanna Berendt, “Lech Walesa Faces New Accusations of Communist Collaboration,” *The New York Times*, February 18, 2016.) Thus, in order to prevent the concept from being stretched to the point of meaninglessness, the definition of reactive authoritarian successor parties excludes parties founded by individuals who held low-level positions in the old regime. In Guatemala, for example, the founder of the National Advancement Party (PAN), Álvaro Arzú, served under military rule as the director of the state tourism institute. However, because this position did not make him a significant figure in the military regime, the PAN would not be considered an authoritarian successor party.

authoritarian ruling parties, they are extremely common. Examples include Spain's PP, founded in 1976 (as the People's Alliance, AP) by former ministers of the Franco regime such as Manuel Fraga; Bolivia's ADN, formed in 1979 by former military dictator Hugo Banzer after he was overthrown in a coup; the Independent Democratic Union (UDI) in Chile, founded in 1983 by hardline *Pinochetistas* during a regime crisis that they feared would result in democratization; Ghana's NDC, created in 1992 by dictator Jerry John Rawlings after he was forced to initiate a transition to multiparty elections (and eventually full democracy); and Nidaa Tounes in Tunisia, founded in 2012 by figures such as Beji Caid Essebsi, who had held numerous ministerial portfolios in the country's authoritarian regime before it was toppled in the "Arab Spring."

I add three notes about this definition of authoritarian successor parties. First, it is located relatively high on Sartori's (1970) "ladder of abstraction." As Sartori noted, this is appropriate for concepts designed to travel across regions and thus is appropriate for this paper. One of the major goals of this paper is to initiate a broad conversation about authoritarian successor parties as a worldwide phenomenon. To be sure, this is not the first study of such parties. A substantial body of work exists on authoritarian successor parties in the post-communist world,<sup>6</sup> and smaller but still significant bodies of work also exist on Latin America,<sup>7</sup> East and Southeast Asia,<sup>8</sup> Sub-Saharan Africa,<sup>9</sup> and other

---

<sup>6</sup> On post-communist Europe, see Bozóki (1997); Bozóki and Ishiyama (2002); Dauderstädt (2005); Evans and Whitefield (1995); Grzymala-Busse (2001, 2002, 2006, 2007, n.d.); Higley, Kullberg, and Pakulski (1996); Huntington (1996); Ishiyama (1995, 1997, 1998, 1999a, 1999b, 1999c, 2000, 2001, 2006); Ishiyama and Bozóki (2001); Ishiyama and Shafqat (2000); Kitschelt et al. (1999); Kuzio (2008); Lewis (2001); Mahr and Nagle (1995); Orenstein (1998); Rizova (2008); Stojárová and Emerson (2010); Tucker (2006); and Waller (1995). See also Spirova (2008); Grzymala-Busse (1998); Rizova (2012); Kopecek and Pseja (2008); Doerschler and Banaszak (2007); Hough and Koß (2009); Kimmo (2008); Olsen (2007); Patton (1998, 2011); Phillips (1994); Thompson (1996); Ziblatt (1998); Ágh (1995); Racz (1993); Clark and Praneviciute (2008); March (2006); Gwiazda (2008); Zubek (1994, 1995); Pop-Eleches (1999, 2008); Haughton (2004); Haughton and Rybar (2008); Rybar and Deegan-Krause (2008); and Zimmer and Haran (2008).

<sup>7</sup> On Latin America, see Roberts (2006, forthcoming); Loxton (2014a, 2014b); and Loxton and Levitsky (n.d.). See also Adrogué (1993); Crenzel (1999); Aibar (2005); Jetté, Foronda, and López (1997); Peñaranda (2004); Sivak (2001); Cantanhêde (2001); Power (1996, 2000, n.d.); Ribeiro (2014); Hipsher (1996); Joignant and Navia (2003); Klein (2004); Luna (2010, 2014); Pollack (1999); Hartlyn (1998); Holland (2013); Koivumaeki (2010, 2014); Azpuru (2003); Copeland (2007); Garrard-Burnett (2010); Ackerman (2012); Flores-Macías (2013, n.d.); Langston (2003, 2006); McCann (2015); Olmeda and Armesto (2013); Serra (2013); Martí i Puig (2010, 2013); Ortega (2007); Pérez (1992); Harding (2001); Abente-Brun (2009); Turner (2014);



regions.<sup>10</sup> To date, however, most of these works have had a regional focus, with only a handful of exceptions.<sup>11</sup> An unfortunate byproduct of this has been that these works have not always been well known to scholars of different regional interests. This has impeded the accumulation of knowledge and, more fundamentally, it has resulted in an inadequate appreciation of just how common these parties are. Given that authoritarian successor parties exist in multiple world regions and that one of the major goals of this paper is to encourage cross-regional dialogue, I have opted for a broad definition that can travel across space. Scholars focusing on particular countries or regions may wish to move down the ladder of abstraction and adopt a more detailed definition.<sup>12</sup>

Second, this definition focuses on the *origins* of authoritarian successor parties and is intentionally agnostic about other potentially important issues, such as how the party positions itself toward the legacy of the old regime or the extent to which it draws upon the regime's organizational infrastructure. Parties that emerge from authoritarian regimes vary considerably along such dimensions. Some embrace the past; others run

---

Deming (2013); Levitsky and Zavaleta (forthcoming); Meléndez (2014); Urrutia (2011); and Kyle (2016).

<sup>8</sup> On East and Southeast Asia, see Hicken and Kuhonta (2011, 2015); Slater and Wong (2013, n.d.); and Cheng and Huang (n.d.). See also Kim (1997); Kim (2014); Park (2010); Suh (2015); Cheng (2006); Copper (2013); Fields (2002); Muyard (2008); and Tomsa (2008, 2012).

<sup>9</sup> On Sub-Saharan Africa, see Ishiyama and Quinn (2006), Riedl (2014, n.d.), and LeBas (n.d.). See also Creevey, Ngomo, and Vengroff (2005); Meyns (2002); Whitfield (2009); Marcus (2001); Ibrahim and Souley (1998); and chapters in Diamond and Plattner (2010), Doorenspleet and Nijzink (2013, 2014), and Villalón and VonDoepp (2005).

<sup>10</sup> On Southern Europe, see Balfour (2005), Hopkin (1999), López (1988, 1998), and Montero (1987). On South Asia, see Hossain (2004). On the Middle East and North Africa, see Masoud (2011, 2013) and Romdhani (2014). On “old regime parties” in late nineteenth- and early twentieth-century Europe, see Ziblatt (forthcoming, n.d.).

<sup>11</sup> See, for example, Haggard and Kaufman (1995); Jhee (2008); Loxton (2015); Kitschelt and Singer (n.d.); and some chapters in Friedman and Wong (2008).

<sup>12</sup> In her classic study of ex-communist parties in East Central Europe, for example, Grzymala-Busse (2002: 14) uses a more detailed definition: “[*S*]uccessor parties are defined as the formal descendants of the communist parties—that is, the main political parties that arose from the ruling communist parties in 1989 and that explicitly claim their successor status.” Such a move down the ladder of abstraction has the benefit of added specificity, or what Sartori (1970) called “intension.” However, this greater specificity decreases the definition’s inclusiveness, or what Sartori called “extension.” Thus, Grzymala-Busse’s (2002) definition includes more information about the parties about which she is interested, but it excludes parties that did not emerge from communist regimes (and thus most authoritarian successor parties in Africa, Asia, and Latin America), as well as parties that emerge from dictatorships but that downplay their authoritarian ancestry. In this paper, I follow Sartori’s (1970) suggestion for scholars to adopt a relatively high-extension/low-intension definition when engaging in cross-regional analysis.

from it. Some deploy large authoritarian-era organizations to engage in clientelism; others win votes primarily on the basis of ideational factors, such as a reputation for good governance or nostalgia for the old regime. For this reason, I treat these as “variable properties” rather than as “defining properties.”<sup>13</sup> Finally, the concept of authoritarian successor parties is used here to refer to parties that emerge from modern authoritarian regimes in the second and third waves of democracy—that is, from 1945 onward.<sup>14</sup> As Ziblatt (n.d.) shows, however, an important analogue can be seen in the conservative parties of late nineteenth- and early twentieth-century Europe, whose parallels, he argues, are sufficient that they can be thought of as “the authoritarian successor parties of the first wave.”

### A WORLDWIDE PHENOMENON

How prevalent are authoritarian successor parties? How influential are they in the countries in which they operate? To answer these questions, I put together a list of all countries that democratized during the third wave. Drawing on Geddes, Wright, and Frantz’s (2014a) Autocratic Regimes Data Set, I included all countries that they scored as having democratized between 1974 and 2010.<sup>15</sup> In order to avoid biasing my sample toward consolidated democracies,<sup>16</sup> I included cases where the new democracy later broke down (and in some cases democratized again). The only countries that I excluded were those in which the new democracy broke down so quickly that it was not able to hold even a single free and fair election after the year of the transition (Armenia, Azerbaijan, Mauritania, Russia, Sudan, and Zambia). Excluding such cases was essential, since a core part of the definition of authoritarian successor parties is that they contest

---

<sup>13</sup> According to Gibson (1996: 8), “[defining properties] define the concept; they provide the basis for excluding specific cases from the pool of cases being compared. Variable properties are characteristics associated with the concept, but their absence from a specific case does not provide grounds for removing it from the pool of cases being compared.”

<sup>14</sup> On the second and third waves of democracy, see Huntington (1991).

<sup>15</sup> Geddes, Wright, and Frantz (2014a) look at all countries that had at least one million inhabitants as of 2009.

<sup>16</sup> Looking only at democracies that consolidated would have made it impossible to examine one of the potential scenarios discussed in the section of this paper on the effects of authoritarian successor parties on democracy: whether their return to power can trigger an authoritarian regression.

elections under democracy. In total, I counted 65 countries that had experienced at least one transition to democracy during the third wave (see Appendix I for a full list).

I then examined each country to see if a prominent authoritarian successor party had emerged. By “prominent,” I meant simply winning 10 percent or more in a single national election after the transition to democracy. A party could be scored as an authoritarian successor party *either* by having served as the ruling party of an authoritarian regime *or* if it was formed by high-level authoritarian incumbents in anticipation of a transition to democracy/former incumbents shortly after a transition (see Appendix I for detailed coding rules). I excluded three types of parties. First, I excluded parties that had long histories predating authoritarian rule and later became official parties of authoritarian regimes, but that held that position for less than 10 years (e.g., the National Party in Honduras). I excluded such parties on the assumption that their long pre-authoritarian histories were likely to have had a greater impact on their political identities than their short-lived relationship with the authoritarian regime. Second, I excluded parties created by former high-level authoritarian incumbents more than one election cycle after the transition to democracy (e.g., Slovakia’s Direction-Social Democracy, or Smer-SD). I excluded such parties on the assumption that their leaders were likely to have developed political identities independent of the old regime in the ensuing years. Finally, I excluded parties founded by authoritarian incumbents who went into opposition before the transition to democracy (e.g., Mexico’s Party of the Democratic Revolution, PRD). I excluded such parties on the assumption that their role as champions of democratization was likely to have absolved them of their links to the authoritarian regime in the eyes of many voters.<sup>17</sup> While including these three types of parties would have expanded my list of authoritarian successor parties considerably, I opted to exclude them in order to avoid stretching the concept to an excessive degree. In total, I counted 47 countries that had produced at least one prominent authoritarian

---

<sup>17</sup> One borderline case that I include is Brazil’s Liberal Front Party (PFL). The PFL emerged from a breakaway faction of the military regime’s official PDS in the lead-up to the military regime’s January 1985 indirect presidential election. I score the PFL as an authoritarian successor party for two reasons. First, it was not formally created until after the transition to democracy. Second, it became the go-to destination for former authoritarian incumbents and held such pro-military positions that, even though the PDS had been the official ruling party of the military regime, the PFL was “the true heir” of the regime (Power 2000: 80; also Power n.d.).

successor party (see Appendix I for a full list of countries and Appendix II for a full list of parties).

Finally, I looked at each authoritarian successor party to see if it had returned to power democratically. For this, I set a high bar: *winning the presidency or prime minister's office in an election after the transition year*. I excluded three types of scenario. First, I excluded cases where the party had contested democratic elections for a time and then returned to power through non-democratic means (Burundi, Central African Republic). I excluded such cases because of the definitional requirement that authoritarian successor parties contest free and fair elections. Second, I excluded one case where the party held the presidency for one term after the transition to democracy but did not hold it in a subsequent election (Brazil). I excluded it because the party never won power in a direct election or in an election after the year of the transition.<sup>18</sup> Finally, I excluded two cases where the party held cabinet positions in coalition governments after the transition to democracy but never held the top job directly (Indonesia, Slovakia). I excluded such cases because in countries with large numbers of parties, it may be possible for a party to serve as a junior partner in a governing coalition with only minimal electoral support. Again, while including these types of cases would have expanded my list considerably, I chose to exclude them in order to avoid conceptual stretching. In total, I counted 36 countries in which an authoritarian successor party had returned to power democratically (see Appendix I for list and Appendix II for details).

In sum, of the 65 countries that experienced a transition to democracy during the third wave, *47 of them (72 percent) produced prominent authoritarian successor parties, and in a whopping 36 countries (55 percent), voters returned these parties to the presidency or prime minister's office in democratic elections.*

---

<sup>18</sup> In 1985, PFL founder José Sarney served as the running mate of Tancredo Neves, who won that year's indirect presidential election (Neves was a member of the Party of the Brazilian Democratic Movement [PMDB], which was not an authoritarian successor party). Sarney became president after Neves fell gravely ill before he could assume office (Neves later died, and Sarney served out his full term). However, the PFL performed poorly in all subsequent presidential elections, and while it did serve as a coalition partner in future democratic governments, it never again held the presidency (Power n.d.). In addition, Sarney was required for legal reasons to join the PMDB in order to serve as Neves's running mate (Power n.d.).

Important authoritarian successor parties also emerged in Germany, Cape Verde, São Tomé and Príncipe, Guyana, Suriname, and Tunisia, but these were excluded because of these countries' small populations, because the party was formed after 2010, or in the case of Germany, because the party did not cross the 10-percent threshold after national reunification (though it did cross it in the former German Democratic Republic). In Cape Verde, Suriname, and Tunisia, the party was voted back into office (see the “Other Notable Authoritarian Successor Parties” section in Appendix II).

In short, authoritarian successor parties are an extremely common phenomenon. Prominent authoritarian successor parties have emerged in nearly three-quarters of third-wave democracies, and in over one-half of third-wave democracies they have been voted back into office. This means that when a party like the PRI returns to power, as it did in Mexico in 2012, or a party like Nidaa Tounes wins office democratically, as it did in Tunisia in 2014, this should not be regarded as a freak outcome. On the contrary, authoritarian successor parties are part and parcel of the democratization experience. It is normal for such parties to exist, and it is normal for them to do well.

### **AUTHORITARIAN INHERITANCE**

The widespread existence of authoritarian successor parties—and their frequent success at the ballot box—is puzzling. If the Workers' Party in North Korea or the Communist Party of Cuba “wins” 100 percent of the vote in an uncontested election, this can be dismissed as the product of totalitarian repression. Similarly, if the ruling party of a competitive authoritarian regime, such as Robert Mugabe's Zimbabwe African National Union–Patriotic Front (ZANU-PF) or Malaysia's United Malays National Organization (UMNO), ekes out an electoral victory, this can be explained in part by the unevenness of the playing field. But if a party with roots in dictatorship performs well or is even voted back into office *under free and fair conditions*, this is more difficult to explain. Instead of saying “good riddance” after the fall of a dictatorship, millions of voters around the world instead seem to have said “good job,” voting for parties led by the very people who previously ruled over them in an authoritarian—and often brutal—manner.

Scholars who have attempted to make sense of this puzzle have found that authoritarian successor parties often flourish under democracy because they inherit

valuable resources from the old regime. One of the earliest and most influential expressions of this argument can be found in Grzymala-Busse's (2002) seminal study of ex-communist parties in East Central Europe. Many of these parties, she argued, benefited from "usable pasts" ("the historical record of party accomplishments to which the elites can point, and the public perceptions of this record—the repertoire of shared political references") and "portable skills" ("the expertise and administrative experiences gained in the previous regime") (2002: 5). Particularly in countries such as Poland and Hungary, where ruling parties had carried out some reforms and engaged with the opposition during the communist period, they entered democracy with reputations for pragmatism and administrative competence, and their cadres possessed many of the skills necessary to thrive in the rough-and-tumble of democratic politics.<sup>19</sup>

In my own work on authoritarian successor parties of the right in Latin America (Loxton 2014a, 2014b), and on authoritarian successor parties more broadly (Loxton 2015), I expanded on such findings by developing the concept of *authoritarian inheritance*. Authoritarian inheritance refers to the various resources that authoritarian successor parties may inherit from the old regime—resources that, paradoxically, can help them to survive, and even thrive, under democracy. These resources go beyond usable pasts and portable skills and may include (1) a party brand, (2) a territorial organization, (3) clientelistic networks, (4) a source of party finance, and (5) a source of party cohesion.

First, authoritarian successor parties may inherit a *party brand*. Party brand is a term used by scholars to denote the ideational component of parties.<sup>20</sup> According to Lupu's (2014, 2016) influential formulation, a party's brand is the image of it that voters develop by observing its behavior over time. Parties with strong brands come to stand for something in the eyes of voters. To the extent that they feel a sense of "comparative fit" between a party's brand and their own views, they become loyal partisans who consistently turn out to vote for the party at election time. Yet, while brand development

---

<sup>19</sup> In his discussion of the "red return," or the return to power of ex-communist parties after the transition to democracy, Huntington (1996: 8) offered a similar reflection: "[P]erhaps all that the red return signifies is that people who have the political talent to rise to the top in communist systems also have the political talent to rise to the top in democratic systems."

<sup>20</sup> Parts of this section draw on Levitsky, Loxton, and Van Dyck (forthcoming).

is a key component of party-building, constructing a well-known and compelling brand often proves elusive to new parties, given stiff competition from older parties with more established brands and from other new parties also trying to stake out a position in the party system.

Authoritarian successor parties may be spared the challenge of brand development by simply inheriting a brand from the old regime. While the idea of a popular brand derived from a dictatorship may seem counterintuitive, it is undeniable that some dictatorships enjoy considerable popular support. In recent years, a significant literature has emerged on this phenomenon of “popular autocrats” (Dimitrov 2009).<sup>21</sup> In Chile, for example, when citizens were given the opportunity in 1988 to vote in a relatively free and fair plebiscite on whether to extend General Augusto Pinochet’s rule for an additional eight years, 44 percent voted in favor. In Mexico, at the time of the transition to democracy in 2000, 38 percent of the population identified as “*priistas*,” or supporters of the country’s authoritarian ruling party—more than the two main opposition parties combined (Medina et al. 2010: 68). And in South Korea, surveys have repeatedly shown that its most popular former political leader is Park Chung-hee, the country’s military dictator from 1962 to 1979, with 55.4 percent of the population expressing a favorable opinion of him in 2006 (Suh 2015: 15).<sup>22</sup>

In some cases, popular support for authoritarian regimes is based on “position issues,” or the regime’s position on the left-right ideological spectrum. Perhaps more common, though, is for authoritarian regimes to generate support on the basis of “valence issues,” or issues about which virtually everyone agrees, such as corruption, inflation, economic growth, national defense, and public security.<sup>23</sup> While few voters may wish for a return to dictatorship, they may nevertheless feel nostalgic for aspects of the old regime if it was viewed, for example, as a competent steward of the economy, protector of public security, defender of the nation’s borders, or opponent of corruption—particularly if the

---

<sup>21</sup> See Rose and Mishler (2002); Shin and Wells (2005); Rose, Mishler, and Munro (2006, 2011); Dimitrov (2009); Treisman (2011); and Chang, Chu, and Welsh (2013).

<sup>22</sup> Scholars have labeled this phenomenon “Park Chung-hee syndrome” (Suh 2015: 15). See also Kim (2014).

<sup>23</sup> For a discussion of the difference between “position issues” and “valence issues,” see Stokes (1963).

new democracy has failed in these areas.<sup>24</sup> If an authoritarian successor party inherits this kind of popular brand, as in the cases of Chile's UDI, Mexico's PRI, or South Korea's DJP/Saenuri,<sup>25</sup> it is born with one of the key determinants of democratic success.

Second, authoritarian successor parties may inherit a *territorial organization*. Parties rarely survive in voters' minds alone. Instead, most successful parties have an organized presence on the ground, whether in the form of formal branch structures, informal patronage-based machines, or social movements. These organizations play an indispensable role in disseminating the party's brand and mobilizing voters on election day. Like brand development, constructing a robust territorial organization represents a significant challenge for new parties. It is therefore no surprise that scholars have found that parties that build upon preexisting mobilizing structures, such as religious associations (Kalyvas 1996) or labor unions (LeBas 2011), are born with a significant advantage.<sup>26</sup>

Authoritarian successor parties may be spared the hard work of organization-building by simply inheriting an organization from the old regime. In the case of former authoritarian ruling parties—especially those from regimes that carried out competitive but unfair elections—a grassroots organization well-suited for electoral mobilization may already be in place. For example, after the defeat of Taiwan's KMT in 2000, the party was able to draw on “its immense organizational network at [the] grassroots level,” which historically had “penetrated all state apparatuses and major associations in society” (Cheng 2006: 371). Indeed, even “[a]fter the March 2000 political earthquake, the KMT [was] still the only party with branch offices in every township and urban district, and it remain[ed] the party with the most card-carrying members” (Cheng 2006: 371).

In other cases, it may be necessary to “retrofit” authoritarian-era organizations originally designed for very different purposes. For example, the founders of El Salvador's Nationalist Republican Alliance (ARENA) built their party upon a vast

---

<sup>24</sup> See Chang, Chu, and Welsh (2013), Serra (2013), and McCann (2015).

<sup>25</sup> South Korea's authoritarian successor party has changed its name several times. At the time of the transition to democracy, it was called the DJP. Since 2012, it has been known as Saenuri. See Cheng and Huang (n.d.).

<sup>26</sup> The reason is straightforward: “Organization building does not come naturally or automatically to political actors. It is a difficult, time-consuming, costly, and often risky enterprise” (Kalyvas 1996: 41).



paramilitary organization created by the previous military regime called the Nationalist Democratic Organization (ORDEN).<sup>27</sup> ORDEN had been used for spying and repressive activities, including torture and extrajudicial executions, and was considered a precursor to the notorious “death squads” of the 1980s. Despite having been invented for these very different ends, ORDEN was successfully repurposed into a grassroots, nationwide organization that could be used to mobilize votes under democracy (Loxton 2014a).

Third, authoritarian successor parties may inherit *clientelistic networks*. Clientelism, or the direct distribution of material benefits in exchange for votes, is one of the classic strategies used by parties of all stripes to maintain electoral support.<sup>28</sup> For clientelism to be effective, however, it is necessary to have a clientele—that is, a group of individuals locked into a stable relationship of dependency with their patron. For this, the patron must become well known and be seen as reliable to his or her clients, and clients must come to expect and depend on payoffs from their patron. Like brand development and organization-building, constructing a clientele represents a costly and time-consuming effort for new parties.

Authoritarian successor parties may be able to skip this labor by simply inheriting clientelistic networks forged under authoritarian rule.<sup>29</sup> Most authoritarian regimes do not attempt to hold onto power through coercion alone; instead, they build popular support through various means, including the selective distribution of material goods. If an authoritarian successor party can transfer this clientelistic network to itself, it inherits a valuable resource. For example, the Pinochet dictatorship in Chile attempted to build popular support in urban shantytowns through material handouts distributed by military-appointed mayors. Many of these dictatorship-era mayors later joined the UDI and brought with them their clientelistic followings.<sup>30</sup> Kitschelt and Singer (n.d.) argue that this is common, with authoritarian successor parties—particularly those that emerge from well-institutionalized authoritarian regimes that last for long periods of time, or what they call “authoritarian legacy parties”—often entering the democratic period with large

---

<sup>27</sup> The acronym “ORDEN” spells the Spanish word for “order.”

<sup>28</sup> On clientelism, see Kitschelt (2000) and Stokes et al. (2013).

<sup>29</sup> For a classic analysis of how patrons are sometimes able to retain their clientelistic networks after a regime transition and subsequently “lend” these to political actors, see Hagopian (1996).

<sup>30</sup> On the UDI’s inheritance of clientelistic networks, see Hipsher (1996), Klein (2004), and Luna (2010).

organizations and other resources that give them an advantage in the distribution of clientelistic goods.

Fourth, authoritarian successor parties may inherit a *source of party finance*. All parties require money to operate. They need funds for everything from organizational upkeep (salaries, vehicles, etc.) to campaign spending (particularly expensive television advertising). In countries where business was part of the social coalition backing authoritarian rule, authoritarian successor parties may inherit a reputation as serious and trustworthy allies and, as result, enjoy the support of the business community after democratization. This was the case with several authoritarian successor parties of the right in Latin America, such as El Salvador's ARENA and Chile's UDI, a region where business has traditionally preferred to keep party politics at arm's length (Loxton 2014a). South Korea's DJP/Saenuri similarly inherited close ties to big business from the old regime, which gave it a funding advantage over other parties (Cheng and Huang, n.d.). In other cases, the relationship between authoritarian successor parties and business has been even more direct, with the party itself owning businesses. For example, in Taiwan, the KMT "possessed hundreds of real estate properties and business enterprises, making it the richest party on earth and the sixth largest conglomerate in corporate Taiwan," which gave it access to "ample in-house campaign financing" (Cheng 2006: 371).

Finally, and somewhat more speculatively, authoritarian successor parties may inherit a *source of cohesion*. Party cohesion refers to the propensity of party leaders and core supporters to hang together—especially in the face of crisis. Party cohesion is the Achilles' heel of new parties. Many new parties collapse after suffering devastating schisms during their early years. While scholars disagree about why some parties are more prone to schisms than others, Levitsky and Way have argued that one of the most robust sources of cohesion is a history of "sustained, violent, and ideologically-driven conflict" (2012: 870). When party activists have fought in the trenches together, they are more likely to be animated by a sense of mission and *esprit de corps*. Moreover, such struggles are likely to result in high levels of polarization, which exacerbate the "us-them" distinction and raise the cost of defection to opposition parties (LeBas 2011, n.d.). While Levitsky and Way (2012) mainly have in mind revolutionary and anti-colonial struggles,

there is good reason to believe that counterrevolutionary struggles may have similar effects (Slater and Smith 2016).<sup>31</sup>

When authoritarian regimes born in the crucible of struggle—whether of a revolutionary or counterrevolutionary nature—eventually break down, they may bequeath this source of cohesion to their partisan successors. This may help to explain why authoritarian successor parties such as Taiwan’s KMT, Mexico’s PRI, El Salvador’s ARENA, Chile’s UDI, and Cape Verde’s PAICV, all of which can trace their roots to a history of struggle, did not suffer devastating schisms after democratization.

In other cases, the party is led by a former dictator (e.g., Hugo Banzer in Bolivia’s ADN, Joaquín Balaguer in the Dominican Republic’s Social Christian Reformist Party or PRSC), whose undisputed personal authority and/or strong coattails can act as a powerful source of cohesion. However, such personalistic authoritarian successor parties tend to experience major crises after the death or retirement of the leader and only rarely manage to “de-personalize” enough to survive in the long term (Loxton and Levitsky n.d.).

To conclude, authoritarian successor parties may inherit various resources from the old regime that can help them to succeed under democracy. Three caveats are in order. First, there is no guarantee that a party will inherit all—or even any—of the forms of authoritarian inheritance discussed in this section. Authoritarian successor parties vary dramatically in the amount and types of resources that they inherit from the old regime. Several possible reasons are discussed later in the paper, including the performance of the authoritarian regime and the nature and timing of the transition to democracy. Second, the effects of authoritarian inheritance may diminish over time. For example, if a party’s brand is based on a reputation for providing protection against a perceived threat from the past (communism, foreign invasion, etc.), this brand may weaken as memories of the earlier threat fade and there is generational turnover in the electorate.<sup>32</sup> Finally, while roots in dictatorship can provide advantages to authoritarian successor parties, they are hardly an unalloyed good—a topic to which I turn in the next section.

---

<sup>31</sup> See also Smith (2005).

<sup>32</sup> This may help to explain why older voters in South Korea were more likely to vote for Park Geun-hye, the daughter of former military dictator Park Chung-hee, in the 2012 presidential election (see Kim 2014).

## STRATEGIES FOR DEALING WITH THE PAST

If roots in dictatorship can be beneficial to authoritarian successor parties in a number of ways, they can also be a liability. Invariably, much of the electorate will disapprove of the party's origins and thus be unlikely to vote for it. If the valuable resources bequeathed by an authoritarian regime to its partisan successor can be thought of as *authoritarian inheritance*, the opposite can be thought of as *authoritarian baggage* (Loxton 2015).<sup>33</sup> One source of authoritarian baggage for virtually all dictatorships is human rights violations. If a regime has killed, tortured, or imprisoned large segments of its own population, this is likely to haunt any authoritarian successor party that emerges from it. Another potential source of authoritarian baggage is a poor performance in key areas such as the economy and national security. As discussed in the next section, while some authoritarian regimes have relatively strong performances in office (e.g., the KMT regime in Taiwan, the Park Chung-hee regime in South Korea), others perform disastrously (e.g., the 1967–1974 military regime in Greece, the 1976–1983 military regime in Argentina). In extreme cases such as Greece and Argentina, the baggage may be so great that outgoing authoritarian incumbents do not even bother to form a party, since they know that its chances of success would be nil.<sup>34</sup> It is more common, however, for regimes to produce some mix of inheritance and baggage, with the proportion varying according to a variety of factors (see next section). In these cases, it is essential for party leaders to craft

---

<sup>33</sup> One way to think about this distinction is in terms of what Hale (2004: 996) calls “starting political capital,” which he defines as the “the stock of assets [parties] possess that might be translated into electoral success.” Authoritarian *inheritance*, which can help parties to achieve electoral success, is a form of starting political capital. Continuing with this analogy, authoritarian *baggage* can be thought of as the opposite: the stock of *liabilities* with which parties are burdened that might impede their electoral success.

<sup>34</sup> No significant authoritarian successor parties emerged in either country at the national level. However, in Argentina several emerged at the provincial level, such as the Republican Force in Tucumán, Chaqueña Action in Chaco, and the Renewal Party of Salta. The existence of these subnational parties can be explained in terms of authoritarian inheritance. While the 1976–1983 military regime was a fiasco at the national level, in some pockets of the country military governors could claim significant accomplishments. In Tucumán, for example, where guerrilla forces had been stronger than anywhere else in the country, General Antonio Domingo Bussi, military governor from 1976 to 1977, brutally and effectively repressed the insurrection. Under democracy, Bussi drew on this authoritarian past in order to bolster his credibility as a champion of “order,” and was democratically returned to the governor’s mansion. See Adrogué (1993), Crenzel (1999), and Aibar (2005).

an effective strategy for dealing with the past, with the aim of maximizing the benefits of authoritarian inheritance while minimizing the costs of authoritarian baggage. As this section shows, parties have successfully pursued several different strategies. These include (1) contrition, (2) obfuscation, (3) scapegoating, and (4) embracing the past.

The first strategy is *contrition*. This is the approach that Grzymala-Busse (2002: 6) describes in her classic work as “symbolically breaking with the past.” Ex-communist parties in East Central Europe, she argued, were “both handicapped and helped by their past” (2002: 7). On the one hand, some of them had earned a reputation under communism for administrative competence and pragmatism, which constituted a *usable past*. On the other hand, they were burdened by their historical connection to “regimes widely despised by their own citizens” (2002: 2), which might be described as an *unusable past*. In order to minimize the damage caused by their unusable pasts, Grzymala-Busse argues that they had to engage in public acts of contrition, such as “changing the party’s name, program, symbols, and public representatives,” and “denouncing [the] former misdoings and crimes” of the old regime (2002: 73, 79). In countries where they made these symbolic changes and promoted a new generation of relatively unsullied leaders, such as Poland and Hungary, they were able to reinvent themselves and quickly return to power, while in countries where they did not, such as the Czech Republic, they performed less well in the early years of democracy.<sup>35</sup>

A second strategy is *obfuscation*. In this strategy, rather than acknowledging and expressing contrition for the past, the party tries to downplay it. One example is Brazil’s Liberal Front Party (PFL), which was founded in 1985 as a breakaway faction of the military regime’s official party, the PDS. Under democracy, the PFL became the go-to destination for former authoritarian incumbents and was arguably the “true heir” (Power 2000: 80) of the military regime. Yet, because the PFL had broken with the regime in its final months, it was able to downplay its status as an authoritarian successor party. In

---

<sup>35</sup> However, as Grzymala-Busse (n.d.) has shown in more recent work, authoritarian successor parties in Poland and Hungary eventually became “victims of their own success.” Having built their brands on the issue of competent governance, they were viciously punished by voters and largely wiped from existence when they failed to deliver. In contrast, those parties that did not make a significant break with the past, such as the Czech Republic’s, continued to exist and win a sizeable number of votes as protest parties.

2007, in a particularly unsubtle act of obfuscation, it changed its name to “Democrats” (Power n.d.).

Another example is El Salvador’s ARENA. The party was founded in 1981 by Major Roberto D’Aubuisson, who had been the deputy director of intelligence under military rule and who became the public face of the country’s notorious “death squads” in the 1980s after being displaced in a palace coup in 1979. Drawing on past connections, he built his new party upon the structure of a paramilitary network constructed by the previous military regime called ORDEN.<sup>36</sup> Yet, while ARENA members strongly embrace D’Aubuisson’s memory, they deny accusations that he engaged in extrajudicial violence and have actively sought to distance their party from the pre-1979 military regime (Loxton 2014a).

A third strategy is *scapegoating*. This strategy involves distinguishing between a “good” dictator, whom the party embraces, and a “bad” dictator, whom it denounces. Although the party acknowledges the unsavory aspects of the old regime, it blames these entirely on the bad dictator. An example is Panama’s PRD. The party was founded in 1979 by military dictator Omar Torrijos to serve as his regime’s official ruling party. In 1981, Torrijos died and was replaced by Manuel Noriega, who continued to use it as the regime’s official party. After the 1989–1990 US invasion and resulting transition to democracy, the PRD fully embraced the memory of Torrijos, who had earned broad popular support by increasing social spending and winning control of the Panama Canal from the United States (Loxton and Levitsky n.d.). To this day, the PRD’s emblem is an “O” with an “11” inside it—a reference to October 11, 1968, the day of the coup that brought Torrijos to power (García 2001: 570). However, the party categorically denounced Noriega, who had become notorious for his brutality and corruption. Thus, during the 1994 election, the PRD’s successful presidential candidate, Ernesto Pérez Balladares, asserted that Torrijos “was a hero, and a great innovator,” but claimed that “Noriega was an opportunist, a traitor and a disgrace to the country.”<sup>37</sup>

A more recent example is Nidaa Tounes in Tunisia. The party was founded by former authoritarian incumbents in 2012 after the overthrow of dictator Zine El Abidine

<sup>36</sup> See above for a discussion of the role of ORDEN in ARENA’s foundation.

<sup>37</sup> Quoted in Howard W. French, “Panama Journal; Democracy at Work, under Shadow of Dictators,” *The New York Times*, February 21, 1994.

Ben Ali the previous year as part of the “Arab Spring.” Like the PRD with Noriega, Nidaa Tounes attempted to distance itself from the disgraced Ben Ali, whose 1987–2011 period of rule had become infamous for its corruption and repressiveness. However, the party embraced the memory of Ben Ali’s authoritarian predecessor, Habib Bourguiba, who had ruled for 30 years as Tunisia’s first post-independence president and whom many associated with the values of secularism and national independence. In order to highlight its connection to “Bourguism,” the party’s founder, Beji Caid Essebsi, kicked off his successful presidential campaign in 2014 in front of the mausoleum housing the former dictator’s remains.<sup>38</sup>

The final strategy is simply to *embrace the past*. In this strategy, rather than expressing contrition, obfuscating its origins, or scapegoating a particular dictator, the authoritarian successor party simply acknowledges and celebrates its past. It proclaims, loudly and proudly, the accomplishments of the old regime and highlights the contrast between the supposedly idyllic state of affairs when its leaders were in power versus the dysfunctions of the present. In Suriname, for example, this was the strategy followed by National Democratic Party (NDP) founder Dési Bouterse, who was military dictator from 1980 to 1987 and who was democratically returned to power in 2010. As *The New York Times* reported: “Rather than playing down his past, Mr. Bouterse has defiantly celebrated it since his election last July by Parliament. He has designated Feb. 25, when he and other soldiers carried out a coup in 1980, as a national holiday, calling it the ‘day of liberation and renewal.’”<sup>39</sup>

As Loxton and Levitsky (n.d.) show, several personalistic authoritarian successor parties in Latin America, such as Bolivia’s ADN and the Guatemalan Republic Front (FRG), have opted for this strategy. As parties whose identities were intimately linked to a former dictator—who in most cases continued to lead the party under democracy—they had little choice but to embrace the past and hope that their authoritarian inheritance

---

<sup>38</sup> “Tunisia’s Presidential Election: In the Shade of Bourguiba,” *The Economist*, November 4, 2014.

<sup>39</sup> Simon Romero, “Returned to Power, a Leader Celebrates a Checkered Past,” *The New York Times*, May 2, 2011.

would outweigh their authoritarian baggage.<sup>40</sup> More surprising is Grzymala-Busse's (n.d.) recent finding that embracing the past was also an effective strategy in the post-communist world. While she famously argued in her 2002 book that breaking with the past was crucial for the success of authoritarian successor parties in Poland and Hungary, the eventual collapse of these parties—and the survival of unreconstructed parties such as the Czech Republic's KSCM—has caused her to reconsider this earlier argument.

To conclude, while all authoritarian successor parties are born with authoritarian baggage (some more than others), parties have developed various strategies to offset this baggage, including contrition, obfuscation, scapegoating, and embracing the past. It is also possible to imagine hybrid strategies. For example, a party might embrace the positive aspects of the old regime but show contrition for others, such as egregious episodes of violence. Another possibility is to pursue what Luna (2014) calls a “segmented” appeal, whereby the party communicates to one constituency in one way and to another in a different way. Thus, an authoritarian successor party might enthusiastically embrace its authoritarian past when talking to its core supporters but downplay its past when speaking to the broader electorate.

An important question for future research is why parties choose one strategy over another. Part of the answer likely has to do with the amount of authoritarian baggage: the greater the baggage, the greater the incentive to try and jettison it through contrition, obfuscation, or scapegoating, rather than simply embracing the past. However, other factors are also likely to affect the particular constellation of opportunities and constraints that party strategists face. In Panama and Tunisia, for example, the scapegoating strategy was only possible because the authoritarian era could be divided into two clearly demarcated periods: the Torrijos and Noriega periods in Panama, and the Bourguiba and Ben Ali periods in Tunisia. In the case of personalistic authoritarian successor parties in Latin America, the fact that the former dictator usually continued to lead the party no

---

<sup>40</sup> Such parties may try to blame regime underlings for misdeeds, as Peru's *Fujimorismo* has done with Vladimiro Montesinos, the intelligence chief of former autocrat Alberto Fujimori (Urrutia 2011: 113). However, this version of the scapegoating strategy is less likely to be effective, as it is hard to believe that the autocrat was simply unaware of such activities—and if he was, this opens him up to charges of incompetence.



doubt contributed to their decision to embrace the past, since it is difficult to deny connections to or denounce the actions of the person at the top of the party ticket.

### **VARIATION IN AUTHORITARIAN SUCCESSOR PARTY PERFORMANCE**

While the concept of authoritarian inheritance can help to explain the general prevalence of authoritarian successor parties, it is also clear that there is major variation among parties in terms of performance. First, they vary in terms of *electoral performance*. In some cases, such as Ghana's NDC, they enjoy massive electoral support and are democratically returned to office; in others, such as the Malawi Congress Party (MCP), they win fewer votes and never directly return to the presidency or prime minister's office.<sup>41</sup> Second, they vary in terms of *longevity*. In some cases, such as Panama's PRD, they institutionalize and survive for long periods of time; in others, such as Bolivia's ADN or Guatemala's FRG, they eventually fizzle out and disappear.<sup>42</sup> These two types of variation can be seen cross-nationally, and also sometimes within-country where more than one authoritarian successor party emerged. In Spain, for example, the PP continues to be one of the country's major parties to this day, while the Union of the Democratic Center (UCD), an important actor in the 1970s and early 1980s, no longer exists.<sup>43</sup> Similarly, as Power (n.d.) shows, Brazil's PFL was a bigger vote-getter than the PDS for the first two decades of democracy, but the two switched positions in the 2010s.<sup>44</sup>

What accounts for this variation in performance? In the previous section, I discussed an important voluntarist factor: strategies for dealing with the past. All else equal, parties that craft effective strategies to offset the costs of authoritarian baggage stand a better chance of succeeding than parties that do not. However, many of the factors that seem to affect party performance are more structural or institutional in nature. In this section, I discuss six possible factors: (1) performance of the authoritarian regime, (2) performance of the new democracy, (3) nature and timing of the transition to democracy,

---

<sup>41</sup> See LeBas (n.d.) and Riedl (n.d.).

<sup>42</sup> See Loxton and Levitsky (n.d.).

<sup>43</sup> On Spain's UCD, see Hopkin (1999). On the PP, see Balfour (2005).

<sup>44</sup> Over the years, both of these Brazilian parties have changed their names various times. As of 2014, the former PDS was called the Progressive Party (PP), and the former PFL was called Democrats (Power n.d.).

(4) electoral institutions, (5) authoritarian regime type, and (6) the competitive environment in which the authoritarian successor party operates.

The first probable cause of variation is *performance of the authoritarian regime*. Authoritarian regimes vary dramatically on this dimension.<sup>45</sup> At one extreme, regimes in Taiwan and South Korea could claim extraordinary policy achievements in the areas of economic development and national security (see Cheng and Huang n.d.). In Taiwan, the KMT regime oversaw average GNP growth of 8.8 percent between 1953 and 1986, with the island going from having a GNP per capita similar to Zaire's in the 1960s to having that of a developed country in the 1980s (Wade 1990: 38, 35). The experience in South Korea was similarly impressive: "Starting from a war-destroyed, improvised economy in the mid-1950s, South Korea industrialized rapidly and in 1996 joined the 'rich man's club,' the Organization of Cooperation and Development" (Kohli 2004: 25). In addition, both regimes could claim to have protected their countries from very real foreign threats (the People's Republic of China and North Korea, respectively). At the other extreme, Greece's military regime of 1967–1974 and Argentina's military regime of 1976–1983 led their countries to military defeat in wars with geopolitical archrivals (Turkey and Great Britain, respectively), and in Argentina the regime oversaw bouts of hyperinflation and negative economic growth (Haggard and Kaufman 1995: 34–35). The closer a regime is to the Taiwan/South Korea end of the performance spectrum, the more likely it is to produce an attractive party brand; the closer it is to the Greece/Argentina end of the spectrum, the more likely it is to produce nothing more than authoritarian baggage.<sup>46</sup> It is no wonder, then, that the KMT in Taiwan and the DJP/Saenuri are among the world's most successful authoritarian successor parties, while in Greece and Argentina outgoing incumbents did not even bother to form authoritarian successor parties.

In addition to looking at issues such as the economy and national security, it is important to consider what Huntington (1991) called "negative legitimacy" when assessing an authoritarian regime's performance. Negative legitimacy stems not from

---

<sup>45</sup> For an earlier reflection on the effects of authoritarian regime performance (though in this case applied to the issue of democratic consolidation), see O'Donnell (1992: 31–37).

<sup>46</sup> According to Slater and Wong (2013: 719), particularly important is a "history of successful state-led development," since an "impressive record of transformative accomplishments in the economic realm provides the kind of 'usable past' that aids a formerly authoritarian party seeking 'regeneration' under democracy."

what a regime *does* but by what it is *against*. It is defined in terms of the enemy from which the regime claims to have saved the country, such as “communism,” “subversion,” “social turmoil,” and so on (1991: 49–50). If an authoritarian regime takes power against a backdrop that much of the population perceives as profoundly threatening, it is more likely to enjoy negative legitimacy than if it takes power in an atmosphere of relative calm. This factor may help to explain the success of parties such as Spain’s PP and Chile’s UDI. Both grew out of dictatorships that had come to power in the context of severe polarization (civil war in Spain and the socialist government of Salvador Allende in Chile), which enabled incumbents to make a compelling case that they had “saved” their countries from sinister, anti-national forces. This, together with their relatively strong economic performances,<sup>47</sup> resulted in considerable popular support for both regimes. The fact that the major protagonists of the pre-authoritarian crisis period (e.g., the Socialist Party in Chile, the Spanish Socialist Workers’ Party) remained powerful actors in the new democracy also likely encouraged former regime supporters to vote for authoritarian successor parties, in the hope that they would act as bulwarks against a return to the “bad old days.”

A second likely cause of variation is the *performance of the new democracy*. Popular perceptions of authoritarian regime performance do not develop in a vacuum. Instead, they are affected by events before and after the period of authoritarian rule. Negative legitimacy, as discussed above, hinges on what occurred before the onset of authoritarianism. What occurs *after* the transition to democracy is also likely to color how the electorate remembers the past. The performance of the previous authoritarian regime may come to look increasingly good in retrospect if the performance of the new democracy is sufficiently bad.<sup>48</sup>

---

<sup>47</sup> Economic growth under Franco was impressive: “Between 1960 and 1975, only Japan experienced higher rates of economic development than Spain” (Encarnación 2008: 445). While accounts of the “Chilean miracle” under Pinochet may have been exaggerated (Domínguez 1998: 71), the regime’s performance was nevertheless impressive by regional standards in Latin America during the so-called “lost decade.” Perhaps most importantly, the Chilean regime ended on a high note, with an average of 6.2 percent annual growth during the last five years of authoritarian rule (Haggard and Kaufman 1995: 176).

<sup>48</sup> In their analysis of survey data on “authoritarian nostalgia” in democracies such as Mongolia and the Philippines, Chang, Chu, and Park (2007: 78) write: “Many East Asian democracies are still struggling against a haze of nostalgia for authoritarianism, as citizens compare life under

In Mexico, for example, the transition to democracy in 2000 was accompanied by a mediocre economic performance and, during the presidency of Felipe Calderón (2006–2012), an explosive drug war that resulted in tens of thousands of deaths. It is therefore perhaps not surprising that survey data in the lead-up to the 2012 general election indicated that 43 percent of the Mexican public believed that conditions had been better under the old PRI regime—a retrospective judgment that almost certainly helps to explain the victory of the PRI presidential candidate, Enrique Peña Nieto (McCann 2015: 91–92).<sup>49</sup> In the post-communist world, Tucker (2006) has observed something similar at the subnational level: authoritarian successor parties have tended to enjoy greater support in those regions where economic conditions were worse after the transition to democracy and less support in those regions where conditions were better. The upshot is that when new democracies perform poorly on key dimensions such as public security and the economy, voters are more likely to remember the former authoritarian regime in a positive light—and more likely to support parties with roots in that regime.

A third possible cause of variation in performance is the *nature and timing of the transition to democracy*. Democratic transitions are not all alike. In some, authoritarian incumbents exit in good times and largely on their own terms; in others, they exit in disgrace and have little influence on the terms of the transition.<sup>50</sup> When authoritarian regimes end on a high note, they are more likely to be remembered positively by electorates and to leave behind electoral institutions favorable to their partisan successors. This was one of the findings of Haggard and Kaufman’s (1995: 126–35) classic work on the political economy of democratic transitions. They found that the nature of the transition—specifically, whether it was a “crisis” or a “non-crisis” transition—had an important impact on the performance of authoritarian successor parties, or what they call “continuist parties.” According to their data, regimes that democratized during the third wave under non-crisis conditions—that is, without contracting economies or severe

---

democracy with either the growth-oriented authoritarianism of the recent past or with their prosperous nondemocratic neighbors of the present.”

<sup>49</sup> See also Flores-Macías (2013: 130) and Serra (2013).

<sup>50</sup> There is a large literature on modes of transition to democracy. See, for example, O’Donnell and Schmitter (1986); Hagopian (1990); and Karl (1990).

inflation—were more likely to produce viable authoritarian successor parties than regimes that broke down in the midst of economic crises.<sup>51</sup>

In their work on “conceding to thrive,” Slater and Wong (2013) have recently made a similar argument, highlighting the importance of timing for authoritarian successor party performance. In their view, the ideal moment to democratize is during what they call the “bittersweet spot.” It is “bitter” because no authoritarian incumbent is likely to consider initiating a transition to democracy without first receiving some ominous warning that the *status quo* is unsustainable, such as declining returns in undemocratic elections, an economic shock, or an uptick in contentious politics. However, it is “sweet” because if the warning is promptly heeded and democratization conceded before a terminal regime crisis sets in, the authoritarian *ruling* party has a good chance of thriving in the new democracy as an authoritarian *successor* party. Slater and Wong (2013) argue that variation in timing helps to explain the uneven levels of success of Taiwan’s KMT (most successful), Indonesia’s Golkar (least successful), and South Korea’s DJP/Saenuri (intermediate level of success) under democracy.

A fourth possible cause of variation is *electoral institutions*. Democracies differ in the rules that they use to structure elections, such as the formula for translating votes into parliamentary seats (e.g., proportional vs. first-past-the-post), the weight given to different electoral districts (e.g., even weight to districts of similar population size vs. greater weight for some districts, such as rural districts, regardless of population), and barriers to entry for new parties (high barriers vs. low barriers). As Riedl (2014, n.d.) has argued, when authoritarian incumbents remain strong during the transition to democracy, they may be able to impose electoral institutions that favor their partisan successors. In Chile, for example, the Pinochet regime ended in the midst of an economic boom in the late 1980s and was largely able to dictate the terms of the transition. One result was an electoral formula known as the “binomial system,” which virtually guaranteed equal representation to the top two tickets in legislative elections, even if the winning ticket outperformed the runner-up by a huge margin.<sup>52</sup> Under democracy, this gave the

---

<sup>51</sup> For a similar finding, see Jhee (2008).

<sup>52</sup> In the binomial system, congressional districts each had a district magnitude of two. One seat was awarded to the winning ticket, and one seat was awarded to the runner-up ticket. The only way that the winning ticket could win both seats was if it *doubled* the number of votes won by the

country's two authoritarian successor parties, the UDI and National Renewal (RN), a percentage of seats in Congress that exceeded their share of the vote.<sup>53</sup>

In other cases, authoritarian incumbents have maintained less control during the transition, and their partisan successors have consequently faced less favorable electoral institutions under democracy. In Venezuela, for example, dictator Marco Pérez Jiménez (1952–1958) fell from power after a mass uprising and was forced to flee the country. Shortly thereafter, his followers formed a party, the Nationalist Civic Crusade (CCN), which won 11 percent of the legislative vote in 1968, with the exiled Pérez Jiménez winning a Senate seat.<sup>54</sup> Fearing the possibility of Pérez Jiménez winning the upcoming 1973 presidential election, the country's major parties passed a constitutional amendment prohibiting the former dictator from running for president, which undermined the CCN's main source of appeal and contributed to its demise (Martz and Baloyra 1976: 75–82).

Similarly, the Guatemalan constitution barred FRG founder Efraín Ríos Montt from running for the presidency during the 1990s while he was at the height of his popularity, on the grounds that he was a former dictator.<sup>55</sup> In this case, however, the prohibition did not have the same deleterious effects as in the case of Venezuela's CCN: in the 1999 general election, the FRG won the presidency with a different candidate and took over 40 percent of the legislative vote. This case suggests that while electoral institutions matter for authoritarian successor party performance, they are probably not decisive. Not only are they largely endogenous to the nature of the transition (a controlled transition is more likely to result in electoral institutions favorable to the authoritarian successor party than a transition by collapse), but a party with broad popular support may

---

runner-up. This meant that if the winning ticket won 66.6 percent and the runner-up ticket won 33.4 percent, each ticket would win one seat, since the winning ticket had not quite doubled the percentage won by the runner-up. In some cases, this produced truly bizarre results, as when UDI founder Jaime Guzmán won a senate seat in 1989 with only 17.2 percent of the vote, because the combined vote of the two candidates on the winning ticket—who won 31.3 percent and 30.6 percent, respectively—had not quite doubled that of the runner-up ticket (Pastor 2004: 45–47). The binomial system was finally replaced in 2015.

<sup>53</sup> However, the effects of the binomial system were not as disproportional as sometimes claimed (Rabkin 1996).

<sup>54</sup> Pérez Jiménez was prevented from assuming his Senate seat, on the basis of his being absent from the country and his failure to vote, which was obligatory in Venezuela (Martz and Baloyra 1976: 278, n. 60).

<sup>55</sup> Ríos Montt was eventually allowed to run for president in 2003, but by then his popularity had declined considerably.

perform well even in the context of unfavorable electoral institutions. Moreover, electoral institutions cannot explain within-country variation, such as why the PFL enjoyed a stronger electoral performance than the PDS during the first decades of Brazilian democracy, or why Spain's PP managed to outlive the UCD.

A fifth possible cause of variation is *authoritarian regime type*. While all authoritarian regimes share the characteristic of not being democracies, that is where their similarities end. Scholars have developed various typologies to describe these varieties of authoritarianism. Geddes (1999), for example, famously distinguishes between “personalist,” “military,” and “single-party” regimes, and Schedler (2002) distinguishes between “closed authoritarian,” “hegemonic electoral authoritarian,” and “competitive electoral authoritarian” regimes. Even among regimes of the same type, there can still be major differences. Thus, in her study of military regimes in Latin America, Remmer (1989: 3) distinguishes between “exclusionary” and “inclusionary” regimes and writes that the “differences among military regimes are as profound as the differences between dictatorship and democracy.” While there is no consensus on this issue, scholars have advanced a number of plausible arguments linking authoritarian regime type to authoritarian successor party performance.

In Sub-Saharan Africa, Riedl (2014, n.d.) finds that authoritarian regimes that incorporated local “big men” into the ruling coalition, such as the Rawlings regime in Ghana, tended to produce more viable authoritarian successor parties than regimes that tried to bypass these figures and substitute them with new elites, such as the regime of the People's Revolutionary Party of Benin (PRPB). The strategy of incorporation, she argues, resulted in “reservoirs of local elite support” that could be drawn upon to mobilize grassroots support for parties such as Ghana's NDC after the transition to democracy. In contrast, the strategy of substitution made these older elites into an “arsenal of enemies” (2014: 106–7) who contributed to the collapse of parties such as Benin's PRPB.

Kitschelt and Singer (n.d.) emphasize the importance of a different aspect of the previous authoritarian regime. They argue that former ruling parties of authoritarian regimes that lasted for at least 10 years (which they call “authoritarian legacy parties”) tended to inherit large organizations that could facilitate a clientelistic linkage strategy under democracy. In contrast, they find that reactive authoritarian successor parties

(parties formed by high-level authoritarian incumbents either shortly before or shortly after a transition to democracy) were less likely to inherit these organizational resources, as were former authoritarian ruling parties of regimes that lasted for fewer than 10 years. Since clientelism is a powerful tool for winning votes, their argument has clear implications for parties' electoral performance.

In their study of personalistic authoritarian successor parties in Latin America, Loxton and Levitsky (n.d.) focus on a different factor: whether or not the party emerged from a personalistic dictatorship. While a handful of such parties managed to “de-personalize” and survive in the long term (e.g., Peronism in Argentina, the PRD in Panama), most collapsed following the death or retirement of their founding leaders (e.g., ADN in Bolivia, the PRSC in the Dominican Republic).<sup>56</sup> Thus, personalistic authoritarian successor parties were less likely to survive in the long term than other kinds of authoritarian successor parties.

A final possible cause of variation is the *competitive environment* in which authoritarian successor parties operate. As noted above, party cohesion—or its absence—is a major determinant of whether political parties survive or die. Cohesion, in turn, can be caused by various factors, such as a history of violent struggle (Levitsky and Way 2012) or the presence of a leader whose undisputed leadership and/or strong coattails discourage defection (Loxton and Levitsky n.d.). LeBas (n.d.) emphasizes the importance of another factor: the presence or absence of strong opposition parties. A common fate for former authoritarian ruling parties in Sub-Saharan Africa, she argues, was defection-fueled collapse (e.g., Kenya, Benin). In some countries, however, they managed to avoid this fate (e.g., Ghana, Sierra Leone). According to LeBas, one of the major reasons that parties such as Ghana's NDC and Sierra Leone's All People's Congress (APC) survived was the existence of strong opposition parties and a polarized competitive landscape. While one might expect that authoritarian successor parties would benefit from a weak or divided opposition, LeBas argues the opposite. Paradoxically, she argues that a strong

---

<sup>56</sup> See also Jhee (2008), who finds that the performance of authoritarian successor parties that emerged from military regimes was affected by the particular nature of the military regime. In cases where the regime military created an “official” party that continued to operate after the transition to democracy, the party tended to perform better. In cases where the military regime did not create an official party and a party was instead formed in reaction to the transition to democracy, the party tended to fare worse.



opposition was a boon, since it contributed to a strong “us-versus-them” divide, which increased partisan identification and raised the cost of defection.<sup>57</sup> She argues that their absence contributed to the disintegration of parties such as the Kenya African National Union (KANU) and Benin’s PRPB. Thus, LeBas argues that the performance of authoritarian successor parties is “relational.” While factors such as a party’s organizational inheritance matters, so too does the broader context in which it operates.

### DOUBLE-EDGED EFFECTS ON DEMOCRACY

As the previous sections have shown, authoritarian successor parties are an extremely widespread phenomenon. They are major actors in most new democracies, and they are frequently voted back into office. Given that they are such a common feature of the global democratic landscape, an obvious question arises: What are their effects on democracy? Since they emerge from authoritarian regimes—and in many cases remain openly nostalgic for those regimes—they would seem to be patently harmful. In this section, I argue that suspicions that authoritarian successor parties can be harmful to democracy are well founded. They can (1) hinder processes of transitional justice, (2) prop up vestiges of authoritarian rule, and in extreme cases, even (3) trigger an authoritarian regression if elected back into office. However, I argue that they can also have surprisingly salutary effects on democracy, by (4) promoting party system institutionalization, (5) incorporating potential “spoilers” into the democratic system, and even (6) encouraging transitions to democracy in neighboring countries by demonstrating that there is, in fact, life after dictatorship. In short, the impact of authoritarian successor parties on democracy is neither wholly negative nor wholly positive, but *double-edged*.

Authoritarian successor parties can be harmful to democracy in several ways. At the most extreme, they may *trigger an authoritarian regression if elected back into office*. New democracies are often precarious, and there are at least two reasons why the leaders of authoritarian successor parties may make for poor stewards of the new regime. First, they may lack a normative commitment to democracy. As former authoritarian incumbents, they are likely to have few qualms about authoritarianism, and in fact they

---

<sup>57</sup> See also LeBas (2011).

may wish for nothing more than to return to the *status quo ante*. Second, they may simply possess greater authoritarian know-how than their competitors. Other parties may also wish to perpetuate themselves in power through less-than-democratic means but lack skills in the art of authoritarianism (skills that are especially important in electoral authoritarian regimes, where authoritarian behavior must be balanced with an outward respect for democratic forms).

An example of an authoritarian successor party whose return to power triggered an authoritarian regression is the Dominican Republic's PRSC, which dictator Joaquín Balaguer used as his vehicle from 1966 to 1978. In 1978, Balaguer was defeated in a relatively free and fair presidential election, resulting in Latin America's first third-wave transition to democracy. In 1986, Balaguer was voted back into office as the PRSC candidate—and then proceeded to install a competitive authoritarian regime (Hartlyn 1998; Levitsky and Way 2010: 132–37). Another example is the Association for the Rebirth of Madagascar (AREMA), the official party of the dictatorship of Didier Ratsiraka from 1976 to 1993. AREMA lost the founding election of 1993, but Ratsiraka was democratically returned to the presidency in 1997. Back in office, he packed the National Election Commission and Constitutional Court, harassed opponents, and engaged in fraud, resulting in a slide into competitive authoritarianism (Marcus 2001; Levitsky and Way 2010: 276–82). A final example is the Sandinista National Liberation Front (FSLN) in Nicaragua, the country's authoritarian ruling party from 1979 to 1990. After FSLN leader Daniel Ortega was returned to the presidency democratically in 2007, his government stacked the Supreme Electoral Council, engaged in fraud, and harassed opponents (Martí i Puig 2013). In all three cases, then, the return of the authoritarian successor party to power triggered an authoritarian regression. However, all three cases also shared a particular characteristic: the person elected president was not simply the candidate of an authoritarian successor party but an actual former dictator (Balaguer, Ratsiraka, and Ortega). This raises the possibility that it is not authoritarian successor parties as such that undermine democracy, but simply that former dictators tend to act dictatorially.<sup>58</sup>

---

<sup>58</sup> In at least six cases since the third wave, former dictators have led authoritarian successor parties to victory and returned to the presidency in democratic elections: Joaquín Balaguer of the

A second way that authoritarian successor parties can be harmful to democracy is by *propping up vestiges of authoritarianism*. Scholars have become increasingly aware of how authoritarian-era institutions and practices may persist after a transition to democracy. There are two main kinds of authoritarian vestige. First, outgoing authoritarian incumbents may leave behind *authoritarian enclaves* (Garretón 2003), or undemocratic institutions such as tutelary powers for the military that limit the ability of elected governments to govern.<sup>59</sup> Second, non-democratic practices can continue to operate at the subnational level following a national-level transition to democracy. In recent years, scholars have paid considerable attention to this phenomenon of *subnational authoritarianism*.<sup>60</sup> As parties that emerge from authoritarian regimes, authoritarian successor parties may be motivated by ideology, self-interest, or a sense of ownership to prop up both authoritarian enclaves and subnational authoritarianism.

An example of a party propping up authoritarian enclaves is Chile's UDI. The UDI's founder, Jaime Guzmán, was considered the main ideologue of the Pinochet

---

PRSC in the Dominican Republic in 1986; Didier Ratsiraka of AREMA in Madagascar in 1996; Hugo Banzer of ADN in Bolivia in 1997; Pedro Pires of the PAICV in Cape Verde in 2001; Daniel Ortega of the FSLN in Nicaragua in 2006; and Dési Bouterse of the NDP in Suriname in 2010. Cases from the second wave include Getúlio Vargas of the Brazilian Labor Party (PTB) in 1950 and Juan Perón of the *Justicialista* Party in Argentina in 1973. In Colombia, Gustavo Rojas Pinilla of the Popular National Alliance (ANAPO) narrowly lost the 1970 presidential election, which many of his supporters blamed on fraud.

In other cases, close family members of former dictators have led authoritarian successor parties to victory, including Khaleda Zia, the widow of General Zia, who led the Bangladesh Nationalist Party (BNP) to victory and became prime minister in 1991 and 2001; Martín Torrijos, the son of Omar Torrijos, who was elected president of Panama in 2004 as the candidate of the PRD; and Park Geun-hye, the daughter of Park Chung-hee, who was elected president of South Korea in 2012 as the candidate of the Saenuri Party. Keiko Fujimori, the daughter of Alberto Fujimori, nearly won the 2011 and 2016 presidential elections in Peru as the candidate of *Fujimorismo*.

There are also at least four cases from the third wave of former dictators returning to power democratically—but *not* with authoritarian successor parties. In Benin, Mathieu Kérékou was voted back into the presidency in 1996 as an independent. In Nigeria, two former military dictators—Olusegun Obasanjo and Muhammadu Buhari—returned to the presidency in 1999 and 2015, respectively, as candidates of non-authoritarian successor parties. And in São Tomé and Príncipe, Manuel Pinto da Costa broke with the authoritarian successor party (MLSTP/PSD) and was elected president in 2011 as an independent. An example from the second wave is former dictator Carlos Ibáñez del Campo, who returned to the presidency democratically in Chile in 1952 as an independent (though with the support of a coalition of parties).

<sup>59</sup> Other scholars have used different names for this phenomenon, such as “reserved domains” (Valenzuela 1992) and “military prerogatives” (Stepan 1988).

<sup>60</sup> See, for example, Gibson (2012), Gervasoni (2010), and Giraudy (2015).

regime and the architect of its 1980 constitution. The constitution had been designed by the military regime to establish the contours of the eventual post-authoritarian order and included a number of undemocratic features, such as appointed senators, tutelary powers for the military, and restrictions on various forms of political activity.<sup>61</sup> In the decades after democratization, most of these provisions were slowly whittled down. The UDI, however, remained a steadfast opponent of constitutional reform, with Guzmán boasting that the UDI was “virtually the only movement that is not in favor of modifying the Constitution” (Guzmán 2008: 186).<sup>62</sup> Brazil’s PDS and PFL were similarly supportive of authoritarian enclaves, showing greater support for military prerogatives than any of the other major parties in the country (Power n.d.).

An example of an authoritarian successor party propping up subnational authoritarian regimes is Mexico’s PRI. In 2000, the PRI lost power at the national level but retained control of many state and municipal governments. In some states, the PRI continued to employ the same dirty tactics that it had used at the national level during the authoritarian regime to tilt the playing field in its favor, such as fraud, intimidation of opponents, and the abuse of state resources (Gibson 2012; Giraudy 2015). It was in part thanks to these pockets of subnational authoritarianism that the PRI was able to regroup and, in 2012, catapult back into the presidency (Flores-Macías 2013, n.d.).<sup>63</sup>

A third way that authoritarian successor parties may be harmful to democracy is by *hindering processes of transitional justice*. While it may seem easier to let sleeping dogs lie, scholars such as O’Donnell and Schmitter (1986) have argued that it is imperative to hold human rights violators accountable after a transition to democracy. While their book is best known for its advocacy of pacts as a means of securing the “vital interests” of key actors such as the military, they also argue that “transitional actors must satisfy not only vital interests but also *vital ideals*—standards of what is decent and just” (1986: 30; emphasis added). “Some horrors,” they write, are simply “too unspeakable and too fresh to permit actors to ignore them,” and thus, “despite the enormous risks it poses,

---

<sup>61</sup> On the content of the 1980 constitution, see Barros (2002).

<sup>62</sup> Guzmán wrote these words in 1987, in the lead-up to the 1988 plebiscite on Pinochet’s rule.

<sup>63</sup> In Brazil the same phenomenon could be observed, with the PFL helping to perpetuate subnational authoritarianism in some of the country’s poor northeastern states, such as Bahia (Durazo 2014).

the ‘least worst’ strategy in...extreme cases is to muster the political and personal courage to impose judgment upon those accused of gross violations of human rights under the previous regime” (1986: 30).<sup>64</sup> Given their origins, authoritarian successor parties have strong incentives to block processes of transitional justice. This may be out of normative convictions (i.e., “the military saved the country and thus deserve to be celebrated, not persecuted”), electoral considerations (drawing attention to the unseemly side of the old regime may cost the party votes), or because party leaders themselves could end up in the hot seat in the event of human rights trials.

There are many examples of authoritarian successor parties using their influence to block transitional justice. In Panama, for example, one of the first acts of newly elected President Ernesto Pérez Balladares of the PRD after taking office in 1994—barely four years after the US invasion that toppled dictator Manuel Noriega and installed a democratic regime—was to issue pardons to hundreds of former authoritarian officials for crimes ranging from corruption to murder.<sup>65</sup> In Suriname, after winning the presidency in 2010, NDP leader and former military dictator Dési Bouterse passed an amnesty for himself for human rights violations committed during his 1980–1987 dictatorship.<sup>66</sup> In Mexico, the PRI used its strength during the transition to democracy to prevent any serious accountability for abuses committed during its 71-year-long dictatorship (Treviño-Rangel 2012). In the post-communist world, transitional justice seems to have ebbed and flowed depending on whether or not a communist successor party was in office (González-Enríquez 2001: 245, 247), and when such parties implemented their own transitional justice measures, they tended to be mild measures that were introduced preemptively in order to avoid harsher measures later (Nalepa 2010).<sup>67</sup> Finally, in Guatemala, FRG founder Efraín Ríos Montt was able to avoid prosecution for the genocidal violence committed by his 1982–1983 dictatorship because of the parliamentary immunity that he enjoyed as a congressman. It was not until after the

---

<sup>64</sup> In addition to satisfying an ethical imperative, human rights trials may help to decrease the probability of human rights violations in the future, both at home and in neighboring countries (Sikkink 2011).

<sup>65</sup> See Larry Rohter, “Some Familiar Faces Return to Power in Panama,” *The New York Times*, February 9, 1995.

<sup>66</sup> See “Suriname parliament gives President Bouterse immunity,” *BBC News*, April 5, 2012.

<sup>67</sup> In Nalepa’s (2010: 169) words, they needed to “scratch themselves a little bit to avoid a blow.”

2011 general election, when the FRG's poor electoral showing caused him to lose his seat in Congress, that he was tried and found guilty of genocide by a Guatemalan court.<sup>68</sup>

But while authoritarian successor parties can be harmful to democracy in a number of ways, they can also have surprisingly salutary effects in other ways. First, they can *promote party system institutionalization*. In their classic work, Mainwaring and Scully (1995) argue that party system institutionalization is an important determinant of the stability and quality of democracy. Democracy tends to function better when there is stability in interparty competition, parties have relatively deep roots in society, parties are largely accepted as the most legitimate route to power, and party organizations are governed by fairly stable rules and structures. In recent years, various scholars have drawn attention to how authoritarian successor parties can help to institutionalize party systems.

In East Central Europe, Grzymala-Busse (2007) found that where ex-communist parties lost power and successfully regenerated (e.g., Poland, Hungary), they helped to structure party systems around a “regime divide.” This gave voters a clear choice and increased the likelihood that newly elected governments would be held accountable, since “[t]he same elite skills that allowed the communist successors to transform after the communist collapse ma[d]e them able critics and highly competent governors” (2007: 62). In Sub-Saharan Africa, Riedl (2014: 174) found that strong authoritarian successor parties helped to structure “a dualistic logic of competition” around an “anti-incumbent regime cleavage.” In addition, they provided an “organizational model that challengers [could] emulate”; decreased the likelihood of party-switching, since parties saw each other as “archrivals”; and discouraged the formation of a host of new parties, since authoritarian ruling parties that were strong at the time of democratization—and thus well-positioned to succeed as authoritarian successor parties—tended to leave behind electoral institutions that create “high barriers to entry” (2014: 5, 173, 14). Similarly, Hicken and Kuhonta (2011: 575) argue that “highly institutionalized party systems in Asia [can be traced] to the presence, historically, of authoritarian institutionalized parties.

---

<sup>68</sup> See Juan Carlos Pérez Salazar, “Ríos Montt: De mandatario a culpable de genocidio,” *BBC Mundo*, May 10, 2013. However, this verdict was overturned shortly thereafter by the Constitutional Court on procedural grounds. See Elisabeth Malkin, “Guatemalan Court Overturns Genocide Conviction of Ex-Dictator,” *The New York Times*, May 20, 2013.

It is these authoritarian, institutionalized parties that are now democratic or maintain some aspects of democracy that serve as the anchor for emerging democratic, institutionalized party systems or semidemocratic systems.”<sup>69</sup> Finally, in Latin America, Roberts (2006, forthcoming) and Loxton (2014a) have found that authoritarian successor parties helped to anchor the right pole of some of the region’s most stable party systems, notably Chile and El Salvador.

Second, authoritarian successor parties can help *to incorporate potential “spoilers” into the democratic system*. A challenge for all democracies is to manage what Linz (1978) called the “disloyal opposition.” These are actors who question not only the policies of particular democratic governments but the legitimacy of the democratic regime itself. Following a transition to democracy, there is a danger that former authoritarian incumbents and their supporters will become democratic spoilers. One option for preventing this is to incorporate them into the new regime, thereby reducing their incentives for disloyal behavior. While this is clearly in tension with the imperative of pursuing transitional justice,<sup>70</sup> it is arguably better for the stability of democracy—if not necessarily for its quality—to have such actors inside the democratic game as players than outside trying to kick over the board. Given their origins, authoritarian successor parties can play a crucial role in incorporating potential democratic spoilers. By giving these actors an institutionalized means to make their voices heard—and even to return to power—such parties may help to stabilize new democracies.

Scholars have made the same argument in widely different settings, suggesting the robustness of this finding. In Taiwan, South Korea, and Indonesia, Slater and Wong

---

<sup>69</sup> Hicken and Kuhonta (2011, 2015) examine party systems in both democratic *and* authoritarian regimes. As such, some of the parties that they discuss (e.g., Malaysia’s UMNO, Singapore’s People’s Action Party or PAP) would not qualify as authoritarian successor parties but instead are ruling parties of existing authoritarian regimes. However, in a hypothetical democratic future, it seems likely that parties such as UMNO and the PAP would contribute to party system institutionalization, much as the KMT and the DJP/Saenuri have done in democratic Taiwan and South Korea, respectively.

<sup>70</sup> The potentially intractable nature of this dilemma can be seen in O’Donnell and Schmitter’s (1986) classic work on transitions from authoritarian rule. On the one hand, they argue for securing the vital interests of the military, which includes “[not] seek[ing] sanctions against military offices for ‘excesses’ committed under the aegis of the authoritarian regime” (1986: 40). On the other hand, they argue that in extreme cases, it is necessary “to muster the political and personal courage to impose judgment upon those accused of gross violations of human rights under the previous regime” (1986: 30).

(n.d.) find that the KMT, DJP/Saenuri, and Golkar, respectively, have all helped to stabilize new democratic regimes. By giving former authoritarian elites an influential position in the new regime, they argue that authoritarian successor parties made these elites “game for democracy.” In Tunisia, the only successful case of democratization of the Arab Spring, scholars have argued that the emergence of Nidaa Tounes was critical for stabilizing the country’s young democracy.<sup>71</sup> By sweeping the legislative and presidential elections of 2014, the party made democracy safe for figures who might otherwise have felt tempted to subvert the new regime. In Egypt, no equivalent of Nidaa Tounes emerged, which pushed former authoritarian officials and their allies into the disloyal camp and thus contributed to the breakdown of democracy. Finally, in late nineteenth- and early twentieth-century Europe, Ziblatt (n.d.) finds that “old regime parties”—conservative parties that were analogous to contemporary authoritarian successor parties—were a crucial determinant of successful democratization. In countries where strong old regime parties existed, such as Great Britain and Sweden, elites felt less threatened by democracy and became “reluctant democrats.” In countries where strong old regime parties did not emerge, such as Germany and Spain, they became opponents of democracy, and it was more likely that strong radical right parties would eventually emerge.<sup>72</sup>

Finally, and more speculatively, the existence of authoritarian successor parties may *encourage new transitions to democracy*. A classic argument in the literature on democratic transitions is that the “vital interests” of powerful stakeholders such as the military must be protected for the transition to be successful.<sup>73</sup> No one signs up for his own liquidation, and thus authoritarian incumbents are unlikely to concede democracy unless they have safeguards that they will not suffer under the new regime. One powerful means to provide such safeguards is through *pacts*, which can reduce uncertainty and thus

---

<sup>71</sup> See Ellis Goldberg, “Arab Transitions and the Old Elite,” Monkey Cage blog, *Washingtonpost.com*, December 9, 2014; Masoud (2011: 30–32; 2013); and Romdhani (2014).

<sup>72</sup> For earlier arguments about the importance of strong conservative parties for democratic stability, see Di Tella (1971–1972), O’Donnell and Schmitter (1986: 62–63, 67), and Gibson (1996). For a similar argument about how authoritarian successor parties can stabilize democracy by doubling as conservative parties, see Roberts (2006) and Loxton (2014a, 2014b).

<sup>73</sup> See O’Donnell and Schmitter (1986) and Karl (1990).



increase authoritarian incumbents' willingness to step down.<sup>74</sup> Another is the creation of an electorally viable authoritarian successor party. As discussed above, authoritarian successor parties have helped to stabilize new democratic regimes in a host of countries by incorporating potential democratic spoilers. Yet their impact may not be limited to the stabilization of *already-existing* democracies. By affecting the calculations of authoritarian incumbents about how they will fare in a hypothetical democratic future, these parties may also help to encourage *new* transitions to democracy.

This argument has been powerfully made by Slater and Wong (2013) in their work on “conceding to thrive.” In their view, the fundamental motivating principle of authoritarian ruling parties is to rule, not necessarily to maintain authoritarianism. This distinction is crucial, since “*ruling parties can democratize without losing office*. For authoritarian parties, democratization entails the concession to *hold* free and fair elections, but not necessarily to *lose* them” (2013: 717–18; emphases in original).<sup>75</sup> In the wake of ominous signals that the regime has passed its apex, they argue that party elites may opt to pursue a new legitimation formula by conceding democracy, especially if they have a high degree of “victory confidence”—that is, confidence in their ability to perform well under democracy as authoritarian successor parties. Crucially, Slater and Wong argue that these parties are more likely to do well if they concede democracy from a position of strength rather than waiting for the regime to fall into terminal crisis. They contend that such calculations were crucial factors behind the decision to democratize in Taiwan, South Korea, and Indonesia, and they argue that Singapore and Malaysia—and perhaps even China, eventually—are also strong candidates for this “democratization through strength” scenario. In addition, they suggest that a diffusion dynamic effect may take

---

<sup>74</sup> O’Donnell and Schmitter (1986: 37) define a pact as an “an explicit...agreement among a select set of actors which seeks to define...rules governing the exercise of power on the basis of mutual guarantees for the ‘vital interests’ of those entering into it.”

<sup>75</sup> Eventually, however, the normal dynamics of democratic alternation take hold and the party is voted out of office. While there are several cases of authoritarian successor parties winning one or more consecutive elections after a transition to democracy, there is only one case of a party that has *never* lost a democratic election: the Democratic Party of Socialists of Montenegro (DPS). However, this is most likely due to the fact that Montenegro made the transition to democracy only in 2007 (see Geddes, Wright, and Frantz 2014a) and thus has had very few elections. In fact, Montenegro only became an independent country in 2006. It is likely that, in due time, the DPS will be voted out of office, like all other authoritarian successor parties.

effect,<sup>76</sup> whereby incumbents of existing authoritarian regimes (e.g., Burma) look to the example of strong authoritarian successor parties in neighboring countries and derive “democratic hope” (2013: 730) from them. Looking at these examples, authoritarian incumbents see evidence of life after dictatorship for people like themselves, and thus they may be inspired to emulate them by initiating their own transitions to democracy.

## CONCLUSION

Since the onset of the third wave of democratization, dictatorships have fallen on an unprecedented scale. Yet democratization has not always meant the marginalization of figures from the old regime. Former authoritarian ruling parties and parties founded by high-level authoritarian incumbents (or former incumbents) in reaction to a transition to democracy have frequently remained key political actors. Indeed, as I showed in this paper, prominent authoritarian successor parties have emerged in nearly three-quarters of all third-wave democracies, and in over one-half of third-wave democracies voters have returned these parties to office (see Appendix I and Appendix II). Authoritarian successor parties are major actors in Africa, Asia, Europe, and Latin America, as well as in the one case of successful democratization of the Arab Spring, Tunisia. They have grown out of a range of authoritarian regime types, including single- and hegemonic-party regimes, military regimes, and even personalistic regimes. While this paper has focused on the third wave, examples can be found in earlier historical periods, as well.<sup>77</sup> In short, authoritarian successor parties are not weird outliers or curiosities; for better or worse, they are a normal part of the democratization experience. They are major actors everywhere from Mexico to Mongolia, South Korea to Slovakia, Tunisia to Taiwan. To date, however, they have not received the attention that they deserve.

---

<sup>76</sup> On diffusion and demonstration effects, see Huntington (1991: 100–6) and Brinks and Coppedge (2006).

<sup>77</sup> Examples of authoritarian successor parties from the second wave include Peronism in Argentina, Getúlio Vargas’s Social Democratic Party (PSD) and Brazilian Labor Party (PTB) in Brazil, the Odriísta National Union (UNO) in Peru, and Gustavo Rojas Pinilla’s Popular National Alliance (ANAPO) in Colombia. Although my definition of authoritarian successor parties is limited to parties that emerged during the second and third waves, there are striking parallels between authoritarian successor parties and Ziblatt’s (n.d.) “old regime parties,” which emerged during the first wave.

This paper represents an effort to spark a new scholarly conversation about the worldwide phenomenon of authoritarian successor parties. To this end, I provided an original definition and operationalization of authoritarian successor parties that can travel across regions; presented new data on the prevalence and influence of authoritarian successor parties worldwide; and developed a new set of concepts and vocabulary to facilitate cross-regional dialogue (e.g., authoritarian inheritance and authoritarian baggage). I also explored four broad questions that these parties raise: What explains the prevalence of authoritarian successor parties? Why are some more successful than others? What strategies can they employ to deal with the past? And what are their effects on democracy? While I have provided tentative answers to all of these questions, my answers should be viewed as the beginning of the conversation, not the end. It is my hope that these and other questions will be taken up by other scholars and will form the basis for a new research agenda on authoritarian successor parties worldwide.

## APPENDIX I

THIRD-WAVE DEMOCRACIES AND ASPs (1974–2010)<sup>i</sup>

Country	Democratic transition <sup>ii</sup>	Prominent ASP <sup>iii</sup>	Returns to power democratically <sup>iv</sup>
Albania	1992–	Yes	Yes
Argentina	1974–76, 1984–	No <sup>v</sup>	No
Bangladesh	1991–2007, 2009–	Yes	Yes
Benin	1992–	No <sup>vi</sup>	No
Bolivia	1983–	Yes	Yes
Brazil	1986–	Yes	No <sup>vii</sup>
Bulgaria	1991–	Yes	Yes
Burundi	1994–96, 2006–	No <sup>viii</sup>	No
Central African Republic	1994–2003	Yes	No
Chile	1990–	Yes	Yes
Congo, Republic of	1993–97	Yes	No <sup>ix</sup>
Croatia	1992–	Yes	Yes
Czech Republic	1993–	Yes	No
Dominican Republic	1979–	Yes	Yes
Ecuador	1980–	No	No
El Salvador	1995–	Yes	Yes
Estonia	1992–	No	No
Georgia	2005–	No	No
Ghana	2001–	Yes	Yes
Greece	1975–	No	No
Guatemala	1996–	Yes	Yes
Guinea-Bissau	2001–02, 2006–	Yes	Yes
Haiti	1991–91, 1995–99, 2007–	No	No
Honduras	1982–	No <sup>x</sup>	No
Hungary	1991–	Yes	Yes
Indonesia	2000–	Yes	No <sup>xi</sup>
Kenya	2003–	No	No
Korea, South	1988–	Yes	Yes
Latvia	1992–	No	No
Lesotho	1994–	Yes	No
Liberia	2006–	No	No
Lithuania	1992–	Yes	Yes
Macedonia	1992–	Yes	Yes
Madagascar	1994–2009	Yes	Yes
Malawi	1995–	Yes	No
Mali	1993–	No	No
Mexico	2001–	Yes	Yes

Moldova	1992–	Yes	Yes
Mongolia	1994–	Yes	Yes
Montenegro	2007–	Yes	Yes
Nepal	1992–2002, 2007–	Yes	Yes
Nicaragua	1991–	Yes	Yes
Niger	1994–96, 2000–	Yes	Yes
Nigeria	1980–83, 2000–	No <sup>xii</sup>	No
Pakistan	1989–99, 2009–	No	No
Panama	1990–	Yes	Yes
Paraguay	1994–	Yes	Yes
Peru	1981–92, 2002–	Yes	No
Philippines	1987–	Yes	No
Poland	1990–	Yes	Yes
Portugal	1977–	No <sup>xiii</sup>	No
Romania	1991–	Yes	Yes
Senegal	2001–	Yes	No
Serbia	2001–	Yes	Yes
Sierra Leone	1997–97, 1999–	Yes	Yes
Slovakia	1993–	Yes	No <sup>xiv</sup>
Slovenia	1992–	Yes	Yes
South Africa	1995–	No	No
Spain	1978–	Yes	Yes
Sri Lanka	1995–	Yes	Yes
Taiwan	2001–	Yes	Yes
Thailand	1976–76, 1989–91, 1993– 2006, 2008–	Yes	Yes
Turkey	1984–	Yes	Yes
Ukraine	1992–	Yes	Yes
Uruguay	1985–	No	No
<b>TOTAL</b>	<b>65</b>	<b>47</b>	<b>36</b>

---

**APPENDIX II**


---

**PROMINENT THIRD-WAVE ASPs (1974–2010)<sup>xv</sup>**


---

Country	Party	Description <sup>xvi</sup>
Albania	Socialist Party of Albania (PS)	Formerly Party of Labor of Albania (PPSh), ruling party under communism. Loses power with transition to democracy in 1992, but voted back into office in 1997. Remains one of country's major parties.
Bangladesh	Bangladesh Nationalist Party (BNP)	Founded in 1978 by military dictator Ziaur Rahman ("General Zia"). Loses power after Zia's assassination in 1981 and coup in 1982, but returns to power on two occasions under leadership of widow, Khaleda Zia, after transition to democracy in 1991. Remains one of country's major parties.
Bolivia	Nationalist Democratic Action (ADN)	Founded in 1979 by former military dictator Hugo Banzer after he was overthrown in a coup in 1978. One of Bolivia's three major parties in 1980s and 1990s, with Banzer returning to the presidency democratically in 1997. Highly personalistic, and collapses after Banzer's death in 2002.
Brazil	Democratic Social Party (PDS)/Progressive Party (PP)	Former ruling party of military regime. Never wins presidency, but forms part of multiple cabinets under democracy. Remains a relatively important actor.
Brazil	Liberal Front Party (PFL)/Democrats (DEM)	Founded in 1985 by PDS defectors in lead-up to transition to democracy. Holds presidency from 1985 to 1990 (though not directly elected), and forms part of cabinet until 2002. Enters into decline thereafter.
Bulgaria	Bulgarian Socialist Party (BSP)	Formerly Bulgarian Communist Party (BCP), ruling party under communism. Loses power in 1991 transition to democracy, but returns to power in 1995. Remains one of country's major parties.
Central African Republic	Central African Democratic Rally (RDC)	Founded in 1987 by dictator André Kolingba. Loses power in 1993 founding election. Remains major actor during subsequent decade of democracy, but never returns to power.
Chile	Independent Democratic Union (UDI)	Founded in 1983 by former high-level incumbents of military dictatorship during regime crisis. Returns to power as part of cabinet in 2010. 14. 15. 16. 17. 18. 19. 20. 21. 22. 23. 24. 25. 26. 27. 28. 29. 30. 31. 32. 33. 34. 35. 36. 37. 38. 39. 40. 41. 42. 43. 44. 45. 46. 47. 48. 49. 50. 51. 52. 53. 54. 55. 56. 57. 58. 59. 60. 61. 62. 63. 64. 65. 66. 67. 68. 69. 70. 71. 72. 73. 74. 75. 76. 77. 78. 79. 80. 81. 82. 83. 84. 85. 86. 87. 88. 89. 90. 91. 92. 93. 94. 95. 96. 97. 98. 99. 100. 101. 102. 103. 104. 105. 106. 107. 108. 109. 110. 111. 112. 113. 114. 115. 116. 117. 118. 119. 120. 121. 122. 123. 124. 125. 126. 127. 128. 129. 130. 131. 132. 133. 134. 135. 136. 137. 138. 139. 140. 141. 142. 143. 144. 145. 146. 147. 148. 149. 150. 151. 152. 153. 154. 155. 156. 157. 158. 159. 160. 161. 162. 163. 164. 165. 166. 167. 168. 169. 170. 171. 172. 173. 174. 175. 176. 177. 178. 179. 180. 181. 182. 183. 184. 185. 186. 187. 188. 189. 190. 191. 192. 193. 194. 195. 196. 197. 198. 199. 200. 201. 202. 203. 204. 205. 206. 207. 208. 209. 210. 211. 212. 213. 214. 215. 216. 217. 218. 219. 220. 221. 222. 223. 224. 225. 226. 227. 228. 229. 230. 231. 232. 233. 234. 235. 236. 237. 238. 239. 240. 241. 242. 243. 244. 245. 246. 247. 248. 249. 250. 251. 252. 253. 254. 255. 256. 257. 258. 259. 260. 261. 262. 263. 264. 265. 266. 267. 268. 269. 270. 271. 272. 273. 274. 275. 276. 277. 278. 279. 280. 281. 282. 283. 284. 285. 286. 287. 288. 289. 290. 291. 292. 293. 294. 295. 296. 297. 298. 299. 300. 301. 302. 303. 304. 305. 306. 307. 308. 309. 310. 311. 312. 313. 314. 315. 316. 317. 318. 319. 320. 321. 322. 323. 324. 325. 326. 327. 328. 329. 330. 331. 332. 333. 334. 335. 336. 337. 338. 339. 340. 341. 342. 343. 344. 345. 346. 347. 348. 349. 350. 351. 352. 353. 354. 355. 356. 357. 358. 359. 360. 361. 362. 363. 364. 365. 366. 367. 368. 369. 370. 371. 372. 373. 374. 375. 376. 377. 378. 379. 380. 381. 382. 383. 384. 385. 386. 387. 388. 389. 390. 391. 392. 393. 394. 395. 396. 397. 398. 399. 400. 401. 402. 403. 404. 405. 406. 407. 408. 409. 410. 411. 412. 413. 414. 415. 416. 417. 418. 419. 420. 421. 422. 423. 424. 425. 426. 427. 428. 429. 430. 431. 432. 433. 434. 435. 436. 437. 438. 439. 440. 441. 442. 443. 444. 445. 446. 447. 448. 449. 450. 451. 452. 453. 454. 455. 456. 457. 458. 459. 460. 461. 462. 463. 464. 465. 466. 467. 468. 469. 470. 471. 472. 473. 474. 475. 476. 477. 478. 479. 480. 481. 482. 483. 484. 485. 486. 487. 488. 489. 490. 491. 492. 493. 494. 495. 496. 497. 498. 499. 500. 501. 502. 503. 504. 505. 506. 507. 508. 509. 510. 511. 512. 513. 514. 515. 516. 517. 518. 519. 520. 521. 522. 523. 524. 525. 526. 527. 528. 529. 530. 531. 532. 533. 534. 535. 536. 537. 538. 539. 540. 541. 542. 543. 544. 545. 546. 547. 548. 549. 550. 551. 552. 553. 554. 555. 556. 557. 558. 559. 560. 561. 562. 563. 564. 565. 566. 567. 568. 569. 570. 571. 572. 573. 574. 575. 576. 577. 578. 579. 580. 581. 582. 583. 584. 585. 586. 587. 588. 589. 590. 591. 592. 593. 594. 595. 596. 597. 598. 599. 600. 601. 602. 603. 604. 605. 606. 607. 608. 609. 610. 611. 612. 613. 614. 615. 616. 617. 618. 619. 620. 621. 622. 623. 624. 625. 626. 627. 628. 629. 630. 631. 632. 633. 634. 635. 636. 637. 638. 639. 640. 641. 642. 643. 644. 645. 646. 647. 648. 649. 650. 651. 652. 653. 654. 655. 656. 657. 658. 659. 660. 661. 662. 663. 664. 665. 666. 667. 668. 669. 670. 671. 672. 673. 674. 675. 676. 677. 678. 679. 680. 681. 682. 683. 684. 685. 686. 687. 688. 689. 690. 691. 692. 693. 694. 695. 696. 697. 698. 699. 700. 701. 702. 703. 704. 705. 706. 707. 708. 709. 710. 711. 712. 713. 714. 715. 716. 717. 718. 719. 720. 721. 722. 723. 724. 725. 726. 727. 728. 729. 730. 731. 732. 733. 734. 735. 736. 737. 738. 739. 740. 741. 742. 743. 744. 745. 746. 747. 748. 749. 750. 751. 752. 753. 754. 755. 756. 757. 758. 759. 760. 761. 762. 763. 764. 765. 766. 767. 768. 769. 770. 771. 772. 773. 774. 775. 776. 777. 778. 779. 780. 781. 782. 783. 784. 785. 786. 787. 788. 789. 790. 791. 792. 793. 794. 795. 796. 797. 798. 799. 800. 801. 802. 803. 804. 805. 806. 807. 808. 809. 810. 811. 812. 813. 814. 815. 816. 817. 818. 819. 820. 821. 822. 823. 824. 825. 826. 827. 828. 829. 830. 831. 832. 833. 834. 835. 836. 837. 838. 839. 840. 841. 842. 843. 844. 845. 846. 847. 848. 849. 850. 851. 852. 853. 854. 855. 856. 857. 858. 859. 860. 861. 862. 863. 864. 865. 866. 867. 868. 869. 870. 871. 872. 873. 874. 875. 876. 877. 878. 879. 880. 881. 882. 883. 884. 885. 886. 887. 888. 889. 890. 891. 892. 893. 894. 895. 896. 897. 898. 899. 900. 901. 902. 903. 904. 905. 906. 907. 908. 909. 910. 911. 912. 913. 914. 915. 916. 917. 918. 919. 920. 921. 922. 923. 924. 925. 926. 927. 928. 929. 930. 931. 932. 933. 934. 935. 936. 937. 938. 939. 940. 941. 942. 943. 944. 945. 946. 947. 948. 949. 950. 951. 952. 953. 954. 955. 956. 957. 958. 959. 960. 961. 962. 963. 964. 965. 966. 967. 968. 969. 970. 971. 972. 973. 974. 975. 976. 977. 978. 979. 980. 981. 982. 983. 984. 985. 986. 987. 988. 989. 990. 991. 992. 993. 994. 995. 996. 997. 998. 999. 1000.

Chile	National Renewal (RN)	Founded in 1987 during military dictatorship. Founders include former high-level authoritarian incumbents and right-leaning democrats. Wins presidency in 2010 with election of Sebastián Piñera.
Congo, Republic of	Congolese Party of Labor (PCT)	Former ruling party of one-party regime. Loses power in 1992 founding election, but performs relatively well in 1993 election. Returns to power after 1997 civil war, but does not do so democratically.
Croatia	Social Democratic Party of Croatia (SDP)	Formerly League of Communists of Croatia (SKH), Croatian branch of ruling League of Communists of Yugoslavia (SKJ). Loses power in 1990–92 secession and transition to democracy, but returns to power in 2000. Remains one of country's major parties.
Czech Republic	Communist Party of Bohemia and Moravia (KSCM)	Formerly Czech branch of ruling Communist Party of Czechoslovakia (KSC). Loses power in 1990–93 secession and transition to democracy. Never returns to power, but remains relatively important actor.
Dominican Republic	Social Christian Reformist Party (PRSC)	Former ruling party of dictator Joaquín Balaguer. Loses power in 1978 founding election, but Balaguer voted back into office in 1986. Highly personalistic, and largely collapses after Balaguer's death in 2002.
El Salvador	Party of National Conciliation (PCN)	Former ruling party of military regime. Loses power after 1979 coup, but remains relatively important actor during semi-democratic 1980s and after transition to full democracy in mid-1990s.
El Salvador	Nationalist Republican Alliance (ARENA)	Founded in 1981 by Major Roberto D'Aubuisson, former deputy chief of domestic intelligence under military rule and public face of "death squad" killings in 1980s. Wins presidency for first time in semi-democratic 1989 election, and then in fully democratic elections in 1994, 1999, and 2004.
Ghana	National Democratic Congress (NDC)	Founded by dictator Jerry Rawlings in 1992 in anticipation of transition to multiparty elections (and eventually full democracy). Loses power in 2000 founding election, but returns to power democratically in 2008 and 2012.
Guatemala	Guatemalan Republican Front (FRG)	Founded in 1989 by former military dictator Efraín Ríos Montt. Major actor in 1990s, winning presidency in 1999. Highly personalistic, and declines in 2000s as Ríos Montt loses personal popularity.

Guinea-Bissau	African Party for the Independence of Guinea and Cape Verde (PAIGC)	Former ruling party of one-party regime. Loses power in 1999 coup and 1999–2000 founding election, but returns in less-than-democratic 2004–05 election. Holds onto power in subsequent fully democratic elections.
Hungary	Hungarian Socialist Party (MSZP)	Formerly Hungarian Socialist Workers' Party (MSzMP), ruling party under communism. Loses power in 1990 founding election, but voted back into office in 1994. One of country's major parties in 1990s and 2000s, but declines after 2010.
Indonesia	Golkar	Former ruling party of General Suharto's New Order dictatorship. After 2000 transition to democracy, remains one of country's major parties. Holds cabinet positions in multiple democratic governments, but never wins presidency.
Korea, South	Democratic Justice Party (DJP)/Democratic Liberal Party (DLP)/New Korea Party (NKP)/Grand National Party (GNP)/Saenuri	Former ruling party of military regime. Retains power after 1987–88 transition to democracy. Loses power in 1997, but returns in 2007 and 2012. Remains one of country's major parties, despite various name changes and mergers.
Lesotho	Basotho National Party (BNP)	Former authoritarian ruling party. Ousted in coup in 1986. Performs well in first few elections after 1994 transition to democracy, but never returns to office, and enters into decline in late 2000s.
Lithuania	Democratic Labor Party of Lithuania (LDDP)/Social Democratic Party of Lithuania (LSDB)	Formerly Communist Party of Lithuania (LKP), Lithuanian branch of Union of Communist Parties–Communist Party of the Soviet Union (UPC-CPSU). Retains power after 1991–92 secession and transition to democracy. Loses power in 1996, but returns in 2001. Remains one of country's major parties.
Macedonia	Social Democratic Union of Macedonia (SDSM)	Formerly League of Communists of Macedonia (CKM), Macedonian branch of League of Communists of Yugoslavia (SKJ). Retains power after 1990–92 secession and transition to democracy. Loses power in 1998 and 1999 elections, but returns in 2002. Remains one of country's major parties.
Madagascar	Association for the Rebirth of Madagascar (AREMA)	Founded in 1976 by dictator Didier Ratsiraka as official party. Loses power in 1993 founding election. Ratsiraka voted back into office in 1996, and AREMA wins a plurality of seats in 1998 election. Enters into decline in 2000s.
Malawi	Malawi Congress Party (MCP)	Former ruling party of one-party regime. Loses power in 1995 transition to democracy. Never returns to power, but remains one of country's major parties.



Mexico	Institutional Revolutionary Party (PRI)	Former ruling party of hegemonic-party regime. Loses power in 2000 founding election, but remains one of country's major parties at national and subnational levels, and wins presidency in 2012.
Moldova	Party of Communists of the Republic of Moldova (PCRM)	Formerly Moldovan branch of Union of Communist Parties–Communist Party of the Soviet Union (UPC-CPSU). Loses power after secession and transition to democracy, but wins plurality of seats in 1998 elections, and voted back into office into office in 2001. Remains one of country's major parties.
Mongolia	Mongolian People's Revolutionary Party (MPRP)/Mongolian People's Party (MPP)	Former ruling party of communist regime. With transition to democracy, loses presidency in 1993 and parliament in 1996. However, swept back into office in 2000 and 2001 elections. Remains one of country's major parties.
Montenegro	Democratic Party of Socialists of Montenegro (DPS)	Formerly League of Communists of Montenegro (SKCG), Montenegrin branch of ruling League of Communists of Yugoslavia (SKJ). Since independence in 2006, has won every presidential and parliamentary election.
Nepal	Rastriya Prajatantra Party (RPP)	Founded in 1990 in anticipation of transition to democracy by incumbents of monarchical "Panchayat" regime (e.g., former prime ministers Lokendra Bahadur Chand and Surya Bahadur Thapa). Performs relatively well in democratic elections of 1990s, with both Chand and Thapa returning as prime ministers. Enters into decline in 2000s.
Nicaragua	Sandinista National Liberation Front (FSLN)	Former authoritarian ruling party. Loses office in 1990 founding election, but returns to power after former dictator Daniel Ortega elected president in 2006.
Niger	National Movement for the Development of Society (MNSD)	Founded in 1989 by military regime. Loses power in 1993 founding election. Following 1996 coup, wins new founding election in 1999 and subsequent 2004 election. Remains in office until 2010 coup.
Panama	Democratic Revolutionary Party (PRD)	Founded in 1979 by military dictator Omar Torrijos. Loses power after 1989 US invasion and transition to democracy, but returns in 1994 and 2004.
Paraguay	Colorados	Ruling party of authoritarian regime from 1940s onward. Remains in power after 1994 transition to democracy, but defeated in 2008. Returns in 2013.

Peru	Fujimorismo	Ruling party of Alberto Fujimori's 1992–2000 competitive authoritarian regime. Loses power after Fujimori's 2000 resignation and subsequent transition to democracy, but remains one of country's major parties.
Philippines	Kilusang Bagong Lipunan (KBL)	Founded in 1978 as ruling party of Ferdinand Marcos dictatorship. Loses power with Marcos's 1986 resignation and transition to democracy. Does poorly in all legislative elections, but candidate Imelda Marcos wins over 10 percent in 1992 presidential election, making it borderline case for inclusion.
Poland	Social Democracy of the Republic of Poland (SdRP)/Democratic Left Alliance (SLD)	Formerly Polish United Workers' Party (PUWP), ruling party under communism. Loses power in 1989–90 founding elections, but returns in mid-1990s. One of country's major parties in 1990s and early 2000s, but enters into decline after mid-2000s.
Romania	National Salvation Front (FSN)/ Democratic National Salvation Front (FDSN)/Romanian Social Democratic Party (PDSR)/Social Democratic Party (PSD)	Formerly Romanian Communist Party (PCR), ruling party under communism. Remains in power after Ceaușescu's 1989 execution and 1990 founding election. Loses power in 1996, but returns in 2000. Remains one of country's major parties.
Romania	National Salvation Front (FSN)/Democratic Party (PD)	Result of split in the FSN prior to 1992 general election, and was under leadership of former prime minister from communist period, Petre Roman. Returns to power in 1996 as part of coalition government, and remains one of country's major parties.
Senegal	Socialist Party of Senegal (PS)	Former ruling party of one-party regime. Loses power in 2000 founding election. Performs relatively well in 2001 parliamentary election, but enters into rapid decline thereafter.
Serbia	Socialist Party of Serbia (SBS)	Formerly League of Communists of Serbia (SKS), Serbian branch of ruling League of Communists of Yugoslavia (SKJ). Loses power after fall of Milošević and founding election of 2000, but returns as part of coalition government in 2008, with party leader becoming prime minister in 2012. Remains one of country's major parties.
Sierra Leone	All People's Congress (APC)	Former ruling party of one-party regime. Loses power in 1992 military coup and subsequent civil war. Following 1999 transition to democracy, loses 2002 election, but returns to power after winning 2007 and 2012 elections. Remains one of country's major parties.

Slovakia	Party of the Democratic Left (SDL)	Formerly Communist Party of Slovakia (KSS), Slovak branch of ruling Communist Party of Czechoslovakia (KSC). Loses power after 1990–93 secession and transition to democracy, but forms part of coalition government in 1998. Enters into rapid decline after 2002 election, eventually merging with former splinter (Smer-SD) that broke away in 1999.
Slovenia	United List of Social Democrats (ZLSD)/Social Democrats (SD)	Formerly League of Communists of Slovenia (ZKS), Slovenian branch of ruling League of Communists of Yugoslavia (SKJ). Following 1991–92 secession and transition to democracy, forms part of multiple coalition governments and wins prime minister's office in 2008.
Spain	Union of the Democratic Center (UCD)	Founded in 1977 by Prime Minister Adolfo Suárez and other former high-level incumbents of Franco regime. Remains in power after 1977 founding election and in 1979 election, but then collapses in early 1980s.
Spain	People's Alliance (AP)/People's Party (PP)	Founded in 1976 by former minister Manuel Fraga and other former high-level incumbents of Franco regime. Remains out of office for several years, before winning 1996 election. Remains one of country's major parties.
Sri Lanka	United National Party (UNP)	Former ruling party of 1978–94 authoritarian regime. Loses power in 1994 transition to democracy, but wins prime minister's office in 2001 parliamentary election (though not presidency).
Taiwan	Kuomintang (KMT)	Former ruling party of one-party regime. Loses 2000 presidential election, but returns to power democratically in 2008 and again in 2012.
Thailand	New Aspiration Party (NAP)	Founded in 1990 by General Chavalit Yongchaiyudh, former Supreme Commander of the Thai armed forces under military rule, and other military officers. Modeled on Indonesia's Golkar. Wins democratic election in 1996, with Chavalit becoming prime minister. Collapses in 2000s.
Turkey	Motherland Party (ANAP)	Founded in 1983 by Turgut Özal, former deputy prime minister under military rule. Wins founding election of 1983 and 1987 election, with Özal becoming prime minister. Remains major force in 1990s, then declines in 2000s. Despite Özal's stint in military government, party a borderline case for inclusion.

Ukraine	Communist Party of Ukraine (KPU)	Formerly Ukrainian branch of Union of Communist Parties– Communist Party of the Soviet Union (UPC-CPSU). Banned after transition, then re-legalized, winning prime minister’s office in 1994 parliamentary elections (though not presidency). Enters into decline in 2000s.
---------	----------------------------------	---

### Other Notable Authoritarian Successor Parties<sup>xvii</sup>

Country	Party	Description
Cape Verde	African Party for the Independence of Cape Verde (PAICV)	Former ruling party of one-party regime. Loses power in founding election of 1991, but voted back into office in 2001 and 2006. Remains one of country’s major parties. Not included in above list because Cape Verde does not meet Geddes, Wright, and Frantz’s population threshold.
Germany	Party of Democratic Socialism (PDS)/The Left	Formerly Socialist Unity Party of Germany (SED), ruling party of communist German Democratic Republic (GDR). Easily crossed 10-percent threshold in former GDR, but not included in above list because did not do so in Germany as a whole, given negligible support in rest of the country.
Guyana	People’s National Congress (PNC)	Former authoritarian ruling party. Loses power in founding election of 1992, but remains one of country’s major parties. Not included in above list because Guyana does not meet Geddes, Wright, and Frantz’s population threshold.
São Tomé and Príncipe	Movement for the Liberation of São Tomé and Príncipe/Social Democratic Party (MLSTP/PSD)	Former ruling party of one-party regime. Loses power in 1991 transition to democracy, but remains one of country’s main parties. Not included in above list because São Tomé and Príncipe does not meet Geddes, Wright, and Frantz’s population threshold.
Suriname	National Democratic Party (NDP)	Founded in 1987 by military dictator Dési Bouterse. Following transition to democracy in early 2000s, Bouterse voted back into office in 2010 and 2015 elections. Not included in above list because country does not meet Geddes, Wright, and Frantz’s population threshold.
Tunisia	Nidaa Tounes	Founded in 2012 in midst of democratic transition by Beji Caid Essebsi, a minister on multiple occasions during the Bourguiba and Ben Ali dictatorships. Wins presidential and parliamentary elections in 2014. Not included in above list because formed after 2010.

---

<sup>i</sup> The following list of third-wave transitions to democracy is drawn from Geddes, Wright, and Frantz's (2014a) Autocratic Regimes Data Set, which covers all countries with at least one million inhabitants as of 2009. I include all cases that they score as having transitioned to democracy between 1974 and 2010, except for those in which the new democratic regime broke down before at least one national election could be held after the year of the transition (these cases are Armenia, Azerbaijan, Mauritania, Russia, Sudan, and Zambia). Excluding these cases of immediate democratic breakdown is essential for the purposes of this paper, since a core part of the definition of authoritarian successor parties is that they contest elections under democracy.

<sup>ii</sup> Following the coding rules used by Geddes, Wright, and Frantz, democracy is operationalized as "a regime in which the executive achieved power through a direct competitive election in which at least 10 percent of the total population (equivalent to about 40 percent of the adult male population) was eligible to vote, all major parties were permitted to compete, and neither fraud nor violence determined the election outcome; or indirect election by a body at least 60 percent of which was elected in direct competitive elections (defined in the same way as for directly elected executives)" (2014b: 9). Elections are not considered to be competitive "if one or more large party is not allowed to participate; and/or if there are widespread reports of violence, jailing, and/or intimidation of opposition leaders or supporters; and/or if there are credible reports of vote fraud widespread enough to change [the] election outcome (especially if reported by international observers); and/or if the incumbent so dominates political resources and the media that observers do not consider elections fair" (2014b: 6). Although this is a minimalist conceptualization of democracy, it nevertheless excludes regimes in which elections are held regularly but are patently unfair (e.g., Belarus, Mozambique, Singapore). In cases where democracy remained in place as late as 2010, this is indicated with an open-ended "-" following the transition year (though some broke down after 2010). In cases where democracy broke down or was interrupted prior to 2010, this is indicated with a year after the "-". Following Geddes, Wright, and Frantz, the date given for the transition to democracy is "the calendar year for the first January 1 in which the [new] regime holds power" (2014b: 1), which in most cases is the year after the founding election.

<sup>iii</sup> Authoritarian successor parties are defined as parties that emerge from authoritarian regimes but that operate after a transition to democracy. For the operationalization of transition to democracy, see previous footnote. A party is scored as having emerged from an authoritarian regime if *one* of the following conditions holds:

- It is a former authoritarian ruling party. The party may have been created by authoritarian incumbents for this purpose (e.g., Indonesia's Golkar), or it may have predated the regime, provided that it was created shortly before the onset of authoritarian rule (e.g., Fujimorismo) or was used by the regime as its ruling party for at least ten years (e.g., Paraguay's Colorados).
- It was created by high-level authoritarian incumbents in anticipation of a transition to democracy (e.g., Chile's Independent Democratic Union, UDI) or by former incumbents shortly after a transition to democracy (e.g., Tunisia's Nidaa Tounes). High-level authoritarian incumbents include heads of state, ministers, and key members of the security apparatus. Parties founded by authoritarian incumbents who defect and go into opposition before the transition to democracy are excluded (e.g., Mexico's Party of the Democratic Revolution, PRD), as are parties founded more than one election cycle after the transition year identified by Geddes, Wright, and Frantz (e.g., Slovakia's Direction-Social Democracy, Smer-SD).

A party is scored as "prominent" if it wins 10 percent or more in a single national election held after the transition to democracy. See Appendix II for details on individual cases.

<sup>iv</sup> A party is scored as having returned to power if a member of the party occupies the presidency in a presidential system, the prime minister's office in a parliamentary system, or the presidency *or* the prime minister's office in a semi-presidential system. The party member must earn or hold onto this position in an election *after* the transition to democracy, since founding elections are sometimes less than fully democratic. See Appendix II for details on individual cases.

<sup>v</sup> As discussed in Loxton and Levitsky (n.d.), Argentina's Justicialista Party (Peronism) qualifies as an authoritarian successor party. However, since it emerged from the second wave of democracy, it is not included in this table.

<sup>vi</sup> In 1996, former dictator Mathieu Kérékou was democratically returned to the presidency. He was elected as an independent, however, with the former authoritarian ruling party, the People's Revolutionary Party of Benin (PRPB), having collapsed during the transition to democracy.

<sup>vii</sup> Although Liberal Front Party (PFL) founder José Sarney occupied the presidency from 1985 to 1990, and although both the PFL/Democrats (DEM) and Democratic Social Party (PDS)/Progressive Party (PP) held cabinet positions in multiple governments after the transition to democracy, Brazil is not coded as a case of an ASP returning to power, since neither party won/retained the presidency in an election after the founding election.

<sup>viii</sup> Although Burundi's former authoritarian ruling party, the Union for National Progress (UPRONA), returned to power after the 1996 coup, it is not included here, since it never won 10 percent in a national election in 1994–96 or after 2006, nor did it return to power democratically.

<sup>ix</sup> The Congolese Party of Labor (PCT) did return to power after the 1997 civil war, but it did so through violence and is thus not coded as a case of an ASP returning to power democratically.

<sup>x</sup> Although Honduras's National Party was a partner in the military regime from 1963 to 1971, it is excluded because it predated military rule and did not serve as the ruling party for 10 years.

<sup>xi</sup> Because Golkar never won the presidency in an election after Indonesia's transition to democracy, it is not coded as a case of an ASP returning to power. However, it held cabinet positions in multiple governments.

<sup>xii</sup> In Nigeria, the People's Democratic Party (PDP), which was founded in 1998 by former military dictator Olusegun Obasanjo, is excluded because it was formed more than one election cycle after the 1980 transition to democracy (following Obasanjo's 1976–1979 stint as dictator). Another former military dictator, Muhammadu Buhari, was elected president in 2015, though not as the candidate of an authoritarian successor party.

<sup>xiii</sup> Although several of the founders of the Social Democratic Party (PSD) had served in parliament prior to Portugal's transition to democracy, the PSD is not scored as an ASP, since none of them had served as heads of state, ministers, or high-level members of the security apparatus.

<sup>xiv</sup> The Party of the Democratic Left (SDL) never held the prime minister's office following Slovakia's transition to democracy and is therefore not coded as a case of an ASP returning to power. However, it did hold cabinet positions in a coalition government from 1998 to 2002, and a splinter party formed in 1999, Direction-Social Democracy (Smer-SD), did reach the prime minister's office in 2012. Although the SDL merged with Smer-SD in 2005, it is not coded as an ASP, because it was formed more than one election cycle after the transition to democracy.

<sup>xv</sup> This appendix provides information on all ASPs that emerged between 1974 and 2010 in countries with at least one million inhabitants as of 2009, and which won at least 10 percent of the vote in a national election after the year of transition to democracy. See Appendix I for a full list of democratic transitions.

<sup>xvi</sup> The descriptions in this appendix draw on the following sources. Albania: Cvetkovic Bajrovic and Rabin Satter (2014). Bangladesh: Hossain (2004). Bolivia: Sivak (2001), Peñaranda (2004). Brazil: Power (n.d.). Bulgaria: Spirova (2008). Central African Republic: Mehler (2005). Chile: Loxton (2014a). Republic of Congo: Clark (1997), Englebert and Ron (2004). Croatia: Šedo (2010a). Czech Republic: Grzymala-Busse (2002, n.d.). Dominican Republic: Hartlyn (1998), Agosto and Cueto Villamán (2001). El Salvador: Loxton (2014a). Ghana (Riedl 2014, n.d.). Guatemala: Loxton and Levitsky (n.d.). Guinea-Bissau: Magalhães Ferreira (2004), O'Regan (2015). Hungary: Grzymala-Busse (2002, n.d.). Indonesia: Tomsa (2008, 2012), Slater and Wong (n.d.). South Korea: Cheng and Huang (n.d.), Slater and Wong (n.d.). Lesotho: Makoa (1996, 2004). Lithuania: Clark and Praneviciute (2008). Macedonia: Šedo (2010b). Madagascar: Marcus (2001), Marcus and Ratsimbaharison (2005). Malawi: Posner (1995). Mexico: Flores-Macías (2013, n.d.). Moldova: March (2006). Mongolia: Fish (1998), Fritz (2008). Montenegro: Bieber (2010). Nepal: Baral (1995), Sharma, Stevens, and Weller (2008). Nicaragua: Martí i Puig (2010, 2013). Niger: Ibrahim and Souley (1998). Panama: Loxton and Levitsky (n.d.). Paraguay: Abente-Brun (2009), Turner (2014). Peru: Levitsky and Zavaleta (forthcoming), Loxton and Levitsky (n.d.). Philippines: Putzel (1995), Hicken (2015). Poland: Grzymala-Busse (2002, n.d.). Romania: Pop-Eleches (2008). Senegal (Riedl, n.d.). Serbia: Bochsler (2010). Sierra Leone: Wyrod (2008). Slovakia: Grzymala-Busse (2002, n.d.), Haughton (2004), Haughton and Rybar (2008). Slovenia: Fink-Hafner (2006). Spain: Hopkin (1999), Balfour (2005). Sri Lanka: de Silva (1997), DeVotta (2002). Taiwan: Cheng and Huang (n.d.), Slater and Wong (n.d.). Thailand: McCargo (1997). Turkey: Kalayctoglu (2002), Haggard and Kaufman (1995: 131, 138, 146). Ukraine: Zimmer and Haran (2008). Cape Verde: Meyns (2002). Germany: Patton (2011). Guyana: Singh (2008). São Tomé and Príncipe: Seibert (2006). Suriname: Weyden (2006), Marchand (2014). Tunisia: Wolf (2014), Lefèvre (2015).

<sup>xvii</sup> The following parties are not included in the list of cases provided in Appendix I because of small population size, date of formation, or other factors that exclude them from consideration. However, they are included in this secondary table because of their significance in the countries in which they operate.