THE POLITICAL RECRAFTING OF SOCIAL BASES OF PARTY COMPETITION: CHILE IN THE 1990s

Mariano Torcal and Scott Mainwaring

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ABSTRACT

This paper examines social cleavages and the impact of political legacies in Chile’s post-authoritarian party system. In contrast to society-oriented approaches to party system formation, we argue that cleavage appearance in a party system depends on political agency, which can even (re)create social identities and social conflicts. The Chilean case illustrates this point; the structure of the party system is deeply influenced by distinctive political legacies of the authoritarian period. The cleavage between those who supported authoritarian rule and those who opposed it has powerfully shaped the party system during the new democratic period.

In postauthoritarian Chile (1990–present), a societal approach does not adequately explain the formation of cleavages or the contours of the party system. A class cleavage has appeared between the governing coalition and the conservative opposition, but this cleavage is politically constructed and maintained. The Chilean case also shows that it is important to examine the ways in which political elites craft party systems from above during the transition period. Political agency from the supply side played a decisive role in emphasizing or diminishing some of the political and cultural conflicts existing after the authoritarian experience and, therefore, an essential role in party system formation in postauthoritarian Chile.

RESUMEN

Este artículo examina los clivajes sociales y el impacto de los legados políticos en el sistema de partidos del Chile postautoritario. En contraste con los enfoques de la formación de los sistemas de partidos orientados hacia la sociedad, sostenemos que la aparición de un clivaje en un sistema de partidos depende de la agencia política, lo que puede incluso (re)crear identidades sociales y conflictos sociales. El caso chileno ilustra este argumento: la estructura del sistema de partidos está profundamente influida por los legados distintivamente políticos del periodo autoritario. El clivaje entre aquellos que apoyaron y aquellos que se opusieron al gobierno autoritario ha dado forma al sistema de partidos durante el nuevo periodo democrático.

En el Chile postautoritario (desde 1990 hasta el presente), un abordaje societal no explica adecuadamente la formación de los clivajes o el perfil del sistema de partidos. Ha aparecido un clivaje de clase entre la coalición gobernante y la oposición conservadora, pero este clivaje ha sido construido y es mantenido políticamente. El caso chileno también demuestra que es importante examinar las maneras en que las elites políticas arman desde arriba los sistemas de partidos durante los períodos de transición. La agencia política desde el lado de la oferta ha jugado un rol decisivo en enfatizar o moderar algunos de los conflictos políticos y culturales existentes luego de la experiencia autoritaria; un rol, por lo tanto, esencial en la formación del sistema de partidos en el Chile postautoritario.
This paper examines social cleavages and the impact of political legacies in Chile’s postauthoritarian party system. We undertake this enterprise as a way of exploring how postauthoritarian party systems are structured. Because a party system is formed and/or reestablished when democracy is restored, new democracies provide an ideal context in which to discuss theoretically important aspects of cleavages and party system formation.

According to the original formulation of the social cleavage theory of party systems, links between cleavages and party systems arose as a consequence of political mobilization and organization of sectors of society affected by four conflicts that emerged during the formation of the nation-state and the industrial revolution in Western Europe: center-periphery, religion, class, and rural-urban (Lipset and Rokkan 1967). These four conflicts do not necessarily find expression in the party system, but once a cleavage has made its political appearance, according to Lipset and Rokkan, it tends to remain stable over time even when the original conflict has subsided. This is the well-known ‘freezing hypothesis’. The theory produced by this seminal work has been a leading approach to the study of citizens’ preference formation and the study of party systems in Western Europe. According to the dominant interpretation of Lipset and Rokkan, divisions rooted in society, such as class, religion, ethnicity, region, and urban/rural location, are the only driving forces behind the appearance of a cleavage (Kelley, McAllister, and Mughan 1985; Rose 1968 and 1974; Rose and Urwin 1969, Weakliem and Heath 1994). Lipset and Rokkan paid some attention to strictly political explanations about cleavage and party system formation, but they treated these explanations as secondary. For these scholars the fundamental engine of cleavage formation and change is sociological.

In contrast to this approach, we argue that cleavage appearance in a party system depends more on political agency. Politics, we maintain, can (re)create sociopolitical identities, polarizing or diffusing potential social conflicts, and can even alter the nature of social conflicts through the policies adopted by the government. There is, of course, a complex interaction between political factors and the social context, but we maintain that politics is the main engine in the formation and evolution of politically relevant social cleavages. We thus agree with other scholars who have emphasized that political factors are the main shapers of party systems and social and political conflicts (Chhibber 1999; Chhibber and Torcal 1997; Kalyvas 1996; Kitschelt 1994; Kriesi 1998; Pakulski and Waters 1996a; Przeworski and Sprague 1986; Sartori 1969).
Latin American party systems constitute fertile cases for examining and challenging propositions about how cleavages form and evolve, and Chile is a particularly interesting case. In contrast to the rest of Latin America, it has often been considered a paradigmatic case of strong class or religious cleavages in party competition (Dix 1989; Scully 1992, 1995). Most explanations of this class cleavage have been formulated from a sociological perspective, leaving politics aside. For these reasons Chile is more likely than other Latin American cases to support the social cleavage model.

Our study of the Chilean case suggests three important points with broader theoretical and comparative applicability. First, it shows that although cleavages have a social component, they are politically constructed. The structure of the Chilean party system has experienced a profound realignment because of the experience of authoritarian rule (1973–90). Chilean society remains politically polarized about the military dictatorship of 1973–90, and the party system still has a powerful democratic/authoritarian cleavage that resulted from the previous nondemocratic regime.

Second, the Chilean case poses doubts about the main arguments given for the ‘freezing’ and ‘thawing’ of social cleavages. Most of the literature emphasizes social, economic, and cultural factors as the main source of class cleavage formation and erosion. The Chilean case demonstrates that politics can be the driving force behind the freezing or erosion of cleavages. It is impossible to understand cleavage formation and erosion in Chile without focusing on political factors.

The Chilean case reinforces the evidence that the social cleavage model was geographically and historically bounded. In postauthoritarian Chile (1990–present), a societal approach does not adequately explain the formation of cleavages or the contours of the party system. A modest class cleavage has appeared between the governing coalition and the conservative opposition, but this cleavage was politically constructed through political and economic decisions taken by political authorities.

Third, the Chilean case shows that it is important to examine the ways in which political elites craft party systems from above during the transition period. Political agency from the supply side played a decisive role in emphasizing or diminishing some of the sociopolitical and cultural conflicts existing after the authoritarian experience and, therefore, an essential role in party system formation in postauthoritarian Chile. Political elites enjoyed considerable autonomy in reshaping the party system from above in a continuous interaction process with existing social differences and potential conflicts. This phenomenon draws attention to the general theoretical importance of political agency in party system formation.
Cleavages and Party System Formation: The Theoretical Debate

Lipset and Rokkan (1967) formulated a theory to explain the divisions and forces that shaped European party systems. The ‘cleavage’ concept is at the core of their analysis and countless subsequent works on party systems. However, here have been ongoing debates about the concept.

In this debate there are three modal positions. First, there is a sociological—in the sense of ‘objective’ social relations—interpretation (Heath, Jowell, and Curtice 1985; Kelley, McAllister, and Mughan 1985; Lipset 1960; Rose 1968 and 1974; Rose and Urwin 1969; Weakliem and Heath 1994). This approach argues that parties represent societal interests, and societal interests fundamentally reflect the sociological position of actors. This is the so called the ‘class causal linkage proposition’ (Pakulski and Waters 1996b, 670). Notwithstanding some caveats about the political mechanisms that translate social cleavages into partisan divides, these scholars assume that individuals’ political orientations reflect their ‘objective’ position in society. To use Heath’s (1981, 51) expression, “classes are real groups with distinct political interests.” Therefore, ‘class’ serves not only to categorize people’s objective societal position (‘class in itself’) but also, and more importantly, to predict the formation of mobilized groups as collective political actors (‘class for itself’) (Kitschelt 1993, 300).

A second position in this debate understands ‘cleavage’ differently and places greater emphasis on the autonomy of party systems vis-à-vis the sociological explicandum. While building also on Lipset and Rokkan’s contribution, it is less structural and more political. For example, Bartolini and Mair (1990), Knutsen and Scarbrough (1995), and Kriesi (1998) argue that a cleavage has three elements: a structural base, the political values of the groups involved, and a political articulation (see also Kitschelt 1997). They also emphasize the relative autonomy of political values vis-à-vis objective sociological factors. Some scholars understand cleavages as political divides based on ‘new’ issues or ideological conflicts rooted in cultural divisions that have more autonomy with respect to the previously existing societal conflicts (Bartolini and Mair 1990; Dalton 1988; Dalton, Flanagan, and Beck 1984; Inglehart 1984, 1990; Knutsen 1988, 1989). Franklin, Mackie, and Valen (1992, 4) maintain that cleavages

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1 We put ‘objective’ in quotation marks because all identities including class are ultimately constructed rather than objectively given. To us, ‘objective’ means merely that a national census could classify individuals according to certain more or less clearly defined sociological categories without asking questions about personal opinions.

2 There are different interpretations of Lipset and Rokkan. For more political and less sociological interpretations, see Bartolini (1996); Bartolini and Mair (1990); and Kitschelt (1997).
refer to issues, policy differences, or political identifications related to certain long-
standing conflicts in a particular society. The logic of cleavage formation, accordingly,
gives priority to cultural or ideological conflicts.

This theoretical approach emphasizes the political elements of a cleavage more
than the traditional sociological approach. The new value cleavage hypothesis has
underscored the autonomy of politics in explaining the lack of conspicuous effects of
these new value conflicts on most party systems. ‘Old parties’ (the social democrats for
example), they maintain, are assimilating the conflicts in their electoral platforms,
creating new cleavages that overlap with old ones and producing new spaces of party
competition but without altering the main structure of their party systems (Inglehart 1984

These interpretations are tilted toward a cultural/sociological view since the
engine that forms cultural cleavages and structures party systems lies in transformations
in society. Although this perspective differs from Lipset and Rokkan’s classical
sociological interpretation, it also largely leaves aside political explanations. Traditional
cleavages (social conflicts) are declining because of the successful resolution of the social
conflicts they had embodied (Franklin 1992, 403–05), or they are disappearing due to the
improvement of economic and social conditions since World War II, giving way to the
appearance of new cultural cleavages (Inglehart 1984 and 1990). The new emerging
‘value cleavages’ may have weak structural foundations (Brooks and Manza 1997;
Knutsen and Scarbrough 1995; Kriesi 1998), but they acquired the autonomy through
social and economic transformations. Political explanations of the cleavage decline
phenomenon are absent.3

The third approach pays more attention to the ways in which political factors in
general and political elites in particular shape cleavages and party systems from above.
Przeworski and Sprague’s (1986) analysis of the electoral fortunes of social democratic
parties in Western Europe is an excellent example (see also Sartori 1969). They argue
that class emerges as a major cleavage in party systems to the extent that parties of the
left emphasize class issues. Some scholarship that accepts the political creation of
cleavages has also paid keen attention to the creation of ethnic and national identities;
several scholars have emphasized that ethnicity and national identities are constructed
and that political elites play a major role in building them (Linz and Stepan 1996).
Although all three approaches that we have sketched here often focus on the same

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3 For political explanations of cleavage decline, see Pakulski and Waters (1996a and 1996b). As these
authors maintain, “the decomposition of these politically organized and reproduced [national] entities
[parties, unions, and class-oriented bodies] marks the dissolution of classes and the end of class society”
(1996b, 671).
concept (cleavage), they differ in how they understand the relationship between social cleavages and party system formation. The first sees party systems as fundamentally being shaped from below, i.e., by society, whereas the third sees party systems as fundamentally being shaped by political processes. The second approach falls between these two poles. It gives more autonomy to the three elements but prioritizes the sociocultural conditions in the formation of cleavages.

We draw mainly on the third approach to the study of cleavage formation and party systems, but with a distinctive twist. We agree with Przeworski and Sprague’s (1986) and Sartori’s (1969) emphasis on political agency in party system formation. The interaction of the competing political parties, their political discourses, electoral platforms, and policy-making can change voters’ political and cultural preferences. These factors are primarily responsible for the creation or disappearance of social identities that can reflect or defuse existing social differences (Pakulski and Waters 1996a). Politics is responsible for creating, transforming, deepening, or defusing specific social and economic conflicts.

The difference between the approach we advocate and the second approach discussed above is one of degree. The second approach recognizes, as we do, that political actors politicize some issues rather than others, but it still sees the conflicts that form the fault lines in party systems as originating in society. We emphasize that political actors and political legacies create important fault lines.

Measurement and Method

The dependent variable of our analysis is the competition among the five electorally most important parties in contemporary Chile: the two conservative parties, Renovación Nacional (RN) and Unión Democrática Independiente (UDI), which together have formed the core of the opposition since 1990; and the most important parties of the governing center-left coalition since 1989, the centrist Partido Demócrata Cristiano (PDC), the center-left Partido Socialista (PS), and the center-left Partido por la Democracia (PPD). We do not examine the social bases of specific parties but rather the competition among parties, so the dependent variable is always a dichotomy of party preferences such as PDC versus PS. We build broader dichotomies such as PDC versus left by aggregating party preferences or with direct questions about coalition preference in order to circumvent the problematic right/left category.4

In two of the surveys used here, party preference rather than vote is the dependent variable. Theoretically, we prefer the information about party identification because party realignment should be measured by stable elements of party preference such as PID (party identification) instead of vote, which depends more on short-terms changes in public opinion. Furthermore, nonidentifiers in Chile are comparatively low (around 38 percent in our 1995 surveys), and the class distribution of nonidentifiers is similar to that of identifiers. As a result, the distribution of party preferences using both measures (vote intention and party identification) is similar. To verify consistency of results, we use both measures when data are available.

Class is the central (but not exclusive) independent variable in this study. Our theoretical and operational reference for class is based on the categories developed by Goldthorpe and his collaborators and also employed frequently in the literature on voting (Heath, Jowell, and Curtice 1985; Weakliem 1989 and 1995; Weakliem and Heath 1994; Evans and Payne 1991; Evans 1996, 1999; Nieuwbeerta 1995). The objective of Erikson and Goldthorpe’s class categories is “to differentiate positions within labor markets and production units…in terms of the employment relations that they entail” (Erikson and Goldthorpe 1992, 37).

They distinguish among different employment relations (employers, self-employed, and employees) and also take into account distinctions among employees depending on the labor contract. Service relationships involve a longer-term and more diffuse exchange than wage-earnings classes. “They exist where it is required of employees that they exercise delegated authority and specialized knowledge and expertise in the interest of the employing organisation” (Erikson and Goldthorpe 1992, 42). Elsewhere, Goldthorpe (1982, 180) observed that the service class enjoys long-term compensation labor contracts, which means that it is relatively advantageous in terms of employment and payment conditions, occupational security, and promotion prospects, and its members, according to a sociological deterministic approach, have a stake in preserving the status quo (see also Evans 1999, 8–11). Erikson and Goldthorpe’s (1992, 38–39) class schema is presented in Table 1.

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5 The five class categories are the reduction of the original 36 class categories developed by Goldthorpe and Hope (1974, 134–43). These 36 are normally reduced to seven; see Erikson, Goldthorpe, and Portocarero (1979, 420); and Erikson and Goldthorpe (1992, 35–47). This classification is based on occupations according to two main dimensions: work situation (level of autonomy in the job) and market situation (level of qualifications required to do it).
Table 1

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Title</th>
<th>Description</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Service class (Classes I and II)</td>
<td>Large landowners; professionals, administrators, and managers; high-level technicians; supervisors of nonmanual workers.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Routine nonmanual (Class III)</td>
<td>Routine nonmanual employees in administration and commerce; sales personnel; other rank-and-file service workers.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Petty bourgeoisie and farmers (Classes IVa, b and c)</td>
<td>Small landowners and artisans, with or without employees. Farmers, smallholders, and other self-employed workers in primary production.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Skilled workers (Classes V and VI)</td>
<td>Lower-level technicians; supervisors of manual workers; skilled manual workers.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Unskilled workers (Classes VIIa and b)</td>
<td>Semi- and unskilled, nonagricultural manual workers and agricultural and other workers in primary production.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

We primarily used four surveys: 1994 and 1995 Centro de Estudios Políticos national surveys, the 1995 Latinobarómetro, and a 1973 survey from greater Santiago. An appendix provides detailed information on the creation of each class category and the validity of the five categories.

To test whether class influences individuals’ party preferences, we use odds ratios. The association between class and party preference is sensitive to variation in the popularity of political parties and class structure (changes in the marginal distributions of the class-by-party preference table). This traditional type of association “confounds differences in the marginal distributions of the variables with differences in the association it is supposed to measure” (Evans 1999, 13; Health, Jowell, and Curtice 1985, 32–35). Therefore, we focus on relative instead of absolute class voting, which we measure by odds ratios or by log odds ratios (the natural logarithm of the odds ratios). Indices of relative class voting that are based on odds ratios measure the strength of the relationship between class and party preference independently of the general popularity of political parties or changes in the size of classes (Evans, ibid.). In this paper the odds ratios measure comparative proclivity of a certain class compared to other classes to prefer one party over another. Odds ratios are a nonsymmetrical association measure: a

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6 See also Evans and Payne (1991).
7 For example, in the 1995 survey skilled workers were 8.78 times more likely to identify with the PDC than with the PS (79 to 9 identifiers), and all other categories were 6.10 times more likely to choose the PDC over the PS (415 to 68 identifiers). The odds ratio for the service class cell in Table 1 for PDC/PS is therefore 6.10 divided by 8.78, or 0.69, indicating the higher relative likelihood that, compared to the
negative association goes from 0 to just below 1 and a positive association ranges from just above 1 to infinity; 1 represents a neutral association. Because of this nonsymmetry, we use log odds ratios.

Social Bases of Party Competition in Postauthoritarian Chile

Tables 2 and 3 show the bivariate odds ratios calculated for each class category and all pairs of party competition among the five major parties using two different measures of party preference: party identification and vote intention. Class categories have a modest but statistically significant influence in the competition among the parties of the two competing ideological blocs. More than other classes, the service class and the petty bourgeoisie tend to identify with and vote for the parties of the conservative bloc. Unskilled workers and to a lesser degree skilled workers disproportionately prefer the progovernment bloc. With a few exceptions, this pattern is consistent between party identification (Table 2) and vote intention (Table 3). This pattern is reproduced when the odds ratios are computed for coalition preference (conservative coalition Democracia y Progreso/center left coalition Concertación de los Partidos—see the last columns of Tables 2 and 3). Perhaps what is most striking is the weak effect of class in party competition, except for the service class. The petty bourgeoisie is never statistically significant in the 24 cells in Tables 2 and 3. The routine nonmanual category is significant only once; skilled workers only twice; and unskilled workers four times.

Class has an even dimmer effect in intrabloc competition. Class matters somewhat in the competition between electoral coalitions, but it has little effect in the competition between parties of the same bloc. This is especially noteworthy for the competition between traditional adversaries, the PDC and the PS, which now form part of the same electoral coalition and have governed together since the reinstauration of democracy.

‘average’ party identifier of other occupations, skilled workers were more inclined to identify with the PDC. If we reversed the dependent variables, with the PDC = 0 and PS = 1, the ratio would be 8.78 divided by 6.10, or 1.44.

In the Latinobarómetro, we built coalition preference with vote intention, whereas the 1995 National Opinion Survey directly asked respondents about coalition preference.
### Table 2

**Party and Coalition Competition (PID) by Class**

**Chile, 1995 (odds ratios)**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Employed categories</th>
<th>Intrabloc Conservative</th>
<th>Interbloc Competition</th>
<th>Intra-Concertación Competition</th>
<th>Democratía y Progreso (0)/Concertación (1)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>UDI/RN</td>
<td>UDI/PDC</td>
<td>RN/PDC</td>
<td>RN/PPD</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Petty Bourgeoisie</td>
<td>1.03</td>
<td>.66</td>
<td>.64</td>
<td>.63</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Salarit (Service class)</td>
<td>1.21</td>
<td>.38*</td>
<td>.31*</td>
<td>.53***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Routine nonmanual</td>
<td>.39</td>
<td>.77</td>
<td>1.97</td>
<td>2.55***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Skilled workers</td>
<td>.77</td>
<td>1.99</td>
<td>2.56**</td>
<td>1.19***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Unskilled workers</td>
<td>1.65</td>
<td>1.63</td>
<td>.98</td>
<td>1.05</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Non-employed categories</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Retired</td>
<td>.40</td>
<td>.63</td>
<td>1.56</td>
<td>1.19</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Students</td>
<td>1.00</td>
<td>.68</td>
<td>.68</td>
<td>1.93</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Home</td>
<td>1.42</td>
<td>1.58***</td>
<td>1.12</td>
<td>.67</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Unemployed</td>
<td>.94</td>
<td>.61</td>
<td>.64</td>
<td>.66</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


(*) Significant at p<.01.

(**) Significant at p<.05.

(*** ) Significant at p<.10
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Party and Coalition Competition (vote intention) by Class</th>
<th>Chile, 1995 (odds ratios)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Intra-conservative Bloc</td>
<td>Interbloc Competition</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Intra-conservative Bloc</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UDI/RN</td>
<td>UDI/PDC</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Petty Bourgeoisie</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1.05</td>
<td>.99</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Service class</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1.00</td>
<td>.54</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Routine nonmanual</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1.08</td>
<td>1.43</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Skilled workers</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>.68</td>
<td>.71</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Unskilled workers</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1.24</td>
<td>1.95***</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


(*) Significant at p<.01.
(**) Significant at p<.05.
(***) Significant at p<.10

Includes data on the occupation of the head of the household if the respondent was a student or a nonemployed person.
So far we have focused on class as the sole independent variable. We are also interested in the effects of religion, the rural/urban cleavage, and gender on party choice. These cleavages were historically important in the Chilean party system (Scully 1992, 1995; J.S. Valenzuela 1995), and in many democracies religion is the most powerful social cleavage in shaping party preferences (Lijphart 1979; Rose and Urwin 1969). We regressed these demographic variables on coalition preference (Democracia y Progreso = 0; Concertación = 1). We used the already discussed five dummy class variables and the four nonemployed groups as a reference category.\(^9\) We assess religiosity through the question, ‘How frequently do you attend Church or practice your faith?’ \(^10\) The other independent variables are urban/rural residence (rural = 0 / urban = 1), age (to assess whether generational cleavages are important), and gender (female = 0 / male = 1).\(^11\)

The results (Table 4, Model 1) again demonstrate a modest direct impact of class on coalition preference when other cleavages are controlled for. The petty bourgeoisie and service classes disproportionately prefer the conservative coalition, while skilled and unskilled workers are more likely than other classes to favor the center-left coalition. Although only the service class is statistically significant, there is some class basis for coalition preference. The average probability that a respondent supports the governing coalition decreases .21 (from 0.78 to 0.57) if he/she belongs to the service class, whereas the probability increases .11 (from 0.75 to 0.86) for unskilled workers.

Model 1 also demonstrates the importance of an urban/rural cleavage in choosing between coalitions. Chileans living in rural areas tend to prefer the conservative coalition, reflecting the transformations that occurred in the rural sector under authoritarian rule (Kurtz 1999). This finding is consistent with the historical record; the rural regions have usually been more favorable to conservative parties (Faletto and Ruiz 1970).

\(^9\) We collapsed the four nonemployed categories from Tables 2 and 3 into one category. The heterogeneous character of these four categories made them less useful for purposes of detecting class cleavages. We used this nonemployed category as the reference class because it the most neutral one; the odds ratio is 1.18.

\(^10\) The values for this independent variable range from 1 (goes to church at least once a week) to 5 (never or almost never goes to church).

\(^11\) These are important intervening variables between class conflict and party preference. See Franklin (1992) and Szelényi and Olvera (1996).
Table 4
Party Competition by Social Cleavages
Chile, 1995 (Logistic Regression)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Model 1</th>
<th>Model 2</th>
<th>Model 3</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Regression</td>
<td>Odds Ratio</td>
<td>Regression</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Coefficients</td>
<td></td>
<td>Coefficients</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Petty Bourgeoisie</td>
<td>-.36</td>
<td>.70</td>
<td>-.15</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Salarit (Service class)</td>
<td>-.79*</td>
<td>.45</td>
<td>Reference category</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Routine nonmanual</td>
<td>.01</td>
<td>1.01</td>
<td>.06</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Skilled workers</td>
<td>.37</td>
<td>1.44</td>
<td>-.66</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Unskilled workers</td>
<td>.31</td>
<td>1.35</td>
<td>-.55</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nonemployed</td>
<td>Reference category</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>.36</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rural/Urban</td>
<td>-.94*</td>
<td>.38</td>
<td>.12</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Religiosity</td>
<td>-.04</td>
<td>.96</td>
<td>-.05</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Age</td>
<td>.14***</td>
<td>1.15</td>
<td>-.14</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gender</td>
<td>-.08</td>
<td>.92</td>
<td>1.16*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Constant</td>
<td>1.84*</td>
<td></td>
<td>-2.20*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>-2 Log likelihood</td>
<td>945.40</td>
<td></td>
<td>385.52</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chi-square of the Model</td>
<td>47.02* (d.f. 9)</td>
<td></td>
<td>17.70** (d.f. 9)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pseudo R-Square</td>
<td>0.04</td>
<td></td>
<td>0.04</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(N)</td>
<td>910</td>
<td></td>
<td>543</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(*) Significant at p<.01  (**) Significant at p<.05  (***) Significant at p<.10.
Surprisingly in view its importance before 1973, religion was nowhere close to achieving statistical significance in 1995. In Santiago religion was a highly significant predictor of coalition preference in the 1960s (Langton and Rapoport 1976). The religious cleavage appears to have weakened between the mid-1960s and 1973, but it continued to exist (Smith 1982, 129–33, 214–23; Smith and Rodríguez 1974). This finding is also notable in light of the fact that the right’s members of congress are much more religious than the center-left’s.12

Although one class variable, the rural/urban cleavage, and age are statistically significant, Model 1 fits badly and the pseudo R-square is very low. This means that social cleavages have limited capacity to explain coalition preference.

The regression in Model 2 uses the same independent variables to examine the influence of social cleavages in the competition between the Socialist and Christian Democratic parties. We changed the model slightly, using the service class, which is the most neutral,13 as the reference category. None of the class cleavages between the PDC and the PS was significant in 1995. In fact, gender is the only statistically significant demographic variable; as was true in the past, women continue to disproportionately favor the PDC over the PS. Although the model as a whole is statistically significant, the pseudo R-square is again very low (0.04), which means that this model fails to include the variables influencing the competition between these two parties. Sociological cleavages have almost no impact in explaining the preference in contemporary Chile for two historical adversaries, the PS and PDC.

Model 3 assesses the influence of traditional social cleavages on the competition between the Christian Democrats and the left, which were adversaries from 1957 until 1973. The left/center-left category includes both offspring of the pre-1973 PS (the PS and the PPD) as well as the Communist Party.14 Age and gender are the only statistically significant predictors of party preference; younger respondents and men are comparatively more likely to identify with a left-leaning party. In contrast to the ongoing existence of a modest class cleavage between the governing coalition and the opposition, no class pattern whatsoever can be observed in the competition between PDC/PS and PDC/left (Models 2 and 3). Also noteworthy is the fact that religiosity does not help

---

12 The Elites Parlamentarias Iberoamericanas project of the Universidad de Salamanca asked members of the Chilean congress to respond to the question, ‘How religious do you consider yourself, from 1 (indifference to religion) to 10 (very religious)?’ The means were 3.4 for the Socialist Party (n = 13), 4.8 for the PPD (n = 11), 7.0 for the PDC (n = 31), 6.4 for RN (n = 23), and 7.5 for UDI (n = 12), Centro de Investigaciones Sociológicas (1997, 37).
13 The odds ratio is .93, the closest to one.
14 The reference category in Model 3 is again the nonemployed, which is the most neutral category (the odds ratio = 1.24).
predict party preference between the PDC and the left. The sociological differences between the center-left and the PDC have withered.

**Social Cleavages in the 1973 Party System in Greater Santiago**

Were class and other social cleavages more salient in the pre-coup party system? The conventional wisdom is that class was an important determinant of party preferences in pre-1973 Chile. Previous ecological evidence based on voting results suggested that in the pre-1973 party system, the left, center, and right had very distinctive class bases and that the Socialists and Christian Democrats also had different class bases (Zeitlin and Petras 1970; Ayres 1976). Moreover, some excellent work on the pre-coup Chilean party system has presented it as based on well-differentiated class and religious cleavages (Scully 1992, 1995; J.S. Valenzuela 1995). Some careful empirical work based on survey data showed that Chilean parties had interclass bases of support and that the class cleavage was not as deep as studies based on ecological data had affirmed; nonetheless, these analyses also confirmed the existence of a class cleavage (Smith and Rodríguez 1974; Smith 1982).

The lack of available national surveys before 1973 made it impossible to compare the pre-1973 and post-1989 social bases of parties at the national level on the basis of individual data. Pre-coup surveys of greater Santiago, however, can be compared with the Santiago subset of the 1995 survey to examine patterns of change and continuity.

A 1973 survey as well as the 1995 survey both indicated the existence of a class cleavage between the PDC and the PS/left in metropolitan Santiago (Table 5), although in neither year is it particularly pronounced. The nature of this class cleavage, however, changed between 1973 and 1995. In 1973 the left drew a higher proportion than the PDC of its votes among skilled and unskilled workers, whereas the PDC won a higher share than the left of its votes among the petty bourgeoisie and the service class. Unskilled workers were more likely than other categories to vote for the Socialists and the left. Controlling for the other variables in the equation, in 1973 the probability of voting for the Socialists increased on average 0.11 if a respondent belonged to the working class.

---

15 The 1973 survey is a Centro de Estudios Políticos study “The Political Situation before the Parliamentary Elections.” Sample size = 754. Roper Center archive number CHCEDOP73-45. Although this survey was limited to one city, in 1973 metropolitan Santiago accounted for 30 percent of Chile’s population. To replicate Goldthorpe’s five class categories, we included the nonemployed. To do so, we used the information provided by the survey about the occupation of the head of the household, which fortunately was included in this survey. The information in this survey about party preference is vote intention, not party identification as was the case in 1995. In 1973 we included Socialists and Communists as respondents on the left; in 1995 we counted PS, PPD, and Communist identifiers. As expected, the results for PDC/left competition are consistent with those obtained for PDC/PS competition. We could not include the rural/urban cleavage because the sample is limited to metropolitan Santiago.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Dependent Variable</th>
<th>Metropolitan Santiago 1973</th>
<th>Metropolitan Santiago 1995</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Model 4 PDC (0)/PS (1)</td>
<td>Model 5 PDC (0)/Left (1)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Odds Ratio</td>
<td>Odds Ratio</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Petty Bourgeoisie</td>
<td>.70</td>
<td>.75</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Salariat (Service</td>
<td>.60</td>
<td>.60</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Routine nonmanual</td>
<td>Reference category</td>
<td>Reference category</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Skilled workers</td>
<td>1.44</td>
<td>1.45</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Unskilled workers</td>
<td>1.61***</td>
<td>1.80**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nonemployed</td>
<td>.83*</td>
<td>.82*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Religiosity</td>
<td>1.02</td>
<td>.90</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gender</td>
<td>1.00</td>
<td>1.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chi-square of the</td>
<td>18.27 (d.f. 7)</td>
<td>24.42 (d.f. 7)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pseudo R-Square</td>
<td>0.01</td>
<td>0.04</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(N)</td>
<td>382</td>
<td>435</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


(*) Significant at p<.01
(**) Significant at p<.05.
(***) Significant at p<.1.
This probability increased by 0.14 in the competition between the Christian Democrats and the left (PS and Chilean Communist Party [PCCh]). In the competition between Unidad Popular (UP) and the opposition the direct impact of class was slightly greater. Skilled and unskilled workers were more likely than other categories to vote for Unidad Popular (Model 6).

The same analysis with the 1995 metropolitan subsample produced different results, revealing a change in the class cleavage between the PDC and the left between 1973 and 1995. The PDC, which had fared comparatively better than the left among the petty bourgeoisie and the service class, now fares comparatively worse than the left among these classes. The left, which in 1973 did disproportionately well among skilled and unskilled workers, now does marginally worse in these classes than the PDC.

The change in the influence of religion is also striking. In 1973 religious citizens voted disproportionately for the Christian Democrats; the probability of choosing the PDC instead of the Socialists increased on average 0.26 from the most to the least religious individuals. The religious cleavage was significant substantively and statistically. Among voters this historic conflict (Prothro and Chaparro 1976; Scully 1992, 1995; J.S. Valenzuela 1995) has seemingly disappeared in Chile today.

The data for Santiago suggest that the postauthoritarian Chilean party system has experienced a realignment since 1973 and that parties’ social bases have changed. The left in general and the PS in particular enjoyed disproportionate support from skilled and unskilled workers before the coup d’état. Since 1989 class has mattered mainly in the competition between the progovernment and conservative electoral coalitions: the petty bourgeoisie and the service classes are more likely than other classes to vote for the conservatives. This realignment is also suggested by the declining impact of religion on voting. Alongside this important change is an element of continuity: the odds ratios indicate that class voting before 1973 was not as intense in Chile as some authors (e.g., Zeitlin and Petras 1970) have indicated and that it remained modest in the 1990s.

Although the survey evidence directly comparing the 1973 and post-1989 social bases of parties is limited to greater Santiago, it seems evident that some realignment has occurred on the national level. Greater Santiago respondents accounted for 40.0 percent of the 1995 sample, a percentage high enough to affect results for the entire sample. Equally important, the literature on the pre-1973 party system presents ecological evidence of a class cleavage between each of the three political blocs (right, center, and

---

16 It is possible that other questions about religion (for example, Catholics versus Protestants) would detect a religious cleavage. Nevertheless, it is revealing that the important question about frequency of religious practice failed to do so.
left) and a religious one. In the post-1989 period the class cleavage between the
left-center-left and the center has faded as has the religious cleavage.

This evidence has implications for the debate on change and continuity in the
Chilean party system. Siavelis (1997), A. Valenzuela (1994), and J.S. Valenzuela and
Scully (1997), among others, have argued that there are powerful continuities from the
pre-1973 party system to the post-1989 system. Carey (1998) has argued the opposite,
namely, that the party system has changed in fundamental respects. The evidence on
social bases of Chilean party competition points in the direction of some change.

Political Legacies in the Reshaping of Modern Chilean Party Competition

So far we have included only class and other demographic and sociological
variables in the model. Now we add some political variables. The reason for this two-
stage model (first the demographic/sociological variables, then the political variables) is
that a one-stage model with all the demographic and the political/attitudinal variables
would implicitly assume that all the explanatory variables are spatially and temporally
co-ordinate. This assumption is flawed and can lead to misleading conclusions (Rivers
1991; Achen 1992). Sociological and demographic variables are at a different level of
causation from the political attitudinal ones; the former are more distant from the
dependent variable than the latter. Therefore, for methodological reasons we begin by
examining class and other demographic variables and later add the political ones (Shanks
and Miller 1990; Bartle 1998). The political attitudinal variables are closer to the
dependent variables in the chain of causation. This analysis also allows us to disentangle
the direct and indirect effects of the demographic variables. Direct effects are not
mediated by the more proximate independent variables whereas indirect effects are
mediated (for example, religion might have an impact on party identification or voting
behavior because of its effect on political values). Total effects are the sum of direct and
indirect effects.

Including the political variables constitutes the required second step in our two-
stage causal analysis aimed at estimating the direct effects of class on party preference
controlled by other explanatory variables, as well as the indirect effects. We also have
theoretical reasons to include the political variables. If our earlier theoretical discussion
about the importance of political factors in forming party systems is correct, these
variables should help us understand and predict coalition and partisan preference.

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17 For example, if religion (or class, gender, age, etc.) strongly influences political values, once political
values were included in the equation, religion might appear to have no impact on party identification or
voting behavior. But it would be fatuous to conclude that religion has no impact on party identification
merely because its impact is mediated.
To examine the impact of political variables in party choice, we added six specifically political independent variables to the previous multivariate logistic regression model. The first asks respondents to evaluate the country’s economic situation. The answers range from 1 (very bad) to 5 (very good). This question assesses how respondents’ evaluation of the economy shaped coalition and party preference, i.e., economic voting. The second political variable is a retrospective economic evaluation. The third scores respondents’ evaluation of the Frei government. This variable measures retrospective voting, i.e., voting on the basis of government performance (Key 1966; Fiorina 1981). The answers range from 1 (bad) to 7 (excellent). Two variables measure whether respondents’ opinions of well-known leaders help determine party and coalition preference. In a regression on coalition preference (Table 6, Model 9), we included the respondent’s personal evaluation of the president at the time of the administration of the survey, Christian Democrat Eduardo Frei, and of Arturo Alessandri, the conservative who ran for the presidency against Frei in 1993. Later models that analyze PS versus PDC competition and left versus PDC competition use respondents’ opinions of Eduardo Frei and Ricardo Lagos, the PPD/PS leader and recently inaugurated president of the Republic. For the regression on vote preference (Table 6, Model 10), Frei’s government assessment and leadership evaluation were not included in the survey. Finally, we have included ideological self-location on the left-right scale (right coded 1 and left coded 5). Left-right identification is an important attitudinal variable to predict party preference that is conceptually and empirically separable from it (Inglehart and Klingemann 1976; Klingemann 1979).

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18 Economic voting can occur along four dimensions: personal-collective, retrospective-prospective, affective-cognitive, and simple-mediated. For the sake of simplicity and given the lack of relevant questions in the 1995 national survey, we used only this question, which measures collective (sociotropic) economic voting (Kinder and Kiewiet 1979). However, the inclusion in the model of government performance evaluation also indirectly measures retrospective and mediated economic voting. See Lewis-Beck (1990, 34–42).

19 Conceptually, respondents’ opinions of political leaders are distinct from party identification, and empirically the two factors are usually separable. According to the classic Michigan model, party identification is clearly different from leadership evaluation. Leadership is considered a short-term effect in the funnel of voting causality, whereas party identification is a long-term effect. The theory holds that they tend to evolve in opposite directions; leadership becomes more important in voting when party identification gets weaker. See Campbell et al. (1960). Later revisions of the model pointed out the importance of leadership and other variables in forming party identification, making the model non-recursive, but the two variables are still considered to be very distinct concepts. See Rabinowitz and MacDonald (1989); Lodge, McGraw, and Stroh (1989); Rapoport (1997). In cases of pronounced personalism, the two might be inextricably connected such that they were measuring the same phenomenon, but statistical analysis of party identification and leader evaluation with these data have revealed that they are distinct in Chile.
Table 6 presents the results of two multivariate logistic regression models for coalition preference (Model 9 for PID and Model 10 for vote). The results are largely consistent with those obtained in Model 1 (Table 4), which has the same dependent variable but without the political independent variables. Class and the rural/urban cleavage have an impact in both models (urban/rural residency was not included in the vote intention survey), but the sociological variables are overwhelmed substantively and in statistical significance by some of the political variables. The chi-square and the pseudo R-square increased considerably relative to the sociological models. Sociological variables do not predict respondents’ coalition preference nearly as well as political variables. In Model 9, four of the six political variables were significant at a .01 level, whereas only two of the nine sociological variables attained this level of significance. Respondents’ left-right self-classification, their evaluation of the Frei government, and their evaluations of Frei and Alessandri were powerful determinants of coalition preference for PID preference.\textsuperscript{20} The evaluation of the economic situation has no impact in either model. Table 6 shows the importance of political variables in predicting coalition preference, although a few class variables remain significant. There is a new dominant competition between the coalitions driven by political factors and, to a secondary degree, by class and rural/urban residency.

Table 7 presents the findings of a similar analysis using virtually the same independent variables but comparing PDC (0) and PS (1) and PDC (0) and left/center-left (1) competition. PDC/left competition dominated Chilean politics between 1964 and 1973. Consistent with the results in Table 4 (Models 2 and 3), few of the sociological variables are statistically significant. Controlling for the other variables in the equation, PDC and PS identifiers and voters differ little in terms of class, rural/urban residence, and religiosity. The only statistically significant sociological variables in Table 7 are gender in Model 11 (PID) and religiosity in Model 12 (vote). Models 13 (PID) and 14 (vote) also display the lack of any clear class pattern in the competition between PDC identifiers/voters and the left, except that skilled workers in Model 13 tend to vote more for the PDC than for the left.

\textsuperscript{20} We checked correlations among the independent variables to detect possible multicollinearity problems. In theory, it seemed plausible that the evaluation of the Frei government and the evaluation of Frei personally could be highly correlated. Although the actual correlation of .51 is moderately high, many respondents evaluated the government and Frei personally differently. This correlation does not affect the significance test since both are statistically significant. Unless there is a perfect correlation between independent variables, multicollinearity mostly affects the significance test leading to a type II error. This is not the case with this model.
Table 6

Coalition Preference by Social Cleavages and Political Variables
Chile, 1995 (Logistic Regression)
Dependent Variable: Democracia y Progreso (0)/ Concertación (1)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Model 9</th>
<th>Model 10</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Odds ratios</td>
<td>Odds ratios</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Petty Bourgeoisie</td>
<td>1.07</td>
<td>.72</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Salaried (Service class)</td>
<td>.37*</td>
<td>.46**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Routine nonmanual</td>
<td>1.07</td>
<td>Reference category</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Skilled workers</td>
<td>1.63</td>
<td>.67</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Unskilled workers</td>
<td>2.86*</td>
<td>1.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nonemployed</td>
<td>Reference category</td>
<td>–</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rural/Urban</td>
<td>.56**</td>
<td>–</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Religiosity</td>
<td>.99</td>
<td>.95</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Age</td>
<td>1.15</td>
<td>1.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gender</td>
<td>.77</td>
<td>1.16</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Economic situation</td>
<td>1.03</td>
<td>.99</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Retrospective econ. evaluation</td>
<td>1.20</td>
<td>1.05</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Frei’s Government Assessment</td>
<td>2.85*</td>
<td>–</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Left-Right</td>
<td>1.26*</td>
<td>1.39*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Frei Evaluation</td>
<td>2.00*</td>
<td>–</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Alessandri Evaluation</td>
<td>.55*</td>
<td>–</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Constant (coefficient)</td>
<td>3.62*</td>
<td>–.01*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>-2 Log likelihood</td>
<td>582.56</td>
<td>629.44</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chi-square of the model</td>
<td>178.47* (d.f. 15)</td>
<td>101.9* (d.f. 10)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pseudo R-Square</td>
<td>0.25</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(N)</td>
<td>641</td>
<td>709</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


(*) Significant at p<.01.
(**) Significant at p<.05.
(***) Significant at p<.10
### Table 7

**PDC/PS and PDC/Center Left Competition by Social Cleavages and Political Variables Chile, 1995**  
(Logistic Regression Odds Ratios)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Dependent Var.: PDC (0)/ PS (1)</th>
<th>Dependent Var.: PDC (0)/ Left (1)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Petty Bourgeoisie</td>
<td>3.64</td>
<td>.79</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Salarit (Service class)</td>
<td>Reference categ.</td>
<td>1.47</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Routine nonmanual</td>
<td>1.22</td>
<td>Reference categ.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Skilled workers</td>
<td>.90</td>
<td>.78</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Unskilled workers</td>
<td>1.42</td>
<td>.89</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nonemployed</td>
<td>2.42</td>
<td>–</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rural/Urban</td>
<td>.97</td>
<td>–</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Religiosity</td>
<td>.98</td>
<td>1.25***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Age</td>
<td>.94</td>
<td>.99</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gender</td>
<td>2.31**</td>
<td>1.34</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Economic situation</td>
<td>.79</td>
<td>.66**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Retrospective economic evaluation</td>
<td>1.13</td>
<td>.62**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Frei’s Government Assessment</td>
<td>.70</td>
<td>–</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Left-right location</td>
<td>2.90*</td>
<td>1.14**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Frei Evaluation</td>
<td>.52*</td>
<td>–</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lagos Evaluation</td>
<td>1.64**</td>
<td>–</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Constant (coefficients)</td>
<td>–4.22*</td>
<td>–.29</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>–2 Log likelihood</td>
<td>250.4</td>
<td>200.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chi-square of the model</td>
<td>97.6* (d.f. 15)</td>
<td>23.4* (d.f. 10)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pseudo R-Square</td>
<td>0.29</td>
<td>0.17</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(N)</td>
<td>419</td>
<td>289</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(*) Significant at p<.01.  
(**) Significant at p<.05.  
(*** ) Significant at p<.10.

In contrast, several political variables in these models are highly significant in the competition between the PDC/PS and PDC/left. Controlling for the other independent variables, individuals who located themselves further to the left, those who had a worse evaluation of Frei, and those who had a better opinion of Lagos were more likely to identify with and vote for the PS or the left in general. Political variables do a much
better job than the sociological ones of explaining partisan preferences between the PDC/PS and the left/center-left. The pseudo-R squared of these models is substantially higher than in the earlier sociological models (Models 2 and 3).

PDC and PS identifiers do not statistically differ in their evaluations of the government or the economic situation. This result probably reflects the fact that the two parties have been governing together since 1990, fostering converging evaluations of the government and the economy notwithstanding somewhat different opinions of Frei.

In sum, although modest class and rural/urban cleavages underpin the divide between the governing center/center-left coalition and the conservative opposition, these sociological variables provide little predictive leverage in shaping whether a particular party identifier prefers the left/center-left or PDC. Political variables, in contrast, provide powerful explanations of both coalition preference and PDC/PS party identification in the post-1989 period. Respondents’ location on the left-right scale and their assessment of political leaders and government performance are decisive factors in their coalition preference and in the choice between the PDC and PS.

Although the class cleavage between the PDC and the left has withered, important ideological and political differences between the PDC and the left persist—notwithstanding the widely documented shift of the PS and PPD away from revolutionary positions. Ideological differences between the members of each coalition are very resilient; they are the dominant factors in party preference. This fact makes the creation of an enduring electoral coalition unlikely, although a reshaping of party competition has occurred and an important new conflict has emerged between the two electoral coalitions.

Military Rule and the Reshaping of the Party System

Between 1973 and 1995 the class cleavage in Chile weakened somewhat and changed and the religious cleavage faded. These important changes in the Chilean party systems result from the nature of the authoritarian period and the democratic transition (Tironi and Agüero 1999).

Authoritarian regimes, especially long-lived ones, can provoke profound changes in party systems (Remmer 1985 and 1989; Hagopian 1993). In Chile four legacies of military rule and the transition to democracy reshaped the party system. First, the military regime imposed a new electoral system with two-member districts. This decision was taken by presidential advisors who anticipated that two-member districts in which the largest party needed to outpoll the second by at least two to one in order to capture both seats would favor the right. In conjunction with the other processes detailed in this section, this electoral system has, as Carey (1998) has skillfully demonstrated, changed
party-system dynamics from tripartite (left-center-right) to bipartite (right versus the Concertación, the left/center-left/center coalition). The electoral system change has fostered cooperation and policy convergence among the PPD, PDS, and PDC.

Second, the military regime and its political allies reshaped the party system through economic and labor policies that diminished the size of the unionized working class in industrial areas and the political articulation of the working class in the rural areas. The industrial labor force declined by 30.08 percent between 1973 and 1983 (Schamis 1991, 208). This has had an impact on party competition since, as Przeworski and Sprague (1986) have argued, without powerful unions there is no organization to unite workers as a class in relation to other classes, which reduces their chances of being a politically organized group (see also Kitschelt 1993 and 1994). Unions in Chile, as in most democracies, have historically been one of the primary political actors to emphasize class, social justice, and redistributive questions. Their partial dismantling through repression and neoliberal economic policies that led to reductions in the size of the industrial labor force weakened the organizational influence of actors with a class discourse. In the rural sector these neoliberal economic policies dismantled the articulation of political interests of rural workers (Kurtz 1999). Weaker unions and a less salient class discourse in the urban and rural areas have weakened the class cleavage between what was the left and the PDC.

Although it had important structural consequences, this is initially a political more than a structural/sociological explanation for the reshaping of the Chilean party system. The reduced size of the unionized Chilean working class, which was a key actor in forming a powerful class identity between the 1930s and 1970s, was not an inevitable product of economic modernization or globalization. Rather, these profound transformations were mainly effected by the military dictatorship, which suppressed unions, radically altered labor legislation, and pursued policies that shrank the industrial working class (Angell 1991; Barrera and J.S. Valenzuela 1986). Thus, while structural changes in the Chilean working class have affected party politics, these changes were primarily induced from above and constitute an important political legacy of authoritarian rule that has contributed to the changes in the Chilean party system. In this respect structural and political explanations go together: political processes (policies adopted by the authoritarian regime) had structural effects (deunionization, increased intraclass fragmentation) that in turn had further political ramifications (weakening actors with a class discourse).

Third, the neoconservative economic policies adopted by the authoritarian regime favored specific sectors of the society and punished others. Chile reduced tariffs from a
historical high of 94 percent in 1973 to an average of 10 percent in 1979 (Schamis 1991, 208). Trade liberalization had a severe impact on some industries, increasing bankruptcies and adversely affecting industrialists and the labor force in those sectors. But market opening also dramatically favored the export-oriented sectors of the economy. This could explain the greater support given to the conservative coalition by the service class, which includes executives and managers of big export-oriented corporations. Furthermore, after 1983 policy-makers and technocrats formed a coalition with some sectors of the economy for designing and implementing neoconservative economic policies (Remmer 1989; Schamis 1991). This coalition of capitalists and landowners, led by producers for the international markets, helped design and implement a gradual neoconservative reform program after 1983 (Silva 1992–3 and 1996; Montecinos 1993). In part because of political negotiations during the democratic transition (Montecinos 1993; Scully 1996), the democratic government has maintained most of these market-oriented policies. However, the beneficiaries of market-oriented policies have credited their implementation to the preceding military regime. This fact could help explain the greater support given by the petty bourgeoisie and the service classes to the conservative coalition.

Finally, the military regime polarized Chilean society between supporters and critics. In the evocative expression of Constable and A. Valenzuela (1991), Chile became a “nation of enemies.” The political conflict between supporters and critics of military rule has profoundly shaped the post-1989 party system. Whereas the pre-1973 system had a tripartite character, with the left, center, and right all representing competitive poles, post-1989 competition has so far been fundamentally bipolar (Carey 1998; Tironi and Agüero 1999), expressing the divide between those who previously supported and those who opposed the dictatorship. This political cleavage has endured for more than a decade as the most powerful fault line in the party system. The presence of Pinochet as commander-in-chief until 1997 and still as a lifetime senator, inquiries into human rights abuses committed under Pinochet, recent public disputes about the legal process opened in Spain against the dictator and his incarceration in England, and occasional highly publicized rifts between the civilian governments and some members of the military have served as ongoing reminders of what brought about this profound divide (Wilde 1998).

The political cleavage between supporters and opponents of military rule has remained powerful. Seven years after the 1988 plebiscite and six years after the first democratic elections, attitudes toward democracy profoundly divided voters of the Concertación and the conservative coalition. The 1995 Latinobarómetro asked
respondents about their preferred political regime. The percentage of voters who always preferred democracy, by party, was 17 percent UDI, 36 percent RN, 75 percent PDC, 75 percent PPD, and 72 percent PS. The very low percentage of UDI and RN identifiers who stated that they always favor democracy would have been less striking in the late 1980s given conservative fears about what might transpire under democracy, but it is remarkable how powerful it remained in 1995. Another question that also tapped this divide between democrats and individuals whose commitment to democracy was more equivocal was “Which of the following actors would you like to have more power?” Thirty-nine percent of UDI respondents, 28 percent of RN respondents, 6 percent of PDC respondents, 9 percent of PPD respondents, and only 3 percent of PS respondents answered the military. The divide between those who supported authoritarian rule and those who opposed it on such issues has powerfully structured the post-1989 party system.

Redistributive questions were also a source of division between the two coalitions, but compared to the differences on regime preference, the differences were less stark. The regime preference question is the most powerful attitudinal difference between supporters of the two coalitions. With the 1995 Latinobarómetro data, we regressed the regime preference question and the distributional question on coalition vote (Table 8, Model 15). The odds ratio for the regime preference is 7.06, and the probability of voting for the center-left coalition increases .37 (from 0.51 to 0.88) when the voter favors democracy. Although the income distribution question also does well in predicting the dependent variable with an odds ratio of 1.32 (the probability of supporting the Concertación increases by .08; i.e., from 0.66 to 0.74), the regime question is easily the most powerful predictor of any variable examined so far. The depth of this conflict over regime preference underscores the importance of this legacy in structuring party competition in post-authoritarian Chile.

This legacy is the most powerful limitation elites have faced in choosing electoral strategies and recreating political cleavages. This can be observed by the fact that in the competition between PDC and PS (Table 8, Model 16), regime preference is not statistically significant whereas the income distribution answer is a powerful predictor of voting preferences. The odds ratio is 2.26, which is higher than in the competition

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21 The exact question was “With which of the following statements do you agree most?
1. Under some circumstances, an authoritarian regime might be preferable to a democracy.
2. Democracy is always preferable to other political regimes.
3. For people like us, it doesn’t matter whether the regime is democratic.”

22 In response to a question about whether the current distribution of income was very or fairly unjust, there was agreement among 44 percent of UDI sympathizers, 47 percent of RN sympathizers, 59 percent of PDC sympathizers, 66 percent of PPD sympathizers, and 81 percent of PS sympathizers.
between coalitions. The contrasting preferences regarding income differences indicate that questions related to distribution, class, and social justice could become a cleavage between the PDC and the PS, but these differences have not powerfully emerged in the political arena.

A New Authoritarian/Democratic Cleavage?

Authoritarian rule in Chile provoked far-reaching changes in political identities. But why have these changes endured after nine years of democratic governments? Is it possible to talk about the existence of an authoritarian/democratic cleavage, as Tironi and Agüero (1999) have suggested?

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Table 8</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Coalition vote and PDC and PS vote by Regime and Distributional Preferences, 1995</strong> (Logistic Regression)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Model 15</th>
<th>Model 16</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Democracia y Progreso (0)/ Concertación (1)</strong></td>
<td><strong>PDC (0)/PS (1)</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Regression Coefficients</strong></td>
<td><strong>Odds Ratio</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Regime preference</td>
<td>1.95*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Distributional perception</td>
<td>.23**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Constant</td>
<td>−0.93**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>−2 Log likelihood</td>
<td>476.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chi-square of the model</td>
<td>87.98* (d.f. 2)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pseudo R-Square</td>
<td>0.17</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(N)</td>
<td>488</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


(*) Significant at p<.01.

(**) Significant at p<.05.

To answer this question, clarity about what constitutes a cleavage is essential, and here we need to go beyond the understanding of a social cleavage that we have used so far. Following Bartolini and Mair (1990), a cleavage should be manifested in three distinctive elements: its structural base, the political values of the groups involved, and their political articulation (see also Franklin, Mackie, and Valen 1992; Kriesi 1998). We have already seen that there are structural differences between the two coalitions: the conservative coalition ‘Democracia y Progreso’ obtains relatively more support from the petty bourgeoisie and the service classes. But what about the cultural dimension of the conflict?
Based on the 1995 Latinobarómetro, Table 9 displays the Ordinary Least Square regression coefficients with the left-right scale as the dependent variable, which constitutes the best predictor of coalition preference in previous models. The table depicts the structure of three cultural-ideological divisions that could potentially give rise to political conflicts among parties: the authoritarian/democratic cultural division, the perception of social inequality, and religious differences. The best predictor of voters’ ideological identification after controlling for class, age, and gender is support for a democratic regime, followed by perceptions of income distribution and religiosity. However, only some of these potential political conflicts have influenced electoral competition. Their influence on party competition depends on being politicized by parties.

Table 10 contains the coefficients and odds ratio of two voting regression models and two PID regression models (two for coalition preference and two for PDC/PS

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**Table 9**

**Determinants of Ideological Self-Location in Chile, 1995 (OLS Regression)**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Model 17: Dependent Variable: Left-Right Scale (0–10)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Regression Coefficients</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Standard Coefficients</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Petty Bourgeoisie</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Salariat (Service class)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Routine nonmanual</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Skilled workers</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Unskilled workers</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Regime Preference</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Distributional Perception</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Religiosity</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Age</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gender</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Constant</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>R-Square</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


(*) Significant at p<.01.

(**) Significant at p<.05.

(***) Significant at p<.10.

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23 This scale goes from 0 (left) to 10 (right).

24 These models contain all the independent variables already discussed plus two new ones that measure economic voting: satisfaction with respondents’ assessments of their personal and the national economic situations (from 1, 'very good’ to 5, ‘very bad’).
In model 18 (PID as the dependent variable) one of the best predictors of coalition preference is the respondents’ evaluations of Pinochet; the probability of supporting the progressive coalition plummets an amazing 0.51 (from 0.88 to 0.37) for respondents who scored Pinochet 7 compared to those who gave him a 1. This is an important factor driving the competition between the two blocs. Model 19 (vote as the dependent variable) reinforces this perception: the authoritarian/democratic conflict is the best predictor (odds ratio = 2.31) of coalition preference. Ideology also matters in both models. Religiosity and the perception of social inequalities are not statistically significant, and except for the service class in Model 19, the direct effect of class disappears when all these variables are included.

In contrast, the authoritarian/democratic conflict does not affect the competition between the PDC and PS (Model 21). Preferences between PS and PDC identifiers regarding income distribution are statistically significant at p <.01 (Models 20 and 21). But as can be seen from the weakness of the class categories in Models 20 and 21, this distribution question is not reflected in different class bases between the PDC and PS; i.e., it does not provoke any kind of class political identity (‘class for itself’). Equally interesting, the evaluation of Allende (Model 20) is a substantively important and statistically significant factor. The probability of supporting the PS instead of the PDC increases .33 (from 0.49 to 0.82) with the most compared to the least favorable evaluation of Allende (7 compared to 1). The diverging evaluations of Allende show that the political legacies of the past are a driving force in the competition between these two parties. These results suggest three conclusions. First, an authoritarian/democratic cleavage is present at all three levels: structural bases, political values, and party differences. Second, attitudinal differences emerging after the authoritarian experience have not tightly conditioned choices of party leaders in Chile during the democratic transition. Voters in the center-left camp believe that income distribution is unjust and would prefer greater emphasis on redistribution. In order to maintain intact the governing

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Table 10</th>
<th>Coalition Support and PDC/PS Competition by Cleavages, Regime Preference, and Distributional Perceptions Chile, 1994 and 1995 (Logistic Regression Odds Ratios)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Dependent Var.: Democracia y Progreso (0)/Concertación de Partidos (1)</td>
<td>Dependent Var.: PDC (0)/ PS (1)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Petty Bourgeoisie</td>
<td>1.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Category</td>
<td>Salariat (Service class)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>--------------------------------</td>
<td>--------------------------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>.67</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Routines nonmanual</td>
<td>1.41 Reference categ.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Skilled workers</td>
<td>.93</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Unskilled workers</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nonemployed</td>
<td>Reference categ.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Religiosity</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gender</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Age</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Urban/rural</td>
<td>.92</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Regime Preference</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Evaluation of Pinochet</td>
<td>.75*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Evaluation of Allende</td>
<td>1.03</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Distributional Perception**</td>
<td>1.14</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Left-right location</td>
<td>1.78*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>National Economic Evaluation</td>
<td>1.45*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Retrospective Economic Evaluation</td>
<td>.96</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Government evaluation</td>
<td>1.60*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Constant</td>
<td>–2.74</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>–2 Log likelihood</td>
<td>669.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chi-square of the model</td>
<td>240.8* (d.f. 15)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(N)</td>
<td>745</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


(*) Significant at p<.01.
(***) Significant at p<.05.
(****) Significant at p<.10

* In 1994 the question was whether the respondent was more in favor of economic development or social justice.
coalition and consolidate democracy, however, PS and PPD leaders have largely followed a centrist line and have not politicized class and redistributive issues. This is why the class cleavage between the PDC and the left, which was not that strong in 1973, has eroded. PDC, PS, and PPD elites have given priority to restoring and consolidating democracy. Neither social class nor religion has been relevant in structuring party competition between the PDC and the center-left despite the potential for such a conflict. Religion helps shape left-right location (Table 9), but it has not crystallized as an important cleavage in the party system. Finally, the legacies of past political conflicts, reflected in the evaluation of Allende, are an ongoing limitation on the unity of the center-left coalition despite the strength of the authoritarian/democratic cleavage.

The authoritarian/democratic cleavage will probably diminish over time as the memories of the 1973–90 dictatorship soften, as a new generation of voters comes on the scene, and as the right seeks to distance itself with respect to Pinochet and the dictatorship. Nonetheless, this cleavage has persisted for considerable time as the dominant one in democratic Chile. Moreover, if our argument is correct, the authoritarian/democratic cleavage will recede not primarily because of structural or cultural changes but rather because new political issues will come to the fore and this one will gradually lose its ability to mobilize and differentiate among voters.

**Elite Recrafting of Party Competition during the Transition to Democracy**

The nature of the Chilean transition to democracy fostered elite reshaping of the party system primarily from above in the 1987–89 period. Chilean civil society mobilized against the dictatorship in 1983–84, but social mobilization proved incapable of toppling the regime. Pinochet used the fear of mobilization and polarization to bolster his legitimacy and crush the popular protests. From then on, the struggle for democratization was elite led. The fundamental dynamics of the political system revolved around the regime and opposition party leaders. Opposition leaders functioned with considerable autonomy vis-à-vis civil society and vis-à-vis traditional party organizations, which had been crushed during the first dozen years of military dictatorship. The construction of the new conservative parties, RN and UDI, was also engineered from above, with relatively weak constraints from below.

25 Moreno (1999) argues that the authoritarian/democratic cleavage characterizes the party systems of many new democracies, but that it tends to recede over time.
Given the dynamics of the Chilean transition to democracy, the process of reorganizing the parties and deciding what line they should adopt was primarily elite led. Small groups of elites got together to determine party strategy and to form the opposition coalition. These elites had almost no need to be responsive to demands from within the party organizations because the organizations were still disarticulated. Nor did party leaders need to be attentive to the ‘electoral connection’ (Mayhew 1974), because elections had not been observed.

Party leaders in the period of reorganizing the Chilean party system (1987–89) deliberately deemphasized class issues, whereas in the 1960s and 1970s they politicized class. During the 1960s and 1970s the PS’s discourse focused on class, dependency, and revolution. The party formally embraced Marxism-Leninism in 1966, and it regarded itself as a vanguard that would further working-class interests. It explicitly rejected the possibility of class compromise, officially embraced revolutionary violence, and criticized liberal ‘bourgeois’ democracy. PS leaders viewed the Christian Democrats as class enemies (Walker 1990).

When they reorganized the Chilean parties in the second half of the 1980s and especially beginning with the preparation for the 1988 plebiscite, party leaders were aware of how disastrous the extreme politicization of class issues had been between the late 1960s and 1973. In response to this and also to the difficult challenge of engineering a transition to democracy in the face of a crafty, well-entrenched military dictatorship that enjoyed considerable popular support, party elites of the democratic opposition deliberately depoliticized class and redistributive issues. Instead, they focused on the importance of reconquering democracy. This was a quintessential pacted transition, and one of the prices of the pact was that major redistributive issues were taken off the agenda. This focus on distinctively political issues reinforced the authoritarian/democratic cleavage and diminished the saliency of class cleavages in the party system.

After years of bitter rivalries among the opposition parties, as the 1988 plebiscite approached opposition leaders became determined to exploit that event in order to try to effect a transition to democracy. Believing that a confrontational, mobilizational, and polarizing approach would imperil prospects for a democratic transition, they pursued a cautious path. To maintain a united front, which they deemed essential to defeat Pinochet in the 1988 plebiscite, they smoothed over historical enmities. They excluded the Communist Party from their coalition because the PCCh insisted on pursuing a more radical, confrontational, ‘classist’ strategy. The coalition played down class and redistributive themes and underscored the desirability of restoring democracy. Eschewing
class confrontation, it also emphasized the importance of maintaining stability and order and of continuity in economic policy (Garretón 1989; Silva 1992–3 and 1996; Montecinos 1993; Scully 1996). This discourse resonated in Chilean public opinion, which generally rejected the confrontational tactics of the 1970–73 and 1973–90 periods.

The change in party discourse was especially pronounced in the Socialist Party. By February 1988, when the alliance for the 1988 plebiscite was formed, class discourse was marginal among most Socialist Party leaders. Instead, party leaders focused on democracy and the need for compromise in order to achieve it (Garretón 1989; Moulian 1983; Roberts 1999; Walker 1990, 174–219). The two competing socialist organizations, product of a 1979 schism, strove to achieve unity and downplay differences.

Without significant changes in the economic model, it would be impossible to radically address redistributive and class issues in the short term. Rather, the coalition leaders emphasized that they would rely on rapid growth to improve everyone’s standard of living. They argued that the greatest priority needed to be growth and that a successful growth strategy precluded dramatic economic changes intended to suddenly redress class inequalities.

Compared to the transitions to democracy in Argentina and Brazil, the Chilean transition was marked by a discourse in which themes of social justice, class, and redistributive issues were muted. In Argentina and Brazil democratic leaders promised to redress social justices and made redistribution a central part of their discourse. Chile’s opposition leaders not only faced a recent past (1970–73) characterized by a particularly painful episode of class confrontation and ideological conflict, they also had witnessed the dramatic failures of Argentine and Brazilian democratic presidents (not to mention the even more spectacular failures of democratic presidents in neighboring Bolivia and Peru) to deliver on their promises of quickly improving living standards for the poor majorities. As a result, the leaders of the Chilean democratic opposition downplayed these themes. Many groups in civil society still favored a confrontational class discourse and perspective, but they did not have the power to shape the discourse and decisions of party leaders. Opposition party leaders marginalized these more progressive voices, fearing that they could disrupt the transition and, after March 1990, that they could threaten the economic successes of the new governing coalition (Oxhorn 1995, 217–20, 243–83).

From 1987 to 1989 political elites had significant autonomy to reshape the party system from above. A conspicuous example of this autonomy is that in 1987 opposition leaders of PS lineage created a new party, the PPD, Party for Democracy. This party’s very name underscores the move from a confrontational class discourse to one that
focused on democracy. It would be difficult to construe the creation of the PPD as a response to demands from below.

The virtual nonexistence of a class or religious cleavage between the left/center-left and Christian Democrats has been reinforced by the fact that the Socialists and Christian Democrats have been members of the same governing coalition since 1989. PS, PPD, and PDC elites have emphasized what brings their coalition together rather than harping on differences. The effort to find common ground has been a part not only of bargaining about coalition candidates but also of legislative voting; the legislative voting of the PDC members of congress has been close to that of PS and PPD members (Carey 1998). The muffling of policy differences within the coalition is partly responsible for the changing nature of cleavages in the party system. But ongoing differences among the members of this coalition still exist.

As some scholars have argued (Pakulski and Waters 1996a and 1996b; Przeworski and Sprague 1986; Sartori 1969), class does not appear spontaneously as an important cleavage in party systems. Rather, it surfaces as a major cleavage only if parties of the left emphasize it. In Chile the electorally most important parties to the left of center, the PS and PPD, have downplayed class issues. Following the logic of Przeworski and Sprague, it is no wonder that when the left-of-center parties eschewed class and redistributive issues, class has not surfaced as a major cleavage in the competition among the PCD and the parties of the left despite attitudinal differences on distributive issues. Whereas Przeworski and Sprague emphasized that socialist and social democratic parties are mainly responsible for politicizing class issues, the Chilean case shows that conservative parties can also activate class cleavages (Chhibber and Torcal 1997). In Chile the activation of the cleavage between the governing coalition and the conservative opposition was a result of the interaction among different parties, including the conservative ones.

Just as class surfaces as a major cleavage in a party system only if parties politicize class issues, the same is true of religion. Religion was an important cleavage at some points in Chile’s past, although its salience declined during the late 1960s and early 1970s (Smith and Rodríguez 1974). Religion became irrelevant as a predictor of party preference in contemporary Chile in part because religious leaders no longer support any particular political ideology or party as a coherent bloc.
Conclusion

The post-1989 Chilean party system has been fundamentally structured by specifically political variables resulting from the authoritarian regime and the democratic transition. The cleavage between those who supported military rule and those who opposed it stands out above all else. Although a modest class cleavage persists between the governing coalition and the conservative opposition, the main key to understanding the bases of the Chilean party system in the 1990s is political.

The military dictatorships in the southern cone and Brazil created new opportunities for destroying party loyalties and for creating new ones. In Chile the military dictatorship led to a persistent realignment in the party system. A deep political cleavage has remained between those who supported military rule and those who opposed it. Military rule profoundly divided Chile politically. It represented a salvation for elite groups threatened by the Allende government, it restored political and economic ‘order’ based on a different economic policy strategy, and it ultimately (1985–89) fostered economic growth. With these achievements, it won the deep support of a significant part of the electorate (Lagos 1997). But at the same time it persecuted scores of thousands of people, destroyed Chile’s lengthy democratic heritage, induced a terrible recession (1981–83) that led to massive unemployment, exacerbated income inequalities (Tironi 1988), hurt the noncompetitive national sectors of the economy, and reduced the labor force working in them. These results provoked the enmity of another important part of Chilean society.

Writing shortly after the transition to democracy, Scully (1992) speculated that a political divide between authoritarians and democrats might surface as a new cleavage in the party system alongside the traditional social cleavages (class, religion, and rural/urban). As Tironi and Agüero (1999) have argued, the democratic/authoritarian cleavage has so far eclipsed the traditional cleavages. The political salience of the divide between those who supported and those who opposed the dictatorship has fostered weaker linkages between social groups and parties, thus diminishing the utility of the traditional social cleavage approach.

Political identities, including party preferences, are mainly formed through political processes. No particular kind of cleavage necessarily dominates a party system (Sartori 1969). Rather, the cleavages that dominate are themselves the result of a political struggle. Because of political conflicts, the authoritarian/democratic cleavage has eclipsed others as the dominant one in postauthoritarian Chile. The main restrictions to reshaping the party system have been political and not societal. Political legacies of
authoritarian rule together with political agency since the transition have created new cleavages and reshaped the party system.

More than the first two approaches to the study of party systems discussed in the first section of this paper, we bring politics back into the logic of cleavage and party system formation. The autonomy of the political element of a cleavage goes beyond what the first two approaches have recognized. Autonomy also implies the capacity of political actors through their discourse and policy-making to forge political identities and party preferences (Kalyvas 1996). Political identities and party preferences may form along fault lines that are not determined or predicted well by actors’ sociological locations but rather are shaped by distinctive political legacies and experiences. Voters may form party preferences not because a party fights for social groups’ material and cultural interests but because a political experience forges collective memories and identities (Kitschelt et al. 1999). Party competition, the electoral strategies adopted by elites, and electoral platforms and policy-making help form these memories and identities once democracy is established.

Our paper also has implications for the debate about the freezing and thawing of social cleavages. The Western European literature has generally seen social and cultural transformations as the cause of the thawing of social cleavages (Inglehart 1984 and 1990). Without denying that social and cultural transformations affect party systems, we have emphasized the impact of political factors in changing cleavage structures.

To understand how Latin American party systems are structured, it is important to look at the supply side of parties, that is, at what political elites create and do.26 The demand side, i.e., the ways in which societal interests shape party systems from below, is important, but an analysis of cleavages from a sociological approach does not satisfactorily explain Latin American party systems. We must also turn our attention to the ways in which political agency and politics shape party systems from above.

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26 A converging approach is Gibson (1997), who contends that electoral politics along with policymaking have been the main factors explaining the successful rebuilding in Mexico and Argentina of the electoral majorities of populist parties in their road to market reforms.
Technical Appendix: The Class Variable

Any assessment of the class bases of parties that rests on survey data must able to a) construct sensible class categories and b) properly identify the class of survey respondents. In this appendix we address these issues.

Rather than using the surveys’ occupational categories, we regrouped these categories into classes. The main reason for doing so is theoretical: the notion of class revolves around production relations and hence calls for classifying according to position in the productive structure. In addition, some of the surveys’ occupation categories had few respondents, making them less amenable to quantitative analysis.

Centro de Estudios Políticos

The 1994 and 1995 Centro de Estudios Políticos National Public Opinion Surveys (Roper Center Archive #s 227/1994 and 236–37/1995) used included 11 occupational categories and four other categories (students, household, retired, unemployed) for those not employed. We split three of the eleven occupational categories among the employed (‘empleados’, ‘obreros’, and ‘otros con contratos’) into two educational levels and placed them in class categories accordingly. This process yielded a total of 14 different occupational categories, which we then grouped into the five class categories. The National Public Opinion Survey did not include data on the occupation of the head of the household, so we could not use this information (as we do for the Latinobarómetro) to determine the class of the nonemployed categories. Our five class categories include the following occupational groups:

1. Petty bourgeoisie. In class terms, this category is independent (employers or self-employed) rather than employees. We created this category with survey respondents who classified themselves as ‘industrialists, merchants (comerciantes), small and large entrepreneurs’.

2. Service class. This category includes survey respondents who classified themselves as ‘managers and executives’, ‘armed forces,’ ‘independent professionals’, ‘employees’ with more than 12 years of schooling (i.e., some college education), and ‘independent workers’. ‘Managers and executives’ and ‘independent professionals’ fit the textbook category of the service class. The data on the ‘employees’ with some college education makes apparent that they belong in this category. The rationale for this grouping is that these individuals generally enjoy high salaries and either supervise subordinates or work with considerable autonomy.
3. Routine nonmanual (Class III). This category includes survey respondents who described themselves as ‘employees’ with 12 or fewer years of schooling (high school or less). These respondents are typically white-collar workers with subordinate positions. This occupational category fits Erikson and Goldthorpe’s textbook definition of the routine nonmanual class.

4. Skilled workers (Classes V and VI). This category includes respondents who were craftspeople—‘ejerce algún oficio (electricista, gasfiter)’—and ‘workers’ and ‘others with a contract’ with eight or more years of schooling. These categories clearly fit Erikson and Goldthorpe’s criteria for skilled workers.

5. Unskilled workers (Classes VIIa and b). We included four groups in the ‘unskilled workers’ class category: ‘does agricultural work’, ‘does occasional odd jobs’, and ‘workers’ and ‘others with contracts’ with fewer than eight years of schooling. Much of the informal urban sector is in this category (for example, ‘does occasional odd jobs’).

Latinobarómetro

The 1995 Latinobarómetro had eight occupation categories. Of these main categories, one subdivision (namely, whether ‘other employees’ worked in an office) was useful, so we maintained it as a separate category. Based on education, we further subdivided three other categories (‘cuenta propia—ambulante’, ‘ejecutivo de mando medio’, and ‘otro empleado’) into eight groups. Otherwise, these three Latinobarómetro categories would have been too heterogeneous to classify in Goldthorpe’s scheme. This generated a total of 14 categories.

We classified individuals who were retired or unemployed on the basis of their previous job and nonemployed with no previous work experience and students on the basis of the occupation of the head of the household. For the nonemployed with no previous work experience and for students, if the head of the household was classified as ‘other employee’, the survey did not provide information on whether this person worked in an office. As a result, we classified these heads of households who were ‘other employees’ according to occupation and education.

1. Petty bourgeoisie. We created this category with respondents who classified themselves as business owners (‘dueños de negocios’), and farmers and other land owners (‘agricultores, ejidalario, comunero’). There was only one case in the latter category.

2. Service class. We included survey respondents who classified themselves as high-level managers and executives (‘alto ejecutivo- director gerente’), independent professionals (‘profesionales independientes—doctor, abogado, contador, arquitecto’),
professional employees (‘profesionales empleados’—doctor, abogado, contador, arquitecto’), and middle-level executives (‘ejecutivo de mando medio’) with some college.

3. Routine nonmanual (Class III). We included medium-level managers (‘ejecutivo de mando medio’) with no college, other employees (‘otros empleados’) who work in an office, other employees (‘otros empleados’) who do not work in an office but who have minimally some university education, and self-employed workers (‘trabajador por cuenta propia’) with minimally some university education

4. Skilled workers (Classes V and VI). This category includes self-employed workers (‘trabajador por cuenta propia’) with ten to twelve years of education. It also includes other employees (‘otros empleados’) who do not work in an office and have ten to twelve years of education.

5. Unskilled workers (Classes VIIa and b). This category includes other employees (‘otros empleados’) who do not work in an office and who have up to nine years of education and self-employed workers (‘trabajador por cuenta propia’) with up to nine years of education.

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The distribution of these five class categories is roughly similar in these three surveys.

The survey information regarding socioeconomic status, household goods, and education was useful in checking the validity of how we grouped different occupational categories. The three surveys include a question on the socioeconomic status of the respondents’ family and three more on ownership of a water-heater, refrigerator, and car. The cross-tabulations of our occupational and five class categories with these variables support the validity and reliability of the way we have constructed class. The distribution of social status and ownership of water-heater, refrigerator, and car on the different class categories behaves as one would expect. The five class categories are heterogeneous, but this heterogeneity reflects a Latin American reality (Weyland 1996) and is not merely a product of the survey’s categories.
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