



**ISSUES IN THE CONSOLIDATION OF DEMOCRACY
IN LATIN AMERICA AND SOUTHERN EUROPE
IN COMPARATIVE PERSPECTIVE
-A RAPPORTEURS' REPORT-**

Timothy Power and Nancy Powers

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The authors (no relation) are doctoral candidates in the Department of Government and International Studies at the University of Notre Dame. **Timothy Power** is a 1984 graduate of the University of Massachusetts at Amherst, and received an M.A. in Latin American Studies from the University of Florida in 1986. His dissertation at Notre Dame will deal with the role of the political right in the recent transition to democracy in Brazil. **Nancy Powers** graduated with honors from Kenyon College in 1983. Before entering graduate school, she was a legislative aide

in the Ohio General Assembly for three years. She specializes in the fields of comparative and American politics, and plans to do dissertation research in Argentina.

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ABSTRACT

On April 24 and 25, 1987, the Kellogg Institute and the Social Science Research Council sponsored a working meeting at the University of Notre Dame on "Issues in the Consolidation of Democracy in Latin America and Southern Europe in Comparative Perspective." Participants explored the possibilities for comparing developments in the new Latin American democracies with trends in Greece, Portugal, Spain, and Turkey. The meeting was co-chaired by Guillermo O'Donnell of the Kellogg Institute and Philippe C. Schmitter of Stanford University; this paper synthesizes the main discussions and debates of the Notre Dame meeting.

RESUMEN

El 24 y 25 de abril de 1987, el Kellogg Institute y el Social Science Research Council auspiciaron el encuentro "Problemas de la consolidación de la democracia en Latinoamérica y en el sur de Europa: una perspectiva comparativa," que se llevó a cabo en la University of Notre Dame. Los participantes exploraron las posibilidades de comparar los desarrollos de las nuevas democracias en Latinoamérica con las tendencias en Grecia, Portugal, España y Turquía. El encuentro fue co-presidido por Guillermo O'Donnell del Kellogg Institute y por Philippe C. Schmitter de la Stanford University; este trabajo sintetiza las discusiones y los debates centrales del encuentro en Notre Dame.

INTRODUCTION

During the last decade, most countries in Latin America and Southern Europe have made a transition from authoritarian to democratic forms of rule, opening the way for the growth of a peaceful civil society and effective liberal institutions. Scholars and democratic politicians share an interest in identifying the strategies, institutions, and actors that will strengthen democracy and prevent a relapse to authoritarianism.

Toward that end, prominent scholars have arranged international meetings to discuss the theoretical underpinnings for comparative work on consolidation. Building on their previous collaboration, which led to the publication of *Transitions from Authoritarian Rule*, Guillermo O'Donnell, Philippe Schmitter, and Laurence Whitehead, eds. (1986), O'Donnell and Schmitter coordinated working groups in Latin America and Southern Europe, respectively, to research democratic consolidation (hereafter frequently abbreviated as DC).

The first meeting of the Latin America project, "Dilemmas and Opportunities in the Consolidation of Democracy in Contemporary Latin America," sponsored by the Ford Foundation and the Helen Kellogg Institute for International Studies at the University of Notre Dame, was held in São Paulo in December 1985. Discussion focused on the question of how to conceptualize "democratic consolidation" and on other methodological problems involved in comparing post-transitional regimes in Latin America. (See Scott Mainwaring's rapporteur's report, *Kellogg Institute Working Paper #73*.) In April 1987, a meeting entitled "Issues in the Consolidation of Democracy in Latin America and Southern Europe," jointly sponsored by the Social Science Research Council and the Kellogg Institute, was held at the University of Notre Dame. The two-day meeting provided an opportunity for participants to share theoretical insights from their work and to discuss the utility of cross-regional comparisons for the study of democratic consolidation. Subsequently, a Southern European working group convened in June, at the European University Institute in Florence, to prepare a formal proposal for the creation of a Subcommittee on Southern Europe to operate under the aegis of the Joint Committee on Western Europe of the SSRC and the American Council of Learned Societies.

O'Donnell characterized the April 1987 meeting as a "parenthesis of theoretical and methodological reflection." Conceived as brainstorming sessions, the discussions were free-flowing. There were no formal papers, although several participants prepared short think-pieces, which provided reference points for alternative approaches. This paper is the rapporteurs' report on the lively discussions which ensued.

We have structured our report thematically, based on our identification of seven broad areas of discussion at the meeting. The first section reviews approaches to the study of the consolidation of democracy, including the difficulties in defining “consolidation.” The second section deals with the difficult question of how to conceptualize cases where the political regime is ill-defined, that is, where authoritarian rule has ended but democracy is not yet fully consolidated. We then proceed to the crucial question of how to pursue inter-regional comparisons between Latin American and Southern European democratization processes. A fourth section examines arguments suggesting three ways in which historical legacies may influence the processes of transition and consolidation. We then discuss the crucial issues of representation and exclusion in new democracies—these issues were at the center of debate throughout the meeting. The severe economic inequalities in most Latin American societies pose great challenges to new democracies, whose characters will be shaped by their abilities to assure broad and inclusive representation. In the sixth section section, we examine the roles of several political institutions in the construction of democracy, and in the seventh we assess the various international factors which affect this process. A concluding section appraises the Notre Dame meeting and the prospects for future comparative work on democratic consolidation in Latin America and Southern Europe.

APPROACHES TO THE STUDY OF DEMOCRATIC CONSOLIDATION

The Notre Dame meeting was directed toward understanding the consolidation process and the potential for studying that process cross-regionally. Most of the discussion concentrated on the factors leading toward consolidation, not those signalling its arrival. Our report of these problems should demonstrate why the central issue at Notre Dame was not, “What does it mean to say that a democracy has arrived at consolidation?” but rather, “What factors encourage consolidation?” Nevertheless, problems of conceptualization underlie all other inquiry and thus serve as the starting point for this report.

Attempting to summarize the discussion, **David Collier** suggested that approaches to defining consolidation fall into three categories: actor-centered, event-centered, and institutional (external or internal). The actor-centered approach focuses on the willingness of significant actors to work within democratic rules. The event-centered approach looks at elections or constitutional ratification as markers. An internal institutional approach focuses on the degree of

institutionalization, while an external approach concentrates on the duration of new political institutions and the extent of meaningful changes therein. Clearly, no single approach is adequate, for there are causal relationships among the actors, institutions, and events, but Collier's scheme outlines the various points of departure and points of emphasis employed in studying consolidation.

Perspectives on the meaning of democratic consolidation tend to be influenced by the countries under study. In unstable, new democracies where the threat of a coup persists, consolidation may be seen as the process of eliminating opposition to democracy on the part of powerful actors. In more stable cases, consolidation may be understood as establishing permanent institutions and arrangements for the functioning of democracy or, alternatively, as eliminating undemocratic features of a post-authoritarian system. The establishment of democratic procedures and institutions does not, by itself, ensure the elimination of undemocratic features, such as privileged roles for the military. This issue was raised by **Terry Karl** in her work on frozen democracies, discussed below.

Similarly, the endpoint of consolidation—that is, the condition of being consolidated—may not be defined universally and is very difficult to identify prospectively. The disparate approaches at the meeting highlighted the problem of using markers, such as elections, as evidence of consolidation across cases. For example, in the Portuguese case, **Maria Carrilho** suggested that it would be possible to identify the end of the first (revolutionary) phase of the transition and the beginning of democratic consolidation as the moment when the fundamental political structure was established. This moment occurred when the new constitution was ratified and elections for the parliament and presidency were held. Others, such as **Juan Linz**, used that same point to define the end of consolidation. Linz does not distinguish transition and consolidation phases; rather, he considers consolidation of democracy to be the completion of procedural democratization, at which point the constitution produces a sovereign elected government and no actor holds veto power over the system. **Karl** cautioned that although elections are often a useful indicator of consolidation some, such as the 1984 election in El Salvador, do not function as “founding elections” and do not further consolidation. **Philippe Schmitter** opposed “essentialist” definitions which suggest that particular institutions or procedures are necessary and sufficient to consolidate democracy. He described consolidation as a condition (not a moment in time) in which elite actors have reliable expectations about politics, such that the parties and rules of the political game are known and can be anticipated.

Regardless of whether or not participants could agree on which regimes were “consolidated democracies,” the primary concern was to identify the institutional bases for democracies and the factors which help or hinder democratization after the transition has been made. Participants seemed to agree that consolidation involves an agreement on the part of significant actors to respect the democratic system, but participants disagreed on the particular institutions, events, or actors which promote that elite agreement. If we can compare similar issues—coup avoidance, institutionalization, representation, party development, or elite expectations—despite definitional disputes, it becomes a semantic question whether or not those issues exist within a regime that we are willing to identify as unambiguously democratic. This may explain why **Guillermo O'Donnell** recommended that we avoid the term “consolidation” altogether and concentrate on types of democracy, without assuming whether or not these types represent “consolidation.”

There was some discussion of the limitations of rational choice approaches for understanding the politics of consolidation. O'Donnell cautioned that choice models are heuristic tools, not substitutes for field work. Moreover, specifying the context in which rationality or irrationality applies is crucial. **Schmitter** contended that the problem with rational choice models is that during democratic consolidation, actors are still in the process of constructing identities. Choice models err in assuming that these identities already exist. **Karl** expressed concern that game theory can be used to understand repeated strategic interactions, but cannot account for political learning. **Collier** disagreed, noting that habits or learning, just like other factors affecting choices, can be worked into the game analysis.

Collier distinguished circumstances of high uncertainty and high discretion, in which choice models (such as the Schelling thresholds, employed by Adam Przeworski) are useful, from circumstances in which choice is constrained by institutional roles, such that institutional analysis is more fruitful. It is difficult to judge the relative level of uncertainty and discretion in a precarious democracy (one which lies in an intermediate state from which it might move toward either stability or authoritarianism). He concluded by advocating a mixed approach: “political events surrounding a potential move back toward authoritarianism could involve ... higher levels of uncertainty and discretion ... whereas political events surrounding a potential move toward the status of a more stable democracy might involve a somewhat more predictable interplay of institutional factors and organizational actors.”

CONCEPTUALIZING POST-TRANSITION CASES

The disparity between the rules, actors, and expectations which guide politics in an authoritarian regime and those which drive the politics of a consolidated democracy is immense. To move from one set to another is neither a quick nor a linear process. In attempts to come to grips with this “in-between” phase, **Samuel Valenzuela** and **Terry Karl** each proposed new research approaches.

Paraphrasing Juan Linz's well-known paper on Brazil, **Valenzuela** said that between the initiation and consolidation of democratic regimes there is a “democratic situation” in which, in addition to electoral processes, there are reserved domains where political power continues to be exercised by undemocratic means. The consolidation process entails moving away from a democratic situation to a democratic regime in which only one power currency exists.

Valenzuela argued that there are profound differences between consolidated democracies undergoing breakdown and democratic situations arising after authoritarianism. Prior to experiencing authoritarian rule, actors tend to ignore emerging threats to a democratic system, which they have come to expect will survive. After the experience of authoritarianism, political actors perceive the electoral process as tentative and they strategize accordingly. As long as actors continue to think that coups are possible, that is, that the electoral system is not the only route to power, the system is not consolidated. It is in a situation between transition and consolidation.

“A democracy cannot be called consolidated unless ... elected elites occupy the most important policy-making positions and all other state elites are, in effect, subordinated to them,” Valenzuela said, noting that the consequence of a system in which elections are the only means to attain power is stronger parties, since parties are the principle means of organizing voters and winning elections. Strong parties will in turn attract capable individuals, resulting in a strong political class. This system becomes self-perpetuating; that is, if the parties are strong, then they will be treated as such by other elites and by the public. Conversely, if elections are not the only means to attain power, the importance of parties will diminish as social groups develop power capabilities apart from electoral and party channels. Thus the continuation of a system with multiple routes to power results in a “vicious circle destructive to democratic institutions.”

Study of the role of parties in democratization suggests to Valenzuela that there may be an inverse relationship between the conditions that are favorable for transition and those which favor consolidation. For example, strong parties facilitate consolidation, but discourage transition.

Similarly, a politicized but divided military facilitates transitions, but threatens consolidation. In order to aid consolidation, it is necessary to “undo” those arrangements which facilitated transition but impede democracy, a process which Valenzuela described as “burning what was once adored.” This dismantling would include eliminating reserved domains and political pacts which were accepted in order to facilitate transition but which undermine the electoral process, ending the politicization of the military and (re)establishing a party system at the center of political life.

Valenzuela's terminology raised several objections from those who were reluctant to abandon standard definitions of regime. Also, **Linz** added a sobering caveat to Valenzuela's account. Noting that reserved domains may be instituted by democratically elected bodies or by enforced consent, Linz argued that democracy may remain incomplete if diarchies—that is, dual power currencies—have been arranged legally. *De facto* reserved domains may be eroded over time as democracy is practiced, but *de jure* reserved domains are difficult to challenge.

Karl's presentation also centered on the problems of reserved domains and founding agreements which might “freeze” a regime in a not fully democratic state. Her term “frozen democracies” focuses on problems raised by Valenzuela's “democratic situation,” although from a different perspective. Valenzuela focused on the relationship between party strength and democratic stability. His use of “situation” emphasizes the temporary or precarious character of states that have made a transition away from authoritarianism but have yet to take the step toward full democracy. In contrast, Karl focused on the static quality of those regimes that might be defined as democratic based on electoral procedure, but that have “frozen” certain political and/or economic inequalities in place. She counted Venezuela, Costa Rica, Uruguay, Brazil, and the Dominican Republic in this category. Whereas Valenzuela concentrated on institutions, Karl focused on arrangements among actors.

Karl proposed that the primary research question for these cases is: What type of democracy has frozen in place, and more specifically, who benefits from the arrangements that seem frozen in place? She called for study of the arrangements made to facilitate a transition from authoritarianism, in order to learn how they affect the long-term durability of the democracy and the inclusiveness of the political process. Rather than cycles in which democratic institutions are strengthened or weakened, Karl saw a deepening of the status quo as the habit of pact-making develops among elite actors.

COMPARING LATIN AMERICA AND SOUTHERN EUROPE

Central to the meeting were questions about the utility and/or feasibility of doing cross-regional comparative work on democratic consolidation. Discouragement was widespread. As theoretical discussions about the meaning and causes of democratic consolidation went on, it became increasingly evident that certain critical themes apply primarily to only one region or the other. **Schmitter** preferred a limited approach. He outlined six major differences between the regions which hinder comparative work and advised against expanding research beyond paired comparisons. The differences in political context are three: first, the international contexts are very different (Southern Europe is particularly advantaged by regional organizations, such as the EEC); second, the role of the military, internally and externally, is very different between the two regions, as was the severity of repression in previous regimes; and third, the distribution of social and economic resources at the time of the transition is more equal in Southern Europe than in Latin America.

An additional concern is the significant difference in ideological contexts. Commitment to democratic rule has become axiomatic in Western Europe during the post-war era and is more universal than in Latin America (although the difference between the regions is diminishing). Also, the range of potential democratic models that scholars perceive as important is much greater in Europe, where issues of collective bargaining, concertative policy-making, and parliamentary process are considered significant research topics for understanding consolidation.

Schmitter cited two other differences involving the context and priorities for research. Scholars in Southern Europe have better tools and information and thus a more narrow focus than their Latin American counterparts. Also, in most of Latin America, the survival of the regime is the primary preoccupation for politicians and scholars alike; whereas in Southern Europe, coups are considered unlikely so scholars are more concerned with long-term questions about the type of democracy being institutionalized.

For different reasons, **Valenzuela** also favored a cautious approach to comparisons between the two regions. Geographical proximity does not place countries in the same conceptual context; therefore inter-regional comparisons may be irrelevant if each region is taken as a whole. Latin America is not a unit that can be compared fruitfully on all questions to Southern Europe, also taken as a unit. **O'Donnell** agreed and noted that Turkey does not meet democratic criteria nearly as well as its Southern European neighbors. Hence, before making generalizations about Southern European democratization, one needs to specify whether Turkey is included. Subsequent discussion demonstrated that El Salvador, Guatemala, and Honduras

present problems in defining democratization in Latin America similar to those which Turkey presents for Southern Europe.

Valenzuela warned that the only way to avoid these methodological mishaps is to look at the universe of cases to which a particular question applies; any attempt to set much-needed conceptual parameters using only paired comparisons would invite dangerous distortion. **O'Donnell** also urged analytical rigor in defining the problems for comparative study; however, he thought that comparisons of two or three countries, chosen on the basis of a well-defined, theoretically relevant problem, could be useful as well as feasible.

A fundamental difference between the two regions is the role of the state. O'Donnell said that to a large extent, democratic consolidation in Latin America depends upon the ability of governments to convey a plausible commitment to try to resolve severe economic problems. The political parties and the general population may recognize that the problems are too complicated to be eliminated in the short-term, but their support for the regime may depend upon hope. That hope comes from believing that democratic governments have the will and the assets to alleviate, in the short run, the more pressing socioeconomic problems and to try to solve them, in the long run, in ways that offer hope for future generations. **Schmitter** said that in Europe today the problem is the opposite: European parties across the political spectrum are seeking ways to extricate the state from civil society, while in Latin America scholars urge the state to "penetrate" civil society. Southern Europe wavers between the two approaches, uncertain if the state offers progress or inefficiency.

Despite the caveats, much of the discussion constituted a collective effort to discover common conceptual ground for understanding democratic consolidation in any of the countries of Southern Europe and Latin America. **Richard Gunther** and **Atilio Borón** were among those with methodological proposals to enable fruitful inter-regional work.

Inequality differentials, as many social scientists have noted, are greater in Latin America than in Southern Europe, such that redistributive questions present much greater challenges to new democracies in the former than in the latter. **Gunther** proffered a method for conceptualizing these consolidation challenges within and across regions. Zero sum issues always cause political difficulty. Therefore, new democracies should avoid redistribution debates if possible, that is, if economic inequalities are not so severe as to demand remedy in the name of substantive democracy. Gunther said that when a country suffers severe poverty and a low level of socioeconomic organization, it may be impossible for democratic leaders to avoid placing

socioeconomic reform on the agenda along with political reforms; in more economically developed countries, there is less pressure to resolve socioeconomic problems, so politicians can concentrate on procedural democracy. Gunther proposed that by distinguishing between countries according to whether or not redistributive issues are primary to the political agenda we can make more accurate comparisons within and across regions. On this basis, he finds Spain, Argentina, and Greece similar: each may hold the advantageous position of being able to ignore these divisive issues; conversely, Bolivia, Ecuador, and Peru share the problem of how to consolidate a democracy under severe pressures for social reform.

Borón seemed most optimistic about the possibilities for understanding Latin American consolidation processes through the study of European cases. (He did not address the question of whether Europeanists can in turn learn from the Latin American cases, for his points of comparison were mostly the already consolidated democracies of Europe.) Borón called attention to the relatively unquestioned assumption that the Southern European countries are the appropriate partners for comparison with Latin America. He advocated a wider perspective, suggesting that scholars examine cases such as Weimar Germany or the consociational European democracies, which might illuminate the opportunities for and constraints upon the construction of bourgeois democracy in authoritarian cultures or in peripheral capitalist societies. Another point of comparison would be the social and class foundations of a democracy. The role of the landed upper classes in Germany or Italy during the democratization process might be illustrative of the power struggle between democrats and reactionary elites in Argentina or Brazil. Similarly, the European cases may shed light on the ability of pro-democratic sections of the middle or lower class, who lack organization or ideological coherence, to defeat the more powerful anti-democratic actors.

HISTORICAL LEGACIES

The Paradox of Success: A Counter-Intuitive Proposition

Democratic consolidation takes place in a political and historical context which shapes the institutions, actors, and politics of the new regime. This context includes the economic and human rights record of the authoritarian regime, the circumstances surrounding the transition, and the strategies of significant actors in the post-transition struggle for influence. Despite the

importance of these contextual factors, it is difficult to identify causal relationships among the factors and methods for studying them.

O'Donnell opened the meeting with a tentative proposal which was to underlie much of the subsequent discussion. Concerned that the consolidation of democracy depends upon the support of the bourgeoisie, he suggested that perhaps we should look at authoritarian legacies in terms of the expectations of the future which derive from experiences of the past. The majority of elite actors may be willing to incur sacrifices and make trade-offs in order to support democracy, not because they are committed to democratic ideals, but because they perceive that they would be more likely to be excluded from policy-making circles if there were an authoritarian regression.

O'Donnell had expected, intuitively, that the more repressive the authoritarian regime and the more ineffective its economic policies, the more difficult it would be to consolidate democracy. A very repressive regime, which destroys the political class and the party system, leaves the subsequent regime trying to establish democratic rule without experienced leaders or organized political parties. Similarly, it would seem an onerous point of beginning for a democracy to face the destabilizing pressures resulting from a deep economic crisis bequeathed by the previous regime. Nevertheless, O'Donnell suggested that perhaps the converse or counter-intuitive argument is more compelling: that is, that it is more difficult to consolidate democracy if the previous regime was economically successful and politically tolerant.

O'Donnell argued that a negative experience with an authoritarian regime engenders lower economic expectations and more realistic demands of the new government on the part of the middle class. Where the middle sectors never felt threatened by state repression and where the military government was successful economically, as in Brazil, the bourgeoisie may be ambivalent about democracy, yet overly optimistic and demanding in economic matters. Conversely, in countries such as Uruguay and Argentina, where repression and economic turmoil threatened all sectors, the middle class is likely to remember military rule and fear its return. Having witnessed economic failure by the military, the bourgeoisie may have diminished expectations of government's capacity to end the economic crisis.

Furthermore, O'Donnell suggested that the decimation of the pre-authoritarian political class under a harsh regime may not be as detrimental to democratic consolidation as previously thought. Perhaps the loss of organization and leadership may be offset by the commitment to democracy which develops in exile and the innovative style which marks leaders who are not yet settled in a familiar political role. In a less repressive regime, politicians may survive and even

maintain their former roles through a weakened congress or through exercise of local responsibilities. Having survived an authoritarian regime, such politicians are less wary of a return to authoritarianism than those who suffered repression and exile under a harsh regime. Accustomed to diminished roles and limitations on individual freedoms, politicians in less repressive regimes may be more likely to accept ongoing military intervention in politics after the democratic transition. Presently, Brazil seems to be the paradigmatic case for this situation.

These propositions sparked numerous comments and introduced issues that were to arise in different contexts throughout the meeting. **Anita Isaacs** noted that Ecuador was a good example of the counter-intuitive case, analogous to Brazil, because economic elites were neither dissatisfied with the authoritarian regime nor deeply committed to democracy. At least in the short-term, democratic consolidation in Ecuador has been complicated because the oil boom brought economic prosperity during the military regime and the military retained prestige and influence after ceding power. According to **Laurence Whitehead**, the intuitive argument is more suited to the histories of Guatemala and Costa Rica (a point of dispute with Karl), such that O'Donnell's reading of the Brazilian and Argentine cases is only counter-intuitive because social scientists have heretofore generalized from the opposite cases.

Whitehead and **Scott Mainwaring** each cautioned that time may change our perspective on the recent efforts towards democratization in Latin America. Citing the underdeveloped political institutions in Brazil, Peru, and Ecuador, Mainwaring said that previous patterns of institution-building may be more indicative of the potential for successful consolidation than previous experiences of repression.

The premise behind **O'Donnell's** suggestion is that learning and lowered expectations are two phenomena which significantly shape elites' perceptions of political opportunities in the new regime. At those times when politicians feel that the political and economic environment for democracy is not very promising, they can attempt to manipulate perceptions in order to persuade significant actors that they are better off playing the democratic game than defecting from it. **Gunther** made a related point while discussing the need to distinguish the actual state of the economy from both the mass public's perceptions and politicians' portrayal of the situation.

In conclusion, whether elite preferences are based on reading the stock pages, on the past, or on the political "writing on the wall," those preferences are relevant to elites' strategic calculations about maintaining the democratic game. Those expectations and historical lessons are products of experience, judgment, or political suasion, but do not seem to depend directly on

political culture. **O'Donnell** stressed that democratization does not depend upon a majority of democrats among the population or even among political elites but, rather, upon elites who reason that they are better off with democracy than with the authoritarian alternatives. He anticipated, however, that a significant part of that coalition which controls decisions to persist with a pact or to remain in the democratic game must be committed democrats. This is a necessary (and maybe sufficient) condition for democratic consolidation.

Juan Linz recounted a conversation with Spanish Prime Minister Calvo Sotelo who, commenting on the Spanish transition, said that independently of their faith in a previous commitment to democracy, Spanish leaders seem to have acted on the advice of Pascal to a friend whose religious faith was in crisis. He told him, "act as if you had faith and you will have it." Linz agreed that actions which support democracy are more important than personal democratic conviction. Nevertheless, Linz disagreed with the notion that positive feelings about the economic record of the previous authoritarian regime correlate with a weak commitment to democracy. He argued that the relationship depends upon the degree of economic hardship actually suffered in the post-authoritarian regime. In order to understand if any correlations exist, we would need a time series on public opinion data, which is not available.

The issue of learning and falling expectations is relevant to public opinion as well as elites. **Alejandro Foxley** commented that a new regime must address the basic needs of the excluded sectors of society—peasants and the urban poor. He favored decentralization in order to address basic needs through local government. Foxley discussed a 1985 survey conducted in a poor section of Santiago, which shows diminished expectations among slum dwellers compared to the 1960s. The survey showed that the marginalized residents of Santiago desire education and jobs, not revolutionary change. Foxley's comments lend support to the argument that the demands made of government are moderated by personal experience, such that most people do not demand the fulfillment of their dreams but merely some improvement over their present situations. If this is true, then consolidation would be easier, as **O'Donnell** suggested, in situations where the authoritarian record was so deplorable as to be easily bettered.

Authoritarian Culture?

Discussions of historical legacies and learning by experience tend to lead toward the related but analytically distinct and always controversial subjects of cultural influences and legitimation. **Borón** argued that cultural and ideological factors are crucial to consolidating a

democracy. Eschewing cultural determinism, he stated that the negative cultural legacy of authoritarianism is the “long lasting result of a complex process of political resocialization in authoritarian values”; therefore, democratic consolidation depends upon a new process of resocialization, this time in democratic values. The problem in Argentina—and, Borón suspects, most of Latin America—is that neither the general population nor political elites recognize that the existing authoritarian political culture threatens the consolidation of democracy. Borón proposed that research into the means of resocialization and “de-fascistization” used in Germany and Italy after World War II would be useful for identifying means to facilitate democratic consolidation in Latin America.

Borón, O'Donnell, and others emphasized that Latin American regimes need to legitimize themselves by at least attempting to address the serious social and economic problems facing their societies. Borón disagreed with those who suggested that consolidation is primarily a problem for elites, contending instead that intense popular legitimation is necessary, at least in the early stages of consolidation, to fortify a democratic regime threatened by anti-democratic elites. **Linz** argued for the importance of legitimation, but qualified the means of legitimation, arguing again that support for democracy is not a product of economic success.

Karl and **Schmitter** disputed Borón's concerns with legitimation and political culture. Karl argued that in the Venezuelan case, public opinion polls suggest that popular legitimation for democratic government is weak; yet it has survived, albeit in a “frozen” state. Therefore, she believes that legitimation must be evaluated in the context of the potential alternatives to democratic rule. Schmitter's stance was the opposite of Borón's. He argued that issues of legitimation and authoritarian culture lead researchers in the wrong direction: we are concerned with whether or not actors will play by a democratic set of rules, not what they think about the underlying principles. **O'Donnell** expressed concern that Borón's point had been misunderstood, for he raised the important empirical question of which actors must be democrats in order to initiate a democracy or to consolidate one.

The Mode of Transition from Authoritarian Rule

Discussion of the relationship between the mode of transition and the consolidation of democracy centered on pacts. Many participants at the meeting shared the view that the type of transition affects the type of democratic consolidation, which in turn foreshadows the type of democracy. According to **Karl**, founding agreements or pacts, where they exist, help build

political institutions; therefore, they affect both the survivability of the regime and the distribution of influence within the regime. Karl is particularly interested in pacts because they seem to institutionalize less-than-democratic procedures, freezing the balance of power in a regime and preventing further democratization.

Collier took issue with Karl's emphasis on pacts, because they are merely formal compromises and compromise is the essence of all politics. He argued that the cause of a democratic "freezing" is not the pact from which the democracy originated, but rather some prior attributes of the political system, such as the characteristics of certain parties. **Karl** responded that pacts can be distinguished from other compromises by their ability to delimit the political agenda of the new regime, perhaps for years to come. She also defended her emphasis on pacts, explaining that they are among the only viable vehicles to democratization in Latin America, where mass ascendant transitions are considered risky because of likely United States hostility. **Isaacs** shared Karl's conviction that pacts, particularly between parties and interest associations, are important areas of study, yet she saw ongoing pact-making after the transition as a way to move democracy forward incrementally, not freezing it as Karl feared. In contrast, **Frances Hagopian** agreed with Karl's view that agreements made at the "birth" of a regime may shape and severely constrain the political system which develops.

Referring to a preliminary model of regime transitions, which she had first introduced at the São Paulo meeting, **Karl** said that transition type is a function of transition strategies (either "compromise" or "force") and the character of the transition (either "mass ascendant" or "elite ascendant"). (Vide Scott Mainwaring, "The Consolidation of Democracy in Latin America: A Rapporteur's Report," Kellogg Working Paper No. 73, p. 26.) The combination of these factors can be drawn in a two-by-two matrix showing four ideal types of transition: reform, revolution, imposition, and pact; the last takes place where there is a compromise strategy and elite ascendancy. (Karl acknowledged that the model does not adequately encompass cases such as Argentina, Peru, and Brazil, in which the military regime relinquished power in response to events which cannot be described merely in terms of compromise or force.)

Karl discussed four issues to be considered in studying the effects of pacts. First, she recommended that empirical studies of "key negotiations and their subsequent ramifications" are needed in order to understand the relationship between procedural and substantive goals for pacts. She questioned whether any pacts can be solely procedural, since agreements over procedures are usually intended to yield substantive results. On this point, **Collier** replied that

there is analytic utility in making a distinction between the procedural and substantive aspects of pacts, because the procedural aspects are most important to building institutions. Second, **Karl** noted that understanding pacts requires studying the extent to which they are “self-reproducing,” either because the actors involved have learned that pacts serve their interests or because they have grown to trust the habit of pact-making. Third, in some cases, pacts are enforced or constrained by a powerful actor outside the agreement—the military, a centrist party, the United States, or the state. The nature of the pact is significantly affected by whether the dominant actor is inside or outside the pact. Fourth, the condition of the economy may also affect the willingness of actors to join in pacts. In an argument which parallels O'Donnell's “counter-intuitive” suggestion about prospects for consolidation, Karl proposed reconsidering the assumption that pacts are difficult to form during economic crises. Actors may be more willing to risk making pacts under severe economic circumstances, when reneging on the agreement becomes difficult and risky. Therefore, Karl suggested that there may be a parabolic relationship between pact-making and economic conditions, such that actors are most willing to enter into agreements during periods of austerity or prosperity.

Similarly, **Nikiforos Diamandouros** urged examination of the trajectories from type of transition to type of consolidation to type of democratic regime. Karl had referred to Otto Kirchheimer to distinguish confining conditions from “birth defects”; she said that the latter “irrevocably set in place constraints upon socioeconomic and/or political transformation.” Advocating an historical approach, Diamandouros agreed that Kirchheimer's distinction between confining and antecedent conditions is useful, but he warned that Karl's notion of birth defects must be used carefully in order to avoid a fatalistic, deterministic approach. Confining conditions are those structural impediments which affect or contain revolutionary breakthroughs and which must be overcome in order to bring about structural change; antecedent conditions are those preexisting factors which affect the phases of democratic consolidation.

Mainwaring warned that experience is not always an accurate predictor of future trajectories, because of differences in leadership; therefore, the correlation between transition type and regime type should be conceived loosely, not as one-to-one, and should be tested against numerous cases, including deviant ones. Agreeing that the type of transition and initial arrangements are important to the prospects for consolidation and the type of democracy, he suggested that the level of control exercised during the transition process by elites of the authoritarian regime would be a meaningful way to distinguish transition types. **Diamandouros**

replied that using an historical approach does not preclude consideration of the role of leadership, but rather can be used to examine the options available to leaders.

Several participants at the Notre Dame meeting called for a more careful conceptualization of the term “pact.” **Linz** distinguished between implicit and explicit pacts, noting that some pacts may be merely implicit “understandings,” used to get through the elections but not binding on the participants afterwards. **Hagopian** differentiated “gentlemen's agreements” from those elite pacts which are made under threat of mass ascendancy.

REPRESENTATION AND EXCLUSION

All of the sessions at Notre Dame were peppered with discussions of representation, exclusion, and socioeconomic justice. In part, these issues were raised out of normative concern that economic democratization should accompany political democratization. Primarily, however, participants shared empirical interests in understanding the impediments to democratic consolidation posed by unequal political—as well as social and economic—arrangements. These arrangements may hinder the legitimation of the regime as well as the institutionalization of democratic processes.

To consolidate a new or restored democracy requires the institutionalization of democratic practices, which entails developing means to represent various societal interests within government. Representation was at the heart of the Notre Dame discussions as participants tried to formulate a research agenda for understanding the consolidation problem: What forms of representation become institutionalized within new democracies? Who is represented? Who is excluded? and, How and why do these patterns change over time? As **O'Donnell** observed, representation has two converse concepts: control and exclusion. Representation gives voice to interests, but at the same time submits those interests to the control of the representative. Also, the representation of certain interests involves the exclusion of others.

Most of the discussions addressed exclusion resulting from formal or informal competition over political institutions. O'Donnell described exclusion in terms of a would-be political participant's potential for making trade-offs in order to acquire representation. **Linz** suggested the importance of distinguishing between exclusion in the form of neglect and exclusion which results from the suppression of political competition.

The poor may be neglected because they have no political resources to barter in exchange for representation. The problem of poverty in Latin America was widely discussed by the Latin Americanists at the meeting, most of whom were ready to concede that consolidation is an elite affair but were also convinced that if elites ignore abject standards of living, democratic consolidation is undermined. Beyond normative concerns about social justice, empirical concerns were raised about the challenge of legitimating a new democracy fraught with economic hardship and the problem of “freezing” economic arrangements that benefit some sectors to the exclusion of others. Nevertheless, Linz, O'Donnell, and others remarked that, at least at the present time, political stability seems to be a requisite for socioeconomic change, rather than the reverse.

Relevant to the issue of legitimation was **Rosario Espinal's** recommendation that the creation and narrowing of representation must be studied in the context of a particular country in order to focus on the problems and tensions that emerge as a result of that narrowing. She noted that in the Dominican Republic and Ecuador there is little tradition of popular organization or participation, so that narrowing the scope of representation will raise fewer tensions than, for example, in Argentina where there is a long tradition of participation and organization.

The transition to democracy entails a broadening of representation as compared with the authoritarian period. Yet the representation of interests cannot be expanded without limit, which is why **Schmitter** described democratic consolidation as a process of narrowing the range of interests represented within government institutions and by particular interest associations. He argued that DC is a process of organization that privileges certain elites, social sectors, and channels of power while excluding others. This characterization raised several cautions. **Valenzuela** warned that some forms of privileging (such as those which would exclude political opponents) are inimical to democracy rather than supportive of consolidation; but **Schmitter** objected to any attempts to categorize a priori particular practices or institutions as essentially democratic or essentially undemocratic. **Borón** agreed that in the long term some narrowing will take place, but he maintained that in the early stages of consolidation, popular legitimation—as witnessed in Buenos Aires during the military putsch of April 1987—is necessary to enable democrats to overcome resistant elites. Moreover, the concept of representation goes beyond interest associations, according to **Linz**, who reminded the meeting that creative leadership and the formation of political elites are critical factors in democratization.

O'Donnell suggested that comparative research in Latin America should study the deficiencies or shortcomings in representation within the institutions of a consolidating regime. He suggested three ways in which institutions may be deficiently representative. First, the existing representative institutions may simply be too weak relative to other actors in society. Second, an institution may have a limited horizontal extension; that is, many important social and political relationships may be excluded from consideration or representation in the political arena. Poor horizontal extension makes politics unpredictable, which further undermines opportunities for strengthening institutions. Third, the scope of representation may be limited, in terms of the interests and identities that representatives recognize as requiring voice on the political agenda. O'Donnell pointed out that while exclusion may be the converse of representation, the exclusion of actors, issues, or definitions of issues should be kept analytically distinct from the restricted scope of interests and identities represented.

O'Donnell noted that all regimes, even authoritarian ones, have *de facto* and *de jure* methods of representing functionally defined class or sectoral interests. The distinguishing characteristics of democracies are elections and territorially defined citizenship. Therefore, he suggested, the relevant research question addresses the interaction of representational systems in the new democracy with pre-existing but non-democratic means of representation. O'Donnell concentrated his remarks on the scope of representation, recommending that variations in scope, both synchronic and diachronic, should be studied comparatively in order to understand the circuits of power in consolidating democracies in Southern Europe and Latin America. This research agenda consists of two categories: first, study of the systems of representation in a regime and the linkages between such systems; second, study of the systems of exclusion.

INSTITUTIONS IN THE CONSOLIDATION OF DEMOCRACY

Following suggestions offered at earlier meetings, the Notre Dame group held discussions on various political institutions deemed important to the consolidation of democracy. These included parliament, the presidency, political parties, interest associations, and the role of the armed forces, among others. Participants were invited to present short “think pieces” on institutions within their area of expertise, and lively discussions ensued.

The system of government in transitional regimes

In recent papers, both Linz and Arturo Valenzuela have urged that political scientists pay more attention to the qualitative differences among the parliamentary, semi-parliamentary, and presidential systems of government. Their suggestions raised a key comparative question for the April 1987 meeting because of differing historical patterns in Europe and Latin America. Europe's historical affinity is with the parliamentary system, although Portugal and Turkey have recently moved in the direction of the French semi-presidential regime. In contrast, Latin America historically has opted for presidentialism on the U.S. model.

Linz's paper offered a series of comparisons among the three systems of government. His institutional comparisons cannot be reviewed in their entirety here, but Linz concluded: "If we had to summarize the basic differences between the presidential and parliamentary systems, we could say it is the rigidity that presidentialism introduces into the political process and the much greater flexibility of that process in parliamentary systems." On the surface, it would appear that the unpredictability of the parliamentary system—the fact that governments often fall and must be reconstituted—implies a lack of political stability. Presidential rule is often seen as more predictable. However, the periods of transition from authoritarian rule and consolidation of democracy are characterized by a high level of uncertainty. Presidential rule may not be able to deal adequately with rapid changes in social, political, or economic realities. In contrast, a prime minister must adapt rapidly or be removed. He or she must reinforce the government's authority and legitimacy by asking for a vote of confidence, and if this is not obtained, he or she will be replaced by a new executive selected through the updated political preferences of the parliament (which, in parliamentary systems, is the only democratically legitimate source of institutional authority).

Presidentialism operates very differently. In Linz's phrase, presidentialism entails a certain "style of politics" which can be prejudicial to the goals of transition from authoritarianism and consolidation of democracy. The political game is zero sum: winners and losers are defined for the period of the presidential mandate, during which there is no possibility for shifting alliances or broadening of the bases of support for the government. Emergency coalitions are unlikely. Losers of presidential elections are deprived of any access to executive power for several years, and thus have no way to build long-term support through the use of patronage. The zero sum game raises the stakes of each presidential election, encouraging polarization. Unpopular presidents will lose off-year parliamentary elections, leading to

confrontations with the congress and a decline in perceived power. Furthermore, the president is always the representative of a partisan option (an option which may, in time, be repudiated by public opinion), yet he or she remains the representative of the state and nation at all times. Thus, the presidential office is by nature two-dimensional and ambiguous.

Linz emphasized that his analysis of the problems of presidentialism should not be read as implying that no presidential democracy can be stable (although the number of stable presidential democracies is very small), but simply that “the odds in many societies might be less favorable.” Neither does he mean to assert that parliamentary democracies will guarantee political stability, “but certainly that they provide a greater flexibility in the process of transition to and consolidation of democracy.” Also, the specific type of parliamentary system is crucial—special attention must be paid to the electoral law, the question of federalism, problems of ethnic and cultural diversity, etc. (Linz's ideas on presidentialism and parliamentarism are more fully developed in a forthcoming volume of papers presented at the Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars.)

Karl pointed out that Venezuela is a stable presidential democracy, and that like many other Latin American countries it is a federal system as well. **Linz** responded that there are some affinities between presidentialism and federalism. State governors are like “little presidents” around whom opposition parties can be formed or strengthened. This phenomenon has led to clientelism, but so have modern European party systems. Many Latin American countries have political systems which are federal in form but highly centralized in practice. The more centralized the polity, the less attention paid to the problems of the interior—and this is a separate problem from the question of presidentialism vs. parliamentarism.

Valenzuela called for a focus on whether or not parliaments in certain systems have abdicated their authority, as occurred in the French Third Republic. He suggested that if Latin American countries choose to remain with the presidential system of government, then congress should be strengthened.

Political parties, party systems, and elections

If there was one outstanding theme of discussion at the Notre Dame meeting, it was the question of “political representation.” As **O'Donnell** pointed out in his notes for the meeting, no regime is without some kind of political representation, but democratic regimes have the unique characteristic of making elections the primary (though of course not the only) channel through

which representation is structured. Since participation in democratic elections is mediated by political parties, and since democratic theory has long emphasized the role of parties in bridging the gap between the state and civil society, it is not surprising that much of the debate on democratic consolidation would turn to these institutions.

Of the participants in the meeting, **Valenzuela** placed the strongest emphasis on the study of parties. Parties are central to his definition of democratic consolidation. A consolidated democratic regime is one in which “multiple power currencies” are eliminated in favor of the electoral performance currency: “free elections must indeed be *the only*, not one of two or more, means of attaining the important state policy-making positions.” Wherever this criterion is met, elites will attach themselves to the appropriate electoral vehicles, and strong political parties will develop. The consequences of this, Valenzuela asserted, are two. First, party careers will tend to attract the most able individuals, who will in turn be taken seriously by other elites in the society. Second, the resultant party system can be termed “complete,” meaning that no important social group can afford to ignore the parties. The party system will then become the “main mediating structure” between the state and society.

In his paper, Valenzuela noted that transitions to democracy (or to “democratic situations,” to use his term) often require the emergence of strong political leaders not closely tied to parties. In contrast, the consolidation of democracy will require that all subsequent state leaders be recruited and selected through party channels. Otherwise party life will continue to take a back seat to charismatic individuals whose careers have been divorced from the parties. If such “independent” leaders maintain serious electoral clout, then the parties will feel compelled to support figures “with whom they have no mutual commitments, and over whom they have no real influence” (p. 10). In such situations (Brazil would be a case), the parties are enfeebled because they cannot fully assume their functions of political recruitment and advocacy of social interests. Therefore, Valenzuela argued, a central task of DC must be to re-establish parties at the center of the political recruitment process. Spain, for example, has succeeded at this task. Suárez did not emerge from party channels, yet he gave way to Calvo Sotelo and then to González, the consummate party politician. In the future, it will be very difficult for non-party elites to rise to the Spanish prime ministership.

While generally favorable to Valenzuela's emphasis on parties, **Mainwaring** disagreed that free elections must be the only means of attaining the important state policy-making

positions. In all democracies, bureaucrats play an important role in the formulation of policy, and the control over the bureaucracy by elected leaders is not always strong.

Espinal also agreed with Valenzuela's assessment of the importance of parties. In her own work on the Dominican Republic, Espinal makes the party system her point of entry. She favors a sociological rather than a formal understanding of the functions of parties. Parties are important actors in structuring interest representation, not only at the state level but also at the societal level. Parties play a crucial role in political socialization and in the construction of identities. In a democracy, there must be sufficient space for the expression of popular discontent. In the Dominican Republic, this space exists because of the consolidated party system, which has supported nine years of democratic government. Espinal suggested that Dominican democracy may prove more durable than democracy in the other Latin American cases.

In contrast, **Schmitter** warned against too strong an emphasis on political parties. In his paper presented in December 1985 in São Paulo, Schmitter noted that democratic theory often presents the party system as the only structure capable of generating legitimacy in democratic regimes. Schmitter disputes this assumption of the "elitist" or "party" theory of democracy, stressing that there are other linkages between citizen and state and among power holders, which need to be taken into account. Schmitter believes that "it would be a serious mistake to confine analysis to the party-electoral realm in confronting the problems of democratic consolidation ... this would ignore a range of sites for decision-making and representation which have increased enormously in importance in recent decades ... the conditions of participation, access, responsiveness and accountability which surround exchanges between interest associations and administrative agencies have become a significant element in how citizens evaluate the performance of the political order."

Schmitter criticized Valenzuela's "party-centric" approach to democratic consolidation. He held that the Schumpeterian conception of a party-based regime is not the only kind of democracy possible. Exceptionally strong political parties may even hinder the democratization process. For example, Schmitter considers Portugal to be the most party-centered democracy in Europe. He asserted that the Portuguese parties occupy too much political space, crowding out other important institutions such as interest organizations, trade unions, etc. Finally, Schmitter stated that it is not sufficient simply to aver that parties are essential to

democratization. It must be specified “where,” and at what level, parties are crucial—in Parliament, in the electorate, or elsewhere.

Interest associations

Philippe Schmitter's Southern European working group undertook to study the role of interest associations (formalized organizations which represent class, sectoral, and professional interests) in the aftermath of authoritarian rule in Italy, Greece, Portugal, Spain, and Turkey. Schmitter's European research agenda was presented to the Latin American working group in São Paulo in December 1985 where, in Schmitter's words, “it was roundly rejected as inappropriate and unfeasible for work in that region.” Schmitter admitted that the design was more appropriate for Southern Europe, where the diversity of “possible configurations that democratic institutions can legitimately take” is greater than in Latin America. He stated that the Latin American scholars seemed unconvinced that organized class, sectoral, and professional representation would play significant roles in their countries' consolidation processes.

For Schmitter, democratization involves subsets of emerging patterns of interaction which gradually evolve into institutions. The specific domains of these various patterns of interaction are called, in Schmitter's scheme, “partial regimes.” Interest associations appear in three of these partial regimes: in the “representation regime,” which links parties, interest associations, and social movements; in the “pressure regime,” which regulates the access of lobbies to parliamentary assemblies; and in the “concertation regime,” which structures the relations between associations and state agencies with regard to public policy. In the consolidation of democracy, interest associations both “create” and “narrow” the domains of political representation, thereby deepening and stabilizing each partial regime.

Schmitter called for close attention to the ways in which representation is extended within these partial regimes. He argued that with a focus on organized interests, not only can we conclude whether or when DC has occurred, but we can learn a great deal about *what type* of democracy will emerge. Schmitter suggested four questions for further research into organized interests. First, we must investigate the specific properties of individual interest associations. Second, we should examine the relations among the associations, assessing their number and degree of federation in different systems. Third, we must discover the ways in which interest associations come to represent whole classes. Fourth, we need to assess the degree to which

organized class, sectoral, and professional interests monopolize the potential space available for all types of political representation in the democratic regime. Posing these questions in individual case studies would be a starting point for comparative work on the role of organized interests in the process of democratization.

The Question of the Armed Forces

In almost all of the recent authoritarian regimes in Southern Europe and Latin America, the armed forces constituted the most significant political actor. In all the newly democratic regimes, the military institution retains a central role. However its importance to the process of consolidation of democracy is probably much greater in Latin America than in Southern Europe; therefore, much of the discussion on the military question revolved around the structuring of civil-military relations in the new Latin American democracies.

Juan Rial presented an historical and comparative analysis of the political role of the military in Central and South America. In particular, he focused on the military's relationship to the state and to society. In general, the military is not subordinated to the state in Latin America. Venezuela presents the only case where the armed forces are subordinated to civilian control in an unambiguously democratic setting. (Costa Rica, also a democratic regime, has no standing army.) In Cuba and Nicaragua civilians are also dominant, but in these cases the armed forces are subordinated to both the state and the ruling party. Elsewhere in the region, the military retains great autonomy.

Rial stressed that Latin American armed forces are poorly integrated into their societies. Such encapsulation of the military tends to increase the ideological and political distance between military officers and civilian politicians. Officers, who have weak or nonexistent relationships to other institutions in society, become increasingly dependent upon the military corporation. The armed forces are more likely to identify themselves with "the West" than is the political class. The armed forces' stance of defending capitalism, liberalism, and "democracy" is often ill-defined, but it is clear that the highest priority of the military is to protect the autonomy of the institution. At the same time, the political class in Latin America often admits, correctly, to a poor understanding of the armed forces.

Rial suggested that the prospects for DC could be enhanced by lessening the gulf between the military and society. He noted that the armed forces are antidemocratic and antiliberal because of "their organizational structure and because of an historical tradition which

reinforced these characteristics.” Nevertheless, Rial argued, it is possible to engage the military in the democratic process. This would be accomplished not by changing the processes of military socialization, nor by attacking the corporate discourse and internal authoritarianism of the military institution, but simply by emphasizing the consensus (or “agreement on fundamentals”) which forms the basis for the new democratic regime. In the Southern Cone and Brazil this consensus is fairly strong. It entails the maintenance of capitalism and a loose identification with the democratic-liberal tradition of the North Atlantic community, values which are shared by both the military and most of the relevant political actors in Argentina, Brazil, and Uruguay. Rial termed this process of consensual engagement of the armed forces “negative integration,” alluding to the political integration of the social democratic parties in Europe during the early part of this century.

Much of the contemporary left in the Southern Cone is now willing to subscribe to such a consensus. If the consensus is broadened sufficiently to integrate sectors of the ideological extremes (the left and the military), then the prospects for democratic consolidation are enhanced.

Carrilho's paper focused on the role of the Portuguese military since the revolution of April 25, 1974. The military guided the transition and initial consolidation phases through a series of pacts with the political parties. In 1976, when the new constitution was proclaimed, it was determined that the armed forces would retain a special advisory role to the government (through the so-called “Revolutionary Council”) until the revision of the constitution in 1982. Carrilho called the 1976-1982 period one of “institutional transition and democratic consolidation.” In 1982, with the revision of the constitution, the military formally withdrew from government, although the first civilian president (Mário Soares) was not elected until 1986. In 1985, ex-president Gen. Ramalho Eanes founded the new PRD party, which now serves as a vehicle for many of the former officers involved in the revolutionary process. Thus, the Portuguese case is one of very gradual military withdrawal from politics, with the interesting twist that many officers have continued political action as citizens. However, in Carrilho's view, it would be a mistake to infer from public events that overall military influence is directly proportional to the degree of explicit intervention in politics.

Valenzuela offered five suggestions on how to limit the “coup-proneness” of the military in newly democratic regimes. First, he noted that transitions which include a military figure in a leading role (à la Eanes) are best able to subordinate the military to the democratic regime and

depoliticize it. Second, it is essential to weed officers with antidemocratic tendencies out of the armed forces as soon as possible, and there is no better time to do this than in the initial post-transition “honeymoon.” Valenzuela acknowledged that the circumstances of certain transitions (such as the Uruguayan) have not permitted this. Third, the military should be directed toward external rather than internal defense; Suárez and González have succeeded at this in Spain. Fourth, Valenzuela agreed with Rial that the gulf between military and society must be reduced. Valenzuela argued for a new military socialization, which would require a revamping of military curricula and the integration of officers into regular, civilian university courses. Fifth, “Civilian leaderships should school themselves in the military logistics of coups, and take the necessary measures to make such coups more difficult to pull off.”

Linz also commented on the issue of civil-military relations. First, we must focus, as does the present work by Alfred Stepan, both on the prerogatives of the military after the transition and on the potential for issue conflicts with the civilian government. Second, we need to examine the institutional evolution of the armed forces under the authoritarian regime. Also, we need to ask “what means what” to the military. What are the most important issues for officers—border conflicts, equipment, exports, budgets, or other items? Finally, we must always assess the role of the police vis-à-vis the army. Which service branch, or which minister, is given jurisdiction over the police?

INTERNATIONAL FACTORS

The consolidation of democracy is a process which is subject to influence by various international forces and actors. Several of the participants at the meeting addressed the question of the varying weight of transnational incentives to democracy in Europe and Latin America.

Whitehead's essay in the *Transitions* volume illustrated the importance of the European Economic Community in the extension of democracy to Southern Europe. Whitehead argued that EEC membership offered critical external guarantees to the business and propertied classes of Spain, Portugal, and Greece. He emphasized that the European incentives are “non-discretionary” (that is, EEC members are unwavering in establishing democracy as a prerequisite for membership), and that their effects are more or less permanent. The “immutability” of the European insistence on democracy stands in sharp contrast to the situation

in the Western Hemisphere, where U.S. incentives are more ambivalent, selective, and subject to rapid change. Thus, the example of the EEC provides a crucial external yardstick by which to judge U.S. claims to promote democracy.

Whitehead discussed the recent Turkish application to join the European Community. Turkey will be an additional case to test his argument on the importance of the EEC to democratization. The key comparative question raised by the Turkish situation, in the words of Whitehead, is “whether there are clear geographical limits within which the process of extending democracy can be made most effective and secure.” Liberal elements in Turkey feel that the EEC application process, which will turn critical European eyes on Turkey's handling of political freedoms and human rights, is the best way to ensure that the government will continue to make progress on these fronts. In a similar vein, **Schmitter** urged that Turkey be included in academic discussions on transition and consolidation, in part so that progressive intellectuals in Turkey might gain space to illuminate the problems of their country.

Commenting on Whitehead's analysis, **Gunther** warned against exaggerating the importance of Northern European intervention in Southern European democratization processes. In Gunther's opinion, direct EEC influence was of secondary importance. He asserted that the informal influence of proximity to prosperous, democratic societies to the north was highly significant. Beginning in the 1960s, large numbers of Spanish, Portuguese, and Greek migrant workers were politically socialized by their extensive exposure to democratic forms of rule.

Turning to the Western Hemisphere, **Whitehead** noted that some lessons learned in Europe may soon be the basis for concerted efforts at democratic consolidation in Central America. With the support of the European Community, Costa Rica is proposing the creation of a Central American Parliament. This initiative comes not from an advanced industrial democracy, but from a regional democracy—Costa Rican democracy would become the implicit “standard” for Central America. Furthermore, the Costa Ricans are attempting to achieve limited integration in an extremely negative economic environment.

On these issues, **Karl** commented that some of the “democratic community” attitudes which arise in Latin America seem to arise in opposition to the United States, which is ostensibly the leading democratic power in the hemisphere. **Linz** warned against one negative consequence of such solidaristic movements in Latin America: such arrangements must necessarily include non-democratic regimes in the quest for solidarity, thereby lowering

standards for everyone. **Schmitter** raised the question of whether elections for a Central American Parliament would follow a pattern established in Europe, whereby periodic voting for the European Parliament often distorts the political process in the various countries.

ASSESSMENT AND PROSPECTS

Apart from the innovation of cross-regional comparisons between Latin America and Southern Europe, the Notre Dame meeting treated three broad categories of issues relating to democratic consolidation. Generalizing broadly, these were: historical dimensions of democracy and democratization; the issues of representation and exclusion; and the importance of key institutions to the consolidation process. The widely varying regional and methodological perspectives represented at the meeting revealed two challenges to researchers. First, much comparative work needs to be undertaken, concentrating on comparisons between countries experiencing similar historical, institutional, or representational challenges. Second, future collaborative work will require deeper investment in establishing mutually acceptable definitions and devising workable typologies.

The discussions at Notre Dame developed a variety of ways in which the political history of a country may shape its prospects for consolidation. O'Donnell's "counter-intuitive" argument suggested that new consideration be given to the effect of the previous authoritarian regime on the strategies and expectations of elite actors. Karl and Valenzuela both raised the problem of arrangements which are prejudicial to democratic consolidation but were, historically, advantageous to the transition away from authoritarian rule. Several participants identified the need to construct trajectories or paths from type of authoritarian government to type of transition to type of democracy. O'Donnell would label this an "historically sensitive typology of democracies."

Consolidating democracy implies moving beyond attention to the procedural aspects of democracy to address the important questions of citizenship, representation, and exclusion. These concepts were used in different ways, as detailed above. Nevertheless, the question of which classes, which issues, and which elites are represented through the democratic regime—and which are excluded—constitutes a normative and empirical problem in studying the *kind* of democratic regimes being consolidated in Southern Europe and Latin America.

Debate continues over which institutions and institutional arrangements are most important for democratic consolidation in Latin America and Southern Europe. The relevance of particular institutions or structures of power varies between the two regions and among the various countries under study. Cross-national and cross-regional research will continue on such themes as parliament, the presidency, the military, parties, organized interests, and political and economic pacts.

List of Participants

Ernest Bartell, c.s.c.	Kellogg Institute
Atilio Borón	EURAL (Buenos Aires)
Maria Carrilho	Instituto Superior de Ciências do Trabalho e da Empresa (Lisbon)
David Collier	University of California, Berkeley
Joan Dassin	SSRC
Nikiforos Diamandouros	SSRC
Rosario Espinal	Kellogg Institute
Alejandro Foxley	Kellogg Institute and CIEPLAN (Chile)
Richard Gunther	Ohio State University
Anita Isaacs	Ford Foundation
Terry Karl	Stanford University
Juan J. Linz	Yale University
Scott Mainwaring	Kellogg Institute
Guillermo O'Donnell (co-chair)	Kellogg Institute
Andrés Pérez	International Development Centre (Canada)
Juan Rial	Kellogg Institute and CIESU (Uruguay)
Philippe C. Schmitter (co-chair)	Stanford University
J. Samuel Valenzuela	Kellogg Institute
Laurence Whitehead	Nuffield College, Oxford University