TRANSFORMING LABOR-BASED PARTIES
IN LATIN AMERICA:
THE ARGENTINE JUSTICIALISTA PARTY
IN COMPARATIVE PERSPECTIVE

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This article seeks to explain the success or failure of Latin American labor-based parties in adapting to the contemporary challenges of economic liberalization and working class decline. It focuses on party organization, and specifically, on informal and under-institutionalized organizational forms. The article’s central claim is that under-institutionalized organizational structures may facilitate party adaptation in a context of environmental crisis. Thus, mass populist parties, which lack the bureaucratic constraints that tend to inhibit change in better institutionalized labor-based parties, may possess a distinctive advantage in the neoliberal period. Although these parties’ deep roots in society provide them with relative electoral stability, other populist legacies, such as fluid internal structures, non-bureaucratic hierarchies, and centralized leaderships, yield a high degree of strategic flexibility. The article applies this argument to the case of the Argentine Justicialista Party (PJ), a mass populist party that adapted with striking success in the 1980s and 1990s. In the coalitional realm, the poorly institutionalized nature of the PJ’s party-union linkage allowed reformers to easily dismantle traditional mechanisms of labor participation, which contributed to the PJ’s rapid transformation from a labor-dominated party into a patronage-based party. In the programmatic realm, the PJ’s non-bureaucratic hierarchy and under-institutionalized leadership bodies provided President Carlos Menem with substantial room for maneuver in carrying out a neoliberal strategy that, while at odds with Peronism’s traditional program, was critical to the party’s survival as a major political force.

Este artículo procura explicar el éxito o el fracaso de los partidos latinoamericanos de base obrera para adaptarse a los desafíos contemporáneos de la liberalización económica y la declinación de la clase obrera. El trabajo se concentra en la organización partidaria y, específicamente, en las formas organizacionales informales y sub-institucionalizadas. El argumento central del artículo es que las estructuras organizacionales sub-institucionalizadas pueden facilitar la adaptación partidaria en un entorno de crisis. Así, los partidos populistas de masas que carecen de las limitaciones burocráticas que tienden a inhibir el cambio en los partidos de base obrera mejor institucionalizados, pueden poseer una ventaja distintiva en el período neo-liberal. Aunque el firme arraigo social de estos partidos les proporciona relativa estabilidad electoral, otros legados populistas, tales como las fluidas estructuras internas, las jerarquías no burocráticas y los liderazgos centralizados les ofrecen un alto grado de flexibilidad estratégica. Este artículo aplica este argumento al caso del Partido Justicialista argentino, un partido populista de masas que se adaptó con resonante éxito en los años 1980 y 1990. En el plano de las coaliciones, la naturaleza pobremente institucionalizada del vínculo entre el Partido Justicialista y los sindicatos permitió a los reformadores desmantelar fácilmente los mecanismos tradicionales de participación obrera, lo que contribuyó al rápido pasaje del PJ de ser un partido con predominio obrero a ser un partido dominado por el patronazgo. En el terreno programático, la jerarquía no burocrática y los cuerpos de liderazgo sub-institucionalizados proveyeron al Presidente Carlos Menem importante espacio de maniobra para llevar adelante una estrategia neo-liberal que, aunque contraria al programa tradicional del peronismo, fue crítica para la supervivencia del partido como una fuerza política importante.
The new world economic order has not been kind to labor-based political parties. Changing trade and production patterns, increased capital mobility, and the collapse of the Soviet bloc have dramatically reshaped national policy parameters. Traditional left-wing programs have been discredited, and policies based on Keynesian and “import-substituting” models are now dismissed as populist and inflationary. At the same time, long-term changes in class structure have eroded the coalitional foundations of labor-based parties. The decline of mass production and the increasing heterogeneity of working classes have weakened industrial labor organizations, limiting their capacity to deliver the votes, resources, and social peace that had been the foundation of the traditional party-union “exchange.” Moreover, weakening class identities have chipped away at labor-based parties’ core electorates. These changes have created a strong incentive for labor-based parties to rethink their programs, re-articulate their linkages to organized labor, and target new constituencies. Yet such change is not easy. Adaptive strategies often run counter to parties’ traditional programs and the interests of their old constituencies, and as a result, party leaders are often unwilling—or unable—to carry them out.

Labor-based parties responded to the neo-liberal challenge in a variety of ways and with varying degrees of success. Some parties either did not adapt (the Chilean Communist party) or turned leftward initially (the Peruvian APRA), which generally resulted in electoral decline. Others, such as the Austrian socialists and the Mexican PRI, adapted slowly and experienced moderate decline. In still other cases, such as Democratic Action (AD) in Venezuela, leaders attempted to reform but failed due to opposition from within. Finally, some labor-based parties, including the Australian Labor Party and the Spanish Socialist Workers Party, adapted quickly and remained in power for substantial periods of time.

The (Peronist) Justicialista Party (PJ) in Argentina is a clear case of successful labor-based party adaptation. Closely aligned with the powerful General Labor
Confederation (CGT), Peronism had opposed liberal economic policies since the 1940s. Yet beginning in the mid-1980s, the PJ underwent a dual transformation. First, it redefined its relationship with organized labor, dismantling traditional mechanisms of union participation and replacing its union-based mass linkages with territorial linkages. By the early 1990s, the PJ had transformed itself from a labor-dominated party into a predominantly patronage-based party. Second, the PJ adapted its socioeconomic program. Beginning in 1989, the government of Carlos Menem dismantled the statist, inward-oriented economic model established under Perón and implemented a neo-liberal program that sharply contradicted the party’s traditional platform. This dual adaptation was accompanied by striking political success: the PJ won six straight national elections between 1987 and 1995, and although it lost the presidency in 1999, it remained the largest single party in Argentina. Hence, while the PJ’s transformation entailed abandoning much of its traditional program and weakening many of its traditional alliances, these changes may have contributed in an important way to the party’s survival in the neoliberal era.

Drawing on an analysis of the Peronist case, this article examines the capacity of labor-based parties to adapt to contemporary processes of socioeconomic change. The article builds on theories of party change that have emerged out of recent studies of parties in the advanced industrialized countries. Yet it also uses the PJ case to refine this literature, suggesting that the routinization of intraparty rules and procedures, which is often taken for granted in studies of European parties, may be critical to explaining adaptive capacity. The article argues the PJ’s adaptation was facilitated by a party structure that combined a powerful mass organization with a loosely structured leadership hierarchy. This structure produced a distinctive combination of elite-level flexibility and base-level stability, allowing party leaders to undertake strategic changes without suffering substantial short-term electoral costs.

More generally, these results suggest that weakly institutionalized parties—such as many populist parties—may be better equipped to adapt to periods of crisis or
environmental change than are well-institutionalized or bureaucratic parties. Recent scholarship on Latin American parties has drawn attention to a variety of problems created by low institutionalization. Weak party institutionalization has been associated with phenomena such as personalism, party indiscipline, rapid policy switches, executive-legislative deadlock, and the rise of anti-system candidates—all of which tend to undermine both accountability and governability. Moreover, because under-institutionalized parties tend to be ineffective channels of representation, they often encourage powerful socioeconomic actors to pursue their interests through non-electoral (and often non-democratic) means. For example, as James McGuire has argued, the poorly institutionalized nature of the Peronist party prevented unions from developing a strong stake in democratic politics through much of the postwar period. Although this article does not dispute these claims, it suggests that party institutionalization may also have important costs. Institutionalization tends to limit parties’ flexibility, and as a result, it may reduce their capacity to respond quickly and creatively to external challenges.

In a context of extreme crisis, such as that faced by many Latin American countries in the 1980s and 1990s, such inflexibility may have far-reaching political consequences. In Latin America, labor-based party adaptation (or non-adaptation) to the neoliberal challenge has had important implications not only for the parties themselves, but also for party systems and, in some cases, political regimes. As in Europe, labor-based parties were central actors in many postwar Latin American party systems. Yet whereas European labor-based parties tended to survive and eventually correct failed strategies in the 1980s and 1990s, often leaving party systems virtually intact, in Latin America, the depth of the socioeconomic crisis was such that failed strategies often had devastating consequences for parties and party systems. For example, in Peru and Venezuela, labor-based party collapse was accompanied by party system decomposition and the breakdown or near-breakdown of democratic regimes. Hence, the question of whether and how labor-based parties in Latin America have adapted to the neoliberal challenge appears to be an important one.
The article is divided into four sections. The first section develops a framework for analyzing party change, making the case for an organizational approach. The second section presents the argument that lower levels of institutionalization may, under certain conditions, facilitate party adaptation and survival. The third section applies this argument to the Peronist case, showing how the PJ’s poorly routinized party structure facilitated its coalitional and programmatic adaptation in the 1980s and 1990s. Finally, the conclusion places the PJ case in comparative perspective, illustrating the argument through an examination of four other Latin American cases.

**Explaining Labor-Based Party Adaptation: An Organizational Approach**

Successful party adaptation can be defined as a set of changes in *strategy* and/or *structure*, undertaken in response to (or anticipation of) changed environmental conditions, that contribute to a party’s capacity to meet its “primary goal.” Although established labor-based parties pursue a variety of goals, winning elections and, more fundamentally, surviving as an organization are clearly predominant ones. For a party to adapt successfully to environmental change, it must accomplish three things. First, its leaders must choose an appropriate strategy. Leaders may fail to respond, respond too slowly, or choose ineffective strategies. Second, reformers must sell the strategy to (or impose it upon) the rest of the party. Adaptive strategies often meet resistance from leaders, activists, and unionists with a stake in the party’s traditional project. Third, the party must sell the new strategy to the electorate. No strategy can succeed unless it wins votes.

What explains labor-based party adaptation in the contemporary period? The most fundamental causes of party change are environmental. For example, parties’ strategies tend to be heavily influenced by the structure of the electorate and the party system. Hence, electoral defeat often serves as a stimulus for party change. Parties must also respond to changes in the *economic* environment. Economic constraints often limit the
degree to which parties can pursue vote maximizing strategies, and in some cases, they induce programmatic choices that have little to do with the immediate preferences of the electorate. In Latin America, for example, the economic crisis of the 1980s frequently led governing parties to adopt policies that ran directly counter to the programs on which they campaigned.10

Although environmental factors explain why contemporary labor-based parties have incentives to adapt, they cannot explain whether and how parties actually respond to these incentives. Hence, they cannot explain variation in responses among parties facing similar environmental conditions.11 Explaining such variation requires that we go inside parties. Several scholars have identified leadership as a critical factor in explaining party change. While some explanations focus on “the voluntary choices of party leaders,”12 others point to changes in party leaderships as the catalyst for party change.13 Yet strategic choices and leadership change cannot be understood apart from the organizational context in which they occur. Party organizations mediate leaders’ responses to external challenges, encouraging some strategies and discouraging others. For example, some party organizations grant leaders substantial room to maneuver in carrying out adaptive strategies, while others limit leadership autonomy through strict rules of accountability. Similarly, some party structures facilitate rapid leadership renovation, while others inhibit it.

This article adopts an organizational approach to party change. Rather than treating parties as unitary actors or “teams,”14 it views them—in the tradition of Michels and Panebianco—as complex systems whose strategies are shaped by their organizational structures and by conflicts among various intra-party actors. It assumes that while leaders who seek to increase their political power (or that of their parties) must respond to changes in the external environment, their choices of strategies, as well as their capacity to carry out those strategies, are mediated by their parties’ internal structures and by internal “power games.”15
Party Organization and Adaptive Capacity: The Role of Institutionalization

Recent work on party organization points to several factors that facilitate party adaptation and survival. One set of factors has to do with parties’ strategic flexibility. Strategic flexibility is enhanced by at least two factors. The first is leadership autonomy. To the extent that party leaders’ strategic initiatives are restricted by rules and procedures that ensure accountability to lower-level authorities, their capacity to respond to external challenges will be limited. Strategic flexibility is also enhanced by leadership renovation. Parties that facilitate the entry of fresh blood into their hierarchies are said to be more open to strategic change than those with entrenched bureaucracies and internal recruitment filters.

Another set of factors that facilitate adaptation and survival relates to parties’ “rootedness” in society. In its extreme form, societal rootedness is associated with encapsulating mass organizations, distinct party subcultures, and stable “electorates of belonging.” Encapsulation raises the threshold at which voters decide to abandon their party. Although the organizational encapsulation characteristic of some turn-of-the-century European parties no longer exists anywhere in the world, many parties retain strong organizations and relatively stable core electorates. Even in this weakened form, societal rootedness provides an electoral cushion that enables parties to make strategic changes—and mistakes—without suffering substantial short-term losses.

The literature on party organization and change suggests the existence of a trade-off between strategic flexibility and societal rootedness. This is because scholars often treat mass organization as coterminous with bureaucratization. The dominant literature, which is based largely on studies of the advanced industrialized countries, generally assumes that parties’ internal structures are institutionalized. Thus, intraparty rules and procedures are assumed to be stable, well-defined, and widely known and accepted by members, and party organizations are assumed to more or less correspond to the formal—often bureaucratic—structures outlined in their statutes. Bureaucratic
organization is said to limit strategic flexibility, for it is generally associated with elaborate rules of leadership accountability (which limit leaders’ strategic autonomy)\textsuperscript{21} and strict recruitment filters and stable career paths (which limit leadership renovation).\textsuperscript{22} For this reason, mass parties are frequently said to “lack the flexibility to adapt easily to new challenges.”\textsuperscript{23} The flexibility-stability tradeoff can be seen in Panebianco’s distinction between “mass bureaucratic” and “electoral-professional” parties.\textsuperscript{24} While mass bureaucratic parties are said to be stable but comparatively inflexible,\textsuperscript{25} electoral-professional parties are expected to be more flexible but less electorally stable.\textsuperscript{26}

Yet the flexibility-stability trade-off may not be as steep as the literature suggests. Mass organizations may exist without strong central bureaucracies, stable career paths, or institutionalized mechanisms of leadership accountability. A clear example is Peronism. The PJ is a mass-based party, but its mass organization is fluid and informal, rather than bureaucratic, and its internal rules and procedures are contested, widely manipulated, and often ignored. Informal and under-institutionalized party organizations are relatively common in Latin America. Indeed, they are characteristic of most populist and clientelistic parties. Nevertheless, these organizational forms have not been adequately theorized in the dominant literature on party organization and change.

**Institutionalization and Party Adaptation**

Although several scholars have suggested that institutionalization has an important effect on parties’ capacity to adapt,\textsuperscript{27} they differ over exactly what that effect is.\textsuperscript{28} Institutionalization has been associated with several different phenomena in the literature on political organizations. One is simply electoral or organizational stability over time.\textsuperscript{29} Another dimension, associated with the work of Philip Selznick and Samuel Huntington, is the degree to which an organization is “infused with value”\textsuperscript{30} or “valued for its own sake”\textsuperscript{31} by its members. A third dimension is the routinization of rules, procedures, and behavior *within* an organization.\textsuperscript{32} Although scholars often treat these phenomena as dimensions of a single concept,\textsuperscript{33} such aggregation has analytic costs.
Organizations may score very differently on the various dimensions. For example, the PJ is well-organized and electorally stable, but its internal structure is thoroughly under-routinized. Consequently, the party has been characterized as both “highly institutionalized”\(^{34}\) and “weakly institutionalized.”\(^{35}\) Different aspects of institutionalization also appear to have different effects on adaptive capacity. Thus, whereas value infusion is said to facilitate organizational adaptation,\(^{36}\) internal routinization is said to inhibit it.\(^{37}\)

In light of this ambiguity, it may be useful to disaggregate institutionalization into clearly specified components. This article focuses on the dimension of internal routinization, or the process by which rules and procedures become known, accepted, and complied with.\(^{38}\) When rules and procedures are routinized, stable sets of expectations and interests form around them. In a highly routinized context, rules and procedures may become so “taken for granted” that actors comply with them without evaluating the immediate costs and benefits of such compliance.\(^{39}\)

Routinization is normally associated with greater efficiency. Indeed, organizational theorists have shown that established routines and taken for granted rules and procedures are crucial for the everyday functioning of complex organizations.\(^{40}\) Yet routinization may handicap organizations in a context of environmental change. Routinized decision-making processes narrow the range of options considered by leaders in the short term.\(^{41}\) Actors are slower to question taken for granted structures and strategies, and when leaders devise adaptive strategies, established routines and decision rules may limit their capacity to implement them. From an interest-based perspective, routinized structures become entrenched because actors invest in skills, learn strategies, and create organizations that are appropriate to the existing rules of the game. These investments give actors a stake in the preservation of existing arrangements, as well as a greater capacity to defend them.\(^{42}\) As a result, routinized organizations tend to be “sticky,” in that they do not change as quickly as underlying preferences and power distributions. This leaves such organizations
vulnerable to external shocks, for it limits the speed with—and often the extent to—which they can adapt. By contrast, in non-routinized organizations, more is “up for grabs” in the short run, and actors have greater room to maneuver in searching for and carrying out adaptive strategies. Because rules and procedures are not buttressed by vested interests or taken for grantedness, actors have less difficulty modifying them when it serves their short-term goals. Such organizations thus tend to be less “sticky,” as lags between institutional outcomes and underlying distributions of power and preferences can be closed with relative ease.

Routinization affects parties’ strategic flexibility in two areas. First, it limits leadership renovation. Where party hierarchies are highly routinized, often in the form of bureaucracies, leadership renovation tends to be slow. In such a context, old guard leaders become entrenched in the party hierarchy, and internal recruitment filters and established career paths ward off reformist movements and instill conformity in aspiring leaders. Reformers thus tend to be “drowned in a sea of conventional party stalwarts,” or what Downs calls “conservers.” Hence, bureaucratized hierarchies often take the form of oligarchies, in which leadership turnover occurs “gradually and slowly” and “never through a sudden, massive, and extended injection of new blood.” By contrast, when party hierarchies are poorly routinized, movement in and out of the leadership is generally more fluid. Old guard leaders may be more easily removed from the party hierarchy, and the absence of recruitment filters and bureaucratic career paths allows reformers to rise quickly through the ranks.

Second, routinization often constrains party leaders. Although routinization may be accompanied by a centralization of authority (as in the case of Leninist parties), it is more often associated with greater limits on leadership autonomy. In highly routinized parties, entrenched decision rules “drastically limit internal actors’ margins of maneuverability.” As a result, such parties tend to respond “slowly and laboriously” to environmental change. By contrast, poorly routinized parties are associated with greater
strategic autonomy. The absence of established bureaucratic routines allows party leaders to consider a wider range of options, and the absence of established mechanisms of accountability gives leaders greater room to maneuver in carrying out adaptive strategies.\textsuperscript{49}

**Mass Populist Parties: Combining Rootedness and Flexibility?**

The above discussion suggests that parties that combine societal rootedness with low levels of routinization or bureaucratization may possess a distinct advantage in terms of adaptive capacity. Many Latin American mass populist parties,\textsuperscript{50} including the PJ, Bolivian MNR, Chilean Socialist Party, Mexican PRI, and Peruvian APRA fall (to varying degrees) into this category. Although mass populist parties generally possess strong base-level organizations and stable loyalties among an important sector of the working and lower classes, they differ in important ways from other (social democratic or communist) working class parties. Whereas most European socialist and communist parties built highly structured and disciplined organizations during their formative periods, populist parties were created from above, often from the state. In most cases, their leaderships were personalistic, which tended to inhibit the routinization of internal structures. Thus, whereas most communist and socialist parties consolidated into mass bureaucratic organizations with routinized rules and procedures and oligarchic leaderships, most mass populist parties never established stable bureaucracies. Indeed, due to their internal instability and dependence on single leaders, many of them fell apart.

When they survived, however, mass populist parties often evolved into strikingly flexible organizations. Although most of these parties maintain deep roots in society, key organizational legacies of populism, including fluid internal structures, non-bureaucratic hierarchies, and relatively autonomous leaderships, provide them with a high degree of strategic flexibility. Although there is no guarantee that populist parties will adopt appropriate strategies when confronted with external challenges, their loosely structured organizations create a greater opportunity for adaptation than exists in more routinized mass parties.
Figure 1 adds the dimension of routinization to Panebianco’s ideal-typical distinction between mass bureaucratic and electoral-professional parties. On the right side of the figure are the routinized parties that predominate in the literature. In the lower-right corner, one finds routinized mass parties, which correspond to Panebianco’s mass bureaucratic parties. Many northern European social democratic parties fall into this category. Such parties tend to be electorally stable but comparatively inflexible. In the upper-right corner, one finds routinized non-mass parties, which correspond to Panebianco’s “electoral-professional” parties. These parties are more flexible, but less electorally stable, than mass bureaucratic parties. On the left side of Figure 1 are poorly routinized parties. In the upper-left corner, one finds non-routinized parties without mass organizations, such as the personalistic vehicles that predominate in Peru and Russia. Such parties are highly flexible but often ephemeral. Finally, the lower-left corner corresponds to non-bureaucratic mass parties, such as mass populist parties. These parties are characterized by a distinctive combination of stability and flexibility, for although they are mass-based, they lack many of the bureaucratic constraints that are common to routinized mass parties. Hence, such parties may be particularly well-equipped to adapt to contemporary processes of socioeconomic change.

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**The Case of Peronism**

The following section applies these ideas to the case of contemporary Peronism. The PJ is a mass populist party. Although it maintains strong linkages to working-
lower-class society, these linkages are informal and poorly routinized. This under-routinized structure is inefficient and often chaotic. Moreover, as McGuire has argued, it limits the party’s effectiveness in representing socioeconomic actors such as organized labor. At the same time, however, under-routinization provides the PJ with a degree of strategic flexibility that is uncharacteristic of most mass working class parties. The section then demonstrates how this structure facilitated the PJ’s coalitional and programmatic responses to the political and socioeconomic challenges it faced in the 1980s and 1990s.

A Mass Populist Party

The PJ is mass-based, but poorly routinized. It is mass-based in that it maintains a powerful organized presence in working and lower class society. In 1993, PJ membership stood at 3.85 million, and its membership-to-vote ratio of 54.2 exceeded those of postwar social democratic parties in Austria, Germany, and Sweden. The PJ also possesses a dense infrastructure of local branches and maintains extensive ties to unions and other social organizations. Moreover, the Peronist subculture and identity remain deeply rooted among the Argentine poor, which provides the PJ with a relatively stable core electorate.

Unlike many other mass working class parties, however, the PJ is thoroughly non-bureaucratic. Its mass linkages are almost entirely informal, and its internal rules and procedures are strikingly fluid. The roots of this fluidity lie in the PJ’s populist origins. The original Peronist party was largely a personalistic vehicle for Juan Perón. Repeatedly re-organized from above during the first Perón government (1946–55), the party never developed a stable internal structure. After Perón’s overthrow, the movement fell into a decentralized, semi-anarchic state, with no overarching authority structure or broadly accepted “rules of the game.” As McGuire has shown, efforts by union and provincial bosses to build a more stable party structure were repeatedly derailed by the exiled leader. Even after Perón’s death and through the 1976-83 dictatorship, no Peronist faction was able to impose a binding set of rules on the party.
The PJ thus emerged from the 1983 democratic transition in a state of extreme internal fluidity. Although the democratizing reforms of the Peronist “Renovation” brought a degree of institutional order to the party in the late 1980s, the contemporary PJ continues to lack an effective central bureaucracy and stable rules of the game. Intra-party rules are not taken for granted, but rather are viewed instrumentally, and as a result, they are routinely circumvented, ignored, or “modified according to the needs of the party leadership.” As one PJ activist put it, Peronists “use the party statutes when they are useful. When they are not useful, we don’t use them.” The relative absence of internal routinization can be seen in three areas: (1) the party hierarchy; (2) leadership bodies; and (3) the party-union linkage.

A Fluid Party Hierarchy: Career Paths and Leadership/Candidate Selection

The PJ hierarchy is strikingly fluid. The party lacks recruitment filters, stable career paths, or tenure security. Peronists routinely gain access to top leadership positions without rising through the party ranks. For example, Isabel Perón and José María Vernet rose to the PJ presidency (in 1974 and 1984, respectively) without having previously held a party office. Leaders may be just as easily removed from the party hierarchy. Indeed, the first four acting presidents elected after 1983—Lorenzo Miguel, Vernet, Vicente Saadi, and Antonio Cafiero—were forced to step down before the end of their four-year mandates. Although the leadership selection process was partially democratized via the introduction of direct elections in 1987, not once during the 1990s was the PJ leadership or presidential ticket chosen via competitive elections. Indeed, 25 years after Perón’s death and more than a decade after the Renovation reforms, the party leadership still had never changed hands by institutional means.

The PJ’s non-bureaucratic hierarchy permits substantial leadership turnover. Leadership changes frequently entail virtual “housecleanings,” in which the entire old guard leadership is removed. In 1985, for example, more than 80 percent of the National Council Executive Board was replaced, and in 1987, more than 90 percent of the Executive
Board was replaced. Turnover between 1983 and 1987 was a full 100 percent. Although this rate declined somewhat in the 1990s, it remained strikingly high. Between 1991 and 1995, Executive Board turnover was 63 percent.

As important as these housecleanings is the threat of housecleaning. Because the PJ lacks secure tenure patterns and routinized career paths, and because the state, rather than the party, is the primary source of positions of power and prestige, ambitious Peronists must remain on good terms with office holding party leaders. For this reason, internal power shifts are routinely accompanied by “bandwagoning” processes in which party leaders defect, en masse, to winning factions.\(^6\) Hence, whereas conservatism may be a rational career-preserving strategy in a bureaucratic context,\(^6\) defecting to internal factions that hold (or are about to hold) power is a more rational strategy for Peronists. Rather than “entrenched bureaucrats,” old guard PJ leaders often become converts.

**Weak Leadership Bodies: The Absence of Taken for granted Authority**

The PJ’s formal leadership bodies are also poorly routinized. Although the National Council is formally the party’s maximum day-to-day authority, in practice, the body has never been taken for granted as the ultimate decision-making arena. In the 1970s, the National Council was widely ignored by Peronists (who viewed it as subordinate to both Perón and the ambiguously-defined “movement”), and as late as 1984, it competed with two parallel authority structures: a “Federal Council” created by PJ governors seeking to take over the party leadership and a “Superior Command” created by former President Isabel Perón, which claimed to be “above all other party organs.”\(^6\) Although these structures disappeared after the mid-1980s, Peronists still do not take the authority of the National Council and other party organs seriously. As one local party leader put it, “other parties can’t do anything if they don’t talk about it in the party council. We don’t pay any attention to the party council.”\(^6\) “Real” authority in the PJ tends to fall into the hands of the public office holders who control access to state resources. Thus, when the PJ occupies the presidency, “the government runs the
Consequently, no norms of executive accountability to the party leadership have developed. In the absence of effective leadership bodies to bring them together in stable and predictable ways, secondary leaders face coordination problems when it comes to questioning decisions made by higher level authorities. They fall into a “hub-and-spokes” relationship with office holding party leaders, which leaves them vulnerable to co-optation.\textsuperscript{66}

\textit{An Under-Routinized Party-Union Linkage}

A third area of under-routinization is the party-union linkage. Despite the central role played by unions during both Perón’s rise to power and the post-1955 proscription, the rules and procedures governing union participation in the PJ have always been fluid. Efforts to routinize the linkage, such as those of the Labor Party in the 1940s and Augusto Vandor in the 1960s, were derailed by Perón,\textsuperscript{67} and although unions gained a \textit{de facto} hegemony over the party after Perón’s death, labor leaders made little effort to establish stable rules for union participation. As a result, the PJ-union linkage remained informal, ill-defined, and contested through the 1990s. For example, although the “62 Organizations” (or “62”) functioned informally as labor’s representative in the Peronist leadership in the 1960s and 1970s,\textsuperscript{68} its status as Peronism’s “labor branch” was never written into the party statutes, and no stable set of rules and procedures emerged surrounding its activities or its position in the party leadership.\textsuperscript{69} The mechanism for union participation in the leadership and candidate selection process, known as the \textit{tercio} (or one-third) system, was similarly under-routinized. Based on Peronism’s “movementist” tradition of granting political, labor, and women’s branches a third of party candidacies and leadership posts, the \textit{tercio} was never formalized in party statutes and never rigorously enforced.

One consequence of the PJ’s under-institutionalized structure is inefficiency and even internal chaos. In the absence of stable decision rules, the PJ suffers frequent institutional crises, including contested party congresses, competing claims to authority,
and bitter conflicts over rules and procedures. These conflicts often produce schisms, and it is not uncommon for two or more Peronist parties to compete in local or provincial elections. Consequently, party leaders must devote a substantial amount of time and energy to monitoring the activities of others, resolving internal conflicts, and creating *ad hoc* rules and procedures. Yet under-routinization also provides the PJ with a striking degree of flexibility, as Peronists are able to quickly modify both the party’s *structure* and its *strategy* in response to environmental challenges. The following section demonstrates how this flexibility facilitated the PJ’s coalitional and programmatic adaptation in the 1980s and 1990s.

**Environmental Crisis and Party Change: The Peronist Adaptation**

The PJ entered the 1983 democratic transition as a *de facto* labor party. Unions, which had sustained the movement during the 1976–83 dictatorship, served as the PJ’s primary linkage to its urban working and lower class base, providing the bulk of the party’s organizational and financial resources. Union bosses, led by Lorenzo Miguel and Diego Ibanez, dominated the party. They represented the PJ in negotiations with the military, imposed the party’s presidential ticket, and were elected to top positions in the party and legislative leaderships. In the programmatic realm, the PJ remained wedded to a statist and redistributive economic model.

Laborism was a poor fit with the electoral and macroeconomic contexts of the mid- and late-1980s. For one, the social bases of Argentine politics had changed substantially. The trade liberalization of the 1970s and economic crisis of the 1980s decimated the manufacturing sector, weakening industrial unions and transforming the working class. The number of workers employed in manufacturing declined by more than a third between 1970 and 1990, while the informal sector grew from 16.5 to 29.9 percent of the economically active population. The retail and service sectors also expanded considerably. These social structural changes challenged the PJ in two ways. First, the decline of industrial unions threatened to erode the party’s presence in working and lower class areas. Voters in the
emerging tertiary and informal sectors had little contact with industrial unions, which meant that the influence that union-based organizations could exercise over them was limited. Second, the identities and interests of informal and tertiary sector voters differed considerably from those of traditional blue collar workers. Indeed, workers in these sectors, particularly the white collar sector, swelled the ranks of the independent electorate in the 1980s. The PJ’s failure to appeal to these voters is viewed as a major cause of its unprecedented defeat in the 1983 presidential election.\textsuperscript{74}

The PJ also faced a challenge in the macro-economic realm. The exhaustion of Argentina’s statist, inward-oriented economic model, together with the fiscal strain generated by the debt crisis, left the economy in a shambles. The Alfonsín government’s (1983-89) attempts to resolve the mounting economic crisis via a series of heterodox adjustments failed, and by 1989 the economy had fallen into a spiral of recession and hyperinflation. When President Menem took office in July 1989, inflation stood at nearly 200 percent a month.

These socioeconomic changes created an incentive for PJ leaders to reconfigure both the party’s electoral coalition and its program. In the coalitional realm, to maintain the support of the urban poor, the PJ would have to reduce its dependence on corporate, union-based linkages and strengthen its territorial linkages. At the same time, to capture a greater share of the independent electorate, the party would have to de-emphasize traditional Peronist appeals in favor of a more multiclass, catch-all appeal. These changes clearly entailed a reduction in union influence. In the programmatic realm, the new economic constraints would limit the degree to which a Peronist government could pursue statist or redistributive policies. However, because the PJ was in opposition between 1983 and 1989, it was not forced to reconcile its platform with these realities until Menem was elected president in 1989.

\textit{Coalitional Adaptation: The De-Unionization of Urban Peronism}

The PJ underwent a striking coalitional change after 1983. In less than a decade,
urban Peronism transformed itself from a *de facto* labor party into a predominantly patronage-based party. The speed and extent of this de-unionization was a product of the poorly-routinized nature of the party-union linkage. Because traditional mechanisms of labor participation such as the “62” and the *tercio* were neither formalized in party statutes nor widely taken for granted, their status was vulnerable to changes in the distribution of power and preferences in the party. Such a change occurred after 1983, as politicians who had previously depended on union resources gained access to the state. Although the PJ lost the presidency in 1983, it won 12 governorships, hundreds of mayoralties, and thousands of city council seats. As Peronists established themselves in public office, they substituted state resources for union resources, building patronage-based networks at the margins of the unions. These networks provided the organizational bases for the Renovation movement that challenged labor’s privileged position in the party in the mid-1980s.

The Renovation challenge destroyed the PJ’s pre-existing mechanisms of union participation. The 62 Organizations’ status as the encompassing representative of Peronist labor was undermined when the Renovators began to treat the “Group of 25” union faction as an alternative “labor branch.” Thus, in the 1985 mid-term elections, Renovation-led party branches granted the “25,” rather than the “62,” the right to nominate unionists for PJ legislative lists. Three years later, pro-Menem unions created another labor branch: the Menem for President Labor Roundtable. By the end of the decade, the “62” had been transformed from the PJ’s “labor branch” into one of several Peronist labor factions, and by the mid-1990s the body had become an “empty name” that “no one pays attention to.” No organization replaced the “62” as the encompassing representative of Peronist labor, and as a result, unions were left without even an informal body to represent them in the party leadership.

The Renovators also eroded the last vestiges of legitimacy behind the *tercio* system. Although the National Council officially ratified the *tercio* in 1986, Renovation-
led branches in Córdoba, Mendoza, and other provinces simply ignored the party leadership’s orders to employ the practice. The Renovators’ takeover of the party in 1987 delivered the coup de grace to the tercio system. In November 1987, the Renovation-led party congress established a system of direct elections to select leaders and candidates, which effectively prohibited the tercio. As a result, labor was left without any (formal or informal) mechanism of participation in the party.

The elimination of the “62” and the tercio contributed to the PJ’s rapid deunionization. The replacement of the tercio with direct elections shifted power away from the unions and into the hands of neighborhood brokers who could deliver votes. PJ politicians organized these brokers into patronage networks, and these networks largely replaced the unions as the primary linkage between the party and its urban base. By the mid-1990s, local patronage networks had consolidated into powerful urban machines. At the same time, in the absence of an encompassing political organization, Peronist labor fragmented. Unions began to negotiate individual alliances with party bosses, which reduced their collective leverage vis-à-vis the party leadership.

As a result of the changes, labor representation in the PJ declined precipitously. In 1983, union leaders held the acting party presidency and more than a third (37.5 percent) of the seats on the National Council Executive Board. By 1995, unionists held no executive posts and just an eighth (12.5 percent) of the seats in the Executive Board. Labor’s presence in the PJ’s legislative bloc fell sharply as well. As table 1 shows, the number of unionists in the PJ bloc fell from 29 in 1983 to just 5 in 1997, despite a substantial increase in the overall size of the bloc. Not surprisingly, union influence over party strategy also declined. In the early 1990s, the newspaper Clarín described labor as “scarcely a spectator” in the PJ leadership, and although most labor leaders continued to back the PJ through the end of the decade, many believed that the party was “more closely aligned with business than with the CGT.”
De-unionization enabled the PJ to reconfigure its electoral coalition in line with the social structural changes produced by de-industrialization. For example, greater autonomy from the unions enabled the Renovators’ efforts to abandon laborist Peronism’s inward-oriented electoral strategy in favor of a more middle class-oriented, catch-all appeal. At the same time, the consolidation of patronage-based territorial organizations helped the PJ maintain its base among the urban poor. Peronist patronage networks mushroomed in urban poverty zones in the 1990s, providing access to jobs, government services, and food and medicine to people who had been marginalized from both the formal economy and the state.\(^{79}\) Although the electoral impact of these activities is difficult to measure, there is little question that such territorial linkages are more effective in areas characterized by mass unemployment and a large informal sector than are union-based linkages.

**Programmatic Adaptation: The Neoliberal Turn**

The Menem government’s programmatic shift is well known. Though elected on a populist platform, Menem responded to the 1989 hyperinflationary crisis with a stunning about-face. Eschewing incremental reforms in favor of an “all or nothing” strategy,\(^ {80}\) the government undertook a radical reform program that, according to one comparative survey, was the second most far-reaching in the world in the 1990–95 period.\(^ {81}\) The reforms included rapid trade liberalization, privatization of nearly all of the country’s state enterprises, and a controversial monetary policy—the Convertibility Plan—that made the Argentine *peso*...
freely convertible with the US dollar. Rather than downplaying his programmatic reversals, Menem forcefully embraced them, often making dramatic public gestures to highlight his conversion. Thus, the government aligned with traditional Peronist enemies such as the multinational Bunge y Born and the right wing Center Democratic Union, issued a decree restricting the right to strike on Peronist Loyalty Day, and sent troops to fight alongside the US in the Gulf War. Although these gestures may have helped close the “credibility gap” that the Menem government faced with respect to domestic and foreign investors, they were difficult to swallow for many Peronists.

Most PJ leaders did not share Menem’s radical strategy. Party president Antonio Cafiero and other top leaders preferred a more moderate approach, and according to former majority leader José Luis Manzano, “very few” PJ legislators agreed with the initial reform project. Indeed, in a 1997 survey of 87 PJ legislators and 75 local PJ leaders, only 12 percent expressed full support for the neoliberal model. Nevertheless, Menem faced surprisingly little internal resistance. Despite the fact that the PJ was controlled by the center-left Renovation faction in 1989, the party made no serious effort to modify or slow down the Menem program. Indeed, not once did the National Council publicly oppose a position taken by President Menem.

There are two major reasons why doubts about neoliberalism was not translated into an effective challenge to the Menem program. One factor was the 1989 hyperinflationary crisis, which convinced many Peronists that there was no viable alternative to orthodox reforms. Yet the crisis alone is insufficient to explain PJ cooperation. As Javier Corrales has noted, one can find many cases of non-cooperation with reforms in the midst of serious economic crises. Rather, Menem’s success in developing and implementing a radical neoliberal strategy was also facilitated by the PJ’s party structure. Although many Peronists were critical of Menem’s strategy, the PJ’s poorly routinized organization left them with little incentive, and few opportunities, to challenge him.
The PJ organization enhanced Menem’s room to maneuver in three ways: (1) the absence of tenure security led to a process of “bandwagoning,” in which scores of non-Menemist party leaders defected to Menemism; (2) the weakness of party leadership bodies allowed Menem to first ignore the formal party leadership and then stack it with government officials; (3) in the absence of effective horizontal links, secondary leaders fell into a hub-and-spokes relationship with Menem, which undermined their capacity to sustain intra-party coalitions.

Bandwagoning and the Collapse of the Renovation Faction. Menem’s position vis-à-vis the party was strengthened by a process of “bandwagoning” in 1988 and 1989. In mid-1988, two-thirds of National Council members and 68 of the 103 members of the PJ legislative bloc belonged to the center-left Renovation faction. Yet top Renovation leaders, including vice presidents José Maria Vernet and Roberto García, legislative bloc president José Luis Manzano, Federal Capital boss Carlos Grosso, and Córdoba leader José Manuel De la Sota, lacked independent (office-based) support structures and thus needed Menem’s backing to retain their positions in the party. Immediately after Menem’s nomination, these leaders found their positions threatened by Menem loyalists who called for a wholesale “housecleaning” of the party hierarchy. Because there existed a clear precedent for removing party authorities before their mandates expired, these calls posed a credible threat.

Menem’s victory thus triggered a large-scale bandwagoning process, as scores of Renovators joined the ranks of Menemism. Many were given positions in the government, while others, including majority leader Manzano, future majority leader Jorge Matzkin, and Budget Committee chair Oscar Lamberto, became the core of the new dominant faction in the legislature. Others, such as Roberto García, were able to preserve their positions in the party leadership. Known as “neo-Menemists,” these defectors brought about a critical intra-party re-alignment, broadening Menem’s base of support within the party. Although De la Sota and a few other Menem critics sought to maintain the Renovation as an
independent faction, Cafiero and other Renovators refused to join them, and the project subsequently collapsed.

*The Weakness of Party Leadership Bodies.* Menem’s strategic autonomy was further enhanced by the poorly-routinized nature of the PJ’s leadership bodies. Because party organs lacked substantial independent authority, critics were unable to use them to modify or slow down the neoliberal strategy. Thus, although the party leadership remained in the hands of non-Menemists such as Cafiero (president) and Vernet (vice president), these leaders possessed neither the authority nor the institutional means with which to hold Menem accountable. The National Council played no role in the development of Menem’s initial economic program, and party leaders complained of learning about cabinet appointments through the newspapers.⁹¹ Indeed, Cafiero opposed Menem’s decision to name a Bunge y Born director as Minister of the Economy but was ignored.⁹² During Menem’s first year in office, National Council communiqués calling for a “mixed market economy” and “social equity brought about by state action” went unheeded, and Clarín observed that the body’s influence over the government was “almost nil.”⁹³ Cafiero himself recognized that the PJ leadership played “no role” in policy making:

> We met every week and kept minutes and other records... But influence over the government? No. We produced reports and declarations, but these declarations directly contradicted what the government was doing. So we were ignored...[Menem] did not consult anyone... There was no way to make him see the existence of another authority at his side.⁹⁵

In August 1990, Cafiero and Vernet resigned—a year and a half before their terms expired—and were replaced by Menem and his brother Eduardo. The “Menemization” of the National Council closed the gap between the PJ’s formal authorities and the “real” balance of power in the party. Although both Menems took leaves of absence from the party leadership, the National Council increasingly came under the control of the government. Between 1990 and 1993, when the party presidency was held by Roberto García, the National Council was largely run by Minister of the Presidency Eduardo Bauza and Interior Minister José Luis Manzano.⁹⁶ According to García,
In the first phase of my presidency, I drew up the party communiqués and got them approved by the government before signing them. In the second phase, the government sent me the communiqués and I revised them and signed them. In the third phase, I read about the communiqués in the newspapers.  

After García resigned in 1993, all of the members of the top leadership were either national government officials or governors, and party decisions were increasingly “made in the presidential palace.”

The post-1990 party leadership thus functioned more as a government mouthpiece than as a channel for party demands. Despite the fact that the Convertibility Plan generated sharp criticism within the party in 1991, the party congress expressed its “unrestricted support” for the plan. The National Council also repeatedly sided with the government in its conflicts with the CGT, publicly opposing general strikes in 1992 and 1996. During Menem’s second term, the National Council acted as a virtual rubber-stamp body, offering unconditional support for the government’s entire post-election legislative agenda.

The Failure of Internal Challenges. Menem’s strategic autonomy was further enhanced by his capacity to maintain a hub-and-spokes relationship with secondary party leaders. Menem’s critics faced a collective action problem. Had they united, they might have forced Menem to moderate his reform strategy, for their collective opposition would have inflicted heavy political costs on the president. However, without tenure security, stable rules of accountability, or an effective central bureaucracy to link them horizontally, secondary leaders fell into a hub-and-spokes relationship with Menem. This permitted Menem to play “chicken” games with individual critics. Because Menem could inflict much more damage on individual leaders than they, by themselves, could inflict on him, critics repeatedly backed down, choosing the safer strategy of non-confrontation. As one local PJ leader put it,

Everyone will tell you, ‘I surrendered because the others surrendered. What do you want me to do, go it alone?’… People were frightened of losing what they had. So they negotiated individually.
Efforts to build anti-Menemist coalitions were repeatedly undermined by defections in the 1990s. During Menem’s first year in office, for example, the neo-liberal program was challenged by several factions, including the left-of-center “Group of Eight,” the orthodox Peronist Militancy, and the Federal Parliamentary Group. Although these factions at times constituted a majority in the National Council and the legislative bloc, they repeatedly failed to come together into a single coalition. In June 1990, for example, an effort by Catamarca governor Ramon Saadi to remove Manzano as majority leader failed when members of the Federal Parliamentary Group defected. Five months later, an effort to build a coalition among Peronist Militancy, the Federal Parliamentary Group, and allies of Vice President Eduardo Duhaldistas allies failed when the Duhaldistas struck a deal with Manzano. By late 1990, the internal opposition movement had collapsed and the Group of Eight and other dissidents had been marginalized. According to former Group of Eight leader Carlos “Chacho” Alvarez, “In private, 90 percent of [PJ leaders] criticized Menem from top to bottom.… But in public, they didn’t say a thing. They were all co-opted.”

A second example of failed internal coalition-building is that of Mendoza senator José Octavior Bordón, a Menem critic who sought the PJ’s 1995 presidential nomination. In mid-1993, Bordón’s “post-Menemist” project appeared to have the support of Cafiero, De la Sota, Duhalde, and several other key party leaders. According to one former party leader, such a coalition would have “changed the balance of power in Peronism, forcing Menem to confront a real opposition.” However, the Bordonista project soon collapsed. After the November 1993 Olivos Pact ensured passage of the constitutional reform permitting Menem’s re-election, few PJ leaders were willing to oppose the president. Thus, Duhalde re-aligned with Menem, and Cafiero, De la Sota, and other ex-Renovators abandoned Bordón, leaving him ostracized. This pattern was repeated during Menem’s second term, as non-Menemist factions such as the provincial Great North and the center-left Peronist Current also failed to take hold. Even Buenos Aires governor Eduardo Duhalde, the PJ’s 1999 presidential candidate, repeatedly failed in his efforts to build an
internal coalition of provincial party bosses.

In sum, the PJ’s rapid and far-reaching adaptation was facilitated by its organizational structure. In the coalitional realm, the poorly routinized nature of the party-union linkage facilitated the dismantling of traditional mechanisms of labor participation in the late 1980s, which helped to transform the PJ from a labor-dominated party into a predominantly patronage-based party. In the programmatic realm, a fluid hierarchy and weak leadership bodies enhanced President Menem’s strategic autonomy as he carried out a set of radical neo-liberal reforms. Although many PJ leaders and activists preferred a more limited or gradual reform, they lacked effective mechanisms with which to challenge Menem.

The PJ enjoyed substantial electoral success in the 1990s, winning six straight national elections between 1987 and 1995. This electoral success had two sources. The first was the government’s success in stabilizing the economy, which helped the PJ win a significant share of the independent and conservative vote. The second was the PJ’s entrenched mass base, which helped it to maintain the support of traditional Peronist voters. Support for the PJ among the poor remained remarkably stable in the 1990s, despite the fact that many of these voters were highly critical of the government’s neo-liberal policies. This electoral stability was greatest in districts in which the PJ organization was strongest. Hence, both the PJ’s flexibility and its societal rootedness contributed to its electoral success in the 1990s. On the one hand, had the PJ failed to resolve the hyperinflationary crisis, it may well have suffered an electoral collapse. On the other hand, were it not for its mass organization and subculture, the PJ’s hold on its traditional working and lower class base would have been much more tenuous.

**Conclusion: The Peronist Case in Comparative and Theoretical Perspective**

This article has sought to explain the capacity of labor-based parties to adapt to the opportunities and constraints posed by changing electoral and economic environments. It
has argued that mass populist parties possess a combination of features that give them a distinctive advantage in terms of adaptive capacity. On the one hand, strong roots in society provide them with an important degree of electoral stability. On the other hand, key legacies of populism, such as fluid internal structures, autonomous leaderships, and non-bureaucratic hierarchies, provide them with a degree of strategic flexibility not found in most other mass parties. The article applied this argument to the case of contemporary Peronism, arguing that the PJ’s poorly routinized party structure facilitated its coalitional and programmatic adaptation in the 1980s and 1990s. Although the PJ’s lack of institutionalization had important costs in terms of internal efficiency and the overall quality of representation in Argentina, the party’s flexibility proved critical both to its own survival and, arguably, to democratic governance in the 1990s.

This argument may be further illustrated with reference to the experiences of other contemporary Latin American labor-based and populist parties. In Venezuela, Democratic Action (AD), which is a well-routinized labor-based party, largely failed to adapt to the neoliberal challenge. AD’s party structure is closer to that of a mass bureaucratic party than a mass populist party. Its leadership hierarchy is relatively bureaucratic,\textsuperscript{114} party organs such as the National Executive Committee (CEN) possess substantial independent authority,\textsuperscript{115} and the party-union linkage has long been institutionalized via the Labor Bureau.\textsuperscript{116} AD adapted slowly and ineffectively to the neoliberal challenge. Old guard leaders used their “iron control over internal promotions” to “block the entrance of new blood into the party leadership,”\textsuperscript{117} and organized labor actually increased its influence in the late 1980s.\textsuperscript{118} Moreover, when President Carlos Andres Pérez embarked on a neoliberal program in 1989, old guard leaders used their control of the CEN to stall the program in the legislature and eventually force Pérez to abandon most of the reforms.\textsuperscript{119} The failures of the Pérez government undoubtedly contributed to AD’s electoral decline in the 1990s. After winning 53 percent of the vote in 1988, AD fell to just 23 percent in 1993, and in 1998, it was unable to even field a presidential candidate.
The cases of the Chilean communist (PCCh) and socialist (PSCh) parties offer further evidence of an inverse relationship between routinization and adaptive capacity. In the 1980s, economic liberalization, the weakening of the labor movement, and the demise of authoritarian rule dramatically reshaped the environment facing the Chilean left. The PCCh and PSCh responded in strikingly different ways to these changes, and research by Kenneth Roberts suggests that these diverging strategies are partly attributable to differences in party structure. The PCCh is a “highly structured and institutionalized” party with “a well-developed bureaucracy.” This rigid structure limited the party’s innovative capacity in the 1980s, for it “screened out innovative or ‘heretical’ ideas that emanated from external sources while suppressing the emergence of such ideas from within the party itself.” As a result, the party maintained its Marxist program and made little effort to broaden its appeal, which resulted in political marginalization and electoral decline. By contrast, the PSCh has a “loosely structured party organization” and “lax disciplinary norms,” which makes it a “very open, dynamic, and flexible party.” Unlike the PCCh, the PSCh underwent a far-reaching renovation of its leadership, its alliances, and its program in the 1980s. It abandoned Marxism for social democracy, loosened its union ties, and adopted a more catch-all electoral appeal. The PSCh and its sister party, the Party for Democracy, enjoyed relative electoral success in the 1990s, more than doubling the average socialist party vote between 1957 and 1973.

Another instructive case is that of APRA in Peru. A populist party with a high degree of strategic flexibility, APRA nevertheless failed in the late 1980s due—in retrospect—to a misguided strategy. APRA differs from the PJ in that it was created in opposition and developed a relatively structured organization. However, the party also has marked charismatic traits, and founder Victor Raul Haya de la Torre enjoyed substantial autonomy in charting APRA’s strategies. These authority patterns persisted after Haya’s death and were inherited in the early 1980s by Alan García. Facing intense competition for working class votes from the emerging United Left, García used his control over APRA to
shift the party leftward. Upon winning the presidency in 1985, García launched a bold reactivation program and announced that debt payments would be limited to 10 percent of export earnings. Two years later, without consulting the APRA leadership, he nationalized the banking system. The strategy provoked the hostility of the private sector and international lending agencies and generated a deep fiscal crisis, which eventually led to hyperinflation. As a result, APRA’s electoral fortunes plummeted, falling from 53 percent in 1985 to just four percent in 1995.

Taken together, these cases provide some initial support for the hypothesis that loosely structured parties are better equipped to adapt to environmental shocks than more bureaucratic ones. The most highly routinized labor-based parties considered here, AD and the PCCh, had the greatest difficulty adapting to the contemporary neoliberal challenge, while more loosely structured PJ and the PSCh adapted quickly and extensively to this challenge. Other Latin American populist parties, such as the Bolivian Nationalist Revolutionary Movement and Mexican PRI, also adapted with relative success in the 1980s and 1990s. Yet as the case of APRA makes clear, strategic flexibility is no guarantee that leaders will choose appropriate strategies. Indeed, autonomous leaders may choose strategies that are highly destructive for their parties.

These findings suggest a need for more systematic research on informal and non-institutionalized party organizations. The literature on party organization and change, which is based largely on studies of parties in the advanced industrialized countries, often takes institutionalization for granted. Yet not only are many Latin American parties informally organized and poorly institutionalized, but as this article has shown, variation on these dimensions may have important implications for party behavior. The findings also raise questions about some widely held assumptions about party institutionalization. Much of the literature on parties associates higher levels of institutionalization with (positively evaluated) outcomes such as effective representation and political stability. Yet institutionalization may also limit the choices available to actors and slow down or even prevent efforts to
undertake organizational change. In a context of crisis, such stability may prove costly. By contrast, loosely structured organizations, through often a source of internal disorder, may help parties adapt and survive during difficult times.

Endnotes

1 Labor-based parties are parties whose core constituency is organized labor. Such parties depend on union support (in the form of organizational resources, votes, and social peace) for their success, and in exchange, they generally grant unions a role in shaping strategy and selecting candidates.


6 The British Labour Party in the 1990s is perhaps the clearest example of such recovery.


11 Thus, Adam Przeworski and John Sprague’s conclusion that the erosion of industrial working classes would lead to the decline of electoral socialism (Paper Stones: A History of Electoral Socialism [Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1986], 183–85) proved overly pessimistic.


15 Examples of such an approach include Koelble, “Recasting Social Democracy in Europe;” Kitschelt, The Transformation of European Social Democracy; and Moshe Maor, Parties, Conflicts, and Coalitions in Western Europe: Organizational Determinants of Coalition Bargaining (London: Routledge, 1998).


Panebianco, Political Parties, 267.

For a similar argument, see Mainwaring, Rethinking Party Systems in the Third Wave of Democratization, 21–25.


Panebianco, Political Parties, 262–67.

Kitschelt, The Transformation of European Social Democracy, 216.

Panebianco, Political Parties, 272–74.


This argument is developed in Steven Levitsky, “Peronism and Institutionalization: The Case, the Concept, and the Case for Unpacking the Concept,” Party Politics 4: 1 (1998).


Huntington, Political Order in Changing Societies, 15.


Janda, Political Parties, 19; Panebianco, Political Parties, 58–60; Mainwaring, Rethinking Party Systems, 26–27.


McGuire, Peronism without Perón, 1.

Huntington, Political Order in Changing Societies, 15–17.


This definition should be understood as distinct from Max Weber’s well-known notion of the routinization of charisma. Whereas Weber’s conceptualization refers to process by which members of charismatic organizations undergo a set of changes in goals and orientations toward the movement or organization, the definition used here refers simply to a convergence around a set of rules and procedures within any kind of organization.


A mass populist party is a mass-based party born of a populist movement, which Collier and Collier define as a movement “characterized by mass support from the urban working class and/or peasantry; a strong element of mobilization from above; a central role of leadership from the middle sector or elite, typically of a personalistic and/or charismatic nature; and an anti-status quo, nationalist ideology and program” (Collier and Collier, *Shaping the Political Arena*, 788).

During this time, the mass populist party was often characterized by a high level of commitment from its members, which was reflected in its ability to mobilize quickly and efficiently. This was evident in the early Peronist Party, which was able to attract a large number of supporters through its strong organizational structure.

To summarize, the mass populist party is a type of party that is born of a populist movement, and it is characterized by the strong support of the working class and peasantry, the mobilization from above, the central role of leadership, and the nationalist ideology and program. This type of party is often able to attract a high level of commitment from its members, which allows it to mobilize quickly and efficiently.

Author's interview with former CGT general secretary Oscar Lescano, 27 October, 1997.


Author's interview with hospital workers union leader Carlos West Ocampo, 13 October, 1997.


Gerchunoff and Torre, “La política de liberalización económica,” 736.


Author's interview, 5 December, 1997.

Levitsky, “From Laborism to Liberalism,” 219–26. Respondents were asked which of the following five statements most closely described their view of the Menem government’s economic policies: (1) The neoliberal reforms were necessary and should be continued; (2) The neoliberal reforms were initially necessary but should have been softened after the crisis ended; (3) Some kind of economic reform was necessary, but the Menem government went too fast and/or too far; (4) The neoliberal reforms should not have been carried out; (5) I don’t like the reforms but I support the government because it is Peronist. Of PJ legislators, 12.6 percent chose the first option, 39.1 percent chose the second option, 35.7 percent chose the third option, 3.5 percent chose the fourth option, and 9.2 percent chose the fifth option. Of local PJ leaders, 12 percent chose the first option, 36 percent chose the second option, 32 percent chose the third option, 12 percent chose the fourth option, and 8 percent chose the fifth option.


Grosso was mayor of the Federal Capital, but this post was appointed by the president.


Author's interview with Antonio Cafiero, 3 October, 1997.


Author's interview, 3 October, 1997.

*Clarín*, 13 March, 1991, 4; and author's interview with José Luis Manzano, 5 December, 1997.

Author's interview, 23 June, 1997.

Author's interview with senator José Luis Gioja, 18 September, 1997.


*Clarín*, 3 December, 1995, 22.


Author's interview with Gustavo Morato, 13 June, 1997.


*Clarín*, 9 June, 1990, 7.

Although the PJ was defeated in the 1999 presidential election, it remained the largest party in Argentina, winning nearly two-thirds of the country’s governorships.


Ostiguy, “Peronism and Anti-Peronism,” 464–79.


Corrales, “El presidente y su gente,” 98.


Roberts, _Deepening Democracy?,_ 47.


McMarthy, “Center-Left Parties in Chile.”


Julio Cotler, “Political Parties and the Problems of Democratic Consolidation in Peru,” in Mainwaring and Scully, eds., _Building Democratic Institutions_, 329.


Sanborn, “El Apra en un contexto de cambio,” 118.


Huntington, _Political Order in Changing Societies_; Mainwaring and Scully, eds., _Building Democratic Institutions_; McGuire, _Peronism without Perón_; Mainwaring, _Rethinking Party Systems in the Third Wave of Democratization._
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