KELLOGG INSTITUTE
THE HELEN KELLOGG INSTITUTE FOR INTERNATIONAL STUDIES

# PARTY ORGANIZATION, IDEOLOGICAL CHANGE, AND ELECTORAL SUCCESS
## A Comparative Study of Postauthoritarian Parties

**Grigorii V. Golosov**

**Working Paper #258 - September 1998**

**Grigorii V. Golosov** teaches comparative politics at the European University at St. Petersburg, Russia. He was a Visiting Fellow at the Kellogg Institute during the 1998 spring semester. Professor Golosov obtained an MA in Russian History and a PhD in Social Philosophy at Novosibirsk State University, an MA in Political Science from SUNY/Central European University, Budapest, and postgraduate study diplomas from the University of Oslo and Southern Illinois University. He has also been a Research Associate at the Center for Slavic and East European Studies, University of California at Berkeley, and a Visiting Scholar at the Kennan Institute for Advanced Russian Studies, Woodrow Wilson Center, and the Institute of Russian and East European Studies, St. Antony's College, Oxford University. In support of his research, he has been awarded grants from the USIA and the MacArthur and Soros Foundations. His most recent publications include *Modes of Communist Rule, Democratic Transition, and Party System Formation in Four East European Countries* (University of Washington, 1996); "Russian Political Parties and the 'Bosses': Evidence from the 1994 Provincial Elections in Western Siberia," *Party Politics* (1997); "Regional Party System Formation in Russia: The Deviant Case of Sverdlovsk Oblast," *Journal of Communist Studies and Transition Politics* (with Vladimir Gelman, forthcoming); and "Who Survives? Party Origins, Organizational Structure, and Electoral Performance in Post-Communist Russia," *Political Studies* (forthcoming). He has also published several books and many articles in Russian.

I would like to thank the Helen Kellogg Institute for granting me a residential fellowship that made my research possible. I am also grateful to Michael J. Coppedge and Martha L. Merritt for their valuable comments on the draft of the manuscript and to Scott Mainwaring for giving unstintingly of his profound knowledge of Brazilian politics. All errors of fact and interpretation are, of course, solely mine.

## ABSTRACT

This study employs the 'most different systems' research design to discuss the factors in the electoral success of four postauthoritarian parties: the Spanish Popular Alliance (1977–82), the Communist Party of the Russian Federation (1993–5), the Democratic Social Party/Brazilian Progressive Party (1986–94), and the Communist Party of Bohemia and Moravia (1990–6). The analysis demonstrates that low availability of political resources inherited from the old regimes stimulates the parties' leaders to engage themselves in extensive party-building efforts. The resulting centralization of organizational power effectively allows the postauthoritarian parties to modify their programmatic standings, thus adapting themselves to the competitive political environments. In this sense, organizational development can be viewed as a factor responsible not only for ideological change but also for electoral success. The study demonstrates that this model can be used in causal explanations of postauthoritarian parties' development in several other countries.



## RESUMEN

Este estudio emplea el diseño de investigación de 'sistemas más disímiles' para discutir los factores del éxito electoral de cuatro partidos post-autoritarios: la Alianza Popular española (1977–82), el Partido Comunista de la Federación Rusa (1993–5), el Partido Social Demócrata/Partido Progresista Brasileño (1986–94) y el Partido Comunista de Bohemia y Moravia (1990–6). El análisis demuestra que la baja disponibilidad de recursos políticos heredados de los viejos regímenes, estimula a los líderes de estos partidos a desarrollar esfuerzos intensivos de fortalecimiento de las estructuras partidarias. La resultante centralización del poder organizacional efectivamente permite a los partidos post-autoritarios modificar sus posiciones programáticas, adaptándose de este modo a los ambientes políticos competitivos. En este sentido, el desarrollo organizacional puede ser visto como un factor responsable no sólo del cambio ideológico sino también del éxito electoral. Este estudio demuestra que este modelo puede ser usado en explicaciones causales del desarrollo de partidos post-autoritarios en varios otros países.

There is a long-standing tradition of relating electoral success to ideological change. Most often, such theories are based upon the spatial metaphors of party competition (Enelow and Hinich 1984). While there is a substantial scholarly debate concerning the validity of different spatial models (Merrill 1995), the Downsian reasoning that people vote for whatever party they believe to stand close to their own positions is too intuitively appealing to be disregarded in any study dealing with electoral success. If a party moves closer to the population mean on ideology, it increases its electoral chances. But, as Przeworski and Sprague (1986, 120) put it, "to assume that party leaders can pick any strategy, address themselves to any group with any program, reduces the study of parties and elections to empty formalisms." Parties are organizations, and their organizational characteristics can be expected to exert some impact on the outcomes of electoral competition. In this analysis it will be argued that while both ideological and organizational factors influence electoral success, the impact of the latter category of factors is more important. Moreover, party organizational development can be used as an independent variable in causal explanations of ideological change.

Recent research on the interplay of party organization, party ideological change, and party electoral performance has focused on the institutionalized parties of the west (Harmel and Janda 1982). But, arguably, the fluid party systems are of no less interest in this respect. High degrees of electoral volatility are often viewed as an important characteristic of such party systems (Mainwaring and Scully 1994; Tóka 1997). One way to explain the phenomenon is to focus on the specific properties of the postauthoritarian electorates (Evans and Whitefield 1993). Yet it is possible to approach the problem from a different perspective. A high degree of electoral volatility indicates that in a given election some parties greatly improve their performance in comparison to the previous election, while some others fail to sustain the previously achieved level of support. Hence the very phenomenon of electoral success is better articulated in new democracies than it is in the well-established ones.

In particular, new democracies provide an opportunity to define electoral success irrespectively of parties' varying goals and aspiration levels. In the well-established democracies certainty about the structures of electoral competition is rather high. Party goals can be set in terms of policy maximization or office maximization. Even if parties do pursue vote maximizing strategies, some of them "will define their goals as winning no less than a majority of votes, while others will be satisfied with a plurality of votes, or winning more votes than party X, or winning an equivalent proportion of the votes to those won by party Y, or winning a certain percentage of the vote" (Müller and Steininger 1994, 3). Such strategic calculations make little sense in new

democracies with their intrinsically high levels of political uncertainty (Bunce and Csanádi 1993). At the same time, 'pure' vote maximization becomes the only rational strategy available to the majority of political actors, however realistic their aspirations are. In this sense, it can be argued that polities with no democratic experience and no 'structured' party systems provide real-world approximations to formal rational choice models of party competition (Cox 1997, 274–5).

Of course, one can argue that precisely for this reason, new party systems are scarcely comparable with the old ones. If there are no 'real' political parties, the organizational factors of electoral success can be expected to play a different role. To increase the comparative utility of the study, I will concentrate on a category of political parties that, to this or that extent, represent continuations of the previous authoritarian regimes. In the following analysis, these parties will be referred to as postauthoritarian parties.[1] Of course, no claim is made that in any country-specific context postauthoritarian parties necessarily exceed other competitive actors in organizational power, cohesiveness, or other organizational properties. But in comparative perspective there appears to be no other category of parties combining the lack of competitive experience with electoral advantages and liabilities rooted in the past. The first section of the analysis will define postauthoritarian parties. It will be demonstrated that even though the phenomenon can be observed in a variety of new democracies, the number of cases corresponding to the tasks of this study is rather limited. On this basis, the use of the 'most different cases' research strategy will be theoretically justified. Two subsequent sections will discuss the factors in postauthoritarian parties' electoral success in four new democracies (Brazil, the Czech Republic, Russia, and Spain). Each of the parties' electoral fortunes will be traced from the first free elections to the earliest instances of 'high-volatility elections' (Mair 1997, 68). In my conclusion I will explicate the resulting causal model and place it into a wider context of the on-going debate on party organization and party change.

## Methodological Problems

Arguably, the most frequently discussed instances of postauthoritarian parties are the Hungarian Socialist Party (MSZP), the Social Democracy of the Polish Republic (SdRP), the

[1] I am avoiding the conventional term 'successor parties' because it carries unnecessary connotations associated with one category of such organizations that has received more scholarly attention than any other, the communist successor parties of Eastern Europe (Waller 1995). Indeed, it can be plausibly argued that extrapolating this category to the South European and Latin American cases can create effects associated with 'conceptual stretching.' See the subsequent section of this analysis for a more detailed definition of postauthoritarian parties.

Bulgarian Socialist Party (BSP), and the Communist Party of the Russian Federation (KPRF). Attention attracted by these parties is quite understandable, given that in terms of electoral support and membership they are quite significant actors in the political arenas of the respective countries. In fact, their significance and visibility allowed students of East European politics to discuss them without providing any formal definition of 'successor parties.' But, in order to place the phenomenon into a comparative perspective, it is important to delineate it first.

Several different criteria can be employed to identify postauthoritarian parties. First, one can argue that postauthoritarian parties inherit the organizational and material assets of the previous regime. This criterion, however, brings into the category of postauthoritarian parties such overtly anticommunist formations as Our Home is Russia and the Coalition Party of Estonia. Second, the criterion of ideological similarity with the previous regime can be used. By this criterion, none of the parties listed at the beginning of this section scores better than small orthodox communist groups in the respective countries. More importantly, it can be argued that some degree of ideological discontinuity is necessary for pursuing successful vote maximizing strategies. Both criteria appear to be self-evident, but neither of them is sufficient. In my view, this is because the phenomenon of postauthoritarian parties cannot be delineated without taking into account the context of electoral competition. Like any competitive actor in new democracies, a postauthoritarian party enters the electoral arena by participating in the 'founding elections.' By definition, the central issue of such elections is regime change (O'Donnell and Schmitter 1986; Bogdanor 1990). Those parties that in the founding elections are most widely perceived as the continuation of the authoritarian regime, and not as representatives of change, can be defined as postauthoritarian parties. It must be stressed, however, that this criterion is also insufficient in itself, for under certain conditions those wishing to voice their protest against radical change can vote for parties clearly dissociated from the old regime. For example, it was observed that in 1975 many voters in the south of Portugal voted for the Socialist Party simply because this was a credible conservative choice (Wiarda 1989, 356).

By combining three criteria discussed above, postauthoritarian parties can be defined as parties that 1) appear as the continuation of the old regime in the founding elections; 2) inherit at least some of the organizational assets of the old regime; 3) display at least some ideological similarity to the old regime. Relatively large and influential postauthoritarian parties exist in nearly every country experiencing transition from the communist rule. This is quite understandable, given the central role played by their predecessors in the functioning of the political systems. However, the clear-cut instances of their electoral success are not very numerous. In fact, this is true of all the cases listed above, with the SdRP, MSZP, BSP, and KPRF achieving their most

spectacular electoral successes in 1993, 1994, 1994, and 1995, respectively.[2] The electoral histories of many other postauthoritarian parties in Eastern Europe, regardless of how well they fared in the founding elections, are those of more or less slow but steady decline.

The striking differences among the electoral fortunes of postauthoritarian parties have been too apparent to be ignored by political scientists. To explain these differences, several theories have been developed. One of the earliest was what could be called the 'cultural' explanation, which viewed the initially high shares of the vote cast for communist successor parties in Bulgaria, Romania, and some of the former Yugoslav republics as a natural consequence of 'predominantly Eastern Orthodox culture' (Banac 1992, 9). While the subsequent sweeping electoral successes of postauthoritarian parties in Hungary and Poland rendered this explanation empirically irrelevant, it has been never seriously challenged on theoretical grounds. Kitschelt (1992, 1995) has powerfully argued that the overall structure of party competition in new democracies, as well as the electoral fortunes and ideological evolution of postauthoritarian parties, are contingent upon the country-specific modes of communist rule in respective countries. The approach of Geddes (1995) is similar in that she emphasizes the role of 'Leninist legacies.' Rivera (1996) examined three possible explanatory variables derived from the general political science/transitions to democracy literature—the political cleavages of the preauthoritarian period, the type of transition to democracy, and the legacy of the communist authoritarian period—and found the last of them most influential. Ishiyama (1995) thoroughly tested the impact of institutional factors upon the electoral fortunes of postauthoritarian parties in Eastern Europe, although his more recent work (Ishiyama 1996, 1997) largely agrees with the conclusion that the authoritarian legacies are more important.

While the explanations cited above are very different from each other, their shared characteristic is the emphasis put on the environmental determinants of party competition in the postcommunist world. In principle, it is possible to theoretically reconstruct a sequence of causal relationships incorporating all these explanations (Golosov 1996), cultural legacy—the mode of communist rule—the mode of democratic transition—the resulting institutional arrangements —the structure of party competition, including the role of postauthoritarian parties. Of course, the question of relative strength that can be attributed to each of the elements of this sequence

---

[2] The case of the Democratic Labor Party of Lithuania cannot be included because the parliamentary elections of 1992, won by that party on a wide margin, were in fact the first elections structured along party lines. We do not know how many votes the party has won in the founding elections of 1990. Moreover, Lieven (1993, 237) contends that the pro-independence communists' electoral chances in that elections were severely damaged by the party's decision not to challenge opposition candidates in the same electoral districts.

remains, and the importance of this question cannot be underestimated. However, the environmental explanations tend to ignore the developmental logic intrinsic to the emerging structures of party competition. To reveal this logic it is essential to control all the variables identified in the environmental explanations. One strategy specifically designed for this purpose is the 'most different systems' research design. As Przeworski and Teune (1970, 39) put it, this design seeks to "eliminate factors differentiating social systems by formulating statements that are valid regardless of the systems within which observations are made." In other words, comparative referents should be maximally different in all but one respect (López 1992, 272–4; De Meur and Berg-Schlosser 1996). An important—and sometimes overlooked—aspect of the "most different systems" research design is that it involves multiple levels of analysis, with special emphasis put on the observed behavior of individual social actors (Przeworski and Teune 1970, 36). Hence the starting point of implementing this strategy is to identify a type of actors present in significantly different systemic environments.

Arguably, postauthoritarian parties do constitute such a type of actors. The next step is therefore to achieve maximum heterogeneity among the observed systems. For this end, however, focusing attention exclusively on the postcommunist polities seems to be insufficient. However different these systems are, all of them share a number of properties stemming from the relatively uniform characteristics of the communist rule, as well as from the specific context created by the Soviet domination over the countries of Eastern Europe (Bunce 1995). Bringing into the analysis a number of cases not belonging to the category of postcommunist countries can solve this problem. Can such cases be selected among the new democracies of Southern Europe and Latin America? It should be acknowledged that while in Eastern Europe and in the former Soviet Union postauthoritarian parties are normally strong, nearly omnipresent, and easily identifiable, this is not the case in the regions under question. The vast majority of the Latin American military regimes, as well as the authoritarian regimes of Greece and Portugal, withered away without leaving any significant political parties to claim their legacies. There are, however, several important exceptions to this rule. Two of them are Brazil and Spain.

Brazil's experiment with military involvement in politics in 1964–86 has been assessed as an authoritarian situation rather than an authoritarian regime (Linz 1973). While the military rulers of the country did exhibit highly authoritarian and repressive attitudes towards the opposition (Alves 1985), opposition was tolerated in form of an officially recognized party, the Brazilian Democratic Movement (MDB). Elections were held and Congress continued to function. To participate in the quasicompetitive political process, the military sponsored a progovernment party, the National Renovating Alliance (ARENA). Its continuous electoral decline within the

format of two-party competition (Lamounier 1989) forced the authorities to opt for a multiparty system which, in particular, resulted in the transformation of MDB into the Party of the Brazilian Democratic Movement (PMDB) and of ARENA into the Democratic Social Party (PDS). The latter continued to provide the partisan support for the military regime. In the context of democratization, affiliation with the PDS became an electoral liability. Many of its leaders and followers escaped punishment in the founding elections of 1986 by joining the PMDB (Mainwaring 1992–3). Some others split away from the PDS to form the Party of Liberal Front (PFL). As Hagopian (1990, 160) put it, "these partisan conversions allowed those who 'should have' been weakened electorally to resurface with a good deal of their power and prestige intact." From this, it becomes clear that by the first of the criteria used in his analysis, it is the PDS rather than the PFL or any other party that should be classified as a postauthoritarian party. While the programmatic differences between the PDS and the PFL were indeed negligible, it was the former and not the latter that appeared to be the continuation of the authoritarian regime in the founding elections.

In Spain the personal dictatorship of Francisco Franco received its main civilian support from the extreme right-wing Spanish Traditionalist Phalanx (FET). In April 1937 the doctrine of the FET was declared to be the ideology of the state (Payne 1985, 19). In creating a state party, however, Franco did not in any way let the Falangists take over his regime. Quite the reverse, the FET was purged and coopted to serve Franco. Because the ideological bases of the regime remained largely unchanged throughout the thirty-nine years that it lasted, this quasi-single party formally continued to exist to the end. But the actual political role of the FET steadily declined to the extent that by the mid-seventies it could be hardly said to be in existence. By 1976 there were four small and politically impotent political groups each laying claim to the original title of the Phalanx (Ellwood 1991, 92). None of them was electorally successful. More credible heirs of Francoism emerged from the structures of 'limited pluralism' that existed under the old regime (Linz 1974). In October 1976 a number of minor parties with conservative leanings created the Popular Alliance (AP, initially the Conservative Electoral Alliance). The leader of the AP, Manuel Fraga, was a reformer of the right whose initial goal was to create a viable center-right alternative to the left-wing forces (López-Pintor 1985a). This goal did not materialize, largely because another party, the Union of Democratic Center (UCD), assumed the aspired to role. During the early phase of democratic transition, starting with the 1977 founding elections, the UCD—in fact, fairly reminiscent of the AP in its initial composition and political orientations (Amodia 1983)—was widely perceived as a 'party of transition' (Heywood 1995). At the same time, more than two-thirds of the 1977 Spanish electorate considered the AP to be a Francoist party, while almost half of its

voters declared themselves to be an ideological continuation of the old regime (Montero 1988). Hence it stands to reason to characterize the AP as Spain's postauthoritarian party.

In electoral terms, the AP (subsequently 'refounded' as the Popular Party) was much more successful than the PDS, which also changed its name first to the Reformist Progressive Party (PPR) and then to the Brazilian Progressive Party (PPB). While the former achieved significant electoral victories (1982, 1993, and 1996) and finally came to power, the level of electoral success of the Brazilian postauthoritarian party was modest. Both destinations, however, have had their parallels in Eastern Europe and in the former Soviet Union. As a step towards the implementation of the most different systems design, this allows us to distinguish two categories of cases defined by similar outcomes in terms of postauthoritarian parties' electoral success. One category will include those countries where they were successful, starting with Spain. Correspondingly, another category will include Brazil. But what countries of the postcommunist world should be selected as comparative referents? Table 1 systematically compares Brazil to one East European polity that also witnessed a low level of postauthoritarian party's success, the Czech Republic. The comparison shows that while the levels of post-authoritarian parties' electoral success are indeed similar, the most significant contextual characteristics are almost entirely different. The only factor that avoids control is the religious affiliation of the respective populations, which is in both cases Catholic. It can be argued, however, that in all other respects, the cultures of Brazil and the Czech Lands are sufficiently different to arrest this similarity's homogenizing effects. Hence for the purposes of this analysis, Brazil and the Czech Lands provide a sufficient poll of cases in this category. Table 2 tests two other new democracies, Russia and Spain. In both countries, the postauthoritarian parties achieved rather high levels of electoral success, while contextual factors differ even more than in cases of Brazil and the Czech Lands.

**Table 1**

**Brazil and the Czech Republic: Postauthoritarian Parties' Electoral Success and Contextual Factors**

| | Brazil | Czech Republic |
|---|---|---|
| Percentage of votes/seats received by the postauthoritarian party in the 'founding' elections | 6.6 (Chamber of Deputies seats, 1986)[a] | 13.5 (National Council votes, 1990)[b] |
| Percentage of votes/seats received by the postauthoritarian party in the first 'high-volatility' elections | 8.3 (Chamber of Deputies seats, 1990)[a] | 10.3 (parliamentary lower-house votes, 1996)[c] |

| | | |
|---|---|---|
| Background factors | Latin American, Catholic | East European, Catholic |
| Mode of authoritarian rule | Noncommunist | Communist |
| Mode of transition | From above[d] | Collapse[e] |
| Federal | Yes[f] | No[g] |
| Strong presidency | Yes[f] | No[g] |

[a] Mainwaring (1997, 15)
[b] Statistická Rocenka (1991, 630)
[c] Statistická Rocenka (1996, 686)
[d] Mainwaring and Share (1986)
[e] Wheaton and Kovan (1992)
[f] Lamounier (1993)
[g] Batt (1993); the Czech Lands constituted a part of the Czechoslovak Federation before 1993.

Of course, the universe of new democracies encompasses many more country cases available for this kind of study. While the number of postauthoritarian parties in Latin America is indeed limited, the Independent Democratic Union in Chile (Pollack 1997) and, with some reservations, the Institutional Revolutionary Party in Mexico (Domínguez and McCann 1992) and the Colorado Party in Paraguay (Lambert 1997) still fit into the category. The strategy of retrospective comparisons involving cases from the previous 'waves of democratization' could further widen the scope of inquiry (Cotta 1996). Some of the postcommunist parties of Eastern Europe have been mentioned already, and there are many more. Increasing the number of cases is a part of an entirely deferent research strategy (Jackman 1985), which is not consistent with but rather complementary to the most different systems design. The effect sought by pairing Brazil with the Czech Republic and Russia with Spain is to ensure that in respect of independent variables, the observed configurations of causal factors are sufficiently diverse to trace similar processes in different contextual settings. At the same time, the heterogeneity of the selected cases is important for minimizing cognitive errors associated with the problem of 'overdetermination' (Przeworski and Teune 1970, 23, 84; López 1992).[3]

**Table 2**

**Russia and Spain: Postauthoritarian Parties'**

[3] The problem of ovedetermination can be related to the fact that in the real world there are always many overlapping chains of causality leading to any specific outcome. This problem is generally recognized to lack any ultimate solution in small *N* comparative studies, irrespective of the research design employed (Haggard 1990, 28, 161). It has been argued that a partial solution can be achieved by revealing combinations of conditions producing similar outcomes in varying contexts (Ragin 1987, 25).

**Electoral Success and Contextual Factors**

| | Russia | Spain |
|---|---|---|
| Percentage of votes received by the postauthoritarian party in the 'founding' elections | 12.4 (State Duma elections by national party lists, 1993)[a] | 8.05 (parliamentary elections, 1977)[b] |
| Percentage of votes received by the postauthoritarian party in the first 'high-volatility' elections | 22.3 (State Duma elections by national party lists, 1995)[c] | 26.5 (parliamentary elections, 1982)[b] |
| Background factors | East European, Orthodox | South European, Catholic |
| Mode of authoritarian rule | Communist | Noncommunist |
| Mode of transition | Collapse[d] | Negotiated[e] |
| Federal | Yes[f] | Regional autonomy[g] |
| Strong presidency | Yes[f] | No[g] |

[a] Sakwa (1995)
[b] Congreso de los Diputados (1998)
[c] Vestnik TsIK (1996)
[d] Dunlop (1993)
[e] Gunther (1992)
[f] Berg (1994)
[g] Heywood (1995)

It must be emphasized that this analysis does not seek to develop a comprehensive explanation of ideological change experienced by postauthoritarian parties, not to mention their electoral success. Indeed, electoral success is a phenomenon complex enough to defy any single-factor theory. In this study, the 'most different systems' research design provides control over a number of important explanatory variables identified in the on-going debate on the electoral fortunes of communist successor parties. But it is obviously impossible to select cases that would be heterogeneous in respect to every possible explanatory variable. Several important contextual factors not discussed in this study deserve special mention. Those are incumbency, government economic performance, the legitimacy of political parties, campaign strategy, and party finances. Other factors influencing electoral success are literally innumerable, and of course it is impossible to enter them all into an analysis. This problem is intrinsic to all varieties of small *N* comparative research. The 'most similar systems' research design, admittedly the most popular technique among the students of comparative politics, rarely if ever achieves complete homogeneity of samples in all but one significant respect. Similarly, the methodological framework employed in this study has its own limitations. Given these limitations, my purpose is to suggest one plausible explanation without claiming that it can be safely generalized to the whole universe of cases of postauthoritarian politics. For this end, more systematic cross-national research is needed.

By definition, the 'most different systems' research design is a qualitatively oriented procedure of inquiry, which makes it important to bring an element of regularity into data presentation. To achieve this, each of the paired case studies will be uniformly organized along the following lines. First, the structures of party competition in the founding elections will be discussed. In respect to postauthoritarian parties' development, this aspect can be labeled 'entry conditions.' Second, the organizational resources inherited by the postauthoritarian parties will be evaluated. Third, I will discuss the paths of organizational development taken by the postauthoritarian parties. Fourth, attention will be given to the ideological choices made by them during the period from the founding to the 'high-volatility' elections. Finally, I will return to the structures of party competition, this time in the high-volatility elections. On this basis, conclusions will be made about the sources of postauthoritarian parties' electoral success or, in case of Brazil and the Czech Republic, of their lack of success.

## Russia and Spain

While identifying the Spanish founding elections, universally recognized as taking place in June 1977, poses little problem, there may be some controversy concerning the timing of Russia's founding elections. Several relatively free parliamentary elections were conducted in the country before the old regime collapsed in late August 1991 (Kiernan 1993) and, of course, one of the major events in the political history of Russia was Boris Yeltsin's victory in the presidential election of 1991 (Urban 1992). None of these elections, however, constituted a decisive threshold in the process of regime change. More importantly for this analysis, none of them was conducted along party lines. While the parliamentary elections of 1993 were the first relatively free elections experienced by Russia after the fall of the communist authoritarianism, they undeniably lacked many properties attributed to the founding elections in transitions to democracy literature. Both in Spain and in Russia it was not long before the next elections were convoked. But if in Russia an extremely high level of volatility (White, Rose, and McAllister 1997) characterized the parliamentary elections of 1995, in the Spanish elections of 1979 no major voter realignments occurred. The first high-volatility elections took place in the country in 1982.

### Entry Conditions

Despite the relatively long duration of the authoritarian rule, the 1977 Spanish electoral outcomes reflected the political cleavages and partisan alignments of the preauthoritarian period

(Maravall 1982). A possible explanation is that the Franco dictatorship ensured that the polarization between victors and vanquished in the Civil War remained a constant of the regime, the left being equated with opposition and the right with the regime (Heywood 1996, 150). The major parties of the left, the Spanish Socialist Workers' Party (PSOE) and the Spanish Communist Party (PCE), managed to survive clandestinely through the whole period of the dictatorship (Preston 1988), and they took part in the 1977 elections. However, the role played by some of the representatives of the Spanish right in the process of transition to democracy allowed them to effectively dissociate themselves from Francoism. This resulted in a 'symmetric' structure of the 1977 electoral outcomes, with four major parties constituting what can be described in terms of a simple left-right continuum: PCE–PSOE–UCD–AP (Table 3).[4] Survey research convincingly demonstrated that at the time of transition to democracy the Spanish electorate had been able to locate itself along the left-right continuum. The distribution of preferences followed the shape of a normal curve, with the mode located to the left of the center (Gunther, Sani, and Shabad 1986). In 1978, using a one-five scale of ideological positions, the electorate placed the PCE at 1.7, the PSOE at 2.2, the UCD at 3.2, and the AP at 4.4 (Moravall 1982, 29). The location of the AP at the time of its entry into the electoral arena was therefore less than favorable. The party's association with the old regime projected an image attractive to a minority of the right-wing voters (Padró-Solanet 1996, 464). One option confronted by the party was to consolidate this portion of the electorate, thus assuming a continuously marginal—but presumably stable—position within the emerging party system. The only way to significantly increase its electoral appeal was, using the left-right spatial metaphor, to move to the center.

**Table 3**

**Spanish Parliamentary Election Results by Party and Political Tendency, 1977–82, Percentage Shares of the Vote**

| | | 1977 | 1979 | 1982 |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| **Left** | | | | |
| | PCE | 6.3 | 10.66 | 3.28 |
| | PSOE | 24.44 | 30.5 | 40.82 |
| | Other Left | 12.3 | — | 8.28 |

[4] Yet another relevant dimension of the Spanish electoral politics that made its appearance in the 1977 elections was a center-periphery cleavage, represented by an array of regional parties (Marsal and Roiz 1985; Coverdale 1985).

| | | | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| **Center** | | | | |
| | UCD | 34.52 | 34.95 | 6.47 |
| | Other Center | 0.37 | — | 2.87 |
| **Right** | | | | |
| | AP/CD | 8.05 | 5.95 | 26.46 |
| | Other Right | — | 2.07 | — |
| **Regional** | | 6.52 | 8.89 | 7.73 |
| **Other Parties** | | 7.5 | 6.96 | 4.09 |

Source: Congreso de los Diputados (1998).

The classification of Spanish political parties by political tendency is based on Heywood (1995). Despite their regional bases, the Unified Socialist Party of Catalonia and the Socialists of Catalonia are included into the category of left-wing parties.

In Russia, the founding elections of 1993 produced a far more complex and uncertain picture of partisan alignments (Sakwa 1995). In contrast to Spain, no political opposition survived through the period of authoritarianism. Major ideological tendencies confronted by the KPRF in the 1993 elections, the 'democrats' and the 'nationalists,' took their shapes in 1989–91. Of these, only the democrats could claim the leading role in transition to democracy for themselves (Devlin 1995). Since its inception in form of the Pamyat' movement (Orttung 1992), the nationalist tendency was marked by its generally negative view of the communist regime. However, hostility towards the contemporary west served as a bond conjoining the nationalists with regime supporters. The ideologically motivated lack of trust in any institutions of representative democracy severely undermined the nationalists party-building capacity. There was, however, one distinctively nationalist group that took part in the elections, the misleadingly named Liberal Democratic Party of Russia (LDPR). In fact, the victory of the LDPR (Table 4) in the party list vote[5] was the most noticeable outcome of the 1993 elections, which were also contested by a number of corporatist and interest groups without any identifiable ideological standing. One of them was a closely allied with the KPRF lobby of state agricultural managers, the Agrarian Party of Russia (APR).

**Table 4**

**Russian State Duma Election Results by Party and Political Tendency, 1993–5**

[5] In Russia's Duma elections half the deputies are elected by a proportional formula and the other half by a plurality system in single-member districts.

**Percentage Shares of the Vote**

| | | 1993 | 1995 |
|---|---|---|---|
| **Left** | | | |
| | KPRF | 12.4 | 22.3 |
| | APR | 7.99 | 3.78 |
| | KTR | — | 4.53 |
| | Other Left | — | 1.61 |
| **'Nationalists'** | | | |
| | LDPR | 22.92 | 11.18 |
| | KRO | — | 4.31 |
| | Other 'nationalists' | — | 4.32 |
| **'Democrats' and progovernment 'center'** | | | |
| | VR/DVR-OD | 15.51 | 3.86 |
| | PRES | 6.76 | 0.36 |
| | DPR | 5.52 | — |
| | Women of Russia | 8.13 | 4.61 |
| | Yabloko | 7.86 | 6.89 |
| | NDR | — | 10.13 |
| | Others of this category | 6.01 | 15.96 |
| **Others, 'against all lists'** | | 6.9 | 6.16 |

Sources: Sakwa (1995); Vestnik TsIK (1996)

The classification of Russian political parties is based on Pribylovsky (1998), with the 'Left' corresponding to Pribylovsky's 'Communists and Agrarians,' the 'Nationalists' to his 'National and Imperial Patriots,' and 'Blocs/Associations between the Center and the National Patriots' and 'Democrats' and Progovernment 'Center' to all other categories in Pribylovsky's classification. 'Others' include, in particular, all parties that received less than 0.2% of the vote in the 1995 elections.

Apparently, the differences between the structures of political fields in the founding elections of Russia and in Spain were profound. A closer look, however, allows us to identify important similarities. In both countries deeper ideological divides (left versus right in Spain and 'reformers' versus 'antireformers' in Russia) were accompanied by minor divides locating postauthoritarian parties closer to the margins of the political spectra. In Spain the AP was a right-wing party, but it was also perceived as a Francoist party. In Russia the KPRF was in opposition to the ruling democrats, but during the campaign it was also portrayed as a party of communist restoration (Urban 1994)—a position that many Russian voters were not prepared to support. The nationalist LDPR was also severely attacked in the progovernment media, but its leaders' rhetoric was anticommunist and promarket to an extent that arrested the plausibility of accusations of 'crypto-communism.' In this sense, the party did manage to locate itself closer to the center of the

political spectrum than the KPRF (Hough 1994). As a result, the LDPR emerged as the primary political rival of the postauthoritarian party.

### Organizational Legacies

The AP emerged in 1976 as an electoral coalition of seven 'associations,' which were mainly created at the beginning of the Spanish transition by prominent personalities of the authoritarian regime. Some of these associations were virtually synonymous with their leaders, all of whom, with only one exception, served at one time or another as ministers in Franco's cabinets (López-Pintor 1985a, 191–6). The backbone of the AP was provided by the Democratic Reform, a group originating from a nonprofit research company to which Manuel Fraga belonged in the mid-seventies (López Nieto 1995, 38). The Democratic Reform, however, was much more an elite circle of Fraga's associates than it was a political party. The extinct Phalanx had little if anything to contribute to the AP in terms of organizational structure or membership, which was largely recruited from the state apparatus and dominated by notables and politicians belonging to the previous regime. It was not large. By 1979 there were five thousand registered members of the AP altogether (Cotarelo and López Nieto 1988, 86, 88). At the local level, the organizational structure of the AP was a continuation of the networks of patronage and clientele that flourished in the late years of the Franco era.[6]

Given the role played by the Communist party in the political system of Soviet authoritarianism, one could expect the KPRF to derive much more organizational benefits from its

[6] It must be mentioned, however, that since many of the party's members and supporters made successful conversions from public to private sectors of the Spanish economy, the financial standing of the party was quite solid from the very start. It was estimated that in 1977, the AP spent more than $30 million on its campaign, as much as a major party (López-Pintor 1985a, 197).

position of the postauthoritarian party than was available to the AP. By summer 1991 the Communist Party of the Soviet Union retained its membership of about fifteen million. The party became factionalized, but it did not split (Beissinger 1992). While its decay was quite evident in Moscow, the vast majority of decision-makers in the Russian periphery were still Communists. In this sense, the party continued to serve as the organizational axis of the national political executive (Helf and Hahn 1992; Moses 1992). Arguably, it was the lasting organizational superiority of the Communist party over the democrats that motivated Boris Yeltsin first to suspend its activities and then to ban it (Gill 1994, 178–84). Yeltsin's move had profound implications for the future of the party. Most importantly, the majority of party officials occupying high administrative positions left the party and never resumed their membership.

This did not make the membership base of the Communist party wither away altogether, but its nature was fundamentally altered. Those people who wished to retain their affiliation were either 'true believers' for whom party membership was an important part of their identities, mostly pensioners, or middle-level functionaries who, for this or that reason, lost opportunities to accommodate themselves to the new order (Golosov 1998b). In late 1992 the Constitutional Court of Russia upheld Yeltsin's action banning the Communist party with regard to its central organs but not to those at the local level. This decision ignited a campaign to restore the party. At the 'revival-unification' Congress of Communists held in February 1993, the KPRF officially came into existence. Less than 5% of the former communist membership chose to join the new entity. As a formally new party, the KPRF was not legally entitled to reassume any material assets of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union. The degree of organizational discontinuity was also revealed by the fact that neither the KPRF chairman, Gennadii Zyganov, nor any one of his elected deputies ever sat on the Politburo (Urban and Solovei 1997, 55). In fact, the 'Programmatic Declaration' of the KPRF expressed a good deal of animosity toward the former Communist party apparatus in general and its leaders in particular.

Hence it is possible to estimate that the organizational resources inherited by the KPRF from the former regime were quite modest. In this respect, there appear to be no fundamental difference between the postauthoritarian parties of Russia and Spain.

### Organizational Development

The organizational weakness of the AP became apparent soon after the 1977 elections, when a succession of leadership crises, resignations, and power struggles started. By 1979 only Fraga remained of the original seven founders of the party. The most serious split occurred in the

aftermath of the December 1978 constitutional referendum, in which Fraga urged AP supporters to vote their approval. This immediately resulted in the departure of the party's most conservative leaders (Arango 1995, 209). But the organizational core of the AP, provided by Fraga's Democratic Reform, remained intact. This allowed Fraga, in the aftermath of the 1979 elections which were bitterly unsuccessful for his Democratic Coalition (combining what remained of the original AP with several groups previously close to the UCD), to engage in a vigorous party-building effort. At the third National Congress of the AP, held in December 1979, a strong presidential structure that reaffirmed Fraga's leadership was established (Montero 1988, 148). In this position Fraga was constantly preoccupied with the establishment and extension of the party organization through the entire Spanish territory. As a result, the basic design of the AP shifted from the lax and informal structure of its founding period to a more articulated one, which was even estimated to be reminiscent of a mass party (Cotarelo and López Nieto 1988, 87). In three years the size of the AP membership increased in about twenty times, reaching 100,000 by the end of 1982. Party objectives were centered on preparations for public office. For this end, the local offices of the AP were encouraged to develop a system of staff training and to incorporate elected officials into the party's administrative bodies (López Nieto 1995, 40–2).

The scope of organizational problems confronted by the leadership of the KPRF was, of course, different. The KPRF did not need to penetrate the localities simply because it was already present there. The 'quality' of the members was, however, scarcely compatible with the aspired role of a major national party. The aged 'true believers,' seeking more to create environments maximally reminiscent of the society they were accustomed to than to play active political roles, were not very useful for developing efficient party organization. During the early months of its existence the KPRF was not very visible in Russia's political arena. In this respect the elections of 1993, generally unsuccessful for the party, signified a major breakthrough. The parliamentary faction of the party provided its leadership not only with its headquarters but also with a number of financial and organizational assets (Gel'man 1996). This enabled the party to extend its reach beyond the initial category of party loyalists. In April 1994 the All-Russian Conference of the KPRF gave top priority to the recruitment of new members. The targeted categories included locally respected personalities capable of running for office and state industrial and agricultural managers.[7] From the published list of the candidates nominated by the KPRF in the 1995 elections, it appears that this strategy was generally successful (Turovskii 1995). On the level of top leadership the party displayed remarkable organizational stability. In sharp contrast to all other parties of Russia, no splits occurred in the KPRF, and its parliamentary faction was the only one

that retained its internal cohesion and discipline throughout the tenure of the 1993 Duma. It must be also mentioned that despite some criticisms voiced by party activists, the leading role of Zyuganov has not been seriously challenged since the foundation of the KPRF.

While the goals pursued by the AP and the KPRF in their party-building efforts were different, it can be concluded that both parties were generally successful in consolidating their organizational bases.

### Ideological Choices

The split among the initial founders of the AP was in part caused by a fundamental controversy about the party's ideological standing. Fraga held the view that the UCD was shifting to the left, leaving a vacuum on the center-right into which the AP had to move. Some others advocated a shift to the right (López-Pintor 1985a, 191), that is, towards a position that would have defended rather than reneged on the Francoist heritage. While their departure from the AP provided Fraga with the freedom of action necessary for the implementation of his strategy, in the short run his opponents' line proved to be more feasible. In the 1979 elections the electorate of the UCD remained loyal. At the same time, more than 250,000 votes gained by the extreme right-wing National Union probably came from the votes lost by the AP (Ellwood 1991, 93–4). Nevertheless, Fraga was consistent in his bid to relaunch the party as a moderate center-right organization. In 1979 the Congress of the AP decided to refer to itself as 'liberal-conservative,' rather than right wing, adding that it was "reformist, popular, and democratic" (Heywood 1995, 204), and to adopt a then-fashionable neoliberal economic program modeled after the British Conservative Party.[8] This new image allowed incorporating into the AP a number of groups and politicians associated with the 'center.' In particular, Fraga was successful in establishing political partnership with the Popular Democratic Party formed by a group of politicians and well-known public figures previously belonging to the Christian Democratic section of the UCD. To be sure, ideological change undergone by the AP under Fraga's leadership was nowhere near an abrupt break with the past (Montero 1988, 148). Many students of Spanish politics used to view Fraga's inability to fundamentally alter the image of the AP as an electoral liability (Arango 1995, 209–10). However, it is difficult to question the fact of change.

---

[7] See Golosov (1997) on the importance of managerial elites in Russia's electoral politics.

[8] The image of 'moderation' consciously pursued by Fraga was reinforced during the 1981 coup attempt, when the leader of the AP unambiguously came out in defense of the Constitution.

This is not the case with the KPRF. Many Russian analysts contend that the party is ideologically immobile on the grounds that it has not experienced 'social-democratization' in a way similar to the postauthoritarian parties of Hungary and Poland. In fact, the evolution of the party in 1994–5 was characterized by its gradual rejection of Marxist orthodoxy, accompanied by a shift towards a nationalist ideological stance (Vujacic 1996). The major proponent of ideological change was Zyuganov. As a philosophical basis for his program Zyuganov employed the Eurasian concept developed by the Russian 'white' émigrés in the twenties and actively exploited by the ultranationalist press in 1987–92. He insisted that first the Russian Empire and then the Soviet Union comprised Eurasian civilization, with its distinctive 'spiritual basis' provided by such values as communality, egalitarian traditions, and patriotism. Russia was also an "original holistic economic organism" distinct from the western free market model (Zyuganov 1995). Proceeding from these premises, the KPRF increasingly portrayed itself not as a class party but rather as the only 'truly national' force capable of conducting the policy of 'national salvation.' The 1995 electoral platform of the KPRF made no reference to Marxism or socialism whatsoever but endorsed the idea of a 'people's patriotic majority' instead. To be sure, the party obviously did not wholeheartedly embrace the ideas of market economy and liberal democracy, and its rather vague economic program showed a mixture of populism and social protectionism. In this sense the KPRF did remain immobile. But it is hardly justifiable to reduce the concept of ideology to the substantial content of economic policy proposals (Ritsert 1990).

Therefore, both the AP in Spain and the KPRF in Russia did experience ideological change after their failures in the founding elections. In both cases, the scope of change should be estimated as moderate. The AP and the KPRF remained a right-wing party and an 'antireform' party, respectively. Within these broadly understood 'camps,' however, the parties' ideological relocations were quite visible.

## Party Competition in the High-Volatility Elections

The most important cause of the mass voter realignment that took place in the 1982 Spanish parliamentary elections was, undoubtedly, the organizational collapse of the UCD. Created as a coalition of some 48 groups, the UCD lacked internal cohesion from the very start. Its ideology was estimated as "a confused amalgam of overlapping principles" (Amodia 1983, 18). The lack of party identity was reinforced by the proportional representation of factions in the party leadership and even in the parliament (López Nieto 1995, 35). By 1980 the increased tensions among the rival constituent groups of the UCD effectively broke it up (Gunther 1992, 60–1). This

allowed Fraga to implement his long-nourished strategy of capturing the center-right electorate. Indeed, survey research demonstrated that the new electorate of the AP included 40% of former UCD voters (López-Pintor 1985b, 297). However, a third of them opted for the AP not because of the party's ideological 'moderation' but rather to support clear right-wing policies (Cotarelo and López Nieto 1988, 93). A large portion of former UCD voters shifted to the PSOE, which emerged as the principal winner of the 1982 elections. At the same time, the AP's election campaign succeeded in attracting many of the votes that formerly went to the extreme right-wing parties. The scope of their electoral defeat was epitomized by the fact that, soon after the elections, the leader of the largest of them dissolved it (Ellwood 1991, 94). In part this can be viewed as a result of 'strategic voting' by ideologically committed right-wingers who did not want to waste their votes in the same manner they had in 1979. But of course their shift to the AP demonstrated that they viewed it as a right-wing rather than a centrist party.

The 1995 elections in Russia were characterized by the extreme political fragmentation of the democratic part of the political spectrum (Golosov 1998). Within the opposition camp, however, many attempts at new entries were effectively stopped by the presence of the electorally established KPRF and LDPR. Of these two the KPRF was a clear winner. While it is difficult to estimate the share of the former LDPR vote captured by Zyganov's party, there are reasons to believe that it was quite significant (Golosov forthcoming). The shift of balance within the opposition can be related to the fact that, in contrast to the KPRF, the LDPR failed to emerge as a viable organization nationwide. True, the party's leader undertook massive efforts to create a regional network for his party. As a result the LDPR was capable of nominating its candidates in every one of Russia's 225 single-member constituencies. But only one of them was able to capture a seat, while 58 nominees of the KPRF won in single-member races. This fact is quite illuminating in regard to the political resources available to the two parties in the localities (Petrov 1996). In addition, the KPRF managed to squeeze out the Agrarian party, a success attributed by many observers to the restoration of the Communist party local organizations in the rural areas. The only opposition party that managed to make a rather impressive entrance into the electoral arena was a radical left-wing association of Communists–Workers' Russia–For the Soviet Union (KTR). With its 4.53% of the vote, the KTR was close to overcoming the 5% threshold, which would have made it the fifth party of national importance. While it has been argued that the majority of the KTR voters would have rather abstained than voted for any other list (Petrov 1996), in general there is no doubt that the KPRF has lost a portion of its ideologically committed electorate to the KTR. This was the price paid for ideological ambiguity.

* * *

Despite significant contextual differences, the cases of Russia and Spain display certain similarities in combinations of conditions leading to similar outcomes. In both cases there were significant limitations on the availability of the former regimes' organizational resources to the postauthoritarian parties; the organizational development of these parties was rather successful in terms of preserving party unity, extending national networks, and consolidating leadership; finally, both parties were capable of limited ideological shifts towards those sectors of the political spectra that, in the founding elections, proved to attract significant portions of the vote. Each of these factors can be viewed as contributing to the postauthoritarian parties' eventual electoral success, thus creating a typical situation of 'overdetermination.' To overcome this problem, and to reconstruct the observed constellation of factors as a causal relationship, it is therefore necessary to examine the selection of 'most different' cases characterized by the lack of the postauthoritarian parties' electoral success.

## Brazil and the Czech Republic

It is generally recognized that the slow process of Brazil's *abertura* [opening] reached its breakthrough point in 1985, when the military-led Figueiredo government was replaced by the administration of President José Sarney (Skidmore 1989, 30–31). The congressional elections of 1986, even though they were held after the event of regime transition, can be viewed as the founding elections in the same sense as the Russian elections of 1993: they provided the voters with the earliest opportunity to express their preferences in new political environments. Very high levels of aggregate voter volatility characterized all of the two presidential and two congressional elections subsequently held in the country. In this respect, the case of Brazil differs from that of Spain, where there were no important voter realignments up to the elections of 1993. For this reason, I will not limit the case study of Brazil's postauthoritarian party to the first instance of high-volatility elections. Instead, references to all elections held in the country in 1989–94 will be made. In the Czech Lands the classical founding elections of 1990 were followed by the parliamentary elections of 1992 and 1996. The level of volatility in the 1992 elections appears to be astronomical if one does not take into account the fact that the largest party of 1990 disintegrated into four organizations, none of which contested the elections under the original label. The established procedure of calculating volatility, however, requires taking such nuances into account (Bartolini and Mair 1990, 311). Collapsing the 1992 electoral returns of all products

of the original large party yields a relatively modest level of volatility (Tóka 1997, 101), with some realignment occurring on the margins of the political spectrum only. In this study, therefore, more attention will be paid to the 1996 elections.

### Entry Conditions

As demonstrated in Table 5, the 1986 congressional elections in Brazil resulted in the landslide victory of the PMDB. The performance of the PFL was also quite impressive. One of the causes of this outcome was a rapid transfer of allegiance by regional and local politicians from the PDS to the winning parties (Mettenheim 1995, 118–20). The PFL was an overtly conservative party without any significant programmatic differences from the PDS. The political profile of the PMDB was more complex. Once the leading party of opposition to the military rule, it still contained the faction of 'authentic,' sometimes left-leaning leaders and activists. However, the influx of traditional political elites into the PMDB inevitably diluted the party's programmatic message (Hagopian 1990, 161), leaving little more than a vague image of the 'party of transition.' In this respect the PMDB was quite reminiscent of another centrist party, Spain's UCD, with 'center' euphemistically indicating internal heterogeneity combined with the lack of any consistent ideological stance. The major innovation was the emergence of a meaningful left-wing opposition. The Democratic Labor Party (PDT), a populist organization with predominantly social democratic tendencies, was not a strongly programmatic party even by Brazilian standards. However, the radical Workers' Party (PT), created in 1979 in opposition to the military rule (Sader and Silverstein 1991), and a number of smaller left-wing organizations did pose an ideological challenge to the traditional elite's grasp on power. Jointly, the left-leaning organizations received 10% of seats in the Camber of Deputies. The PDS found itself standing to the right of the PMDB in this rather ill-defined political space. Its position was marginal in sense that it was at least as conservative as the PFL and several other right-wing groups. Nevertheless, it remained the third largest party in terms of congressional representation.

**Table 5**

**Brazilian Chamber of Deputies Election Results by Party and Political Tendency, 1986–94, Percentage Shares of Seats**

| | 1986 | 1990 | 1994 |
|---|---|---|---|

| | | | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| **Left and center-left** | | | | |
| | PT | 3.3 | 7.0 | 9.6 |
| | PDT | 4.9 | 9.3 | 6.8 |
| | PSDB | — | 7.4 | 12.1 |
| | Others of this category | 1.8 | 3.8 | 5.4 |
| **Center** | | | | |
| | PMDB | 53.6 | 21.5 | 20.9 |
| **Right and center-right** | | | | |
| | PTB | 3.5 | 7.6 | 6.0 |
| | PFL | 23.8 | 16.7 | 17.3 |
| | PP | — | — | 7.0 |
| | PDS/PPR | 6.6 | 8.3 | 10.1 |
| | PRN | — | 8.0 | 0.2 |
| | Others of this category | 2.5 | 10.0 | 4.7 |

Source: Mainwaring (1997, 15)

The classification of Brazilian political parties by political tendency is based on Mainwaring (1997). After the 1994 elections the PP merged with the PPR to form the PPB.

**Table 6**

**Czech National Council and Lower-House Parliamentary Election Results by Party and Political Tendency, 1990–6**
**Percentage Shares of the Vote**

| | | 1990 | 1992 | 1996 |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| **Left and center-left** | | | | |
| | LB/KSČM | 13.3 | 14.1 | 10.3 |
| | CSSD | 4.1 | 6.5 | 26.4 |
| | CSS/LSU/SD-LSNS | 2.7 | 6.5 | 2.1 |
| | OH | — | 4.6 | |
| | HSD-SMS/CMUS | 10.0 | 5.9 | 0.5 |
| | Others of this category | 8.2 | 3.8 | 5.3 |
| **OF** | | 49.5 | — | — |
| **Right** | | | | |
| | KDU | 8.4 | 6.3 | 8.1 |
| | ODS | — | 29.7 | 29.6 |
| | ODA | — | 5.9 | 6.4 |
| | SPR-RSČ | — | 6.0 | 8.0 |
| **Other parties** | | 3.8 | 10.7 | 3.3 |

Source: Statistická RoČenka (1991, 630); Statisticá RoČenka (1993, 441); Statistická RoČenka (1996, 686)

The classification of Czech political parties is based on Olson (1997) and Green and Leff (1997). The SPR-RSČ is a xenophobic extreme right-wing party.

The arena of the 1990 founding elections in the Czech Lands was strongly dominated by the Civic Forum (OF). Created on the eve of regime change by the long-term opponents of communist rule, the OF experienced a massive influx of new members, both previously inactive citizens and those who had been communists before 1989. The OF avoided describing itself as a political party. At first, some of its leaders even denied that it would play any political role, such as participating in elections, but would rather act as a forum for spiritual regeneration and social reeducation. Correspondingly, the Forum did not advocate any specific political program, claiming to represent the whole of society against communist rule and tending to imply that sectional interests were somehow of inferior moral worth (Batt 1993, 38–9). In the Czech Lands the OF received the majority of the vote (Table 6). Two other parties that fared reasonably well in the

election, the Christian and Democratic Union (KDU) and the Movement for Self-Governing Democracy (HSD-SMS), appealed to specific constituencies, rural church-goers and Moravians with their specific regional identity, respectively (JehliCka, Kostelecky, and Sykora 1993). Two noncommunist left-wing organizations, the Czech Socialist Party (CSS) and the Czechoslovak Social Democratic Party (CSSD), lost the elections. At the same time, the Communist Party of Czechoslovakia, later to be known as the KCSM, emerged as the largest opposition party. But, given the 40% distance between the shares of the vote received by the OF and the postauthoritarian party, one could hardly expect the latter to play a very important role in the new parliament.

Overall, it would seem that the entry conditions of the Czech and Brazilian post-authoritarian parties did not differ much from those of the AP in Spain. In all these cases the founding elections had been won by generally prodemocratic organizations with vague programmatic standings. Indeed, Heywood (1996, 154) goes as far as to ascribe Russia's LDPR to this category of 'movement parties.' And in all four cases, the initial roles of the postauthoritarian parties were marginal but quite visible. The experience of Russia and Spain suggests that from this perspective at least there was definite potential for their electoral growth in Brazil and the Czech Lands. Some other factors should be held responsible for the fact that this potential was never realized.

**Organizational Legacies**

While it would be highly misleading to depict the military rule in Brazil as an instance of a 'party state,' the role played by the PDS under authoritarianism was far more important than that of the virtually extinct Phalanx in Spain. Cultivating some semblance of electoral legitimacy, the military rulers sought to ensure the electoral success of the PDS. For this end, they helped sustain pervasive clientelism characteristic of the earlier periods of Brazilian party politics (Mainwaring 1988, 98). The PDS had no programmatic basis for its appeal. Rather, it functioned as an alliance between authoritarian state leaders and local-level professional politicians, aimed at winning popular support by providing personal favors. Correspondingly, the organizational structure of the party was built upon a plethora of political machines controlled by locally prominent personalities. This was especially evident in rural Brazil, where landowners exercised a virtual monopoly of power (Flynn 1997, 259). Yet in the urban areas traditional elites also remained in

firm control of the electoral process (Hagopian 1996). Under these conditions party splits are easy in sense that any politician controlling a local political machine is perfectly capable of changing its label without causing any harm to his own political standing. In fact, this is what happened when a large portion of the Brazilian elite left the PDS to join either the PMDB or the PFL.[9] Of course, the disintegration of the postauthoritarian party severely undermined its electoral chances by circumscribing the scope of its territorial reach. For instance, the northeast of Brazil that used to serve as an important source of the PDS support under authoritarianism was largely lost to the PFL (Roett 197, 31). But, perhaps more importantly, those political resources that did not flow away to other parties remained largely intact. The political context of the emerging 'New Republic' did not provide any disincentives to the established practices of patronage and clientele (Kinzo 1993). Hence the PDS, although deprived of its status as the 'party of power,' continued to function in much the same way as under the military rule.

The collapse of the communist regime in Czechoslovakia caused disarray within the ranks of the KSČM. By June 1990 the party's membership fell from 1.7 million to nine hundred thousand (East 1992, 45). While subsequently it reached lower points of about two to three hundred thousand, in comparison to Russia or such countries as Hungary and Poland this indicates a fairly high degree of organizational continuity. Hence it is important to examine who were the remaining members of the party. While the empirical evidence that would help to answer this question is insufficient, there are reasons to agree with a Czech observer that the core of the party membership came from the old party apparatus (Ulc 1996, 91). This observation is supported by the geographical distribution of the vote for the KSČM in the 1990 elections (Jehlička, Kostelecky, and Sykora 1993, 243). Among East Central European countries the Czech Republic has continuously had the largest percentage share of the former communist party members supporting the successor party (Tóka 1996, 115). To explain this phenomenon it is important to take into account the marked peculiarities of the communist rule in the Czech Lands. The Soviet occupation of 1968 eliminated the once strong procommunist sentiment among the Czech publics, thus creating a political regime that was highly repressive and alienated from the society (Dawisha 1984). Once this regime collapsed, its officials found themselves in a political ghetto with very limited opportunities to 'convert' their dubious 'political capitals' into state administration, as in Russia, or the economy, as in Hungary and Poland. The KSČM provided

[9] As Hagopian (1990, 168) has observed, "today the PDS survives only as an electoral vehicle for those members of the old elite who choose not to coexist with their traditional enemies who fled to other parties."

them with the only available career outlet. At the same time the continued presence of the former officials allowed the party to save a significant part of its organizational assets. While many basic organizations abolished themselves, others, although experiencing membership decline, retained their original structures.

It is possible to conclude that both in Brazil and in the Czech Lands the postauthoritarian parties experienced quantitative rather than qualitative change. Their sizes diminished, but the organizational structures remained the same.

### Organizational Development

The Brazilian postauthoritarian party belongs to the category of parties that do not conduct any significant grassroots activities in the intervals between elections. Party affiliation is not a very meaningful indicator of its organizational development. One way to trace this parameter is to focus on the party's congressional delegation. In this respect it is indicative that the members of the 1986 Congress elected on the PDS ticket did not switch to other parties after regime change (Kinzo 1993, 141). After the 1994 elections the Cardoso administration started to view party switching to the ruling parties quite favorably (Mainwaring 1997, 26–7). Under this pressure the size of the congressional delegation of the postauthoritarian party (then PPB) decreased by 11% in the course of three years.[10] The level of party discipline displayed by the members of the congressional delegation appears to be rather low. The 'absolute loyalty score' of the PDS calculated by Mainwaring and Pérez-Liñán (1997, 11) on the basis of roll call votes in the Constitutional Congress of 1986 equals 56.2, compared to 93.9 in case of the PT. It must be noted, however, that low discipline is characteristic of all Brazilian right-wing or center-right parties. Quite understandably, similar modes of activity lead to similar outcomes. These modes of activity did not change with transition to democracy, and the postauthoritarian party is not exceptional in this respect. Little if any organizational effort has been undertaken to alter its nature of a 'patronage-oriented' political machine (Ames 1995), territorially based in the São Paulo area and centered around the personality of this area's conservative strongman, Paulo Maluf.

The organizational development of the KSČM was characterized by a number of internal conflicts among party leaders from different generations and political backgrounds. None of these conflicts, however, resulted in the disintegration of its inherited organizational structure on

[10] At the same time, 30% and 18% of the deputies switched from the delegations of the center-right Brazilian Labor Party (PTB) and of the PMDB, respectively (Câmara dos Deputados 1998).

the grassroots level. In 1990, in a symbolic gesture indicating the party's willingness to dissociate itself from the former 'antinational' regime, the reformist Jirl Svoboda was elected as the chairman of the party. However, Svoboda's efforts to change the image of the KSČM found little understanding among its rank-and-file members (Ishiyama 1995). This led to the proliferation of small left-wing groups mostly founded by those few party members who deplored the idea of coexisting with the hard-core communists. None of these groups, however, was strong enough

to participate in national elections on its own, and in 1992 they joined the Left Bloc electoral coalition dominated by the KSČM (Kroupa and Kosteleckc 1996, 90). At the party congress in July 1993 the majority of delegates representing local party organizations finally voted Svoboda out of the leadership of the party. He was replaced with Miroslav Grebenicek, a former higher school lecturer in 'scientific atheism' who displayed his communist convictions quite consistently. Dissatisfied with this move, some of the members of the party split off to found two new organizations, the Party of the Democratic Left and, later, the Party Left Bloc (Kopecky 1995, 148). None of them was successful in attracting significant portions of the KSČM membership which, in fact, remained quite steady with annual 5% decline, mainly due to mortality (Ulc 1996, 93). By refusing to change, the KSČM preserved its membership and organizational structure.

Both in Brazil and in the Czech Lands the postauthoritarian parties were successful in retaining the organizational legacies of the old regime. The price to be paid, however, was the lack of organizational renovation.

### Ideological Choices

The Brazilian postauthoritarian party has not experienced any significant ideological change since the country's transition to democracy. The value of +4.9 attributed to the PDS by the left-right ideological scale constructed by Mainwaring and Pérez-Liñán (1997, 14) places it on the far right end of the political spectrum, with only the PFL appearing to be a more right-wing party.[11] Ideologically, the postauthoritarian party is indeed scarcely distinct from the PFL, which also belongs to the conglomerate of nonprogrammatic right-wing organizations. Some of them are ephemeral 'parties for rent,' meaning that candidates needing an electoral vehicle can make use of the party's registration in exchange for money or other favors (Power 1991, 84), while others represent clear instances of personalistic political movements. At this or that moment, several right-wing organizations opted to merge with the PDS for pragmatic reasons, each such merger being accompanied with the change of the party's name. The word 'progressive' in its current label, however, does not indicate any ideological commitment. Quite the reverse, one can speculate that it has been selected exactly because it combines vaguely favorable connotations with the complete lack of any specific meaning.

---

[11] This, however, is considered as an oddity by the authors of the scale, who mention that for most observers the PDS stands to the right of the PFL.

As demonstrated above, the conflicts within the leadership of the KSČM resulted in the decisive victory of the opponents of ideological change. Its current leader characterizes the process of privatization as a 'bureaucratic putsch' and claims that "private ownership has failed everywhere" (Ulc 1996, 91). The program of the KSČM endorsed on the eve of the 1996 parliamentary elections makes it clear that the party not only opposes right-wing parties but also differs "from those self-styled 'left' parties which in fact aim only at partial reform of the present system" (Communist Party 1998). In contrast to the Hungarian and Polish postauthoritarian parties, the KSČM thoroughly rejects the idea of joining NATO, advocating closer relations with the former Soviet republics instead (Kroupa and Kostelecky 1996, 95). The programmatic standing of the KSČM corresponds to the political preferences of its voters who, according to Markowski (1997, 233), place themselves closer to the left end of an ideological scale than the supporters of postauthoritarian parties in other East Central European countries. At the same time, it has been empirically proven that KSČM support "is drawn from an isolated and recognizably extreme segment of the Czech electorate" (Evans and Whitefield 1995, 569). From all these observations, it can be safely concluded that the scope of ideological change undergone by the KSČM has been negligible.

The Brazilian postauthoritarian party exists in political environments that are scarcely conductive to ideological change, due to a generally low level of ideological articulation among the right-wing parties of the country. In the Czech Lands the level of ideological articulation appears to be rather high (Brokl and Mansfeldová 1995). These contextual differences, however, did not yield different levels of ideological mobility displayed by the postauthoritarian parties.

### Party Competition in the High-Volatility Elections

One of the most peculiar features of electoral politics in Brazil is "a bifurcation of the vote between presidential elections (which have assumed a plebiscitary quality) and legislative contests (in which clientelistic criteria are still primordial)" (Hagopian 1996, 247). In presidential elections party affiliation plays a secondary role, partly because whoever wins is bound to go beyond his party base. At the same time the personalities of the candidates and their abilities to deliver attractive messages to the electorate weigh heavily on election results. The 1990 election brought to political prominence Fernando Collor de Mello who ran on the ticket of his personal

political vehicle, the National Reconstruction Party (PRN). His major opponent, Luís "Lula" da Silva, was the recognized leader of the PT. Both candidates capitalized on the widespread dissatisfaction with traditional politics, politicians, and parties (De Lima 1993). A charismatic leader with dynamic oratorical skills, Collor combined populist appeals to the 'shirtless and shoeless' with a fairly conservative economic program and anticommunist rhetoric (Sader and Silverstein 1991, 116). In the second round of the election, he won as the joint candidate of the right (Table 7). The candidates nominated by the 'real' right-wing parties failed in the first round. The PDS candidate was its long-time strongman, Maluf, who had a reputation for dishonesty, arrogance, and ultraconservatism. With virtually no chance to win, he was still nominated by his party, even though it would be more realistic to say that he nominated himself. The party's candidate in the 1994 election was even weaker. This time the leader in the race was Fernando Henrique Cardoso, supported by an unlikely coalition of the center-left Brazilian Social Democratic Party (PSDB) and a number of right-wing organizations including the PFL, while his nearest rival was Lula again. The only viable candidate of the right, Eneas Carneiro, ran on the ticket of his own party.

**Table 7**

**Results of Presidential Elections in Brazil by Parties/Blocs Supporting the Candidates, 1989–94**
**Percentage Shares of the Vote**

| | 1989 first round | 1989 second round | 1994 |
|---|---|---|---|
| PT and others | L. I. da Silva, 17.2 | | L.I. da Silva, 27.0 |
| PT, PDT, PSDB, and others | | L. I. da Silva, 47.0 | |
| PDT | L. Brizola, 16.5 | | L. Brizola, 3.2 |
| PSDB | M. Covas, 11.5 | | |
| PSDB, PFL, PTB, and others | | | F. H. Cardoso, 54.3 |
| PMDB | U. Guimaraes, 4.7 | | O. Qucrcia, 4.4 |
| PRN | F. Collor de Mello, 30.5 | | |
| PRN, PDS, PFL, PTB, and others | | F. Collor de Mello, 53.0 | |
| PDS/PPR | P. Maluf, 8.9 | | E. Amin, 2.8 |
| PRONA | | | E. Carneiro, 7.4 |
| Other candidates | 10.7 | | 0.9 |

Source: Mainwaring (1997, 14)

Collor's success, as well as the role of conservative organizations in the election of Cardoso, points to conclusion that the resources of right-wing political mobilization in Brazil are far from being exhausted. At the same time it is clear that traditional parties cannot use their organizational resources to promote their own candidates. Instead, they have to rely on unpredictable 'outsiders' like Collor, or support not quite convenient candidates like Cardoso, or else suffer continuous electoral defeats, which is the case with the postauthoritarian party. A possible explanation is that their organizational resources are too archaic and thus irrelevant for this purpose. While it may be unthinkable to win presidential elections in the country without any support of traditional political machines (Hagopian 1996, 247), they do not seem to be sufficient. Arguably, the major cause of this situation is the increased role of ideology in Brazilian electoral politics. The programmatic appeal of the left cannot be counterbalanced with the vague and unconvincing messages of the traditional elites. True, the parties of the left were not entirely successful in translating their gains in presidential elections into congressional seats. But, as clearly follows from Tables 5 and 7, whatever party wins the presidency, the size of its congressional delegation tends to increase quite drastically (PRN in 1990, PSDB in 1994). Incapable of winning presidential elections, the traditional parties either lose congressional races (PMDB and PFL in 1990) or become trapped in their rather narrow support bases delineated by the territorial reach of their patronage networks, as happened with the PDS. Particularly, the Brazilian postauthoritarian party failed to capitalize on the disintegration of the 'party of transition,' the PMDB. In this respect the case of Brazil sharply contrasts to that of Spain.

The most important development in the Czech Republic's party politics in the aftermath of the founding elections was the disintegration of the OF. The rapid polarization of the Forum started after Finance Minister Václav Klaus was elected its chairman. Klaus vowed to transform the movement into a political party with a well-defined structure, a registered membership, and an ideology characterized by a strong commitment to free market principles and adherence to 'Christian national,' right-wing values. This tendency was opposed by a number of the founding leaders of the OF. Before long the Forum split into four formations (Legters 1992, 387–94). Two of them, the Civic Democratic Party (ODS) led by Klaus and the Civic Democratic Alliance (ODA), adopted fairly similar right-wing programmatic stances. In this sense they were bound to ally themselves with the already existing party, the KDU. Of the remaining offsprings of the OF the Civic Movement (OH) was the largest, and its leaders displayed rather left-wing inclinations. Within

the left segment of the political spectrum there was, in addition to the KSČM and the ČSSD, the Liberal Social Union (LSU), a coalition of the ČSS with a number of interest representation parties. To complement this picture of fragmentation, the regionalist HSD-SMS and several smaller groups also positioned themselves to the left of the ODS. The 1992 parliamentary elections resulted in the decisive victory of the right-wing parties. Jointly, they received the majority of seats and proceeded to form a coalition government (Olson 1993). At the same time a fairly large share of the vote (about 40%) jointly polled by the left-wing parties demonstrated that it was largely due to fragmentation that they failed to convert their electoral potential into parliamentary representation.

In the aftermath of the 1992 elections the KSČM was stronger than any other left-wing party in terms of organizational strength and electoral support. Since the OH failed to receive parliamentary seats, the most viable alternatives were the ČSSD, the LSU, and the HSD-SMS. The latter two parties' organizational bases proved to be too shaky to realize this promise. As early as 1993 both of them disintegrated (Brokl and Mansfeldová 1993, 271). The Social Democrats were a relatively small party (Kroupa and Kostelecky 1996, 112), haunted by intensive leadership struggle. In spring 1993 this struggle brought to party leadership Milos Zeman. In sharp contrast to the party's moderate stance in the 1992 elections, Zeman advocated 'uncompromising opposition politics.' This change caused the loss of a few members of the party, but the majority of Zeman's opponents chose, for the sake of party unity, to coexist with the controversial leader (Kopecky 1995, 146). Zeman's strategy proved to be successful. In the 1996 parliamentary elections, the ČSSD more than tripled its share of the vote, emerging as the major opposition party and a close contender for power. Arguably it was the ideological immobility of the KSČM that allowed for this realignment. For a variety of reasons not to be discussed here, the Czech voters wanted to punish the government at the polls by voting for a credible opposition party. But apparently they were not prepared to vote for what has been generally perceived as a hard-line communist party. Under these conditions the ČSSD, combining radical opposition to the right-wing government with an unmistakably noncommunist stance, was an acceptable choice. The electoral support base of the KSČM shrank but not very significantly. Very probably those who had voted for the party in the previous elections remained loyal. But it was the ČSSD that emerged as the focal point of the opposition vote in the country.

The analysis of party competition in Brazil and in the Czech Lands demonstrates that the lack of electoral success on the part of the postauthoritarian parties cannot be connected with their allegiance to political tendencies bound to suffer continual defeats. In fact, in both cases major electoral successes (Collor in 1989 and the CSSD in 1996) took place in those segments of the political spectra to which the postauthoritarian parties belonged. Rather, their failure to win votes can be related to their low adaptability both in organizational and in ideological terms.

* * *

What constellations of characteristics make the cases of Brazil and the Czech Republic different from those of Russia and Spain in terms of postauthoritarian parties' electoral success? First, the availability of the former regimes' resources to these parties was apparently lower in the former two cases. To be sure, any postauthoritarian party is bound not to inherit these resources in their entirety. Otherwise, there is no regime change. This being said, however, it is clear that the KSCM and the PSD were, at the time of transition to democracy, organizationally stronger than the banned communist party in Russia and the unstable coalition later to become the AP in Spain. Second, the organizational development of the AP was more dynamic than that of the postauthoritarian parties of Brazil and the Czech Lands. The KPRF has not changed its organizational basis since its reconstitution in 1993 but, obviously, the very necessity of such a reconstitution has influenced its organizational development quite substantially. Finally, certain degrees of the postauthoritarian parties' ideological evolution can be detected in Russia and Spain, but hardly in Brazil and the Czech Lands. Therefore, it is possible to observe the constellations of factors leading to similar outcomes in different contextual settings. The remaining task is to theoretically reconstruct these constellations as causal contingencies.

## Conclusion

The analysis demonstrates that the role of organizational resources inherited from the old regime in shaping the electoral fortunes of postauthoritarian parties is ambiguous. In the founding elections the lack of such resources can be expected to be a liability. In all the cases discussed above the initial electoral support for postauthoritarian parties was secured by mobilizing those voters who, to this or that extent, were already within the organizational reach of these parties. In those few instances when postauthoritarian parties failed to retain any meaningful organizational

resources they also failed to adopt themselves to competitive environments and withered away, as happened in Latvia (Plakans 1997) and in Estonia (Arter 1996). However, the initial support base secured by these means is rarely sufficient. In relative terms the performance of the postauthoritarian parties of Brazil, the Czech Lands, Russia, and Spain in the founding elections was not very impressive. To increase their electoral appeal the postauthoritarian parties had to change the substantial content of their messages to the electorates. At this point, however, the lack of inherited organizational resources ceases to be a liability and becomes an advantage.

Any kind of change inevitably causes internal party strains. But in organizationally underdeveloped parties their leaders have no choice but to engage themselves in extensive party-building efforts. This increases their grasp on the existing party organization, thus effectively excluding the possibility that the party will explode from within due to programmatic disagreements with the innovating leadership. In Spain Fraga easily got rid of the proponents of the 'turn to the right' in the initial AP leadership simply because they had little to carry away with them. The organizational structure of the party still had to be constructed from above, and as a prime mover in this process Fraga consolidated his leadership to the extent that his attempts to reshape the ideological image of the party met little if any resistance. In Russia Zyuganov's efforts to impose a nationalist ideological stance upon his party were viewed with suspicion by some of the regional branches of the party (Rossiiskii Sbornik 1995, 87), but these disagreements remained tacit. None of the regional party leaders was resourceful enough to challenge the party leadership. In contrast, the resources of the local party organizations of the KSCM proved to be sufficient to oust Svoboda and other reformers from the party. Overall, it appears that dispersed power in a party organization, especially vertically dispersed power, makes it difficult for a party to adapt or modify its programmatic standing. This tends to lead to the party's electoral decline. Conversely, organizations with centralized power are more adaptable and therefore more likely to enjoy electoral success.[12]

Of course, the conclusion that organizational change is the cause of ideological change, and not vice versa, can be questioned because, arguably, ideological change may stem from the overall conditions of party competition. Some parties, irrespective of the paths of their organizational development, may choose not to change ideologically for the reason that no 'political space' is available outside of their original niches. The truth of such claims cannot be denied. As I already mentioned at the beginning of the analysis, more systematic cross-national research is needed to make safe generalizations possible. For instance, I would suggest that the

[12] I am indebted to Michael J. Coppedge for suggesting this interpretation

'lack of space' argument is well applicable to the development of the postauthoritarian party in Chile (Munck 1994). However, Table 8 shows that in all of the cases discussed above the traffic of voters from one ideological trend to another was quite substantial, with those political tendencies that included the postauthoritarian parties invariably being on the winning side. In this sense at least 'political spaces' were far from being 'frozen.' The case of Chile, on the other hand, is quite unique in its level of continuities in electoral support (Scully and Valenzuela 1993, 11).

**Table 8**

**Dynamics of Electoral Support in Four Countries by Political Tendency**

| | Category 1 | | Category 2 | | Category 3 | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Brazil, 1986–90 | 36.40 | 50.60 | 53.60 | 21.50 | 10.00 | 27.50 |
| Czech Republic, 1990–6 | 38.30 | 44.60 | 49.50 | 0 | 8.40 | 52.10 |
| Russia, 1993–5 | 20.39 | 32.22 | 22.92 | 19.81 | 49.79 | 41.81 |
| Spain, 1977–82 | 8.05 | 26.46 | 34.52 | 6.47 | 43.04 | 52.38 |

Sources: as for Tables 3–6

Category 1 (includes the postauthoritarian parties): Right and Center-Right in Brazil, Left and Center-Left in the Czech Republic, Left in Russia, and Right in Spain.

Category 2 (includes prodemocratic movements and other 'center' parties): PMDB in Brazil, OF in the Czech Republic, 'Nationalists' in Russia, and Center in Spain.

Category 3 (includes the ideological opposites of the postauthoritarian parties): Left in Brazil, Right in the Czech Republic, 'Democrats' and Progovernment 'Center' in Russia, and Left in Spain.

Despite the limited scope of this study, the most spectacular cases of ideological change in postcommunist Eastern Europe, those of the MSZP in Hungary and SdRP in Poland, fit into the proposed model quite comfortably. In both cases the levels of organizational decay experienced by the postauthoritarian parties were especially high. The MSZP, for instance, had less than twenty thousand members at the beginning of November 1989. At the same time the party freed itself from the organizational legacies of the old regime by adopting an alternative organizational model and pushing the majority of the former officials into the reconstituted hard-line communist party (Agh 1995, 493). This allowed the MSZP to undergo extensive ideological change without any significant internal tensions. The case of Slovakia is more complex. There the post-authoritarian party's inherited resources were similar to those of the KSČM. This did not prevent the Slovakian section of the communist party from a rather profound ideological transformation.

However, the internal party strains caused by this strategy were intensive enough to make it split into two formations of almost equal electoral strength (Wolchik 1997, 232). Jointly they received about 18% in the 1994 elections, but none of them is capable of becoming a major political party on its own. The most visible deviation from the model used to be the Bulgarian Socialist Party, which enjoyed an extraordinarily high level of electoral support while preserving a good deal of its inherited assets and displaying remarkable ideological immobility (Troxel 1992).[13] However, recent developments in Bulgaria brought about both the organizational collapse and electoral decay of the BSP.

It is therefore possible to suggest that low availability of the inherited organizational resources is conductive to a postauthoritarian party's electoral success insofar as its leadership receives strong stimuli to initiate party-building efforts and to centralize organizational power. This consolidates the leadership's position vis-à-vis the pre-existing party organizational structures and thereby encourages ideological change. How to 'translate' this ad hoc causal model into conventional language of reasoning about party change? One variable that features most prominently in the on-going debate on the subject is party institutionalization. Janda (1990, 10) has plausibly hypothesized that "the greater the institutionalization, the less extensive the change." The problem is that there is no intuitively obvious way to relate the concept of party institutionalization to the political realities of new democracies. Such often-cited criteria as party age, electoral stability, and legislative stability are not directly applicable to postauthoritarian

[13] This phenomenon can be tentatively explained with reference to the fact that the BSP not only initiated the process of democratization but also, in contrast to other postauthoritarian parties, presided over the early phase of its implementation. As a result the party's location in the field of electoral competition was ambiguous. Arguably, a postauthoritarian party that wins the founding elections is bound to expose some unusual patterns of political behavior.

parties. Even their age is often difficult to determine. For example, what was the founding year of the KPRF—1993 or 1898? It is, however, generally clear that, jointly, the empirical indicators listed above point to organizational stability. In this sense the more organizational resources the postauthoritarian party inherits from the old regime, the more institutionalized it is. Hence its low inclination toward change and low ability to achieve success in the new environments created by the advent of competitive politics. To become electorally successful the postauthoritarian party has to undergo the painful process of what may be called deinstitutionalization, even though we have observed that in reality this process is more often externally imposed upon postauthoritarian parties than it is deliberately opted for by their leaders. This is most illustratively exemplified by the case of the KPRF. The MSZP is probably the only instance of a deliberate organizational self-destruction.

Panebianco (1988, 56) has developed a different definition of the concept. In his view, an important dimension of institutionalization is what he calls 'systemness.' "When an organizational system leaves a good deal of autonomy to its internal subgroups, its degree of systemness is low," and so, by implication, is the level of its institutionalization. In particular, so understood, institutionalized parties are characterized by "the centralized control of organizational resources and exchange processes with the environment." In principle this definition does not reject stability as the principal characteristic of party institutionalization. Parties exerting control over their subgroups can be reasonably expected to be stable. It can be observed, however, that as far as postauthoritarian parties are concerned, the two definitions do not yield similar implications. The more institutionalized such a party is in sense of its 'stability,' the less it is institutionalized in sense of its 'systemness.' In case of the KSCM the subparty groups proved to be strong enough not only to reverse the process of change initiated by the party leadership but also to eliminate this leadership altogether. In case of the Brazilian postauthoritarian party the substantial autonomy of local political machines constituting the party drastically reduced the feasibility of change. Hence, if we accept Panebianco's definition, deinstitutionalization is rather what happens to those parties that have inherited significant organizational assets. This kind of deinstitutionalization, however, can hardly be viewed as conductive to electoral success. To achieve electoral success a party should rather reinstitutionalize itself by establishing effective control over its subgroups. But by doing this the party becomes reinstitutionalized in sense of its 'stability' as well.

Therefore, the dependence between party institutionalization and party change is not linear. Irrespective of how institutionalization is defined, its lack cannot be automatically translated

into party change, nor is its presence automatically a liability. Speaking of those modes of organizational development that lead to electoral success, it is especially evident that they combine the decomposition of inherited structures with the development of new ones. If these processes facilitate each other, ideological change may arrive as their joint subproduct, and electoral gains may follow. Needless to argue at length, the chain of causality identified in this argument is not deterministic. Strong, centralized party leadership may actually impede ideological change if party leaders are driven by nonpragmatic commitments more than by vote-seeking aspirations. Ideological change may impede electoral success if voters display little willingness to change their preferences. However, I would suggest that the probability of outcomes predicted by the proposed model increases insofar as both party elites and mass publics embrace the norms and routines of democratic politics.

**List of Acronyms**

| | | |
|---|---|---|
| AP | Alianza Popular | Popular Alliance (Spain) |
| APR | Agrarnaia Partiia Rossii | Agrarian Party of Russia |
| ARENA | Aliança Renovadora Nacional | National Renovation Alliance, Brazil |
| BSP | Bulgarska Sotsialisticheska Partia | Bulgarian Socialist Party |
| CD | Coalición Democrática | Democratic Coalition (Spain) |
| CMUS | Ceskomoravská Unie Stredu | Czech-Moravian Party of the Center |
| CSS | Ceská Strana Socialistická | Czech Socialist Party |
| CSSD | Ceská Strana Socialné Demokratická | Czech Social Democratic Party |
| DPR | Demokraticheskaia Partiia Rossii | Democratic Party of Russia |
| DVR-OD | Demokraticheskii Vybor Rossii—Ob''edinënnye Demokraty | Democratic Russia's Choice—United Democrats |
| FET | Falange Española Tradicionalista | Spanish Traditionalist Phalanx |
| HSD-SMS | Hnutí za Samosprávnou Demokracii Spolecnost pro Moravu a Slezsko | Movement for Self-Governing Democracy—Association for Moravia and Silesia (the Czech Lands) |
| KDU | Krest'anská a Demokratická Unie | Christian and Democratic Union (the Czech Lands) |
| KPRF | Kommunisticheskaia Partiia Rossiiskoi Federatsii | Communist Party of the Russian Federation |
| KRO | Kongress Russkikh Obshchin | Congress of Russian Communities |
| KSCM | Komunistická Strana Cech a Moravy | Communist Party of Bohemia and Moravia (the Czech Lands) |
| KTR | Kommunisty—Trudovaia Rossiia—Za Sovetskii Soiuz | Communists—Workers' Russia—For the Soviet Union |
| LB | Levy Blok | Left Bloc (the Czech Lands) |
| LDPR | Liberal'no-Demokraticheskaia Partiia Rossii | Liberal Democratic Party of Russia |
| LSU | Liberální Sociální Unie | Liberal Social Union (the Czech Lands) |
| MDB | Movimento Democrático Brasileiro | Brazilian Democratic Movement |

| | | |
|---|---|---|
| MSZP | Magyar Szocialista Párt | Hungarian Socialist Party |
| NDR | Nash Dom—Rossiia | Our Home Is Russia |
| ODA | Obcanská Demokratická Aliance | Civic Democratic Alliance (the Czech Lands) |
| ODS | Obcanská Demokratickea Strana | Civic Democratic Party (the Czech Lands) |
| OF | Obcanské Forum | Civic Forum (the Czech Lands) |
| OH | Obcanské Hnutí | Civic Movement (the Czech Lands) |
| PCE | Partido Comunista de España | Communist Party of Spain |
| PDS | Partido Democrático Social | Democratic Social Party (Brazil) |
| PDT | Partido Democratico Trabalhista | Democratic Labor Party (Brazil) |
| PFL | Partido da Frente Liberal | Party of the Liberal Front, Brazil |
| PMDB | Partido do Movimento Democrático Brasileiro | Party of the Brazilian Democratic Movement |
| PP | Partido Progressista | Progressive Party (Brazil) |
| PPB | Partido Progressista Brasileiro | Brazilian Progressive Party |
| PPR | Partido Progressista Reformador | Progressive Reformist Party (Brazil) |
| PRN | Partido da Reconstrução Nacional | National Reconstruction Party (Brazil) |
| PRONA | Partido de Reedificação da Ordem Nacional | Party for the Restoration of National Order (Brazil) |
| PSDB | Partido da Social Democracia Brasileiro | Party of Brazilian Social Democracy |
| PSOE | Partido Socialista Obrero Español | Spanish Socialist Workers' Party |
| PT | Partido dos Trabalhadores | Workers' Party (Brazil) |
| PTB | Partido Trabalhista Brasileiro | Brazilian Labor Party |
| SD-LSNS | Svobodní Demokraté— Liberální Strana Národne Sociální | Free Democrats—Liberal National Social Party (the Czech Lands) |
| SdRP | Socjaldemokracja Rzeczpospolitej Polskiej | Polish Social Democracy |
| SPR-RSC | Sdruzení pro Republiku—Republikánská Strana Ceska | Association for the Republic–Czech Republican party |
| UCD | Unión de Centro Democrático | Union of Democratic Center (Spain) |
| VR | Vybor Rossii | Russia's Choice |

## References


Agh, Attila. 1995. "Partial Consolidation of the East-Central European Parties: The Case of the Hungarian Socialist Party," *Party Politics* 1 (4, October): 491–514.

Alves, Maria Helena Moreira. 1985. *State and Opposition in Military Brazil*. Austin: University of Texas Press.

Ames, Barry. 1995. "Electoral Strategies under Open-List Proportional Representation," *American Journal of Political Science* 39 (2, May): 406–33.

Amodia, José. 1983. "Union of the Democratic Center" in David S. Bell, ed., *Democratic Politics in Spain: Spanish Politics after Franco*, 1–28. New York: St. Martin's Press.

Arango, Ramón E. 1995. *Spain: Democracy Regained*. Boulder: Westview Press.

Arter, David. 1996. *Parties and Democracy in the Post-Soviet Republic: The Case of Estonia*. Aldershot: Dartmouth.

Banac, Ivo. 1992. "Introduction" in Ivo Banac, ed., *Eastern Europe in Revolution*, 1–12. Ithaca: Cornell University Press.

Bartolini, Stefano and Peter Mair. 1990. *Identity, Competition and Electoral Availability: The Stabilisation of European Electorates*, 1885–1985. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Batt, Judy. 1993. "Czechoslovakia" in Stephen Whitefield, ed., *The New Institutional Architecture of Eastern Europe*, 35–55. New York: St. Martin's Press.

Beissinger, Mark R. 1992. "Transformation and Degeneration: The CPSU under Reform" in James R. Millar, ed.,*Cracks in the Monolith: Party Power in the Brezhnev Era*, 213–35. Armonk: M. E. Sharpe.

Berg, Ger P. van den. 1994. *Comments on the Constitution of the Russian Federation: With the Text of the Constitution of 12 December 1993*. Leiden: Institute of East European Law and Russian Studies.

Bogdanor, Vernon. 1990. "Founding Elections and Regime Change," *Electoral Studies* 9 (4, December): 288–94.

Brokl, Lubomir and Zdenka Mansfeldova. 1994. "Czech Republic," *European Journal of Political Research* 26 (3/4, December): 268–77.

_____. 1995. "Zerfall der Tschechoslowakei—Structurelle Ursachen und Parteihandeln" in Dieter Segert and Csilla Machos, eds, *Parteien in Osteuropa: Kontext und Akteure*, 133–47. Opladen: Westdeutscher Verlag.

Bunce, Valerie. 1995. "Should Transitologists Be Grounded?' *Slavic Review* 54 (1, spring): 111–27.

Bunce, Valerie and Mária Csanádi. 1993. "Uncertainty in Transition: Post-Communism in Hungary," *East European Politics and Societies* 7 (2, spring): 240–75.

Câmara dos Deputados. 1998. Internet source, http://www.camara.gov.br.

Communist Party. 1998. Communist Party of Bohemia and Moravia. Internet source, HYPERLINK http://www.kscm.cz/cpcm/p198.htm.

Congreso de los Diputados. 1998. Internet source, http://www.congreso.es.

Cotarelo, Ramón Garcia and Lourdes López Nieto. 1988. "Spanish Conservatism, 1976–87" in Klaus von Beyme, ed., *Right-Wing Extremism in Western Europe*, 80–95. London: Frank Cass.

Cotta, Maurizio. 1996. "Structuring the New Party Systems after the Dictatorship: Coalitions, Alliances, Fusions and Splits during the Transition and Post-Transition Stages" in Geoffrey Pridham and Paul G. Lewis, eds., *Stabilizing Fragile Democracies: Comparing New Party Systems in Southern and Eastern Europe*, 69–99. London: Routledge.

Coverdale, John F. 1985. "Regional Nationalism and the Elections in the Basque Country" in Howard R. Penniman and Eusebio M. Mujal-León, eds., *Spain at the Polls, 1977, 1979, and 1982: A Study of the National Elections*, 226–52. Washington, DC: American Enterprise Institute.

Cox, Gary W. 1997. *Making Votes Count: Strategic Coordination in the World's Electoral Systems*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Dawisha, Karen. 1984. *The Kremlin and the Prague Spring*. Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of California Press.

De Lima, Venicio A. 1993. "Brazilian Television in the 1989 Presidential Election: Constructing a President" in Thomas E. Skidmore, ed., *Television, Politics, and the Transition to Democracy in Latin America*, 97–117. Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press.

De Meur, Giséle and Dirk Berg-Schlosser. 1996. "Conditions of Authoritarianism, Fascism, and Democracy in Interwar Europe: Systematic Matching and Contrasting of Cases for 'Small *N*' Analysis," *Comparative Political Studies* 29 (4, August): 423–68.

Devlin, Judith. 1995. *The Rise of the Russian Democrats: The Causes and Consequences of the Elite Revolution*. London: Edward Elgar.

Domínguez, Jorge I. and James A. McCann. 1992. "Wither the PRI? Explaining Voter Defection in the 1988 Mexican Presidential Elections," *Electoral Studies* 11 (3, September): 207–22.

Dunlop, John B. 1993. *The Rise of Russia and the Fall of the Soviet Empire*. Princeton: Princeton University Press.

East, Roger. 1992. *Revolutions in Eastern Europe*. London: Pinter.

Ellwood, Sheelagh. 1991. "The Extreme Right in Spain: A Dying Species?" in Luciano Cheles, Ronnie Ferguson, and Michalina Vaughan, eds., *The Far Right in Western and Eastern Europe*, 2nd edition, 91–107. London: Longman.

Enelow, James M. and Melvin J. Hinich. 1984. *The Spatial Theory of Voting: An Introduction*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Evans, Geoffrey and Stephen Whitefield. 1993. "Identifying the Bases of Party Competition in Eastern Europe," *British Journal of Political Science* 23 (4, October): 521–48.

_____. 1995. "Economic Ideology and Political Success: Communist-Successor Parties in the Czech Republic, Slovakia and Hungary Compared," *Party Politics* 1 (4, October): 679–87.

Flynn, Peter. 1997. "Brazil: Conflict or Conciliation?" in William Gutteridge, ed., *Latin America and the Caribbean: Prospects for Democracy*, 233–70. Aldershot: Ashgate.

Geddes, Barbara. 1995. "A Comparative Perspective on the Leninist Legacy in Eastern Europe," *Comparative Political Studies* 28 (2, July): 239–74.

Gel'man, Vladimir. 1996. "Kommunisty v Strukturakh Vlasti: Analiz Deiatel'nosti," *Vlast'* (6, June): 20–9.

Gill, Graeme. 1994. *The Collapse of a Single-Party System: The Disintegration of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Golosov, Grigorii V. 1996. "Modes of Communist Rule, Democratic Transition, and Party System Formation in Four East European Countries," *Donald W. Treadgold Paper in Russian, East European and Central Asian Studies,* 9. Seattle: Henry M. Jackson School of International Studies, University of Washington.

_____. 1997. "Russian Political Parties and the 'Bosses': Evidence from the 1994 Provincial Elections in Western Siberia," *Party Politics* 3 (1, January): 5–21.

_____. 1998. "Who Survives? Party Origins, Organisational Development, and Electoral Performance in Post-Communist Russia," *Political Studies*, forthcoming.

_____. Forthcoming. "Ideologicheskaia Evolyutsiia Politicheskikh Partii I Strutura Mezhpartiinioi Konkurentsii na Dumskikh Vyborakh 1995 Goda v Rossii," *Mirovaia Ekonomika i Mezhdunarodnye Otnosheniia*.

Green, Andrew T. and Carol Skalnik Leff. 1997. "The Quality of Democracy: Mass-Elite Linkages in the Czech Republic," *Democratization* 4 (4, winter): 63–87.

Gunther, Richard. 1992. "Spain: The Very Model of Modern Elite Settlement" in John Higley and Richard Gunther, eds., *Elites and Democratic Consolidation in Latin America and Southern Europe*, 38–80. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Gunther, Richard, Giacomo Sani, and Goldie Shabad. 1986. *Spain after Franco: The Making of a Competitive Party System*. Berkeley: University of California Press.

Haggard, Stephan. 1990. *Pathways from the Periphery: The Politics of Growth in the Newly Industrializing Countries*. Ithaca: Cornell University Press.

Hagopian, Frances. 1990. "'Democracy by Undemocratic Means'? Elites, Political Parties, and Regime Transition in Brazil," *Comparative Political Studies* 23 (2, July): 147–70.

_____. 1996. *Traditional Politics and Regime Change in Brazil*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Harmel, Robert, and Kenneth Janda. 1982. *Parties and Their Environments: Limits to Reform?* London: Longman.

Helf, Gavin and Jeffrey Hahn. 1992. "Old Dogs and New Tricks: Party Elites in the Russian Regional Elections of 1992," *Slavic Review* 51 (3, fall): 511–30.

Heywood, Paul. 1995. *The Government and Politics of Spain*. New York: St. Martin's Press.

_____. 1996. "The Emergence of New Party Systems and Transitions to Democracy: Spain in Comparative Perspective" in Geoffrey Pridham and Paul G. Lewis, eds., *Stabilizing Fragile Democracies: Comparing New Party Systems in Southern and Eastern Europe*, 145–66. London: Routledge.

Hough, Jerry F. 1994. "The Russian Election of 1993: Public Attitudes towards Economic Reform and Democratization," *Post-Soviet Affairs* 10 (1, January–March): 1–37.

Ishiyama, John T. (1995) "Communist Parties in Transition: Structures, Leaders, and Processes of Democratization in Eastern Europe," *Comparative Politics* 27 ( 2, January): 147–66.

_____. 1996. "Red Phoenix? The Communist Party in Post-Soviet Russian Politics," *Party Politics* 2 (2, April): 147–75.

_____. 1997. "The Sickle or the Rose? Previous Regime Types and the Evolution of the Ex-Communist Parties in Post-Communist Politics," *Comparative Political Studies* 30 (3, June): 299–330.

Jackman, Robert W. 1985. "Cross-National Statistical Research and the Study of Comparative Politics," *American Journal of Political Science* 29 (1, February): 161–82.

Janda, Kenneth. 1990. "Toward a Performance Theory of Change in Political Parties." Paper presented to the 12th World Congress of the International Sociological Association, Madrid, 9–13 July.

JehliČka, Petr, Tomás Kostelecky, and Ludek Sykora. 1993. "Czechoslovak Parliamentary Elections 1990: Old Patterns, New Trends and Lots of Surprises" in John O'Loughlin and Herman van der Wusten, eds., *The New Political Geography of Eastern Europe*, 235–54. London: Belhaven Press.

Kiernan, Brendan. 1993. *The End of Soviet Politics: Elections, Legislatures and the Demise of the Communist Party*. Boulder: Westview Press.

Kinzo, Maria D'Alva G. 1993. "Consolidation of Democracy: Governability and Political Parties in Brazil" in Maria D'Alva G. Kinzo, ed., *Brazil: The Challenges of the 1990s*, 138–54. London: The Institute of Latin American Studies, University of London and British Academic Press.

Kitschelt, Herbert. 1992. "The Formation of Party Systems in East Central Europe," *Politics and Society* 20 (1, winter): 7–50.

_____. 1995. "Formation of Party Cleavages in Post-Communist Democracies: Theoretical Propositions," *Party Politics* 1 (4, October): 447–71.

Kopecky, Petr. 1995. "Factionalism in Parliamentary Parties in the Czech Republic: A Concept and Some Empirical Findings" in Richard Gillespie, Michael Waller, and Lourdes López Nieto, eds., *Factional Politics and Democratization*, 138–51. London: Frank Cass.

Kroupa, Ales and Tomas Kostelecky. 1996. "Party Organization and Structure at National and Local Level in the Czech Republic since 1989" in Paul G. Lewis, ed., *Party Structure and Organization in East-Central Europe*, 89–119. Cheltenham: Edward Elgar.

Lambert, Peter. 1997. "Ideology and Opportunism in the Regime of Alfredo Stroessner, 1954–1989" in Will Fowler, ed., *Ideologues and Ideologies in Latin America*, 125–38. Westport: Greenwood Press.

Lamounier, Bolivar. 1989. "Authoritarian Brazil Revisited: The Impact of Elections on the Abertura" in Alfred Stepan, ed., *Democratizing Brazil: Problems of Transition and Consolidation*, 43–79. New York: Oxford University Press.

_____. 1993. "Institutional Structure and Governability in the 1990s" in Maria D'Alva G. Kinzo, ed., *Brazil: The Challenges of the 1990s*, 117–37. London: The Institute of Latin American Studies, University of London and British Academic Press.

Legters, Lyman H. 1992. *Eastern Europe: Transformation and Revolution*. Lexington: D.C. Heath.

Lieven, Anatol. 1993. *The Baltic Revolution*. New Haven: Yale University Press.

Linz, Juan J. 1973. "The Future of an Authoritarian Situation or the Institutionalization of an Authoritarian Regime: The Case of Brazil" in Alfred Stepan, ed., *Authoritarian Brazil: Origins, Politics and Future*, 233–54. New Haven: Yale University Press.

_____. 1974. "An Authoritarian Regime: Spain" in Erik Allardt and Y. Littunen, eds., *Cleavages, Ideologies, and Party Systems*, 291–341. Helsinki: Transactions of the Westermack Society.

López, Juan J. 1992. "Theory Choice in Comparative Social Inquiry," *Polity* 25 (2, winter): 267–82.

López Nieto, Lourdes. 1995. "The Centre-Right in Spain, 1976–82" in Richard Gillespie, Michael Waller, and Lourdes López Nieto, eds., *Factional Politics and Democratization*, 31–44. London: Frank Cass.

López-Pintor, Rafael. 1985a. "Francoist Reformers in Democratic Spain: The Popular Alliance and the Democratic Coalition" in Howard R. Penniman and Eusebio M. Mujal-León, eds., *Spain at the Polls, 1977, 1979, and 1982: A Study of the National Elections*, 188–205. Washington, DC: American Enterprise Institute.

_____. 1985b. "The October 1992 General Election and the Evolution of the Spanish Party System" in Howard R. Penniman and Eusebio M. Mujal-León, eds., *Spain at the Polls, 1977, 1979, and 1982: A Study of the National Elections*, 293–313. Washington, DC: American Enterprise Institute.

Mainwaring, Scott. 1988. "Political Parties and Democratization in Brazil and the Southern Cone," *Comparative Politics* 21 (1, October): 91–120.

_____. 1992–3. "Brazilian Party Underdevelopment in Comparative Perspective," *Political Science Quarterly* 107 ( 4, winter): 677–707.

_____. 1997. "Presidentialism in Brazil: The Impact of Strong Constitutional Powers, Weak Partisan Powers, and Robust Federalism," Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars, Latin American Program, Working Paper 225, March.

Mainwaring, Scott and Aníbal Pérez-Liñán. 1997. "Party Discipline in the Brazilian Constitutional Congress,' Helen Kellogg Institute for International Studies, University of Notre Dame, Working Paper No. 235, March.

Mainwaring, Scott and Timothy R. Scully. 1994. "Introduction: Party Systems in Latin America" in Scott Mainwaring and Timothy R. Scully, eds., *Building Democratic Institutions: Party Systems in Latin America*, 1–34. Stanford: Stanford University Press.

Mainwaring, Scott and Donald Share. 1986. "Transition through Transaction: Democratization in Brazil and Spain" in Wayne A. Selcher, ed., *Political Liberalization in Brazil: Dynamics, Dilemmas, and Future Prospects in Brazil*, 175–215. Boulder: Westview Press.

Mair, Peter. 1997. *Party System Change: Approaches and Interpretations*. Oxford: Clarendon Press.

Maravall, José. 1982. *The Transition to Democracy in Spain*. London: Croom Helm.

Markowski, Radoslaw. 1997. "Political Parties and Ideological Spaces in East Central Europe," *Communist and Post-Communist Studies* 30 (3, September): 221–54.

Marsal, Juan F. and Javier Roiz. 1985. "Catalan Nationalism and the Spanish Elections" in Howard R. Penniman and Eusebio M. Mujal-León, eds., *Spain at the Polls, 1977, 1979, and 1982: A Study of the National Elections*, 206–25. Washington, DC: American Enterprise Institute.

Merrill, Samuel. 1995. "Discriminating between the Directional and Proximity Spatial Models of Electoral Competition," *Electoral Studies* 14 (3, September): 273–87.

Mettenheim, Kurt von. 1995. *The Brazilian Voter: Mass Politics in Democratic Transition, 1974–1986*. Pittsburgh: University of Pittsburgh Press.

Montero, José R. 1988. "More than Conservative, Less than Neoconservative: Alianza Popular in Spain" in Brian Girvin, ed., *The Transformation of Contemporary Conservatisme*, 145–63. London: Sage.

Moses, Joel C. 1992. "Soviet Provincial Elites in the Era of Transition and Revolution, 1989–91," *Soviet Studies* 44 (3, May–June): 479–509.

Müller, Wolfgang C. and Barbara Steininger. 1994. "Party Organisation and Party Competitiveness: The Case of the Austrian People's Party, 1945–1992," *European Journal of Political Research* 26 (1, July): 1–29.

Munck, Gerardo L. 1994, "Democratic Stability and Its Limits: An Analysis of Chile's 1993 Elections," *Journal of Interamerican Studies and World Affairs* 36 (2, summer): 1–38.

O'Donnell, Guillermo and Philippe C. Schmitter. 1986. *Tentative Conclusions about Uncertain Democracies*, Volume 4, *Transitions from Authoritarian Rule*. Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press.

Olson, David M. 1993. "Dissolution of the State: Political Parties and the 1992 Election in Czechoslovakia," *Communist and Post-Communist Studies* 26 (3, September): 301–14.

_____. 1997. "Democratization and Political Participation: The Experience of the Czech Republic" in Karen Dawisha and Bruce Parrott, eds., *The Consolidation of Democracy in East-Central Europe*, 150–96. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Orttung, Robert W. 1992. "The Russian Right and the Dilemmas of Party Organization," *Soviet Studies* 44 (3, May–June): 445–78.

Padró-Solanet, Albert. 1996. "Political Parties in Spain: A Review of Literature since the Democratic Transition," *European Journal of Political Research* 29 (4, June): 451–75.

Panebianco, Angelo. 1988. *Political Parties: Organization and Power*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Payne, Stanley. 1985. "Representative Government in Spain: The Historical Background" in Howard R. Penniman and Eusebio M. Mujal-León, eds., *Spain at the Polls, 1977, 1979, and 1982: A Study of the National Elections*, 1–29. Washington, DC: American Enterprise Institute.

Petrov, Nikolai. 1996. "Analiz Rezul'tatov Vyborov 1995 Goda v Gosudarstvennuiu Dumu po Okrugam I Regionam" in *Parlamentskie Vybory 1995 Goda v Rossii*, 10–57. Moscow: Moscow Carnegie Center.

Plakans, Andrejs. 1997. "Democratization and Political Participation in Postcommunist Societies: The Case of Latvia" in Karen Dawisha and Bruce Parrott, eds., *The Consolidation of Democracy in East-Central Europe*, 245–89. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Pollack, Marcelo. 1997. "Jaime Guzmán and the Gremialistas: From Catholic Corporatist Movement to Free Market Party" in Will Fowler, ed., *Ideologues and Ideologies in Latin America*, 151–69. Westport: Greenwood Press.

Power, Timothy J. 1991. "Politicized Democracy: Competition, Institutions, and 'Civic Fatigue' in Brazil," *Journal of Interamerican Studies and World Affairs*, 33 (3, fall): 75–112.

Pribylovsky, Vladimir. 1998. "Russia's Political Parties and Electoral Associations, December 1995." Internet source, http://www.geocities.com/ CapitolHill/2768/pp95.html.

Przeworski, Adam and John Sprague. 1986. *Paper Stones: A History of Electoral Socialism*. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.

Przeworski, Adam and Henry Teune. 1970. *The Logic of Comparative Social Inquiry*. New York: Wiley.

Ragin, Charles C. 1987. *The Comparative Method: Moving beyond Qualitative and Quantitative Strategies*. Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of California Press.

Ritsert, Jürgen. 1990. *Models and Concepts of Ideology*. Amsterdam: Rodopi B.V.

Rivera, Sharon Werning. 1996. "Historical Cleavages or Transition Mode? Influences on the Emerging Party Systems in Poland, Hungary, and Czechoslovakia," *Party Politics* 2 (2, April): 177–208.

Roett, Rirdan. 1997. "Brazilian Politics at Century's End" in Susan Kaufman Purcell and Riordan Roett, eds., *Brazil under Cardoso*, 19–41. London: Lynne Rienner.

Rossiiskii Sbornik. 1995. Moscow: Informatsionno-Ekspertnaia Gruppa "Panorama."

Sader, Emir and Ken Silverstein. 1991. *Without Fear of Being Happy: Lula, the Workers Party and Brazil*. London: Verso.

Sakwa, Richard. 1995. "The Russian Elections of December 1993," *Europe-Asia Studies* 47 (2, March): 195–227.

Scully, Timothy and J. Samuel Valenzuela. 1993. "From Democracy to Democracy: Continuities and Changes of Electoral Choices and the Party System in Chile," Helen Kellogg Institute for International Studies, University of Notre Dame, Working Paper No. 199, July.

Skidmore, Thomas E. 1989. "Brazil's Slow Road to Democratization" in Alfred Stepan, ed., *Democratizing Brazil: Problems of Transition and Consolidation*, 5–42. New York: Oxford University Press.

Statisticka Rocenka. 1991. *Statistická Rocenka Ceské a Slovenské Federativní Republiky*. Praha: Statistické a Evidencní Vydavatelství Tiskopisu.

_____. 1993. *Statistická Rocenka Ceské Republiky*. Praha: Cesky Statisticky Úrad.

_____. 1996. *Statistická Rocenka Ceské Republiky*. Praha: Cesky Statisticky Úrad.

Tóka, Gabor. 1996. "Parties and Electoral Choices in East-Central Europe" in Geoffrey Pridham and Paul G. Lewis, eds., *Stabilizing Fragile Democracies: Comparing New Party Systems in Southern and Eastern Europe*, 100–25. London: Routledge.

_____. 1997. "Political Parties in East Central Europe" in Larry Diamond, Marc F. Plattner, Yun-han Chu, and Hung-mao Tien, eds., *Consolidating the Third Wave Democracies*, 93–134 (first pagination). Baltimore: Johns Hopkns University Press.

Troxel, Luan. 1992. "The Socialist Persistance in the Bulgarian Elections of 1990 and 1991," *East European Quarterly* 26 (4, winter): 407–30.

Turovskii, R. F. 1995. "Gde I Kakie v Rossii Partii? 'Partiinye' Protiv 'Nezavisimykh' v Odnomandatnykh Okrugakh" in V.A. Kolosov, ed., *Rossiia na Vyborakh: Uroki I Perspektivy*, 63–109. Moscow: Tsentr Politicheskikh Tekhnologii.

Ulc, Otto. 1996. "Populism, Racism and Society in Czechoslovakia" in Joseph Held, ed., *Populism in Eastern Europe: Racism, Nationalism, and Society*, 63–106. New York: Columbia University Press.

Urban, Joan Barth and Valerii D. Solovei. 1997. *Russia's Communists at the Crossroads*. Boulder: Westview Press.

Urban, Michael. 1992. "Boris El'tsin, Democratic Russia and the Campaign for the Russian Presidency," *Soviet Studies* 44 (2, March–April): 18–207.

_____. 1994. "December 1993 as a Replication of Late-Soviet Electoral Practices," *Post-Soviet Affairs* 10 (2, April–June): 127–58.

Vestnik TsIK. 1996. *Vestnik Tsentral'noi Izbiratel'noi Komissii Rossiiskoi Federatsii*, No. 1.

Vujacic, Veljko. 1996. "Gennadiy Zyuganov and the 'Third Road'," *Post-Soviet Affairs* 12 (2, April–June): 118–54.

Waller, Michael. 1995. "Adaptation of the Former Communist Parties of East-Central Europe: A Case of Social-Democratization," *Party Politics* 1 (4, October): 473–90.

Wheaton, Bernard and Zdenek Kovan. 1992. *The Velvet Revolution: Czechoslovakia, 1988–1991*. Boulder: Westview Press.

White, Stephen, Richard Rose, and Ian McAllister. 1997. *How Russia Votes*. Chatham: Chatham House.

Wiarda, Howard J. 1989. *The Transition to Democracy in Spain and Portugal*. Washington, DC: American Enterprise Institute.

Wolchik, Sharon L. 1997. "Democratization and Political Participation in Slovakia" in Kharen Dawisha and Bruce Parrott, eds., *The Consolidation of Democracy in East-Central Europe*, 197–244. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Zyuganov, Gennadii A. 1995. *Rossiia I Sovremennyi Mir*. Moscow: Obozrevatel'.