Adela Cortina was born in Valencia, Spain, where she studied philosophy and received her doctorate in 1976. She furthered her work with scholarships from DAAD in Munich and the Alexander von Humboldt Stiftung research programmes in Frankfurt. Since 1987 she has been professor of Ethics and Political Philosophy at the University of Valencia, as well as visiting professor at the universities of Louvain-la-Neuve, Vrije (Amsterdam), Notre Dame, and Cambridge. She is director of the ÉTNOR Foundation (for Business and Organization Ethics) and member of the National Commission on Assisted Human Reproduction, Ministry of Health and Consumption, and of the Advisory Council of the Ministry of Health and Consumption (Consejo Asesor del Ministerio de Sanidad y Consumo). She is director of the “Ética y Democracia” Doctoral Program which has been recognized with a “Quality Mention.” A participant in research and working groups in both Europe and Latin America, she does research on: discourse ethics, applied ethics (development ethics, bioethics, economic ethics, and business ethics), democratic theory, theories of citizenship, and human rights. Her many books include Ética mínima (1986), Ética aplicada y democracia radical (1993), Ética de la empresa (1994), Ciudadanos del mundo (1997), Alianza y Contrato (2001), Por una ética del consumo (2002), Covenant and Contract. Politics, Ethics and Religion (2003), Razón pública y éticas aplicadas (2003), Construir confianza (2003), and Ética de la razón cordial (2007).

*I would like to express my sincere gratitude to the University of Notre Dame, and to the Kroc Institute for International Peace Studies and the Kellogg Institute for International Studies in particular, for the opportunity to take part in a tribute to Professor Denis Goulet, one of the most relevant figures worldwide in the ethics of development and one of the nicest people I ever met. This paper was first presented at a public lecture in his honor in April 2005. I am also grateful to Notre Dame for previously inviting me to be a visiting scholar at the Nanovic Institute for European Studies and to do research at the Mendoza College of Business. That visit to Notre Dame enabled me to enjoy the university community’s warm hospitality for six months and to finish my book on the ethics of consumption.*
ABSTRACT

Peace has to be sought through development, but not through just any form of development. From the practice of working for development an ethical reflection has gradually come about, which stresses the ethical aspects of development, without which there is no human development strictly speaking. The paper puts forward a model of development ethics which has two roots: the development ethics of Denis Goulet, who was a pioneer in this field, and the author’s conception of applied ethics, which stems from a Kantian tradition and an Aristotelian tradition. The paper attempts to reveal the ethical elements of development and their significance for human development.

RESUMEN

La paz tiene que ser buscada a través del desarrollo, pero no a través de cualquier forma de desarrollo. A partir de la práctica de trabajar para el desarrollo, ha surgido gradualmente una reflexión ética, que acentúa los aspectos éticos del desarrollo y sin la cual no hay desarrollo humano en sentido estricto. Este artículo avanza un modelo de ética del desarrollo que tiene dos raíces: la ética del desarrollo de Denis Goulet, que fue un pionero en este campo, y la concepción de ética aplicada de la autora, que deriva de una tradición kantiana y de una tradición aristotélica. El artículo trata de revelar los elementos éticos del desarrollo y su importancia para el desarrollo humano.
DEDICATION

I would like to dedicate this work to Denis Goulet, a real pioneer and master in Development Ethics, not only in America (North and South) but also in Europe, and very particularly in Spain. I knew him first of all through his work and I was always drawn by his in-depth knowledge of economic matters, the lucidity of his ethical appraisals, the valour and realism of his proposals. He talked and wrote on the basis of a great deal of reading and a great deal of experience. He succeeded in combining the theory and practice of the Ethics of Development, like the genuine authority that he was and continues to be for all of us.

Our research group shared work sessions with him through the PASOS network and later on in research at the University of Notre Dame and at congresses arranged by IDEA (International Development Ethics Association), with such valuable and affable teachers as David Crocker, Ramón Romero, Christian Parker, Nigel Dower, and so many others from all over the world. On each of these occasions Denis’s outstanding intellectual and human quality shone through.

Denis’s death was a particularly sad event for us. We are in such great need of people with his lucid intelligence, his unquestionable intellectual skill, his nimble discourse, his profound solidarity, his sincere, open, complex-free faith! But we can at the same time affirm that knowing him and sharing life with him a little was a precious gift, one of the sort that make life worth being lived.
1. THE COMPASS OF PRACTICAL REASON: THE OBLIGATION OF PEACE

I should like to begin this essay by recalling that in 2004 the academic world celebrated the second centenary of Emmanuel Kant’s death. Experts discussed various aspects of his philosophy, but one important facet particularly stands out for discussion: Kant’s philosophy of peace. In the Metaphysic of Morals Kant affirms that practical reason proclaims its irrevocable veto “there should be no war,” because war is not a method that should be used by anyone to seek their rights (Kant, 1968c, 354). The aim of law and politics is to build peace, not through the militarization of states, but by establishing bonds of friendship and, where possible, legal bonds as well. Precisely because it is a practical reason which orders one to build peace, those who engage in practical work to this end act rationally.

Kant’s proposal doubtlessly has its great merits, but also some major drawbacks, and, two centuries later, some of its shortcomings ought to be remembered, to show that meeting the needs of developing peoples is one of the necessary roads leading to peace.

Indeed, new developments in international law reveal the possibility of sovereignties shared among states, the possibility of establishing legal bonds among nations, and not merely friendly confederations—something that Kant could not even dream of. Transnational unions such as the European Union already exist, but there are also world organizations, which can be considered as forming the seed of a world republic (United Nations, World Bank, World Trade Organization, International Monetary Fund, International Criminal Court). Obviously, these institutions would have to be democratized to build a true world republic of world citizens (Habermas, 1996; Pogge, 1997).

In order to reach a pacific society, however, one needs to rely not only on legal and political bonds among states, as Kant did, but also on civil society, that is, on civic organizations, communities, and even business firms. One also has to get there from a starting point of respect for different cultures: this requires moving beyond ethnocentrism, and outlining the paths toward peace from a stance of multiculturality, or better still, from that of interculturality. But above all it is not enough to promote a negative idea of peace (“there should be no war”); one must opt instead for a positive concept—peace needs to be actively constructed (Cortina, 2005).
Building peace requires discovering what the causes of war are and making positive peace interventions, but it also requires discovering what harms and threatens people and acting to protect them, since they are all vulnerable and need protection. People’s safety is not achieved only through arms control, nor only through legal bonds among nations, but by protecting them from everything that endangers their safety: weapons indeed, but also hunger, illness, ignorance, exclusive doctrines, unjust inequalities, the aggression of speculative financial markets, the plundering of the environment. This is what is understood as “human safety” by the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) in its 1994 report: humanity is better protected the more developed it is (Fisas, 2002). As Paul VI said, “development is the new name for peace” (Paul VI, 1967).

Therefore, peace has to be sought through development, but not through any form of development. In the early 21st century we can say that peace has to be sought through *just* development in the distribution of goods and the respect for cultures. This is what we have learned through the practice and reflection of those who have worked in the past and continue to work for the development of peoples (Goulet, 1965; Crocker, 1991; Crocker and Schwenke, 2005; Gasper, 2004). From that practice of working for development an ethical reflection has gradually emerged, which stresses the ethical aspects of development, without which, strictly speaking, there is no human development. In the formation of this ethics of development Denis Goulet was a pioneer and is recognized today as a worldwide authority on the subject. Denis Goulet has worked as development practitioner and theorist/educator, inter alia, in Lebanon, Brazil, Mexico, Sri Lanka, and Guinea-Bissau, and has spent extended periods sharing the life of poor populations—this with no overt research agenda—in the Sahara (Algeria) and the Brazilian Amazon.

2. DEVELOPMENT ETHICS EMERGES AS A DISCIPLINE:
GOULET AS PIONEER AND WORLD AUTHORITY

The ethics of development has not been formed only through a deductive procedure, that is, by taking shared ethical principles from which conclusions are drawn. Neither has it been built by induction alone, that is, by starting from particular cases and reaching general—though not universal—principles. The process of discovering the ethical elements
at work in development has not been solely downward from deduction or upward by induction. In this type of work there are many interacting facets: the emergence of development ethics has turned out to be a multilateral, not a unilateral, process.

Nor has the procedure for discovering the ethical aspects of development work been that of a “reflective equilibrium,” like the one Rawls proposed, because reflective equilibrium reflects the political culture of societies with liberal democracies and attempts to discover the principles of justice which are imbued in that culture. Development, on the contrary, is a cross-cultural matter which cannot take for granted the existence of some universal content in ethical principles (Crocke and Schwenke, 2005).

In my opinion, the discovery process has instead been one proper to a critical hermeneutics, as occurs in other domains of applied ethics: that of an auto-clarification of the ethical aspects involved in work for development, understood as a social activity. Indeed, in the 1970s there took place what may be called a “revolution of applied ethics,” which sets out from the different spheres of social life and attempts to explain the ethical elements involved in each one: in health care, business, and the media, in the professions, and, especially, in development (Cortina, 1993, 2003a). The ethics of development is precisely one of these pioneer fields, thanks in large part to the work of researchers such as Denis Goulet.

Certainly, after World War II development was considered to be the main objective of national economic policy and international strategy. At that time, however, development was understood as a straightforward economic problem: a matter of identifying and quantifying the composition of economic growth packages. Along with such forerunners as Gandhi, the French economist and planner Louis-Joseph Lebret, and social scientists such as Gunnar Myrdal, Goulet argued in the early 1960s that “development needs to be redefined, demystified, and thrust into the arena of moral debate.” Goulet did groundbreaking work in addressing “the ethical and value questions posed by development theory, planning and practice,” as shown in such books as Ética del desarrollo (1965) and The Cruel Choice: A New Concept in the Theory of Development (1971).

Decades of “development” and “foreign aid” have not yielded substantial advantages for all. In many areas development creates few jobs and destroys many others in the traditional sector. And one may ask if the Washington Consensus model (liberalization,
stabilization, and privatization) is truly “descriptive,” or if it is “valuational”; that is, does it include economic values, such as productivity, efficiency, and competitiveness, manifesting a particular way of understanding the economy? Is it not true that economic growth, modernization, industrialization, and a high GDP end up becoming goals and targets of development instead of being seen as the means for development?

In my opinion, there is no axiologically neutral human activity; development work is, like other activities, impregnated with values of one type of ethics or another. They may be values of economic efficiency, competitiveness, economic growth, and a high level of consumption; or they may be intended to reduce inequalities, meet basic needs, foster people’s basic capacities, and reinforce self-esteem.

Precisely because there are always ethical valuations involved in development processes, it is a fallacy to speak of a “descriptive” use of the term “development,” because any use of the term is valuational: preferring to cultivate some sides of society or others, and preferring the valuing of means. It thus becomes necessary to bring out the values that are involved in development processes which are being carried out, and to clarify if these form part of the ethics that we are willing to defend, precisely because we recognize ourselves in these values.

One may say that the ethics of development was born as a publicly recognized discipline in 1987 with the creation of the International Development Ethics Association (IDEA), in San José, Costa Rica. With IDEA’s creation, development ethics gained formal recognition as an interdisciplinary field, both within development studies and within philosophy. In the early 1990s there was a tendency towards defining the objectives of development as something broader than economic growth, technological processes, and institutional modernization. And in its 1992 report on human development, the UNDP declared that development covers all the dimensions of human welfare and the means to obtain it: there has to be a debate on the means and the ends. There must be an ethical debate on the very concept of development, as Denis Goulet had frequently pointed out. Because the human costs involved in perpetuating underdevelopment are probably greater than the costs of development, great care needs to be taken when exporting strategies proper to industrially advanced countries to countries that are not prepared for them. There has to be a critical rethinking of the concept of development and an elucidation of its ethical aspects.
As an active participant in this debate I shall now put forward a model of development ethics which has two roots: Goulet’s ethics of development and my own conception of applied ethics. The latter, in turn, stems from at least two traditions: the Kantian tradition, the ethics of discourse, begun in the 1970s by Apel and Habermas (Apel, 1973; Habermas, 1983), and an Aristotelian tradition, that of the concept of “practice” that MacIntyre, also a renowned professor at the University of Notre Dame, proposed in his book *After Virtue* in 1981.

3. PROPOSAL FOR A MODEL OF DEVELOPMENT ETHICS

3.1. Development Work as a Practice

Numerous questions have been raised regarding the ethics of development. To attempt a reply to these questions I shall start out from the point that seems most appropriate: work for development, understood as a cooperative social activity—or *practice*, in MacIntyre’s sense—in which those who work for the development of peoples (practitioners) cooperate.

“Am Anfang war die Tat” (“At the beginning was the Deed”) is Faust’s famous statement; at the start of his *Nicomachean Ethics*, Aristotle reminds us that human life consists of different activities (sciences, arts, techniques) and that these all tend towards an end. Working for development is—in my opinion—an activity, which like all others, is connected to an end, and I feel that it is in this respect that MacIntyre’s concept of “practice” proves so useful: it reformulates the Aristotelian concept of “praxis.” Whereas Aristotelian *praxis* is an individual action which has an end in itself, and takes on its meaning precisely from pursuing that end, the notion of “practice” proposed by MacIntyre is that of a “coherent and complex form of socially established cooperative human activity through which goods internal to that form of activity are realized in the course of trying to achieve those standards of excellence which are appropriate to, and partially definitive of that form of activity” (1985, 187). Different agents thus cooperate in that social activity in order to attain *télos*, the internal goods, which are what give that activity meaning and social legitimacy. A social activity needs to be socially legitimated, and legitimation is possible only if society accepts the goods that the activity provides and the means that it uses to attain these goods.
It is true that the modern world has concentrated its greatest attention on norms and has pushed activities far into the background. It is also true that ethics and politics have become excessively deontological, excessively related to duty (deon), and have given everyday praxis a very secondary role. As the neoaristotelian philosopher Günther Bien has pointed out, Kantian modernity has preferred compasses (the norms) over road maps (the activities). Although compasses are no doubt necessary, there also must exist maps (Apel, Bien and Bubner, 1986) or social activities which take on their meaning through the pursuit of internal goods. To reconstruct practical rationality one must start by analyzing social practices, attempting to understand by which traits these practices can be considered socially legitimate. This is the way, for social agents and organizations to be able to understand, from within the activity, which paths are to be preferred (Cortina, 1993; Martínez, 2000).

There is no doubt that the concept of development has gradually evolved through development work from the model prevailing after World War II, to the notion of human development advocated by the UNDP in 1992, and further to the present situation of a globalized world (Goulet, 2004a, 2004b).

From this perspective, we may characterize work for development as a cooperative social activity, in which different social agents (policymakers, project managers, aid donors, NGOs, economists, technical experts, national and international institutions, development scholars, and development ethicists) cooperate to attain a goal, which is the development of Third World peoples. Although there has been some discussion as to whether work for development should also apply to certain groups in the First World countries, it would seem more reasonable to restrict this work to the Third World, to avoid excessive dispersion which could lead to dissolution.

3.2. Ethical Traits of Work for Development

Like any cooperative social work, work for development has a structure which gradually comes through in everyday life, and which I would characterize with the following ethical traits (Cortina, 2003a):

1) Work for development attempts to attain internal goods, which are those that give it meaning and social legitimacy, just as occurs in other areas of applied ethics. If the internal good of health services is to achieve what have been called the “goals of medicine”
(preventing illness, curing, caring for, and helping to die in peace); and the internal good of education is conveying knowledge and forming a critical capacity; and if each cooperative social activity attempts to attain its own good, then work for development will also attempt to attain internal goods that have to be identified. This would be the “agathological moment” of the activity, which is to say the moment of the good \( (agathos) \).

2) To attain those goods the people who work in development must abide by ethical principles, which constitute the deontological framework of the activity and modulate the way the goods are obtained. These principles will be postconventional for the agents of development who participate in the civic ethics of countries with liberal democracies: they will be principles of justice which take into account the humanity as a whole (Apel, 1973; Habermas, 1978; Cortina, 1986).

3) The agents of development will attempt to embody moral values in society, either implicitly or explicitly, because, as noted earlier, no axiologically neutral human activity exists: it is impossible not to realize values. The great question in this respect is whether it is legitimate to impose values, demolishing existing values without any dialogue with those affected.

4) Those who work for development cultivate different virtues, different “excellences of character,” which will vary according to how the internal goods are characterized.

5) Different social agents clearly take part in the cooperative social activity of work for development. Who are these agents? Political and economic world organizations? NGOs? Development workers? Does this work have to be conceived in a paternalistic way? And have the decisions to be made without consulting those affected by the development, taking it for granted that they are “basically incompetent” in what constitutes their own welfare? Or, on the other hand, is it not vitally necessary to consult those affected by concrete plans, in order to determine what constitutes their welfare?

6) It is necessary to choose certain models of development over others, certain means over others, means which have to be appropriate so as to attain the internal goods and which have to obey the ethical principles that trace out a structure to attain the goods.

7) Work for development needs to have political, economic, and citizens’ institutions which support the activity and give it human and material support. Are those responsible for development to be only national and international political institutions, or are business firms
and citizens to be included as well? In any event, institutions should be at the service of the activity and of the internal goods that the activity seeks to provide, and not vice-versa.

8) Lastly, we need a philosophical foundation, which answers the following questions: Why these internal goods? Why these ethical principles? We need that foundation in order to avoid fundamentalism, which consists of undertaking particular practices without rendering justifying accounts for them (Apel, 1973; Cortina, 1986). We must not take it for granted that the supreme good is economic growth, an increase in commodities, the indefinite satisfaction of desires. Seeking a philosophical foundation consists, precisely, of attempting to account for the contemplated practice.

After outlining the traits of an ethics of development, I shall now attempt to fill in the content for each of these (see also Martínez, 2000).

4. A MODEL OF DEVELOPMENT ETHICS

1) Internal goods. After World War II it was taken for granted that economic development is a good thing for everyone, everywhere, and that work for development consisted of fostering economic growth, modernizing institutions, and increasing technology. Nevertheless, considering the fact that sixty years later the situation of many developing countries has not improved significantly and that in today’s globalized world unjust inequalities between elites and non-elites have heightened, one is led to ask at least two questions: Is the economic model of the Washington Consensus, even with its corrective adjustments, the only economic model possible? Is this a model of the good life which should be universalized? I shall try to answer the first of these two questions in point 7 of this section, and now proceed to tackle the second.

Models of the good life cannot be imposed, either universally or particularly. At this point one has to distinguish between “the Right” and “the Good,” between the demands of justice that a society must meet and invitations to the good life, which individuals and groups have to accept personally. Justice is something that is demanded and the good life, something to which one is invited. This is why the deontologists are right when they stress the priority of the just over the good when attempting to answer the question, What can be socially demanded (Rawls, 1993)?
It is not socially demandable to universalize a model of the good life for everyone in all groups. It is not even morally acceptable to do so, and precisely for this reason it is *unfair* to universalize the economist model, because the good life is a question of personal option. What is socially demandable is to comply with demands of justice, that is, with the requirement to create minimum conditions for all the peoples of the earth which allow all individuals to choose their own project for a good life (Cortina, 1986).

For this reason I consider that the internal goods provided by those who work in development do not consist of imposing their models of a good life, but rather in establishing the *conditions of justice which enable people to make use of their freedom*. The most significant philosophers of recent times have taken part in the discussion on what the conditions of justice are: utility (preference satisfaction) for utilitarianism; primary goods for Rawls; the satisfaction of basic human needs for Streeten, Galtung, and Gasper; the protection of human or moral rights (Pogge), and empowerment of basic capabilities for Sen, Nussbaum, Crocker, and the UNDP. Goulet offers an answer which, in my opinion, would take in the best of those previously mentioned: the internal goods of development would humanize development work, empower people to procure their sustenance, raise their self-esteem, extend their freedom, and maintain the hope of a better situation (Goulet, 1999).

Humanizing development work is one of the internal goods of development because “not damaging” is a basic good, prior to those others. This is why it is necessary to humanize development actions to ensure that the changes proposed, not imposed, do not produce anti-development, do not destroy cultures, and do not demand excessive sacrifices (Goulet, 1999, 45).

Sustenance is also one if the internal goods of development because there is absolute underdevelopment when there is a shortage of goods to maintain life, that is, a shortage of food, medicine, shelter, and protection. The average lifetime is today, quite rightly, one of the main indicators of development. And in spite of the controversies, there is agreement that those who work in development assume a commitment to understanding and reducing human deprivation and misery in poor countries (Crocker and Schwenke, 2005).

Fostering peoples’ esteem is vital, because if material welfare is presented as the essential ingredient of a worthy life, it proves very difficult for underdeveloped countries to feel themselves respected.
Apart from this, freedom has numerous meanings, but it can basically be understood as the extension of the alternatives to pursue a life which is perceived as good. In accordance with the capabilities approach, this would involve empowering people to exercise their capacities in choosing the life project that they consider attractive (Sen, 1999). But, to complete the capabilities approach, as we will see later, extending freedom demands maintaining alternatives for a good life, and not actually fostering a single model. It is necessary to maintain the “living communities of culture,” as Goulet says, because otherwise, by destroying projects of good life, freedom is restricted.

Lastly, it becomes vital to maintain hope in developing countries (Goulet, 1995). Central America is loses population daily, as its citizens emigrate; and Africa does not exist for growth economists. Who could keep up hope in these conditions? And who could set out on a course of development without the strength that comes from the hope that a better situation is possible?

To conclude we could say that the question, “What goods have to be offered as a result of work for development?” is a controversial one. Nevertheless, it gradually generates a broad consensus when it is understood that it is a matter of establishing the conditions of justice for people to be able to pursue the life projects which they choose. Accordingly, whoever works in development is not legitimated to impose conceptions of the good life, nor to obliterate any that exist among different peoples. The task of the development worker consists of providing more and better means to sustain the lives of society members; creating better conditions in relation to their need for esteem; releasing men and women from oppressive servitudes (of nature, ignorance, and other people) and empowering them to carry on with the life plans that they choose, in a society in which one does not attempt to do away with existing proposals for the good life, on condition that these fulfill minimums of justice.

2) Ethical principles. To attain the proper internal goods those who work for development must be guided by ethical principles which constitute the deontological framework of the activity. In the early 21st century, in the context of an activity which has begun in countries with a postconventional civic ethics in Kohlberg’ sense, there would be three of these principles, all procedural.
The first is the principle of “not manipulating” people, because people are ends in themselves and cannot be treated simply as means. The second is the principle of “empowering” them to be able to develop the plans for life which they choose, precisely because, as human beings, they are basically free. These two principles obviously have their philosophical foundation in a Kantian tradition which discovers the absolute value of people and consequently, in the case of development action, these persons constitute the limitative end (“not manipulating”) and the positive end (“actually empowering”) (Kant, 1968a, 1968c). As the Spanish philosopher Jesús Conill so rightly says, Kantian ethics are “eleutheronomic” rather than deontological; the core of Kantian ethics is freedom (eleutheria) rather than duty (deon), and Sen’s capabilities approach has a Kantian, rather than an Aristotelian, foundation (Conill, 2004).

As regards the third principle, we could formulate it in the following way: “any being with communicative competence is a valid interlocutor and must be taken into account through dialogue about any questions affecting him or her.” This is the principle of discourse ethics, which complements the previous two, insofar as it openly acknowledges that, in order to introduce substantial changes in people’s lives, it is vital to take them into consideration through dialogue (Apel, 1973; Habermas, 1983; Cortina, 1986, 2003a).

Taking into account these principles, work for development cannot be understood as a “knowledge of control,” in which one subject (the expert) handles other subjects in developing countries as if they were objects. It is vital to understand it as a “knowledge of understanding” and as a “knowledge of emancipation” (Apel, 1973; Habermas, 1973). In the context of a “knowledge of understanding,” the expert attempts to come to an understanding with those who are similarly subjects, to understand their needs and aspirations, and sets out to cooperate with them, to empower them, so that they can implement their plans for life. It is thus vital to attempt to understand people, to try to get dialogue under way and share their lives, respecting different cultural backgrounds, and to work cooperatively with them so that they can freely pursue the ways of life that they consider valuable. Taking into account the values of different cultures is crucial.

3) Values. It is true that the first practitioners and scholars of development thought that “studying development was not a philosophical inquiry into value change, but a technical examination of how to mobilize resources and people most efficiently and fashion
the institutional arrangements best suited to growth. In a word, development was the proper object of study for economics. And within the economic discipline, what prevailed was the value-free ‘engineering’ stream of theory” (Goulet, 1995). Nonetheless, the practitioners of development soon realized that to achieve their ends (industrialization, use of technological progress, the modernization of institutions, and the fostering of “psychic mobility”) it was necessary to change people’s lifestyles: to train the work force, to motivate people to desire the fruits of modern production and accept its discipline, and to provoke cultural changes in their beliefs. Whoever works in development necessarily makes an effort to realize values of some kind. So the question is: do these have to be the values that the practitioner appreciates, the values that the different living communities appreciate, or those that are decided and preferred through dialogue between both?

In different countries people pursue their life projects according to different traditions and steer the course of their lives from different cultural backgrounds; discarding or destroying traditions and cultures means ending the sources of life. For this reason Goulet gives four guidelines for development: growth; distribution with development; satisfaction of basic human needs; and working from tradition, starting from dialogue in communities on their values and on how they perceive changes (Goulet, 1999, ch. 3).

To do this cultural freedom has to be fostered, and in this respect it is encouraging news that the UNDP’s 2004 report has taken cultural freedom as one of the indicators of development. However, to promote development it is not enough to promote “negative freedom,” the “freedom of non-interference.” Instead, it is essential to foster projects for a good life in what Goulet calls “living communities of culture,” with dialogue on values with those who have different cultural backgrounds.

Freedom not only implies the capacity to choose, but also involves maintaining alternatives from which to choose, on condition that these are alive. Working for development is necessarily transcultural. If there are universal values, it is vital to discover these through dialogue. If there are specific values in different cultures, it is also vital to discover them through dialogue with living communities of culture.

However, to carry out these dialogues it is vital to distinguish with Kymlicka between “external protections” and “internal restrictions” (Kymlicka, 1995, ch. 3). That is, not allowing the elites of culture communities to oppress the individuals which form them,
taking advantage of the fact that one is attempting to protect that culture from external interferences and aggressions. And at this point one should go by Sen’s advice to establish dialogues with the rank and file of these communities, not only with the hierarchies, which are often only interested in maintaining their dominance (Sen, 1999).

With this caveat, dialogue is vital, because, as the World Bank puts it, people need physical capital, human capital, and social capital in order to develop. But they also need “ethical capital” and one should not “ethically decapitalize” people.

4) *Virtues*. Indeed, one of MacIntyre’s objectives in *After Virtue* is to craft an ethics of the virtues necessary to attain the internal goods of an activity. And although in this essay I started with other ethical elements, it is clear that the virtues of those who work in development are necessary to attain the internal goods and to ensure guidance by ethical principles.

Competence in the field itself would doubtlessly be one of these, whether this field is economy, political governance, engineering, or any other. The problems of development are not only a question of goodwill, but also of great competence. However, as Aristotle noted, a person who uses poisons to kill is as competent in the art of making them as one who uses poisons to heal: it is not enough to be competent, therefore—those who have competence must pursue goals which are good.

In this respect it proves difficult to attain the internal goods of development without a great sense of justice, with which we appreciate that the earth’s goods—both material and immaterial—belong to all human beings, and nobody should be excluded from enjoying them; without cultivating the prudence necessary to reach human decisions in view of cruel choices; without sufficient creativity to find new paths, which do not obliged one to take “tragic decisions” between painful alternatives; without an enormous sensitivity towards the concrete contexts of action and towards concrete cultures; without an active respect for cultures other than one’s own; without a great capacity for interpretation and dialogue; and without a good dose of solidarity. Playing down these virtues in work for development may lead to converting it into work for anti-development.

5) *Social agents*. Another important ethical question is: who are the agents of development viewed as a cooperative activity? Although we have referred to policymakers, project managers, aid donors, NGOs, development scholars, and development ethicists, the
need for those affected by development projects to take part in decisions about those projects is increasingly perceived by sensible people.

On one hand, this is because the capacity to participate in the projects which affect them is one of the basic capacities which empower people to carry on with their plans for a good life and, as has already been said, because it is immoral, when making vital decisions, to ignore those affected by these decisions. Moreover, it has often been shown that decisions taken “from the top” do not succeed in reducing poverty or inequality.

This failure is revealed, for example, by the report on “Democracy in Latin America,” promoted by the UNDP, whose first results came out in April 2004 (Programa de las Naciones Unidas para el Desarrollo 2004). According to this report, while political democracy seems to have gained credit in the region, thanks to universal suffrage and to the great unlikelihood of military authoritarianism returning, the inequalities found there are the greatest in the world and poverty remains extreme, notwithstanding the great differences found between some countries and others. The increase in electoral participation has not been matched by greater economic equality, greater protection of economic, social, and cultural rights, nor in many countries, by basic civil guarantees. There exists a profound asymmetry among three dimensions of citizenship: the extension of voting rights, active political citizenship and social and economic citizenship.

In order to improve, the report proposes moving from a democracy of voters to one of citizens, designing and getting under way a democratic power–generating policy, whose aim is integral citizenship. The scanty success of economic reforms that have followed the line of the Washington Consensus forces us to look elsewhere in the search for new solutions: to public politics and citizens’ participation. The first fosters a more just distribution of wealth; participative political democracy, on the other hand, comes forward as a factor of development, and civil rights, including the freedom of expression and discussion, as a privileged place to interpret people’s economic needs and induce appropriate responses. The people affected are the best interpreters of their needs; they should be the economic citizens, and freedom is the path towards freedom.

6) Institutions. This is why the institutions involved in development doubtlessly have to be political institutions, located on both the local and international and global levels, in a globalized world. There is doubtlessly a need for global governance, able to dispense global
public goods, and the work of international and local bodies becomes vital.

Nevertheless, on both a local and global level there are two new protagonists that hold enormous power: companies and citizens’ organizations. Companies generate material and also immaterial wealth (Cortina, Conill, Domingo, and García-Marzá, 1994; Enderle, 1999; Cortina, 2003a; Conill, 2004; García-Marzá, 2004) and civic organizations, from families to neighborhood associations, churches, NGOs, and professional associations, entail the potential for solidarity without which associations do not survive, and even less develop. Without the help of business and civic organizations, it proves difficult to make any progress in the task of development.

The democratic state, an ethical economy, and active citizenship form the tripod on which a developed society is sustained. The philosopher’s stone of the new times lies in structuring the endeavors of these three powers—political, economic, and civic—and in doing so dealing intelligently with the rank and file, for the empowerment of those who should be the real protagonists, because they are the parties affected.

7) Models of development. In the decision to choose models of development in accordance with the internal goods intended to be obtained, one may take as a guide the distinction Amartya Sen makes between two concepts of development, which he calls respectively BLAST (“blood, sweat and tears”) and GALA (“getting by, with a little assistance”) (Sen, 2001). BLAST interprets development as a necessarily cruel procedure, while GALA interprets it as a process of cooperation, in the sense that those who act in the market are interdependent and that public services can foster cooperation between individuals. These two concepts can, in practice, take on highly diverse forms and their traits may be found even in diverse plans and projects.

In one of its versions, BLAST understands that certain sacrifices need to be made in terms of social benefits, inequality, or authoritarianism to attain high levels of accumulation which allow the formation of capital. The quality of life of one part of the present population and even of a part of the population in the immediate future must be sacrificed, with a view to favoring future generations.

In Sen’s opinion, which I share, BLAST has at least two ideas that are impossible to relinquish: inter-temporal compensation and the necessity that accumulation of capital be taken into account. But it also has two essential shortcomings: its lack of interest in the
quality of life in the present and the immediate future, and its lack of creativity in getting through the “tragic decisions,” that is, inventing formulas which prevent having to choose between an increase in the quality of life for present generations and an increase in productivity, showing that the quality of life of present generations can also be a factor in productivity. For instance, social consumption in health and education can increase production and in this sense be an “investment.”

For this reason GALA appreciates the interdependence between quality of life and economic productivity, realizing that social development can foster integral growth if it is complemented with favorable policies. “Human capital” is seen to be vital even for generating “physical capital” and a country needs human capital, human resources, to develop.

Nevertheless, going back to Sen, people’s capacities may be understood only as resources for obtaining economic productivity, or they may be understood as valuable for their own sake, such as the capacities which need to be fostered in order for people to be able to choose their life plans. With these words we return to the approach that Kant put forward in Perpetual Peace and in the Foundations of the Metaphysic of Morals.

Kant asserted that even a people of devils, even a people of beings with no moral sensitivity, would rather live in a state ruled by law than in a state of war (Kant, 1968b). Even a people of devils—we would say today—would prefer to have human resources available rather than do without them, the condition being, as Kant added, that these devils would have to be intelligent. And on too many occasions it is a lack of intelligence that leads to disdaining human capital in work for development.

But human capital is not only a resource. People are not a means for other ends, but are valuable in themselves. That is why it is important to distinguish between “acting through interest” and “taking an interest” in what is valuable in its own right (Kant, 1968a). An ethical economy takes an interest in people and their capacities, because they are valuable in their own right. This is the key to working for peoples’ development. This is the core of Denis Goulet’s ethics of development.

Note: This article has been elaborated in the framework of the Proyecto de Investigación Científica y Desarrollo Tecnológico HUM2004-06633-CO2-01/FISO (Ministerio de Educación y Ciencia y Fondos FEDER) and of the Proyectos del Grupo de I+D+I 03/179 (Generalidad Valenciana).
BIBLIOGRAPHY


Paul VI (1967) Populorum progressio.


