CREATING COMPETITION: PATRONAGE POLITICS AND
THE PRI’S DEMISE*

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ABSTRACT

Why do dominant parties persist in power for decades and under what conditions do challengers expand enough to beat them at the polls, thus transforming these systems into fully competitive democracies with turnover? Unlike in one-party regimes, the world’s sixteen dominant party systems feature meaningful electoral competition; however, dominant parties have persisted despite enough social cleavages, permissive electoral institutions, negative retrospective evaluations of the incumbent’s performance, and sufficient ideological space for challengers to occupy. I craft a resource theory of single-dominance that focuses on the incumbent’s ability to divert public resources for partisan use. Using formal theory, I show how asymmetric resources and costs of participation force challengers to form as non-centrist and under-competitive parties. Only when these asymmetries decline do opposition parties expand. I test the theory’s predictions using survey data of party elites in Mexico. I also extend the argument to Malaysia and Italy using aggregate data.

RESUMEN

¿Por qué los partidos dominantes se mantienen en el poder durante décadas y bajo qué condiciones los retadores se expanden lo suficiente como para derrotarlos en las urnas, transformando así estos sistemas en democracias completamente competitivas con recambio? A diferencia de los sistemas de un solo partido, los dieciséis sistemas de partido dominante del mundo muestran una competencia electoral significativa; sin embargo, los partidos dominantes han persistido a pesar de la existencia de suficientes clivajes sociales, instituciones electorales permissivas, evaluaciones retrospectivas negativas del desempeño del oficialismo y suficiente espacio ideológico para ser ocupado por los retadores. Elaboro una teoría del dominio singular basada en los recursos que se concentra en la capacidad del gobierno en funciones de desviar recursos públicos para el uso partidario. Usando teoría formal, muestro cómo los recursos asimétricos y los costos de participación fuerzan a los retadores a formar partidos no-centristas y sub-competitivos. Los partidos de oposición se expanden solamente cuando estas asimetrías declinan. Pongo a prueba las predicciones de la teoría usando datos de encuestas a elites partidarias en México. Asimismo, extiendo el argumento a Malasia e Italia usando datos agregados.
Dominant party systems are puzzling because they combine meaningful electoral competition with the absence of turnover. In the world’s sixteen dominant party systems, challenger parties existed but failed so consistently that we can characterize the existence of a dominant party equilibrium. Nevertheless, the equilibrium eventually broke down in twelve cases, transforming these systems into fully competitive democracies with turnover. Explaining the dominant party equilibrium and its failure has profound implications for our understanding of party system competitiveness, political representation, and opposition party building in inhospitable circumstances.

A key reason for opposition party electoral failure is that challengers form as niche-oriented parties that make specialized appeals to minority electoral constituencies on non-primary partisan cleavages or through relatively extremist positions on primary cleavages. As a result, their positions are out of step with most voters’ preferences and they lose national elections accordingly. Country studies and party monographs consistently describe challengers to dominant parties in these terms (see Mizrahi, 2003, Bruhn, 1997 on Mexico; Riker, 1976, Chhibber, 2001 on India; Laver and Schofield, 1990, Tarrow, 1990 on Italy; Arian and Barnes, 1974, Shalev, 1990 on Israel; Diaw and Diouf, 1998 on Senegal; Chua, 2001 on Malaysia; Scheiner, 2006, Otake, 1990 on Japan; and Chu, 2001 on Taiwan).

Yet why the dominant party equilibrium persists—why challengers form as noncentrist parties—cannot be explained by the existing literature. Riker (1976) first implied the dominant party equilibrium when he noted that challengers spread to the left and right of the Indian Congress Party, and thus failed to create an “ends-against-the-center” coalition. But he did not specify why the challengers were expelled from the center where the large mass of voters was located. Like Riker’s spatial theory, a broader class of “neutral” theories about party system competitiveness undervalues the constraints on opposition parties and thus cannot explain dominant party persistence despite sufficient social cleavages, enough voter demand, permissive electoral institutions, and enough policy space for challengers to occupy. Other “non-neutral” models incorporate incumbency advantages, but in their current form they cannot explain why a losing challenger party would ever enter competition. Thus, the alternative theories predict that single-party dominance never occurs or that if it does arise due to historical contingency,
it quickly breaks down into a multiparty democracy or a one-party regime without challengers.

I argue that dominant parties win despite meaningful electoral competition because the incumbent’s resource advantages and the costs the incumbent imposes on challengers make elections substantially unfair. As a result of these advantages, dominant parties attract virtually all careerist politicians who want to win office. The only citizens willing to pay high costs and reap uncertain instrumental benefits by joining the opposition are those who strongly disagree with the status quo policies offered by the incumbent. Although these ideologically oriented candidates and activists build opposition parties despite strong incentives to the contrary, they end up creating niche parties that make specialized appeals to voters.

This paper develops a new resource theory of single-party dominance that pays close attention to the effects of hyper-incumbency advantages on recruitment into the opposition. It shows how dominant parties bias competition in their favor and virtually win elections before election day without engaging in bone-crushing repression or persistent outcome-changing fraud. The first section defines single-party dominance and specifies the universe of cases. The second section shows why existing theories fail to explain dominance or its demise. The third section develops a new theory both non-formally and formally. The third section tests the model’s predictions for Mexico, the world’s longest-lasting dominant party system. The final section before the conclusion extends the argument to Malaysia and Italy.

**SINGLE-PARTY DOMINANCE DEFINED**

Single-party dominance is a notoriously vague concept in the existing literature. For instance, Duverger states that “A dominant party is that which public opinion believes to be dominant” (1954: 308–09) and Sartori teaches that a party “is dominant in that it is significantly stronger than the others” (1976: 193). I define dominant party systems as hybrids that combine genuine elections with continuous executive and legislative rule by a single party for at least twenty consecutive years or four consecutive elections. These systems’ key feature is that elections are meaningful, even though systematic biases in partisan competition make them substantially unfair. Drawing in part from Przeworski et
al. (2000), meaningful electoral competition means that 1) the chief executive and a legislature that cannot be dismissed by the executive are chosen through regular popular elections, 2) all opposition forces are allowed to form independent parties and compete in elections, and 3) the incumbent does not engage in persistent outcome-changing electoral fraud. These elements distinguish dominant party systems from fully authoritarian regimes, including one-party regimes that do not hold elections, ban challenger parties, or routinely disregard electoral results. On the other side, biased partisan competition violates the notion of electoral fairness and distinguishes dominant party systems from fully competitive democracies with turnover.

Single-party dominance also implies power and longevity thresholds.\(^1\) Regarding power, I argue that dominance means the ability to dictate social choice. In presidentialist systems, this means that the incumbent controls the executive and the absolute majority of legislative seats.\(^2\) In parliamentary and mixed systems, it means holding the premiership, at least a plurality of legislative seats, and it must be impossible to form a government without the putative dominant party. The longevity threshold should capture the notion of a dominant party system as a stable pattern of inter-party competition, but one that is not so restrictive as to make the category disappear.\(^3\) Consequently, I set the threshold at twenty years or four consecutive elections.\(^4\)

Applying these definitional rules yields sixteen dominant party systems. Eight are dominant party authoritarian regimes (DPARs) where, despite genuine elections, incumbents supplemented resource advantages with targeted and episodic repression of opposition forces. These cases include Malaysia under the United Malays National Organization/Barisan Nacional (UMNO/BN) (1974–), Mexico under the Institutional Revolutionary Party (PRI) (1929–1997), Senegal under the Socialist Party (PS) (1977–2000), Singapore under the People’s Action Party (PAP) (1981–), Taiwan under the Kuomintang (KMT) (1987–2000), Gambia under the People’s Progressive Party (PPP) (1963–94). It probably also includes Botswana under the Bostswana Democratic Party (BDP) (1965–). Africanists routinely consider it to be democratic, and classifying it as one or the other does not affect my argument. DPARs are an important subset of “electoral authoritarian” regimes.\(^5\) The remaining nine cases are “uncommon democracies” (Pempel, 1990) or dominant party democratic regimes (DPDRs) where
challengers operated without threat of repression, including Italy under Christian Democracy (DC) (1946–1992), Japan under the Liberal Democratic Party (LDP) (1955–93), India under Congress Party (1952–77), Bahamas under the Progressive Liberal Party (PLP) (1967–92), Luxembourg under the Christian Social Party (PCS) (1980–), Trinidad and Tobago under the People’s National Movement (PNM) (1956–86), Sweden under the Social Democratic Party (SAP) (1936–76), and Israel under the Mapai/Labor Alignment (1949–77). The final case, South Africa under the National Party (NP) (1953–1994) might be classified as a democracy for whites if one is only interested in why the NP was dominant among citizens with the franchise, although the broader regime was obviously authoritarian.

The authoritarian and democratic cases differ in fundamentally important ways; however, their partisan dynamics feature key similarities. Dominant parties in both regime types bias voters in their favor and raise the costs of participating in the opposition. A major difference concerns the level of costs. In DPDRs, opposition joiners pay asymmetric opportunity costs, whereas in DPARs they also suffer under the pervasive threat of physical repression. While one might adopt a “thick” definition of dominance that strictly separates these systems, I argue that we learn more by adopting a “thin” definition and assessing the causal impact of regime characteristics on dominant party durability.6

WHY EXISTING THEORIES FAIL TO EXPLAIN SINGLE-PARTY DOMINANCE

Prior research dating back over half a century fails to supply a viable theory of single-party dominance. A number of scholars focused on the creation of dominant party systems and implied that their initial legitimacy from spearheading nation-building projects (e.g., revolution, independence, reconstruction after defeat in war, or sustained struggles between rival political forces over modernization) underwrote their long-term dominance (Duverger, 1954; Blondel, 1972; Huntington and Moore, 1970; Arian and Barnes, 1974; Sartori, 1976; Pempel, 1990). However, it is unlikely that the mechanisms that produce dominant party rule also reproduce it over time since, even in dominant party systems, “epochal events pass into memory” (Levite and Tarrow, 1983: 299) and
quickly transform “revolutionary nationalist regimes” into “extinct revolutionary nationalist regimes” (Tucker, 1961), “established one-party regimes” without strong ideology (Huntington, 1970: 23), or “pragmatic” dominant parties that focus on winning. What allows such parties to win long after their founding projects have faded or been abandoned?

Several well-developed theories about party system competitiveness should be able to explain single party dominance in the context of meaningful elections, but they cannot. First, social cleavage theory posits that parties represent groups that emerge around major social divisions (Lipset and Rokkan, 1967), and some analysts argued that the number of competing parties responded to the number and strength of such cleavages (Charlesworth, 1948; Cox, 1997: 15). But in dominant party systems and fully competitive democracies with turnover ethno-linguistic fractionalization (ELF)—a common proxy for social cleavages—was statistically indistinguishable, while dominant party systems had, on average, almost one fewer effective parties in 1961 and 1.42 fewer in 1981 (differences were significant at the .05 level).  

Second, retrospective voting theory would predict that dominance is sustained by popularity, leading to limited demand for new parties. Yet, case data does not support the theory’s empirical predictions. For instance, 43% of voters in Mexico who held the most negative retrospective evaluations of the PRI’s economic performance still planned to vote for the PRI in 1994 (Magaloni, 1997) even after the 1980s when it presided over the worst economic crisis since the Great Depression. In Taiwan, a striking 51% of voters who held the most negative assessments of the KMT’s dealings with China—a central partisan cleavage—still planned to vote for the KMT in the 1996 elections (Niou and Ordeshook, 1992). Analysts echo the minimal effects of negative retrospective evaluations for Senegal (Diaw and Diouf, 1998: 127), Israel (Shalev, 1990: 118); Italy (Tarrow, 1990: 311), and Japan (Scheiner, 2006).

Third, if Duverger’s Law generalizes to dominant party systems then they should, on average, have lower district magnitude than fully competitive democracies. However, mean district magnitude for lower house elections between 1975 and 1990 was statistically indistinguishable for fully competitive democracies and dominant party systems while the latter had 1.3 fewer effective parties (significant at the .001 level).
Even in countries that used single member districts (SMD) from 1950 to 1990, the dominant party systems had 1.3 fewer effective parties than the fully competitive democracies. In addition, changes in district magnitude preceded the incumbent’s eventual loss in just three of twelve dominant party systems.

Finally, what might be called the folk theorem of dominance implies that incumbents occupy all available “issue space” and do not leave room for opposition parties to enter. However, all existing formal models that assume a neutral entry market where no party has a nonspatial advantage predict at least two competitive parties in equilibrium. This result holds whether parties enter competition simultaneously (Fedderson et al., 1990) or sequentially (Palfrey, 1984).

The social cleavages, retrospective voting, institutional, and standard spatial theory approaches all implicitly or explicitly assume a neutral market for votes where no party is advantaged with extra resources. As a result, they over-predict opposition party success and imply that challenger parties should form easily at the most efficient location, typically close to the policy preferred by the median voter. Yet if they did, dominant party systems would not exist since relatively centrist incumbents such as the Indian Congress, Taiwan’s KMT, Italy’s DC, and Mexico’s PRI would get squeezed from the right and left, and noncentrist incumbents such as Israel’s Mapai/Labor Alignment and Japan’s LDP would lose outright.

As a corrective, less well-known formal models give incumbents some extra nonspatial probability of victory (Banks and Kiewiet, 1989). When applied to dominant party systems, this implies that all candidates from the incumbent party are advantaged over all challengers. But, according to Cox, in the presence of an advantaged dominant party, “there is no (current seat-maximizing) reason to run under any other than the dominant label. Would-be career politicians will either enter the dominant party’s endorsement process, or not at all” (Cox 1997: 166; Epstein, 1986: 129). Thus, dominant party systems would break down into one-party regimes without challengers. Similarly, arguments that over-emphasize electoral fraud or bone-crushing repression make it difficult to see why opposition forces would form parties instead of social movements or revolutionary organizations.
A RESOURCE THEORY OF SINGLE-PARTY DOMINANCE

Dominant parties win consistently because their advantages and the costs they impose on challengers skew the partisan playing field so substantially in their favor that only citizens who deeply oppose the status quo are willing to join opposition parties. Such candidates and activists form parties that are out of step with the preferences of most voters and therefore cannot win national elections. This argument links macroeconomic conditions to challenger-party weakness and shows why challengers form but also how incumbents tilt the partisan playing field in their favor to virtually win elections before election day.

Asymmetric Resources

It is well-known that incumbency advantages in fully competitive democracies yield extra fundraising capacity (Jacobson, 1980) and perquisites of office (Cain, et al., 1987) that are sufficient to help create strikingly high rates of reelection. Resource advantages in dominant party systems are party-specific rather than candidate-specific and are so much larger that they should be considered hyper-incumbency advantages.

Once established, dominance persists when incumbents can use their control over the government to generate hyper-incumbency advantages. As in all competitive systems, targeted legislation and pork-barrel projects are a mainstay of advantage-seeking politicians (see Diaz-Cayeros, 1997 on Mexico; Gomez, 1994 on Malaysia; Golden, 2004 on Italy; Scheiner, 2006 on Japan). Even more important is that unlike in fully competitive democracies, dominant parties also typically have access to five types of illicit public resources that they can use for partisan purposes. First, they can divert funds from the budgets of state-owned enterprises (SOEs). These often massive companies are usually run by high-level political appointees, their finances are generally hidden from public scrutiny, and they engage in multiple and difficult-to-track transfers with the federal government that yield manifold opportunities for the incumbent to divert public funds for partisan use. In a few countries (Taiwan, Malaysia, Israel), dominant parties are also permitted to own businesses, and these ventures typically operate in sectors that are protected by the state. Second, money may also be funneled to party coffers directly from the public budget through secret line-items controlled by the executive branch and hidden
legislative allocations reserved for legislators from the dominant party. Third, a large public sector allows the incumbent to dole out huge numbers of patronage jobs to supporters and withhold them from opponents. Fourth, the economic importance of the state encourages domestic businesses to exchange kickbacks and sometimes illicit campaign contributions for economic protection. Finally, dominant parties use the “administrative resources of the state,” including office supplies, phones, postage, vehicles, and public employees themselves that help inform, persuade, and mobilize voters. These go far beyond the limited perquisites of office typical in competitive democracies and extend to the virtual transformation of public agencies into campaign headquarters.

When incumbents can access and use public resources for partisan gain, they benefit from a virtually bottomless campaign war-chest and become dominant parties by creating quasi-permanent asymmetries between insiders and outsiders. Incumbents can access public funds when the public bureaucracy is politically controlled through non-merit-based hiring, firing, and career advancement that make bureaucrats less likely to act as gatekeepers (Shefter, 1994 Epstein, 1986: 110–11; Geddes, 1994). They can use public funds for partisan advantage where campaign finance laws do not exist or cannot be enforced because the electoral authority is controlled by the incumbent.

Dominant parties’ control over the government also discourages private donors from funding challenger parties. Where rotation is expected, as in the United States, major donors often hedge their bets by contributing some amount to the party they like less (Jacobson, 1980). Even where a donor’s preferred party has virtually no chance of winning, she may contribute if costs are low. Such donors helped launch third parties in the United States and Green parties in West Europe. But the threat of economic or physical retribution in dominant party systems deters major donors from supporting an opposition party to any significant extent.\(^\text{10}\)

Asymmetric Costs of Participation
Running for office or working as an activist entails personal costs. In fully competitive democracies, these costs are typically limited to time and energy, and they are close to equal across parties (Aldrich and Bianco, 1992). In dominant party systems, costs are
asymmetric and different in kind for members of the opposition. First, opposition personnel pay high opportunity costs for not joining the incumbent since they usually forego stipends and the material benefits associated with access to the old boys’ network. Second, in DPARs, opposition personnel also suffer the threat of repression. DPARs permit meaningful elections, ensure basic political rights, and are headed by civilians, but the incumbent’s control over the government allows it to deploy the military and law enforcement against regime outsiders. Such repression falls far short of the “ban on all pluralism” (Féher et al., 1983: 159–65) in one-party regimes where the state attempts to purge or purify the body politic (Tucker, 1965). Rather, it is typically targeted, episodic, and used as a last resort when cooptation fails (Solinger, 2001). This hierarchy of tactics is neatly summarized as “two carrots, then a stick” (Hellman, 1983). Freedom House civil rights scores reflect these differences between regime types. DPDR and DPAR country-year mean scores are 2.5 and 3.7, respectively, while fully competitive democracies with turnover are better at 2.0 and one-party regimes are worse at 5.4. All comparisons are statistically significant at the .001 level.

Modeling Candidate and Activist Party Affiliation in Dominant Party Systems

Asymmetric resources and costs of participation affect the ideological profile of citizens willing to work for an opposition party. A resource-poor challenger that is outmatched in advertising, out-staffed in canvassing, and outspent on patronage has a lower chance of winning no matter what the party’s strategy. Thus, a prospective participant would have to be substantially opposed to the status quo policy offered by the incumbent to want to participate in an activity with such low instrumental benefits and high costs. Specifying exactly how opposed to the status quo for a given level of resource and cost asymmetries requires us to model prospective candidates’ and activists’ party affiliation decisions. (I treat candidates and activists together as “party elites” since opposition candidates rarely win and high-level activists deeply influence party strategies.) There are three payoffs to constructing a model. First, by getting party elites’ utility functions right, I show why opposition parties form when existing non-neutral spatial theories suggest that they should not. Second, by specifying how the dominant party’s advantages affect the ideological profiles of those willing to become opposition elites, I show why challengers
are noncentrist when neutral spatial theories predict otherwise. Finally, I generate precise hypotheses about the dynamics of party affiliation as the dominant party’s advantages and costs change.

In order to understand who would join an opposition party, we first need to specify why citizens become active in party politics. Most current models view party elites as pure instrumentalists who want to win for the ego rents associated with the prestige, power, and notoriety of public office (Aldrich and Bianco, 1992; Cox, 1997, Ch. 8). According to Schlesinger, parties are “primarily vehicles for allowing individuals ambitious for public office to compete for office effectively” (1991: vii). But this assumption leads to a dead end. As noted above, if participants were pure instrumentalists, then no one would join opposition parties, these parties would not form, and dominant party systems would collapse into one-party regimes. Since challengers to dominant parties do exist, participants must value something more than winning.

The problem confronting prospective participants in the opposition is not unlike the “rebel’s dilemma” where it is possible that “no potential dissent will become actual dissent” (Lichbach, 1998: xii). One way to get individuals to work for infinitely divisible collective benefits such as the policy promises in a typical political party’s platform is to offer selective material incentives (Olson, 1971; Tullock, 1971). Yet this argument makes little sense for challengers to dominant parties. They are so poor that, for instance, challengers in Mexico had just a handful of paid staff until the 1990s, ran sparse campaigns that were largely financed by the candidates (if at all), and could barely keep the lights on. Challengers were similarly poor in dominant party Italy (Tarrow, 1990; Shefter, 1994), Taiwan (Chu, 2001; Solinger, 2001), India (Sridharan and Varshney, 2001), Israel (Shalev, 1990), Malaysia (Gomez, 1994), and Singapore (Rahim, 2001).

A more plausible solution to the participation problem focuses on what Chong (1991: 73) calls “narrowly rational expressive” benefits that accrue to self-interested activists when they are able to “effectively express their anger or disapproval over a policy or existing state of affairs” (1991: 88) whether or not they achieve their goals. Yet unlike a social or solidary benefit that could derive from participation in nonpolitical organizations, it is what Clark and Wilson call a “purposive selective incentive” where “the members are brought together to change the status quo” (1961: 136). Benefits like
changing economic policy or opening the political system are purposive because they are collective goods tied to the group’s goals (Clark and Wilson, 1961: 135) and they are selective because they only accrue to participants who actively express support for them (Moe, 1980: 118).

Expressive benefits can be powerful enough to overcome the disincentives to participation in high-cost group activities that have a low probability of success. Clark and Wilson argue that “if organizational purposes constitute the primary incentive, then low prestige, unpleasant working conditions, and other material and solidary advantages will be outweighed—in the mind of the contributor—by the ‘good’ ends which the organization may eventually achieve” (1961: 136; Moe, 1980: 118). Chong further implies that expression appeals more to disadvantaged outsiders when he writes, “We are able to transform society and ‘make history’ by way of collective action only when there is a worthy opponent that must be subdued” (1991: 88).

I argue that all participants in challengers to dominant parties value both the expressive goals associated with participation and the instrumental goals of winning office for themselves or their party, although they may prioritize one goal over the other. Survey data and over 100 in-depth interviews of challenger party personnel in Mexico suggest that some party elites prioritize instrumental benefits and prefer to run for office or help their party win. These *office-seekers* are still committed to party goals associated with political change, but they prefer to work from the top down through the bully pulpit. Their refrain is “you cannot change policy unless you first win elections.” Others prioritize expressive benefits and prefer to operate behind the scenes by crafting the party’s message and expanding its base one heart and mind at a time. The refrain of these *message-seekers* is “winning is only valuable if it reflects social transformation from the bottom up.”

Given these motivations or values, how anti-status quo on policy would a prospective *office-seeker* and message-seeker have to be to join the opposition rather than the dominant party? How would the policy radicalism of new cohorts differ from prior cohorts as the dominant party’s advantages change?

I modify Aldrich and Bianco’s (1992) model of candidate affiliation by arguing that prospective *office-seekers* examine four fundamental incentives when making party affiliation decisions. First, they look at the pre-election probability of victory \( p_x \),
preferring to join the party that offers the higher likelihood. Second, they examine the
difficulty of winning nomination \( s_k \), preferring the party that offers the quickest access
to the ballot (Cox, 1997). Third, they want to minimize the personal costs of
participation \( c_k \). Finally, to the existing model I add expressive benefits \( u(e_k) \), where
a prospective participant prefers to work for a party that shares his or her policy views.
Combining these elements, the expected utility to a prospective office-seeker \( i \) of action
\( k \), defined as affiliating with a dominant party (d) or a challenger (c), is
\[
Eu_i(a_k) = p_k [s_k u(o) + u(e_k)] - c_k .
\] (1)
The \( u(o) \) term is a constant that captures the utility of office for its own sake regardless
of which party an office-seeker joins. The \( u(e_k) \) term captures the selective benefit of
expressing a partisan message. Expressive benefits should rise as office-seeker \( i \) agrees
more with party \( k' \)’s message. Thus, I define the value of expression as the quadratic loss
function
\[
u_i(e_k) = q - (x_k - x_i)^2
\] (2)
where \( x_i \) is the personal policy preference of the prospective office-seeker \( i \) and \( x_k \) is the
policy stance of each party before she decides to affiliate. The constant \( q \) satisfies the
condition \( q = \max(x_k - x_i)^2 \) and simply ensures that \( u(e_k) \) is always positive.\(^\text{15}\)

What makes the utility function in (1) a representation of an office-seeker’s
incentive structure is that the probability of victory tempers the value of winning office and of expressing a partisan message. These office-seekers are not pure instrumentalists
in that they like to work for a good cause, but their interest in the cause declines with the
probability of victory. As a result, an office-seeker may sacrifice some ideological
congruence for a better chance of winning.

I also add message-seekers as a new type of party elite. These actors also want to
win, but they are more interested in pursuing policy goals through partisan political
pressure, disseminating information, and transforming politics from society. Whether on
the left or the right, they believe they are engaged in a Gramscian war of position. Rather
than just campaigning for a particular candidate, they campaign for an historical cause
such as the realization of a free, just, pious, socialist, or liberal society. They value the
same elements as office-seekers—except the utility of office and the probability of
nomination—but they weight the elements differently. Message-seekers’ utility functions are

\[ Eu_i(a_k) = u(e_k)(\alpha + p_k) - c_k \]  

(3)

where \( \alpha \) is a constant. Unlike office-seekers who discount the importance of partisan expression by the probability of victory, message-seekers value expression \( u(e_k) \) for its own sake. Thus, message-seekers are more ideologically firm and less willing to compromise on policy for electoral expediency. Yet they are not necessarily radicals like Kitschelt’s (1989) “ideologues,” Panebianco’s (1988) “believers,” or the extremist activists featured in other theories about intra-party actors (May, 1973; Jackson, 1999). They are defined by what they value, not by what they advocate. In fact, since they care less about winning, they are more willing to join the opposition at lower levels of policy disagreement with the incumbent even if the opposition will lose with certainty. The only way that no message-seekers will join the opposition is if it has no chance of winning and the participation costs are so high that they outweigh the value of making any partisan statement (i.e., when \( u(e_k) \alpha < c_k \)).

To understand the value of expressive benefits, we need to model the parties’ overall policy appeals (the \( x_k \)s) that enter party elites’ utility functions through (2) above. The dominant party holds most positions in government, so its policy appeals are determined by its officeholders, much as models on the fully competitive democracies assume (Alesina and Spear, 1988; Stokes, 1999). In contrast, challengers to dominant parties have limited access to public office, and, as a result, they are primarily “parties in the electorate” whose policy positions are determined by their elites. The key modeling decision is how party elites’ preferences are aggregated (i.e., the party’s organizational form). For simplicity, I assume full intra-party democracy. Thus, opposition party position \( x_k \) can be written as

\[ x_k = \left( \frac{\sum x_{isk} + \sum x_{imk}}{n_k} \right) \]  

(4)

where \( x_{isk} \) is the policy preference of each office-seeker \( i \) in party \( k \), \( x_{imk} \) is the preference of each message-seeker \( i \) in party \( k \), and \( n \) is the total number of elites in party \( k \). This expression represents a simple average of all participants’ preferences.
A final assumption concerns the origin of party elites’ policy preferences (the $x_i$s). All citizens are potential party elites. Therefore, I assume that both office-seekers’ and message-seekers’ policy preferences are uniformly distributed over a single dimension $[-1, 1]$. This assumption is important because it does not distinguish ex ante between voters’ preferences and those of potential party elites. Other theories that do so assume that intra-party actors are more extreme than voters (May, 1973; Jackson, 1999), thus building one of the most interesting conclusions into the assumptions instead of deriving it from the dynamics of competition.\textsuperscript{18}

We can now use the model to generate hypotheses about the policy profiles of opposition parties and their elites as resource and cost asymmetries change. To make the math more tractable, I focus on the case of two-party competition between a nominally centrist dominant party and an opposition party that is always to its left (i.e., no leapfrogging is allowed). The model produces analogous results if the challenger is nominally on the right.

The main findings that I want to highlight are the policy preferences of the office-seeker ($x^*_o$) and message-seeker ($x^*_m$) who are just indifferent between joining either the dominant party and the challenger.\textsuperscript{19} I bypass the lengthy mathematical solutions and show results graphically.\textsuperscript{20} In addition, I focus on the dynamics of party development rather than formation per se. I am less interested in the political entrepreneurs who form opposition parties than the candidates and activists who decide to support them, thus providing fuel for the entrepreneur’s spark.

Figure 1 presents the policy preference of $x^*_o$ and $x^*_m$ for varying cost asymmetries between the incumbent and challenger where negative values on the vertical axis are defined as “leftwing” positions. For each panel, all office-seekers to the left of $x^*_o$ and all message-seekers to the left of $x^*_m$ join the challenger while all those to the right join the incumbent. If we think about opposition party development as occurring over multiple elections where the challenger slowly chips away at the incumbent, then the figure provides an aggregate picture of opposition party building. Results in Panel A assume no cost differences for joining the incumbent or challenger (i.e., no asymmetry in opportunity costs and no repression). It shows that elites join the incumbent in
overwhelming numbers when the challenger is unlikely to win, but some are so far from the status quo on policy that they join the challenger. The aggregate partition does not reach parity until the parties have an equal chance of winning.

FIGURE 1
PREDICTED POLICY PREFERENCES OF INDIFFERENT OFFICE-SEEKERS AND MESSAGE-SEEKERS WITH CHANGING COSTS OF PARTICIPATION

\[ x_0^* = \text{The office-seeker who is just indifferent between joining the (leftwing) challenger and the dominant party.} \]

\[ x_m^* = \text{The message-seeker who is just indifferent between joining the (leftwing) challenger and the dominant party.} \]

\[ p_c = \text{The challenger party’s probability of victory.} \]
Panel A shows the radicalizing effect of challenger parties’ lower chances of winning, but equal costs are unrealistic even in DPDRs where opposition party elites pay high opportunity costs. Costs are of course substantially more asymmetric in DPARs where opposition elites risk repression. Panels B-D thus show \(x_o^*\) and \(x_m^*\) for progressively higher cost differences. The main finding is clear: as cost asymmetries increase, those willing to join the opposition are more extreme on policy. But how unequal can costs become before a dominant party system transforms into a one-party system without a party-based opposition? I argue that the cost differential should be low enough to retain an instrumental rationale for activism and thus a reason to form opposition parties rather than groups that rely more heavily on expressive benefits such as social movements and revolutionary organizations.\(^{21}\)

As costs rise, the instrumental incentives featured in office-seekers’ utility functions push them away from party-based activism. The indifferent office-seeker’s policy preference is “out of bounds” until the opposition’s probability of victory reaches about 12% in Panel C and 48% in Panel D. I interpret this to imply that no office-seekers will join the challenger at this level of costs until the chance of winning surpasses a threshold. Thus, in highly repressive systems that still somehow feature meaningful electoral competition, opposition parties should fail to form. This implies that repression is a delicate tool for incumbents in DPARs such as Mexico, Taiwan, Senegal, and Malaysia. They run the risk of clamping down so hard that opposition forces abandon party politics, thus transforming the system into a one-party regime.

**Hypotheses: Dominance and the Dynamics of Opposition Party Recruitment**

The model generates six predictions about how prospective party elites sort themselves into the dominant party or the opposition.

*Hypothesis 1: Resource Asymmetries:* Opposition party elites’ policy radicalism rises with the dominant party’s resource advantages. As resource asymmetries increase the probability of opposition victory decreases, implying that a prospective participant would have to be more distant from the status quo to join the opposition. Conversely, as resources become more symmetric, more moderate personnel join the opposition.
Hypothesis 2: Asymmetric Costs of Affiliation: Opposition party elites’ policy radicalism rises with the costs of affiliation. As opportunity costs or repression rise, a prospective participant would have to be more distant from the status quo policy to join the challenger. As costs become more symmetric, more moderate personnel join the opposition.

Hypothesis 3: Party Elite Type: Since office-seekers prioritize winning, they are more sensitive to changes in the incumbent’s resource advantages. In the aggregate, they will be more radical than message-seekers when resources are highly asymmetric and less radical when they are more symmetric.

Hypothesis 4: Proportion of Office-Seekers. Since office-seekers are more radical when the dominant party’s advantages are high, there should be fewer of them than message-seekers. As advantages decline, the proportion of office-seekers should rise.

Hypothesis 5: Challenger Party Position. Since opposition parties’ appeals are determined by the preferences of the elites who join them, challengers’ radicalism with respect to the status quo should rise with resource and cost asymmetries.

Hypothesis 6: DPARs and DPDRs. Since DPARs almost always impose higher costs on opposition personnel, challengers in these systems will be more radical at the same level of resource asymmetries than in DPDRs. As a result, all else being equal, challengers in DPDRs should typically win more and dominant parties should persist with lower vote shares.

TESTING THE ARGUMENT ON MEXICO

Testing this argument requires fine-grained data on party elites. I use data from the Mexico Party Personnel Surveys (MPPS) that I conducted with a team of interviewers between March and November 1999. We completed two surveys per party for a total of 1,470 responses. One set of surveys was directed at members of the National Political Councils that include distinguished party leaders and many current officeholders. These samples approached censuses with responses from between 55% and 65% of the populations. The other set was directed at voting delegates at national party conventions with samples ranging from 5% to 16%. These data represent the current stock of party elites at party meetings in 1999. By not measuring the outflow of personnel who became
inactive before that date, my findings could be biased; however, the bias would favor my hypotheses only under very unlikely circumstances.\textsuperscript{24}

**The Dependent Variable: Party Elites’ Policy Preferences**

In order to understand the policy preferences of party elites, we need to identify the main issues that structured party-voter alignments. Before the 2000 elections, partisan competition in Mexico was two-dimensional and included an economic policy cleavage that pitted free marketeers against advocates of state-led development as well as a cross-cutting regime cleavage that separated democratizers from authoritarian actors (Molinar, 1991; Bruhn, 2001).

Prior work shows that these two dimensions structured opinion at the mass level (Domínguez and McCann, 1996; Magaloni, 1997). I reproduced these analyses using LatinoBarometer 1999 data and found that voters were centrist and close to normally distributed over the economic policy dimension and surprisingly centrist on the regime dimension as well.\textsuperscript{25} I then conducted a factor analysis of very similar issue items from the MPPS to see if party elites had the same cognitive map. As expected, the analysis recovered the same two latent dimensions. Even though social issues such as abortion and the death penalty were included, they did not constitute a separate dimension among respondents.\textsuperscript{26} On economic policy issues, National Action Party (PAN) elites were concentrated on the right and Party of the Democratic Revolution (PRD) elites were on the left. However, preferences in both parties ranged from moderate to radical anti-status quo.\textsuperscript{27} On regime issues, elites in both parties substantially favored democracy.\textsuperscript{28} These distributions should come as no surprise to students of Mexico’s politics; however, the data show two puzzles. First, given the incentives to moderate due to centrist voters, why did party elites not endorse more centrist policies that could presumably improve their electoral chances? Second, what explains disagreements within and between the opposition parties?

**Explanatory Variables: Resource Advantages, Costs of Participation, and Party Elite Type**

In order to measure the explanatory variables highlighted in the hypotheses above, we need information on the political conditions that citizens experienced at the time they
decided to affiliate with an opposition party. I argue that these initial conditions had
durable effects on party elites’ policy preferences, even as conditions changed. Ideally,
we would have repeated cross-sections to measure party elites’ policy preferences over
the last 30 years. Since no such data exist, I construct a faux longitudinal analysis where
the dependent variable was measured in 1999 only and the explanatory variables were
measured by year and then matched to each respondent’s initial year of affiliation. It is
likely, of course, that party personnel learn over time and update their preferences as they
do. Yet if everyone updated similarly as new political conditions emerged, then all
interviewees in 1999 would hold very similar preferences. Not taking learning into
account actually biases the results substantially against Hypotheses 1 and 2. Thus, if the
data show that the initial socialization still affected party personnel in 1999, then we can
be confident that the findings are robust.

Measuring Dominant Party Resource Advantages

Resource asymmetries between competing parties are difficult to measure under any
circumstances, but particularly difficult in a dominant party setting. Incumbent dominant
parties that win votes partly by bribing voters using public resources have incentives to
hide their finances. Probably for this reason, data on campaign finance are not available
for Mexico until 1994. As a result, we need an indirect over-time measure of the PRI’s
resource advantages dating back to 1970. I argue that dominant parties can raise more
partisan funds from public resources when the state’s participation in the economy is
large and the public bureaucracy is politically controlled. As described above, absent a
gatekeeper, incumbents can appropriate the state’s economic power in a number of ways
including the direct use of public funds and administrative resources, provision of public
sector jobs, use of highly targeted spending bills, and awarding of contracts and
economic protection in exchange for kickbacks. The mix varies by country and over time,
so case knowledge helps determine the best measurement strategy.

In Mexico, the federal public bureaucracy was politically controlled and thus was
unlikely to protect public funds from partisan pillaging. PRI governments controlled
hiring, firing, and advancement either directly through political appointments of “workers
of confidence” or indirectly through public sector unions tied to the party in what
Moctezuma Barragán and Roemer call a “spoils system [where] posts inside the public administration have been the prizes and rewards (or punishments) for those who have shown ‘loyalty’ to the boss or leader of his political group (2001: 122). Arrellano and Guerrero further argue that “the public administration system was a strategic tool for political control...to generate a transparent, accountable, honest, and externally controlled public apparatus would jeopardize the political control that the dominant political group has enjoyed” (2000: 6). Despite calls for a professional civil service by technocrats, reforms were not pursued until 2001, after the PRI lost national power.

Without gatekeepers, the PRI could more easily capture and politicize public funds. I measure variation in the PRI’s resource advantages by scoring the contribution made by state-owned enterprise (SOE) investment and production to GDP. Higher SOE participation means larger budgets controlled by the incumbent, more public sector jobs available for partisan distribution, and more state capacity to offer economic protection for political support. SOE participation in Mexico hovered around 17% of GDP in the 1970s, reached its peak of 22.3% in 1983, and then declined continuously over the next seventeen years as Mexico moved from protectionist to free market economic policies, reaching a low of just 5.5% in 2000.³¹

To be clear, I consider SOE participation as a proxy for the relative magnitude of the PRI’s patronage resources over time, not its absolute size. I argue that the decline in SOEs progressively deprived the PRI of patronage goods because it limited the size of the pie from which it could take partisan slices. Thus, those who joined the opposition in the 1970s and early 1980s faced a significantly richer PRI that was able to supplement policy appeals with substantial patronage outlays to voters and reduce the opposition’s chances of winning. As privatization made the incumbent poorer beginning in the mid-1980s, partisan competition for votes was waged on a more level playing field. To operationalize the resource environment, I match SOEs as a percent of GDP by year with the initial year of affiliation of each party elite.³²

The Costs of Activism: Opportunity Costs and the Repression of Opposition Forces

The costs of political activism in dominant party systems are largely controlled by the incumbent. It can lower the costs of participation for its members by providing stipends,
in-kind goods, insider favors, transportation, meals, and other benefits. Resource-poor challengers cannot provide such club goods, thus raising the opportunity cost of joining the challengers. In addition, incumbents in DPARs may target repression against opposition personnel by cutting off access to basic services such as water and power, threatening their livelihood, or harassing, jailing, or physically abusing them or their families.

Despite the clear asymmetry in opportunity costs, there is no straightforward way to measure the value of access to the PRI’s old-boy’s network, although it probably covaried with resource asymmetries more generally. Repression is easier to measure. While coercion varied over time and across the national territory, analysts agree that it generally declined from its high point in the late 1960s and early 1970s when the government massacred student protesters and hunted radical leftwing forces to the 1980s and 1990s when harassment was milder. One way to capture this trend is to use Freedom House civil liberties scores. Although they are the best quantitative data available, they underrepresent the true level of repression during much of the 1970s. The full extent of officially-sanctioned torture and disappearances during this period was not known until the PRI lost national power in 2000. To take this new and important information into account, I raised scores from 1972 to 1976 by 10% to reflect the more repressive environment. I also added scores for 1970 and 1971, equal to the modified 1972 score.33

Types of Party Elites: Office-seekers and Message-seekers
Why citizens become active in party politics conditions how the political environment affects their willingness to join the opposition. To identify respondents as office-seekers or message-seekers, the MPPS collected data on respondents’ preferred post, regardless of the position they held at the time of the survey. Those who wanted to run for office were considered office-seekers while those who preferred to serve inside the party organization were considered message-seekers. All three parties had more office-seekers than message-seekers, with the PAN at 54%, the PRD at 65%, and, not surprisingly, the PRI at 74%. Hypothesis 4 suggested that the proportion of office-seekers in the opposition should increase as the partisan playing field becomes fairer. Data bear this out. Among party elites who affiliated with the PAN in the 1970s, the proportion of each type
was about the same, but nearly 60% of new joiners in the 1990s were office-seekers. Similarly, about 55% of those who joined the left in the 1970s were office-seekers, but among new joiners in the late 1990s, they accounted for nearly 70%. These over-time differences are statistically significant at the .001 level. As the partisan playing field became fairer, office-seekers had increasing chances of winning with the opposition, so more of them indulged ideological conviction and joined a challenger party instead of the incumbent.

**Quantitative Tests of the Formal Model of Party Elite Affiliation**

In this section, I test Hypotheses 1–3 by estimating OLS regression models where the dependent variables are respondents’ preferences over economic policy and regime issues. Models include the explanatory variables operationalized above and variables associated with alternative hypotheses. First, I include real GDP per capita, chain rule series from Penn World Tables 6.1. Economic development could level the partisan playing field even if the state’s participation in the economy remains constant by creating more independent sources of opposition party funding or by increasing the size of the middle class that is presumably less susceptible to patronage politics. To use this variable in the faux longitudinal analysis and test whether development had a moderating effect on party elites, I matched yearly GDP per capita to each respondent’s initial year of affiliation. Second, I include the annual percentage Change in GDP—again matched to each respondent’s initial year of affiliation—to test for the shorter-term effects of economic crisis that might quickly generate negative retrospective evaluations of the incumbent’s performance, leading prospective party elites to perceive a better chance of winning with the opposition and sending more moderates to the challenger parties. Third, I add a dummy variable Leader that measures whether a respondent was a leader (i.e., a member of the National Political Council) or an activist (i.e., National Assembly delegate) to test whether higher-level leaders are more moderate as the “curvilinear disparities” thesis predicts (May, 1973). Finally, I include a host of demographic variables that could plausibly affect policy preferences, including Age, Education, Female, and Religiosity.
I constructed models for each party where economic policy and regime preference are the dependent variables. Negative scores on the economic policy preferences dimension indicate a preference for state-led economic development while positive values indicate a preference for market-led development. Thus, movement toward the center is represented by negative coefficients for PAN personnel and positive coefficients for PRD personnel. On regime issues, positive values indicate a preference for a faster and more complete transition to democracy while negative scores are associated with authoritarian positions. Moderation on regime issues is indicated by negative coefficients for both parties.

Results are shown in Table 1. I parsed the resources variable between office-seekers and message-seekers to show the slope coefficients for each elite type separately. \( \text{Resources} \times \text{Office} \) represents the size of state-owned enterprises as a percent of GDP that corresponds to each office-seekers’ initial year of affiliation while \( \text{Resources} \times \text{Message} \) represents the same but for message-seekers only. I did the same for the costs of affiliation variable. \( \text{Costs} \times \text{Office} \) represents the modified Freedom House score that corresponds to each office-seeker for her year of affiliation and \( \text{Costs} \times \text{Message} \) measures the same for message-seekers alone. \text{Office} \) is a dummy variable coded 0 for message-seekers and 1 for office-seekers. \text{PRI’s Economic Position} \) and \text{PRI’s Regime Position} \) are factor scores representing the incumbent’s policy platform for each respondent’s year of initial affiliation derived from a content analysis of published documents by Bruhn (2001).
TABLE 1

OLS MODELS OF PARTY ELITES’ ECONOMIC POLICY AND REGIMES
PREFERENCES

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Independent Variable</th>
<th>PRD</th>
<th></th>
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<th>PAN</th>
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<tr>
<td>Resources*Office</td>
<td>-0.013**</td>
<td>0.012*</td>
<td>0.020**</td>
<td>0.002</td>
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<tr>
<td>(0.006)</td>
<td>(0.007)</td>
<td>(0.008)</td>
<td>(0.005)</td>
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<tr>
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<td>0.020*</td>
<td>0.006</td>
<td>0.010*</td>
</tr>
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<td>(0.011)</td>
<td>(0.009)</td>
<td>(0.006)</td>
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<tr>
<td>Costs*Office</td>
<td>-0.229**</td>
<td>1.093**</td>
<td>0.225**</td>
<td>0.321*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(0.110)</td>
<td>(0.501)</td>
<td>(0.111)</td>
<td>(0.181)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Costs*Message</td>
<td>0.289</td>
<td>0.730</td>
<td>0.159</td>
<td>0.213</td>
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<tr>
<td>(0.707)</td>
<td>(0.709)</td>
<td>(0.356)</td>
<td>(0.228)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Office (0=message; 1=office)</td>
<td>0.373</td>
<td>-0.180</td>
<td>-0.216</td>
<td>0.042</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Leader (0=activist; 1=leader)</td>
<td>-0.088*</td>
<td>0.079</td>
<td>0.045*</td>
<td>0.115**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(0.053)</td>
<td>(0.057)</td>
<td>(0.027)</td>
<td>(0.058)</td>
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<td>-0.0005</td>
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<td>-0.022*</td>
</tr>
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<td>(0.013)</td>
<td>(0.012)</td>
<td>(0.012)</td>
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<tr>
<td>Female (0=male; 1=female)</td>
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<td>(0.047)</td>
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<td>Education</td>
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<td>0.092***</td>
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<td>PRI’s Economic Position</td>
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<td>0.172*</td>
<td>0.172*</td>
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<td>(0.098)</td>
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<td>(0.000)</td>
<td>(0.000)</td>
<td>(0.000)</td>
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<tr>
<td>GDP Change</td>
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<tr>
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<td>(0.009)</td>
<td>(0.005)</td>
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<td>(0.497)</td>
<td>(0.366)</td>
<td>(0.173)</td>
<td></td>
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</tbody>
</table>

Entries are unstandardized coefficients. Standard errors appear in parentheses.

*** p<.01; ** p<.05; * p<.1

The most important result evident in Table 1 is that the coefficients for resources and repression for office-seekers are in the expected direction and remain statistically significant in all models except one. The coefficients for message-seekers are only significant for costs and only when regime preference is the dependent variable.
However, as noted in Hypothesis 3, the hypotheses predicted only very small effects for message-seekers. Since statistical techniques have difficulty distinguishing small effects from zero without a very large number of cases, failure to reach statistical significance for this variable is not unexpected.

Resources and costs remained important predictors of policy preferences even when controlling for demographic variables and macroeconomic indicators. Advancing age is typically associated with policy moderation, but it fails to reach statistical significance in three of the four models and the sign is in the wrong direction where it is significant. Among personnel in both parties, education is associated with a greater preference for market-led economic development, but even when we control for these effects, resources and repression remain significant. It is even more impressive that GDP per capita and annual change in GDP had no effect on policy preferences, implying that socioeconomic development did not breed moderation and economic crisis did not quickly produce centrist parties that could take advantage of the PRI’s performance blunders.

The effects of the political environment on individuals’ long-term policy preferences are also substantively large. The most accessible way to appreciate the results is to examine the predicted preferences of opposition personnel by year of affiliation. To create the simulation, I reproduce the political conditions that a prospective party elite would have encountered in a given year by substituting in the observed values on the resources and costs variables while holding all other variables at their mean or mode and generating predicted values from the model. The simulation shows the combined effect of changes in the PRI’s resource advantages and the use of repression on the mean predicted policy preference of yearly opposition cohorts.

Figure 2 shows predicted economic policy preferences. The solid trend lines for office-seekers and the dashed trend lines for message-seekers show that those who joined the PAN and PRD in the 1970s were much less centrist than those who joined in the late 1990s. I also added the preferences of PRI personnel as predicted by analogous regression models (not shown), although I did not distinguish them by type since the great majority were office-seekers. The PRI line shows that those who joined the status quo party were centrist on average over time. The overall impression, as predicted in
Hypothesis 5, is of challenger parties polarized to the left and the right on economic policy when the PRI’s resource advantages were high and its use of repression extensive, and increasingly centrist challenger parties as those advantages decline. A simulation for regime preferences shows similarly that opposition personnel were more pro-regime change if they joined when the PRI advantages were higher; however, due to space considerations, I concentrate on economic policy preferences here.

The differences between party office-seekers and message-seekers also appear as predicted in Hypothesis 3. Even though these differences are small, office-seekers are more radical on policy than message-seekers when the probability of victory is low and costs are high. As the promise of achieving office via a challenger party increases, new office-seekers are more moderate than new message-seekers who respond less to changes in the competitive environment since they care less about winning.

Overall, the results of the statistical tests supply strong evidence for Hypotheses 1–3. Figure 2 looks strikingly similar to Figure 1 generated from the formal model. Yet the results actually understate the match between theory and data since the formal model predicted that the preference of the indifferent party elite would moderate as resource and costs asymmetries decline and the preference of the mean party elite shown in Figure 2 is necessarily less moderate than the indifferent one.

The underlying (i.e., non-trended) predicted values, represented by the thinner solid grey line for office-seekers and the dashed grey line for message-seekers, closely parallel political events in Mexico. They lend credibility to the model’s predictions and show that new joiners were very sensitive to changes in the partisan political environment captured in the explanatory variables. They also underscore two key elements in the PRI’s longevity. First, the challenger parties were polarized on economic policy issues and would not ally against the incumbent, despite their similar support for democracy. Second, the challengers were individually under-competitive because they were out of step with the preferences of the median voter.

The left’s radicalism in the early and mid-1970s responded to the PRI’s substantial resource advantages and state-sponsored violence, first against students and then against broader leftist groups (Hellman, 1983). In response, the independent left shrank in size, radicalized in posture, and fragmented (Johnson, 1978). The PAN’s
FIGURE 2

PARTY ELITES’ PREDICTED ECONOMIC POLICY PREFERENCES, 1970–1999
comparative radicalism in the 1970s was spearheaded by party president Conchello, who
Shirk characterized as a “caustic anti-leftist” (2005: 79) and likely responded to the
substantial expansion of public ownership and rhetorical attacks on business reminiscent
of the 1930s populism that encouraged capital interests to help form the PAN in 1939.

The initial round of moderation in the late 1970s evident in Figure 2 was a
response to the PRI’s 1977 electoral reform that was accompanied by a reduction in
repression. The PRI’s advantages had created such severe polarization that neither the left
nor the right participated in the 1976 elections, temporarily turning Mexico into a one-
party regime and creating a legitimacy crisis for the PRI. The reform successfully
encouraged opposition groups to reenter partisan politics, leading the left to give up the
goal of revolution and coalesce behind a new and more moderate party called the
Mexican Unified Socialist Party (PSUM). On the right, pro-business party elites
associated with Conchello yielded to Catholic humanists who were socially conservative
but skeptical of the market’s effects on community. But despite the decrease in
repression, the opposition did not moderate enough to win, and thus PRI dominance
endured.

A common argument suggests that the PRI lost due to the 1982 debt crisis. The
crisis certainly turned many voters against the PRI; however, since the state’s economic
role actually expanded until 1984, opposition parties remained at a severe disadvantage
and new joiners were more, not less, out of step with the median voter’s preference. On
the right, the 1982 bank nationalization politicized entrepreneurs and sent them to the
PAN. These “neopanistas” were far more market-oriented and focused on winning office
than the party’s social conservatives (Mizrahi, 2003). Figure 2 reflects this by showing
that new office-seekers were more radical on economic policy through the late 1980s but
message-seekers remained about the same. On the left, new joiners after 1982 were also
somewhat more radical on economic policy than earlier cohorts; however, since public
policy moved to the left, the left’s radicalization is not as marked as the right’s. In
general, the challenger parties’ failure to moderate in this period made them unable to
take advantage of voters’ discontent with the PRI’s performance, thus helping to prolong
PRI rule for some 15 years after the crisis.
It is not until after 1985 that privatization substantially downsized the state, shrinking public sector involvement in the economy by nearly a factor of four over the next 15 years. As free market reforms created a leaner state, the PRI’s access to illicit public resources and its ability to dole out patronage jobs plummeted. It searched for other sources of campaign finance, first turning to the private sector and then creating a system of public financing that increasingly included funding for the opposition as well as oversight and reporting mechanisms. Thus, while the PRI accounted for 72% of all public and private campaign spending in the 1994 elections, it fell to just 38% in 2000.34

As the PRI’s advantages diminished and the partisan playing field leveled, new opposition elites were more centrist, and this was reflected in the challenger parties’ moderation (Bruhn, 2001). Centrism made the opposition much more appealing to moderate voters and in particular to the 35–40% of the electorate that identified as independents. By expanding beyond their core constituencies, the PAN and PRD attracted enough votes to strip the PRI of its historic majority in Congress in 1997 and for the PAN’s Vicente Fox to win the presidency in 2000, thus ending 71 years of PRI rule.

EXTENDING THE ARGUMENT TO OTHER DOMINANT PARTY SYSTEMS

The resource theory of dominance also helps understand the dynamics of partisan competition and regime longevity in other dominant party systems. Fine-grained data on party elites are not available for other cases, so we cannot test the formal model’s individual-level predictions. In addition, there is currently not enough comparable data on incumbents’ resource advantages to facilitate time-series cross-sectional statistical analysis,35 and there are too few country cases to test a meaningful cross-sectional model. However, country studies and party monographs present a convincing case at the aggregate level. Space considerations only allow suggestive sketches of two cases. In other work, I extend the argument to a broader set of cases (Greene, 2007). Here, I purposively selected Malaysia and Italy as parallel demonstration of theory using one DPAR and one DPDR. Given their many differences, these cases also help show that culture, region, and level of development do not explain dominance.36
Malaysia: Continued Authoritarian Dominance

Malaysia’s United Malaysian National Organization (UMNO) has dominated since 1974 when competitive rule was restored following a brief suspension, and it remains dominant today. Dominance has persisted despite competition in part because the four main challengers have failed to “contest UMNO for the moderate political discursive space” (Chua, 2001: 142–43). UMNO rule is underwritten by “vast patronage machinery that has been pivotal in enabling the party to win and maintain electoral support” (Gomez, 1994: 290). At the same time, “identification with the opposition meant denial of the benefits associated with the patronage network” (Crouch, 1996: 240). The incumbent’s machine is funded in part by a large public sector, and in particular by the National Economic Plan (NEP) that began in 1974 to transfer wealth from the economically dominant Chinese population to ethnic Malays. Under the NEP, public development expenditure increased to nearly 15% of GNP and remained there through the 1990s even as many developing countries were privatizing. It also increased public sector employment by 50%, and so thoroughly politicized the public bureaucracy that “government machinery at the local level was regularly mobilized during election campaigns” (Crouch, 1996: 62). A large state and a politically quiescent public bureaucracy mean that “the party’s hegemony allowed it access to state rents that could be disbursed to develop a powerful party base” (Gomez, 2002: 86). It also makes private business reliant on UMNO for licenses, contracts, and favorable credit deals (Crouch, 1996: 238–39) that they obtained in exchange for kickbacks. Finally, UMNO owns its own businesses that serve as cash cows for the party’s patronage machine (Gomez, 2002).

One might expect the 1997 Asian economic crisis to threaten UMNO dominance; however, UMNO successfully resisted IMF-prescribed adjustment policies and managed to keep the government centrally involved in economic development. As a result, despite the economic contraction, the party maintained the majority of its resource advantages. To be sure, UMNO resources did fall somewhat, and to compensate, Prime Minister Mahathir increased repression and hardened authoritarian rule (Chua, 2001). Without substantial reductions in UMNO’s access to politicized public resources, electoral challenges to its dominance are likely to fail.
Italy: Democratic Dominance Defeated

Italy’s Christian Democrats (DC) dominated at least from 1945 to 1982, but many argue until 1992 (Golden, 2004; Spotts and Weiser, 1986: 15). DC dominance persisted in this DPDR without repression in part because challenger parties were polarized to the left and right (Laver and Schofield, 1990). The DC’s electoral power was underwritten by a “massive system of political patronage” that was used for “enlarging the party’s aggregate vote share while protecting the incumbency advantage of individual legislators” (Golden, 2000: 10). Funding for this patronage system came from the politicization of 1) public works projects such as the Cassa per il Mezzogiorno that was “a gigantic patronage organization which employs people and awards development contracts strictly on the basis of political considerations” (Weiner, 1967: 344), 2) the budgets of the nearly 60,000 SOEs, including the Institute for Industrial Reconstruction (IRI), which was Europe’s largest corporation in the mid-1980s, and 3) the massive public bureaucracy that expanded from 7.8% of the total labor force before the war to 22.3% by 1981 (Pignatelli, 1985: 166, 170). Since access to public sector jobs required DC membership, the DC was “in a very strong position to corrupt the bureaucracy because those bureaucrats who do not cooperate with the party…have little hope in general of making a career” (LaPolombara, 1964: 326). The large state and a politically quiescent bureaucracy allowed the DC to divert massive resources from the public budget to its campaign war chest (Economist, 3/20/93, p. 69).

The DC’s access to politicized public resources was threatened in the 1980s as increasing international economic integration and competition encouraged downsizing the state and focusing on production rather than pork. Investment in the Cassa per il Mezzogiorno fell by over 80% (Kostoris, 1993: 92); privatizations reduced SOEs as a percent of GDP by more than 25% (World Bank, 2004); over 150,000 public sector jobs disappeared; and domestic business ended its “long-term contract for protection” (della Porta and Vannucci, 2000: 3) with the DC as the leaner state offered fewer benefits (Golden, 2000: 25).

The DC lost definitively and the postwar political system virtually collapsed in the 1992 elections. The most proximate cause was the “clean hands” investigations that exposed a web of illicit public funding and criminality involving high-level politicians;
however, these investigations were only possible because the DC’s vote dipped below 30%, thus permitting legislation that lifted politicians’ immunity (Golden, 2000: 25). As his government fell, Prime Minister Craxi boldly declared, “What needs to be said, and which in any case everyone knows, is that the greater part of political funding is irregular and illegal” (della Porta and Vannucci, 2000: 2).

CONCLUSION

This paper crafted a new theory of single-party dominance by showing how the dominant party skews the partisan playing field in its favor and essentially selects the type of challengers it faces. In particular, it showed how the incumbent’s resource advantages and the costs it imposes on prospective party elites affect who joins the opposition. The argument links the political economy of single-party dominance—a large state sector and a politically quiescent public bureaucracy—to opposition party failure and specifies the mechanisms that translate these broad structural causes into opposition party failure. This is one way to complete Riker’s (1976) insightful but incomplete theory of dominance and shows why, under certain conditions, challenger parties will be noncentrist with respect to the voters, fail to coordinate, and fail to offer the most efficient electoral appeals. As a result, opposition parties will be undersupplied even when there is sufficient voter demand, permissive electoral institutions, and enough ideological space for them to become viable competitors.

This argument has four implications that I want to highlight here. First, dominant parties can use their advantages to bias the partisan playing field in their favor and thwart standard Downsian competitive dynamics. Disadvantaged opposition parties are forced to use ideological or expressive incentives to attract anti-status quo outsiders who are willing to reap low instrumental benefits for their activism. While dominant party systems offer an extreme example of resource asymmetries, the argument might be fruitfully extended to account for the character of third parties in the United States, Green parties in Western Europe, and other resource-poor challengers.

Second, the dynamics of recruitment into the opposition create challengers that disagree deeply with each other on policy. As a result, dominant party rule can be prolonged since the opposition may prefer a centrist authoritarian incumbent to remain in
power rather than lose to a challenger with policies even more distant from their own. More generally, policy disagreement is an important but underappreciated element in stalled transitions to democracy in competitive authoritarian regimes. Unlike in fully authoritarian regimes without competition where the overriding salience of the regime cleavage encourages opposition coordination, in DPARs policy differences may cause elite coordination failure.

Third, the dynamics of single-party dominance and opposition failure in both DPARs and DPDRs suggests that we should treat these cases together rather than keeping them taxonomically separate. In both regime types, the incumbent’s politicization of public resources for partisan advantage biases voters in their favor and ensures that only more anti-status quo citizens join the opposition. Both regime types also raise the costs of joining the opposition; however, challengers in DPARs pay much higher costs. As a result, holding resource and cost asymmetries constant, we would expect challengers to be less centrist in DPARs than in DPDRs and incumbents in the former to win with higher margins than the latter.

Finally, like standard modernization theory, the argument here implies that political and economic monopolies are mutually reinforcing. However, I argue that it is not the level of socioeconomic development that matters, but the balance of public and private sector resources. It is not that a large public sector necessarily creates dominance since there are many economies with large public sectors that do not have dominant parties. Rather, single-party dominance cannot long survive without access to a steady stream of resources, and the most reliable stream comes from turning the state from a neutral actor into the party’s piggy bank. The recent wave of privatizations in much but not all of the developing world suggests that most dominant party systems are going the way of the dinosaurs, and that it will be difficult but not impossible for potentially dominant parties in places such as South Africa, Tanzania, Mozambique, and Zambia to lock in access to the public resources that would prolong their rule indefinitely.
ENDNOTES

1 Existing thresholds range from 40% of votes (Blondel, 1972) to 70% of seats (Coleman, 1960).
2 The incumbent could fail to make constitutional amendments if they require a super-majority; however, in practice, it should be able to draft a small opposition party into alliance.
3 Existing thresholds range from two elections (Przeworski et al., 2000: 27) to “30 to 50 years” (Cox, 1997: 238) “permanent or semipermanent governance” (Pempel, 1990: 15).
4 Employing any longevity threshold $t$ raises the question of whether systems that were dominant at $t$ were dominant at $t-x$ and whether proto-dominant party systems that failed before $t$ or have not yet reached $t$ are also dominant. But identifying dominance absent a threshold would require identifying dominance by the mechanisms that sustain it thus creating a tautology.
5 Six of Diamond’s (2002: 23) seven historical cases and three of Levitsky and Way’s (2002: 51–52) sixteen cases are DPARs while four are proto–dominant party systems. Also see Schedler (2002).
6 Sartori disagreed. He argued that in predominant party systems (DPDRs) all parties have “equality of opportunities” while in hegemonic party systems (DPARs), “turnover is not envisaged” due to fraud (1976: 194). But he overstates fairness in DPDRs where resource asymmetries bias competition in the incumbent’s favor and overstates the effects of fraud in DPARs since 1) fraud is attempted only when pre-election mechanisms fail and elections are close, and 2) fraud affects actors’ calculations probabilistically since no one knows ex ante how well the incumbent’s machine will operate (see Greene, 2007).
7 I use the standard Laakso and Taagepera (1979) formula, $N = \sum_{i}^{x} \frac{1}{v_{i}}$.
8 I classified democracies using Przeworski et al. (2000) and dominant party systems using my coding rules (described above). ELF indicators come from Roeder (2001).
9 District magnitude data come from the Database of Political Institutions (Beck et al. 2001).
10 Private donations would be secret if they existed, but case literature almost never mentions them.
11 For a biased spatial voting model with patronage that demonstrates this, see Greene (2007).
12 Researchers would have noticed benefits larger than the opportunity costs of joining the incumbent.
13 Expressive benefits already play a key role in models of voting, rank-and-file party activism, social movements, and interest groups.
An alternative model would allow party elites to mix over motivations. I simplified by concentrating on modal types, but make no ex ante assumption about their policy preferences. We could add a policy component where a prospective party elite gets the policy of party $k$ with probability $p_k$ and the policy of party $j$ with $1 - p_k$. But one individual has such a small effect on $x_k$ that the expected policy benefits of affiliation with either party are virtually the same. If $p_k = 0$ no office-seekers join, but message-seekers do with expected benefit of $u(e_k)\alpha - c_k$.

The intra-party democracy assumption ignores seniority. A more complicated model could build in path-dependency by giving earlier joiners more weight in determining $x_k$, perhaps by modeling it as the inverse of the location of the indifferent elite’s function with respect to $p_k$. I let $p_k$ vary independently of $x_c$ and $x_d$. It would be desirable to derive $p_k$ from $x_c, x_d$, and a model of voting behavior; however, it is not technically possible to do so (unless assume that party elites do not value $p_k$) since $p_k$ determines $x^*_o$ and $x^*_m$ and these values, in turn, determine $x_k$. Given this limitation, I let $p_k$ vary independently and focus on the dynamics of party affiliation. For a model that derives $p_k$ from a voter model, see Greene (2007).

Indifference in this context may be thought of as having an equal probability of joining the dominant party or the challenger. In order to make the presentation possible in two dimensions and to highlight the effect of changes in $p_k$ and $c_k$, I assume that $s_k$ is equal for office-seekers in both parties. Changing this assumption would still yield a very similar affiliation pattern to Figure 1.

Setting $u(o) = 1$ and $c_c - c_d < 1$ satisfies these assumptions for some $p_c < 1$.

Reforma newspaper, supervised by Alejandro Moreno, Jogin Abreu, and Rossana Fuentes-Berain, conducted the first four surveys. Olivares-Plata Consultores conducted the last two. The PRI did not hold a national convention in 1999. We interviewed invitees to the closed-door candidate launch that drew national and local party elites eager to network. This bias would favor my hypothesis only if personnel who departed when resource and cost asymmetries were high (the 1970s) were more moderate than those who remained and/or if the outflow when resource and cost asymmetries were low (the 1990s) were more radical than those who stayed. This is contradicted by the formal theory’s opposite predictions and by the MPPS. Departing opposition personnel who joined the PRI in the 1970s were not more moderate. Furthermore, new parties in the 1990s were less radical than the PAN and PRD.
Data were generously supplied by Dan Lund. The Kolmogorov-Smirnov test showed that the distribution over the economic policy dimension is normal. On regime issues, the distribution appears quasi-normal and skewed but failed the Kolmogorov-Smirnov test.

I used a pooled Principal-Components factor analysis weighted by party with Varimax rotation. The economic policy factor included control of cross-border capital flows, the state’s role in social welfare, and the extent of public ownership. It accounted for 26.8% of sample variance with $\lambda = 1.61$. The regime factor included the pace of transition to democracy and the degree of political decentralization. It accounted for 22.4% of the sample variance while $\lambda = 1.34$. The technique was exploratory, but the items were selected for use only after consulting experts and the literature on partisan attitudes in Mexico.

The midpoint at 0 was scaled to represent the substantive center of Mexican politics as perceived by respondents by subtracting the factor score for a respondent who chose the midpoint “3” on the “1” to “5” scale on all issue questions from each respondent’s factor score.

Group differences between party elites were statistically significant at the .01 level for all comparisons except PAN versus PRD on regime issues. In logistic regressions of party affiliation (not shown), economic policy and regime preferences correctly sort almost 80%.

Miller and Jennings (1986, Ch. 7) argue that Democratic Party activists’ preferences were relatively invariant over time, especially for those socialized in the tumultuous 1960s.

A trend variable is not needed since the data were not produced in a time-dependent process.


Determining the year of initial affiliation with the rightwing opposition was simple since the PAN dominated the right from its founding in 1939 and a respondents’ affiliation year with the PAN and rightwing non-party organizations are almost the same. Initial year of affiliation with the left is less straightforward since the MPPS did not ask PRD personnel when they joined the left before joining the PRD, which was founded in 1989. However, in-depth interviews and other survey responses indicated prior activism. Existing missing data fixes do not correct truncated variables. I estimate these missing data using respondents’ prior organizational affiliations captured in the MPPS.

Inquiries as to how Freedom House would have scored 1970–76 with the updated information went unanswered. Using the original scores produced virtually identical results in Table 1, except Costs * Office for PAN when Regime is the outcome was not statistically significant.

35 I am currently completing a TSCS data set to test my arguments cross-nationally and over time with quantitative data.

36 A theoretical element not dealt with concerns electoral systems that intervene between resources and challenger party profiles. Political outsiders will try to form opposition parties in all dominant party systems, but insider defection depends in part on central party control over resources. Low control, as in single non-transferable vote systems (SNTV), gives politicians more independent resources (Carey and Shugart, 1992) and makes defection more likely. This implies that in these systems, 1) challenger parties will be more centrist, 2) dominant parties will win with lower vote shares, and 3) dominant parties may lose with smaller decreases in resources. These elements help explain the KMT’s loss in 2000 and the LDP’s loss in 1993.

REFERENCES


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