POlitical Catholicism in Revolutionary Mexico, 1900–1926

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ABSTRACT
This paper argues that the Mexican revolution played a formative role in the construction of modern Mexican Catholicism, while Catholic politics fundamentally shaped the outcome of the 1910 revolution. The argument analyzes several distinct but related moments and their constitutive movements. Catholic social and political movements sought to 1) restore religion to secular society, 2) govern, 3) protest revolutionary fiat, 4) confront anticlericalism, 5) mobilize emerging civil society in an era of mass politics through organized labor, and 6) ultimately channel this legacy of religious-based identity through defense leagues that opted for armed conflict over political negotiation. Catholic lay associations included the Guadalupan Workers, a vanguard movement of provincial intellectuals that operated between 1909 and 1914; the National Catholic Party, which competed electorally and governed in western Mexico between 1911 and 1914; sustained parish-based movements of protest, boycott, and civil disobedience in the western Mexican state of Jalisco between 1917 and 1919; a Catholic labor confederation, which organized urban and rural working people in competition with pro-government unions between 1920 and 1925; the Popular Union, a decentralized religious defense league that operated between 1924 and 1927; and the National League in Defense of Religious Liberty, which attempted to provide leadership for Catholic armed rebellion as of 1925 and beyond. The main conclusions concern the political grounding of religiosity, the weight of state-Church conflict, and the broader historical process of secularization as a main organizing concept for interpreting the Mexican revolution. In the end, I demonstrate how Catholic militants were central to the construction of a modern state in Mexico, a state that, ironically, would be defined by their exclusion as a political group.

RESUMEN
Este trabajo sostiene que la revolución mexicana tuvo un lugar central en la construcción del catolicismo mexicano moderno, a la vez que la política confesional determinó el desenlace de la revolución de 1910. El argumento analiza una serie de momentos, cada uno caracterizado por un movimiento social distinto pero ligado a través de una memoria colectiva de lucha religiosa. Los movimientos católicos de índole social y político buscaron 1) restaurar la religión a la sociedad secular; 2) gobernar; 3) desafiar la autoridad de los revolucionarios; 4) hacer frente al anticlericalismo; 5) movilizar la sociedad civil emergente a través de la sindicalización en una época de política de masas; y 6) canalizar la identidad religiosa a través de ligas de defensa que optaron por el conflicto armado por encima de la negociación política. Entre las asociaciones laicas incluidas en este trabajo, se encuentran los Operarios Guadalupanos, una vanguardia compuesta por intelectuales de provincia que trabajaron entre 1909 y 1914; el Partido Católico Nacional, que compitió en elecciones y gobernó en el centro occidente de México entre 1911 y 1914; movimientos parroquiales de protesta, boicot y desobediencia civil entre 1917 y 1919; una confederación de sindicatos confesionales que organizó a trabajadores rurales y urbanos entre 1920 y 1925; la Unión Popular, una liga descentralizada de defensa religiosa que dio cobijo a los militantes católicos entre 1924 y 1927; y la Liga Nacional Defensora de la Libertad Religiosa, organización que pretendió dirigir una eventual rebelión católica a partir de 1925. Las conclusiones tratan el fondo político de la identidad religiosa, el peso y forma del conflicto entre iglesia y Estado, y el proceso histórico de la secularización, visto como un concepto organizador central para la interpretación de la revolución mexicana. Al final, demuestro cómo fueron protagonistas los militantes católicos en la construcción de un Estado moderno en México, Estado que los excluiría, en tanto grupo, del proceso político construido por la revolución.
AN AGE OF SECULARIZATION

The French Revolution marked the start of a century-long crisis in Catholicism, and a multifaceted political struggle against the tenets of liberalism, socialism, and the emerging phenomenon of the secular nation-state. By the 1830s, secularization became a central issue in the formation of independent states in Latin America, many of which developed anticlerical policies that sought to curb Church privilege, carve out spheres of institutional differentiation, or even privatize religion. Across Western Europe, the revolutions of 1848 incited Vatican condemnation of the “perverse systems” of socialism and communism. As the Vatican became increasingly intransigent, liberal states responded in kind. In Mexico between 1854 and 1867, civil war and foreign military occupation violently altered the political terrain and destroyed the traditional conservative political elite; as a result, by the 1870s, liberals radically limited the wealth and power of the Church. At roughly the same time, Italian Republicans forged a nation at the expense of the Papal States, and anticlericalism became common across Western Europe. By the end of the century, an organized Catholic response emerged in the form of confessional political parties in many countries, including Belgium, the Netherlands, Austria, Germany, France, and Italy.

The crisis was general. Initially, the Vatican opted to retreat from the “public sphere” and reject secularism in favor of a model of “perfect” autonomy. The concept of a societas perfecta held that the Church did not rely on civil authority, but constituted a separate, autonomous authority in society parallel to the state. The 1864 “Syllabus” of modern errors condemned liberalism and progress, while mapping out a separate sphere in which Catholics might be protected from the secularizing world. In this controversial encyclical Pope Pius IX called for Catholics to reject all aspects of modern society: to retreat materially and spiritually from Western secularization. The Vatican policy sought to protect Catholics from liberalism, and eventually to reconquer, or re-evangelize society from below and beyond the liberal state. However, by the 1890s, Vatican policy would
take a new turn. Pope Leo XIII was critical of liberalism and socialism as his predecessor had been. However, he favored a different strategy, one that would actively seek to confront the problems of the time, to shape the political arena in the new century, and with extraordinary zeal, to plot out a religiously inspired model for society.

In 1891, Pope Leo published *Rerum Novarum*, his encyclical on the condition of workers. The letter’s tone was provocative: it invited Catholics to play an active role in the solution of society’s problems, and to reject liberalism and socialism as viable alternatives. The philosophic inspiration of Vatican policy was drawn from the thirteenth century, but the problems were novel. Thus, while the Church was faced with the separation of powers, the privatization of religion, the emergence of the individual, and the decline of corporate society, the pope sought answers in the theology of St. Thomas Aquinas. In *Rerum Novarum*, Pope Leo built on St. Thomas’s concept of society as a natural order, using it to criticize modern economic, political, and social arrangements. St. Thomas had written that the salvation of the spirit was tied to material life, and in particular, to community life. Derived from the work of Aristotle, his vision of community was defined in terms of political relations between thinking, reasoning actors. But contrary to nineteenth-century liberalism, Thomist society did not progress with individual interest as its motor. In fact, the notion of “progress” would have been strange for St. Thomas and, in any case, his interest lay in the “harmony” of society. This harmony should be the result of collaboration between individuals of different skills and rank, whose contribution was equally important for the common good. Rich and poor, employers and workers, statesmen and soldiers, men and women: all had a raison d’être and an ontologically stable identity in Thomist ideology. Their estates were as natural as their particular skills. For Pope Leo, … neither the talents, nor the skill, nor the health, nor the capacities of all are the same, and unequal fortune follows of itself upon necessary inequality in respect to these endowments.

The logic of a corporatist social body continued to resonate in Mexico, as in Europe, because the organization of society in terms of estates endured, in certain
This process, well into the nineteenth century. For Mexico, François-Xavier Guerra explained this in terms of the contradiction between a “modern” government and a “traditional” people. Fernando Escalante Gonzalbo brought irony to his characterization of reform-era Mexico as a country of “imagined citizens.” William H. Sewell, Jr. found a similar dilemma in revolutionary France; he argued that the “corporate idiom” of the old regime remained in the revolutionary discourse of 1848. The key, according to Sewell, was to understand how ideas and social forms proper to the French ancien régime (“traditional” in Guerra’s language) acquired new meaning and, therefore, could only be defined in time. In Mexico, an analogous process was evident, through which some Catholics sought to rescue a medieval language and organization, to construct a corporatist alternative to liberalism. Confronted with an emerging society of individuals, they sought to restore a corporatist harmony reminiscent of an idealized colonial golden age, dressed in the neo-Thomist language of the day. The harmony to which they referred was part of a utopian Christian imaginary. Catholic efforts to organize for greater harmony in early twentieth-century Mexico created a network of local parish-based associations that took to the political sphere following the 1911 fall of the Porfirio Díaz government. In doing so, they would transform the idea of Christian Democracy from its limited scope in the writing of Pope Leo to a broad movement indicative of early mass politics.

The form, goals, and meaning of Christian Democracy changed over time. As a result, one must distinguish between early twentieth-century experiences, in México as well as Europe, and the mature, party-based version that came to dominate much European (and some Latin American) politics during the latter half of the century. It will also be important to clarify the concept here, at the outset, because a main argument of this article has to do with how, when, and why it changed. Prior to 1910 Catholic activists organized locally, and stayed clear of politicizing issues. Catechism was a common topic of discussion; so was the evil of alcohol; voting was only discreetly mentioned. Little in 1910 suggested further-reaching developments in Mexican politics. Therefore, I argue that the emergence of organized, confessional, party politics in 1911 was a significant
departure from earlier social Catholicism\textsuperscript{12} as it had developed in response to Pope Leo’s call to address “the social question.” In short, the cycle of Mexican confessional-party politics was a consequence of revolution, emerging in 1911 only to collapse by 1914, when the armies of Venustiano Carranza and Alvaro Obregon installed anticlerical military governors in the states they controlled. Nevertheless, ten years later Central and Western Mexico had become home to a mass movement based on religious affiliation, and rooted in the same cities and towns where confessional party politics had been popular. But where did the term “Christian democracy” come from?

By the late 1880s, Leo XIII was probably working with the concept of “Christian democracy,” although the idea would become public currency only as of the 1901 encyclical, \textit{Graves di communi}, and then only with apparent reservation. An early formulation made by Pope Leo is found in a letter offering advice to Cardinal Manning at the time of the 1889 London dockers strike: “Oppose the socialists with popular Christian associations” he wrote, “it will depend on you that democracy be Christian; leave the sacristy, and go to the people.”\textsuperscript{13} This formulation seems circumstantial, yet it nicely frames the political position that would inspire postwar Christian Democratic parties in Europe, whose main rivalry came from socialist parties. It also seems to foreshadow the 1891 encyclical, \textit{Rerum novarum}, in an interesting way.

There are really two recommendations present in the Manning letter fragment. The first, in order of importance, is to leave the sacristy and take to the streets; the second is to oppose socialism by Christian means. This duality belies a preoccupation that can be found in both \textit{Rerum novarum} and \textit{Graves de communi}. Leo XIII wanted to mobilize Catholicism, but he was wary of underwriting local political movements. In \textit{Rerum novarum}, he would develop his most famous writing on the topic of how to take Catholicism “to the streets,” how priests should organize, how laity should participate, and what kind of goals were acceptable. Explicitly political goals were not. Ten years later, shortly before his death, Leo XIII finally released his position on Christian
democracy, in *Graves de Communi*. The text follows *Rerum novarum* closely by tailoring its arguments toward the social, where the author asserts that no censorship may reasonably come in reaction to efforts that merely seek to make the lives of working people more tolerable, both spiritually and materially.¹⁴ There is also, however, a warning:

> [It] would be a crime to distort this name of Christian Democracy to politics, for, although democracy, both in its philological and philosophical significations, implies popular government, yet in its present application it must be employed without any political significance, so as to mean nothing else than this beneficent Christian action in behalf of the people.¹⁵

The pope seemed to favor the term “Social Christians,” which was less likely to generate anticlerical backlash or a Catholic move toward the political sphere.¹⁶ In fact, the whole discussion of naming is set in opposition to “Social Democracy,” which is characterized in the letter as the type of society sought by socialism. Therefore, in contrast to Social Democracy, the pope would have Catholics promote Christian Democracy, the type of society sought by Christianity.

Catholic activists in Mexico tried unsuccessfully to work such positions into their own organizing, at least until the fall of Porfirio Díaz. After President Díaz’s 1908 interview with James Creelman, a journalist from the United States who wrote for *Pearson’s Magazine*, there was discussion among Catholic activists and intellectuals regarding the founding of a confessional party. Francisco Traslosheros addressed the issue in writing, saying he saw President Díaz as a liar, but that in any case Catholics should take him at his word and organize politically.¹⁷ Nevertheless, the prevailing attitude was to wait and see. Refugio Galindo wrote that, despite the admirable intentions of those who hoped for a Catholic electoral alternative, the only practical strategy was to limit themselves to encouraging like-minded men to run within the already established political channels.¹⁸ Purportedly, there was even an elaborate plan—written by the Jesuit Bernard
Bergoend and circulated among Catholic intellectuals like Miguel Palomar y Vizcarra—which laid out the foundation for a confessional political party. But the Catholic conventional wisdom of late Porfirian Mexico was to bide time. The 1911 collapse of the Díaz presidency changed the political landscape, and afforded Catholic militants the opportunity to organize a confessional party and formally compete in electoral politics.

Christian Democracy meant something particular to Catholic intellectuals and activists at the time, something that may be unclear and potentially confusing to modern readers. Its political genealogy stretches backward to include confessional parties formed in response to nineteenth-century anticlericalism in a host of European countries. It also stretches forward to include governing parties in many countries both in Europe and America. Stathis Kalyvas has argued convincingly that these two extremes are connected, and that Christian Democracy was transformed over a long period of time. From a religious project beholden to the Catholic Church, it became secular, independent, and politically popular. In Mexico, a similar phenomenon occurred on a smaller scale, in a shorter timeframe, and with explosive results, beginning with the social Catholic associations of late–Porfirian Mexico.

The focus of this paper is on the confessional project in Mexico that grew out of nineteenth-century Catholicism as it responded to the crisis of modern secularization. I will argue that an incipient confessional political program developed in Mexico, with its center in western Mexico’s Guadalajara Archdiocese. This program was articulated through a national political party that was successful in democratic elections, but unable to overcome the most reactionary elements in its national leadership. In the midst of civil war, a confessional political party proved unsustainable. However, as the armed struggle wound down, an alternative movement-based Catholic politics was built through lay associations that grouped women, youth, and workers under cover of a national umbrella organization that allowed for supra-local operations. Though initially successful, the movement eventually clashed with anticlerical governments and ultimately opted for armed struggle over nonviolent resistance and political negotiation.
My proposal is to put forth a comprehensive argument about the political grounding of religiosity, the weight of state-Church conflict, and the broader historical process of secularization as a main organizing concept for interpreting the Mexican revolution. The historiographic point of reference is Robert Quirk’s work of the mid-twentieth century, but such an argument has never been attempted by a scholar focusing primarily on Mexican laity as subjects and protagonists of the revolutionary period. Political Catholicism been seldom been considered as a central component of the history of the Mexican revolution.

Historiographically, the argument has benefited enormously from the work of Jean Meyer and Manuel Ceballos Ramírez. Meyer’s groundbreaking work on the Cristero rebellion created the field of contemporary religious history in Mexico. Nevertheless, Meyer’s work generally avoids the Mexican revolution, as it was understood thirty-five years ago. His argument ran against the grain of 1960s historiography, attempting to establish the religious rebellion of 1926–1929 as a counterweight to the official interpretations of the revolution. Although a brilliant strategy, the result was a historiography of the Cristero rebellion as outside the revolution. Similarly, Ceballos Ramírez’s work also falls outside the Mexican revolution. It treats the crucial period following the nineteenth-century liberal reforms, when clergy and laity reorganized the Church in society. Here I have tried to carry the careful detail of Ceballos Ramírez’s work up into the revolutionary period.

This paper attempts to place the Mexican revolution as a central event shaping modern Mexican Catholicism, even as Catholic politics played a formative role in the outcome of the 1910 revolution. Several contemporary authors have influenced the course of this argument. In a 1985 article, Alan Knight asked what had changed as a result of the 1910 revolution. Here I argue that a major change was the formation of a new system of political representation. Furthermore, to the extent that the political arena incorporated Mexican men as modern citizens following the revolution, it did so primarily by proscribing confessional politics. In this sense, the struggle for a Catholic politics,
waged through civic organizations between 1911 and the mid-1920s, was of tremendous influence. Moreover, the religious rebellion of the late 1920s ended any possibility of a civic Catholic politics.

Politics was also at the center of John Womack’s classic revisionist interpretation, in which he argued, first, that political management was more important than social revolution for characterizing Mexico after 1910, and second, that one need not dwell on social movements because their defeat was their most salient aspect. “The great issues,” he wrote, “were issues of state.”26 An important challenge to this statement may be found in the work of Mary Kay Vaughan27 and Gil Joseph and Daniel Nugent.28 Their work reveals the false dichotomy between politics and social revolution, and restores the relational character to analysis of the state, refusing to separate subaltern actors from a basic understanding of the politics of state formation. I will argue below that political management was indeed central to the outcome of the Mexican revolution, that Catholic men and women consistently attempted to negotiate rule with agents of the central state, and that they practiced citizenship within and beyond the parameters sanctioned by revolutionary fiat and the 1917 Constitution. In this manner Catholic militants were central to the construction of a modern state in Mexico, a state which, ironically, would be defined by their exclusion.

CONFESSIONAL POLITICS

For a decade prior to the revolution of 1910, Catholic clergy and laity organized numerous regional and national congresses to debate what they called “the social question.” These meetings set a strategy for Catholic expansion in civil society. The congresses provided a forum for ideological and strategy debates, and an arena in which Catholic laity and clergy designed the groundwork for a political party. Crafting a new vision and agenda, this social catholic leadership rapidly politicized the laity. From the 1903 Puebla conference, at which all “politics” were officially censored, to the 1911 launching of the National Catholic Party (Partido Católico Nacional, or PCN), these
congresses pushed Mexico’s social problems to the front of a Catholic political agenda. The national congresses were held at Puebla (1903), Morelia (1904), Guadalajara (1906), and Oaxaca (1909). Agricultural congresses were celebrated at Tulancingo (1904 and 1905), and Zamora (1906). Weeklong social seminars were celebrated at Puebla (1908), León (1909), and Mexico City (1910). The meetings analyzed the situations faced by Indians and rural and urban workers; participants addressed issues of land ownership, agrarian reform, literacy, the right to strike, the family wage, and alcoholism; and they combined these social issues equally with more clearly doctrinal themes such as the Eucharist, the rosary, and evangelization. Overall, they plotted out a political platform that was taken up—not without debate and dissent—after 1911 by the National Catholic Party.

In 1909 two new lay organizations were founded, and both discussed how and when to establish a Catholic political party. Each with its own leadership and territorial representation, the Guadalupan Workers (Operarios Guadalupanos, or OG) and the National Catholic Circle (Círculo Católico Nacional, or CCN) subsequently provided the institutional organization for National Catholic Party. The CCN was formed by well-connected Mexico City Catholics. As early as August 1909, Francisco Traslosheros expressed fear that socially conservative Catholics of the Mexico City economic elite would dominate this group. In contrast, the Operarios Guadalupanos were a network of social Catholics organized mostly across the cities and towns of central and western Mexico (generally, the states of Jalisco, Michoacán, Aguascalientes, Zacatecas, Colima, Guanajuato, Hidalgo, Puebla and Mexico). Dissatisfied with the proceedings of the 1909 National Catholic Congress, which was controlled by pro-Díaz bishops, six provincials met privately in Oaxaca to form a Marian study group with the idea that the social question ought to be treated through more active means (some argued openly for political participation), which they termed “Christian Democracy.” They identified themselves with the Marian cult, and used the initials OG (or OOGG to denote plurality) after their name in allusion to their secular order. Their founder, J. Refugio Galindo, was
the Tulancingo doctor who had organized the 1904 and 1905 agricultural congresses at the behest of Archbishop José Mora y del Río. According to Manuel Ceballos Ramírez, the OG founded over 100 groups in twenty states and federal territories between January 1909 and the end of 1911, with hundreds of members, including individuals and group members such as Catholic worker circles.33

Despite the official ban on Catholic political activism, the Operarios Guadalupanos openly discussed the issue in their written correspondence. By 1910, they had developed a one-man-one-vote system for processing their ideas, and they managed to execute this internally democratic process via letters sent monthly from each of the dozens of groups, and funneled to a rotating five-man directorate that was in charge of collecting the news and data from around the country and helping the OG president to put together the monthly newsletter.34 Considering the size and complexity of this task, the newsletters are a remarkable source of information regarding the interests and operations of this Catholic social organization. They reveal how the leadership was elected, how new members joined or were sought and recruited, and how proposals were made, discussed, and voted on.

In a five-page, single-spaced, typewritten analysis of the papal encyclicals written by Leo XIII, the Operarios Guadalupanos developed an explicit position regarding Church and state, and also what they called “la cosa publica” (political participation). In the document they embraced secularization, in the sense of separate spheres for Church and state; they pledged obedience to constituted political authority; opposition within all licit means when faced with state-policy encroachments on the rights of the institutional Church; and open political participation within any and all licit means.35 Among the debates leading up to, and the final conclusions of their first annual meeting, held in León, Guanajuato (1909), a proposal to field candidates for the 1910 elections was defeated; but they pledged to work in favor of a libertad practica del sufragio, essentially universal male suffrage, and to participate in the election process by promoting the campaigns for public office by social Catholic candidates, men with ideas similar to their own, or preferably, men belonging to their immediate circle of activists.36
The OG functioned as a vanguard association with an intense intellectual presence, manifest through members’ writing, and a highly decentralized structure. Activities focused on promoting social action in its different forms. Dr. Galindo, as president, preferred local cells to have no more than five or six members, and ideally less, although the OG did occasionally seek out “collective” members, particularly parish-based worker societies. As early as July 1909, cells as far afield as Oaxaca, Puebla, Hidalgo, and Chihuahua were cultivating collective memberships by incorporating mutualist societies, artisan and worker circles, some even with their own newspapers. From this early point in time, two years prior to Francisco Madero’s initial call for revolution in Mexico, there is a tension in Catholic lay organizing. The OG worked like a vanguard party, but had already started to experiment with organizational forms that would open the movement more to the logic of mass politics. In these exercises, one can find the roots of National Catholic Party organization and success.

Nearly seventy percent of the membership was laity, and the rest was clergy. Of the priests, a few were diocesan administrators, but most were parish priests, their assistants, or professors from seminaries and other educational institutions. The OG were involved in, and promoted, social projects where they lived (or elsewhere when they were invited), but much energy was spent studying and planning. They circulated a monthly newsletter, and each member had a monthly obligation to report on his activities, generally to five of his comrades in different parts of the country. Many wrote for local newspapers, and some were newspaper editors or owners, with circulation covering many cities, including Guadalajara, Puebla, Aguascalientes, Tulancingo, Zamora, Chihuahua, León, Sahuayo, Ciudad Guzmán, Villanueva (Zac.), Orizaba, Cocula, and Ixtlan del Rio. Larger cities often had more than one Catholic newspaper affiliated with the OG. Other members were involved in founding new schools, and common activity involved such issues as convincing couples living out of wedlock to marry, or protesting theater or press deemed immoral.
Within this broad network of activists, Guadalajara emerged as the intellectual and organizational center of the movement due to the successful organizational skills and intellectual contributions of Miguel Palomar y Vizcarra, Luis B. de la Mora, Felix Araiza, Nicolás Leaño, Canon Miguel de la Mora, and others. A committed activist, Miguel de la Mora would soon become Bishop of Zacatecas; moreover, Palomar y Vizcarra was probably the most celebrated Mexican Catholic intellectual of his day. Following up on a suggestion made by Refugio Galindo, Archbishop José Mora y del Rio of Mexico City supported a proposal to have the Guadalajara group edit and publish a social Catholic magazine that was distributed across the country through the OG network. The magazine was called *Restauración Social* and was published between 1909 and 1913. In it, the Operarios Guadalupanos and their guests debated everything from the importance of historical and religious figures like Agustin de Iturbide and the Virgen of Guadalupe, to emerging issues of social welfare, such as the family wage and just salary. Until the 1914 collapse of party-based confessional politics, the Operarios Guadalupanos would be most numerous throughout Jalisco, with more than 100 members constituting over twenty groups in as many cities and towns.

Throughout 1909 and 1910, the OG studied, debated, and organized. In Jalisco, where Palomar y Vizcarra and his cohorts had several years of experience, the plans developed quickly. In Tapalpa and Arandas the first two rural credit and savings cooperatives were opened, the first toward the end of 1909, and the second in July of the following year. Known by the surname of its German inventor and propagator, the *caja Raiffeisen* was promoted by the OG as a means of combating rural usury by making cheap credit available to smallholders. In Mexico, its most zealous promoter was Palomar y Vizcarra. At the age of twenty-three he was responsible for introducing the Raiffeisen cooperative to the 1903 Puebla Catholic Congress; over the intervening years he had carried his message across the country and back. In 1909, the first Raiffeisen bank was established and named for his grandfather, José Palomar, founder of Atemaja’s *La Prosperidad Jalisciense* textile mill and noted nineteenth-century philanthropist.
Tapalpa and Arandas initiatives were moderately successful, making loans that were used for planting, construction, and in one case to avoid foreclosure by a non-Catholic credit institution.45

The 1911 founding of the National Catholic Party (PCN) coincided with the resignation of President Díaz. At that time, the National Catholic Circle elite from Mexico City formed the party leadership and monopolized the executive committee, but recruited the OG to write up party statutes and collaborate on a political platform. As a result, the party commenced with a program formed in the image of European confessional parties, but relied on a political leadership schooled in the obsolete liberal Catholic tradition of Porfirian Mexico.46 In countries as diverse as Italy, Germany, Austria, Belgium, and The Netherlands, confessional parties were already immersed in a process of secularization, and an effective split from Church tutelage. In México, such efforts had mixed results, and ultimately failed, at least in the short-run.47

Comprised of Porfirista, Reyista, and Maderista factions, the PCN struggled to define its political position and agree upon presidential and vice-presidential candidates for the October elections. At the first PCN convention, delegates discussed three possible electoral strategies. It could either opt out of the electoral process in order to further organize the party structure, field its own candidates, or throw its support behind an external candidate such as Francisco Madero, following the logic that in exchange they would gain political favor. Madero was a realistic possibility for two basic reasons. First, because he was extremely popular, and the PCN leadership was sure he would win. So, on grounds of pragmatism, the choice made sense. Second, he had made fairly explicit overtures to the Catholics. On receiving the PCN program in Ciudad Juárez, he sent word by telegraph to the party leaders in the capital that he considered the Mexican Catholic Party “the first accomplishment of our recently conquered liberties.” He went on to point out that all points in the PCN program but one were also included in his own political platform.48 So, on the grounds of principle, he was not antagonistic, and might prove to be supportive of Catholic interests. The party convention decided not to field its own
candidates, but left open the possibility of an alliance. Eduardo J. Correa put it this way: the PCN was strong enough to make a considerable contribution in the election of an external candidate like Madero, but not strong enough to field one of its own candidates and win.⁴⁹ Thus, Madero was a pragmatic and opportunistic choice.

The voting was fairly even, but most delegates supported a ticket with Madero as the presidential candidate. The second-place candidate, supported by the National Catholic Circle, was Francisco León de la Barra, the interim president. Going against its decision not to field its own candidates, the PCN had decided to run de la Barra as the vice-presidential candidate. De la Barra was conservative and openly Catholic, politically and ideologically close to the Mexico City-based Catholic lay-leadership. However, he had also said that he was not interested in running. Nevertheless, the party leaders split their decision, adopting the external candidate, Madero, but fielding de la Barra, one of their own, for the vice-presidency. Madero asked them to reconsider, and support his official running mate, José Maria Pino Suárez. Again, Correa’s dispassionate commentary is helpful: Pino Suárez was seen as a radical liberal, whose ideas were frankly opposed to those of the PCN, and it was a stretch to suppose that the Catholic leadership could support him. In any case, the politically mature decision, Correa argued, would have been to negotiate their support for Madero’s ticket in exchange for concessions that might soften Pino Suárez’s influence on basic issues of interest to the Catholics.⁵⁰ After all, de la Barra had made clear that he would not be a candidate in the first place. However, Madero and the PCN both were convinced that Catholic voters would support the PCN candidates. This led the party leadership to a false sense of strength, just as it led Madero to put special emphasis on the need for a complete alliance.

Ultimately, anti-Madero elements among the PCN leadership made it clear to Madero that Pino Suárez was not an acceptable option, and that party support for Madero’s own candidacy would not be unconditional. Thus, even before the October elections, Madero and the PCN were becoming estranged. However, the elections would
eventually correct these misconceptions. Madero won the presidency; Pino Suárez won the vice-presidency; but the National Catholic Party also won important elections in some states. So, on one hand, Catholics did not unconditionally support the PCN, and on the other hand, the PCN ticket did win in some states. It turned out that their success was due less to Catholic unity, and more to the strength of the party organization locally. This was particularly clear in Jalisco, where the Madero-de la Barra ticket prevailed, despite Madero’s endorsement of Pino Suárez and despite de la Barra’s stated rejection of his own candidacy.

Supporters of a confessional party were moved by the notion of social reform, by the possibility of constructing a Catholic politics, or by a combination of both ideas. Jalisco was the most successful state, but the OG and PCN were present throughout West Central Mexico. The nineteenth-century conservative debacle and the anticlerical legislation of the 1857 constitution conditioned the behavior of political Catholics and as a result they were slow to participate openly, as Catholics. During 1909–1910 the OG diligently organized throughout the Mexico-Guadalajara corridor and beyond. But their efforts were directed outside the political sphere, and mostly self-contained within the recognized spaces of parochial life. As such they went undetected for the most part. Only in 1911 would the effects of their work begin to register publicly; and by 1912, the main areas of OG organizing would elect PCN activists, many of whom belonged to the Operarios Guadalupanos. Newspapers like El Luchador Católico would tap into the OG social network to drum up support for PCN candidates, get out the vote, and denounce interference or the uncivic behavior of anticlericals when it threatened to obstruct Catholic politics. Such was the case in 1912 when several hundred señoras and señoritas from Zapotiltic Jalisco published a letter of protest regarding several men who tried to impede the speech of a PCN candidate. It is important to note here that Catholic politics was a pathway for women’s participation in the public sphere, at a time when women were not yet voting citizens.
THE NATIONAL CATHOLIC PARTY

The main historical legacy of the PCN is its collusion with the Huerta government following the military coup in which President Madero and Vice-President Pino Suárez were assassinated. In Mexico City, the PCN leadership provided a veneer of legitimacy to the coup in exchange for Huerta’s promise that they would be awarded 100 seats in Congress and that results of the October presidential election would be upheld if their candidate were to win. In the words of José C. Valadés, Huerta engaged in “political theater” and was only interested in buying time and perhaps the added measure of legitimacy that the PCN all too willingly provided. Whether the result of political naivety, or unbridled cynicism, the PCN bought into Huerta’s promises. Yet by autumn of 1913, it became clear that Huerta was unlikely to hold elections. In January of the following year, the Huerta regime began to shut down the political spaces open to the PCN, and had the party president, Gabriel Fernández de Somellera, arrested and exiled. The party dissolved even before the military defeat of the Huerta regime. Finally, the armies loyal to Venustiano Carranza took over much of the country, and generally treated the PCN remnants as part and parcel of the Huerta regime.

How did the PCN get there? How did a party that started out looking a lot like the first modern political party in Mexico end up the unhappy prop to a dictatorship? Why did it disappear in 1914, almost as suddenly as it had appeared in 1911? What kind of popular support did it have? Were there anti-Huerta elements in the party? All of these questions are important, because the PCN was founded in one political moment, became successful electorally in another, and was destroyed in yet a third moment, all within a three-year period.

The elections of 1911 and 1912 constituted a unique political experiment in Mexican history, and in general, ought to be recognized as one of the few great contributions of the Madero period. In the case of Jalisco, the PCN records that were preserved by Miguel Palomar y Vizcarra offer ample evidence that the party was building a network of support stretching across the state. To be sure, not all was modern
democratic practice: in the highland region, Carlos L. Corcuera rounded up the personnel on his estate and had them all go into town to vote for the Catholic party, in an exercise rife with “traditional sociabilities.”

But this is not indicative of the broader trend. In town after town, local PCN groups sprang up, pleaded for printed copies of the party program and statutes, of speeches delivered by party leaders, and of Palomar’s writings on rural credit institutions. Local activists from the villages wrote letters to the Guadalajara leadership asking its advice regarding innumerable matters, even as they debated how best to confront other candidates and local caciques. However, the party was not well organized everywhere, as its activists’ letters sometimes indicated. Moreover, organizing the party was often quite difficult, as is poignantly expressed in a letter sent by a PCN activist to Palomar y Vizcarra. The author had been recently jailed for his political activity. On release, he left the lakeside town of Cajititlán to develop support for the party in San Cristóbal de la Barranca, near the Zacatecas border. There, he found himself in precarious territory:

I often cover long distances on foot in order to reach the ranches here, as traveling on horseback is difficult. I have found myself traversing the river on foot, my clothing all bundled up on top of my head so as not to get it wet. On more than a few occasions I have been at risk of falling from a cliff, you see, here the footpaths run through canyons and more canyons.

The fact that the villages were mobilized for elections in the first place was noteworthy, because Porfirian elections had not only been fixed, but were sometimes a complete fiction. François-Xavier Guerra has cautioned that the Porfirian electoral system followed a peculiar logic and reflected a different power structure than that which was on display during the 1912 Maderista elections. During the Díaz regime, elections were more often a ceremony celebrating the successful implantation of official candidates than an exercise in popular sovereignty. In such circumstances, only the cities and larger towns
might actually have ballot boxes, like the one described by the US consular representative at Guadalajara:

I think it was 1904— that a Presidential election was being held on a Sunday. A vacant house just opposite the Kipp home was being used as a voting booth. I asked Mrs. K. to have the place closely watched, to ascertain as nearly as she could, the number of votes that might be cast. On my last visit about 6 P.M., I asked if a strict count had been kept of the number of voters. She said yes; that she and her servants had kept a close watch all day long, and that not one person had been seen to enter the voting booth. And this, you will remember, was in one of the most populous sections of the city. Just as I was leaving the Kipp home, I saw the “election judge” (there was only one, and he wore a soldier’s uniform) take up his chair, the supposed ballot box, and a tripod table and walk away. In all of the papers the next day there appeared flaming accounts of the election, telling that Don Porfirio Díaz had been unanimously elected to succeed himself as President!!

These comments concern elections in a middle-class neighborhood near the center of the city. As always, it is prudent to ask whose description is in the balance. In fact, Dr. Davis may have been ill-prepared culturally to appreciate the complexities of Mexican society. Yet his story is plausible. Guerra refers to other cases during the Porfiriato in which the inmates at the local prison were in charge of filling out the electoral ballots. In still other cases people showed up to vote, found their votes already made for them, and took it all in stride, presumably content that the system worked and provided stability. Such examples were fundamentally different than the 1912 elections, because they reflected a system in which there was not supposed to be political pluralism. The Maderista elections, to the contrary, reveal a diversity of actors. Even so, Guerra estimates that average voter turnout was about 12 percent nationally, and as high as 50...
percent in the center-west. The variation between 12 and 50 percent is wide, and Guerra does not offer a more detailed explanation; but certainly this data suggests the importance of local factors. The most important of such factors in Jalisco seems to have been the breadth and success of local PCN organizing.

Between the summer of 1911 and the end of 1912 Jaliscans were called to vote, as republican citizens and individuals, on six separate occasions. During this fourteen-month period they voted for: 1) president and vice-president; 2) for mayor; 3) for the reestablishment of the 23rd state congress (partial term); 4) for both houses of the federal congress; 5) for governor; and finally 6) for the 24th state congress (full term) as well as new municipal governments. This new public, civic competition was evidently popular, but no parties had any sort of statewide organizational infrastructure. Political parties, in a modern sense, were as new as the concept of electoral competition. Porfirian political campaigns had been carried out via a candidate around whom small support groups formed for a few months and then disappeared until the next elections. On occasions they might publish a newspaper briefly, before the elections. The newspaper that supported Manuel Ahumada during the 1906 gubernatorial campaign first appeared a few months prior to the elections, announcing itself as the official campaign newspaper. After the elections it disappeared. All told, it was published for six months.

Although there were no established parties, the PCN organized very quickly across the state. Such organization was unheard of and was possible for two reasons. First, the Catholic Church had a statewide presence, maintained through the network of parishes. But the diocesan network could work as a double-edged sword. For example, when Ireneo and Francisco de Sales Quintero made the trip out to Mascota in western Jalisco, they were pleased to find a well-organized social base awaiting the arrival of PCN leadership. Here the local Workers’ Society, a parish-based association, had existed prior to the call for elections and accepted the PCN as a collaborator. A similar case awaited Agustín Navarro Flores in Tototlán, near Guadalajara in central Jalisco. There
he was greeted by the local priest, Father Donanciano Rubalcava, who called a meeting of the parish workers’ circle. More than 120 attended, and took on the commitment of organizing the PCN local there.62

Nevertheless, a Catholic political campaign was a novel idea, and not all parishes, or priests, were ready for it or accepting of it. Located in the highland region northeast of Guadalajara, Tepatitlán was quite active on the many issues of social Catholicism, and would be a bulwark of the Cristero rebellion after 1926. But during the PCN era, the lay leaders seemed to regularly come up against the opposition of local priests. In 1912 the Workers’ Society decided to enlist the support of a layman, a “capitalist” who would be restricted to caring for the financial aspects of the association. They had first solicited the sponsorship of the parish priest, who read the society statutes and responded, “you each will have a voice and a vote, but when I speak you all will obey.”63 The group, with 200 membership pledges, decided that it was preferable to seek the moral authority of a well-to-do layman than give up their just rights as members. The leaders, who belonged to the PCN, realized they would likely lose a part of their membership, but were not willing to turn over complete control of the organization to the priest. Two years later, one of the same party leaders sought the removal of the parish priest after he tried to impose his own list of candidates for the upcoming municipal elections:

We were studying the possible candidates for the city government, and a prominent member of the party appeared. Without explanation, he turned over a piece of paper with a list of names that he said would be our candidates. One of the committee members said that they would be subject to discussion, and if they prevailed, the committee would have no problem supporting them. At that, the prominent party member snapped back that he had not come to have his list discussed, but to have it accepted. This generated a commotion among the committee members…. [Then], the member who had brought the list revealed
that the parish priest had summoned him, handed him the list, and told him that these were the candidates that he willed. The majority of the committee members, except for three, were opposed to proceeding in that manner, and . . . . when the priest found out, he became so angry that he said he himself would contact the state party officials and ask them to authorize him to form a new committee, obedient and submissive before parochial authority . . . . Fortunately the national leadership decided to abstain from participating in the elections, and things calmed down . . . . No comment.64

The second reason the PCN organized quickly was that social action campaigns had included the laity in parish-based organizations, and created new communication and contacts across the archdiocesan network where they had not existed before. Archbishop of Guadalajara José de Jesús Ortiz had had a favorable attitude towards social action as well as the parish reform mandated by the 1899 Latin American Council in Rome, in which he had participated.65 So by 1911, the jump from Marian Congregations, social study circles, worker circles, health care services, and moral theater to a political campaign was not an impossible leap. I have already offered examples of social action initiatives that were linked to the expanding political base of the party. Undoubtedly, such collaboration was greatly facilitated by the OG, who had founded local groups by 1911 in many parts of the state, and who maintained constant communication through their newsletter as well as the monthly magazine, Restauración Social, both of which promoted social issues and the National Catholic Party. As of 1911, members of the Jalisco OG were traveling across the state to bring their ideas and organizing expertise to the towns and villages. Agustín Navarro, Ireneo Quintero, Francisco Arrieta, and J. Encarnación Preciado were among them. They continued right up into the summer of 1914, well after the OG and PCN had run their course. In June of that year, Preciado wrote to Palomar from Tapalpa, in southern Jalisco, to suggest they develop an agrarian
reform policy that included the parceling up of large haciendas, in exchange for long-term indemnification of the owners through a system of bonds paid by those who would receive land.

Despite many problems, the Jalisco PCN was better organized than its opposition, and in Guadalajara this was most clear. The October 1911 presidential race offers a good example. Madero and Pino Suárez were not chosen in direct elections, but by an electoral college. In other words, votes were not cast for candidates, but for parties. And in each electoral district the parties had to have a representative to cast that district’s vote, similar to the way presidents are elected in the US. This was a complex system, which included 216 districts (or precincts) in Guadalajara alone. Prior to the election, the PCN published and circulated a list with the names of every elector in the city, including the smaller satellite populations of Huentitán el Alto, Huentitán el Bajo, and the Atemajac Textile Factory. In 211 districts (97.7 percent), the PCN was able to field electors. The names on the list are local, corresponding to people living in each and every neighborhood. Hypothetically, a voter would find his district on the list, recognize the name of his neighbor who was the party representative, and get the party line from him. The elector would be the party’s official at the balloting place where the neighbor would have to vote. The speed with which the party assured its presence across the city is surprising, but even more so is that the system actually worked. It is unthinkable that the PCN would have been able to create such a presence without the parish structure, because it provided a system of identifying traditional authority figures. Moreover, the parish structure was primed through a decade of social action organizing. This, for one, explains why de la Barra swept Jalisco: voters did not have to deliberate over candidates, but choose their party’s elector. The electors would vote for them.

Even so, PCN organizing was not always successful, for a variety of reasons, including resistance from preexisting political groups often in the form of cacicazgos, patron-client networks underwriting the power of a local boss or perhaps a hacienda
owner. During the November 1911 mayoral elections, for example, the Catholics lost most of the races. I have argued above that the party was not well organized in some towns, but there were also cases of voter intimidation by local caciques. In Tamazula, for example, PCN activists were jailed when they went to vote, and the liberal opposition spread the word that other Catholics that attempted to vote would be jailed as well. Another form of intimidation consisted in using the local tax office to fine PCN supporters arbitrarily, based on invented crimes. In Tapalpa, the Catholic party candidate won, but was promptly detained by a group of his opponent’s supporters. In this case the parish priest, Jesús Hueso, was able to use his authority to negotiate the release of the detained candidate. In correspondence, Catholic activists expressed frustration with the way the elections were manipulated, but dismissed it as their own lack of experience. Instead of protesting the outcome, the Guadalajara leadership decided to prepare for the January 1912 state congressional elections ten weeks later, in hopes of guaranteeing that the balloting would be unhindered. This time they won all twelve seats in the Jalisco legislature.

Although the Jalisco PCN became quickly successful in terms of electoral victory, voter intimidation continued to be common. During the June 1912 elections for the Federal Congress, many reported abuse at the hands of local bosses or political opponents. In Tamazula, which had previously reported problems, the local cacique organized roving bands of armed thugs and announced that voters would be conscripted into the army. As a result voter turnout was under 10 percent. Even still the PCN only lost by a slim margin. In northwestern Jalisco, the June congressional elections were not held in Hostotipaquillo, because the municipal president, Julian Medina, refused to allow the balloting places to open. By contrast, in the highland town of Tepatitlán, where the PCN governed, the municipal president was suspended from office, and a group of supporters including his son were thrown in jail on the eve of the elections. Four months later, the Guadalajara leadership had successfully negotiated the liberty of the jailed activists, but the ex-municipal president had yet to be informed of the “crime” for which
he had been thrown out of office. In at least one case, charges of voter intimidation were leveled against the Catholics. In the highland town of Arandas, the Liberal candidate, Dr. Marcelino Alvarez, demanded the elections be nullified, claiming that the PCN had coerced voters by warning them that they would incur divine punishment were they to vote against religion. The PCN representative, Dr. José Maria Martínez, denied the charges, and as Alvarez offered no proof and the PCN had received 80 percent of the votes, no further action was taken.

Huerta’s coup, the assassination of the president and vice-president, and the establishment of a military dictatorship in Mexico City were a watershed. In that moment of crisis, however, three responses emerged: armed resistance; alliance with the Huerta regime; and a course of political opposition within the preexisting order. In the Plan de Guadalupe, Venustiano Carranza argued that constitutional order had been destroyed by the coup, and therefore, the only possible opposition was armed resistance. Chihuahua was a good example of this logic. Madero’s governor was brutally assassinated and the hacendados went on the offensive against the Maderistas: there was little or no room for a political solution. However, such was not the case everywhere, and in many regions of the country, things were less polarized, while at the same time they functioned with a degree of independence vis-à-vis the central state. Yet because the Carrancistas eventually prevailed militarily, historians generally adopt this position, leaving all political opposition in the uncomfortable circumstance of appearing as Huertista lackeys. But at the time, Carranza’s victory was far less obvious. Political opposition by way of upholding the institutions that were established during the Madero administration did not automatically mean capitulation to Huerta.

One must ask what Huertismo meant, in practical terms, in a state like Jalisco, with a tradition of political conflict vis-à-vis Mexico City. The Jalisco Maderistas did not suffer the fate of their comrades in Chihuahua. Huerta was from Jalisco, but he did not have a strong following there. Nor was there a clear-cut hacendado class that opposed the
Maderista reforms, as was the case in Morelos or Chihuahua. In Jalisco, unlike Morelos, there was a fairly solid urban middle class, made up of professionals and merchants. It filled the gap left by the ousted Porfirian political elite, and while Madero did not universally satisfy it, neither did it feel bound by Huerta. There was also an agrarian middle sector in parts of the state, while there were few large estates comparable to those of the north, and few Indian communities comparable to those in the south. Haciendas and independent communities existed, but they were not nearly so polarized in Jalisco as in other parts of the country.\textsuperscript{72}

The emerging political class was not familiar with Carranza, and Obregón, who eventually would occupy the state militarily, was unknown. There was some support for Félix Díaz, and more perhaps for Francisco León de la Barra; there were enclaves of armed support that followed the cue of the northern rebels, and there was the Catholic party, which controlled many municipal governments and the state congress. It had also hoped to control its civilian candidate to the governor’s office, with limited results. Only in 1914, when governor López Portillo y Rojas was called to Mexico City to take a ministerial position in Huerta’s cabinet, did the military dictatorship become an unavoidable, daily reality in Guadalajara. It was then that General José María Mier was sent by Huerta to take charge of the governor’s office and the Western Division of the Federal Army, in preparation for the probable advance of Obregón’s rebel army.

The Jalisco PCN was convinced that a political solution was possible, and that it was preferable to a renewed civil war. In the end the armed rebellion prevailed, and the National Catholic Party was consumed by the revolution.\textsuperscript{73} But this was not yet clear in 1912 or even in 1913, and Jalisco was a staging ground in which the political transition seemed convincing and successful in the short run. It failed, ultimately, because of events that occurred in Mexico City.

Nevertheless, it is important to note that the PCN participated as a modern political actor. However, its limited experience with legislative reform did not suggest theocratic radicalism, but democratic republicanism. PCN activists were democratic
in their attempts to mobilize society in support of their political movement, and republican in their use of state power to guarantee a minimum plurality in Congress and a minimum of wealth for society’s less fortunate. It is also true that a priority of the national leadership was to repeal the anticlerical articles of the 1857 Constitution. The only step taken in that direction by the Jalisco PCN was its education reform, which permitted those who had studied in private schools to have their studies recognized by the state. There was no effort to do away with the political separation of Church and state, although, in practice, there may have been less enforcement of the reform laws regarding public worship.

In retrospect, the PCN belongs to the Maderista interlude, not properly part of the old regime, but unable to adapt to the new realities of revolutionary Mexico. The PCN ultimately disappeared, but not before transforming the idea and practice of Christian democracy in Mexico. In 1914, Catholic activists abandoned the political sphere, but preserved an organizational infrastructure built on the system of parish networks. By 1917 it would provide new platforms for Catholic politics.

**REVOLUTIONARY ANTICLERICALISM**

Beginning in July 1914, the Sonoran revolutionaries and the leadership of the Guadalajara archdiocese became entrenched in what might be considered a war of position. The Carrancista press told of a revolutionary crusade against clerical privileges and abuse; the archdiocese saw it as a campaign to wipe out the Catholic Church as a viable institution in Mexican society. Both claims were exaggerated, but such was the expediency of propaganda. Confronted by an army, the archdiocese discovered that it possessed a method of defense, or resistance, that would become quite important for its survival in the coming years: the indignation of laity, of different social strata, sexes, and generations, civilians who were less interested in the details of constitutional restoration than in the attacks against their customs. For them, “los revolucionados” in Luis González’s colloquialism, the arrival of the Sonoran revolutionaries meant “savage
crimes, robbery, kidnappings, hanging corpses, ravished women, and religious images stripped of their ‘milagros.’”

The initial Carrancista assault on the Catholic Church was broad sweeping: Guadalajara, Tepic, Durango, Monterrey, Ciudad Victoria, Tampico, Veracruz, and Mexico, to name some of the major cities. The Carrancista generals jailed the priests, occupied churches, seminaries, and schools, and shut down the Catholic press. In early July, Division General Álvaro Obregón destroyed the Federal Army division commanded by Huerta’s governor in Jalisco, General José María Mier, and replaced him with Manuel M. Diéguez. In Guadalajara, Vicar General and Governor of the Archdiocese Manuel Alvarado sent Carranza a list of the religious sites that the army occupied as barracks beginning 8 July, 1914: the buildings that housed the Seminary Major and Minor, the Sacred Heart College for boys and girls, the Holy Spirit Vocational School, the Exercise Houses at Saint Sebastian of Analco, Our Lady of Guadalupe, and Our Lady of Afflictions. Later the archbishop’s residence, the printing press of the Catholic daily, El Regional, and all Catholic schools affiliated with the ecclesiastic administration were seized. According to Alvarado’s estimates, the education of 20,000 children was interrupted, many of whom received free food and clothing, and almost all of whom received free instruction.

Important aspects of the tactics adopted by Carrancista military governor Diéguez during the fall of 1914 were meant to weaken or destroy common religious symbols. The military government removed the “Ave María” customarily inscribed above the doorways of houses, stores, tenements, middle and grade schools; and the saints disappeared from streets, plazas, markets, and towns. In a vivid example of symbolic, if pragmatic, violence, the 13th Battalion of Sonora supplied its drum corps with 300-year-old parchment from the cathedral choral books to repair its drums. But the main focus, as suggested by the initial occupation of Guadalajara, was on the templos, or church buildings, and their pastors. For the Carrancista leadership, establishing government and
forging a new society belonged to a process of cultural, as much as political, revolution. For men like Diéguez, the “battlefield of ideas” was as important as the military battlefield, and they understood that in order to win in such difficult terrain, they must control the forums as well as the voices of dissent. As a result, the churches and their pastors became a site of struggle, one which Catholic Guadalajara would not easily abandon.

The tensions between Church and state were refocused through certain of the debates at the 1916 Querétaro Constitutional Congress. Several articles in the 1917 Constitution caused immediate concern to the Church, and from their exile in Texas, the Mexican bishops protested the restrictions of the new Constitution. Their disagreement was focused in the following areas: Article 3, which prohibited religious schools; Article 5, which established that the state would not recognize religious vows, equating them with forms of servitude or slavery and arguing that no one, voluntarily or involuntarily, may cede their freedom; Article 13, which denied legal institutional status to religious organizations; Article 27, which prohibited religious associations from owning or acquiring property and established that all churches were to be considered the property of the nation; and Article 130, which established that the state would exercise final authority above and beyond any other institution regarding religious worship.80

The anticlerical articles of the 1917 Constitution dominated Church-state relations and the strategies of the political Catholicism for the next ten years. Initially, however, the conflicts were played out regionally between state governments and the dioceses. This was partially because, once president, Carranza was inclined to play down the Church-state antagonisms by not enforcing the anticlerical content of the new Constitution. Similarly, the Mexican Episcopate officially pushed conciliation and cooperation. However, among the Carrancista governors, as well as the bishops, there were widely divergent positions. In this regionally defined context the first important confrontation occurred in Jalisco in 1918, involving Governor Manuel Bouquet, Jr. and Archbishop Francisco Orozco y Jiménez.81 The historical relevance of the episode is that it involved
the same issue that triggered the Cristero rebellion, with the difference that Church and state were able to come to a political solution. Eight years hence, in 1926, this would no longer be possible.82

The conflict centered on the decision of the state government to interpret and apply Article 130 of the 1917 Constitution. The legislation was known as Decree 1913, and it restricted all religious associations to one priest and one church per 5,000 faithful, while requiring all religious “professionals” (i.e., priests, ministers) to be licensed by the state government.83 The law was framed by a general government policy of subordinating all aspects of religious life and practice to civil authority. Such campaigns of institutional differentiation are not unique to Mexico, by any means. However, they are apt to provoke angry response from the religious faithful, who interpret them as an assault on their traditions. As is often the case, the devil is in the details.84

The problem was not simply legal, but political, and General Diéguez seems to have recognized this. Two days after the publication of Decree 1913, Archbishop Orozco y Jiménez was arrested in Lagos de Moreno by Lieutenant Colonel Leopoldo Ortiz, acting on orders from Diéguez. The following day General César López de Lara arrived at Lagos by train from Michoacán, and escorted the archbishop to Tampico. Several times along the way the archbishop’s defenders obtained amparos, legal restraining orders against his detention and forced exile, but each time the military refused to abide by them. In Tampico, he was charged with treason and strongly advised to leave the country, which he did.85 In Chicago for the next year, Orozco y Jiménez was the distinguished guest of Monsignor Francis C. Kelley, author of a 1915 diatribe against the Mexican revolutionaries, *El libro de rojo y amarillo, una historia de sangre y cobardía.*

If the disintegration of the old regime and the emergence of Constitutionalist rule had disarticulated Catholic politics, the Constitutional Congress and establishment of a new regime in 1917 and 1918 served to reenergize the movement, mobilizing large number of Jalisco Catholics in opposition to the restrictions set on religious worship.
In 1918, the movements against Decree 1913 and in support of the exiled archbishop were characterized by a variety of organizational forms, some parish-based and others community-based. All were articulated through Catholic lay organizations, such as the Catholic Association of Mexican Youth (Asociación Católica de la Juventud Mexicana, or ACJM), and the Union of Catholic Mexican Ladies (Unión de Damas Católicas Mexicanas, or UDCM). All directed themselves to different levels of civil government, from the town council, to the state congress, to the governor’s office, and even to President Carranza. The movement was waged through petition and civil disobedience, or nonviolent noncooperation. The forms of the protests are of considerable importance in understanding the broad appeal of the demands, the formation of Catholic identity, and the strategies of a subsequent period of militancy, highly politicized and willing to challenge the revolutionaries and their governments in the spheres they considered proper to the revolution.

Following much protest, the state legislature published an amended version of Decree 1913, called Decree 1927, which repealed the first. Decree 1927 contained the basic content of its predecessor, but specified fines of 10 to 200 pesos and imprisonment of one to eleven months for priests who did not comply. Compliance meant that priests would need state-government licensing in order to legally minister to the faithful. The response of the diocese was to abandon the churches. If the priests did not exercise their vocation, they did not have to be licensed by the state. And while much worship would go underground during the following months, as of 1 August, mass would not be given in any of the Guadalajara churches. For the rest of the state, the same would be true as of 1 September.

In Guadalajara during the final days of July, the churches swelled under the pressure of those who wished to confess, marry, baptize, or receive the Holy Eucharist. The pattern was repeated outside the capital during the days prior to 1 September. As of August a state of mourning was rigorously observed which entailed two distinct forms of protest. The first was inward, recalling the practices of abstention observed during
Advent and Lent. Black ribbons appeared in the windows and over the doors of homes across the city; Catholics refrained from all recreation, purchased only basic necessities, and abstained from music and parties; they also boycotted the use of carriages, cars, or the city tram. These practices of mourning were widespread in the city, in addition to the discontinuation of all activity or practice having to do with the churches. Remaining as empty buildings, the churches were converted into symbols of resistance. The self-imposed distance between worshippers and their place of worship served to strengthen their resolve.

On 14 August the archdiocese published a circular directed to its faithful, declaring days of holy obligation for all priests and faithful on 22 August, in the Zapopan Basilica, and 23 August, in the parish church of San Pedro Tlaquepaque. As customary pilgrimage sites just outside of the city limits of Guadalajara, these churches temporarily became the material focus of Catholic identity. The masses created a modern-day pilgrimage for religious liberty, serving as a point of union and reaffirmation of Catholic identity in struggle against the civil authorities. The Catholic newspaper, *El Futuro*, published the following note:

Things continue without change in the city; the Government sustains its campaign of persecution and the Catholics [continue their] passive resistance, extremely pious in protest, during these final days of worship in the towns near Guadalajara; more than three-quarters of the population has been to San Pedro and Zapopan; of course, the majority make the trip on foot, there and back.

The article went on to comment, with a certain irony, that Decree 1927 had been a blessing in disguise; it had sown a “miraculous crop” which the Church would harvest. This should be seen as a general question of interest to historians: to what extent did conflicts between groups (of revolutionaries and Catholics) forge Catholic identity, or shape revolutionary practice for that matter?
The second part of the mourning protest was as much outwardly directed, as it was inward. The principal target was the pro-government daily, *El Occidental*, which was commonly seen by Catholic laity as systematically misreporting the news pertaining to government repression of their movements. Anacleto González Flores referred to the protest as “economic sovereignty,” and it consisted in boycotting the newspaper, not only in terms of consumption, but applying pressure on those who used the newspaper for advertising their businesses. A pro-Catholic newspaper, *La Época*, published a list of businesses in the city that advertised in the newspaper. Another pro-Catholic newspaper, *La Lucha*, did the same, including a list of the city’s prominent Masons, whose businesses were also boycotted. In a matter of weeks *El Occidental* was forced to discontinue circulation. For the rest of 1918 and the first half of 1919, the Catholic weekly *La Palabra* continued to publish lists of businesses to be boycotted.92

Concurrently with the August boycott, the governor and state legislature were bombarded with protests from the rural towns and secondary cities of Jalisco. Two of the organizers, J. Ignacio Dávila Garibi and Salvador Chávez Hayhoe, had the extraordinary foresight to collect the written protests and signatures from around the state and publish them in two volumes in 1920. According to their collection of documents, between mid-August and mid-September, forty-five petitions of protest were sent, representing thirty-two different towns in Jalisco. Although a few were sent directly to President Carranza, most went to the state legislature or to the governor. In at least one-third of the towns, the Asociación Católica de la Juventud Mexicana was directly involved in the petition campaign. In all, these protests carried close to 35,000 signatures. Unlike the July Guadalajara petitions, these were more often signed by men. Over 9,000 signatures accompanied protests sent exclusively by women; nearly 19,000 signatures corresponded to protests signed exclusively by men; and another 6,000 signatures corresponded to petitions signed by men and women. Most petitions came from towns that were also parishes. For example, 600 vecinos, ciudadanos mexicanos (Mexican citizens, members
of the community, and in this case men) of Ciudad Guzmán, in full exercise of their constitutional rights, petitioned the governor. Three days later, over 200 Damas Católicas of Ciudad Guzmán protested in a separate petition sent to the local congress.  

What do the petitions reveal about the towns? As might be expected, there is a loose correlation between the size of the towns and the number of people who signed the petitions. Many towns sent separate petitions for men and women, a reflection of the sexual division observed by the lay organizations. In two cases, Arandas and San Miguel el Alto, important highland parishes that subsequently became vital centers of resistance during the Cristero rebellion, three petitions were sent. In San Miguel, women and men circulated separate petitions, the latter signed by more than 1,100 vecinos and sent to the governor, who answered the petition. On receiving the governor’s reply, the men of San Miguel formulated a response, which was again signed by over 1,000. Similarly, in the case of Arandas, separate men’s and women’s petitions were sent to President Carranza, the first with over 900 signatures, the second with over 3,000; at roughly the same time, a separate petition was circulated among the men of Arandas, and signed by over 3,000 vecinos.

In the Altos region, one hundred kilometers northeast of Guadalajara, the town of Mexticacán provides a somewhat different pattern of protest. There, on 21 August, over 800 men and almost 1,000 women, exercising their Article 8 constitutional right to petition their authorities, signed a joint protest. But instead of petitioning the president, the governor or the Congress, they directed their demands to their local municipal government. Specifically, they asked that Decrees 1913 and 1927 be repealed; that no other decrees of such nature be substituted for them; and that their local representatives make use of the constitutional right of municipal government to send bills to the local Congress.

The Mexticacán Ayuntamiento (town council) responded in support of the petition, and in turn sent the accord to the local congress. In a four-point agreement, they unanimously applauded the pacific attitude demonstrated by the townspeople; approved the protest, as Catholics and citizens, pledging to “honor the favor of God before that
of the State”; formally petitioned the congress on behalf of the town, asking that the congress take up the issue of repeal; and requested a formal response from the authorities in Guadalajara. The president, vice-president, legal counsel, and secretary of the town council signed the petition. Following their signatures, a declaration read: “These are the actions of those who are and know how to be true representatives of the people!”

In late 1918 a new state legislature and governor were elected, clearing the way for a repeal of Decree 1913/1927. Following his military leave of absence of sixteen months, General Manuel M. Diéguez returned to office on 31 January, 1919, in order to give his final address as outgoing governor. On 4 February, 1919, the state legislature rescinded decree 1927 in a vote of 15 in favor and 5 against. The following August, Archbishop Orozco y Jiménez returned to México.

The events of 1917–1919 proved to be a catalyst for a new kind of political Catholicism, a Christian democracy sustained by a coalition of lay organizations such as the Asociación Católica de la Juventud Mexicana, Unión de Damas Católicas Mexicanas, and a variety of Catholic labor unions (rural and urban), that formed the Catholic Worker Confederation (Confederación Católica Obrera, or CCO). These organizations assumed Catholicism as a basic identity compatible within the framework of other identity-based constituencies (women, workers, and youth). To the extent that different groups embraced Catholicism as a public identity in social or political action, they articulated Catholicism in different ways through different lenses. Catholic identity, then, looked different for women, workers or youths, and would be contingent and changing within those groups. But sustained conflict with an identifiable enemy, in this case revolutionary anticlericals, created a shared Catholic identity. People of different backgrounds and localities, surely with different expectations, were able to band together in a clear, militant expression of identity politics for a limited period of time—long enough, however, to reach two basic goals. They forced a political retreat from civil authorities, and they created a situation in which their ecclesiastic authorities could return from exile: the archbishop from his forced expatriation and the parish priests from a self-imposed separation from their church.
The role of the Catholic lay organizations in the political battle was central, and the victory was significant. During the following six years groups of Catholic women, youth, and workers would grow, constituting themselves as parallel organizations in competition with the state for its constituencies. Confessional political parties were illegal, yet this only served to push the arena of politics out of formal institutional spaces and reconstitute it in those spaces open to a highly mobilized population. This final point is particularly relevant. Although weak and internally divided (prior to 1923), the Mexican state did claim legitimacy and authority conferred by revolution. In practice, a new Christian democracy movement questioned both.

A CATHOLIC MASS POLITICS

Between 1919 and 1926 a Catholic union movement flourished in central and West Central Mexico, built on the existing foundations of a network of parishes and incorporating the experience of a previous generation’s mutualist societies. Since the early twentieth century, *Rerum Novarum* had given these local institutions a new language and a new sense of belonging to a growing, vibrant network. For members, the community was a model for the Catholic nation; they shared and promoted it through a periodical press, along with a network of unions, mutualist societies, producer and consumer cooperatives, and other associations. The main organizations were located in Guadalajara, where they pulled together in the form of a confederation in 1919. Over the next couple of years the organization expanded to incorporate new associations from rural Jalisco, Michoacan, Guanajuato, Mexico City, and the surrounding regions.

In April 1922, delegates from over 1,300 Catholic workers organizations from twelve states and Mexico City met in Guadalajara to form a national confederation, set up an operative framework, and discuss the elements of a common ideology. Three issues are important in understanding the congress. First, 60 percent of the delegates came from Jalisco; the other two states with strong representation were Michoacán and Guanajuato, each comprising 10 percent of the delegates. Practically, the construction of
a national confederation had only begun. It was more regional in breadth than national.\textsuperscript{98} Second, due to the overwhelming numerical and organizational superiority of the Jalisco unions, the “national” confederation would be based in Guadalajara, which was the heart of the movement.\textsuperscript{99} The two most important publications, each with circulation in the main centers of the movement, were published in Guadalajara. \textit{El Obrero} was a weekly newspaper aimed at workers, and \textit{El Archivo Social}, with a smaller circulation, was a biweekly magazine aimed at intellectuals, advisors, and organizers, both clergy and laity. Third, several important ideological and programmatic issues were debated at the congress, and bear repeating, as they help explain the tactics of the unions their umbrella organization, the National Catholic Confederation of Labor (Confederación Nacional Católica del Trabajo, or CNCT). The congress decided against the concept of a single obligatory union, as this would be an unnecessary limitation of the natural right to association. Although the delegates rejected the notion of class struggle, they established the right to strike. They agreed that their unions should abstain from political participation. They favored the expansion of small-scale private property, the creation of schools for working-class children,\textsuperscript{100} their own savings and loan institutions, and their own periodicals. With the goal of forming alliances, they agreed to establish institutional relationships with other unions not part of their confederation. Although they did not foresee allying with the socialist unions, they did decide to send them their publications, and in fact, there would be at least one such alliance.\textsuperscript{101}

The issue that occasioned most debate, and which was most transcendent historically, was “confessionalism,” the openly religious identity of the confederation.\textsuperscript{102} The debate over confessionalism was neither new nor restricted to Mexico.\textsuperscript{103} In Germany, social Catholics founded interconfessional parties and unions, and in Spain, there were Catholic intellectuals on both sides of the debate. While some argued for a general Christian moral orientation, others responded that Catholic unions would only be effective if they were militantly Catholic. With the publication of \textit{Singulari Quadam}
(1912), Pope Pius X called for Catholic associations to be confessional, although he pragmatically decided not to require changes in Germany. In France during the Third Republic, the secular-confessional division had been a central issue of public policy, and at the turn of the century a liberal reform was legislated similar to that which shaped Mexico’s 1857 Constitution. Yet social Catholicism grew, and Catholics founded unions in many of the trades. In France, as in the rest of Europe, the lay organizations only abandoned confessionalism by the 1950s. On the whole, Christian Democracy has been considered the most important western European political movement of the last half of the twentieth century.

Within Mexico, the idea of confessionalism had its critics, such as the Jesuit Arnulfo Castro, who wrote to Palomar y Vizcarra in 1911 expressing his reserve regarding the name given to the newly founded Catholic political party:

…the problem with the name, as I see it, is that not only its enemies but people in general will identify the Catholic Party with the Catholics and with the Catholic Church. Those who for one reason or another do not belong to the party will be non-Catholic. In short, “Catholic” on one hand will be reduced to the political party, and on the other the mistakes and errors that the party may eventually commit (after all it is only human), will be extended to the whole of Catholics. This is without a doubt a serious shortcoming.

Castro’s keen observations foreshadow major problems that seriously impeded the efforts of Mexican Christian democrats, as I have argued regarding the rise and fall of the National Catholic Party. A similar fate awaited the Catholic labor movement.

As in France, the secular-confessional divide defined the formation of the state, although in Mexico it was situated in terms of Revolutionary-Catholic, or more commonly, revolution-reaction. This was one of the principle dilemmas for political
Catholicism, from the formation of the National Catholic Party down to the union movement, and it was certainly an issue in the 1922 Guadalajara congress. But the debate might not have surfaced, except that the Catholics were attempting to form alliances with the Free Worker unions which had broken away from the socialist labor confederation and the government-backed official unions. The words of a delegate from the Río Blanco mill at Orizaba Veracruz are eloquent regarding the issue of confessionalism:

"think about what you’re doing with regards to religion, because if you insist, the poor free laborers who have only just split with the bolsheviks won’t be strong enough to resist. I won’t stand down and I won’t go back, but I can only speak for myself, not for all our brothers out there on the firing line who are asking their Catholic brothers for help. They are Catholic too, but they aren’t ready for what you have here; may they be spared the fate of the man whose legs healed badly because he was obliged to stand on them too soon. I ask you not to demand that the free worker associations carry the name of the Catholics, that they may truly be Catholic; but don’t demand it of them so that the bolsheviks might let them live Comrades, if you could only see how different it is to speak of things Catholic here in Guadalajara, and there in Río Blanco."

Castro spoke to this very situation in his letter, when he foresaw that a Catholic party would polarize the political arena. He feared that all might be reduced to Catholic and non-Catholic, a move that would collapse everybody into a politicized binary opposition. The delegate from Río Blanco expressed this dilemma in very real terms when he asked the congress not to enforce confessionalism, so that the associations he represented might in turn actually be able to embrace Christian principles. He hoped to construct a middle ground, and in the short run he was evidently successful. The congress decided on a two-tier system, so that nonconfessional unions that adhered to a certain
maxim could join. Basically, they would have to abide by Catholic doctrine, and thus could not be socialist.

The alliance was apparently less successful in practice, and there is little evidence that the two movements continued to work together. The most likely reason is that in the region where the Catholic union movement was strongest, the “free labor” movement had very little presence; and in the region where “free labor” was more common, the free workers and the Catholics faced systematic hostility from both the socialist and government-backed unions. Yet the Río Blanco delegate’s plea has survived, precisely because a Jesuit, Alfredo Méndez Medina, chose to publish it at the time of the congress, a decision that speaks to an openness regarding alliances, but also to the tolerance sought by the movement’s clerical overseers. On one hand, if Méndez Medina were in agreement with the statement, which was probably the case, he was promoting a tactical opening to broaden the movement’s attraction to other workers. Although the incipient movement was self-consciously confessional, it promoted a heterogeneity that most nonconfessional unions, particularly the pro-government unions, did not possess. Of course, if Méndez Medina did not agree with the statement made by the worker from Orizaba’s famous Río Blanco factory, then he was revealing a respect for difference that is generally thought of as incompatible with the Catholic Church and its clergy. In any case, and despite *Singulari Quadam*, the congress provided support for the construction of a middle ground, where Christian principles could coexist with nonconfessional social movements.

Where Catholic labor movements developed, there is evidence that they were successful in achieving improvements in working conditions and remuneration. This was not the radical transformation of society sought by socialism, but contrary to old labor history, it was apparently popular among workers in both Mexico and Europe. Specific cases demonstrate that Catholic workers expressed class-specific interests in addition to a religious identity. Near Guadalajara, for example, the Atemajac, Experiencia, and Río Blanco textile mills struck in 1922 over salary cuts. The confessional unions at these
factories negotiated a 65 percent increase. The tactic was to negotiate a solution amenable to capital and labor, but there is no doubt that the unions understood and represented the class interests of workers. In the other large textile mill near Guadalajara, Río Grande, the confessional union won a 50 percent salary increase and 12,000 pesos to establish a worker-run consumer cooperative in a strike settlement a year later in June 1923.112

Beyond the factory belt that ran along Guadalajara’s perimeter to the north and east, the unions of rural, small-town Jalisco were further removed from the logic of the strike, and more oriented toward mutualism. This is not to say that they lacked “class consciousness.” In Lagos de Moreno, the Farmers Union had twenty sections and over 600 paying members. In December 1921 the union reported conflicts with landowners over the working conditions of day laborers employed in crop harvesting. The representative in charge of correspondence with El Obrero wrote that the union had begun to search for a settlement acceptable to its members, and would soon publish a detailed account of worker grievances in the local union bulletin.113 It is often unclear whether such local conflicts ended in a manner agreeable to the offended party. What is clear is that the Farmers Union expressed both the religious and class interests of its members, that the official newspaper of the Catholic union movement printed them, and that the paper was widely distributed to groups across the most populous states in the nation. However, the most common aspects of Catholic unionism were less sensational and more a part of daily lived forms of cooperation.

The unions frequently maintained consumer, credit, or insurance cooperatives. These institutions frequently benefited their members, as attested by the ongoing correspondence published by El Obrero. In San Miguel el Alto, Jalisco, where the mutualist society had 100 members, it was able to provide medical attention for 28, victims of a 1920 typhoid fever epidemic.114 In Encarnación de Díaz, also in the highland region, the women’s seamstress union created a producer’s cooperative, which allowed them to bring in extra work from nearby Aguascalientes. As a result they were able to
provide work for 60 members over sixteen months, and double their salaries. In the same
town the men’s mutual fund maintained 1,000 paying members. At Lake Chapala,
two masons from Guadalajara who were working on the railroad line organized the
local union. In 1919, the Chapala union had a men’s mutualist society with over 100
paying members and a women’s chapter with over 150 paying members, in addition to a
consumer coop, a workers’ social studies circle, a night school, and a theater company.
The Etzatlán union had 130 members, who established a recreation center with a
gymnasium and tables set up for chess, Parcheesi, and dominoes.

There are many such examples, and they serve to illustrate a basic argument: the
Catholic unions were formed by working people across the state who lived in generally
precarious circumstances, and who had few luxuries in their lives. Jean Meyer wrote
of these organizations as part of a Catholic socialism. The term is loaded, and must be
“unpacked” if it is to be used. More to the point, in my opinion, such communities were
forced to create their own safety nets, and in times of civil war, frequent poor harvests,
and epidemics, such local cooperation was that much more important. But it is difficult
to ascertain just how deep this village communitarianism goes. Surely there was intrigue,
jealousy, discontent, and hatred in the communities, too. In July 1922, for example, the
Lagos consumer cooperative was looted. But this aspect of village life does not often
surface in these accounts, and it was probably less important to the extent that an outside
force threatened the villages, as happened during the last half of the decade.

What does come through in the brief correspondence that the villages maintained
with the Catholic newspaper is a combination of material and spiritual redress afforded
by the unions, and the importance it plays in people’s lives. It is striking to note the
succession of individuals who are injured, fall ill, or are somehow unable to work,
receive aid from their respective cooperatives, and then send notice of their gratitude
to the Catholic newspaper. Their acción de gracias, or thanksgiving, is extended
invariably to the local aid society, and sometimes to a local saint. The practice is very
much reminiscent of the ex voto tradition that was and is popular in these same towns. J. Dolores Lorensana, J. Ireneo Salcedo, Juan de la Cruz, Jorge Contreras, Cecilio Delgadillo, and Marciano Gómez at the Río Grande textile mill; Germán Velasco, Nicolás Huitrón, and Pablo Salcedo at the Atemajac mill; Sixto Sánchez at San Julián; J. Carmen Pedroza at Chapala: all published vows of thanks, public manifestations of gratitude for help received. A similar note helps tease out the context of this custom. In Chapala a member of the local Catholic union died in June 1919; the other 200 or so members of the union published a note expressing their condolences for the lost comrade, who they accompanied en masse to the burial ceremony. The benefits offered by the Catholic unions were material indeed; but they were also spiritual. Members could live their precarious lives in the security that they would die a Christian death, and that they would not suffer their tribulations alone. Through the act of publishing their thanks in a newspaper, they also reconstructed the ex voto tradition for the era of mass politics, substituting the broad circulation of the newspaper for the local expression of the chapel, and transforming the pages of the newspaper into an ephemeral, mass-produced altar, at which each individual is able to publicly display his or her faith.

Catholic syndicalism placed strong emphasis on education, organizational skills, and additional training. The breadth of training the Catholic workers received in Jalisco includes arithmetic, history, metallurgy, chemistry, sociology, drawing and painting, reading, agriculture/farming, ethics, European social Catholicism, singing, orchestra, sewing and needlework, English, French, telegraphy, accounting, typing, shorthand, acting, public speaking, religious studies, and catechism. Courses were free for members, and they reflected, at least to some extent, the interests of workers. In fact, the additional training offered by the women’s Catholic employee’s union was so popular that the organizers were forced to find a larger space. Many times skills were necessary for political activity, for advancement on the job, and even for improved pay. Some were more social, like singing, orchestra, and theater, while others, like religion and sewing,
were more important in terms of the domestic roles assumed by workers. While men did not generally sew, there were religious studies circles for men as well as for women. The circles were sex specific, reflecting the sexual division of social space, and the organization of society in general. They also extended the social to include family, work, recreation, and education. Similarly, unions founded primary and secondary schools for boys and girls, and night schools for men and women, sometimes in collaboration with the Unión de Damas Católicas Mexicanas.

The Catholic confederation also organized study circles, and a statewide speakers circuit that offered seminars in practically any little town where there was an affiliated union, a youth association, or a chapter of the Damas Católicas. In this manner, the more experienced members could share their expertise with those who were more isolated from the dynamic center of union organizing. Most speakers were men, but not all, and women speakers gave conferences too. Such was the case of Rosa González Garibay, of the Guadalajara-based women’s confederation, who had her first experience ever as a public speaker in 1921, three months after the union was formed. As a member of the Feminine Social Action propaganda group she addressed the women’s unions on the founding and administering of mutualist societies.\(^{124}\) If most speakers were men, not all came from the clergy or liberal professions. Maximiano Reyes, for example, was a man of humble origins from Mezquitán, who worked at the Atemajac textile mill, and joined the National Catholic Party in the summer of 1911. By the early 1920s he was traveling around the archdiocese with other Catholic intellectuals and organizers advising on union organizing. All of this was rooted in the corporatist vision of social Catholicism, which did not separate work from family and society, and considered poor working conditions in general, and insufficient salaries in particular, to be intimately linked to both moral and material deterioration of the family.\(^{125}\) This situation is what Catholics called the social question.
THE COLLAPSE OF CHRISTIAN DEMOCRACY

Catholic unions could not participate in party politics; nonetheless, their growth and popularity had very real political consequences. In Jalisco, where anticlerical policy had profound consequences, Governor Jose Guadalupe Zuno shut down legal channels for the Catholic unions and their affiliates. In the summer of 1923, all confessional unions and mutualist societies were declared illegal, effectively collapsing the political sphere where lay associations had developed a Catholic mass politics. Under the threat of state-sanctioned violence, Catholic unions were forced to relinquish space won during the previous four years, and avoid serious confrontations with the official unions.

In Jalisco anticlerical harassment was more or less constant during 1924. Governor Zuno moved to suppress the Catholic press, and confiscate the property of lay organizations. In December he had the police raid the Guadalajara seminary on the charge that the people studying there were lazy and dirty. The Department of Public Health declared that the building did not meet standards of public hygiene, and Zuno had it confiscated. At the same time his administration began closing down the Catholic hospitals and schools in the state capital and smaller towns and villages. As the schools were closed, classes often continued in the houses of the faithful or clandestinely, along Guadalajara’s undeveloped perimeter. Catholic leadership initially misjudged the new anticlericalism, interpreting it as similar in scope and resolve to the conflict of 1918. But there were important differences.

The armed phase of the revolution radicalized the anticlerical sentiments of leaders such as Manuel M. Diéguez. It also produced a well-organized Catholic opposition, and destroyed the conciliatory politics of Church and state that had characterized the presidency of Porfirio Díaz. In the midst of civil war, however, much anticlericalism was the expression of political tactics exercised in a context of “multiple sovereignty,” that is, in the vacuum left by the collapse of the state. Only with the reestablishment of the institutions of government did a more coherent anticlerical policy...
appear, and even then government fiat was not strong enough initially to impose such policy where locals opposed it.

The reestablishment of a more or less well-defined public sphere after 1916 also provided a set of ground rules by which political opposition could be expressed. In my opinion, this was the real triumph of the Carrancista clique. The weak anticlericalism of 1919 through 1922, I believe, underwrote the tentative legitimacy of a new state. This legitimacy was destroyed during the 1923 rebellion of Adolfo de la Huerta, Enrique Estrada, and others. Following the rebellion, revolutionaries such as Plutarco Elías Calles and Zuno were unwilling to put up with political opposition, and acted quickly to marginalize it. In Jalisco, this translated into a strong anticlerical policy that was directed less at the clergy than at political Catholics. In shutting out his political opposition, Zuno took anticlericalism away from the traditional arena of Church privilege, and used it to close down the public sphere created by the 1917 Constitution.

The end result was the Cristero rebellion, but it is unhelpful to think of the rebellion as simply a violent cleavage between Church and state. This may be seen through an Interior Ministry report dating to the first weeks of fighting in 1927. In Jamay, along the coast of Lake Chapala, one can see a break at the level of the state, in its most local expression. Here the entire local government had been pushed to rebel by the anticlerical policies of Governor Zuno and President Calles. A confidential government agent sent by the Interior Ministry reported in February of 1927 that everybody in the town, from the mayor on down, belonged to the Unión Popular (Popular Union), and was openly opposed to Calles and Zuno. One may observe in Jamay, Jalisco, a local counterhegemonic movement, articulated through the state, pitting popular sovereignty against the prerogatives of revolutionary authority. There is a significant question in all of this, which should be of general interest to historians: did conflicts between anticlerical revolutionaries and political Catholics forge a new politico-religious Catholic identity, shape revolutionary practice, and transform political space in postrevolutionary Mexico? The conflicts analyzed in these episodes suggest all of the above.
ENDNOTES


14 The encyclical also treats the larger issue of beneficence, or philanthropy, and has quite a bit to say regarding the charity of the well-to-do, which is seen as part of the same order of things. The underlying position is that society ought to be understood in corporatist terms, as is pointed out by Alzaga. A thread of analysis not taken in this article, but all the same important, is how and in
what ways this sort of thinking would eventually predispose political Catholics in many countries to support fascist regimes. See Alzaga, *La primera*, p. 23. This connection is explicitly made by *franquista* intellectuals Miguel Sancho Izquierdo, Leonardo Prieto Castro, and Antonio Muñoz Casayús of the Universidad de Zaragoza in 1937. Their treatise on corporatism looks into the models offered by Italian, Portuguese, and German varieties, and links the idea directly to Pope Leo XIII. See *Corporatismo: Los movimientos nacionales contemporáneos. Causas y realizaciones*, (Zaragoza: Editorial Imperio), 1937, pp. 14–15, 87–88.


16 Ibid, paragraph 4.

17 See, for examples, three letters written by Francisco Traslosaeros to Miguel Palomar y Vizcarra, on 24 and 26 March, and 29 April, 1908, Universidad Nacional Autónoma de México, Centro de Estudios Sobre la Universidad, Fondo Miguel Palomar y Vizcarra (henceforth FPyV), box 38, file 263, docs. 144–146, 147–149, and 155–160.


22 A new political historiography of Catholicism has begun to emerge, through the work in progress of Matthew Butler, Adrian A. Bantjes, Kristina Boylan, Patience A. Schell, Edward Wright-Rios, Ben Fallaw, Benjamin Smith, Julia Preciado, Christopher R. Boyer, and Laura O’Dogherty.


24 Ceballos Ramírez, *El Catolicismo Social*.


The best analysis of the cycle of conferences is Ceballos Ramírez, *El Catolicismo Social*, chapter 5.

FPyV, box 40, file 273, docs. 2154–55, TraslosHERos to Palomar y Vizcarra, Mexico City, 27 August, 1909.


The founding members were: Dr. J. Refugio Galindo (Tulancingo), Antonio de P. Moreno (Villa de Guadalupe), father José María Soto (Morelia), Francisco Villalón (Morelia), Silvestre Terrazas (Chihuahua), and Miguel Díaz Infante (León). It is almost certain that Palomar y Vizcarra would have been among this group had he attended the Oaxaca congress, and in fact, he was the first person formally invited to join the others. FPyV, box 40, file 273, docs. 2086, 2094, and 2095, Galindo to Palomar y Vizcarra, Tortugas-Tamascalillos, January and February 1909.


It is unclear who individually or collectively wrote the analysis, although it would have to be somebody close to Refugio Galindo. FPyV, box 40, file 284, docs. 2198–2200, Operarios Guadalupanos, Monthly Newsletter, 12 June 1910.

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FPyV, box 40, file 273, docs. 2149–2150, Operarios Guadalupanos, Monthly Newsletters, 8 July and 8 August, 1909.


The early newsletters, such as the one cited here, were typewritten by Dr. J. Refugio Galindo, and mimeographed. He would then write in the name of the member to whom it was to be sent, and in the case of Miguel Palomar y Vizcarra, would often write in a note at the end, containing information that was not for broader consumption. Newspaper circulation data is primarily from Ceballos Ramírez, “Los Operarios Guadalupanos,” p. 77.

FPyV, box 40, file 273, docs. 2164–65, memorandum circulated by Palomar y Vizcarra, Guadalajara, 12 September, 1909.

Debates regarding salary and the family wage were important on the eve of the Mexican revolution in 1910. For differing opinions expressed by members of the Operarios Guadalupanos, see *Restauración Social*, Vol. 2, nos. 11–12, and Vol. 3, numbers 13–19. All of these articles originated as speeches delivered to the 2nd Catholic Social Week, celebrated in Mexico City in October 1910.


45 In the case of Arandas, for which there are detailed records, loans were made at 8 percent interest. Barbosa, *La caja rural católica*, pp. 52–61.


47 There is a solid, if limited, argument to be made that by 1940, the incipient Partido Acción Nacional (National Action Party, or PAN) offered a secular, Christian-inspired, politics independent of Church tutelage. The most obvious limit to this argument is that the PAN was unable to win the presidency, and most other elections, for another 60 years. One can see the roots of Christian Democracy in the PAN through the founding participation of Efrain Gonzalez Luna; see Jorge Alonso, *Miradas sobre la personalidad política de Efrain Gonzalez Luna*, (Guadalajara: Universidad de Guadalajara/CUCSH), 2003.

48 The one exception was the idea that those who served in the judicial branch should have special guarantees vis-à-vis the executive branch in order to safeguard their independence. The telegram is reproduced in Francisco Banegas Galván, *El por qué del Partido Católico Nacional*, (México: Jus), 1960 [1915], p. 50.

49 Correa, *El Partido Católico Nacional*.


51 *El Luchador Católico* (Ciudad Guzmán, Jalisco), 24 November 1912, p. 2.


54 On poor organization in La Barca and Jamay, see FPyV, box 40, file 286, doc. 2373, Arrieta Vizcayno to Palomar y Vizcarra, Jamay, 28 November, 1911; for Talpa, see Ibid., box 40, file 289, docs. 2577–78, Quintero to Palomar y Vizcarra, Mascota, 20 August, 1912.

55 FPyV, box 41, file 291, docs. 2793–94, Juan Medina to Palomar y Vizcarra, San Cristóbal de la Barranca, 23 April, 1913.


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60 *El Obrero, Organo de la Convención Obrera Electoral*, appeared from June 1906 until the end of the year, and is held at the Biblioteca Pública del Estado de Jalisco, in Guadalajara.

61 FPyV, box 40, file 289, docs. 2577–78, Quintero to Palomar y Vizcarra, Mascota, 20 August, 1912.

62 FPyV, box 40, file 290, docs. 2693–96, Navarro Flores to Palomar y Vizcarra, Tototlán, 26 December, 1912; and box 40, file 290, doc. 2697, Rubalcava to Palomar y Vizcarra, Tototlán, 26 December, 1912.

63 FPyV, box 40, file 288, doc. 2482, Reynoso to Palomar y Vizcarra, Tepatitlán, 2 April, 1912.


65 FPyV, box 40, file 288, docs. 2344–45, Martínez to Palomar y Vizcarra, Arandas, 19 July, 1912; and box 41, file 292, docs. 2879–82, Official Minutes of the Municipal Electoral Commission, Municipal President José Jesús Mojica, 19 July, 1912.


52 National Archive and Records Administration, Washington, DC, United States Department of State, Records Relating to the Internal Affairs of Mexico, 1910–1929 (henceforth SD), 812.00/12591, Hanna to the Secretary of State, Monterrey, 23 July, 1914; 812.00/12634, Canada to the Secretary of State, Veracruz, 27 July, 1914; 812.00/12885, Hamm to the Secretary of State, Durango, 8 August, 1914; 812.00/12959, Canova to the Secretary of State, México, 21 August, 1914; 812.00/12983, Sillman to the Secretary of State, México, 24 August, 1914; 812.00/27431, H. L. Hall to Davis, México, 1 October, 1914; 812.00/13720, Davis to the Secretary of State, Guadalajara, 31 October, 1914; 812.00/14090, Canada to the Secretary of State, 13 December, 1914.

53 Biblioteca Pública del Estado de Jalisco, Guadalajara, Fondo de Misceláneas (henceforth BPE), Misc. 783/7, “Memorial del cabildo metropolitano y clero de la arquidiócesis de Guadalajara, al C. Presidente de la República Mexicana, Dn. Venustiano Carranza; y voto de adhesión y obediencia al Ilmo. y Revmo. Sr. Arzobispo, Dr. y Mtro. Dn. Francisco Orozco y Jiménez” (Guadalajara, April 1918), p. 4, (henceforth Memorial). In addition to the schools, Alvarado commented on the damaging effects of the occupation of hospitals, rest homes, and other charitable institutions, as well as libraries and laboratories administered by the Catholic Church and closed by the Constitutionalist army during the occupation of Guadalajara.

54 BPE, 783/7, Memorial, p. 10.

55 BPE, 783/7, Memorial, pp. 8.

56 Carta pastoral del Episcopado mexicano sobre la Constitución de 1917, (Acordada, Texas, 1917). For a different appraisal (the government line, according to Jean Meyer), see Luis C. Balderrama, El clero y el gobierno de México: Apuntes para la historia de la crisis en 1926, (México, Editorial Cuauhtémoc), 1927, pp. 19–32.

57 The elected governor of Jalisco was Manuel M. Diéguez. Bouquet was officially Gobernador substituto (acting governor) for eleven months, from 25 February, 1918 until 31 January, 1919; Mario Aldana Rendón, comp., Manuel M. Diéguez y el constitucionalismo en Jalisco (documentos), (Guadalajara: Gobierno de Jalisco), 1986.


60 On institutional differentiation, and other forms of secularization, see Casanova, Public Religions, chapter one.


Rius Facius, *De Don Porfirio*, p. 111.


González Flores refers to a one-page handout of the list of Masons that was circulated throughout the city; González Flores, *La cuestión religiosa*, p. 332; Rius Facius, *De Don Porfirio*, p. 270; *La Palabra*, which was edited by González Flores and contained much of his writing from the period, may be consulted in a facsimile version covering two years of publication, from June 1917 until May 1919; see Sección Diocesana de Educación y Cultura, *La Palabra, Edición Homenaje al Maestro Anacleto González Flores*, (Guadalajara: Arquidiócesis de Guadalajara), 2002.

“Vecinos” is archaic by the twentieth century, but refers to those “neighbors” with full political rights in the community. It once generally distinguished Indians from non-Indian residents of an Indian village. The reference above deploys a dual identity, partly referring to the nation (citizen), but also referring to the local community (*vecino*). It is worth mentioning here that Ciudad Guzmán, located in the more heavily Indian southern region of Jalisco, was named after the nineteenth-century liberal reforms. Its ancient name was Zaptlán, revealing its origins as an Indian community. See Dávila Garibi and Chávez Hayhoe, *Colección de documentos*, Vol. 2. The following three paragraphs are also based on this collection of documents.


*El Informador*, 5 February, 1919.

This phenomenon was not altogether new. Mexican history is punctuated by local religious identities that have been galvanized by intruders, outside interference, and threats (real and perceived) to local autonomy or customs. Examples include the 1712 Tzeltal revolt of Cancuc, Chiapas; mid-nineteenth century Cruzob rebels during the Mayan caste war; the 1867 Tzotzil rebellion in Chamula, Chiapas; and the 1891 Tomóchic, Chihuahua rebellion. However, there is a basic difference between what I am describing and these earlier conflicts. In this case, Catholic opposition to revolutionary anticlericalism in Jalisco is inseparable from a broader movement that sought to carve out a role for Catholic activists in the emerging system of modern, political representation. The confrontation was local, but Catholic dissenters saw themselves as part of a national community: Catholic Mexico.

The archive of the Catholic labor confederation was probably lost, which makes writing about Catholic syndicalism very difficult. My basic source has been a data base constructed from the news briefs sent in to the worker newspaper in Guadalajara from local correspondents who were union members. The material is often limited in detail, but there is much of it, sent from all over Mexico. Each union might include many different internal organizations, sex specific and theme specific, such as a men’s and a women’s mutual aid society, a consumer cooperative, or schools. So the individual groups are many more than the number of towns, villages, haciendas and ranches I have
Curley


98 It is noteworthy that, even as early as the 1922 congress, the strongest concentration of Catholic unions was in the Jalisco-Michoacán-Guanajuato region where the Cristero rebellion would be located five years later.

99 The Catholic labor confederation (CNCT) had over 22,000 members in 1926, according to its own statistics. Jean Meyer estimated that 353 organizations belonging to the CNCT represented 80,000 workers; he attributed this figure to Joaquín Márquez Montiel. Ceballos Ramírez, who included a wealth of data and maps to illustrate the growth of the Catholic labor movement, cites the CNCT figure; Seminario Conciliar Mexicano (henceforth SCM), 30/C-III-9, Confederación Nacional Católica del Trabajo, Carta abierta del Comité Central de la Confederación Nacional Católica del Trabajo –C.N.C.T.-al Sr. Luis N. Morones, Secretario de Industria, Comercio y Trabajo, (México: C.N.C.T.) 1926, p. 4; Manuel Ceballos Ramírez, “El sindicalismo Católico en México, 1919–1931,” Historia Mexicana, 35:4, no. 140, 1986 p. 656; Meyer, La cristiada, Vol. 2, p. 216; Joaquín Márquez Montiel, La Iglesia y el Estado en México, (Chihuahua: Regional), 1950.

100 Patience A. Schell looks at the role of the Damas Católicas in educating working-class children, in Church and State Education in Revolutionary Mexico City, (Tucson: University of Arizona Press) 2003.

101 The case in point involved the Catholic Interprofessional Union of Workers and Peasants (Unión Interprofesional de Obreros y Campesinos), which participated in a joint committee with the socialist and pro-government union locals at the “Dos Estrellas” mines of Tlalpujahua, Michoacán; SCM, 30/C-III-9, “Carta abierta,” p. 7.


106 Ibid., p. 2.


108 Junta Diocesana de Acción Católico-Social, Primer congreso nacional obrero: preparación, reseña, conclusiones aprobadas, modelos de estatutos para las agrupaciones confederadas, (Guadalajara: Tip. Renacimiento), 1922; see also Pbro. Librado Tovar, Primer Congreso Católico Regional Obrero, (Guadalajara: Tip. C.M. Sainz), 1921.
... miren bien lo que resuelven en esto de la religión, porque si le ponen mucho, los pobres obreros libres que acaban de romper con los bolcheviques no tendrán todavía fuerzas para tanto. Yo no me aparto ni me voy p’atrás, pero yo no hablo sólo por mí, sino por esos hermanos nuestros que están en la línea de fuego y piden amparo a sus hermanos católicos. Ellos son también católicos, pero no están para tanto como aquí; no les vaya a pasar como aquel que se le enchuecaron las piernas porque lo pararon fresco. Yo pido que no se les exija a las agrupaciones de obreros libres que lleven el nombre de católicos con tal que lo sean de verá; pero que no se les exija eso para que los dejen vivir los bolcheviques. . . . Compañeros, si vieran qué distinto es hablar de cosas católicas aquí en Guadalajara y allá en Río Blanco”; see Ceballos Ramírez, “El sindicalismo católico,” p. 642; originally printed in Acción y fe, no. 1, 1922, p. 459.


115 El Obrero, no. 4, 28 June, 1919, p. 3; and no. 114, 6 August, 1921, p. 4.

116 El Obrero, no. 15, 14 September, 1919, p. 1.

117 El Obrero, no. 105, 4 June, 1921, p. 1.


119 Ex votos are essentially altarpieces, handcrafted by somebody who is thankful for receiving aid, perhaps perceived as a miracle, from a particular saint to whom they pray. In Jalisco’s rural villages, almost any chapel has them propped in nooks, hung on walls, at the feet of a local saint. The most famous of these chapels is at San Juan de Los Lagos, in the highlands. In the case of the Catholic unions, the brief acknowledgements constitute modern ex votos, the newspaper serving as an ephemeral altar for mass consumption.

120 El Obrero, no. 156, 7 May, 1922, p. 3; no. 102, 14 May, 1921, p. 1; no. 129, 19 November, 1921, p. 4; no. 110, 9 July, 1921, p. 3; no. 107, 18 June, 1921, p. 1; no. 147, 26 March, 1922, p. I; no. 23, 8 November, 1919, p. 1.

121 It is difficult to demonstrate such claims. Nevertheless, labor history has often posited no relation between material and spiritual benefits of worker solidarity, a claim which is equally, perhaps more, difficult to demonstrate. In any case, much like E. P. Thompson’s Methodist working-class subjects, the workers of western Mexico were religious, and their faith was an aspect of their everyday lives. In the Mexican context, the CNCT unions were uniquely accommodating of this circumstance. One sort of example, union-sponsored pilgrimages to religious sites, is chronicled in El Obrero, no. 131, 3 December, 1921, p. 2; no. 137, 15 January, 1922, pp. 2 and 4; no. 158, 11 June, 1922, p. 3. On Methodism among the working class, see E. P. Thompson, The Making of the English Working Class, (New York: Vintage Books), 1966, pp. 350–400.
This list, which is not exhaustive, was compiled from *El Obrero* for the years 1919–1923, which are held at the BPE in Guadalajara.

*El Obrero*, no. 92, 5 March, 1921, p. 4; and no. 96, 2 April, 1921, p. 2. The women’s employees union would be one of the initial recruiting bodies for the Saint Joan of Arc Women’s Brigades during the Cristero rebellion. See Jean Meyer, *The Cristero Rebellion*, pp. 131–132; see also, Barbara Ann Miller, “The Role of Women in the Mexican Cristero Rebellion: A New Chapter,” PhD dissertation, University of Notre Dame, 1981.


Archivo del Arzobispado de Guadalajara (AAG), Caja San Miguel Mezquitan, Memorandum, García de Alba, 13 September, 1925; Rius Facius, *De don Porfirio*, pp. 321–322.

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