Capitalist Development and Democracy in South America

by

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In the current debate on redemocratization in Latin America, the focus is squarely on political variables proper, that is, on the political process as shaped by political institutions and leadership. Political choices by major actors, particularly the adoption of explicit or implicit political pacts designed to ensure the transition, are accorded primary importance. In fact, the most influential work on the topic has argued that the high indeterminacy of the process of transition makes the use of conventional social science categories and approaches, such as class, sectors, institutions, and macroeconomic and world systemic structures inadequate for its analysis (O'Donnell and Schmitter 1986:4).

Whereas this focus is certainly appropriate for the immediate transition period, the other important question, namely consolidation of democratic regimes in the medium and longer run, draws attention to underlying structural conditions favorable to such an endeavor. Analyses of the process of transition in a given country "freeze" the structural context; there is generally little structural change over the relatively short periods of transition. Furthermore, analyses comparing processes of transition in the late seventies and the eighties keep the world economic and political context constant, and they tend to take structure in the individual countries as a given. Taking a longer historical view, though, and asking under what conditions democracies were established and consolidated in Latin America in the past and are likely to be consolidated in the future moves structural variables back into the center of attention.¹ Yet, with the exception of Therborn's (1979) attempt, there is no theoretically well grounded, comparative historical structural treatment of the emergence and decline of (nearly) democratic forms of rule which covers all the South American countries.

¹ There are attempts to explain the trajectory of democracy in Latin America in cultural terms, emphasizing the "distinct tradition" (e.g. Wiarda 1980, 1982) rooted in the colonial past, and implying that the question why democracy has not become the norm is intellectually inappropriate and ethnocentric. However, if one discards somewhat parochial Latin American views and adopts a wider perspective which includes the Third World in general, the South American experience becomes important, as its democratic record is much stronger than in the rest of the Third World. From a general world wide perspective, both the tendencies to and difficulties with democracy in South America can be explained in structural rather than cultural terms.
The following analysis provides such a treatment and demonstrates that structural factors have considerable explanatory power for the trajectory of democracy in South America. The nature of a country's integration into the world market (enclaves versus nationally controlled export sectors), the labor requirements of agriculture, the degree of subsidiary industrialization generated by the export sector, the process of consolidation of state power, the role of the state in shaping civil society, the class alliances to which the economic and social structures gave rise, along with the nature of political parties strongly influenced the dynamics of democratization. The relationships between these variables and democratic rule are by no means simple and unilinear. Some factors have contradictory consequences for democratization, some effects change over time, and the various factors interact over time. Accordingly, the analysis here will be comparative historical, paying attention to the way in which economic growth and the patterns of dependence shaped the class structure and class relations and influenced political change, and taking the lasting effects of certain historical conjunctures seriously.

The theoretical building blocks for this comparative historical analysis are Moore's (1966) emphasis on the importance of the survival of labor repressive landlords into the modern era, Skocpol's (1979) emphasis on the role of the state and the interstate system, Cardoso and Faletto's (1979) and O'Donnell's (1973) emphasis on the effects of dependent development on class structure and class alliances, and the working class strength perspective's (Korpi 1978; J. Stephens 1979; Esping-Andersen, 1985; Stephens and Stephens, 1986) emphasis on the importance of the organizational power of subordinate classes.

In a nutshell, I will argue that the difficult processes of consolidation of state power cast the military in a prominent role in politics, set the precedent for alliances between factions of civilian elites and of the military in the struggle for state power, and made institutionalization of contestation difficult. After a period of significant export expansion, large landowners in nationally controlled export economies tended to develop into a hegemonic class and to establish contestation among themselves. Where agriculture was labor intensive, these landowners became crucial obstacles to political inclusion of the lower classes; where it was less so, they
were willing to compromise. In enclave economies, the large landowners were less hegemonic as a class, and in some cases anti-oligarchic alliances were able to force the establishment of a democratic regime, but unable to consolidate it. Where the export sector generated subsidiary industrialization and high urbanization, pressures for democratization emerged comparatively early. Import substitution industrialization generated such pressures everywhere, but the pressures remained weaker where the state prevented the independent political articulation of civil society, most prominently in Brazil. In enclave economies, there was a stronger tendency for middle class - working class alliances to emerge, forged by political parties approximating the mass party type. Such alliances were more likely to push for full democracy, i.e. with universal suffrage, than alliances between the middle classes and sectors of the economic elites which pushed for an opening of the political system and had their base in clientelistic parties. For the consolidation of democracy, particularly for the reduction of military involvement in politics, the presence of two or more strong political parties, at least one of which effectively represented elite interests, proved to be indispensable.

The analysis here will be confined to South America; political dynamics in the Central American countries, which were shaped to a much greater extent by U.S. political intervention, are analyzed elsewhere (Stephens and Stephens 1987). Since genuine democracies are so rare in South America and regime forms so varied, we first have to cast a conceptual net over this diversity and construct theoretically meaningful dependent variables. After proposing a classification of regimes according to their degree of contestation and inclusion and filling it with historical cases, I will first analyze the factors leading to the establishment of the various types of regimes, then the factors which support the consolidation or breakdown of democratic regimes, and finally those which promote redemocratization. The distinction between these different stages in the analysis is important because factors which are supportive of the installation of
some form of democratic regime may not be so for its consolidation, and because the existence of a democratic regime profoundly influences future political dynamics.\footnote{Rustow (1970:340-7) also emphasizes the difference between the factors which bring democracy into existence and those which keep it stable, and the need to adopt a diachronic perspective to study the former.}

**Classification of Regimes**

To start with, I have to establish the criteria for democratic rule in my conceptualization. I start with the two dimensions of inclusion and contestation which are generally distinguished in the literature; the former includes degree of suffrage extension and (non-) proscription of parties, the latter degree of institutionalization of opposition, freedom of association and expression, responsible government, and free and fair elections.\footnote{A very clear formulation of these dimensions and a conceptualization of regimes based on them is provided by Dahl (1979).} Clearly, regimes can vary on both of these dimensions. Regimes which rank near zero on both dimensions will be called authoritarian regimes; those with considerable contestation but low inclusion will be called constitutional oligarchic regimes. Among those regimes approaching highly institutionalized contestation and medium to high inclusion, I will distinguish between full and restricted democracies. Restricted democracies can have restrictions in either one or both dimensions; for example, literacy qualifications for the suffrage impose restrictions on inclusion; and frequent military intervention, or political pacts, impose restrictions on the effectiveness of contestation. In reality, it is often difficult to clearly attribute the effects of restrictions to one of the two dimensions, as formal restrictions in one affect the other. For instance, restrictions on contestation in the form of political pacts tend to include proscription of certain parties and thus to exclude specific social groups, mostly from the lower classes.

The distinction between full and restricted democracies, called exclusionary democracies by Remmer (1986), is crucial for South America, because among other things it draws attention to
the fact that continued exclusion of the rural popular sector was often crucial for the installation and consolidation of "urban-democratic" regimes. Among the restricted democracies, we will further have to distinguish between subtypes with high and with low military involvement in politics, as this particular type of restriction has its own distinctive dynamics. The type of military involvement that is relevant is of the "moderator" type (Stepan 1971), i.e. interventions to block certain policies, or to prevent elections from having unacceptable outcomes, or to effect changes in the executive if elections did. Restricted democracies with high military involvement we will consider severely restricted ones; those with low involvement can further be distinguished according to the existence of restrictions on contestation or inclusion only, or on both. These categories include regimes with restrictions on suffrage and/or with provisions whereby election outcomes are rendered irrelevant, such as by previously concluded political pacts on power sharing, with provisions proscribing one or more parties, and with varying interference in the electoral process at the local level.

Periods with unqualified democratic rule according to these criteria have been rare indeed before the 1980s.\footnote{As pointed out in the text, the dynamics of redemocratization in the eighties are different from those underlying the phase of initial democratization. Not only did the initial installation of a democratic regime have some lasting effects, but the world historical context for the two processes is quite different. Accordingly, I shall discuss the redemocratization of military regimes in the late seventies and eighties in a later section of this paper.} Argentina 1912-30, 1946-51, and 1973-76, Uruguay 1919-33 and 1942-73, Chile 1970-73, Bolivia 1952-64, and Venezuela 1945-48 and 1968 to the present qualify.\footnote{For a period to be classified as fully democratic, at least two separate (i.e. not simultaneous) popular free and fair elections had to be held, with universal suffrage and in the context of protected civil and political rights. These elections could be of the same or of different types, such as one presidential and one congressional election, or one to a constituent assembly and one congressional or presidential election. Fixing the exact dates for such periods is somewhat arbitrary. One can date the democratic period from the introduction of the political reforms which protect it, or from the first national elections held under the new system. Where the introduction of the political reforms came as a clearly identifiable package (e.g. in Argentina in 1912), or where a dramatic regime change or announcement of elections ushered in the new period (e.g. Venezuela in 1945, or Bolivia in 1952), these dates were chosen, otherwise the date of the first election. Similarly, to date the end of the democratic period is easy in the case of coups, but more difficult in the case of slow erosion through growing harassment of the opposition (e.g.}
only, existed in Chile 1958-70. Colombia 1936-48 is a borderline case, because suffrage was universal and contestation highly institutionalized, but control of local notables over the electoral process and thus fraud, as well as partly violent intimidation of the opposition, were widespread.6

In Chile before 1958 lack of a secret ballot and interference in the electoral process by local notables, in addition to the literacy requirement, restricted democracy more significantly, particularly in rural areas. Inclusion was further limited in the period 1947-58 because the Communist Party was illegal, a party which had received over ten percent of the vote in the two previous elections. Nevertheless, in the period 1932-58 the urban middle classes and large sectors of the urban working class were included, as the constitution of 1925 had established a permanent electoral register (which amounted to a de facto widening of the franchise) and the direct election of the president (Gil 1966:58-9). Thus, one can call this severely restricted democracy.

The same label can also be applied to the situations in Uruguay from 1903 to 1919, Colombia from 1958 to the present and Venezuela from 1958 to 1968. In Uruguay before the legal changes in 1915 and the constitution enacted in 1919 (also referred to as the constitution of 1917), there were literacy qualifications on the franchise (Nahum 1977:75-6), voting was public by signed ballot (Vanger 1980:100), and the election of the president was indirect. In the cases of Colombia and Venezuela, despite de jure full inclusion through universal suffrage, different factors have severely limited contestation and inclusion, and thus the effective representation of lower class interests. In Colombia, the National Front agreement, which was in force from 1958 to 1974, provided not only for alternation in the presidency and a division of all important political posi- tions, elected or appointed, between Liberals and Conservatives, but it explicitly prohibited third parties from participating in elections. After 1974, the practice of dividing executive positions

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6 Oquist (1980:104) states that the entire period 1930-46 was characterized by widespread electoral fraud and coercion, which were accepted as a fact of political life. Moreover, in some municipalities the parties concluded pacts and fixed elections accordingly. Also, the local police was often highly partisan (1980:106). The 1942 elections were reportedly fraudulent (1980:109).
and protecting the hegemony of the Conservative and Liberal Parties was continued. Even more serious in its implications for restrictions on democratic practice is the repeated recourse to declarations of the state of siege since the late forties.

In Venezuela, the pact of Punto Fijo of 1958 committed the three main parties to a coalition government, regardless of the outcome of the 1958 elections, to a common program which buried sensitive issues, and to a common defense of democracy. It deliberately excluded the Communist Party from participation in government. Coalition government and moderation in political programs, along with ostracism of the radical left, continued until the 1968 elections. Leftists were expelled from Acción Democrática and purged from leadership positions in unions. In the 1968 elections, the Communist Party, which by that time had come to reject insurrection, was allowed to participate through a front organization, and its legalization in 1969 signified the transition to full democracy.

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7 A constitutional reform in 1968 effected only a partial change in the Front arrangements. Competitive elections at the national level were held in 1974, but parity in the judicial branch was to be maintained, and in the executive branch it was to be maintained until 1978. However, even thereafter the party receiving the second highest number of votes was entitled to "adequate and equitable" representation, i.e. to participation in a coalition government (Hartlyn, forthcoming). In 1971, ANAPO was recognized as a political party and thus made legal for electoral purposes. However, the dominance of the two traditional parties was further cemented, for instance, by the electoral reform law of 1979 which stipulates that the Electoral Court have four representatives each from the two major parties, and one from the third largest party.

8 The fact that significant sectors of the thus alienated left took up arms and failed in their revolutionary goals critically weakened the entire left by not only physically liquidating many militants but delegitimizing radical leftist positions. Thus, the inclusion of the Communist Party was a risk of minor proportions for the established political forces. See Levine (1978:97-101) and Karl (1986:206-215) for discussions of the Pact and the subsequent marginalization of the left. If the universe of cases was expanded to include Mexico, one might argue that it should be included in the category of severely restricted democracies also. However, the effects of the hegemony of the PRI have so significantly restricted democratic competition since 1917 that it is questionable whether Mexico can qualify as a democracy at all, no matter how restricted. PRI control over the state and thus the electoral machinery has not only provided immense advantages in the campaign stage, but also in the stage of casting and counting the ballots. This, together with the party’s dominant position, e.g. in controlling access to state jobs, and the widespread use of patronage, have made it extremely difficult if not impossible for other parties to compete effectively. The fact that the party could maintain its dominant position and control over the electoral machinery with so little coercion is partly due to the legacy of its initially strong revolutionary legitimacy, and partly due to the effective use of cooptation, harrassment of the opposition, and selective repression. Adler Hellman (1983) provides an insightful discussion of this mixture; see Levy (forthcoming) for a discussion of Mexico’s (non-)democratic character.
Periods of severely restricted democracy, with high military propensity to intervene directly through coups or indirectly through pressures on civilian political elites, occurred in Argentina 1955-66, Brazil 1945-64, Peru 1939-48 and 1956-68, and Ecuador 1948-61. In addition to strong military involvement, the proscription of the Peronist party greatly restricted the democratic quality of Argentine politics in this period. In Brazil, Peru and Ecuador, literacy qualifications served to exclude the majority of the rural population in these periods. Moreover, the illegal status of the Peruvian Aprista Party from 1939 to 1945, and of the Communist Party in Peru and Brazil in the post-WW II period added a further exclusionary feature. Thus, these were cases of severely restricted urban democracy.

Looking at this classification of cases, it is obvious that South American countries by no means followed a path of linear progression from oligarchic regimes to severely restricted, then mildly restricted, and finally fully democratic ones. Rather, there is a variety of paths and they involve reversals and the skipping of stages. Thus, we need to identify both the preconditions for the emergence of the various types of regimes and the factors leading to their consolidation or decline. In order to do so, comparisons will be made among the various national experiences in South America, complemented by occasional comparisons between South American and European patterns.

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9 In Ecuador, military involvement in this period was not as strong as in the other cases. Three elected presidents were able to serve their full terms, and no party or candidate was vetoed by the military. However, in matters of interest to the military itself, strong pressures were put on the incumbents, and a conflict between the president and a military officer in his cabinet almost led to the overthrow of the government in 1953. Moreover, there were unsuccessful military revolts in 1950 and 1956. Thus, the military remained active behind the scenes and ready to intervene if the occasion were to arise. The main reason why none of the three presidents was overthrown was that no major social groups appealed for military intervention in this period. See Fitch (1977:40-6) for the role of the military in this period.
Conditions for Initial Democratization

Consolidation of State Power

The first obvious precondition for the emergence of a regime form with regularized contestation and more than minimal inclusion is the consolidation of the state apparatus and the establishment of effective control over a continuous population.\textsuperscript{10} The struggles for independence and later over borders, and the foreign interventions in the nineteenth century go a long way towards explaining the importance of caudillos in national politics and the inability of elites to create institutionalized competition for power even among themselves. The expansion of regular armies during the wars of independence created many military leaders who, in the power vacuum left by the collapse of Spanish rule, became power contenders at the local or national level, based on control over loyal troops. The emergence of local militias in the period of struggle over the question of who should rule and how further contributed to the emergence of such caudillos. Naturally, they sought power through force of arms, not through constitutional processes.\textsuperscript{11}

Furthermore, the economic legacy of the colonial period and continued economic dependence made national unification problematic in many cases in that great regional diversity and lack of economic integration created conflicts over the degree of political centralization (see e.g. Silva Michelena 1973). There was great variation among the various countries in the time it took for the problems of struggles over borders and over regional autonomy, centralization of the military, and more or less assured rule enforcement to be solved. In Chile, the absence of strong regional diversity and the comparatively easy struggle for independence allowed for the earliest

\textsuperscript{10} My argument here is compatible with Rustow's who stipulates national unity as single background condition for the emergence of democracy, that is, enduring borders, a continuous citizenry, and the absence of any doubt among the citizens as to which political community they belong to (1970:350-1); my argument, however, puts less emphasis on citizens' attitudes than on effective state control over the national territory.

\textsuperscript{11} For a discussion of the problem of consolidation of the state, and of the role of caudillos in post-independence Latin America, see e.g. Cardoso and Faletto (1979:36-41) and Burns (1986:90-132).
settlement of the question of consolidation of state power in any South American nation, namely in the 1830s (e.g. Loveman 1979:134-49). In Venezuela, in contrast, one of the latest cases, the severe disruptions of the drawn out independence struggle, the importance of caudillos in this struggle, and the great regional diversity delayed this settlement until the turn of the century (e.g. Lombardi 1982:157-205).

Consolidation of state power was a necessary, but not sufficient condition for the creation of relatively stable rule with institutionalized contestation by the elite alone or with wider participation. In Peru, for instance, this was never achieved, despite state consolidation in the period 1860-90; and in Venezuela the attempt to establish constitutional rule coincided with the opening of the political system to mass participation. In contrast to Western Europe, then, the tasks of consolidating state power and establishing a stable form of elite rule were more difficult, completed later (if at all), and thus temporally closer to the next phase, that of incorporating newly emerging groups into the political system. This can certainly be considered a contributing factor to the lesser frequency of emergence and consolidation of democracy in South America compared to Europe. Additional important differences are to be found in the effects of dependent development on the class structure, and in the power balance within civil society and between civil society and the state.

Expansion and Character of the Export Economy

The second precondition for the establishment of institutionalized competition for political power was a sustained period of expansion of the export economy, giving rise to a prosperous class of export producers and urban merchants and financiers. Economic growth could of course also complicate the consolidation of state power, where it increased regional diversity and differential linkages of various regions to the international economy, as e.g. in Argentina.

\[\text{12} \quad \text{For comparative historical analyses of the development of democracy in Europe, see Therborn (1977) and J. Stephens (1987).}\]

\[\text{13} \quad \text{Economic growth could of course also complicate the consolidation of state power, where it increased regional diversity and differential linkages of various regions to the international economy, as e.g. in Argentina.}\]
homogeneous elite of large landowners with ties to urban interests than growth of enclave economies. This had contradictory consequences for democratization. On the one hand, it facilitated institutionalization of contestation among elites, even where regionalism and/or different agrarian exports generated some diversity among a landholding elite with otherwise strong common interests, such as in Brazil and Colombia. On the other hand, it strengthened large landowners and thus a potentially formidable opponent of democracy.

In Brazil, consolidation of state power was not a problem because of the continuity from colonial times. Export growth in coffee started in the middle of the nineteenth century, and both coffee and sugar exports increased dramatically after 1880. Accordingly, after the fall of the monarchy in 1889, the landowning oligarchy was economically secure and prosperous enough to quickly replace the middle sectors which had gained a share of political power in the first years of the republic, and institutionalize a system of competition for political power among its different factions, in which governors as representatives of regional oligarchies bargained over national executive power (Burns 1980:278-320). In contrast, in Colombia effective consolidation of state power and a first sustained period of export expansion were delayed until the early twentieth century. Consequently, it was only after the end of the War of a Thousand Days in 1903 that the Conservative and Liberal oligarchic factions started to overcome their deep historical enmity and establish a viable system of elite contestation (Wilde 1978:34-37). In Ecuador, President García Moreno (1860-75) was able to consolidate state power to the extent of bringing the periods of civil war to an end (Schodt 1987:28-33). However, tensions between the coastal agro-exporters and the highland oligarchy remained strong and obstructed the institutionalization of contestation. The cacao boom starting in the late nineteenth century then shifted power from the highland landowners, allied with the Church and acting through the Conservative Party, to coastal elites and the Liberal Party as their representative. This made possible a period of constitutional

14 For a discussion of dynamics in nationally controlled and enclave economies in this period see Cardoso and Faletto (1979:66-73).
Liberal oligarchic rule from 1916 to 1925, during which, however, there was little attempt to extend centralized state control over the highlands, where the landowners were left in control.

Uruguay had a rocky road to national unification as well, as both frequent foreign invasions and armed confrontations between Blancos and Colorados persisted throughout the nineteenth century. However, export prosperity set in earlier than in Colombia, after 1880, and this enabled the urban based Colorados to assert their dominance over the Blancos, led by the traditional landowners of the interior, with the defeat of the latter's rebellion in 1904 (Mendez 1977:87-121). Given the character of the agrarian export economy, a topic which will be taken up below, this defeat ushered in a form of restricted democracy, rather than simply oligarchic contestation. The contrast to Paraguay here is instructive. President Francia (1814-40) consolidated state power internally, greatly weaken the Church, the Spanish landowners, and the criollo merchants and financiers by expropriation, strengthened the military as his major support base, and pursued essentially an autarchic development (Schmelz 1981: 54). The War of the Triple Alliance devastated population, land, and state finances, and opened Paraguay's economy to the outside. Yet, there was no export boom of any kind. A quite diversified export base developed, but without bringing prosperity and strengthening export-linked groups to the extent that they would have been able to impose constitutional oligarchic rule. In Argentina, the problem of consolidation of state power was finally solved with the acceptance of the status of Buenos Aires as federal capital in 1880, though Mitre (1861-68) had effectively unified the country already. Significant export growth began in the 1870s, consolidating the dominance of the agro-exporting groups in the littoral, who managed to institutionalize contestation among themselves (Rock 1985: 118-61).

In nationally controlled economies, the economic power of the elites connected to the export sector facilitated (though did not guarantee) the subordination of power contenders not willing to abide by the new rules of contestation, such as the military or less prosperous sectors of traditional elites. Subordination of the military was successful in Uruguay and Colombia, where the military stayed out of politics from 1903 until the sixties and fifties, respectively. It was much
less successful in Argentina and Brazil, where significant sectors among officers conspired with anti-oligarchic civilian sectors during the period of oligarchic power sharing, and where the military continued to play a crucial arbiter role even in later periods of relatively high contestation and inclusion.¹⁵

On the anti-democratic side weighed the fact that growth of the nationally controlled export sector strengthened the large landowners and thus a force rather universally opposed to full democratization. The intensity of landlord opposition against democracy depended on the character of export agriculture. Where it was highly labor intensive and labor relations were based on a combination of wage labor and a semi-bound labor force (labor repressive agriculture, in Moore’s terminology), as in Colombia and Brazil, the landowners were implacable opponents of democratization. In Brazil, they were an important part of the forces which managed to prevent the installation of a democratic regime with universal suffrage until 1985. In Colombia, one faction of the Liberals pushed through universal suffrage in 1936 despite strong opposition from the Conservatives and from the landowners in the Liberal Party itself, but interference in the electoral process by local (landowning) notables kept democracy de facto restricted. Where export agriculture was mostly ranching, with low labor requirements, and labor relations were

¹⁵ As Lowenthal (1986:9) points out, studies explaining why the military has not taken an extensive and direct political role in a number of countries and periods, including Uruguay, are scarce and “generally unilluminating”. Thus, we can only propose some very tentative hypotheses here about the factors that appeared important. In both Colombia and Uruguay, the intense rivalry and armed conflicts between the two party camps prevented the emergence of a strong, professionalized army in the nineteenth century, as the regular troops were frequently confronted by armed irregulars. Thus, in Colombia the military could not offer any significant resistance to the attempts of civilian leaders to keep its size and budget small; as of 1940 the military was still the smallest relative to population in the Western Hemisphere (Ruhl 1980:182-3). In Uruguay, the officers of the regular army were mostly of Colorado extraction, and the army fought under Batlle to put down the Blanco rebellion of 1904 (Finch 1981:6-10). In order to be prepared for potential future Blanco rebellions, the army was strengthened by Batlle and his successor Williman. Thus, it had no reason to accede to insistent Blanco calls for military intervention in 1910 to prevent a second Batlle presidency (Vanger 1980:92; 170; 184). The majority of officers remained Colorado supporters, and the renewed military threat from the Blanco caudillos in 1932-3 helped the Colorado president to consolidate his control over the military (Taylor 1952:310). It was only when both parties declined in the situation of economic stagnation and intensifying social struggle that the military started acting autonomously from civilian authority.
firmly based on wage labor, as in Argentina and Uruguay, the landowners were anti-democratic as well, but their opposition to democracy was less strong, which allowed for full democracy to be established in the teens in response to pressures from a comparatively highly urbanized and industrializing society. I shall return to the question of pressures from society below.

In the enclave economies, in contrast, growth tended to produce less elite homogeneity in so far as it strengthened urban commercial and financial groups who came to coexist with traditional landowners in a less close alliance than the one between urban commercial and financial interests and agrarian exporters in nationally controlled economies. This had also contradictory effects on the chances for democracy. On the one hand, it made institutionalized contestation among elites more difficult and thus tended to perpetuate military interventionism, but on the other hand it weakened the position of the large landowners and thus one crucial opponent of democracy. The local proceeds from the export sector were primarily captured by the state apparatus, and thus control of the state as a means for access to resources remained salient and the struggle for control of the state intense. Moreover, in enclave economies, alliances between the middle and working classes were more likely to emerge than in nationally controlled ones, for reasons to be discussed below. This had equally contradictory effects on democratization. On the one hand, it meant that stronger pressures for democratization emerged earlier, but on the other hand these alliances tended to be radical in their demands and thus stiffened the resolve of dominant groups to keep the alliances excluded.

These alliances participated in the struggle for control of the state, and where they managed to gain such control, they were able to develop a considerable autonomy from the landowning class. Revenue from the foreign owned export sector and from imports stimulated by it provided the resources for state expenditure. By extending the franchise to the rural sector and mobilizing rural workers, urban groups could attempt to further strengthen their base relative to that of the landowners. However, the parties fomenting these alliances between middle and working classes in enclave economies, namely Acción Democrática in Venezuela, Apra in Peru, the National Revolutionary Movement in Bolivia, and the Radical, Socialist and Communist
Parties in Chile, promoted radical programs, and this, together with the potential that they might be able to carry out their programs if they were able to capture control of the state, presented a strong threat not only to landowning but also to urban elites and united them in resistance to democracy.\(^{16}\)

In Peru and Venezuela, elite contestation was never firmly institutionalized. In Chile and Bolivia, in contrast, both of which had certain features atypical for enclave economies, elite contestation took hold by the second half of the 19th century (Chile) or by the turn of the century (Bolivia). Chile is a special case of an enclave economy, because there had been a period of agricultural export growth and of domestically controlled silver and copper mining after 1848, before the denationalization of nitrate mining in the 1880s and the growth of the foreign copper companies after the turn of the century. Also, a significant domestically owned coal mining sector existed. As a result, the Central Valley landlords were economically powerful and significant sectors of them were more closely connected to mining and urban interests than their counterparts in other enclave economies (Zeitlin and Ratcliff 1975:11-13). Thus, institutionalized contestation became a viable option early on, and inclusion could even be widened to non-elite sectors. Early unification, early elite prosperity, and relative elite homogeneity, then, all contributed to making Chile the first country in South America to establish a political system with highly institutionalized contestation and more than minimal inclusion.\(^{17}\)

However, landlord strength also explains why the establishment of full democracy was delayed until the seventies.\(^{18}\)

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16 The Chilean case is different from the other three in so far as the middle class - working class alliance was an alliance of three separate parties, rather than one organized within one party. The Radical Party, which was the dominant partner in the Popular Front (it fielded the candidate for President), was clearly much less radical and thus mitigated the threat to the Chilean elites.

17 Chile introduced literate male suffrage in 1874 and thus has frequently been referred to as a democracy with a long history. However, control of local notables over the process of registration and partly even the casting of ballots assured oligarchic domination to such an extent that it would be misleading to even classify Chile before 1920 as a democracy with severe restrictions, rather than a competitive oligarchic system. For instance, since the oligarchy felt that effective control threatened to slip out of their hands, they decided to greatly reduce participation through the process of registration. In 1914, the administration of suffrage was turned over to municipal Committees of the Largest Taxpayers, and thus the number of registered voters dropped from 598,000 in 1912 to 185,000 in 1915; before the 1923 elections the Presidents of the Chamber of Deputies and of the Senate agreed again to keep registration of voters much below 30 percent of
Bolivia had the typical appearance of an enclave economy, that is, the central sector of the economy was linked directly and exclusively to the international economy, but from the 1920s on this sector was essentially nationally controlled. Thus, Bolivia had, like Chile, a stronger dominant class than other enclave economies dominated by foreign ownership, but the pattern of middle and working class formation and the role of the state was similar to the latter. Tin did not become important until the end of the 19th century; from the 1860s to the 1890s silver mining had been important. Silver was mainly under national control, and the mining bourgeoisie was closely linked to the landowning families. This led to the formation of an amalgamated elite of landed and silver interests. Before the consolidation of the industry in the twenties, tin mining was largely controlled by foreign, particularly Chilean, financial interests. With the rise of tin, new elements achieved elite status, and the old families developed connections to urban activities and the tin companies, e.g. through family members serving as lawyers for the companies. Thus, an elite of old and new elements emerged, with close links to tin and heavy involvement in politics; this elite was called La Rosca (Malloy 1970:38).

The expansion of the export economy in the period 1870-1920 made possible the establishment of relatively stable elite contestation between 1899 and 1920. Thereafter, the economy started to stagnate and intra-elite struggles intensified, making coups the dominant mode of transfer of political power. During the twenties, the Big Three (Patiño, Aramayo, and Hochschild) managed to gain control over some 80% of tin production. Two of these owners were clearly of national origin, and the third one a German Jewish immigrant (Malloy 1970:35-6). Though the companies were incorporated abroad and held extensive financial interests outside the country, they were also deeply entrenched in the national economy. For instance, Patiño was also the largest banker in Bolivia, and he and the other two tin magnates had interests in those eligible (A. Valenzuela, 1977: 213-215). For a different explanation of the emergence of Chilean democracy, stressing political rather than socio-economic determinants, namely national identity, consolidation of political authority, and gradual extension of the suffrage, see A. Valenzuela (forthcoming); for an analysis of the 1874 reforms see J.S. Valenzuela (1985).

18 See Zeitlin et al. (1976) and Zeitlin and Ratcliff (forthcoming) for a discussion of the importance of landlords in Chilean politics well into the second half of the twentieth century.
railroads, land, and commercial ventures (Malloy 1970:43). Given their national origins, Patiño and Aramayo were legitimate political actors; Aramayo came from an old elite family, and he in fact attempted to sponsor his own political party in the period 1936-38 and did so for the 1951 elections (Klein 1971:37 and 45).

In Venezuela, high regional geographic and economic diversity, and the strong caudillo legacy from the Independence war delayed effective unification until the turn of the century. Moreover, significant export growth did not occur until the early twentieth century. Thus, caudillo rule, rather than institutionalized elite competition for power prevailed until the death of Gomez in 1935, and the military dominated politics from 1935 to 1945. The period from the twenties on presents the clearest case of weakening of the landowning elite by an enclave. The oil wealth led to an overvalued exchange rate which made agrarian exports uncompetitive and unattractive and exposed even agricultural production for the domestic market to strong competition from imports (Karl 1986: 199-200). Thus, destruction of export agriculture and rural-urban migration left the large landowners without a strong enough economic or political base to block the establishment of fully democratic rule in 1945. Though they were strongly opposed to Acción Democrática (AD), it would be hard to argue that they were the decisive force behind the overthrow of the democratic regime in 1948.

The Peruvian example confirms that export growth, like consolidation of state power, was not a sufficient condition for the establishment of institutionalized contestation among elites. Neither the guano boom of 1845-79, nor the export boom after 1890 were followed by such an arrangement. In part, this can be explained by the legacy of the long struggle for Independence, namely the strong tradition of caudillismo. Though caudillo rule was replaced by civilian dominated regimes after 1895 (Pike 1967: 168ff), different military factions continued to play important roles as allies sought by civilians. The reasons why civilians continued to turn to the military for political support, in turn are to be sought in the impact of the enclave economy on elite formation. The guano boom did not strengthen a national class, but rather provided resources mainly through state extraction and thus raised the stakes of control over the state apparatus.
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(Berg and Weaver 1978). After 1890, though, Peru started to deviate somewhat from a pure enclave economy. The post-1890 boom did include agricultural exports and thus clearly strengthened the large landowners in the coastal areas, many of whom diversified into urban activities. However, mining came predominantly under foreign control, and the coastal agro-exporters did not become a clearly hegemonic ruling class. Coups remained the dominant mode of transfer of power and the period 1919-30 was one of dictatorial rule.

Significant expansion of the export economy with concomitant growth of the middle and working classes and of urbanization was even more necessary for a widening of political inclusion than for institutionalization of contestation. With the newly emerging urban groups of employees and professionals, of workers in transport, beginning manufacturing for the domestic market, and, depending on the type of export economy, mining or subsidiary industrialization to the export sector, civil society became stronger and the weight of middle and lower classes in the power balance increased. Through the formation of unions and political parties, important segments of these classes became political actors capable of exerting pressures for both civil rights and political inclusion.

Like in Europe, the effectiveness of these pressures depended on the one hand on their strength, i.e. the size of these new groups, the density of organization, degree of unity, and alliances with other groups, and on the other hand on the strength and resolve of the elites to resist these pressures. In contrast to Europe, international political conjunctures were less important for the transition to democracy.19 This is not surprising, since South America was not

19 This is not at all to say that the structures of economic dependence and international economic conjunctures did not have an impact on the process of democratization. However, both World Wars affected political power constellations in Latin America less directly than in Europe. It is important here to distinguish between economic conjunctures resulting in economically conditioned changes and political conjunctures resulting in impulses for change coming from the political sphere proper. The former are mediated through changes in the class structure and the balance of power in civil society; the latter through changes in the state or in the behavior of political parties. Examples for the former are the weakening of the landowning export oligarchy by the Depression, or the strengthening of the working class through ISI stimulated by the contraction of international trade; examples for the latter are the experience of the Brazilian military in WW II and its consequent decision to replace Vargas, or the decision of many governments to outlaw the Communist Party in response to U.S. pressures after the onset of the
directly involved in WW I, and only peripherally so in WW II. The post-WW I political conjuncture, while in some cases seeing considerable increases in labor mobilization, most prominently in Argentina and Chile, did not produce the wave of democratization it did in Europe. The post-WW II conjuncture arguably had an impact strengthening pro-democratic tendencies in Brazil, Argentina, Venezuela and Peru.

The reason why pro-democratic tendencies in the aftermath of WW I remained too weak to take advantage of the international discrediting of authoritarian regimes was the internal balance of class power which, unlike in Europe, was not significantly affected by involvement in the War. Despite beginning import substitution industrialization before and during WWI, neither the position of the economically dominant classes nor the size and mobilization capacity of the subordinate classes underwent significant changes. In contrast to Europe, the large landholders were still economically important and politically powerful, and, with the exceptions of Argentina and Uruguay, the urban middle and lower classes were too small and/or insufficiently organized to play the role of counterweights. By the end of WW II, organized segments of the middle and working classes, in some cases supported and in others tolerated by urban industrial elites and sectors of the military, were in a stronger position to ride the wave of international pro-democratic sentiment and pressure for the discarding of authoritarian political practices, despite the continued opposition of the large landowners and traditional sectors of the military.

A look at Argentina and Uruguay, the two early breakthroughs to full democracy, supports the above argument in so far as these countries had achieved an unusually (in the context of Latin America) high degree of urbanization and middle and working class formation and

Cold War. Therborn (1979:87-89) does not make this distinction. He identifies a Latin American democratic conjuncture which culminated in the mid-forties but started in the mid-thirties in Colombia and ended in 1952 in Bolivia; alternatively, he suggests that a wider conceptualization would have the conjuncture end in 1964, with the overthrow of Goulart. He argues that the Depression, the following boom during WW II and the post-War period, and the challenge from and defeat of fascism were all important ingredients of this conjuncture. To use the concept of conjuncture in such an undifferentiated manner is to broaden its meaning to the point of destroying its analytical precision and usefulness. I shall return to the issue of international influences below.
organization by the teens already. This was due to their particular type of export economy, beef, hides, wool, and grain, which generated considerable subsidiary activity not only in transport, but in meat packing, tanning, and wool processing. One might accept this as a sufficient explanation for the breakthrough to democracy, but the fact that the achievement of similar levels of urbanization and industrialization in Chile and Brazil in the fifties, for instance, did not lead to full democratization forces one to consider additional factors. The Moore thesis suggests that one should again look at the role of large landowners. Like all the other South American countries, Argentina and Uruguay have landholding patterns dominated by large estates, and large landowners have constituted the most powerful social class since colonial days. However, as discussed above, the type of agriculture and the resulting labor relations dominant in Argentina and Uruguay were unique for South America. Thus, it was the combination of both factors resulting from the particular character of the agricultural export economy in Argentina and Uruguay, namely the pressures emanating from society, generated by early industrialization and urbanization, and the moderate anti-democratic stance of the large landowners, which made the establishment of a fully democratic regime possible in the 1910s.

As a general statement, we can say that in no case where (1) labor repressive agriculture predominated and (2) agriculture was the crucial export sector and (3) production was controlled by domestic landowners, unrestricted democracy was established in South America. Under these conditions, the landowners feared the loss of control over their labor force in the wake of democratization, and they were powerful enough to resist an opening of the political system or to extract concessions from urban groups to keep the rural sector excluded.

In Venezuela, Bolivia, and Chile, the other three countries with periods of full democracy, the landowners were not in control of the crucial export sector. As discussed above, in Venezuela they were greatly weakened by the oil-induced changes in the economy. In Bolivia,

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20 Industrial output as percentage of GDP was 23 percent in Argentina in 1929, compared to 12 percent in Brazil and 8 percent in Chile; in 1957 it had grown to 23 percent in Brazil and 20 percent in Chile (Furtado 1976:108-11).
their economic importance was clearly secondary to the Big Three tin magnates. To the extent that landowning families were involved in the export economy, it was through medium and small mining, which accounted for roughly 20% of minerals exports only; there was virtually no export agriculture (Malloy 1970:35-43). Due to being part of La Rosca, the landowners were strong enough to effectively resist a constitutional opening of the political system, but not to prevent the emergence of a revolutionary movement and a breakthrough to full democracy through force of arms. In Chile, most of the landowning families had strong ties to urban interests also and were firmly united in opposition to those political forces attempting to mobilize the rural lower classes and include them politically. Thus, they were able to delay electoral reforms which started the de facto inclusion of the rural sector until the late fifties, and the breakthrough to full democracy until 1970, when ISI had greatly strengthened the middle and lower classes, but they were not able to prevent it altogether.

In Argentina and Uruguay, the fact that pressures from below for political reform did exist and that landowners "could afford" to give in does not fully explain why they did it. Divisions within the landowning class, partly along structural lines and partly along more narrowly political lines were another factor facilitating the opening, in so far as they made the formation of a closed anti-democratic power bloc difficult. In Argentina, some landowners who were not part of the Buenos Aires export oligarchy supported the Radical Party. More importantly, the oligarchy was split over the question of electoral reform. A significant sector correctly perceived that an opening of the political system would constitute no fundamental threat to their interests, as its main beneficiary would be the Radical Party which represented middle class interests. The working class was organized in militant unions, but two factors obstructed their effective political action. The heavily foreign extraction disenfranchised a large proportion of the working class.

21 See Smith (1978:14) and Rock (1975:95) for a discussion of the importance of landowners in the Radical Party.
22 One might argue that this fact disqualifies Argentina and Uruguay as full democracies in this period. However, disenfranchisement of non-citizens for national level elections is a universal feature of full democracies. Despite this de facto limitation, there was a clear difference between these two political systems, where more than half of the urban and rural lower classes could vote,
and the dominant influence in the unions was exercised by anarchists and anarcho-syndicalists who did not promote party building and participation in electoral politics (Spalding 1977:23-31; Bergquist 1986:101-16). On the contrary, continued exclusion of the middle class carried the risk of Radical attempts to mobilize the working class into an anti-oligarchic alliance and of renewals of insurrectionary attempts.

In Uruguay, the modernizing landowners of the littoral provinces were opposed to the old Blanco-Colorado rivalry and did not support the Blancos, representing the traditional landowners of the interior, in their rebellions in 1897 and 1904 against the more urban-based Colorados (Mendez 1977:87-122; Finch 1981:5-11). Moreover, the heavily immigrant composition of both the modernizing landowners and urban commercial, financial, and industrial groups linked to them (Mendez 1977:16), in addition to divisions among them prevented them from controlling the political system to the same extent as their counterparts in Argentina. This opened the way for middle class political leaders to form alliances with sectors of the elites and pursue political reforms to strengthen their own position (Finch 1981:9). The defeat of the 1904 rebellion by Batlle helped to institutionalize contestation and open the way for inclusion under the 1919 constitution. Like in Argentina, a significant proportion of the working class remained disenfranchised because they were immigrants, which reduced the threat posed by democratization to elite interests.

Import Substitution Industrialization

Starting in the thirties, import substitution industrialization (ISI) brought with it further growth of the middle and working classes and thus the potential for a strengthened civil society. Compared to the core countries, the lower level of development and the pattern of dependent development made for different timing, proportion and composition of the emergence of the and, say, the Chilean one in the thirties, where suffrage qualifications and lack of a secret ballot kept virtually the entire rural lower class excluded. Moreover, by the forties the bulk of the working class was locally born, and thus these periods unambiguously qualify as fully democratic, which leaves the analysis here valid.
middle classes relative to the working class. At comparable levels of development, the working class was weaker relative to the middle classes than in the core countries. This pattern was set by the growth of the export economy, as this caused growth of the state and urbanization before any significant industrialization (with the above mentioned exceptions of Argentina and Uruguay) and perpetuated during the ISI phase. Urbanization and state expansion brought forth middle classes of state employees, private white collar employees, professionals and intellectuals, artisans, shopkeepers and small entrepreneurs. Late and dependent industrialization, though, did not lead to a corresponding formation of an industrial working class and labor movement. Even when ISI was undergoing significant growth, labor absorption by industry remained limited. Within the industrial sector, the predominance of small enterprises with paternalistic labor relations hampered labor organization,\(^{23}\) and the geographical isolation of many mining enclaves made it difficult for the generally stronger and more radical unions in these enclaves to maintain a close organizational link with their urban counterparts. Moreover, many of these small enterprises were in the informal sector, that is, outside the coverage of labor laws, social security legislation, and contractual labor relations with regular money wages.\(^{24}\) This had important implications both for the strength of civil society and the political articulation of the middle and working classes. It meant that the middle classes had to play an important role in pushing for an opening of the political system, if such an opening was to occur.

ISI also enlarged the ranks of the industrial bourgeoisie oriented towards production for the domestic market. This bourgeoisie was not strong enough to play the leading role in challenging oligarchic domination, even where it emerged as a separate group from and independent of the large landowners. However, as long as the growth potential of the economy was large, ISI opened the possibility for an alliance between this bourgeoisie and the middle and

\(^{23}\) These characteristics were also present in Italy and France, and they weakened the labor movements there.

\(^{24}\) Portes and Walton (1981: 67-106) develop this conceptualization of the informal sector, and Portes (1985) discusses the development of the informal sector in Latin America, showing that it remained larger than in the U.S. at comparable stages of development.
working classes, and thus for the establishment of an including regime (O'Donnell 1973). Such including regimes, though, were neither necessarily democratic (e.g. Vargas, Perón), nor did their social and economic policies necessarily weaken the oligarchy and prepare the way for democratization in the longer run (e.g. Vargas, the Liberals in the thirties in Colombia). Nevertheless, growth made for a socio-economic positive sum game, that is, new urban groups could gain while old groups still retained many traditional privileges. Accordingly, the political struggle came to be perceived as less of an all-or-nothing affair, and more democratic forms of rule became possible. The gradual opening of the Chilean system from the thirties to the early seventies certainly was facilitated by the growth of ISI not only because it strengthened the urban subordinate classes, but also because it provided the resources for state patronage which ensured a continued strong electoral base for the right wing parties without requiring any significant increase in the taxation of private property.25

Two broad patterns of ISI growth can be distinguished in South America, namely initial strong growth stimulated by the depression and World War II and in some cases heavily promoted by deliberate pro-industrial policies, based mainly on domestic capital, versus a growth spurt in the fifties and sixties, with heavy participation of foreign capital. The former pattern fits Argentina, Brazil, Chile, and Uruguay (though in Uruguay ISI did not develop very far because of the small size of the domestic market). In Brazil and Chile, political decisions to accelerate ISI were particularly important. The latter pattern fits Colombia, Peru, and Bolivia (though Bolivia remained at a clearly lower level of industrialization). Ecuador and Paraguay fit neither pattern as they experienced little industrialization until the late sixties. Venezuela is a special case because of the relatively constant oil based growth since the twenties. On the basis of our assumptions about the impact of ISI on the development of civil society, we would expect stronger and earlier pressures for an opening of the political system in the former cases and in Venezuela. However, the growth of middle and working classes does not automatically and uniformly translate itself into

25 A. Valenzuela (1977) emphasizes the importance of patronage for the Chilean party system.
a stronger civil society and more effective political articulation. Rather, the role of the state and of party builders and union organizers significantly shapes civil society and its expression through the party system.

Social Classes, the State, Political Parties, and the Struggle for Democracy

If one analyzes the class forces behind successful and failed attempts to install democratic regimes, the middle classes emerge as the crucial forces behind the initial breakthrough to full or restricted democracy. It was in the middle classes that the parties or movements mobilizing and exerting pressures for democracy had their main base. Only if we take a very long range view and include every step which contributed towards greater institutionalization of contestation and greater inclusion, even if those steps were not made with the intent to include significant new groups and subsequently a variety of mechanisms de facto limited inclusion, then we can find cases where parts of the oligarchy itself pushed for it. For instance, in Chile in 1874, the oligarchy-based Conservatives supported an electoral reform whose main goal was to remove control over the electoral process from the incumbent government, but which included universal male suffrage (J.S. Valenzuela 1985).26 In Colombia after the War of a Thousand Days, export-oriented sectors of the landed oligarchy and commercial and industrial groups generated bi-partisan support for a new system of institutionalized contestation with safeguards for minority representation, which was established with the reforms of 1910 (Bergquist1978:247-262). However, in no case did significant sectors of the oligarchy actively support greater political inclusion in a situation where the majority of the subordinate classes were mobilized enough to actually participate.

Like in Europe, the bourgeoisie was nowhere the driving force behind democratization. A possible exception are the unsuccessful rebellions in Chile in the 1850ies where the mining bourgeoisie in alliance with artisans, craftsmen and small farmers demanded participation in the

26 As discussed above, the introduction of universal male suffrage did not really bring in full democracy in Chile at that point.
oligarchy-dominated state (Zeitlin 1984:30-56), though it is important to point out that other sectors of the mining bourgeoisie supported the incumbents. The emerging industrial bourgeoisie was small and weak as a political force because of their dependence on the state for protection from imports and foreign competition, except for those sectors which were closely linked to agro-exporting interests and for this reason did not challenge the political order. Furthermore, the industrial bourgeoisie in many cases was of immigrant extraction and thus lacked either the franchise or important kinship connections to establish political prominence (e.g. Argentina and Uruguay; see Rock 1985: 233, and Finch 1981: 163-70). The same was true for the commercial bourgeoisie in many cases. In other cases, the commercial and financial bourgeoisie was closely linked to the landowners through multiple holdings and/or kinship links (e.g. Chile since the 19th century; see Zeitlin 1984: 165-71) and thus did not develop into an independent political force. Particularly where the ISI growth spurt came after WWII and involved strong participation of foreign capital (Colombia and Peru), the bourgeoisie remained too weak even to form a Keynesian alliance with middle and working classes to effect pro-industrialization policies. The conditions under which bourgeois groups, along with sectors of the oligarchy, supported institutionalization of contestation (though not inclusion) were either crises of hegemony resulting in political instability and possibly even internal war (e.g. Uruguay 1903; Chile 1932; Ecuador 1948), or incumbency of corrupt dictatorial, military backed regimes (Venezuela and Colombia 1958).

In contrast to Europe, however, the urban working class was not the crucial pro-democratic force either.27 Before the thirties, there were only few cases where the labor movement achieved sufficient strength to have some political impact. As already discussed, the character of the export economy in Argentina and Uruguay generated early urbanization, subsidiary industrialization, and thus labor movements which were much stronger than their

27 One may speculate that this was an important contributing factor to the persistence of greater restrictions on democracy and the more frequent occurrence of breakdowns in South America than in Western Europe. These comparisons are taken up in more detail in Rueschemeyer et al. (forthcoming).
counterparts in the rest of South America. The intensity and potential threat from labor mobilization motivated elites in both cases to accept political reforms, and in Uruguay in addition social welfare and labor reforms sponsored by the middle class based Colorado governments. In Chile, the labor movement was not very large and mainly concentrated in the nitrate zones and major cities and ports, but it was very militant precisely because of the importance of the nitrate mining areas (Bergquist 1986). Labor militancy was important in influencing the electoral college to bring Alessandri to power in 1920, the first presidential candidate to build his campaign on appeals to middle and lower classes (Drake 1978: 47-54). In Brazil, early labor organization emerged in the Sao Paulo area, but at the national level labor organization remained insignificant in size, and from its very beginning it was reigned in by state paternalism (Schmitter 1971:140).

In the twenties and first half of the thirties the labor movements in Argentina and Chile were greatly weakened by repression. In Argentina heavy repression came in the aftermath of the semana trágica in 1919, and in Chile under Ibáñez. In Uruguay labor organization stagnated during this period. In Peru and Colombia labor organization was growing, mainly due to its promotion by Apra and the Liberal Party and government, respectively. In Bolivia, Venezuela, Ecuador, and Paraguay only isolated efforts were made in this period to form labor unions, mainly among transport workers. 28 Starting in the second half of the thirties, ISI led to an expansion of industrial and other urban employment and thus the potential for labor organization and mobilization. The trajectories of the labor movements in the South American countries in the following two decades varied with the level of industrialization and with the role of the state and political parties in labor mobilization. The state and political parties became the crucial actors shaping the social construction of class interests of the swelling ranks of the urban workforce, as well as its capacity for the concrete pursuit of these interests.

The state's role in shaping the labor movement was generally stronger in South America than in Europe, but there was significant variation among the South American countries. The

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28 For basic information on the development of labor organization in the various countries, see Alexander (1965) and Alba (1968); for a comparative historical analysis, see Spalding (1977).
conventional explanation for this is the colonial legacy with its corporatist tradition. However, it should be kept in mind that the independence wars thoroughly destroyed state structures in most countries and therefore no direct institutional continuity exists. The exception here is Brazil, and the fact that Brazil represents the only case in South America where state incorporation of the labor movement had lasting effects gives some support to the argument about the importance of the colonial legacy. However, even in Brazil, the state apparatus had become quite decentralized during the Old Republic and it was Vargas who really created the corporatist structures. Thus, a more convincing argument is that organic statism, the normative political theory underpinning the colonial order, was available to elites as a world view, legitimacy formula, and guide to institution building when faced with crisis situations (Stepan 1978:40-45). This raises the question why Latin American elites perceived the rise of the labor movement as generating actual or potential crisis situations. Here, one can reasonably hypothesize that historical time was important; with the European experience as an example, Latin American elites perceived the potential power of labor and thus the need to control and/or coopt emerging labor organizations. In many cases such attempts kept the labor movement weak, even if they were not successful in incorporating it into state-controlled structures.

The working class in South America only weighed on the democratic side where (1) an organized middle class constituted a potential for mobilizing it into an anti-oligarchic alliance, as in Argentina before 1912, (2) a middle-working class alliance was actually formed, as under the Popular Front in Chile or through Acción Democrática in Venezuela, or (3) the working class was mobilized into a revolutionary movement, as in Bolivia. That the formation of a middle-class-working class revolutionary alliance was by no means always successful in bringing about an (even partial, i.e. urban) democratic opening, is exemplified by Apra in Peru.

29 The other case in Latin America, where labor incorporation had even stronger lasting effects, is Mexico. Here, however, the argument about institutional continuity is weak, because not only the independence war but also the revolution destroyed old state institutions.
In three cases one might argue that the working class did play the leading role in the breakthrough to full democracy, namely Argentina in 1945/46 and 1973, and Chile in 1970. However, in the case of Argentina, the international political conjuncture at the end of World War II and particularly U.S. pressures in the form of withholding of arms shipments until free elections would be held (Potash 1969: 258-9) strengthened pro-democratic tendencies among the elites, the middle classes, and the military. Moreover, Perón's mobilization of the working class through the state apparatus was crucial, and the coalition formed by Perón for the 1946 election was multi-class, including some urban industrialists (Kenworthy 1973:43). The mobilization of this expanding class by Perón and the significant benefits extended by Perón made its majority identify its class interests with the preservation of a Peronist regime, democratic or not (an excellent example of the importance of the social construction of class interests). For the return to democracy in 1973, the growing opposition to the Onganía regime among virtually all social classes was essential. Though the working class played a highly visible role in the events in Cordoba in 1969, the fact that the internal logic of the bureaucratic authoritarian regime had alienated a majority of all classes except for the internationalized bourgeoisie (O'Donnell 1978) was crucial in motivating the military to depose Onganía and move towards a reestablishment of democratic procedures (Smith 1983: 97-8). Chile in 1970 appears to be the one case where the working class was of crucial importance. It was the Unidad Popular which made the final step to full democracy with the enfranchisement of illiterates for the 1971 municipal elections. Though only about two fifth of industrial workers in the Greater Santiago area supported the Marxist left between 1958 and 1970, and though the Unidad Popular had important bases of support among sectors of the middle classes, its main base was in the urban working class (Smith and Rodríguez 1974:64-7). One might counter this argument by pointing out that the Christian Democrats, a party with its main base among the urban and rural middle classes and the urban poor, also supported universal suffrage. However, it should be kept in mind that the Christian Democrats in the sixties and seventies were competing heavily with the Unidad Popular parties for the support
of both urban and rural lower classes; thus, its support for universal suffrage can be seen as a concession to these classes.

The driving force behind the initial establishment of full or restricted democracy, then, was the middle class, or rather, the middle classes, namely urban professionals, state employees and employees in the private sector, artisans and craftsmen, and small entrepreneurs, sometimes joined by small and medium farmers. As pointed out above, this contrast to Europe can be explained by the fact that the expansion of the export economy caused the growth of the state and urbanization before any significant industrialization, and that the size and organizational strength of the working class remained restricted during the phase of ISI by the capital intensive character of dependent industrialization, the large number of small enterprises, and the existence of surplus labor from the rural sector. In a somewhat crude generalization we could say that in Europe the working class in most cases needed the middle classes as allies to be successful in its push for democracy, whereas in Latin America it was the other way around. However, the middle classes by no means allied with the working class in every case, nor were they genuinely supporting full democracy in every case. The very position of the middle classes, in between the elites and the masses, made for considerable ambiguity in the perception of their class interests regarding the desirability of democracy. Moreover, the great heterogeneity of the middle classes made for diversity in the perception of class interests. Thus, historical legacies and present alliance options were important determinants of middle class action in support of full or restricted democracy. Instead of the working class, alternative important allies were the military, dissident sectors of the oligarchy, and sectors of new economic elites (Argentina before 1912, Uruguay 1903, Brazil 1930, Chile 1932). In one case, oligarchic factions actively sought middle and working class support (Colombia in the thirties). This meant that democracy in these cases was achieved without a high degree of popular organization and mobilization and thus without the strength of pro-democratic forces needed to maintain it once elites turned decidedly against it. In

30 Artisans and craftsmen can also be classified as working class if they are employed, rather than being self-employed or employers.
other words, the nature of the alliance formed in the stage of breakthrough to full or restricted democracy had important implications for the stage of consolidation or breakdown of democracy, a topic to which I shall return below.

The timing of the first significant growth in industrialization and urbanization, be it as a spin-off from the export sector or for import substitution, shaped the emergence of pressures for democratization from the middle and working classes, in so far as these two processes strengthened civil society. The strength of these pressures, however, and their effects depended also on the political articulation of civil society and thus were heavily influenced by the role of the state, preexisting political parties, and party builders active at that particular time. Table 3 gives a schematic overview of these variables and their impact on the emergence and decline of democratic regimes in the post-WW II period.

Where industrialization and urbanization occurred early in connection with the export economy, and where there was no major attempt on the part of the state to encapsulate newly emerging groups in this period, i.e. in Argentina and Uruguay, full democratization took place in the second decade of the twentieth century. This was made possible because the additional condition concerning agrarian class relations in the two countries was fulfilled. Uruguay is the case with the least direct state involvement in the formation of the labor movement. Indirectly, state policy favorable towards labor in the areas of labor and social legislation did affect the growth of the labor movement, but there was no attempt whatsoever to control unions; not even compulsory registration of trade unions existed (Alexander 1965:61). Batlle had supported the inclusion of the labor movement as a legitimate political actor in 1895 already, and in his first term (1903-07) he explicitly recognized the right to strike and passed a variety of labor laws. However, he did not make any attempt to link the labor movement to the Colorado Party. Rather, the Uruguayan labor movement was from the beginning heavily influenced by its Argentine counterpart, and thus the dominant political tendencies until the mid-twenties were the anarchists,

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31 See Finch (1981:53-62) for a concise overview of the development of the labor movement in Uruguay.
and then syndicalists, socialists, and communists. In Argentina, state attempts to deal with the comparatively large but weakly politically articulated labor movement were largely repressive. In both cases, middle class support for the parties promoting contestation and inclusion was broad based, and though they appealed for and received some working class support, they also attracted some allies from marginal or dissident sectors of the landowning elites. In addition, sectors of the military, particularly younger officers, supported the Radicals in Argentina (Rock 1975:48), and in Uruguay the military had fought to defeat the Blanco rebellions in 1897 and 1904 (Mendez 1977:88-94; 118-22).

After the teens, however, the patterns of political development in Argentina and Uruguay started to diverge. In Uruguay, civilian supremacy over the military was established and the two main political parties became virtually the exclusive channels for competition for political power. Batlle’s second administration (1911-15) again brought progress in labor legislation and growth in the labor movement, thus strengthening support for the Colorados and the transition to full democracy in 1919. However, during the twenties and early thirties the labor movement declined in membership and was badly split politically, such that it could offer little resistance to the turn to authoritarianism in 1933. After 1938, repression eased and the increase in industrialization resulted in revival and growth of the labor movement. The labor movement in turn strengthened the constituency of the traditional urban, pro-industrialization, pro-labor Batllista faction in the Colorado Party, facilitating the return of this faction to power and the return to full democracy by 1942. In Argentina, in contrast, sectors of the military had served as an ally of the middle class in that military participation in the revolts of the Radicals intensified the threat to the oligarchy and thus the perception by one part of the oligarchy that electoral reform was needed. However, by 1930 this alliance had turned into the opposite; as opposition to the Radicals and Yrigoyen mounted because of their populist spending and his intervention in provincial and military affairs, and as middle class support for the government declined because of the effects of the depression, the oligarchy found willing allies in the military (Rock 1975:243-64). The working class at that point was not really a threat any longer. The severe repression starting with the events of the semana
trágica in 1919 had left the labor movement greatly debilitated. Yet, despite frequent repression of militant labor actions, the comparatively high degree of industrialization since the second half of the thirties generated a civil society with considerable strength. Perón then further strengthened it and added much greater weight to the working class, because his incorporation strategy involved a heavy dose of mobilization as he built his own electoral base. The holding of open elections in 1946 and Perón’s victory were largely attributable to well organized working class support and careful coalition building with other urban groups.32 The construction of a political party with close ties to the unions added effective political articulation to a strong civil society.

Where significant growth of industrialization and urbanization occurred in the thirties and during World War II, i.e. in Brazil, Chile, and Venezuela, the transformation of the oligarchic (or dictatorial, in the case of Venezuela) state took different forms depending on the state’s capacity to incorporate and control newly emerging groups and the capacity of the party system to provide effective representation to old and newly mobilized groups. In Brazil, where the state played the strongest role in incorporating labor among the South American countries, civil society remained very weak until the seventies. Given Brazil’s comparatively smooth transitions to independence and then to the Republic, a well consolidated (though decentralized) state apparatus was available to the oligarchic groups in the early decades of the twentieth century for the attempt to encapsulate new groups and prevent their acquisition of an independent organizational power base.33 Unionization was legalized in 1907, but in practice it was discouraged. Aside from the urban centers of Sao Paulo and Rio, there was only very little and localized labor organization. To the extent that a labor movement emerged, the oligarchy embarked on a strategy of

32 See Bergquist (1986) and Spalding (1977) for discussions of the development of the labor movement in Argentina, Smith (1969) and Rock (1975) for the political context, and Kenworthy (1973) and Page (1983) for Perón and his legacy.

33 There is a debate in the literature about the relative autonomy of the Brazilian state before 1930 (see the review by Graham 1987; also see Topik 1987). Whether the state acted on behalf of the oligarchy in the attempt to coopt and control the emerging labor movement, or whether incumbents in state roles developed their own initiatives does not have to be decided for the discussion here; the point is that such an attempt was made, that the nature of the state apparatus facilitated the success of the attempt, and that it had lasting effects.
government sponsorship and paternalism in workers’ organizations. For instance, all expenses for the Fourth National Workers’ Congress held in 1912 with representatives from 71 associations, the high point of the early stage of labor organization, were paid by the authorities (Schmitter 1971:140). As of 1930, middle class activism was rather narrowly centered in students, intellectuals, and the military, and the coalition bringing Vargas to power included sectors of the military, dissident sectors of landowners, and urban interests, in addition to the middle classes (Skidmore 1967: 9-12). There were no strong national parties of any kind at that point. The result was a hybrid between an authoritarian system and a highly restricted democracy with continued strong military intervention, until the breakdown into full blown authoritarianism in 1937.\footnote{The reason why the period 1930-37 does not really qualify as a highly restricted democracy is that the Constituent Assembly of 1933 was not in its entirety elected by direct popular elections, as it included syndicate members, and that Vargas was elected President by this Assembly, not by direct popular election either.} Under the estado nôvo, then, Vargas pursued the incorporation strategy to the ultimate, with strong emphasis on control via the state bureaucracy (Erickson 1977). The result was a numerically moderately strong labor movement, but with very low mobilization capacity and no independent political articulation. Thus, despite growing industrialization in the thirties and forties, civil society did not develop many autonomous organizations nor any effective political articulation through parties at the national level, and pro-democratic pressures from popular groups remained weak until way into the post-1945 period of restricted democracy. The transition in 1945 was again largely the result of a decision by the military, influenced by the post-WW II political conjuncture (Skidmore 1967: 53). Accordingly, military intervention remained a salient feature of the following period.

Chile, along with Peru, Venezuela, and Bolivia, the four enclave economies, represents a case where the working class played an important role either as an explicit ally of the middle classes, or at least in that working class mobilization and militancy reinforced middle class pressures for institutionalization of contestation. In Chile state involvement in the formation of the
labor movement had effects of intermediate significance. The labor code of 1924 was an attempt to capture and contain the growing working class organizations and militancy. Moreover, Ibáñez crushed the independent labor movement, which had been greatly weakened by unemployment, and substituted government sponsored, centralized, and paternalistic unions (Drake 1978:59). Union growth and strength were permanently hampered by the Code, but the effective control gained by the state over the labor movement never became significant, and after 1932 what control there was eroded rapidly under competitive party politics. The political parties became the crucial agents in the organization of the labor movement, thus not only providing political articulation for civil society but actively shaping it (Angell 1972). The transition to restricted democracy in 1932 predated the formation of the middle class - working class Popular Front alliance, but the high level of popular unrest in the preceding years had impressed on the oligarchy the need to accept institutionalized forms of contestation, as well as inclusion of parties representing working class interests (Drake 1978:60-98). Party sponsored growth of the organizational strength of civil society, facilitated by the social changes resulting from ISI in the decades after 1932 effected the gradual reduction of initially severe restrictions on contestation and inclusion, most notably the electoral reforms of 1958 and 1962 and the legalization of rural unionization in 1967 (Loveman 1979:256-316).

In Venezuela, there was no comparable attempt at cooptation of the labor movement by the state, only repression, and civil society as well as its political articulation grew very rapidly in strength when repression was eased after the death of Gómez in 1935. The economic base for

35 Collier and Collier (forthcoming) and R. Collier (1986) classify Chile, along with Brazil, as a case of state incorporation. The reasons for my disagreement are explained in the text here and in the section on “Social Classes and the Struggle for Democracy”.

36 Two reasons account for the difference in the success of the incorporation attempts in Brazil and Chile; first, in Chile there was no tradition of state involvement in the affairs of civil society comparable to state involvement in Brazil, and second an autonomous and radical labor movement with links to socialist and communist parties had already developed in the mining enclaves and could not be coopted through state sponsorship and paternalism. R. Collier (1986) offers a comparison of incorporation attempts in these two cases which comes to the same conclusion that Vargas went further and produced more lasting effects than Ibáñez, but emphasizes other reasons for the difference in success, namely the effects of the depression on the fall of Ibáñez and the timing of his regime in relationship to the spread of European fascism.
greater density of civil society was provided by the oil induced economic growth. Yet, the activity of political organizers and leaders, many of whom had returned from exile in 1935, was of crucial importance for strengthening civil society and its political articulation. Particularly the leaders of Acción Democrática engaged in intense organizing activity, which enabled them to ally with sectors of the military and force a breakthrough by coup to full democracy in 1945 (Martz 1966:49-62). Three years followed in which particularly labor organization in urban and rural areas continued to increase rapidly, and in which far reaching reforms were initiated. However, AD’s strength and virtually total domination of the party system, and its emphasis on the representation of the exclusive interests of sectors of the middle classes, the working class and the rural poor, cemented an opposition coalition among the entire elite sectors of the society, large sectors of the middle classes, and the Church (Levine 1978:89-93). When its former allies among the military also turned against AD because of their lack of influence on policy formation, the strength of the lower classes was insufficient to prevent the coup of 1948 (Lombardi 1982:224-5).

Peru and Bolivia represent further cases where alliances between middle and working class forces were important in promoting political democracy. They both underwent late spurts of ISI and concomitant growth of the labor movements, but in both cases pressures for an opening of the political system emerged earlier, generated by political parties. In neither case had the state made more than a short futile attempt to incorporate the emerging labor movement, and in neither case did other strong political parties compete with Apra or the MNR in mobilizing popular forces. In Peru, the first strong pressures emerged in 1930-32, organized by Apra, the party

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38 A short and unsuccessful incorporation attempt was made in Bolivia between 1936 and 1939 (Malloy 1970:105). In the early years of his long rule (1919-30), Leguía in Peru made some attempts to coopt and control labor (Collier and Collier, forthcoming, ch.3). As far as competing parties are concerned, the Communist Party did promote labor organization in Peru, but it lost control over the labor movement to Apra by 1945 (Sulmont 1984:48-62) and it was never able to build a mass base coming close to Apra’s. Various Marxist parties were involved in labor organization in Bolivia, but they did not manage to develop mass bases outside the labor movement.
that had been formed by Haya de la Torre in exile. Apra had its main base in the sugar growing areas of the North where it had been able to forge a coalition between sugar workers (through Apra-supported unions) and the large sectors of the middle classes impoverished by the expansion of the large-scale, heavily foreign owned or financed, sugar plantations and the growing domination of trade in the area by the same companies (Klarén 1973). Sugar workers and the declassed middle classes were certainly not natural allies; they had little day to day contact with each other and were only brought together by the party. Apra was also active in organizing urban unions, but the level of industrialization was very low, and the depression together with political repression greatly weakened existing unions and made organizing very difficult; thus, a significant urban labor movement did not emerge until the forties (Sulmont 1979).

Apra's program and style were very radical, anti-oligarchic and anti-imperialist, and after the election defeat of Haya de la Torre in 1931 it embarked on an insurrectionary strategy, leading to the uprising in Trujillo in 1932. This provoked a very intense counterreaction from the oligarchy, large sectors of the middle classes, and the military, with the result that Apra was suppressed until 1939.39 Since Apra was the crucial force behind popular organization, its suppression effectively dampened pressures, though only temporarily. In 1939, Apra was de facto reintegrated into the political process, and in the forties it was able to carry on organizational activities. Before the 1945 elections, Apra was legalized, which opened a three year period of less severely restricted democracy, with literate male suffrage. During these three years, popular organization and mobilization led by Apra reached new levels, which again alarmed the oligarchy and the military and provoked another coup followed by suppression of Apra. In 1956 a restricted democracy was reestablished, with continued strong military pressures against Aprista

39 In the course of the Trujillo uprising several military officers who had been taken hostage were killed. This provoked an immediate bloody retaliation by the military, as well as a deep lasting enmity between the military and Apra. This is an example of an historical event which had consequences lasting much beyond the underlying structural conditions that had originally provoked the event. Aside from Klarén (1973), Pike (1967), Bourricaud (1970), Villanueva (1975; 1977) and Cotler (1978:183-4) discuss the relationship between Apra, the oligarchy, the military, and other political actors.
participation in power, ultimately enforced by direct intervention (Villanueva 1975; 1977; Hilliker 1971:58-71). In the sixties, when civil society had grown stronger, the oligarchic-military alliance broke apart, and after the failure of a civilian regime to effect any significant reforms, the military seized power and established an authoritarian but including regime.40

In Bolivia, anti-oligarchic mobilization started in the late 1920s and greatly intensified after the loss of the Chaco War with Paraguay (1932-36). By that time, economic stagnation had accentuated elite infighting and eroded what contestation had been institutionalized in the early 20th century. Both nationalist and revolutionary socialist groups emerged among the middle classes, particularly the younger generation (Malloy 1970: 60-77). Radical forces promoted unionization; by 1940 railroad workers and artisan groups were organized already, and the miners were in the process of being organized. The MNR emerged as the strongest middle class nationalist group and aligned with a section of the military in 1943 to stage a coup and impose a mildly reformist government. However, in 1946 this government was overthrown, and in the following years the MNR deliberately widened and strengthened its social base (Klein 1971: 38-40). By that time, the organized working class was already strongly influenced by revolutionary socialists, and therefore the alliance sought by the MNR pushed the party’s program clearly to the left. In 1951 the MNR for the first time committed itself to universal suffrage, tin nationalization, and land reform (Malloy 1971:117).

After the successful 1952 revolt, the new MNR government did decree universal suffrage, including the large illiterate portion of the population. However, the MNR-labor alliance was fraught with tension and mutual suspicion from the beginning, and these tensions grew more severe as economic problems became pressing. Industrialization was still at a low stage and consequently civil society relatively weak, but strategically located sectors were highly organized and armed and competed for power in the context of weakly institutionalized contestation. Though the MNR continued to exist, it was unable to play the role of a cohesive, programmatic party, and

40 See e.g. Lowenthal (1975), Stepan (1978), and Philip (1978) for an analysis of the emergence and the character of this regime.
its organizational strength was insufficient to weather the economic problems of the mid-fifties (Malloy 1971:112-33). The economic austerity policies pitted labor against the center-right faction of the party which controlled the executive, and eventually led to bloody confrontations. Furthermore, there were no other cohesive parties representing interests of important social groups and capable of competing with the MNR. Thus, the military, which had been purged and greatly reduced in size after the revolution, was rebuilt with U.S. support and increasingly drawn into politics, with the result that it replaced the MNR by coup in 1964 (Malloy 1971: 131-44). 41

Colombia represents another case of "premature", party mediated mobilization, but here the mobilizing party, the Liberal Party, was firmly entrenched in the political system. In fact, it was attempting to strengthen its position in the system through mobilization and inclusion of the urban lower classes (Urrutia 1969:115-21). In this attempt, the Liberal government of 1934-38 introduced universal male suffrage. Local corruption of the electoral process, however, particularly in rural areas, remained so important that the resulting system can only be considered a restricted democracy (Oquist 1980:104-9). Partly due to initiatives by the Liberal government, such as promotion of labor organization and the founding of the central union organization CTC, and partly due to further growth of the Colombian economy, civil society grew in strength and some Liberal factions, particularly Gaitán and his followers, began to articulate the interests of new groups politically more forcefully. Despite the fact that labor organization was sponsored by the Liberal government, there were no corporatist institutions created to subject the labor movement to state control, nor was the labor movement brought under control of the Liberal Party; the Liberals shared control with the Communists and Socialists until 1946 when a Catholic union confederation was established in addition (Alexander 1965:134-7). By the mid-forties, mobilization and partisan political and class based hostility and violence were increasing rapidly, and after the Bogotazo violence became an unsolvable problem. This presented a strongly perceived threat to Conservative as well as Liberal interests, but instead of being able to

41 For developments leading up to and following the 1952 revolution, see Malloy (1970), the essays in Malloy and Thorn (1971), and Mitchell (1977).
compromise as in earlier times in the context of a less mobilized society, party leaders intensified competition and hostility, which led to the installation of an authoritarian regime in 1949 (Wilde 1978:51-58).

In Ecuador, the absence of an enclave and of any significant industrialization before the sixties meant that there was no base for a middle class - working class alliance which could have mobilized pressures for inclusion. There was little state involvement in the formation of the labor movement, and neither one of the traditional parties (Conservatives and Liberals) attempted to mobilize workers and link them organizationally to the party. Some ferment and opposition against oligarchic domination emerged after the mid-twenties, when the decline of cacao weakened the coastal agro-exporters and the commercial and financial groups linked to them (Schodt 1987: 37-50). However, the middle and working classes were too weak to take advantage of this crisis of hegemony to install an alternative regime responsive to their interests, and the military as an institution assumed an important political role. The combination of stalemate between the traditional sierra landowners and the coastal agro-exporting groups, with growing involvement of the middle classes, in part in alliance with the Liberals, a politically fractionalized military, and a weak working class led to extreme political instability. In 1944, an uprising by a coalition including sectors of the elites, middle classes and the military, and supported by the urban lower classes, toppled the incumbent president who was attempting to impose his handpicked, unpopular successor (Cueva 1982:34-44). The populist Velasco assumed the presidency and soon took an authoritarian path, thus alienating all major groups in the society; he was overthrown by the military in 1947. In the absence of the ability of any one group to impose its rule, the Conservatives as well as the Liberals, supported by the Socialists (Neira 1973:360), accepted the results of the 1948 election. These elections ushered in 13 years of restricted democratic rule, as three successive presidents were elected and able to serve their full terms. The military, though, remained directly involved in any matters that affected the interests of its members. The maintenance of restricted democracy in this period was greatly facilitated by the prosperity resulting from the rapid increase in banana exports, by the fact that
none of the elected presidents was under pressure from organized popular groups to initiate any major departures from the status quo, and by the resulting abstinence of all major social groups from appealing to the military for direct intervention. Some social diversification took place, as a significant amount of bananas was produced by medium and small farmers and the coastal prosperity attracted large numbers of migrants (Schodt 1987: 56-7). However, the industrial working class remained very small, the new urban and rural middle and lower class groups poorly organized, and the parties very weak personalistic institutions (Blanksten 1951: 58-71), such that there was no viable political movement defending the democratic regime when economic problems emerged in the late fifties, social tensions intensified, and the military reentered the scene as ultimate arbiter and temporary ruler.

Paraguay was similar to Ecuador in the long delay of industrialization, the lack of an enclave, and the weakness of the middle and working classes and the political parties. Where it differed from Ecuador was in the absence of a relatively strong landowning, commercial, and financial class linked to the export sector, competing for power with the more traditional landowners of the sierra and their ally, the Church, and in the strength of the state. This accounts for the difference between the prolonged political instability in Ecuador and the ability of authoritarian rulers in Paraguay to establish durable authoritarian regimes. The preponderance of the state and its repeated ruthless application of repression, combined with some attempts at incorporation in the aftermath of the Chaco War (Lewis 1982:27-42), left the middle and lower classes even weaker than in Ecuador. The two traditional parties had emerged in the 1870s, but they remained weak, personalistic, patronage based organizations, never making a serious attempt to organize middle and lower classes. When social diversification did accelerate under the impact of industrialization in the sixties, there was a very strong regime, under Stroessner, in place which managed to dominate the newly emerging groups from the beginning through the imposition of corporatist controls and repression (Lewis 1982:56-61). Accordingly, there was not even one period of restricted (not to speak of full) democracy.
What Chile, Venezuela, Peru, and Bolivia, the cases where the working class did play an important role in supporting middle class pressures for democratizing measures, have in common is that they are all enclave economies. Three mechanisms account for this relationship. First, enclaves, particularly in mining, facilitated early labor organization and the emergence of labor as a potentially important political actor. Second, the presence of the enclave weakened the capacity of the large landholders to establish themselves as a truly hegemonic class and consequently shape the values and political behavior of the middle classes. This meant that significant sectors of the middle classes could be organized into an anti-imperialist/anti-oligarchic alliance with the working class. Third, where the enclave was prospering, its proceeds gave the state a certain autonomy from the domestic economic elites and thus provided the potential for middle class political leaders who managed to gain control of the state to pursue a reformist course promoting middle and working class interests (and thus maintaining the coalition) without necessarily generating a fundamental conflict with the urban sectors of the economic elite and concomitant economic decline. The extreme case of this is Venezuela after 1958; under the Pact of Punto Fijo the vital interests of all classes could be protected and nevertheless AD retained a strong middle and working class base (Karl 1986:210-16). The counterexample is Bolivia, where the stagnation of the tin industry since 1930 had led to a non-expanding economic environment and a precarious financial situation, which meant that the policies of the MNR which increased working class consumption rapidly generated a balance of payments crisis and high inflation, which hurt the middle classes. The measures taken to deal with this crisis, then, shifted the burden of adjustment onto labor and thus broke the coalition apart (Malloy 1970:255-74).

There is another important difference between enclave and nationally controlled economies in the political articulation of civil society. In enclave economies, where the working

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42 Bergquist (1986:12; passim) makes a similar argument concerning the radicalizing impact of foreign dominated, capital intensive enclaves on the working and middle classes, but he does not see the role of the landowners as an important link. The greater strength of landowners in Chile in comparison with the other three cases certainly contributed to the conspicuous absence of anti-oligarchic and anti-imperialist policies under the Popular Front, in addition to the context of WWII.
class was mobilized into alliances with the middle classes, the type of party that was likely to emerge was a programmatic mass party, such as Apra in Peru, AD in Venezuela, and the Radical, Socialist and Communist Parties in Chile. The MNR in Bolivia more or less fits the type of a programmatic mass party, but the nature of the alliance formation discussed above meant that its unity and organizational coherence were precarious. In nationally controlled export economies, in contrast, where the middle classes did not promote working class mobilization into an alliance but nevertheless needed lower class support, the predominant type of party was a clientelistic one, such as the Radicals in pre-1930 Argentina, the Colorados and Blancos in Uruguay, and the Conservatives and Liberals in Colombia. This is not to say, of course, that the former type of parties did not also engage in clientelistic practices, particularly at the local level. However, they also had a commitment to a distinctive program at the national level, and they attempted to socialize their followers into a particular world view, something absent in the purely clientelistic parties.

The consequences of the existence of programmatic mass parties for the viability of democratic regimes are somewhat contradictory. On the one hand, they presented a more dramatic threat to elites than clientelistic parties with a middle and working class base and thus generated more repressive responses (Apra from its founding until 1978; AD 1948-58), but on the other hand they enjoyed strong legitimacy among and influence on their followers and thus could ensure mass compliance with political alliances or pacts concluded by party leaders (Chile after 1932; Venezuela after 1958). Such compliance, in turn, was favorable for the survival of restricted and fully democratic arrangements, as it reduced threat perception among elites and prevented ungovernability. Moreover, programmatic mass parties made a positive contribution to democratic consolidation in so far as their promotion of mobilization and political education strengthened the subordinate classes and increased the level of political participation among them.

43 A. Valenzuela (1977) makes a convincing case for the importance of patronage at the local level for all parties in Chile, including the left.
Clientelistic parties were highly susceptible to fragmentation. Where historical loyalties cemented party identification (Uruguay and Colombia), the parties managed to survive and maintain both their cross-class bases and the constitutional political process for longer periods of time than where the quest for state power was the only glue holding the party together (the Radicals in Argentina). However, even in the former cases party fragmentation led to situations where party leaders lost their ability to negotiate compromises, enforce compliance of their parties, and prevent a breakdown into uncontrolled violence (Colombia) or creeping military domination (Uruguay).

The experience of Venezuela and Colombia since 1958 demonstrates that historical legacies, or lack thereof, are not necessarily permanent impediments to the installation of democratic regimes. The political pacts concluded by leaders in the two countries established the conditions for effectively competing parties and a democratic system, albeit initially with a heavy dose of elite control and severe restrictions, whose effects are still omnipresent in Colombia. In Colombia, the pact revived an older tradition of compromise and coalition-building among the two traditional parties, but in Venezuela AD's position was weakened and party competition deliberately strengthened through political engineering, and accommodation and compromise were created virtually from scratch.44

The Chilean - Venezuelan contrast underlines the importance of the party system for the mediation of pressures for democratization. What was essential for elite acceptance of restricted democracy in Chile was that the elite had viable political parties capable of protecting its own interests. In Venezuela before 1958 in contrast, the elites and even sectors of the middle classes lacked political parties capable of competing effectively with Acción Democrática and thus turned against the democratic system. In general, where elite competition through political parties was

44 Lombardi (1982:241) makes the point that a legacy of strong authoritarian institutions is a problem for democracy, but that Venezuela demonstrates that this does not mean that democracy requires a long tradition of pre-democratic institutions, but rather that such institutions can be created rapidly under conditions of a political vacuum, i.e. the absence of entrenched authoritarian institutions.
firmly established when civil society grew in strength, as in Colombia, Chile, and Uruguay, new
groups were integrated into these parties and through them into the political system, and the
result was democracy with varying degrees of restriction but low military involvement. Where
elite competition through political parties was not well established, the results of the growing
strength of popular groups were severely restricted democratic regimes with high military
involvement (Argentina 1955-66, Brazil 1945-64, Peru 1939-48; 1956-68), or a short-lived
breakthrough to full democracy (Venezuela 1945-48). Under these conditions, the modal
response of elites, and partly also of non-elite groups, to high levels of social and political conflict
remained appeals to the military for intervention, appeals which were heeded all too frequently.

Military Involvement in Politics and Democracy

Having identified the differences in the timing and strength of democratizing pressures, the
class forces behind these pressures, the role of parties, and the response of the landowning elites
and of the state, we now need to analyze the conditions leading to high versus low military
involvement during periods of restricted democracy. This question, of course, has to be treated in
the context of the long tradition of military involvement in South America. As was discussed
above, the independence wars and the subsequent struggles over borders led to the great
importance of military force, which interacted with the problems of consolidating state power.
Military leaders competed with civilians for political power, and the existence of regional caudillos
made the imposition of national rule often difficult. But the problem of military involvement in
politics was by no means solved with consolidation of state power and the establishment of regular
armies under central command. Rather, intra-elite struggles and the weakness of civil society
caused civilian groups to appeal to factions of the military for intervention on their behalf.
Dissident elite sectors and the emerging middle classes appealed for military support in their
efforts to gain a share of political power, and the ruling groups frequently relied on the military to
squash such challenges. Consequently, the anti-oligarchic democratizing alliance often included military officers.

A first and easy answer to the question why the military continued to intervene during democratic periods in some cases but not in others is that "the most frequent sequel to military coups and government is more of the same" (Nordlinger 1977:207); in other words, that a tradition and/or relatively recent precedent of military intervention increases the likelihood of renewed intervention. To a certain extent, this is certainly the case; military intervention is more likely where normative underpinnings of institutionalized contestation are weak to begin with, and it weakens such norms further. For instance, military involvement in the overthrow of incumbent oligarchic governments and in the establishment of democratic rule by the middle class or middle-working class alliances was not particularly auspicious for the consolidation of democracy. Such military participation was mostly a result of the presence of internal conflicts in the military between supporters and opponents of the incumbent oligarchic governments. However, such conflicts in most cases perpetuated themselves and often intensified. This entailed the potential that the military opponents of the new government might get the upper hand again in the internal struggle and might intervene on the side of the civilian anti-democratic forces. Often, the very attempts of an incumbent government to influence military promotions in order to strengthen its supporters violated norms of professionalism and thus alienated crucial sectors of the officer corps. Argentina from 1912 to 1930, particularly during the second administration of Yrigoyen 1928-30 (Potash 1969: 29-54), and Venezuela from 1945 to 1948 (Lombardi 1982: 223-5) exemplify this pattern well.

In statistical studies a precedent of military intervention emerges as a good predictor of renewed intervention (Putnam 1967; Hibbs 1973), but the relationship is not perfect; for us, precisely the "outliers" are the interesting cases. For instance, Chile as of 1932 had an extended recent experience of military intervention, and nevertheless civilian governments came to power and ruled constitutionally for the next forty years. Moreover, military involvement does not need to take the form of outright intervention through a coup; other important forms of involvement are, for
instance, ultimatums posed to civilian governments and backed by coup threats, or implicit acknowledgment by civilian governments of military veto power over crucial decisions.

What clearly distinguishes the countries and periods with restricted democracy where military involvement is low from those where it is high is the existence versus absence of strong political parties. In the former type of system, parties provided for the representation of all established interests in the society, as well as for the gradual integration of new groups. The possibilities for protecting their interests and mediating conflict through the parties restrained civilians from appealing to the military for intervention and thus greatly reduced the military’s propensity to do so. In particular, it was important for elites to feel secure that their interests would be protected by a party with a strong base. What is important, then, is not just the existence of a strong party, but rather of two or more such parties capable of making a credible bid for participation in political power. Apra in Peru, AD in Venezuela, and the Peronists in Argentina were all very strong parties in terms of their organizational structure and mass base. However, they had no rival parties of comparable strength, their programs and appeals were quite radical and oriented exclusively towards their lower class base, and they furthermore claimed a monopoly on the representation of popular interests. As a result, they marginalized all other political actors and generated broad opposition coalitions, which in turn appealed to the military to repress these parties, lacking strong enough parties of their own to compete electorally.

Lowenthal (1986:15) is certainly correct when he points out in his review of the literature on the military in politics that the most persuasive writers on the subject stress the impact and interaction of macrosocial factors with corporate structure and interests proper. The degree of conflict in the society is a powerful incentive for military involvement, and in fact dynamics in society and in the military institution interact (e.g. O'Donnell 1976, Philip 1985, Nordlinger 1977). Stepan (1971) has demonstrated the importance of strong civilian appeals to the military for the

45 Parallel to my argument here, J.S. Valenzuela emphasizes the importance of strong conservative parties, representing elite interests, for the viability of democratic regimes. O'Donnell and Schmitter (1986:62-3) stress the importance of a strong showing of right wing parties in the founding elections in a process of redemocratization.
formation of a coup coalition and the actual execution of coups in Brazil between 1945 and 1964. Such appeals were also frequent during the period of restricted democracy in Argentina, Venezuela and Peru, where various elite sectors similarly lacked strong parties as instruments to protect their interests. In this group of countries, we can distinguish two patterns of relationships between civil society and the state, specifically its coercive arm. One pattern consists of an initially weak civil society which is undergoing a process of rapid organization, with out-groups pressuring for inclusion and in some cases trying to ally with sectors of the military, and in-groups feeling threatened and appealing to the military to protect order and keep the out-groups excluded. This is the pattern of Brazil 1945-64, Peru 1939-48 and 1956-68, and Venezuela 1935-45. The other pattern, occurring only in Argentina, consists of a very strong but stalemated civil society, where open conflict is high and the military is firmly opposed to the inclusion of one of the major social actors. In either pattern, military intervention of the moderator type contributed nothing to the institutionalization and resolution of the conflicts, notwithstanding military claims that intervention was necessary for the installation and preservation of "genuine" democracy. Ultimately (with a short fully democratic interlude in Venezuela), these moderator patterns ended in a military dictatorship, either of the institutional or the personalistic variety.

**Preliminary Summary**

To conclude this discussion of democratization before the late seventies/early eighties, we can stipulate the following three sufficient conditions for the establishment of viable (i.e. surviving more than one electoral period) fully democratic regimes in South America: (1) absence or previous elimination of large landowners engaged in labor intensive agriculture as powerful economic and political actors; (2) significant strength of subordinate classes, particularly the working class, in the balance of power in civil society; (3) political articulation of civil society
through two or more strong political parties. These conditions were given in Uruguay and Venezuela after 1958. The first two conditions are a result of the structure of the economy (type of agriculture, enclave versus nationally controlled export sector) and of the level of economic development (industrialization and urbanization); the third, and the second one in part, are a result of historical legacies or deliberate institution building acts. The first one is also subject to deliberate political action; that is, a sweeping land reform can eliminate large landowners as a powerful class. However, the conditions under which this is possible have occurred exceedingly rarely in South America, only in Peru 1968-75 and in Bolivia 1952-64, both countries with enclave economies where the landowners did not control the crucial export sector. In the Chilean case, the land reform failed to deprive the landowning class of economic and political power; under Pinochet, significant amounts of land were restituted to the former owners.

In the light of these conditions, it is understandable why democratic regimes without or with restrictions but low military intervention enjoyed greater longevity after a significant phase of ISI expansion. Industrialization both strengthened the working class and weakened the economic and political power base of large landowners relative to other sectors of the dominant class and the subordinate classes. Moreover, these conditions lead one to expect generally better chances for the consolidation of democracy in the eighties, particularly in countries where the large landholders have been eliminated as a powerful class, such as in Peru.

Admittedly, all three variables are continuous, and it would be very difficult to state exactly how powerless landowners engaged in labor repressive agriculture have to be, how strong civil society, and how strong political parties. Moreover, there is the possibility that the lower classes, particularly the organized working class, could be too strong and radical and thus

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46 These conditions are not necessary ones, though, as the examples of Argentina 1912-30 and Bolivia 1952-64 demonstrate, where there were no strong parties competing with the Radicals and the MNR, respectively.

47 The Chilean case makes clear that satisfaction of the three conditions has to be an accomplished fact before they can sustain a fully democratic system. In Chile, the attempt to disempower the landowners and the simultaneous rapid strengthening of civil society, which raised the threat level to the elites, contributed to the erosion of the democratic system.
too threatening not only to landowners and the bourgeoisie but also to significant sectors of the middle classes. In this situation, the likely outcome is not democracy but rather stalemate and instability and/or widespread support for a coup and the installation of a strong authoritarian regime excluding the lower classes. Argentina after 1955 approximated this situation. This draws our attention to the substantive limits, or the class nature, of democracy, that is, the extent to which democracy as a regime form became and remained viable only as long as the dominant classes were firmly represented by political parties or their interests protected by political pacts from democratic reform attempts by the political representatives of subordinate classes.\textsuperscript{48} The following discussion of breakdowns of democracy will again underline this point.

\section*{Regime Transformations After Initial Democratization}

\subsection*{Patterns of Transition}

The initial installation of a full or restricted democratic regime had an impact on later political dynamics in two ways; democracy allowed greater freedom for organizing among the subordinate classes, thus strengthening them, and this in turn put strains on the alliances which had achieved democratization. The attitudes of the dominant classes vis-a-vis democracy were affected by the concrete experience with it; where they enjoyed strong representation in the new system, they learned to accommodate to it, but where they were clearly marginalized from political power and threatened by the increasing organizational power of subordinate classes, they attempted to undermine the system.

In shifting the focus to the conditions accounting for regime changes after initial democratization, one can start by analyzing the types of transformation in the course of which

\textsuperscript{48} The implications of the comparative historical analysis for the questions of substantive limitations of democracy and of the possibilities for democratic reform are taken up in Rueschemeyer et al. (forthcoming).
political contestation and inclusion were widened (i.e. democratizing transitions) or restricted (i.e. transitions to authoritarianism), and by asking whether there are connections between the patterns of democratic and authoritarian transitions. Tables 4 and 5 give an overview of the types of transformation in the various cases.

In five of the eight countries which experienced periods of full or restricted democracy with low military involvement, the first transition was preceded by constitutional oligarchic or restricted democratic rule; in the other three cases, the transition took place directly from authoritarian rule. This gives some support to the hypothesis about the favorable effects of institutionalized contestation for the installation of democracy. If we look at the longevity of democracy rather than simple installation, the hypothesis about the favorable effects of fairly well consolidated contestation receives some more support. In two of the cases with immediately preceding constitutional oligarchic rule the new democratic regimes were quite long lived (Argentina 1912-30; Colombia 1936-48); the third case, Chile 1920-24, was a transitional case rather than a clear democratic opening and was very short lived (see notes to Table 1). If we look at all our cases and compare the longevity of full or restricted democracies with low military involvement which had no precedent of either constitutional oligarchic or democratic rule, whether immediate or in a previous phase, with those which were preceded by constitutional oligarchic and/or democratic rule, we find that the former lasted on the average ten years and the latter thirteen years.

There is also evidence to support the contention that the installation of a democratic regime produced dynamics favorable for democracy in the future, even if the first democratic regime could not be consolidated. The average length of the first period of fully democratic rule was 10 years; in the case of full democracies established after a (not necessarily immediately)

49 Dahl (1971:34-9) argues that the path from competitive oligarchy to polyarchy, i.e. first institutionalization of contestation and then inclusion, which was typical among the older polyarchies, is more likely to result in a stable regime than a simultaneous institutionalization of contestation and widening of inclusion, or a path where institutionalization of contestation comes after inclusion.
preceding fully or restricted democratic period, the average lifespan was 19 years. The difference is even stronger for restricted democracies with low military involvement; the average length of the first such phase was 11 years, as opposed to 26 years for such regimes in countries which had experienced a previous phase of democracy. One can explain this difference with the growth in the strength of subordinate classes made possible during previous democratic periods on the one hand, and the greater willingness of elites to compromise in order to consolidate the regime on the other hand.

Where a first democratic regime broke down and a second democratizing transformation occurred, the same type of democracy tended to be reestablished. If a fully democratic regime had been established the first time, the country was likely to return to the same type (Argentina 1946; Uruguay 1942); if it had been a restricted democracy, the same or similar restrictions were likely to reemerge (Chile 1932; Colombia 1958; Peru 1956; Ecuador 1978). Only in a further step was a full opening likely to occur (Chile 1970; Peru 1980), and only after a second breakdown were greater restrictions likely to be imposed (Argentina 1955). One explanation for this is an institutionalization effect in so far as previously established political rules and procedures could more easily be revitalized than new ones shaped from scratch. A second and complementary explanation is that in general traditional authoritarian regimes did not drastically change the underlying constellation of contending forces; only the populist and the bureaucratic authoritarian systems did, the former by mobilizing and thus strengthening, and the latter by demobilizing and violently breaking the organizational strength of popular forces. The exception here is Venezuela;

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50 This only includes cases where redemocratization occurred before the eighties, as the lifespan of these newest democracies cannot be gauged yet.
51 The latter part of this argument appears to support a presently fashionable view, the importance of "political learning" for the consolidation of democracies. However, I would argue that to the extent that learning does take place and does support consolidation, it is not the learning by experience of appropriate democratic behavior, but rather the learning by experience of the highly detrimental features of authoritarian rule, and the consequent commitment to making democracy work in order to avoid them.
52 The same argument is quite familiar if applied to the legacy of authoritarian institutions; successor authoritarian regimes tend to revitalize previously established forms of political control.
after the authoritarian regime which had replaced the short lived (1945-48) experiment with full democracy, political and economic elites decided to install a restricted democracy in 1958.

What is striking if one looks at the transformations which restricted contestation and/or inclusion is that there are no cases where any form of democracy was replaced with a constitutional oligarchic regime, nor cases where one type of democracy was replaced with another, more restricted one. What this means is that once a more open political system was established, it was not possible any longer to simply restrict participation and/or restore an oligarchic system; rather, recourse to more coercive measures and the installation of some type of authoritarian system were necessary.

Transitions to Authoritarianism

To understand the transitions to authoritarianism, one needs to separate out two questions, namely (1) the factors accounting for the breakdowns of democratic regimes, and (2) the factors shaping the type of regime replacing the democratic one. The first question asks whether some types of democratic regimes had congenital weaknesses which made their breakdown likely. The most clear cut case are restricted democracies with high military involvement; sooner or later, they all broke down into authoritarianism. Where the military was heavily involved in the politics of a restricted democracy, it was not possible to reduce or neutralize such involvement without an intervening authoritarian period during which the military discredited itself and/or endangered its own institutional cohesion and therefore decided to withdraw from politics. Full democracies before the 1980s did not fare much better; eight of the nine cases broke down, the exception being Venezuela since 1968. In three cases, though, the breakdown occurred after extended periods of democratic rule (Argentina 1930; Uruguay 1933 and 1973).

The least likely type of democratic regimes to break down into authoritarianism were restricted democracies with low military involvement. Of the six cases established prior to the late seventies, only one was replaced by an authoritarian regime, namely Chile 1924, which was a
transitional case of regime to begin with; three were transformed into full democracies (Chile 1970; Uruguay 1919; Venezuela 1968); and two remained restricted democracies but relaxed some of the restrictions (Chile 1958; Colombia 1971). The relative stability of these regimes was due to two factors; first, the nature of the coalition which had established the regimes, i.e. an alliance between the middle classes and sectors of the economic elites, in some cases appealing for popular support but not including organized lower classes as full partners; and second, the existence of firmly institutionalized party competition, i.e. the presence of two or more strong political parties at least one of which effectively represented elite interests. The working class was allowed to organize, and its organized sectors were included (or better: tolerated) in the political process, but there was no concerted effort by the state and/or a political party to promote organization and mobilize the working class into an alliance with the middle classes. Thus, civil society grew in strength gradually, without posing an acute threat to the elites which would engender repression. Chile is a partial exception; the installation of the restricted democracy in 1932 was effected by a middle class - elite alliance, but from 1938 on the middle - working class alliance played a very important role and generated a considerable degree of mobilization. The reason why the restricted democratic regime nevertheless managed to survive for such a long time in Chile is the confidence of the elites in their effective representation in the political system. When this confidence was eroded in the early seventies, the elites started undermining the democratic regime.

In general, where an alliance between the middle classes, sometimes represented by a relatively autonomous political class, and sectors of the economic elites was the decisive force behind the democratizing transformation, relatively stable restricted or full democracies emerged. This was the case for the democratizing transformations in Uruguay in 1903, 1919, and 1942; Colombia in 1936 and 1958; and Venezuela in 1958 and 1968. The condition for the very formation of such an alliance was, of course, that at least significant sectors of the economic elites felt that they would be able to ensure protection of their interests under the new regime either through strong parties or through the provisions of a political pact. As long as this
expectation was borne out, the democratic systems survived; where the party system appeared to lose the ability to perform this function, such as in Colombia by 1948, and Uruguay by 1933 and 1973, elites effectively promoted a turn to authoritarianism.

Where the middle classes and sectors of the elites were allied with sectors of the military in the process of democratization, there was a strong potential for perpetuation of military involvement (Brazil after 1945, Argentina after 1955, Chile after 1920), or for an easy revival thereof in response to civilian appeals (Argentina 1930). In either case, the result was an eventual military takeover and installation of an authoritarian regime. Equally unstable situations prevailed in all cases but Chile before 1970 where middle and working classes formed an alliance to push for democratization, a situation typical of enclave economies (Peru in 1939 and 1956, Bolivia in 1952, Venezuela in 1945, and Chile in 1970). In order to be successful, these alliances needed to promote high mobilization, but the price of victory was the implacable enmity of the elites and/or the military and other sectors of the middle classes. Thus, even where such alliances were able to establish full democracies, their success entailed the danger of polarization and formation of broad opposition coalitions, and thus of rapid erosion of these democracies.53 Moreover, except for Chile, these democracies were premature in the sense that civil society and particularly the organization of lower classes were still comparatively weak. This weakness was compensated by party mobilization of strategic sectors in the installation phase, but it impaired consolidation of the democratic regimes. In the case of Peru, high military involvement prevailed during the periods of restricted democracy, as Apra's early insurrectionary strategy and its

53 This is not to be interpreted as an argument in support of the view that Chilean democracy broke down because of "hypermobilization" (Landsberger and MacDaniel 1976). It is not clear that the inclusion of the rural sector through rural unionization and political mobilization in the sixties, the increase in urban unionization, and the enfranchisement of illiterates for the 1971 municipal elections per se were responsible for the breakdown of Chilean democracy. They certainly contributed to a turn among the large landowners and the bourgeoisie against the democratic regime, but it is plausible to argue that democracy would have survived if the electoral system had not produced a minority president with a hostile congress and with very radical reform designs. For a discussion of the political institutional factors contributing to the breakdown, such as the presidential system and the constitutional reforms of 1970 designed to strengthen the executive, see A. Valenzuela (forthcoming).
continued strong mobilization efforts and participation in coup conspiracies made a majority in the military determined to bar Apra from access to state power; both periods of restricted democracy gave way to authoritarian military regimes.

The role of large landowners as opponents of democracy tended to change after the installation of democratic regimes, under the impact of their concrete experiences with full or limited democracy. Whereas landowners engaged in non-labor repressive agriculture acquiesced to the installation of fully democratic regimes, they turned into rabid opponents of these regimes once they saw their influence dwindle and felt economically threatened (Argentina 1930, Uruguay 1933). In contrast, landowners who depended on a mixture of market and political coercion to ensure themselves a large pool of cheap labor and who had opposed a democratic opening, tended to accommodate themselves to limited democracies if they were convinced by experience that their control over votes could assure them an influential position in the political process, or that their interests were effectively protected under a political pact (Chile after 1932; Colombia after 1958).

In most cases, though not in all, the breakdown of democratic regimes occurred in situations of acute economic problems and was clearly related to these problems. This was the case in Chile 1924 and 1973, Argentina 1930, 1951, 1966, and 1976, Uruguay 1933 and 1973, Bolivia 1964, Brazil 1964, Ecuador in 1961, and Peru in 1948 and 1968. In Venezuela and Colombia in 1948 this was clearly not the case. The breakdowns in the twenties and thirties were related to the crisis of the nitrate industry in Chile and to the Depression in Argentina and Uruguay. In the latter two cases, the agrarian exporters felt threatened by the decline in external demand and by what they perceived as inadequate policy responses of the incumbent governments.\textsuperscript{54} The later breakdowns were related to balance of payments problems, resulting

\textsuperscript{54} Rock (1975) and Smith (1978) disagree on the importance of the Depression for the 1930 breakdown in Argentina. Rock emphasizes the effects of the depression, whereas Smith stresses the question of access to political power and the consequent illegitimacy of the system in the eyes of the conservatives. I agree with Rock that the depression was clearly crucial and would argue that it was the perception of an acute threat to their interests which made the marginalization from political power intolerable for the agro-exporting interests. For a discussion
from secular stagnation of the export sector (Argentina 1951), or decline of the export sector due
to increased competition from other producers and falling prices (Ecuador), or secular stagnation
aggravated by the decline in exports and terms of trade after the Korean War boom (Bolivia), or
by problems in the export sector combined with the exhaustion of the easy phase of ISI (Brazil,
Argentina 1966 and 1976, Uruguay). In Peru in 1948 and 1968 economic problems were present
but, compared to the other cases, of lesser importance than more strictly political factors in
causing the breakdown. Chile in 1973 is a special case in so far as the economic crisis was
crucial in the fall of the Allende government, but its emergence was less due to economic factors
per se than to their interaction with the internal political struggle.

Whereas the type of coalition which installed a democratic regime and the type of party
system in place heavily conditioned the likelihood of the regime's breakdown, and the occurrence
of severe economic problems influenced its timing, the stage of ISI reached when the breakdown
occurred shaped the type of authoritarian regime which would replace the democratic one. In the
early stages of ISI, traditional or populist authoritarian regimes emerged, the former based on an
alliance including agro- exporting, commercial and financial economic elites and the military
(Argetina 1930, Colombia 1949, Peru 1948), and in addition sectors of the middle classes
(Uruguay 1933, Venezuela 1948, Bolivia 1964), the latter based on a populist cross-class
coalition with military backing (Perón 1951). Foreign capital in all these cases was

55 Peru in 1968 does not fit the mold of the traditional or populist authoritarian systems nor of the
bureaucratic authoritarian one. The regime was initially exclusively based on the military

concentrated in extractive industries, commerce, finance, transport, and utilities, and only in Argentina, Venezuela and Bolivia the democratic regimes had seriously threatened some of these holdings. Accordingly, foreign companies and their local representatives played a less prominent role in the traditional or populist authoritarian regimes than they would in supporting the bureaucratic authoritarian regimes at advanced stages of ISI. Popular mobilization at the time of the installation of the traditional authoritarian regimes was at a comparatively still low to intermediate level, but in several cases it had been growing very rapidly and thus had raised the level of threat perception among the elites and the military (Venezuela 1945-48, Peru 1945-48), or led to a decay of the democratizing coalition (Bolivia 1952-64), or started to degenerate into uncontrollable violence (Colombia in the 1940s), all of which paved the way for the turn to authoritarianism.

The type of regime which tended to replace critically weakened democracies at advanced stages of ISI was a bureaucratic authoritarian one (Brazil 1964, Argentina 1966 and 1976, Chile 1973, Uruguay 1973). As O'Donnell (1973) has convincingly argued, it was the situation of completion of light consumer goods industrialization, heavily dependent on imports of capital and intermediate goods, in the context of the declining export performance, which generated balance of payments crises and economic stagnation. Since ISI had strengthened the labor movement, institution, and it never managed to build a strong organized social support base. Its reformism alienated all elite sectors, and its incorporation attempts towards the lower classes generated significant mobilization and organization, but stifled efforts to turn these organizations into strong support bases. It emerged at an intermediate stage of ISI and in the context of intermediate levels of popular mobilization. Thus, the threat from popular forces was less important as a motivating factor for the military than the inability of the democratic system to generate effective nationalist-developmentalist policies (see e.g. Stepan 1978 and Lowenthal 1975).

Ecuador in 1961 and 1963 does not fit the patterns of class coalitions and regimes outlined here either. No stable class and party coalitions were formed; rather, the President from 1961-63 was under fire from right and left, elites and labor, and in 1963 the military took power with reformist intentions, ruling at least initially quite autonomously from forces in civil society (Schrodt 1987:82-3).

The critiques of O'Donnell's argument in Collier (1979) focus on the connection between the implementation of policies for the deepening of industrialization and the installation of bureaucratic-authoritarian regimes; they largely accept the point that the situation of economic stagnation after a period of rapid industrialization generated sharp social conflicts over economic policy.
efforts to implement an economic solution to the crisis which shifted the costs onto the lower classes repeatedly failed in the framework of the democratic systems and intensified open confrontation. Moreover, the strong penetration of foreign capital into the manufacturing sector had opened new alliance possibilities for authoritarian forces (O'Donnell 1973, Collier 1979). Accordingly, military regimes whose installation was initially supported by the entire economic elite and large sectors of the middle classes threatened by popular mobilization came to base themselves exclusively on support from civilian technocrats, the big internationalized bourgeoisie, exporting groups, and foreign capital (O'Donnell 1978). The implementation of their austerity and export promotion policies hurt not only the working and lower classes, but also the middle classes and the traditional sectors of the bourgeoisie producing for the domestic market. Whereas their primary emphasis was on the economic exclusion and the destruction of the organizational potential of the lower classes, the economic effects of their policies on the middle classes and sectors of the bourgeoisie required a closing of all channels and destruction of all institutions for the articulation of group or class interests. As a result, civil society as a whole and its political articulation were significantly weakened in all these cases, at least initially, and most dramatically so in Chile and Brazil.

Redemocratization in the Seventies and Eighties

Where the new authoritarian regimes were successful in generating further industrialization, civil society grew stronger again after the initial phase of repression, and pressures for liberalization and democratization reemerged. As Stepan (1985:333) points out, the number of industrial workers in Brazil grew by 52% from 1960 to 1970, and by another 38% from 1970-74, and the concentration of new industrial activity in the Sao Paulo area facilitated the emergence of new unions. Such new unions in crucial economic sectors, along with human rights groups and Church-related organizations demanded a restoration of civil and political rights. In Peru, under a different type of military regime from the bureaucratic authoritarian ones, mobilization of urban and rural workers and of urban squatters greatly increased and provided the
basis for forceful protests against the military government's economic policies and for a return to democratic rule (Stephens 1983). Though divisions within the military institutions and the regimes were crucial for the initiation of liberalization in all cases (O'Donnell and Schmitter 1986:19), and Brazil and Peru were no exceptions, democratization would arguably not have gone as far as it did in these two cases had it not been for the greater organizational weight of subordinate classes and the consequent pressures from civil society.

In Argentina, the bureaucratic authoritarian regimes failed to achieve both their economic and political goals, and there was no clear change in the strength of civil society. If anything, fragmentation of the Peronist movement weakened an important part of civil society. The transition to democracy then was less the result of growing pressures from civil society than self-destruction of the military regime (Cavarozzi 1986:155, 168; Viola and Mainwaring 1984). Tensions between the military as an institution and the military as a government had started in 1980 already (Stepan 1985:329-30), were aggravated by the severe economic crisis generated by the government's policies, and were completed through the disastrous launching of the Falklands war.

In Uruguay the years between 1974 and 1980 brought significant (at least compared to Uruguay's record over the preceding two decades) economic growth, before the balance of payments crisis of the early eighties ushered in austerity policies and a recession. Despite this growth, civil society was drastically weakened between 1973 and 1978, mainly due to heavy repression of labor and the left (Stepan 1985:325). However, neither the economic base for the labor movement nor the organizational infrastructure of the traditional non-left parties were destroyed. Thus, despite the previous repression of activists from all parties, the opposition managed to regroup rapidly once the first opening was provided by the military's decision to hold a referendum in 1980 (Gillespie 1986: 179-87; Handelman 1986:209-14).

Pinochet's deindustrialization policies and the attempt to destroy the party system significantly weakened civil society and its capacity for articulating demands for political change (Valenzuela and Valenzuela 1986). As Garretón points out (1986:121), the military's policies of
deindustrialization and state retrenchment in Chile have generated marginalization, segmentation, and disintegration, in stark contrast to the consolidation of new social forces as a result of industrialization and expansion of the state in Brazil. This contrast, along with Pinochet’s iron control over the military and the ruthlessness of repression, go a long way in explaining the lack of significant progress towards democratization.

In Bolivia and Ecuador, economic growth in the sixties and seventies did not result in a strengthening of the working class; the percentage of the workforce in the secondary sector remained virtually stagnant between 1965 and 1980, at about one fifth (World Bank 1986:238-9). Unlike in Peru, the policies of the military regimes did not significantly raise the level of mobilization and organization of the lower classes either; on the contrary, the Banzer regime was highly repressive towards labor and the left. And in both cases the weakness and fractionalization of political parties persisted (Malloy and Gamarra 1987; Conaghan 1987; Handelman 1981). Accordingly, despite formal steps towards redemocratization, democracy remained highly unstable, threatened by frequent coup conspiracies and resort to unconstitutional means by incumbents, and restricted by a continued crucial role of the military. In Bolivia, the heavy involvement of the military in the narcotics smuggling industry which had flourished under Banzer was an additional obstacle to democratization (Whitehead 1986:64-7). The result was chaotic politics, at times behind a democratic façade (Malloy and Gamarra 1987). In Ecuador, the struggle among contending forces produced an impasse between executive and legislature right from the start (Handelman 1981:66-9); this repeated itself under the second civilian government and eventually led to constitutional crisis and resort to physical force by members of Congress and the President (Conaghan 1987: 152).

57 McClintock (1986) also points to the lower level of development in Ecuador and Bolivia compared to Peru as a factor making democratic consolidation less likely. Among the other factors increasing the chances for consolidation in Peru she mentions the legacy of the reforms under the Velasco regime and the guerrilla threat which induces the elites to perceive the choice as one between elections and civil war or revolution.
International economic influences were important for democratizing tendencies in an indirect way, in so far as the expansion of the export economy and later ISI, stimulated by the Depression and World War II, affected the class structure and thus the strength of civil society and its political articulation. Thus, to the extent that integration into world markets generated economic growth, it also affected the class structure in a way to bring forth pressures for democratization. Moreover, where this integration took the form of an enclave it tended to weaken the economic and political power bases of anti-democratic landowners. However, other effects of economic dependence, perpetuated by the particular way in which Latin America was integrated into world markets, were negative for pro-democratic forces.

First, as already discussed, dependent industrialization led to the emergence of a comparatively small industrial working class and of a very large urban informal sector of self-employed and of people employed in very small enterprises. This made labor organization exceedingly difficult. The relative isolation of the best organized sectors of the working class in the minerals industries further hindered the spread of labor organization and ideology. And in the absence of a strong current of organization in the working class, middle class organizations tended to remain weaker and less prone to promoting democratization as well. Even though elites were dependent on external markets and/or state protection and thus weak compared to their counterparts in the core countries, they could and did derive considerable strength from the formation of alliances with the state and with foreign capital.

Second, vulnerability to external shocks in some cases gave rise to economic crises which fundamentally threatened the interests of economic elites along with those of all other sectors of society. This induced elites who had shared political power in a democratic context with representatives of middle class interests to attempt to reassert exclusive control by imposing an authoritarian system. The most clear cut cases illustrating this are Argentina in 1930 and Uruguay in 1933. The economic problems which contributed to the erosion of fragile
democracies in the fifties and sixties were less attributable to a clearly identifiable external shock like the Depression, but they were equally clearly related to structural features of dependent industrialization.

Third, the presence of direct foreign investment in crucial sectors of the economy also tended to weigh on the side of the anti-democratic forces in a very direct way. Foreign investors not only strongly opposed reform attempts of democratic governments, such as increases in corporate taxes and elimination of privileges (not to speak of expropriation), thus undermining these governments' economic base and political support, but also encouraged anti-democratic forces to take action. The opposition from foreign investors and their support for authoritarian transitions were most visible in the sixties and seventies (Brazil 1964, Chile 1973), both because the penetration of foreign capital was very extensive and these regimes most openly challenged its position. However, opposition and retaliation also occurred where foreign capital was largely confined to extractive industries and infrastructure, if its prerogatives were attacked (Venezuela 1945-48). Particularly detrimental for democracy was the fact that U.S. companies could mobilize pressures from their home government on democratic regimes. Chile 1970-73 is the most dramatic case (U.S. Senate, 1975), but Brazil under Goulart (Skidmore 1967:322-30) and Peru under Belaunde (Jaquette 1971:172) also experienced such pressures. In these cases, pressures from international economic and political forces coincided.

Influences from the international system of states favorable to democracy were clearly weaker than in Europe. South American countries were not significantly involved in either of the World Wars, and thus the aftermath of the Wars had a weaker impact on pro-democratic forces. Only in Argentina, Brazil, Venezuela, and Peru did the end of WW II reinforce democratic tendencies. In the post-War period, the European powers were very concerned with consolidating democracy in their own region, and EEC pressures for democratization in Southern Europe were related to these concerns. Moreover, the Socialist International played an important pro-democratic role in Europe. The European concerns and consequent pro-democratic actions in international politics had only a much weaker counterpart in the U.S. and its
sphere of influence, as perceived security interests of the U.S. as a global power assumed priority (Whitehead 1986). The one case in Latin America where U.S. pressures for democracy were applied and where they managed to tip the internal balance of power towards the democratic forces is the Dominican Republic in 1978 (Kryzanek 1979).

In contrast, anti-democratic influences from the international state system were considerably stronger in South America than in Europe, most prominently the Cold War and U.S. support for and training of the South American military. U.S. pressures induced many governments to outlaw communist parties and thus to allow at best for restricted democracy, even where these parties clearly played by the democratic rules of the game. Military assistance in the fifties and sixties reinforced the anti-communism of the South American military, which tended to become co-terminous with anti-leftism and anti-popular (democratic) forces. It also strengthened the military as an institution and thus its potential to act autonomously not only from the incumbent government but from civil society and political institutions in general. Whereas U.S. military aid and assistance do not explain the erosion of the democratic systems, (which was mainly due to the underlying forces discussed above), they clearly were a factor shaping the type of bureaucratic-authoritarian regimes installed in Brazil, Argentina, Chile and Uruguay in the sixties and seventies.58 Furthermore, U.S. pressures exercised through economic means and diplomatic channels did contribute to the undermining of the legitimacy of incumbent governments and thus to the critical weakening of democratic systems in Bolivia and Brazil before 1964, Peru before 1968, and Chile before 1973.

58 In a study of 17 countries which were "developing democracies" (i.e. developing countries under democratic regimes) in the early to mid-sixties, Muller finds a statistically significant and quite strong negative correlation between U.S. military aid per soldier received in the period 1953-63 and subsequent democratic political stability during the Johnson and Nixon administrations (Muller 1985:461). In contrast, he finds no such relationship between indicators of economic dependence and democratic survival. This suggests that high levels of military aid did add to the troubles of democracy in South America. One can accept Muller's explanation that military aid afforded strong influence to U.S. policy-makers whose Cold War views often predisposed them to support authoritarian regimes, and one can add to this that the aid also strengthened the general potential of the military to act politically, be it in alliance with sectors of elites or autonomously from civilian social and political forces.
Conclusion

To summarize the results of this analysis and draw out its implications for the explanatory power of structural approaches to the study of democracy in South America, we can start with the point that Moore was correct in identifying a strong landed class engaged in labor repressive agriculture as a crucial obstacle to the establishment and survival of democratic regimes. Only where the landed class played a secondary role in the export economy (Venezuela, Chile, Bolivia), or where non-labor repressive agriculture predominated (Argentina and Uruguay), the establishment of a fully democratic regime was possible. 59

The role of the middle classes, which are the crucial democratic protagonists in modernization theory, was important, to a large extent because the working class was too small and the peasantry too dominated to play an important political role by themselves. However, the middle classes were by no means an inherently democratic force; rather, they primarily promoted their own inclusion and formed the alliances most conducive to the achievement of this goal. Where dissident elite sectors and sectors of the military were available as allies, the middle classes were quite content with restricted democracy (e.g. Chile 1920-24; Peru 1956-68; Colombia 1958 to the present). Where the middle classes depended on the working class as an ally, and where illiteracy was high, they pushed for full democracy (Peru before 1948, Venezuela), though sometimes reluctantly (Bolivia); where they depended on the working class

59 If one widens the perspective and includes Central America, Guatemala presents a problem for this argument in that coffee was the crucial export sector, it was labor intensive, and domestically controlled. However, the reason why the coffee oligarchy was unable to prevent the revolution of 1944 and thus the installation of a democratic regime was that its position as a national dominant class was weakened by the extremely strong presence of foreign capital in transport and in the marketing of coffee, as well as by the coexistence of coffee with foreign owned banana plantations as important export producers. Thus, the oligarchy shared political control with military dictators. Moreover, direct U.S. political pressures often exerted strong influence and thereby reduced oligarchic control over the political system further.
as an ally and illiteracy was low, they were content with literacy restrictions of the franchise, or restricted urban democracy (Chile 1938-70).60

As the working class power perspective would lead one to expect, in all cases but one the working class was a pro-democratic force if it was strong enough to play any visible political role (Chile, Venezuela, Peru, Bolivia, Uruguay). The notable exception here is Argentina under Perón, where a large part of the working class had been mobilized by Perón and thus did not challenge his authoritarian control over the labor movement itself nor his turn to political authoritarianism. The fact that in the other cases (Brazil, Colombia, Ecuador, Paraguay) the working class was too weak to play a significant political role was crucial for the problems of democracy there, and even in the above mentioned cases where the working class did play a significant role, its relative weakness presented a problem for the consolidation of democratic regimes.

The role of the state was very important in Brazil in retarding the growth of civil society and its political articulation. The legacy of Vargas consisted not only in a weak and dependent labor movement but also in two weak parties, unable to promote any clear programs and effectively represent conflicting interests. In general, the coercive arm of the state, the military, has been an important political actor since the nineteenth century. However, the frequency and

60 Implicit in this argument is a rejection of the hypothesis that exclusion is a function of ethnic composition of the population. Reviewing the cases from the point of view of this hypothesis, its weakness becomes apparent as no clear pattern of a relationship between ethnicity and exclusion emerges. Ethnic heterogeneity is neither a necessary nor a sufficient condition for the presence of excluding rule; conversely, ethnic homogeneity is neither a necessary nor a sufficient condition for the absence of it. It is true that the countries with the most years of fully democratic rule, Argentina and Uruguay, are also the most “European” countries; however, both of these countries had also periods of excluding authoritarian rule. Bolivia has a very large Indian population, and nevertheless had 12 years of full democracy. Paraguay is a case with a very homogeneous population but still no periods of democracy at all. What one can say is that where selective exclusion existed, the most common mechanism was literacy qualifications of the franchise, and this affected primarily the rural population and thus Indians where they were present. Where the Indian population was large, these features affected a large percentage of the population (e.g. in Peru and Ecuador). However, the effect on voter turnout was not very different, for instance, from Chile, where there was also a restricted (literate) urban democracy but a small percentage of Indians. In the 1960 elections in Ecuador, 14% of the population voted, in Peru in 1958 12%, and in Chile in 1958 17% (Statistical Abstracts of Latin America 1963).
type of military involvement in politics has varied among the different countries. Direct intervention through coups was particularly frequent where major civilian groups did not play by the rules of institutionalized contestation but rather appealed to the military for intervention on their behalf. The type of intervention, i.e. whether it was on the side of pro- or anti-democratic forces depended on the interaction between the institutional character of the military (degree of professionalization, internal unity versus tensions between old and new guards, recruitment and socialization patterns of officers) and the political role of the middle classes. The stronger the middle classes and the more pro-democratic their posture, the more likely it was that factions of the military aligned with them in their efforts to install a democratic regime (e.g. Argentina before 1912, Uruguay in 1903-04, and Venezuela in 1945). Whether these factions were able to get the upper hand depended in part on their positions in the military hierarchy and the strength of ties to oligarchic interests among the senior officers. In contrast, the stronger the perceived threat to stability from the lower classes, and the more anti-democratic the posture of the middle classes, the more likely it was that the military would support oligarchic efforts to assert control or, in the case of highly professionalized military institutions, that it would intervene in a moderator role or establish a military dominated regime.

The analysis of the circumstances under which major civilian groups did or did not accept the rules of institutionalized contestation drew our attention to the need to add the structure of political institutions to the social structural analysis. For the survival of a democratic system with low military involvement, the existence of two or more strong competing parties was indispensable. These parties could derive strength from a well developed organizational structure and programmatic cohesion, typical of mass parties (Chile, Venezuela, Peru since

61 Nun points out the middle class character of the officer corps and the similarity in the political interests and actions of the military and the middle classes. In fact, he goes as far as to claim that "the armed forces became one of the few important institutions controlled by the middle class" (1967:76). Whereas his view ignores important internal dynamics in the military institution and cannot account for the cases where the military intervened on the side of the elites against middle class attempts to force an opening of the oligarchic system, it does draw attention to the frequent affinity between the political roles of the middle classes and of the military.
1980), or in the absence of either organizational or programmatic cohesion, they could derive strength from historical partisan identification (Colombia and Uruguay). As noted already, the fact that the presence of strong parties representing elite interests, or of a political pact protecting these interests instead, was crucial for the consolidation of restricted or full democracy underscored the substantive limits of democracy with regard to effective participation of the lower classes. Acceptance of democracy on the part of elites and large sectors of the middle classes was conditional, subject to transformation into search for an authoritarian solution if political power were to be used to bring about fundamental social change (Venezuela 1945-48; Chile 1970-73).

The analysis here also underlined the importance of different stages of dependent industrialization for the formation of different class coalitions and thus regime forms. Some degree of industrialization was necessary for the emergence of democratic pressures because of the need for a certain level of consolidation of civil society. Accordingly, the most advanced countries in the early 20th century were the first to establish democratic regimes (Argentina in 1912 and Uruguay in 1903/1919). In contrast, raw material based export economies which generated little subsidiary industrialization were inhospitable ground for democratization.

The contraction of the export economy after 1929 promoted import substitution industrialization which in turn brought forth pro-democratic forces in the expanding middle and working classes and provided the potential for the formation of new class coalitions and the establishment of including regimes. Thus, transitions to various forms of democratic regimes took place in the thirties and forties in Chile, Uruguay, Argentina, Colombia, Venezuela, Brazil, Peru, and Ecuador (see Table 4). The alternative to democratic transitions tended to be the emergence of populist authoritarian regimes.

The problems in the export sector and the stagnation of ISI in the fifties intensified social conflict virtually everywhere, and breakdown or survival of democratic regimes depended on the degree of elite representation through the party system, the threat posed to elite interests by
popular mobilization, and the severity of the economic crisis. Democracy emerged and survived only in Venezuela and Colombia, the two cases where political pacts guaranteed the elites that their interests would be protected. The character of the new regimes and their economic policies were strongly influenced by the degree of industrialization reached, by the traditional role of the state in the economy, and by pressures from international financial institutions. Where industrialization was advanced, as in Argentina, Brazil, Chile, and Uruguay, bureaucratic-authoritarian regimes based themselves on alliances between the state, foreign capital, and the internationalized segment of the national bourgeoisie. All these regimes implemented orthodox economic stabilization policies of the variety prescribed by the International Monetary Fund, but then Brazil embarked on a program of deepening industrialization with very strong state participation, whereas Chile in the seventies went to the opposite extreme of destatization and deindustrialization, with Argentina and Uruguay falling in between these two policy positions. The progress of industrialization in Brazil in turn generated new social forces, new alliances and stronger pressures for democratization than had ever existed before.

Where industrialization was less advanced, the political outcomes of the generalized economic problems emerging in the fifties were more diverse, namely the establishment of a reformist military regime in Peru and of more traditional military regimes with intermittent manifestations of some reformist tendencies in Bolivia and Ecuador, and democracies established on the basis of political pacts in Colombia and Venezuela. In Bolivia severe resource constraints impeded the establishment of an including regime like the Peruvian one. A lower level of popular mobilization made the establishment of an including regime unnecessary in Ecuador, and it facilitated the survival of restricted democracy in Colombia. In Venezuela oil resources made inclusion and thus the transition to full democracy in 1968 possible.

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62 Collier (1979:388) focuses on the interaction of economic resources, popular sector strength, and threat perception as determinants of regime change in this period.
The role of the international state system in shaping domestic political outcomes was shown to be important in the analysis here. The weakness of constitutional rule in South America in the 19th century can be explained by the combination of the effects of the independence wars on elite fragmentation, and frequent external military interventions, which brought the military into a prominent political role and made military dictatorships the dominant form of rule. Strong influences from the international state system which reduced chances for democracy in the twentieth century were the Cold War pressures from the U.S. for outlawing the Communist Parties, the military assistance and training provided by the U.S. to South American militaries, and direct U.S. pressures on incumbent democratic governments, most prominently Allende in Chile.

Finally, the analysis here showed that dependent development had contradictory effects on chances for democratization and that these effects were changing over time. Ultimately, of course, the judgement of these effects depends on one’s counterfactual assumptions. If the counterfactual assumed for comparison is a kind of autonomous development like in the core, then the effects of dependent development appear virtually uniformly negative. If, however, the counterfactual assumed is stagnation, particularly lack of industrialization, then the effects appear partially positive. The predominantly negative effects of dependent development compared to development in the core are the following: First, its effects on the class structure produced a smaller and weaker working class and thus cast the middle classes into a more prominent role among the subordinate classes. This meant weaker pressures for full democratization, as the middle classes primarily sought their own inclusion. Second, high vulnerability to external shocks and limited control over the domestic economy afforded only small room for maneuver to any government, but the lack of options to deal with economic problems was particularly damaging to the legitimacy of democratic governments. The Depression in the thirties generated significant social unrest and led to the breakdown of democracies where they had been established (Argentina 1930, Uruguay 1933; in Chile the incipient restricted democracy had collapsed in 1924 already, in part in response to the decline of the nitrate industry). However, in the longer run it
also weakened traditional elites and strengthened pro-democratic forces by way of promoting import substitution industrialization, and thus it prepared the way for later transitions to democracy. Third, alliances of elites, or sectors of elites, with foreign economic interests, and strong dependence of the state on foreign support in the form of military and economic aid gave these foreign actors significant influence on domestic politics. The effects of this were primarily negative for democracy because for these foreign actors, like for their domestic allies, their own economic and political interests clearly outweighed any interest in promoting democracy.

In contrast to these generally negative effects on democracy, dependent development, if compared to stagnation, had a differential, partly positive, impact on chances for democratization, varying with the character of the export economy. The growth of mineral enclaves as crucial export sectors weakened large domestic landowners, though it also made the establishment of constitutional rule more difficult by way of generating elite diversification and raising the stakes in the control over the state apparatus. The growth of nationally controlled export economies in contrast strengthened large landowners, but it also facilitated the establishment of constitutional rule. The emergence of democratizing pressures was also different in the two types of economies. In the enclave economies, relatively radical alliances between middle and working classes, mobilized by mass parties, exerted early and strong pressures for democratization. In two cases (Venezuela in 1945 and Bolivia in 1952) these alliances were successful in effecting a breakthrough to full democracy at a relatively early stage of development, but they were not able to consolidate it. In the nationally controlled economies, the emergence of democratizing pressures depended on the degree of subsidiary industrialization generated by the export sector. Where it was high (Argentina and Uruguay), the early expansion of the middle and working classes brought forth democratizing pressures which did achieve their goal. Where it was low (Brazil, Colombia, Ecuador, Paraguay), such pressures remained absent or weak until after a phase of import substitution industrialization, and, given the continued strength of labor repressive landowners, even then the most that was ever achieved were periods of restricted democracy. Moreover, the dominant type of party emerging in the nationally controlled
economies, namely personalistic and clientelistic parties with little organizational and programmatic cohesion, further dampened pressures for democratization. Where such pressures emerged nevertheless because of higher degrees of industrialization, these clientelistic parties were less threatening to elites than the programmatic mass parties in the enclave economies, and this facilitated the installation of democratic regimes. However, this type of party remained highly susceptible to fractionalization and decay and thus constituted a problem for the consolidation of democracy in the long run.

The preceding analysis has demonstrated the importance of structural factors in shaping the alliances behind pro- and anti-democratic pressures and the room for maneuver open to these alliances. On the basis of this analysis, one would venture the hypothesis that chances for consolidation of democratic regimes are generally better in the eighties than before because the achievement of higher levels of industrialization strengthened civil society and tended to relegate large landowners to secondary importance. However, there are variations among the different countries on these dimensions, and they are by no means sufficient for the installation and consolidation of democratic regimes. Rather, the role of competing strong political parties was shown to be crucial for the consolidation of democratic regimes. This suggests that prognoses for Argentina, Peru, and Uruguay seem brighter than for Brazil, Ecuador, and Bolivia. In the former three cases, labor repressive landlords are not (or no longer) an important group. Argentina and Peru also meet the condition of having two or more relatively cohesive programmatic parties, whereas the continued fractionalization of the Uruguayan parties is a liability for the consolidation of democracy there (Gillespie, forthcoming). Brazil is handicapped in two ways: not only are labor repressive landlords still a formidable force, as evidenced by the problems with the land reform, but the parties are weak, lacking organizational and programmatic cohesion (Hagopian and Mainwaring 1987). In Ecuador all three conditions are unfavorable: labor repressive landlords still exist also, and civil society and political parties remain weak. In Bolivia, the land reform basically eliminated labor repressive agriculture, but the subordinate classes are weakened by political and regional splits and the parties are extremely weak
(McClintock 1986). If one draws out the implications of this discussion for the initially mentioned studies of transition processes which choose to focus on political variables proper, one can suggest that they could best enhance our understanding of the potential for consolidation of redemocratized regimes by putting party building efforts and party interactions to the center of their analyses.
REFERENCES


Zeitlin, Maurice. 1984. The Civil Wars in Chile (or the bourgeois revolutions that never were). Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.


<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>Date Ranges</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Brazil</td>
<td>before 1930 1930-45 1945-64; 1985-present</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bolivia</td>
<td>before 1930 1930-52 1964-82 1982-present 1952-64</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chile</td>
<td>before 1920 1924-32 1920-24; 1970-73 1973-present</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Colombia</td>
<td>before 1936 1948-58 1936-48; 1958-present</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Paraguay</td>
<td>up to present</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Peru</td>
<td>before 1930 1930-39 1939-48; 1980-present</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Uruguay</td>
<td>before 1903 1933-42 1903-19 1919-33 1942-73 1984-present</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

0  See attached page for notes
# TABLE 2

Types of Restricted and Full Democracy

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
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<th>Inclusion</th>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>restricted</td>
<td>unrestricted</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>military</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>involvement</td>
<td>Argentina 1955-66</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>strong</td>
<td>Brazil 1945-64</td>
<td>Brazil 1985-present</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Peru 1939-48; 1956-68</td>
<td>Bolivia 1982-present</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Ecuador 1948-61</td>
<td>Ecuador 1978-present</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>restricted</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>other</td>
<td>Chile 1920-24; 1932-58</td>
<td>Colombia 1936-48</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>restrictions</td>
<td>Venezuela 1958-68</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Uruguay 1903-19</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Colombia 1958-present</td>
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<tr>
<td>Contestation</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Chile 1958-70</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Argentina 1912-30; 1946-51</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>1973-76; 1983-present</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Bolivia 1952-64</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Chile 1970-73</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Peru 1980-present</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Uruguay 1919-33; 1942-73;</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>1984-present</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Venezuela 1945-48; 1968-present</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Notes for Table 1

1. The criteria for differentiating between a constitutional oligarchic or an authoritarian regime and a severely restricted democracy are the following:
   1. adult male literate or universal suffrage
   2. direct popular elections of executive and/or legislature
   3. percent of population voting more than 5% (this is an indicator of formal and informal restrictions put on participation)
   4. compliance with election results
   5. freedom of association and speech; protection from arbitrary arrest

2. For finer distinctions within this category, see Table 2.

3. In Brazil the 1985 election of the President was indirect. Furthermore, the military retains veto rights over key legislation. However, all the other criteria for democracy are met; illiterates were enfranchised in 1985, direct elections for Congress and Governors were held in 1986, and the expectation is clearly for direct elections of the next president. Thus, Brazil has to be classified as a restricted democracy.

4. In Chile the period 1920-24 was clearly a transition period between an oligarchic and a severely restricted democratic regime. Voter registration had greatly increased after the reforms of 1915 and participation rose above 5% in 1921 (Drake 1978:51). [Participation had actually reached 8.7% in 1912, but after that the oligarchy deliberately restricted registration; see Remmer (1984:84) for the figures.] Alessandri won with middle and some working class support; however, oligarchic groups still dominated Congress and managed to block any reform promoted by Alessandri.

5. Prior to the 1984 elections in Uruguay, the military engaged in some political manipulation, and a leading Blanco politician, Wilson Ferreira, was barred from participating; thus, the regime at that point should be classified as a restricted democracy. However, these restrictions did not seem to dramatically influence the election outcome (Gillespie 1986:192), and de facto Uruguay has stated to function as a full democracy.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>Crucial export sector</th>
<th>Labor requirements of dominant type of agriculture</th>
<th>Level of industrialization around 1950</th>
<th>State encapsulation of labor</th>
<th>Strength of labor movement as of 1950</th>
<th>Presence of strong political parties</th>
<th>Type and trajectory of democratic regimes in the post-WWII period</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Argentina</td>
<td>national control</td>
<td>low</td>
<td>high</td>
<td>high under Perón only, low before and after</td>
<td>strong</td>
<td>one clearly dominant</td>
<td>full democracy-&gt; authoritarianism-&gt; restricted democr. w/high military involvement-&gt; bureaucratic authoritarianism-&gt;full democr.-&gt; b.a.-&gt;full democracy</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Brazil</td>
<td>national control</td>
<td>high</td>
<td>medium</td>
<td>high</td>
<td>weak/medium</td>
<td>none</td>
<td>restricted democr. w/high military involvement-&gt; bureaucratic authoritarianism-&gt; restricted democracy</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bolivia</td>
<td>enclave</td>
<td>high</td>
<td>low</td>
<td>low</td>
<td>medium</td>
<td>one; then decaying</td>
<td>revolution-&gt; full democracy-&gt; authoritarianism-&gt; instability/ restricted democracy</td>
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<tr>
<td>Chile</td>
<td>enclave</td>
<td>high</td>
<td>medium</td>
<td>low</td>
<td>strong</td>
<td>several</td>
<td>restricted democracy-&gt; full democracy-&gt; bureaucratic- authoritarianism-&gt; restricted democracy</td>
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<tr>
<td>Colombia</td>
<td>national control</td>
<td>high</td>
<td>low</td>
<td>low</td>
<td>weak</td>
<td>two</td>
<td>violence/chaos/authoritarianism-&gt; restricted democracy</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ecuador</td>
<td>national control</td>
<td>high</td>
<td>low</td>
<td>low</td>
<td>weak</td>
<td>none</td>
<td>restricted democracy w/high military involvement-&gt; authoritarianism-&gt; restricted democr.</td>
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<td>high</td>
<td>low</td>
<td>high</td>
<td>weak</td>
<td>one</td>
<td>authoritarianism</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Peru</td>
<td>enclave</td>
<td>high</td>
<td>low</td>
<td>low</td>
<td>medium</td>
<td>one; then several</td>
<td>restricted democr. w/high milit. involvement-&gt; authoritarianism-&gt; restr. authoritarianism-&gt; full democr.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Uruguay</td>
<td>national control</td>
<td>low</td>
<td>high</td>
<td>low</td>
<td>strong</td>
<td>two, but getting weaker through splits</td>
<td>full democracy-&gt; bureaucratic authoritarianism-&gt; full democracy</td>
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<tr>
<td>Venezuela</td>
<td>enclave</td>
<td>high</td>
<td>low</td>
<td>weak/medium</td>
<td>one before 1958; several after 1958</td>
<td>coup-&gt; full democracy-&gt; authoritarianism-&gt; restricted democracy-&gt; full democracy</td>
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</table>
1 "Dominant" in the share of value of production.
2 Low is under 15%; medium between 15 and 20%; high 20% or more of GDP.
Sources: Furtado (1976:111); SALA (1963); Finch (1981:171) for Uruguay.
## TABLE 4

**Transitions Widening Inclusion and Contestation**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Old Regime</th>
<th>New Regime</th>
<th>Restricted Democracy with Military Involvement</th>
<th>Full Democracy</th>
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<tr>
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<td></td>
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<td>Oligarchic Constitutional</td>
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<td>Regime</td>
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<td>Chile 1920 (4)*</td>
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<td>Colombia 1936 (12)</td>
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<tr>
<td>Traditional, Populist, or</td>
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<tr>
<td>Military</td>
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<td>Peru</td>
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<td></td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Argentina 1955 (11)</td>
<td>Uruguay 1903 (16)</td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Brazil 1945 (19)</td>
<td>Chile 1932 (38)</td>
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<td>Colombia 1958 (29)</td>
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<td>Venezuela 1945 (3)</td>
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<td></td>
<td>Uruguay 1919 (14)</td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Venezuela 1968 (20)</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bureaucratic Authoritarian</td>
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<tr>
<td>Regime</td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Brazil 1985 (3)</td>
<td>Argentina 1973 (3)</td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>1983 (5)</td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Uruguay 1984 (4)</td>
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</table>

* The numbers in parentheses after the year of the transition indicate the number of years which the new regime lasted.
### TABLE 5

**Transitions Restricting Inclusion and Contestation**

**New Regime**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Old Regime</th>
<th>Constitutional Oligarchic</th>
<th>Traditional or Populist or Military Authoritarian</th>
<th>Bureaucratic Authoritarian</th>
<th>Restricted Democracy with Military Interventionism</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>High</td>
<td>Peru 1948, 1968</td>
<td>Ecuador 1961</td>
<td>cancer 1924</td>
<td>Brazil 1964</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Restricted Democracy with Military Involvement</td>
<td>cholera 1948, 1951</td>
<td>Colombia 1948</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Bolivia 1964, 1973</td>
<td>Venezuela 1948</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>