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THE VOTE SHARE OF NEW AND YOUNG PARTIES

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ABSTRACT

In this paper, we analyze the remarkable differences in the electoral success of new and young parties in fifty-eight countries in the post World War II period. We hope to make three contributions. First, we present and test a new theoretical argument about the electoral success of new parties, or conversely about the "frozenness" of party systems, in competitive political regimes. In the short to medium term, poor performance by governing parties facilitates the electoral success of new contenders. In the long term, new parties have more opportunities for garnering votes in post-1978 democracies because of the sequencing of party building and opportunities created by modern mass media, especially television. Second, we introduce the concepts of extra-system volatility (or the vote share of new parties) and the vote share of young parties. These concepts are useful complements to the established focus on total electoral volatility. Two countries with similar levels of total volatility can have very different levels of extra-system volatility, signaling divergences in voters' willingness to flee from existing parties and different levels of dissatisfaction with the existing parties. Third, we present information on volatility, extra-system volatility, the vote share of young parties, and within-system volatility in 58 countries for an extended period of time. The historic and geographic scope of the dataset is useful for an empirical mapping and for testing our theoretical arguments about the variance in the "frozenness" of party systems or, conversely, about the electoral success of new and young parties.

RESUMEN

En este artículo analizamos las notables diferencias en el éxito electoral de los partidos nuevos y de los partidos jóvenes en 58 países en el período posterior a la Segunda Guerra Mundial. Esperamos hacer tres contribuciones. Primero, presentamos y ponemos a prueba un nuevo argumento teórico acerca del éxito electoral de los partidos nuevos o, alternativamente, acerca del "congelamiento" de los sistemas de partidos, en regímenes políticos competitivos. En el corto y el mediano plazo, el mal desempeño de los partidos gobernantes facilita el éxito electoral de los nuevos contendientes. En el largo plazo, los nuevos partidos tienen más oportunidades de obtener votos en las democracias posteriores a 1978 debido a efectos de secuencia entre la construcción de partidos y las oportunidades creadas por los modernos medios de comunicación masiva, especialmente la televisión. Segundo, presentamos los conceptos de volatilidad extra sistémica (o la proporción de votos obtenida por los partidos nuevos) y la proporción de votos obtenida por los partidos jóvenes. Estos conceptos son complementos útiles al tradicional énfasis en la volatilidad electoral total. Dos países con niveles similares de volatilidad electoral total pueden tener niveles muy diferentes de volatilidad extra sistémica, lo que indica divergencias en la disposición de los votantes a abandonar los partidos existentes y distintos niveles de insatisfacción con los partidos existentes. Tercero, presentamos información sobre la volatilidad total, la volatilidad extra sistémica, la proporción de votos de los partidos jóvenes y la volatilidad intra sistémica en 58 países durante un extenso período. El alcance geográfico e histórico de la base de datos es útil para el mapeo empírico y para poner a prueba nuestros argumentos teóricos acerca de la varianza en el "congelamiento" de los sistemas de partidos o, alternativamente, acerca del éxito de los partidos nuevos y jóvenes.

In this paper, we analyze the remarkable differences in the electoral success of new and young parties in 58 countries in the post–World War II period. What accounts for these differences? This question is relatively new on the political science agenda.

Prior to the third wave of democratization, this question would not have been especially interesting because variance across countries was limited. The main parties in western European and Anglo-American party systems were stable from the 1920s until 1967, when Lipset and Rokkan (1967) published their seminal contribution. Major new parties were uncommon. In many post-1978 competitive regimes, however, new parties burst on the scene and become important electoral contenders while some established parties faded away into oblivion. The mean vote share of new and young parties in competitive regimes established by 1945 is a meager 2.4 percent and 8.2 percent, respectively, compared to means of 13.4 percent for new parties and 26.6 percent for young parties in competitive regimes established after 1977.[1] Social scientists need ways to systematically capture and account for these differences.

Deductively, the wide variance in the success of new parties is important for at least three reasons. First, where new parties regularly come on the scene and win a meaningful share of the vote, it is probably more difficult for voters to assess parties' programmatic positions. Programmatic linkages between voters and parties depend on the relative stability of party labels and positions. In fluid systems, voters are less likely to be able to identify the parties and where they stand, with adverse consequences for programmatic representation. Party system institutionalization is a powerful facilitating condition for programmatic representation (Kitschelt et al. 2010).

Second, parties are key mechanisms for electoral accountability (Downs 1957). Where important new parties frequently appear and established ones disappear or become minor labels, the information complexities for voters are likely to increase, and the difficulty of effective accountability is also likely to increase.

Finally, where new parties frequently become important contenders, ambitious anti-institutional populists can more easily create new party labels and cultivate popular support. In such contexts, it is probably more likely that a personalistic anti-system politician can become the head of government. The higher level of personalism in fluid

party systems can pave the way toward authoritarianism (e.g., President Alberto Fujimori in Peru in 1992 and President Vladimir Putin in Russia after his election in 2000) or toward the erosion of democratic regimes (e.g., President Hugo Chávez in Venezuela since 1998).

With this paper, we hope to make three contributions. First, we present and test a new theoretical argument about the "frozenness" or fluidity of party systems in competitive political regimes. Extensive literatures have focused on the freezing or stabilization of party systems (Bartolini and Mair 1990; Lipset and Rokkan 1967) and on changes within the party systems of the advanced industrial democracies since Lipset and Rokkan wrote their seminal work. In contrast, the huge variance in the openness of party systems to new and young contenders is a relatively new research question. We argue that one short-to-medium-term and one long-term factor affect the value of existing party labels and thereby affect the electoral success of new and young parties. In the short-to-medium term, poor performance by governing parties facilitates the electoral success of new contenders. In the long term, new parties have more opportunities for garnering votes in post-1978 democracies because of the sequencing of party building and opportunities created by modern mass media, especially television. In the post-1978 competitive regimes, party labels have less value because party organizations are less essential for political campaigns. In addition, we argue that institutional arrangements affect the probabilities of electoral success of new and young parties.

Second, we introduce the concepts of extra-system volatility (or the vote share of new parties) and the vote share of young parties. *New* parties are those that have never competed before; we operationalize young parties as those that have competed for at most ten years. An analysis of the vote share of new and young parties complements the established focus on total electoral volatility. Electoral volatility is a useful measure of aggregate stability and change in party systems,[2] but it fails to distinguish between vote transfers among established parties and transfers to new contenders. This distinction is helpful in analyzing differences among party systems.

Building on recent work (Birch 2003: 119–135; Golosov 2004: 47–49; Sikk 2005; Tavits 2008b), we distinguish between within-system and extra-system electoral volatility. Within-system volatility means that votes are transferred from one established

party to another. Extra-system volatility occurs when the vote share of some established parties declines and instead is captured by new contenders. The dynamics and characteristics of a party system are quite different if new parties frequently enter the system and capture a significant share of the vote. In this situation, the very parties that compete to win elections change.

Extra-system volatility refers to the fact that these new parties come from outside the previously existing party system even though they become part of the new system. It serves as a measure of change and stability not only of aggregate-level electoral competition, but also of membership in the party system. High extra-system volatility reflects dissatisfaction with all of the parties within the system.[3] It is therefore a useful complement to the widely used data on electoral volatility and a useful complementary measure of party system institutionalization.

Our second dependent variable is the share of the vote captured by *young* parties, defined as those that have competed in elections for ten years or less. Young parties are still youthful challengers to established parties, and their electoral support still signals a shift away from previously existing parties. The vote share of young parties assesses the electoral success of youthful entrants during the short period when they still are fresh contenders.

Third, we present information on volatility, extra-system volatility, the vote share of young parties, and within-system volatility in 58 countries for an extended period of time, beginning in 1945 or the inauguration of a country's most recent competitive regime, whichever came later. To the best of our knowledge, this is the most comprehensive dataset of electoral volatility that has been compiled. The historic and geographic scope of the dataset is useful for an empirical mapping and for testing our theoretical arguments about the variance in the "frozenness" of party systems or, conversely, about the electoral success of new and young parties.

THE SUPPLY OF AND DEMAND FOR NEW PARTIES

The electoral success of new and young parties depends on politicians' willingness to form or join new parties (the supply side of new parties) and on voters' willingness to

support them (the demand side). In turn, this willingness depends on the value of existing party labels and on the institutional barriers to (i.e., the cost of) forming new parties. Where existing party labels are valuable and where institutional barriers are greater, new parties will be less electorally successful.

An influential literature (Aldrich 1995; Downs 1957) has focused on why politicians form and value parties. In almost all competitive regimes, almost all politicians band together to form parties because parties offer them compelling electoral and resource advantages. Parties provide information shortcuts to voters so that politicians can capitalize on a brand name when they run for office (Downs 1957; Hinich and Munger 1994). They also offer politicians resources and organizational capacity within legislatures (Aldrich 1995). These benefits of parties are so compelling that little research has addressed the opposite question: when do politicians *not* believe that it is to their electoral advantage to remain in an existing party? Under some circumstances, it is more attractive to run as an independent or to join a new party.

Some previous work on new parties posited that politicians create a new party to represent new values or for other programmatic reasons, and that voters also chose a new party for value or programmatic reasons (Hug 2001; Inglehart 1997: 237–266). The assumption that the emergence of new values drives party entry is probably largely correct for what Kitschelt (1994) called left-libertarian parties, but we are leery of generalizing this argument to most new parties. Only if 1) "new" values have high political salience for a substantial number of voters; 2) established parties fail to adequately represent these new values; 3) some politicians or grassroots activists decide to launch a new party to capitalize on this gap in representation; and 4) voters choose this new label because it represents these new values could the emergence of new values even partially explain the emergence of new parties. According to the coding of Harmel and Robertson (1985: Table 4, p. 509), only 9.9 percent of a sample of 233 new parties in 19 western European and Anglo-American democracies emerged to represent "new values." Moreover, Harmel and Robertson (1985) and Hug (2001) found no support for the hypothesis that post-material values among citizens help explain the propensity to form new parties.

A focus on new values misses a point crucial in many post-1978 competitive regimes, that in contexts of delegitimation of the existing system, politicians might create a new party primarily as an instrumental electoral vehicle—a possibility that is consistent with the literature on political ambition. Understanding the vote share of new and young parties in programmatic or value terms is misleading for many post-1978 competitive regimes.

Our reflection about why politicians would join new parties shares the core assumption of the literature on political ambition (Aldrich 1995; Mayhew 1974). We assume that most politicians will form or join a new party only if doing so enhances or at a minimum does not imperil their chances of winning election. That is, we assume that electoral viability is an important concern to politicians when they exit an existing party and create or join a new one.

We thus agree with Tavits (2006) that it is useful to think of politicians' instrumental rationality in forming or joining a new party, but we conceive of this instrumental rationality in a different way than she did. Tavits focused on the costs and benefits to the *party*, but when it comes to a decision to form or join a new party, the costs and benefits to individual politicians are paramount; the new party either does not exist yet or has barely come into formation. Accordingly, we focus on what factors lead politicians to believe that they are more likely to be electorally successful by forming (or joining) a new party as opposed to running on an existing label. We assume that this calculus depends on the electoral value of existing party labels and on the institutional barriers to the electoral success of new parties. Politicians will be less likely to form or join new parties where existing labels hold greater value and where the institutional barriers to the electoral success of new parties are greater.

If the electoral value of existing party labels is high because a sizable share of the electorate is attached to parties, politicians will be unlikely to jump ship. We hypothesize that one short-to-medium-term and one long-term factor affect the electoral value of established party labels for politicians. First, if the major existing parties are discredited, politicians will be more tempted to form or join a new party. The primary ways in which major existing parties become discredited is through poor government performance and corruption scandals. These problems tend to discredit the governing parties, and they

have potential for spillover to other parties as well, especially if the other parties have also governed poorly or have been tainted by corruption scandals. In these situations, existing party labels can become more of a liability than an asset, and politicians are more likely to defect to new parties.

The long-term factor that affects the value of party labels follows the logic of Gunther (2005), Mainwaring and Zoco (2007), Pizzorno (1981), and Schmitter (2001). We hypothesize that the historical time period during which competitive political regimes emerged influences the degree to which parties are central actors in organizing political campaigns and therefore influences the value of existing party labels to politicians. Parties in post-1978 democracies are less dominant in structuring democratic politics than parties in the emerging democracies of the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, so party labels are less valuable. Democracies created by the early twentieth century had strong party organizations, and most voters had strong attachments to parties. Citizen attachments to parties make party labels valuable to politicians. Even as democracy has changed over generations, large numbers of voters remain relatively loyal to parties, creating disincentives for politicians to defect to new parties. In later emerging competitive regimes, candidates for executive positions can more easily appeal for votes through television and have less need to build parties. Party labels have less value to politicians in the absence of strong linkages between parties and voters.

If this argument is correct, then when a competitive political regime was inaugurated should have an effect on the vote share of new and young parties. Most long-established competitive regimes should have low extra-system volatility from the outset. Most newer competitive regimes should continue to have high extra-system volatility even over time. This is a congenital hypothesis about the electoral space open to new parties: when parties were born is decisive for stabilizing interparty competition and for limiting possibilities for new contenders.

Finally, the difficulty or ease of forming electorally viable new parties depends on formal institutions. Some formal institutions make it easier for political entrepreneurs to create electorally viable new parties. Permissive electoral rules such as high district magnitudes should make it easier for new parties to emerge and fare well. Because presidential systems personalize the vote for the head of government, they might make it

easier for new parties to win electoral inroads. Public financing of parties might level the playing field and give new contenders greater opportunities.

Because we are interested in the electoral success of new parties and not merely in their emergence, our analysis focuses on the demand (voter) side of the electoral market as well as the supply side (i.e., politicians' decision to form a new party). In other words, we must also consider voters' willingness to support the new parties. We hypothesize that the same factors that influence politicians' decisions to form a new party are also fundamental in voters' willingness to support a new label.

First, voters should be more likely to abandon existing parties when governing performance is poor and when perceived corruption is rampant. Second, the historical moment when political regimes form should affect voters and politicians. Before television was an important means for transmitting campaign information, politicians developed organizational ties to voters. Because of the material and symbolic resources that parties offered, voters became tightly connected to parties. In later emerging competitive regimes, politicians can use television as a way of partially replacing party organizations to reach mass audiences. Because party identities are weaker, voters are less likely to remain loyal to their party (Gunther 2005). Under these circumstances, voters are less likely to develop lasting loyalties to parties, and the party system is likely to be more open to new contenders.

Third, just as formal institutions should affect politicians' willingness to take on the costs of organizing a new party, so should they affect voters' strategic electoral choices. Voters should be more likely to support a new party that is electorally viable than a pure "spoiler." Because electoral viability depends somewhat on formal institutions, these institutions should affect voters' electoral choices (Duverger 1954).

THE DEPENDENT VARIABLES AND CASE SELECTION

We have two primary dependent variables: 1) extra-system volatility, or the share of the lower-chamber vote won by *new* parties; 2) the share of the lower-chamber vote won by *young* parties, which we operationalize as those that have competed for ten years or less. We code the vote share of *new* parties beginning with the second election of a new

competitive regime because in the first election the vote share of new parties might be very high (approaching 100 percent) simply because the antecedent dictatorship had suppressed parties. For related reasons, we code the vote share of *young* parties beginning with the third election after the inauguration of a new competitive regime.[4] We also have two secondary dependent variables: 3) total volatility; and 4) within-system volatility, i.e., the share of the vote transferred from one previously existing party to another.

Whereas extra-system volatility is a subset of total electoral volatility, this is not true for the vote share won by young parties. If a *new* party wins 20 percent of the vote in its first election, the 20 percent counts toward extra-system volatility, total volatility, and the share of the vote won by young parties. If this party wins 20 percent again in the next election (or any other election until ten years after its first election), this 20 percent counts toward the share of the vote won by *young* parties, but not toward extra-system volatility or total volatility.

We include all countries with at least one million inhabitants that as of 2006 had experienced at least four consecutive lower-chamber elections in which the country's Polity score was 2 or higher.[5] Such scores usually indicate that elections are reasonably free and fair. An authoritarian regime's control of elections favors the governing party and tends to limit electoral volatility, so it is usually misleading to compare electoral volatility between democratic and authoritarian regimes. We limit the analysis to countries with at least one million inhabitants because calculating the vote share of new and young parties requires proper coding of party mergers, schisms, changes of name, and coalitions. It is more difficult to find this information for very small countries, and it is harder to find experts who can help with judgments about these issues. We limited the case selection to countries that had experienced at least four consecutive reasonably free and fair elections because a minimum number of elections and years is needed to compare the congenital and age hypotheses about the electoral success of new and young parties.

These criteria generated a set of 58 countries with 588 electoral periods. Table 1 reports total volatility, extra-system volatility, within-system volatility, and the vote share for young parties for the lower chamber for these 58 countries. The data are based on valid votes, leaving aside null and blank votes. Table 1 includes all post-1945 elections

since the inauguration of the most recent competitive regime.[6] The beginning year of our analysis is 1945 because of the difficulty of finding the data for some independent variables for earlier years. The authors can provide details about coding rules for party mergers, schisms, coalitions, and mixed electoral systems.

Table 1 also shows the year of inauguration of the current competitive regime. To operationalize the inauguration of a competitive regime, we again used a Polity score of 2 or higher on a continuous basis. This threshold does not indicate the existence of full democracy, but it requires a competitive political regime.

The mean electoral volatility for the 588 electoral periods is 16.6 percent, and for the 58 countries the mean is 22.6 percent using the country (not the electoral period) as the unit of analysis. The substantial difference between the mean for the 588 observations and the mean for the 58 country averages reflects the fact that the competitive regimes that have had more elections also have had lower volatility. Mean extra-system volatility is 5.8 percent for each electoral period and 9.2 percent at the country level. For the average country, 41 percent of total electoral volatility represents transfers to new parties and 59 percent is within-system volatility. The percentage of total volatility transferred to new parties varies considerably, from 3 percent in the US to 81 percent in Taiwan. The mean vote share won by young parties was 18.6 percent for the 58 countries and 12.6 percent for the 540 electoral periods.[7]

TABLE 1

MEAN TOTAL VOLATILITY, MEAN EXTRA-SYSTEM VOLATILITY, MEAN WITHIN-SYSTEM VOLATILITY, AND MEAN SHARE OF VOTE WON BY YOUNG PARTIES, 58 COUNTRIES

	Elections Included for Volatility	Year Democracy Was Inaugurated	Mean Volatility	Mean Within-System Volatility	Mean Extra-System Volatility	Mean Share of Vote of Young Parties
United States	1946–2004	1800	3.4	3.3	0.1	0.6
Germany	1949–2005	1949	8.0	7.8	0.2	1.9
Honduras	1981–2005	1981	6.8	6.4	0.4	2.5
Sweden	1948–2002	1911	7.9	7.2	0.7	1.8
Jamaica	1959–2002	1959	14.7	13.7	1.0	1.1
Finland	1945–2003	1917	8.0	6.9	1.1	7.4
Norway	1945–2005	1945	11.3	10.1	1.2	2.5
Austria	1945–2002	1945	6.6	5.3	1.3	3.5
United Kingdom	1945–2005	1837	7.6	6.2	1.4	3.6
Ireland	1948–2002	1921	9.5	8.1	1.4	4.5
Australia	1946–2004	1901	6.9	5.3	1.6	4.6
Denmark	1945–2005	1945	11.0	9.1	1.9	8.7
Canada	1945–2006	1867	11.6	9.6	2.0	6.2
Greece	1974–2004	1974	10.8	8.7	2.2	4.2
Netherlands	1946–2003	1946	12.5	10.1	2.4	6.2
Switzerland	1947–2003	1848	7.4	4.8	2.6	7.5
Brazil	1986–2006	1985	19.6	16.8	2.8	10.9
Chile	1989–2005	1990	13.9	11.0	2.9	4.9
Uruguay	1984–2004	1985	15.6	12.6	3.0	4.0
France	1946–2002	1946	18.7	14.9	3.1	7.9
Portugal	1975–2005	1975	16.1	13.0	3.2	5.4
Mauritius	1976–1995	1968	19.3	16.1	3.2	4.2
Belgium	1946–2003	1944	11.7	8.2	3.4	14.2
New Zealand	1946–2005	1857	11.1	7.5	3.6	8.8

Dominican Republic	1978–2006	1978	33.2	29.5	3.7	12.7
Hungary	1990–2002	1990	30.1	26.0	4.1	8.3
Botswana	1965–2004	1966	10.6	6.2	4.5	10.6
Spain	1977–2004	1976	17.6	13.0	4.6	9.6
Sri Lanka	1952–2004	1948	16.7	11.7	5.0	6.8
Japan	1952–2005	1952	14.1	8.6	5.5	15.2
Malaysia	1974–2004	1971	13.3	6.8	6.5	14.1
Italy	1948–2001	1945	15.4	8.7	6.7	20.6
Argentina	1983–2003	1983	22.5	15.1	7.4	14.7
Mexico	1994–2006	1994	20.6	13.0	7.6	21.4
Israel	1949–2003	1948	20.1	12.5	7.6	17.4
Colombia	1958–2006	1958	15.9	7.9	8.0	12.7
Mongolia	1990–2004	1990	32.2	24.0	8.2	11.7
El Salvador	1985–2006	1982	17.8	8.3	9.6	30.9
Costa Rica	1946–2006	1853	29.9	18.7	11.1	25.4
Papua New Guinea	1977–1997	1975	27.8	16.3	11.4	21.0
India	1951–2004	1950	26.7	13.1	13.6	29.5
Macedonia	1990–2006	1991	38.3	24.0	14.3	21.8
Venezuela	1958–2005	1958	32.9	18.1	14.8	36.6
Poland	1991–2005	1989	45.5	30.0	15.5	36.5
Ecuador	1979–2002	1979	31.9	15.6	16.3	37.3
Taiwan	1992–2001	1992	20.3	3.8	16.4	23.2
Czech Republic	1990–2002	1990	28.5	11.6	16.9	26.5
Philippines	1987–1998	1987	44.8	27.1	17.8	59.9
Trinidad & Tobago	1966–2002	1962	27.3	8.7	18.7	45.8
Turkey	1983–2002	1983	32.7	12.0	20.7	53.8
Bolivia	1985–2005	1982	39.5	18.5	21.0	50.2
Romania	1990–2004	1990	46.5	23.8	22.7	51.2
Bulgaria	1990–2005	1990	39.3	15.5	23.8	34.4
Estonia	1992–2003	1991	44.7	20.9	23.8	46.4
Russia	1993–2003	1992	44.8	20.3	24.5	31.1
Latvia	1993–2002	1991	52.0	26.8	25.2	44.3
South Korea	1988–2004	1988	36.6	9.9	26.7	32.5
Benin	1991–1999	1991	68.3	26.5	41.8	36.1

The cross-national differences in the country means for the dependent variables are huge. Among the 58 countries included in the analysis in this paper, mean electoral volatility—a widely used measure of aggregate electoral change from one election to the next—is twenty *times* greater in the country with highest volatility (Benin, 68.3 percent) than in the country with the greatest aggregate stability (the United States, 3.4 percent). The capacity of new parties to burst on the scene and win a meaningful share of the vote varies even more across countries. Mean extra-system volatility ranges from 0.1 percent (the US) to 41.8 percent (Benin), and the mean share of the vote won by young parties ranges from 0.7 percent (the US) to 53.8 percent (Turkey). Mean extra system volatility is therefore 400 times greater in Benin than in the US. Party systems such as the US's pose huge barriers to the success of new entrants, while new competitors have a much easier time achieving success in many other systems.

Correlations among total volatility, extra-system volatility, and the vote share of new parties are high, but well below 1.00. The bivariate correlation between total volatility and extra-system volatility for the 588 electoral periods is .74 (two-tailed). The bivariate correlation between total volatility and the share of votes won by young parties for 540 electoral periods is .65. Finally, the correlation between extra-system volatility and the share of the vote won by young parties is also .65, again based on 540 electoral periods. All three correlations are significant at $p < .001$.[8]

Notwithstanding these high correlations, examining extra-system volatility and the vote share of young parties often suggests a very different picture than total volatility. Jamaica has approximately average (for our dataset) total volatility (14.7 percent) but scores exceedingly low for extra-system volatility (1.0 percent) and the vote share of young parties (1.1 percent). The same two parties have dominated Jamaican elections every election since independence in 1962 with the exception of 1983, when the People's National Party did not run. El Salvador is also a case of average total volatility (17.8 percent) but with a much higher vote share of young parties (30.9 percent), reflecting the entrance of a major new competitor, the leftist FMLN (Frente Farabundo Martí para la Liberación Nacional or Farabundo Martí National Liberation Front), into the party system in 1994, and the parallel withering of the former governing party, the Christian Democrats (Partido Demócrata Cristiano, or PDC) after 1989. The entrance of the FMLN and the near exit of the PDC

profoundly changed party competition. Although the two countries are very close in total volatility, El Salvador's vote share of young parties is twenty-six times greater than Jamaica's. Jamaica's party system has been largely closed to new entrants; El Salvador's had a highly successful new entrant whose emergence radically altered party competition. The similarities in total volatility conceal these important differences.

HYPOTHESES AND MEASUREMENT OF INDEPENDENT VARIABLES

We hypothesized that party systems' openness to electorally successful new and young parties depends on 1) government performance; 2) the timing of the foundation of the competitive regime; and 3) formal institutions. We also add some control variables. To simplify the prose, we present the hypotheses in terms of extra-system volatility, but the same logic applies to the vote share of young parties.

Government Performance

Poor government performance can adversely affect the electoral fortunes of governing parties (Remmer 1991; Roberts and Wibbels 1999) and hence boost electoral volatility. It could also produce dissatisfaction with all existing parties and therefore boost extra-system volatility and the vote share of young parties.

H1: Low economic growth fosters high extra-system volatility. We measured short-term economic growth with change in per-capita GDP from the year of the first election in the electoral period to the year before the second election. Because there is a possibility that it takes medium-term bad performance to open the doors to new parties, we also include a variable that measures GDP-per-capita growth over the medium term, which we operationalized as a minimum of six years and a maximum of ten. The measurement of medium-term growth begins with the first year of the competitive regime, but only when a regime has lasted at least six years do we record a value for medium-term growth. (A period of less than six years does not qualify as "medium term.") The coefficient for both growth variables should be negative; higher growth should produce lower volatility. GDP-per-capita

growth is based on the World Bank's *World Development Indicators* for 1961–2006 and on Penn World Tables for 1951–60.

H2: High inflation fosters high extra-system volatility. High inflation can produce dissatisfaction with existing parties and facilitate the rise of new parties. We measured short-term mean annual inflation for the electoral period from the year of the first election in the electoral period to the year before the second election. Medium-term inflation is operationalized in the same way as medium-term growth. We used the natural log of inflation because we expect a nonlinear effect.[9] The hypothesized coefficient for inflation is positive. For most countries, data for inflation come from Mitchell (1998a, 1998b) for 1945–60; Bruno and Easterly (1998) for 1960–94; and IMF (2008) for 1995–2006.

H3: Increasing inflation fosters high extra-system volatility. Voters may take into consideration not only the level of inflation but also the change in the inflation rate. If government policies result in escalating inflation, voters might punish the governing party and be willing to support new contenders.

This variable measures the difference between the natural log of inflation in the first and penultimate years of the electoral period. For example, for the 1992–1996 electoral period in Taiwan, we took the log of inflation in 1995 minus the log of inflation in 1992. Because the first and penultimate years of an electoral period are the same when elections take place in consecutive years, we lost 30 observations. When two elections were held the same year, for both elections we used the difference between the log of inflation in the year before these two elections and the log of inflation in the year of the immediately previous election.

H4: A perception of widespread corruption fosters high extra-system volatility. Corruption has corrosive effects on the legitimacy of democracy (Seligson 2002). Therefore, we hypothesize that a perception of widespread corruption opens the door for new parties.

The World Bank Governance Indicator (Kaufmann et al. 2009) for control of corruption captures perceptions of corruption. We average the World Bank Governance Indicators from the first year of the electoral period to the penultimate year. The first data

point is 1996, and the most recent we used is 2005, the final year of our dataset. The coverage includes all 58 countries in our dataset.

The Congenital Theory of Party System Stabilization

H5: Extra-system volatility is lower in democracies that were inaugurated earlier. We presented the logic behind this hypothesis above. We measured H5 with the natural log of the number of years from the birth of democracy until 2006 because we expect a diminishing effect over time.

H6: A higher number of television sets per 100 inhabitants at the time of inauguration of a competitive regime increases extra-system volatility. Television makes it easier to win office without investing in a party organization and hence reduces the value of party labels for politicians. Data on televisions per 100 inhabitants came primarily from a dataset compiled by the International Telecommunications Union.

Institutional Hypotheses

Formal institutional arrangements make it easier or more difficult for new parties to achieve electoral success.

H7: Extra-system volatility increases as party-system fragmentation increases. A fragmented party system indicates a permeable electoral market in which new contenders can more easily win a meaningful share of voters. Consequently, it makes it more inviting for politicians to form a new party and for voters to support it. Conversely, low fragmentation is an expression of a closed electoral market. We measured party system fragmentation with the effective number of parties (ENP) (Laakso and Taagepera 1979) in votes. The ENP in the first of the two elections that constitute an electoral period is the value for that observation. If H7 is correct, the coefficient for ENP should be positive.

H8: A higher district magnitude fosters higher extra-system volatility. A high district magnitude (the number of seats per district) should make it easier for new competitors to win seats (Cox 1997: 203–221; Duverger 1954; Taagepera and Shugart 1989: 112–125; Willey

1998). Conversely, single member districts and other systems with low magnitudes set a high barrier for new entrants. The effects of district magnitude operate partly through their impact on the effective number of parties (H7), but district magnitude might have an independent effect on our dependent variables.

Our measurement is based on the mean effective magnitude (Taagepera and Shugart 1989: 126–141). For mixed systems (Bolivia, Hungry, Japan, Mexico, Romania, Russia, and Venezuela 1993–98), we took a weighted mean based on the percentage of seats allocated in the two systems and the average magnitude of seats allocated via proportional representation.

The effects of increases in district magnitude on the electoral market are typically high at low values and diminish as magnitude increases. Therefore, we use the natural log form.

H9: A presidential or semi-presidential system makes it easier for new parties to win votes. In presidential and semi-presidential systems, individuals can more easily become heads of government without having the backing of a major party. This institutional arrangement might make it easier for an individual to create a new party en route to winning executive power. Parties might dominate the route to executive power less than they do in parliamentary systems, making it easier for new parties to succeed.

In presidential or semi-presidential systems (coded as 1), the head of government has a limited term in office and is elected through direct popular vote or through an electoral college that does not have the power to overlook electoral results. Parliamentary systems and hybrid systems in which there are both a president and a prime minister are coded 0 if the presidents' powers are considered ceremonial or limited in scope.

H10: Public financing of parties should make it easier for new parties to win votes. Public financing could level the electoral playing field, reducing the advantages of established parties. We coded 0 in cases of no public funding of political parties or if public funding was available in *one* election of the electoral period and 1 if public funding was available for parties for *both* elections of the electoral period.

Control Variables

H11: Extra-system volatility diminishes over time. In a classic article, Converse (1969) posited that as individuals aged, their partisan attachments became stronger. He argued that the length of support for a party and of exposure to elections explained the deepening attachment over time to parties. By implication, newly established party systems would become more stable as voters had more time to identify with parties. Some authors have argued that post-communist regimes have similarly encouraged the growth of partisanship (Brader and Tucker 2001 cf. Kitschelt et al. 1999: 96). In addition, one might expect that with the passage of time, parties would win over some relatively stable clientele groups, routinize their electoral appeals, and build a more stable base. If this hypothesis is correct, new and young parties should find it harder to win electoral support as a competitive regime becomes older. Other research, however, has cast doubt on the nation that party systems become more stable over time (Bielasiak 2002; Mainwaring and Torcal 2006; Mainwaring and Zoco 2007; Rose and Munro 2003; Shamir 1984: 49; Sikk 2005).

We measure time with the number of years from the inauguration of a competitive regime until a given election in that country. For example, if democracy was inaugurated in 1983, in 1991, the number of years since the inauguration of democracy is 8. We expect the effect of time on the stabilization of electoral competition to diminish after about thirty years so we imposed an upper limit of 30 on this variable. Whereas the independent variable for H11 (age of democracy) changes from one electoral period to the next, the independent variable for H5 (birth year of democracy) is constant for all electoral periods for a given country. If H11 is correct, the coefficient for age of democracy should be negative; as the number of years since the inauguration of democracy increases, volatility should decrease.

H12: Extra-system volatility is lower in competitive regimes with a higher percentage of the labor force employed in manufacturing, mining, construction, and transportation. This is a structural hypothesis about the electoral opportunities for new parties. Most individuals in traditional blue-collar employment have a common workspace and experience with other employees. This workplace experience might foster stronger allegiances to political parties that represent workers. In turn, strong allegiances to existing parties make it more difficult

for new parties to succeed electorally. Conversely, individuals in the informal sector might be less likely to establish a partisan linkage because of the absence of organizational influences in the workplace. Because large informal sectors are associated with a low share of the labor force in manufacturing, mining, construction, and transportation, this is a second structural reason for H12.

To fill in some gaps in our series, we used linear interpolation, which added 310 missing observations.

H13: Extra-system volatility is lower in competitive regimes that have higher union density (the number of unionized workers divided by the total number of paid employees). According to Bartolini and Mair (1990: 231–238), strong "organizational encapsulation" (i.e., strong linkages between voters and parties via organizational attachments) favors party system stability. Organizational encapsulation creates bonds between citizens and parties; hence, it promotes stability in interparty competition and should lower extra-system volatility. Bartolini and Mair include union density as a measure of organizational encapsulation.

Table 2 shows the descriptive statistics for the dependent and independent variables. Electoral periods (the period from one election to the next) are the unit of observation; each electoral period in a country is one observation. A complete list of sources for all data is available from the authors.

TABLE 2

DESCRIPTIVE STATISTICS

Variable	No. of observations	Mean	Std. deviation	Minimum Value	Maximum value
Total volatility	588	16.6	14.2	0.4	77.6
Extra-system volatility	588	5.8	10.4	0.0	70.4
Within-system volatility	588	10.7	9.6	0.0	68.4
Vote share young parties	540	12.6	16.3	0.0	86.1
Birth year of democracy	588	73.2	51.8	12	206
Birth year of democracy (ln)	588	4.04	0.73	2.48	5.33
Age of democracy (truncated)	588	22.2	9.7	1	30
ENP	585	4.00	1.84	1.24	15.5
District magnitude	582	17.2	40.7	1	299
GDP growth (short term)	585	2.24	2.64	-11.2	18.7
GDP growth (medium term)	479	2.38	1.74	-3.49	12.56
Inflation (short term) (ln)	583	1.87	1.20	0.0	7.86
Inflation (medium term)	480	14.8	45.1	-0.1	560.2
Inflation (medium term) (ln)	480	1.90	1.0	0	6.33
Change in inflation (ln)	549	-0.09	1.54	-6.63	5.30
Presidential system	588	0.36	0.48	0	1
Labor force	526	35.1	8.9	7.3	63.6
Union density	480	36.8	19.6	2.6	100.0
Public funding of parties	390	0.67	0.47	0	1
Control of corruption	140	0.65	1.10	-1.06	2.40
Control of corruption extrapolated	199	0.65	1.11	-1.06	2.40
TV sets per 100 inhabitants	497	4.62	9.21	0	41.78

METHODS, RESULTS, AND INTERPRETATION

We estimate our models through Generalized Estimating Equations (GEE), an estimator that is appropriate for panel data when the goal is to obtain population-averaged estimates, as opposed to a situation in which the goal is to obtain country-specific results (best achieved by conditional models such as random effects and fixed effects) (Zorn 2001). GEE models are appropriate for data sets with temporally correlated errors and with a larger number of units than time periods (ours contains 58 countries and a mean of 10.1 electoral periods per country) (Beck: 2001: 273–4). We chose an autoregressive correlation structure, AR(1), because we expect each of our dependent variables to be positively correlated over time, and we also expect this correlation to be larger for consecutive elections than for those farther apart in time. The AR(1) specification has the additional advantage of not demanding too much from a relatively small data set (only one ρ parameter has to be estimated). Because there is always some uncertainty about whether the correlation structure chosen is the most appropriate, we ran the models with semi-robust standard errors, which are valid even if the assumed structure is incorrect, and with the Stata option "force," which includes in the calculation observations that are not equally spaced in time. There is clearly sufficient within-country variance in our dependent variables to treat each electoral period as a legitimate observation.

Table 3 shows the results with the seven independent variables for which we have almost complete data. The data for change in inflation (H3), the percentage of the economically active population (EAP) in manufacturing, mining, transportation, and construction (H12), and union density (H13) are missing for a relatively small number of electoral periods. Accordingly, in Table 4 we add these three variables and drop short-term inflation in favor of medium-term inflation because of the high correlation (r=.78) between the two variables. Later we add the independent variables for televisions per 100 inhabitants at the time of inauguration of a competitive regime (H6) (497 observations), public financing of parties (H10), which has 390 observations, and control of corruption (H4), which has only 198 observations.

TABLE 3

GEE(AR[1]) MODELS FOR TOTAL VOLATILITY, EXTRA-SYSTEM VOLATILITY, VOTE SHARE OF YOUNG PARTIES, AND WITHIN-SYSTEM VOLATILITY
(coefficients and p-values)

	Volatility	New Party	Young Party	Within-system Volatility
Birth year of democracy (ln)	-9.02***	–3.17**	–7.99**	–5.31***
	(0.000)	(0.010)	(0.005)	(0.000)
Age of democracy (Truncated 30 yrs)	0.013	–0.06	0.17	0.07
	(0.875)	(0.243)	(0.126)	(0.378)
GDP growth	–0.83***	–0.65**	–0.45	–0.19
(short term)	(0.000)	(0.007)	(0.078)	(0.21)
Inflation (ln)	–0.34	0.29	0.20	–0.36
(short term)	(0.423)	(0.497)	(0.734)	(0.286)
Effective number of parties	1.31**	1.79***	3.10***	–0.29
	(0.006)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.393)
District magnitude (ln)	–0.34	–0.39	–0.49	–0.10
	(0.670)	(0.506)	(0.658)	(0.793)
Presidentialism	3.90	1.01	3.75	2.54
	(0.141)	(0.544)	(0.337)	(0.097)
Constant	49.75***	14.20*	29.89*	32.38***
	(0.000)	(0.020)	(0.024)	(0.000)
N	574	574	532	574

*p<.05 **p<.01 p<.001

TABLE 4

GEE (AR[1]) MODELS WITH PERCENT EAP, UNION DENSITY, MEDIUM-TERM GROWTH AND INFLATION, AND SHORT-TERM GROWTH
(coefficients and p-values)

Dependent variable	(1) Total volatility	(2) New parties	(3) Young parties	(4) Within–system volatility
Birth year of democracy (ln)	-6.18***	-1.40	-6.90*	-4.86***
	(0.001)	(0.157)	(0.011)	(0.000)
Age of democracy	0.090	-0.079	-0.007	0.165*
	(0.466)	(0.390)	(0.950)	(0.028)
GDP growth (short term)	-1.13**	-0.956*	-1.07**	-0.186
	(0.004)	(0.029)	(0.004)	(0.357)
GDP growth (medium term)	-0.33	0.621*	-0.113	-0.891
	(0.591)	(0.040)	(0.803)	(0.085)
Inflation (ln) (medium term)	1.46	1.63*	2.03	-0.25
	(0.056)	(0.028)	(0.078)	(0.617)
Change in inflation (ln)	0.17	0.52	0.32	-0.31
	(0.654)	(0.063)	(0.331)	(0.321)
Effective number of parties	1.69**	1.063	3.76***	0.48
	(0.006)	(0.065)	(0.000)	(0.108)
District magnitude (ln)	0.05	0.16	-0.17	-0.17
	(0.945)	(0.828)	(0.906)	(0.651)
Presidentialism	-0.05	-2.04	-1.58	1.99
	(0.978)	(0.176)	(0.624)	(0.215)
Economically active population	-0.14	-0.09	-0.07	-0.07
	(0.054)	(0.161)	(0.581)	(0.215)
Union membership	-0.10**	-0.10***	-0.20**	-0.00
	(0.001)	(0.000)	(0.005)	(0.933)
constant	40.48***	13.53	36.30**	28.47***
	(0.000)	(0.104)	(0.009)	(0.000)
N	358	358	358	358

* p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001

The results for the first seven independent variables are quite consistent across Tables 3 and 4.

H1: In Table 3, as hypothesized, poor short-term growth performance increases the ability of new and young parties to make electoral inroads. The effects of poor short-term growth are sizable but not huge in most models. Each increase of 1 percent in per-capita GDP growth generates a predicted decrease of 0.65 percent in extra-system volatility, 0.45 percent in the vote share of young parties, and 0.8 percent in total volatility.

When we include both short and medium term growth (Table 4), poor short-term growth still boosts extra-system volatility and the vote share of young parties. Poor medium-term growth increases the vote share of new parties but not of young ones. Thus, the evidence solidly supports H1 for the impact of both poor short-term and medium-term growth.

H2 and H3: Short-term inflation was not statistically significant (Table 3).[10] Higher medium-term inflation increased extra-system volatility (Table 4), but increases in the inflation rate had marginal impact (only at 0<.07, and only for the vote share of new parties).

H5: Birth year of democracy has a consistently powerful impact on extra-system volatility, the vote share of young parties, and total volatility, thus supporting the arguments of Gunther (2005), Mainwaring and Zoco (2007), and Schmitter (2001) about the critical importance of when parties were formed. To show the substantive effects of birth year of democracy, Table 5 simulates increases in the number of years from the inauguration of the competitive regime until 2006 from 10 to 11 years, 20 to 21, 50 to 51, 100 to 101, and 200 to 201. We start at 10 and finish at 200 to approximate the limits of our real data, in which birth year of democracy ranges from 12 to 206. We simulate extra-system and total volatility and the vote share of young parties using the coefficients from Tables 3 and 4. Extra-system volatility decreases by (.30) when years since the birth of democracy go from 10 to 11, by half of that (.15) when we go from 20 to 21 years, and so forth. Total volatility is more responsive than extra-system volatility to birth year of democracy. But both are substantial, as just one additional year of experience with democracy reduces volatility by non-trivial amounts.

TABLE 5

SIMULATED EFFECTS OF BIRTH YEAR OF REGIME ON EXTRA-SYSTEM VOLATILITY, VOTE SHARE OF YOUNG PARTIES, AND TOTAL VOLATILITY

	Model	Coefficient of logged birth year	Effect of a one-year increase in age of democracy at an age of…				
			10 years	20 years	50 years	100 years	200 years
Extra-system volatility	Table 3	-3.17	-.30	-.15	-.06	-.03	-.02
	Table 4	-1.40	-.13	-.07	-.03	-.01	-.01
Share of young parties	Table 3	-7.99	-.76	-.39	-.16	-.08	-.04
	Table 4	-6.90	-.66	-.34	-.14	-.07	-.04
Total volatility	Table 3	-9.02	-.86	-.44	-.18	-.09	-.04
	Table 4	-6.18	-.59	-.30	-.12	-.06	-.03

H7: A higher effective number of parties facilitates greater extra-system volatility and a higher vote share of young parties in both Tables 3 and 4. The substantive effect is powerful, especially with the vote share of young parties. In Table 3, an increase of 1 in the effective number of parties produces an increase of 1.8 percent in a country's predicted extra-system volatility and of 3.1 percent in the share of vote of young parties.[11]

ENP is not significant for within-system volatility in Table 3 or 4. The greater impact of the effective number of parties on extra-system volatility and the vote share of new parties suggests that a fragmented party system is particularly important in facilitating the success of new and young parties. With a more restricted offer of party options, at the aggregate level, voters are more likely to turn to an established contender when they defect from their previous electoral choice.

H8: Surprisingly, district magnitude does not have an impact on any of the four dependent variables in either Table 3 or Table 4. The correlation between district magnitude logged and ENP is modest at .33 (the correlation is even weaker, at .12, with the unlogged version of district magnitude), so the null effect is not overwhelmingly a product of multicollinearity.

H9: Presidentialism had no statistically significant impact on any of the four dependent variables in Tables 3 or 4.

H11: Years of democracy fails to achieve significance for new and young parties in Tables 3 and 4. The likelihood of electoral success of new contenders is not affected by how

long the regime has been in existence. As competitive regimes age, the vote share of new and young parties remains constant on average, contrary to what one might expect based on Converse's (1969) theory about the stabilization of partisan identities over time. Indeed, against expectations, as democracy grows older, within-system volatility actually increases in Table 4.

In combination with the findings for H5, this result means that competitive regimes established early in the world history of democracy had high barriers to new entrants. This is consistent with Lipset and Rokkan's (1967) notion of "frozen" party systems. The joint findings of H5 and H11 also indicate that on average, party systems in later emerging competitive regimes were open to new competitors from the outset, and that this openness does not on average diminish over time.

H12: The share of the labor force in manufacturing, mining, transportation, and construction has no impact on extra-system volatility or the vote share of new parties (Table 4). However, a higher share of the labor force in these activities is weakly associated with lower total volatility (p=054).

H13: Union density has a significant impact on total volatility, extra-system volatility, and the vote share of young parties (more unionization is associated with less volatility and a lower vote share for new and young parties). The substantive effect is considerable for the vote share of young parties. An increase of 5.0 percent in union density produces a predicted decrease of 1 percent in the vote share of young parties (p=.005). Union density has no impact on within-system volatility. High union density therefore reduces the propensity of voters to switch electoral allegiance to parties outside the established market.

One plausible causal mechanism for the significance of this variable is that countries with strong labor movements tended to have great union density and stronger working-class parties. Strong working-class parties were historically associated with the more stable party systems of the advanced industrial democracies (Gunther 2005). Workers remained fiercely loyal to parties already within the system.

Many countries with low union density also have high shares of the labor market in the informal sector. These individuals are probably particularly disposed to vote for political outsiders and for new parties. This might also help explain why low union density is associated with a high vote share for young parties and with high extra-system volatility.

CONTROL OF CORRUPTION, TELEVISION, AND PUBLIC FUNDING

Table 6 shows the results of adding control of corruption to the seven independent variables used in Table 3. The models are based on only 198 observations because the World Bank Governance Indicators series begins in 1996. Since scores for control of corruption are exceptionally stable over time,[12] we increased the number of observations by extrapolating backwards the scores to 1991. Given the greatly reduced number of observations, we are cautious about interpreting some of the results.

In this small sample, control of corruption is a very powerful predictor. It has the expected negative coefficient. A one-standard-deviation increase in a country's score for control of corruption produces a very large expected decrease of 9.95 percent in the vote share of young parties and of 4.4 percent in the vote share of new parties. Control of corruption has a weaker effect on within-system volatility, which indicates that a perception of pervasive corruption pushes people away from the whole system, not just the incumbent party. Most of the other coefficients become insignificant, in part because explanatory power now goes to the new variable and in part because of the smaller N. The effective number of parties is the only other variable that achieves conventional levels of significance on both new and young parties. Short-term growth has a marginally significant impact on the vote share of young parties (p=.09).

This restricted sample suggests that the vote share of new and young parties is to a large extent explained by state performance factors. Because of the severe reduction in the number of observations, we do not dismiss some earlier positive findings—in particular, the findings that the birth year of democracy and economic performance affect the electoral prospects of new and young parties.

TABLE 6

MODELS WITH CONTROL OF CORRUPTION (EXTRAPOLATED) COEFFICIENTS AND P VALUES

Dependent variable	(1) Total volatility	(2) New parties	(3) Young parties	(4) Within-system volatility
Birth year of democracy (ln)	-1.87	2.56	3.60	-0.78
	(0.528)	(0.173)	(0.439)	(0.727)
Age of democracy	-0.18	-0.25	-0.28	-0.18
	(0.484)	(0.107)	(0.448)	(0.300)
GDP growth (short term)	-0.75*	-0.27	-0.95	-0.28
	(0.024)	(0.396)	(0.094)	(0.348)
Inflation (ln) (short term)	-1.00	-0.75	-0.78	-0.65
	(0.187)	(0.363)	(0.501)	(0.330)
Effective number of parties	0.98	2.030**	2.74**	-0.88
	(0.176)	(0.002)	(0.009)	(0.076)
District magnitude (ln)	0.37	0.26	-0.79	0.45
	(0.635)	(0.558)	(0.502)	(0.537)
Presidentialism	-0.52	-2.23	-4.60	-0.03
	(0.850)	(0.213)	(0.288)	(0.990)
Control of corruption	-5.79***	-4.39***	-9.95***	-2.98*
	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.001)	(0.026)
constant	35.80***	0.25	14.00	28.52***
	(0.000)	(0.968)	(0.310)	(0.000)
N	198	198	189	198

* p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001

H6 and H10: We also ran models with the seven independent variables in Table 3 and added in separate regressions added televisions per capita at the time of inauguration of a competitive regime and public funding. Neither variable had close to a statistically significant result in any model. To save space, we do not present the results. The weak results with televisions per capita at the inauguration of democracy suggest that the effects of early democracy in creating an institutionalized party system that creates high hurdles for new entries is not primarily a result of television.

THE VOTE SHARE OF NEW AND YOUNG PARTIES IN POST-1945 DEMOCRACIES

Our dataset includes eleven democracies born before 1945. Because of missing values for many independent variables before 1945, we began coding in 1945. Therefore, for these eleven countries, we do not have full data from the first electoral period of a competitive regime. To ensure that these eleven countries were not distorting the results for the age of democracy variable, we ran regressions without these countries using the same independent variables in Table 3. We obtained largely similar results; the age of democracy still has no effect on the vote share of new parties. Against expectations (H11), among the forty-seven competitive regimes born in 1945 or thereafter, as democracies get older, young parties fare better electorally (p=.04). Each increase of one year in the age of democracy (up to 30 years) generates an expected increase of 0.24% in the vote share of young parties, controlling for the other six independent variables in Table 3. To save space, we do not show the full results.

On average, for these forty-seven countries, the vote share of new parties is high (14.5%, n=47) in the second election after the inauguration of a new competitive regime, consistent with the expectation (H11) of higher initial openness to new parties followed by subsequent stabilization. But from the third election on, the data display no clear pattern, and there is even an idiosyncratic spike to an average vote share of 16.8% for new parties in the seventeenth election for the five post-1944 democracies that had seventeen or more lower chamber elections after the inauguration of democracy. Overall, the data are clearly inconsistent with the hypothesis of stabilization over time.

THE COLLINEARITY BETWEEN BIRTH YEAR OF DEMOCRACY AND AGE OF DEMOCRACY

Although they are designed to test different theories about the openness of the electoral market to new contenders, birth year of democracy and age of democracy are conceptually and empirically related. Their strong association (r=0.95 in the raw form of the variables) hints at this problem. The two variables used in the models, birth year of democracy (logged) and age of democracy truncated at 30 years, have a weaker but still considerable correlation (r=0.70).

Having these two variables in the same model implies some collinearity. Given that birth year of democracy has more and more consistent explanatory power than age of Democracy (a finding similar to Mainwaring and Zoco 2007), we dropped the latter and reran the models. The remaining estimates are more efficient both because of one less parameter to estimate and because of the reduction in multicollinearity. When we ran the models from Table 3 without age of democracy (results not shown), the standard errors associated with birth year of democracy become noticeably smaller in all four models (and the p-values are smaller in three of them, the exception being vote share of young parties). The value of the coefficient for birth year of democracy is somewhat larger in absolute magnitude for extra-system volatility and somewhat smaller for share of young parties and within-system volatility. The coefficients for the other independent variables change only very marginally. The results therefore reinforce previous findings.

ROBUSTNESS CHECK

Are these findings robust to alternative time-series cross-section (TSCS) estimators? Given the sensitivity of TSCS analysis to different specifications (Wilson and Butler 2007), it is useful to check.

In Table 7, we rerun the model with extra-system volatility as the dependent variable and all seven independent variables with nearly complete information using five different estimators and comparing the results to the GEE estimates, which are in column 1. The alternatives used are Beck and Katz's (1995, 1996) panel-corrected standard errors with an autoregressive 1 (AR1) process (PCSE_AR1) and with a lagged dependent variable (PCSE+LDV), the random effects estimator (RE), the fixed effects (FE) estimator, and fixed effects with a lagged dependent variable (FE+LDV) (a model advocated by Wilson and Butler 2007 in some situations). Most of the results are robust.

H1: GDP growth was significant in all models except panel-corrected standard errors with a lagged dependent variable, PCSE+LDV. The coefficients are stable across all of the models.

H2: Inflation does not have an impact in any model.

H5: Time-invariant variables cannot be estimated in fixed effects models, so the birth year of democracy variable is dropped from both fixed effects models. The finding for this variable is highly robust in the other four models. Birth year of democracy is consistently negative and significant, meaning that democracies inaugurated earlier have lower extra-system volatility. The coefficients are consistent from one model to the next.

H7: In all of the models, a higher effective number of parties produced an increase in estimated extra-system volatility.

H8: District magnitude did not have an effect on extra-system volatility in any model.

H9: Presidentialism had no impact.

H11: Age of democracy is barely significant and negative in the GEE model (p=.10). Otherwise, it has no impact.

TABLE 7

ROBUSTNESS CHECK
Dependent variable = extra-system volatility
(Coefficients and p-values)

	(1) gee b/p	(2) pcse+ar1 b/p	(3) pcse+ldv b/p	(4) re b/p	(5) fe b/p	(6) fe_ldv b/p
Birth year of democracy (ln)	-3.17** (0.010)	-3.19** (0.003)	-2.51** (0.004)	-3.48* (0.017)	-	-
Age of democracy (truncated 30 years)	–0.064 (0.243)	–0.062 (0.306)	0.047 (0.466)	–0.075 (0.150)	–0.087 (0.100)	–0.056 (0.355)
GDP growth (short term)	–0.65** (0.007)	–0.65*** (0.000)	–0.35 (0.084)	–0.63*** (0.000)	–0.63*** (0.000)	–0.56*** (0.001)
Inflation (ln) (short term)	0.29 (0.497)	0.30 (0.535)	0.28 (0.594)	0.01 (0.973)	0.03 (0.941)	0.04 (0.910)
Effective number of parties	1.79*** (0.000)	1.74*** (0.000)	1.00** (0.009)	2.17*** (0.000)	2.47*** (0.000)	2.75*** (0.000)
District magnitude (ln)	-0.39 (0.506)	-0.40 (0.247)	-0.20 (0.419)	0.340 (0.505)	1.04 (0.124)	1.14 (0.088)
Presidentialism	1.01 (0.544)	1.00 (0.346)	0.72 (0.436)	-0.28 (0.893)	-	-
Lagged vote share of new parties			0.251 (0.060)			–0.07 (0.121)
Constant	14.20* (0.020)	14.42** (0.002)	9.40* (0.020)	14.36* (0.018)	–2.40 (0.262)	–4.48 (0.050)
N	574	574	523	574	574	523

* p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001

CONCLUSION

Although the extensive work on electoral volatility has made important contributions in understanding party system dynamics, it is useful to distinguish between within-system and extra-system volatility. Two countries with similar levels of total volatility can have very different levels of extra-system volatility, signaling divergences in voters' willingness to flee from existing parties and different levels of dissatisfaction with the existing parties. Whereas within-system volatility might signal a temporary shift from one established party to another, extra-system volatility indicates that voters have turned away from all the established parties. The very membership of the party system changes when new parties come along and capture a meaningful share of the vote.

The distinction between established and new parties and the parallel distinction between within- and extra-system volatility is useful, but these dichotomies are too blunt for some purposes. A party does not transition from new to established the day after its first election. Accordingly, we created an intermediate category, young parties, defined as those that have competed at least once but not more than ten years. The ten-year cut-off point is arbitrary, but somehow capturing the intermediate category is useful.

Both extra-system volatility and the vote share of young parties are useful supplemental ways to measure party system institutionalization. If twenty percent of the electorate transfers their vote from one long-established party to another in a given election, this act does not unambiguously reflect markedly lower institutionalization than complete stability (i.e., 0 volatility) in aggregate voting patterns. If, however, twenty percent of the electorate shifts from an established party to a new one, institutionalization is clearly weaker.

Systems with high extra-system volatility are at the opposite end of the spectrum from "frozen" systems. With high extra-system volatility, voters cast their ballots for a party that did not previously exist.

We began by positing that the "frozenness" or fluidity of party systems depends on the value of established party labels to politicians and to voters and on the institutional barriers to the electoral success of new parties. The results support this theoretical perspective. Poor government performance as measured by rates of short-term economic

growth and by the perception of pervasive corruption opens the doors to new party competitors. In our main explanatory models (i.e., those that include most observations in the dataset, i.e., Tables 3 and 4), sluggish economic growth has a consistent impact on total volatility, extra-system volatility, and the vote share of young parties. With poor growth, voters get disgruntled, leading to high extra-system volatility. Poor growth not only produces retrospective voting against the incumbents, but also opens opportunities for new contenders. Based on a much smaller number of observations, the perception of pervasive corruption has very strong delegitimizing effects on the whole party system, making it easier for new parties to win votes.

The analysis based on the full set of observations supports the argument that when democracy was created has a strong influence on the electoral fortunes of new and young parties. In earlier competitive regimes, parties forged strong and enduring linkages to most voters. In the early twentieth century, they served as agents of political mobilization, successfully pushed for the incorporation of new citizens into politics, and even offered health and recreational benefits. Voters developed political identities closely connected to their parties. Voter attachments to parties have weakened slightly in recent decades in many of the advanced industrial democracies (Dalton and Waldon 2007), but parties remain crucial organizations in structuring the vote in these countries (see Bartels 2000 on the US).

In most later emerging competitive regimes, political elites have weaker incentives to invest in party building. Especially for executive posts, politicians can win election by campaigning through the mass media and by employing modern campaign consultants. Strong party organizations are typically less crucial to electoral success, so party labels are less valuable to politicians. Many politicians have won the presidency running on new (or nearly new) party labels: Alberto Fujimori of Peru (1990–2000), Fernando Collor de Mello of Brazil (1990–92), Vladimir Putin of Russia (1999–2008), Hugo Chávez of Venezuela (1999–present), Alejandro Toledo of Peru (2001–06), Alvaro Uribe of Colombia (2003–present), and Rafael Correa of Ecuador (2007–present). These presidents eschewed building a powerful party organization even after their election. In contrast, in the early decades of our dataset and the first forty-five years of the twentieth century, few successful presidential candidates ran on new party labels, except in cases

where a major expansion of the electorate enabled new parties to be successful. Presidents who did run on new party labels proceeded to invest in party building.

The fact that well-structured organizations are less essential to electoral victory makes it is easier and more attractive to start a new party. Once a new party forms, it is easier for it to win electoral support. In most later competitive regimes, parties have played a less central role in citizens' lives. Citizens are more willing to shift their vote to new contenders.

While the birth year of democracies has a strong impact on our dependent variables, the age of democracies has little impact (see also Tavits 2008b: 131; Mainwaring and Zoco 2007). Converse (1969) argued that citizens would gradually come to identify more with parties, but in many post-1978 competitive regimes they have instead become increasingly disgruntled with parties. The gradual development of stable linkages between voters and parties depends on conditions that do not exist in most of these regimes.

It seems intuitive that as a competitive regime ages and as citizens have more time to develop partisan linkages, electoral competition would become more stable, making it more difficult for new parties to succeed electorally. Our interpretation of the contrary finding is that in later democratizing countries, the positives and negatives of more extended party competition on the development of stable partisan loyalties offset one another. In many post-1978 competitive regimes, citizens became more disaffected with parties because of government failures (Mainwaring 2006). Parties and politicians in these low-quality competitive regimes engage in predation and patrimonial practices. Citizens feel defrauded by politicians and parties, and they are more likely to turn to new options. Sensing palpable citizen discontent, politicians are more willing to take the plunge and form (or join) a new party.

Political scientists have long expected that the competitive electoral market would work in some basic sense: representatives would deliver some acceptable combination of public goods, constituency service for the local community, and private benefits. Otherwise, they would get voted out of office. This combination of goods would stabilize the electoral market: citizens would develop allegiance to the parties that offered them the most attractive combination of benefits. In many post-1978 competitive regimes,

however, there seems to be a market failure. Large numbers of voters are disenchanted and disaffected with all existing parties. Rather than developing partisan allegiance over time, they continue to be floating voters if they vote at all. In these contexts, parties fail to generate the supply of public policies and constituency service that create voter loyalty. Citizens get disgruntled with the existing parties and look for new vehicles of representation.

The effective number of parties also affects the vote share of new and young parties. A high effective number of parties signals an open electoral market, typically with low entry barriers. In these contexts, it is easier for political elites to split off and risk forming new parties, and easier for citizens to believe that their vote will be meaningful if they support a new party.

Finally, union membership helps stabilize voters' linkages to parties and reduces the likelihood that voters will switch to a choice outside the system.

In sum, competitive regimes born later, high levels of perceived corruption, more fragmented party systems, competitive regimes with worse growth performance, and less unionized labor forces are favorable to the electoral success of new contenders. Older competitive regimes and those with fewer parties, competitive regimes with better performance in stimulating economic growth and in preventing corruption, and more unionized labor forces create daunting barriers to the success of new parties.

ENDNOTES

[1] These means are based on individual observations (electoral periods). N=271 for new parties and 258 for young parties for competitive regimes established by 1945.

[2] Electoral volatility is computed by adding the absolute value of change in the percentage of votes gained or lost by each party from one election to the next, and dividing by two so that gains and losses are not double counted. See Bartolini and Mair 1990; Bielasiak 2002; Birch 2003: 119–135; Caramani 2006; Chhibber and Nooruddin 2008; Gunther 2005; Lane and Ersson 2007; Madrid 2005; Mozaffar and Scarritt 2005; Pedersen 1979, 1983; Roberts and Wibbels 1999; Shamir 1984; Sikk 2005; Tavits 2005, 2008; Toka 1998.

[3] This is not to say that extra–system volatility is driven exclusively by voters' preferences. Elite decisions to form new parties are an essential part of extra–system volatility. Ultimately, however, voters make the decision to cast their ballots for a new entrant to the system or for a previously existing party.

[4] In the second election, the only parties that qualify as young also qualify as new. It would artificially suppress the vote share of young parties if we began measurement with the second election because in the second election, all young parties are also new parties. After the inauguration of a new competitive regime, only parties that were new in the second election or thereafter count as young parties. It would artificially inflate the values for the vote share of young parties if we counted the vote share of parties that were new in the founding election as "young" parties in subsequent elections. In the post-Soviet cases, essentially all parties would then count as "young."

[5] See Gurr et al. (1990) and Jaggers and Gurr (1995) on the Polity scores. They coded scales of institutionalized democracy and institutionalized autocracy. Both scales range from 0 to 10. We subtracted the autocracy score from the democracy score, thus creating a scale from –10 (highly authoritarian) to 10 (very democratic).

[6] We did not find complete electoral data for Benin and Mauritius, so we include partial results for those two countries.

[7] The number of observations for the share of the vote won by young parties is 539 because we record a score for this variable only in the second electoral period after the inauguration of a new competitive regime.

[8] In contrast, the correlations between within–system volatility and extra–system volatility (.01, n=588) or the vote share of young parties (.29, n=539) are low.

[9] It is not possible to calculate a log from a negative value. To minimize the number of missing cases, we assume that inflation below 1 percent per year including deflation has an impact on

electoral volatility that is indistinguishable from that of an inflation rate of 1 percent. We recorded all such cases as having a logged inflation of 0.

[10] The negative finding for the impact of inflation is consistent with Madrid (2005) and Roberts and Wibbels (1999) for Latin America, and with Mainwaring and Zoco (2007), but contrary to the findings of Tavits (2005) for post-communist Europe. These authors all use total volatility as their dependent variable.

[11] Bartolini and Mair (1990: 131–145), Pedersen (1983), Roberts and Wibbels (1999), and Tavits (2005) also found an impact of ENP on total volatility.

[12] For the 57 countries in our dataset that have a score for control of corruption in 1996, the 1996 score correlates at .97 with the 2002 score ($p<.001$). Therefore, interpolating back to 1991 seems very safe. Results were almost identical when we ran models without extrapolating the scores for control of corruption.

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