



**LABOR MOVEMENTS IN TRANSITIONS TO DEMOCRACY:
A FRAMEWORK FOR ANALYSIS**

J. Samuel Valenzuela

Working Paper #104 - June 1988

J. Samuel Valenzuela is a senior fellow of the Helen Kellogg Institute for International Studies of the University of Notre Dame. He is the author of *Democratización vía reforma: La Expansión del sufragio en Chile*, and coeditor and author of *Military Rule in Chile: Dictatorship and Oppositions* and of *Chile: Politics and Society*. His articles on comparative labor, development theory, and political change have appeared in English, Spanish, Italian, and French publications.

This paper was prepared for a conference on labor movements in transitions to democracy at the Kellogg Institute, University of Notre Dame. The author would like to thank the National Endowment for the Humanities, Mr. Arthur F. O'Neil, and IDRC for the grants that made that conference possible. He also wishes to express his appreciation to Alessandro Pizzorno for contributing to his understanding of this topic during discussions in 1982, and to David Collier, René Cortázar, Rosario Espinal, Robert Fishman, Guillermo O'Donnell, Juan Rial, Philippe Schmitter, Larry Peterson, John Stephens, Evelyne Stephens, and an anonymous reviewer for *Comparative Politics* for their comments on earlier versions of this paper.

This is a second, and revised, edition, printed in May 1989.

ABSTRACT

This paper presents a general framework to analyze the relationships between labor movements and redemocratizations. This relationship has two components: the influence of labor movements on the overall process of political change, and the effect of the latter on the internal reorganization of the labor movements themselves. Although virtually all labor movements respond to situations of breakdown of authoritarian regimes and possible transitions to democracy by increasing their mobilization in strikes and demonstrations and by restructuring their organizations and links to parties, there is considerable variation in the degree to which these changes occur, and in their ultimate political and internal organizational effects. After discussing the relationship between labor and redemocratizations in general terms, the paper presents a series of dimensions which should be heuristically useful to help account for the variations.

RESUMEN

Este artículo presenta un marco general para analizar la relación entre movimientos obreros y procesos de redemocratización. Esta relación tiene dos aspectos: el impacto de los movimientos obreros sobre el curso del cambio político en general, y los efectos de éste sobre la reorganización de los propios movimientos laborales. Aunque prácticamente todos los movimientos obreros aumentan las huelgas y manifestaciones y reestructuran sus organizaciones y sus vínculos partidarios al producirse una quiebra del régimen autoritario y una posible transición a la democracia, hay bastante variación tanto en la intensidad de dichas movilizaciones como en sus efectos políticos y organizacionales internos. Después de discutir la relación entre movimientos laborales y redemocratizaciones en términos generales, el artículo presenta una serie de dimensiones analíticas que debieran ser de utilidad heurística para tratar de explicar las variaciones.

There is as yet no adequate systematic comparative treatment of the position of labor movements—or of other social actors—within processes of redemocratization out of authoritarian rule.ⁱ The best comparative analyses of these transitions have focused mainly on their political dynamics. Thus, this literature informs us that redemocratizations are often fostered by the development of a characteristic split within the ruling circles of the authoritarian regime between sectors that have been labelled “hard-liners” and “soft-liners.” The transition results as the latter gain the upper hand over their hard-line opponents, and initiate a political opening that eventually expands until a fully democratized regime is achieved. The literature has also noted the various paths that transitions may undergo. Some follow mainly a *reforma* model, as in Spain, by evolving towards democracy out of the political institutions of the authoritarian regime, while others take place primarily through a prior *ruptura*, as in Portugal, by first generating a breakdown of the authoritarian regime’s political framework, although most contain elements of both trajectories. Similarly, some transitions clearly occur under foreign pressures, as in the postwar Japanese or German cases, while others result primarily from internal events and forces, as in Brazil. Transitions may also progress through a series of phases, from a crisis of the authoritarian regime, to its liberalization, to the creation of a harsh form of democracy, to, finally, the democratic regime itself. At each moment the agendas of the various political actors may differ considerably. The literature has also pinpointed the importance of agreements or pacts between political, military, and other elites. These serve to minimize the many uncertainties of the process of political change, and thereby increase the possibility of its fruition.ⁱⁱ

And yet, despite this focus on political processes, the analysts have noted that labor movements (as well as other segments of civil society) do have a significant input into democratic transitions. No one suggests that labor movements, or other such organized groups, can by themselves trigger a successful transition, not to speak of carrying it to a successful conclusion. But occasionally labor and other social actors are drawn into formal or informal pacts, whose effects may be more important symbolically than in terms of their overt content, that facilitate transitions. Moreover, at a certain point virtually all processes of redemocratization include a sharp increase in labor movement activation through strikes and demonstrations, usually in conjunction with a broader upsurge of mobilization by a wide variety of groups.

Guillermo O’Donnell and Philippe Schmitter have referred to this upsurge as the “resurrection of civil society.”ⁱⁱⁱ It can play a critical role at key moments in the uncertain course of political change. The “resurrection” often coincides with phases of crisis of authoritarian rule or of its liberalization. In such settings, the heightened mobilization greatly increases the repressive force the hard-liners must apply if they wish to secure order by reverting to a highly exclusionary authoritarianism, and they may be momentarily unwilling or unable to apply such massive

repression. Hence, the soft-liners may be able to press ahead with a program of redemocratization with moderate opponents of the regime in a bid to restore normalcy by further broadening the channels of political participation. Labor leaders and/or their political allies may even become part of the democratizing coalition, either informally or by entering a formal pact or agreement. However, the same labor and popular mobilizations may have the exact opposite effect. The soft-liners may fear a total loss of control over social forces, and this fear may lead them to permit the hard-liners to restore a repressive, but well known, form of order regardless of its cost. Consequently, labor movements and other popular sectors can unwittingly either facilitate or impede change towards democracy by helping to tip the political scales within the ruling circles one way or the other.^{IV}

This general depiction of the relationship between labor movements and processes of redemocratization is certainly valid, but only as a first approximation. A closer look at labor in these contexts shows a much more complex and varied set of labor responses to the political change than this excessively general view allows. While virtually every process of redemocratization is accompanied by a rise in labor mobilization, it should be possible to go a step further with the analysis to reveal the conditions under which labor movements may actually threaten the course of political change and vice versa.

Moreover, any discussion of the relationship between labor movements and processes of redemocratization should examine not only the effects of labor actions over the course of the overall political change. It should also look at the consequences of the changing political context on labor management relations and on the labor movement itself, i.e., the possible recreation or reorganization of unions, the likely reemergence of previously suppressed leaderships, the reconstitution of links to political parties and state officials, and so on.^V Both aspects (the reaction of labor to the overall political change, and the latter's effects on it) are intimately connected, to the degree that the first cannot be fully understood without analyzing the latter.

Allowance should also be made for the fact that, contrary to most treatments of labor in the redemocratization literature, the labor movement is hardly ever a completely unitary actor. Rather, it is usually a complex and diverse one. National labor movements often have competing sets of leaders as well as political and party alignments, and their various levels of membership, which include non-militant as well as militant workers, plant level leaders, middle ranking and top leaderships, do not necessarily have the same visions or interests. Periods of transition out of authoritarian rule often lead to an increase in the internal differences and tensions between the various constituent elements of labor movements, which, again, complicates the analysis of the relationship between labor and this form of political change.

The objective of this paper is to discuss in some detail the special relationship between labor movements and processes of redemocratization, both in terms of labor's reactions to the

overall change and the latter's effects on it. The paper will first examine this question in general, and then present a series of dimensions that can help explain its variations. The framework presented here has been informed by the cases of redemocratization which have occurred since the mid seventies, especially in Argentina, Brazil, Greece, Peru, the Philippines, Portugal, Spain, and Uruguay, but does not examine in detail any one situation; rather, it refers to the various cases only for illustrative purposes.

A GENERAL VIEW OF THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN LABOR AND REDEMOCRATIZATION

Labor occupies a special place among the forces of civil society which react with heightened mobilization to the possible initiation of a transition out of authoritarianism. It therefore should not be discussed simply on the same plane with other segments of society.

There are several reasons for this. The labor movement generally has a greater capacity for extensive and effective mobilization at critical moments than other social groups. It has an organized network through its more or less permanently established unions which can provide an underlying grid for the choreography of demonstrations and protests. Its mass base normally has specific common interests, and a politically tinged collective identity rooted in a lived history. And most importantly, unlike other social segments such as students, church related groups, and neighborhood associations that in some national contexts may share with labor the previously mentioned attributes, the labor movement can disrupt the economy directly through work stoppages. Its wage demands are also an important element in the longer term macroeconomic context, and it can seek to redefine the conditions of employment and the character of labor management relations. Labor's demands cannot be lightly ignored.

Given labor's position in the economy of both nation and firm, authoritarian regimes devote a great deal of attention to it, which in turn ultimately heightens the significance of labor during the transition. A brief digression on the treatment of labor under authoritarian regimes is necessary to establish this point.

Even though many authoritarian regimes would prefer to simply eliminate worker organizations altogether, twentieth century technology, management, and marketing provide workers with many opportunities to disrupt production, for which a totally repressive stance towards labor is simply counterproductive. For this and other reasons, such as the existence of international agreements and pressures, authoritarian regimes allow some form of worker organization, and establish some mechanism for the channeling of worker grievances.^{vi} However, they encumber such organizations and mechanisms with a heavy hand of restrictions and controls, not only because the organizations can serve as the basis for coordinating labor actions that can stop production, but also, and more importantly, because they can serve as a

platform for the action of the political oppositions to the regime. In the absence of free elections and the other aspects of a democracy where oppositions normally act, opponents of authoritarian regimes are left with directing their energies towards the organized spaces of civil society, the labor movement being one of the most attractive ones because of its mass base and capacity to disrupt the economy.^{vii} As a result, questions of labor policy are among the most sensitive for authoritarian regimes to decide, given that they must permit worker organization and yet seek to prevent it from acquiring much power and importance. Ultimately, the tension between both objectives is irresolvable, so most authoritarian regimes go through cycles of repression and liberalization vis-à-vis the labor movement, repression to defuse social protest and to ferret out opponents, and liberalization to secure the commitment of the work force to the process of production and to curtail international criticism of the regime.

For heuristic purposes, the containment strategies followed by authoritarian regimes towards labor organizations can be divided into two ideal types: the corporatist (in the sense of Schmitter's "state corporatism"^{viii}) and the market. The corporatist approach involves the creation by the state of some form of worker organization, usually with official financing, compulsory membership, and the setting of strict boundaries to the sectors they cover.^{ix} The leadership of such unions may be designated by state officials, or elected by workers; in the latter case, the candidates are usually screened for political reliability. Collective bargaining in this model is generally centralized and also controlled by state officials. The margin of autonomous action by union leaderships is limited, although not completely negligible. Opponents of the regime are of two minds when faced with this type of union control; some try to use the official channels and elections while at the same time trying to organize informal parallel networks of contacts with rank and file workers and even with employers for plant specific bargaining, while others will simply have nothing to do with the official system and choose to remain outside of it. In any event, this authoritarian labor containment strategy can occasionally lead to the creation of a sizeable group of union leaders who are beholden to the authorities even if not always their active and enthusiastic supporters.

The market mechanism for union control tries to weaken unions as bargaining agents to a maximum extent. Collective bargaining is decentralized completely. Strikes are rendered as ineffective as possible by allowing them to be staged only when contracts have expired, by preventing the use of union funds for strike support, by permitting the hiring of strike breakers, by allowing lockouts, by designating many areas of the economy as "strategic" thereby prohibiting work stoppages in them, and so on. Affiliation to unions is made voluntary, the formation of new unions is made easy in order to stimulate union pluralism, and membership dues are their only source of financing. Union democracy may be encouraged through frequent elections for new leaders. However, by using this strategy the regime denies itself the possibility of generating

union leaders beholden to it. While all regime opponents with an audience among workers normally seek to participate as actively as possible in union leadership, the state can always repress those leaders it dislikes. Whatever bargaining rights and power unions are formally given have little economic impact, since the restrictions under which they operate render them quite ineffective unless their respective labor markets are tight, which is to say that they hardly make a difference.^x

While authoritarian regimes will tend to employ primarily one or the other strategy of labor containment, mixed forms are not uncommon. Regimes with corporatist approaches may tolerate union formation at the margins of legality in the stronger industries, where workers' bargaining clout is greater and where the official unions and their leaders have little capacity to gain even minimal worker allegiance. Regimes with a market approach may nonetheless sponsor union organizations in certain sectors, generally ones which they choose to favor. And, as illustrated by populist authoritarianisms, the more the regime hopes to stimulate mass mobilization in its support the greater the proclivity to adopt a corporatist approach. This tends to occur where the organizational space of unionism has not been effectively occupied by labor movement organizations prior to the onset of the authoritarian regime; conversely, where such space is taken by previously established organizations, authoritarian regimes will tend to follow a market containment strategy.^{xi}

The severity of the restrictions imposed by authoritarian regimes on labor movements under either containment strategy varies considerably—a point to be elaborated later. In general, however, given the potential use of labor mobilizations as a power resource by opponents of authoritarian regimes, such regimes are virtually by definition harsher on labor than on other less strategically situated groups in civil society. Therefore, the controls these regimes institute normally generate, firstly, industrial relations systems that prevent workers from employing job actions to press maximally for their demands; secondly, they cast a pall of suspicion over union militants and leaders, who are prevented from mobilizing workers and from pressing for their interests to a full extent, and who are often the targets of government and state tolerated employer repression; thirdly, they weaken union organizations at the plant level and those at the national level unless the latter are officially sponsored; and fourthly, they suppress the opposition party or parties with which the unions may be historically linked. Consequently, a crisis or a liberalization of the authoritarian regime, or its change to initiate a transition to democracy, create opportunities for the labor movement to overcome all these limitations.

In these circumstances, the key element underpinning the regime's labor containment strategy, repression, is either lifted or weakened—or perceived to be lifted or weakened. Rank and file workers, who will often by then have a long list of pent-up demands given the prior restrictions on their actions, will take advantage of the political moment to seek redress. As the

numbers of protesters skyrocket, so does the impunity of protest, which further stimulates the size of the mobilization as normally quiescent workers, and even other popular sector groups, join in. Union militants and leaders, including those forcibly excluded from the labor field by the regime, will heighten their activities and seek to use the new freedoms to create, recreate, or extend their organizations; occasionally those whom the regime considered its worst enemies may have the advantage in gaining ascendancy among the newly mobilized workers, since they will be seen as having championed workers' rights under the most difficult circumstances. A primary target of union leaderships, particularly those which were strongly suppressed by the authoritarian regime, will be to establish or reestablish their role as negotiators for rank and file demands before employers and the state at the plant as well as national levels (unless a revolutionary political objective takes precedence). This will normally lead them to demand a change of the labor laws and the labor management relations system enforced to labor's disadvantage by the authoritarian regime. Finally, the party or parties associated with the labor movement will attempt to reassert their links to labor organizations and their audience among workers, and will seek a place in the newly opened political space (unless they judge the moment to offer revolutionary possibilities). In sum, periods of crisis of authoritarianism, of liberalization, and transition, are ones which normally lead to increases in rank and file activation and participation in unions, a widespread restructuring of labor organizations, and a reestablishment or recomposition of union links to parties.

As noted earlier, the heightened labor mobilization, together with that of other social sectors, may accelerate the process of redemocratization. The soft-liners in association with the moderate opponents of the regime may argue that only a full redemocratization will reestablish order, while the hard-liners may be prevented from taking action by the prior loss of key state positions (loss normally associated with the political changes provoking the mobilization in the first place) as well as by the heavy and widespread repression which would be necessary at that point to recreate an exclusionary authoritarianism. But this mobilization, as intimated above, may also act like a double-edged sword, and permit a reversion of the process of redemocratization. The pent-up demands of workers may exceed the capacity of the economy, or the willingness of employers and state economic policymakers to provide a satisfactory response, and the wave of strikes and street demonstrations may lead to a protracted crisis. Formerly suppressed labor leaders may succeed in establishing their hegemony over labor organizations, and their clamor for a rapid change in labor laws and collective bargaining procedures to do away with the authoritarian regime's restrictions may meet fierce opposition from employers, since the latter will normally have been the beneficiaries of the heavy hand of the state over labor. This may lead employers to reconsider their commitment, if any, to supporting the process of democratic change. Similarly, conservative and even moderate politicians, military officers, and others may be alarmed by the

popular backing of labor and political leaders they consider far too radical, and may press successfully for a new political closure. In other words, the changes in and reactions of the labor movement (accompanied often by the mobilization of other popular sectors) may furnish the necessary pretexts for a backlash by hard-line forces that may still retain or may regain important positions of state power.

Therefore, a combination of high labor and popular mobilization at certain critical moments of breakdown of the authoritarian institutions (i.e., when the option for a course of redemocratization becomes possible but state elites have not yet committed themselves to it), followed by the decline of that mobilization and by the willingness and capacity of the labor movement's union and political leaderships to show restraint when the political agenda shifts in favor of redemocratization, would seem to provide the ideal mix in terms of labor's contribution to ensuring the latter's success.^{xii} The initial high levels of mobilization would increase the cost of repression and demonstrate that a mere liberalization of the authoritarian regime (i.e., providing greater space and openness for the activities of regime opponents and for the autonomy of action of social groups, but without relinquishing the main institutional framework of authoritarianism) will not resolve the essential legitimation problems of the authoritarian regime and secure political order, while the subsequent restraint would demonstrate that democratization can lead to greater social and political order rather than to revolution, instability, and chaos. The final restraint phase need not be devoid of all social conflict. By that point, however, as O'Donnell and Schmitter point out in discussing the bell-shaped curve of mobilization in transitions, social actors should have increased their tolerance of such conflicts.^{xiii} Moreover, by then new rules and institutions for channeling social, and in particular, labor conflict should be in place, permitting the leadership of the various groups involved to negotiate their resolution. The levels of worker mobilization should be higher than those that existed before the breakdown of the authoritarian regime, but should correspond to those considered "normal" given a democratic regime and a particular mix of market forces.

While a process of uncontrolled labor mobilization leading to a breakdown of public order is rarely the single most important explanation for a liberalized authoritarian regime's failure to make a transition to democracy, the success of redemocratization is also rarely buttressed by a perfectly timed sequence of mobilization followed by restraint. This sequence's occurrence depends on the compatibility or coincidence between, on the one hand, the specific economic, organizational, and/or political interests and goals of the various segments composing the labor movement and, on the other, the overall political process of the transition, but this congruence is hardly ever complete for all the elements of the movement. Thus, the moment in which the political process points to a redemocratization should coincide with a substantial decrease in workers' activation generated by the fact that their most pressing demands have been satisfied

after the initial explosion of their mobilization, or by their perception that no further gains—if any—are in fact possible or desirable; but this coincidence is rare. Moreover, at the moment the transition begins labor leaders should feel that they have secured control both over labor organizations and over the representation of worker interests (at best through their participation in a social pact with employers and the state), and that there is at least the promise of a new industrial relations system which allows for the effective expression of worker demands; but given rank and file activation, competition among labor leadership groups, revolutionary political objectives on the part of some labor leaders, continued state and employer repression, the unwillingness of business to change labor management practices, and so on, this congruence may not occur. Similarly, the transition should correspond with the beginning of a full participation of the labor movement linked political party or parties in the fledgling democratic institutions (preferably through their inclusion either formally or informally in the transition coalition), but this may likewise be delayed either by a self imposed or externally imposed exclusion. And so on.

A few cases, such as the Uruguayan and Spanish despite high strike levels up to four years after Franco's death, have come close to having this congruent sequence. In most situations, some (but rarely all) elements of the labor movement have pursued—or have been forced to pursue by either other labor movement groups, the state, or business elites—their specific economic, organizational, or political objectives regardless of the effects on the overall process of change. This has often led to tensions between those segments of the labor movement that are most committed to contributing to the overall transition and those that pursue narrower objectives, resulting in a highly complex and mixed record in terms of labor's effects on the transition. Transitions are most successful in terms of producing a consolidated democratic regime when there is a compatibility between the narrow objectives of all significant segments of society and the newly evolving overall political institutions. Hence, the more various elements of the labor movement see their narrow objectives unfulfilled by the democratic transition, the more the labor sector will be a source of potential semi-loyalty or disloyalty to the new regime.^{XIV} For instance, if state and employer pressures force workers' wages to continue below their collectively organized market power and no other compensations are given to them in return, if labor leaders still cannot effectively represent worker interests both at the plant level and nationally given the absence of significant changes in the industrial relations system, if the party or parties linked to labor are unable to gain much influence in the new political system due to untoward military pressures, and so on, then not much has changed for labor and its loyalty to the new regime—which in these extreme cases can only questionably be labelled democratic—will be low indeed.

The discussion of the relationship between labor and redemocratization has until now been cast in general terms. We shall now turn to the sources of variation in the way labor responds to, and is affected by, this form of political change.

THE SOURCES OF VARIATION IN THE RELATIONSHIP OF LABOR MOVEMENTS TO PROCESSES OF REDEMOCRATIZATION

The main sources of variation are the following: first, the strength or weakness of the labor movement, and the economic context of the transition; second, the centralization or decentralization of the labor movement, and its unity or division; third, the authoritarian regime's treatment of labor and its political allies prior to redemocratization; and fourth, the modalities of the transition to democracy, and the relationship between the labor movement and the elites guiding the transition. Each dimension will be discussed separately in what follows, although the third one will take a disproportionate amount of space given its importance and complexity.

I. The Relative Strength or Weakness of the Labor Movement

The stronger the labor movement, the more likely it is to assume an important role in the transition. Strong movements should have greater chances of participating in top level negotiations or pacts with business and state elites to set policy guidelines on a whole series of socioeconomic issues; their rank and file workers should find more responsiveness to their demands among transition elites; labor leaders should be more successful in changing the authoritarian regime's labor relations system to permit effective plant and national level voices in favor of worker interests; and labor's associated party leadership or leaderships should be sought after to form part of the transition coalition. The opposite should hold for weak movements. Cases where the labor movement is strong are consequently more likely to follow the favorable sequence of mobilization followed by restraint: the early mobilization has a greater probability of permitting the various segments of the labor movement to fulfill their narrow goals to a significant extent, at which point an attitude of restraint in order to secure the overall transition will also permit labor to consolidate these previously attained specific gains. And as a result labor will in the longer term accord greater legitimacy to the democratic institutions, whose long term prospects will be more firmly assured. Consensual class relations buttress democratic stability, and such consensual relations depend largely on the proper development of institutions for the negotiation of worker-employer differences in the absence of state enforced limitations on workers' rights to collective organization.

And yet, for reasons such as radicalness and/or divisions among the labor movement leaderships, the intransigence of business, the influence of an entrenched conservative military establishment, the bitter opposition between the elites controlling the transition and the political party or parties associated with the labor movement, and others, the transition can occur without the various components of a strong labor movement realizing their specific economic, organizational, or political goals. In these cases there is a high likelihood that the new democratic

institutions will be brittle given the easy development of semi-loyalty or disloyalty towards them in the labor movement, and the readiness of business and state elites to revert to repression as a means of preventing such movements from exercising their full market capacities. An authoritarian reversion is therefore more likely.

Where labor movements are weak and transitions can thereby occur without the realization of the economic, organizational, or political goals of the various segments of the labor movement, the latter may well fail to develop any firm commitments to the new regime. This may not present immediate problems given the movement's weakness, but may foster the radicalization of the labor movement leadership, provide a social base for anti-system parties, and generate long term instability if the movement grows in strength. Ironically, the very weakness of the labor movement should make it easier for conservative business and state elites to follow a deliberate policy of inclusion of labor during the course of the transition, thereby encouraging in the long run the development of a more stable and consensual democratic system, but such inclusion is, for the same reason, also less likely to occur. The weakness of labor is therefore often associated in the long run with the development of radical tendencies within it, and with strained class relations. And since labor weakness makes it easier for state and business leaders to suppress labor rights, there is a greater chance that the new regime will not evolve fully into a democracy. This has, so far, occurred in the Philippines.

But which are the determinants of strength or weakness of the labor movement in times of transition? Unfortunately, the answer to this question is complex.

The first criterion for labor movement strength is the density of union affiliation in the total labor force. All of the recent cases of redemocratization have, by world standards, medium to low levels of union density, from a high of over 30% in Argentina, to a low of around 10% in the Philippines, with most around the 15-20% level.^{XV} Following this measure, none of these cases are ones in which the labor movement has an unquestionable capacity to project itself into the center of transition politics. Similarly, an expansive economy with low levels of unemployment should increase labor movement strength. But recent democratizations have all occurred, with the possible exception of Korea, in crisis economies.

Nonetheless, there are other important indicators for union strength. The density of union affiliation in key areas of economic activity is one of them. Thus, the near universal unionization levels found in Chile's copper industry and in its medium to large manufacturing establishments compensates to a large extent for the fact that only about 15% of the total labor force is currently unionized. The same analysis may be extended to Brazil, where the unionization levels of industrial São Paulo, whose wages serve as a bellwether for Brazilian incomes policies, are high, and for Argentina, Spain, Korea, and so on. Similarly, the concentration of union membership in capital cities may also compensate for the overall weakness of unionism. Thus, the

Peruvian labor movement is heavily located in the Lima/Callao area, which it can paralyze through general strikes; the same is true in Uruguay, where the concentration of unionism in Montevideo heightens its importance.

Attention should also be directed at the historical characteristics of union organizations. Those that have been heavily subjected to the state, highly divided into many small units, with competing ideological and political allegiances, and/or chronically underfinanced, are certainly weaker than those that have enjoyed greater autonomy, centralization, a predominant political coloration, and adequate funding. Unions with historical legacies of organizational weakness are also more vulnerable to further weakening under authoritarian regimes. Following this analysis, the Greek unions are weak, while the Argentinian ones are relatively strong, having demonstrated a considerable capacity to resist sometimes heavy state interference since 1955.

The industrial relations system, in particular the degree to which unions can indeed organize collective pressures to alter their respective labor markets, can also provide an indication of union strength. A legacy of the authoritarian regime is, as noted earlier, to weaken unions in this regard, but there are different degrees to which this is so. The Spanish labor movement through the Comisiones Obreras was able to overcome to a large extent the strictures imposed on collective bargaining by the regime well before the death of Franco.^{xvi} A major disadvantage of Brazilian unions has been the continued use of the collective bargaining arrangements set up by the authoritarian regime of Getúlio Vargas, which have prevented workers in the more heavily capitalized industries from exercising their full market capacity.^{xvii} This has weakened the Brazilian labor movement.

The link between unions and one or more national political parties may also add a considerable measure of strength to labor. The party or parties may derive their electoral strength, and therefore significance, from a much broader social base than just workers. In this case the labor movement may derive its importance during the transition from its insertion into party politics. This was notably the case in Spain, where the link between the unions and the Socialist and Communist parties certainly enhanced the significance of the former in the political agenda of the transition. The same phenomenon should occur were there to be a transition in Chile. Similarly, some labor movements have close links to a broader segment of informal sector workers, which increase their strength in street mobilizations. This was one advantage of the otherwise weak Philippine labor movement.^{xviii}

Lastly, the strength of unions may result from the relative weakness of employers. If the latter are not well organized, are heavily dependent on the state, are identified too closely with an authoritarian regime that has broken down dramatically, and so on, labor unions may acquire much greater influence and significance than their possibly low levels of membership in the total labor force may suggest. This was the case in Portugal.

Hence, while all labor movements will react with heightened mobilization to the process of transition, only those that have some measure of strength, given one or more of the above mentioned attributes, are likely to occupy a significant place beyond the effects of this mobilization in the politics of the transition. Within recent cases of redemocratization, the Spanish and Argentinian labor movements appear to have been the strongest. In both cases labor leaders and their associated parties have had high level negotiations with state elites. The Portuguese labor movement, given the circumstances surrounding the transition and its links to the Communist party, and the Uruguayan movement, given its presence in Montevideo and links to a coalition of parties of the Left that were a part of the negotiations leading to the transition, have also occupied important positions in their respective transitions. The weakest movements are to be found in Greece, Ecuador, the Dominican Republic, and in the Philippines, where labor has not been included in top level transition negotiations. Brazilian labor may also be said to be weak.

II. The Centralization or Decentralization of the Labor Movement, and its Political Unity or Division

A mobilization followed by restraint sequence would be more probable if union organizations and collective bargaining were highly centralized. Were this the case, a small number of top labor leaders would be so empowered that they would be more likely to be participants in the negotiations of the transition process, and they would have a good chance of obtaining satisfaction of important labor movement goals while contributing worker restraint to the transition at the proper moments. However, given the almost certain disorganization and financial weakness of unions after a period of authoritarian rule, top confederal leaders are unlikely to have the capacity to enforce nationally negotiated agreements over the lower levels of union organizations. Such a capacity is exceptional even under democratic regimes, as Jelle Visser has noted in his

comparative study of European unions, since it requires a well established staff and the resources to support local unions in their job actions.^{xix}

Nonetheless, there is a significant difference between cases with mainly plant level unions and collective bargaining, and those with industrial branch or occupational category forms of organization and bargaining. The more decentralized cases are much less likely to have a mobilization followed by restraint sequence that corresponds to the political cycle of a smooth transition. In these situations, generated either for historical reasons or given the authoritarian regime's application of a stringent market type labor containment policy, the local labor leaders and rank and file workers will view their mobilization as something partial, limited, and specific. They will not feel that it affects the overall economic or political situation one way or another. They may even support the redemocratization process which, after all, creates the political climate permitting their own mobilization, but they may consider that their actions have virtually no repercussion beyond the local firm. (The exception to this are workers located in strategic axes of some national economies, such as oil or mining). Moreover, given the extreme weakness of the higher levels of union organization and the large number of local level leaders, labor leaders are less likely to be called by state elites and employer organizations to form part of whatever negotiations are undertaken to advance the process of political transition. In these cases, the decrease of worker mobilization would result mainly from worker perceptions that they have little more to gain from continuing their job actions. The Philippines has this type of decentralized unionism, as does Chile.

Conversely, the mobilization followed by restraint sequence is more probable in the cases in which the scope of unions and of collective bargaining is larger. Such a pattern of organization may occur for what are, again, historical reasons, or given the authoritarian regime's use of corporative labor containment policies. Workers in the biggest industrial branch or occupational category organizations, which given their size can have a stronger influence on their respective labor markets, are bound to sense that their mobilization has important economic and political effects, and state and business elites are likely to seek to involve union leaders, who are obviously fewer in number, in negotiations to secure labor peace. Several such negotiations with the leadership of the various largest unions—not only the peak confederal one—will be necessary to secure the beginning of a restraint phase to coincide with the political transition. Uruguay is a good case in point.

The mobilization-restraint sequence responding to the logic of the political transition is also more probable where only one political party is historically dominant in the labor movement, provided that that party supports the transition and is not excluded from it. These features were also present in Uruguay. The Uruguayan Communist party, which is the main labor linked party in the country, strongly supported the political negotiations leading to the transition, and made

every effort to secure worker restraint. Although the transition government concluded separate agreements with the leaders of the various industrial and occupational branches of Uruguayan labor, the leadership of these was uniformly predisposed to follow the centrally formulated party policy.^{xx}

By contrast, where there are sharp political and ideological divisions in the labor movement, labor leaders are more likely to focus on the competition between them for rank and file support than they are on the economic and political effects of worker mobilization on the transition.^{xxi} Typically, the various political and ideological groups will have historically gained greater or lesser strength in different segments of the labor movement. But the period of authoritarian rule will most probably have threatened to alter the previous balance, given its selective repression or given the different abilities of the various groups for organizing under clandestine or semi-clandestine circumstances. Hence, the period immediately following the fall of the authoritarian regime will most probably generate a scramble by the various groups to insure control over their usual turf and to expand beyond it. This will tend to increase mobilization and labor conflict as the various leadership groups seek to articulate new demands in order to galvanize worker support for their organizations. Curiously, during authoritarian rule political divisions within the oppositional labor movement tend to increase, even though they are often placed on the back burner as the various sectors focus on opposing the regime; but redemocratization will lead, once again, to a sharp efflorescence of political conflict within the labor movement in cases where it is so divided. This will occur especially when the authoritarian regime has been particularly repressive of labor leaderships, and has followed a corporative labor containment policy thereby creating new officially accepted union leaders while trying to exclude previous leadership groups from the field.

In these competitive situations, a labor leadership may waver between riding and even stimulating the crest of worker mobilization in order to extend its control over it, i.e. following a union centered strategy, and attempting to contribute worker restraint as a means of seeking acceptance in the coalition of the political transition and contributing to its overall success, i.e. following a politically focused strategy. Changes from one to the other are not uncommon. For instance, after the aborted left-wing coup of 25 November 1975, the Portuguese Communist party, which until then had been urging worker restraint, opted to stimulate worker demands and mobilization. Its decision was prompted by the fact that it was forced at that point to leave the government positions it held, and by the imminent threat of losing the officially sanctioned monopoly of worker representation the party had earlier secured for its labor confederation, the Intersindical.^{xxii} Similarly, it is quite likely that the Spanish Unión General de Trabajadores, the union confederation linked to the Socialist party, at the very beginning of the transition placed the highest priority on extending its control over the labor movement; at that point they perceived the

Communists as having a much more formidable base in the unions than they actually had. By contrast, the Communist party sought to pursue a policy of worker restraint through Comisiones Obreras, the union confederation close to it, in order to gain acceptance in the evolving political framework of the transition. Thus, the Socialist unions did not endorse the first important political and socioeconomic pact of the transition, the *Pacto de la Moncloa*, while Comisiones did. The different attitudes were largely the result of the different circumstances in which the Spanish Socialists and Communists found themselves at the moment: the Socialists were unsure of their following among workers, while they had little doubt that they would be accepted within the newly evolving political framework, while the Communists were in the opposite situation. In subsequent years, the position of the two parties reversed. The Socialists participated in the *Acuerdos Marco*, while the Communists, surprised at their low electoral showing and at their smaller than expected share of the organized labor movement, stayed clear of such agreements while trying to present a more militant posture in favor of worker demands.^{xxiii}

Hence, if the union organizations are decentralized and/or the union leaderships highly divided for political and ideological reasons, the likelihood of a sharp rise in labor conflictuality which does not readily decline in order to secure the transition is very high.

III. The Effects of the Authoritarian Regime's Treatment of Labor and its Political Allies

Since authoritarian regimes have a variable record of suppressing parts of the labor movement and allowing others to exist, they mold the kind of labor organizations that will be in place when the possibility of a transition to democracy arises. They therefore condition to some extent the demands that the various components of the labor movement will raise at that point, and the nature of the organizational building that they will have to accomplish in order to establish or reestablish the labor movement in the democratic setting. This can often lead to tensions among different segments of the labor movement as they pursue objectives which are at cross-purposes with each other.

For this analysis, the earlier distinction between market and corporatist strategies of labor control, which refers exclusively to unions, does not suffice. Rather, it is necessary to distinguish between the degrees of "syndical harshness" or "mildness," and the amount of political "space," i.e. whether mostly "closed" or relatively "open," that authoritarian regimes allow for the action of elites from parties linked, however tenuously, to the labor movement. I hasten to note that these characterizations should be understood within the authoritarian contexts, for "mild" and "open" regimes of this type still do not have the freedoms of organization, petition, and political and electoral expression of twentieth century democracies.

The syndical harshness or mildness dimension refers to the extent to which the authoritarian regime limits the channels for the expression of collectively formulated worker grievances, for labor actions, and for effective labor input into the process of collective bargaining. Obviously, harsh regimes are the ones that are strictly exclusionary, and mild ones are the opposite. Regimes which employ a corporatist strategy of labor containment can be harsh or mild; Portugal under Salazar and post-revolutionary, especially post-thirties Mexico both employ different varieties of corporatism (although the latter with a decentralized variant), but the Portuguese was indeed harsh while the Mexican is mild. Regimes employing exclusively a market strategy can only be characterized as harsh, since this approach is single-mindedly centered on preventing collective actions from having any effect on the labor market. Chile under Pinochet is a good example, while Argentina under Videla presents an ultimately aborted attempt to pursue the same strategy.^{xxiv}

The political "space" dimension refers to the degree to which the regime has, or tolerates, arenas for political activity by identifiably different groups, including among them those linked to the labor movement or to at least one of its segments. Some regimes, for instance, have elections (even if not completely free) for local governments and/or legislatures in which oppositions can run, permit a considerable extent of press freedom, and even have a variety of political views within the inner circles of power with which different opposition groups can dialog, and so on. Such regimes can be called "open"; Brazil's post 1964 military regime, except from 1968 to 1973, is a case in point. Political elites allied, however minimally, with the labor unions can sometimes score considerable successes within these arenas. The "closed" regimes are those where power is much more concentrated in the head of state or a junta, where no elections are held (or where they are so controlled and fraudulent they are meaningless) and no multi-member legislatures (except the rubber stamp varieties) or relatively autonomous local governments exist. Again, Chile's military dictatorship is clearly a "closed" case, as was Salazar's Portugal which, despite its corporative trappings, its elections, and National Assembly, was in fact a highly centralized system where regime opponents could not use the existing arenas to advance their views. Naturally, the extent of repression against political dissidence, including forms of unofficial repression, is greater the narrower the regime, even though more demonstrations and police repression may actually be seen in the streets of more "open" settings.

In general, a syndically harsh regime will generate a greater accumulation of pent up resentments and demands among workers, which can lead, when the authoritarian regime enters a crisis or begins a process of redemocratization, to a singularly strong wave of strikes and demonstrations. These regimes will also stimulate the development of union leaderships that are willing to overstep the bounds of labor legislation in order to organize the defense of workers' rights. (Whether or not they have much success in doing so is another matter.) The more

restrictive the labor legislation, the greater the propensity for such overstepping. Since this exposes labor leaders to the risk of repression, there will be a tendency for union leaderships to be recruited from among politically engaged as well as radical individuals (radical in the sense of seeking a drastic overhaul of the socioeconomic system). Whenever the personal stakes of labor leadership are high, the labor movement tends to be led by individuals who will take the risks involved because of their commitment to a certain political program and cause, which under capitalist authoritarianisms will normally be anti-capitalist.^{XXV} The mobilization of the rank and file will, when it occurs, generally favor the extension of the organizational capacity of the politically committed leaderships, who will benefit from the absence of other leadership sectors and/or from the prestige associated with having borne the brunt of the authoritarian regime's repression. However, this tendency could reverse itself in time as the new conditions favor more moderate sectors, and as the memory of the authoritarian experience fades.

A syndically mild regime will still generate an upsurge in labor conflict when it enters a crisis or redemocratizes, but this labor activation will be less felt. Workers will not have as many pent-up demands, and politically moderate leaders—even some associated with the authoritarian regime where a corporatist labor containment model is used—are likely to be present in greater numbers to gain from the new possibilities for extending union organizations.

The effects of political closure or openness are somewhat parallel to the previous ones. Regimes which are politically closed force oppositions to them to act in ways that will overstep the bounds of the regime's legality. Thus, opponents will rely on tactics such as street demonstrations and disturbances, strikes, boycotts, lobbying for the international isolation of the regime, and even armed insurrection. Again, such actions expose their organizers to the regime's repression, for which they require a great deal of commitment as well as the training and capacity for clandestine organizing. A very closed political context can eventually favor the development of a radical opposition that takes an insurrectionary path. When this occurs, there is a certain point at which politics becomes mainly a militarized affair. The center of gravity of the opposition will shift to those who have military capabilities, and other non-military opposition pressure tactics, such as strikes by the labor movement, will become much less important. In these cases it is also less likely that the authoritarian regime will eventually be superseded by a democracy. Not every closed political context will produce this result, however. The prior history of the opposition groups and their assessment (right or wrong) of the possibilities of success through the use of various tactics, including armed ones, go a long way towards explaining the difference. If the authoritarian regime begins, for example, in the context of a civil war or proto civil war in which its opposition has suffered a military defeat, as in Uruguay, it is unlikely that armed insurrection will once again soon become that opposition's strategy of choice. Conversely, where the authoritarian regime has

come to power suppressing an unmilitarized political force, some sectors within it will be subsequently more likely to adopt armed struggle, as has occurred in Chile.

By contrast, under regimes which are relatively open politically, moderate oppositions have arenas in which they can act, and they are therefore much more likely to retain the center of gravity of the opposition forces. The moderate political opposition will seek to use the spaces the regime offers, such as, to repeat, reasonably fair plebiscites or elections, legislatures, local governments, or simple dialogues, to try to convince the authorities that in the long run authoritarian rule is unsustainable given its lack of legitimacy, and that redemocratization is the best course to develop a minimum of national unity and consensus. Street demonstrations, disturbances, strikes and other such actions may help drive this point. Relatively open authoritarian regimes are more likely than closed ones to redemocratize through following the *reforma* model, in which there is a process of protracted negotiations.^{XXVI} To qualify as “open” for current purposes, a regime must, to repeat, allow political leaders who can draw labor movement support to participate in its political “spaces.” Parenthetically, if the labor movement is linked mainly to Marxist or far-left political groups before the onset of the authoritarian regime, it is more likely that the authoritarian regime will be a closed one.

As can readily be seen, these distinctions yield four types of authoritarian regimes: harsh-closed, harsh-open, mild-closed, mild-open. Each type molds the various components of their respective labor movements differently; consequently, as the following discussion will show, labor and its associated political leaderships react to, and are affected by, processes of redemocratization differently as well. I will assume in discussing the politically “harsh” cases that the possible process of militarization of political conflict has not dwarfed other forms of oppositional activity, and that the transition does not occur through the victory of an armed insurrection which destroys the authoritarian regime’s army.

a) Syndically Harsh and Politically Closed Regimes (for example, authoritarian Portugal, Chile, Uruguay, etc.)

The instauration phase of authoritarian regimes often assumes this form. The comments here refer not to this regime phase, but rather to regimes that take this form more permanently.

Generally speaking, an authoritarian regime that has been harsh and closed, i.e., exclusionary of worker demands and intolerant of all opposition political activity by groups associated with the labor movement or its segments, will produce a close alliance between political and syndical leaderships during the authoritarian regime but a split between the two (especially the local level union leaderships) during the initial phases of redemocratization. During the authoritarian regime, the close alliance between the union and political leaderships will be the result of the fact that labor conflicts and demonstrations by workers will be viewed by the

opposition as one of the principal means to exert pressure on the regime. Hence, the political leadership, which would otherwise be quite impotent, will support all actions organized by labor. As a result, workers and labor leaders will occupy a central position among opposition forces. The opposition as a whole will tend to radicalize, a tendency which will also be felt strongly among local level union leaderships.

With the possibility of a redemocratization, which will normally occur abruptly in these cases, the objectives of the top national party and occasionally union leaderships will tend to be at odds with those of rank and file workers and of the more radicalized local level union leaderships. Workers will have accumulated long held demands, and will therefore take advantage of the new political context to sharply increase their mobilization in order to air them. Local level union leaders are likely to support and stimulate this mobilization in order to reestablish control over plant level organizations (especially where the regime has prevented many of them from acting effectively), and to seek to define as quickly as possible a new set of industrial relations institutions expanding the capacity of labor to press for its demands. However, the national party leadership and to a certain extent the top union leadership (unless there is competition among groups) will most probably try to moderate worker demands. They will do so in an effort to increase public order and economic growth during the transition process, thereby attempting to prevent hard-line forces from using labor mobilization as an excuse for a reassertion of the authoritarian regime as well as seeking to ensure admission as a political and bargaining force in the new context. The top leaders may in fact be overly cautious in their reactions, especially in cases where hard-line forces are seen as having considerable influence and power. This position, a mixture of political prudence and of an effort to project an image of "responsibility," can well be observed in the Uruguayan Left during the transition.^{xxvii} The position of the Communist Party of Italy in the postwar period was also similar; with his dramatic "svolta de Salerno," Togliatti led the party to a course of great moderation, placing its recognition and acceptance as a political force in the new democratic system above changes in industrial ownership and even workers' and unions' rights.^{xxviii} The same "responsible" position may be adopted by labor linked parties when they are one of the government transition forces; this was the situation of the Portuguese Communist Party until the aborted Leftist coup of November 25, 1975, which forced the party out of power.^{xxix} In these cases, the outcome will be a conflict between different levels of the labor movement, since it is likely that many rank and file workers and local level leaders will mobilize regardless of the attitude of the top leaderships of the labor movement.

It should be noted, however, that this predicted tension between worker social mobilization and the political action and objectives of the labor movement's top leaderships will only develop if the political leadership thinks that a democratic transition is a possibility. In other words, a crisis or opening of the authoritarian regime may lead to a strike wave which the political

leadership will support if the latter perceives the rulers, as was the case with Caetano's 1969-1970 liberalization in Portugal, to be steadfastly against any real political change; such mobilization would correspond to the strategy of pressing the authoritarian regime to commit itself to a course of redemocratization. Moreover, the tensions will only develop if the political leadership places a high value on the success of the transition. If it does not—when, for instance, it does not think the new political situation will represent much of a change with respect to the previous one, as in the Philippines^{xxx}—it may seek to stimulate worker mobilization even beyond what local level leaders and workers are willing to do.

b) Syndically Mild and Politically Closed Regimes (for example, Spain 1962-1975)

In those settings where the authoritarian regime has been mild in terms of allowing a relatively effective voice in collective bargaining by representative union leaderships and channels for workers to present their grievances, but has closed all political arenas to party leaderships somehow associated with the labor movement, the transition will produce, once again, tensions within the labor movement between the union leaderships, this time local and national, and the party leadership. The union leaders will probably be reluctant to accept subordination to the political directives and voice on behalf of the labor movement as a whole of the newly reemerging national party leadership. The mildness of the authoritarian regime should have stimulated the rise of union leaders guided by the immediate demands of the rank and file rather than by overall political strategies. They will also have held visibly important public roles during the authoritarian regime, given their negotiations with employers and/or the state, and will hope to continue to hold that status unhindered by party policies. Those with greater bargaining power will have tended to detach themselves from the rest, while the party leaderships will try to foster the unity of the whole workers' movement in order to further their own political influence and importance.

Aside from these general considerations, the effects of this type of situation should differ considerably depending of the attitude adopted by the party leadership towards the redemocratization process and its role within it. If this leadership places little or no value on the transition to democracy relative to asserting its control over the labor movement, it will assume a militant attitude in favor of worker demands in an effort to obtain that control. Since labor leaders will be guided mainly by their role as representatives of worker's immediate interests, the labor movement as a whole will act more in accordance with whatever specific demands rank and file workers will raise taking advantage of the political moment than by a strategy of ensuring the success of the transition. Restraint is therefore unlikely to follow mobilization—unless workers reduce the latter feeling no further gains on their specific demands are possible.

By contrast, if the party leadership places a high value on securing a fragile transition to democracy and on obtaining a recognized place within the new regime, it will not adopt a militant attitude in favor of workers' demands and rights despite the uncertainty of its control over the labor movement. Such was the case with the Spanish Communist party. Its position may have been partly determined as well by an inadequate assessment of the degree to which the Comisiones Obreras were in fact animated by Communist militants. As it turned out, many of the Commissions' leaders had other political sympathies—or no firm ones at all.^{xxx1} The Socialists drew great numbers of Commission leaders into their historic but until then mostly inactive labor confederation. The latter's success was subsequently greatly aided by the strong electoral showing of the Socialists, and the poor one gained by the Communists. The autonomy of workers and local union leaderships with respect to parties remains high, however, with declining levels of rank and file militancy.

c) Syndically Harsh and Politically Open Regimes (for example, Brazil 1973-1985)

A conflict between the different levels of leadership given their disparate narrow goals is also bound to develop where the regime has been syndically harsh and uncompromising, but relatively open with important sectors of the political opposition linked however loosely with labor. In this case the political elites enjoy greater room to maneuver than the labor leadership during the authoritarian regime, as long as they do not try to organize opposition to the regime through labor mobilizations. Hence, the political leadership, or at least major segments of it, will try to take advantage of the spaces the regime allows it to occupy while urging restraint by labor if not ignoring its actions and demands completely. Under these conditions, it is likely that labor leaders will also (as in the previous type) eventually initiate their own course of action, becoming an independent but more radical (unlike some instances in the previous type) sector in the constellation of anti-authoritarian forces. During the process of transition or when an opening or crisis of the authoritarian regime occurs labor leaders will try to maximize worker mobilization, which the rank and file should normally be eager to follow given the long suppressed demands. By contrast, the political leadership (which in these cases will be committed to a gradual, *reforma* type of transition to democracy) will generally continue to press for labor restraint, or to simply draw to the sidelines in instances of labor conflict, while it attempts to steer a course towards redemocratization through its participation in the institutions of the authoritarian regime. However, it is unlikely to be able to exert much influence over the labor movement as a whole, which is probably going to experience growing political divisions as labor leaders assume active political roles. This is, generally speaking, the case in Brazil, where a new party, the Partido dos Trabalhadores, has even emerged from the strongest sector of that country's labor movement.^{xxxii}

d) Syndically Mild and Politically Open Regimes (for example Velasco Alvarado's Peru, and all populist authoritarianisms)

Periods of liberalization of authoritarian regimes can produce situations which have syndically mild and politically open characteristics. Hence, regimes which correspond to the previous types may well, if their transitions occur with a relatively lengthy period of liberalization which contain not only a political opening but also syndical mildness, transit to redemocratization through situations which approximate this type. However, such periods are rarely stable and long lasting enough to obliterate completely the molding effects on labor movements of the more enduring characteristics of the regime before liberalization took place. These openings should therefore not be considered paradigmatic examples of the mild/open type of authoritarian regime.

Rather, populist authoritarian regimes constitute the more permanent form of this type of authoritarianism. The labor movement under these regimes is normally officially sponsored (even though there may be independent and oppositional labor leadership groups who seek to compete, mostly unsuccessfully, with the official organizations), and it is part, albeit a subordinate

part, of the governing circles. Given its position, the labor movement leadership and many rank and file workers will generally view any possible process of redemocratization with suspicion, since such a change is likely to displace the ruling authorities in favor of a new elite that has no association with the labor movement, and to shift economic policies in a way which is detrimental to workers. Consequently, workers are bound to respond to a process of redemocratization by greatly increasing their mobilization not because of any pent-up demands, but as a warning to the new leading elites of the transition not to reverse all the policies which benefited them. The labor leadership will support and do everything it can to increase this upsurge in worker mobilization, since it will permit a recreation of the labor movement and its party as an opposition force within the new context. This occurred with the peronist labor movement after the fall of Perón in 1955.^{xxxiii}

The most recent case of this type of response by labor to a process of transition occurred in Peru after the fall of the General Velasco's regime, which the Leftist sectors of the Peruvian labor movement supported.^{xxxiv} The new government led by General Morales Bermúdez, which adopted a highly repressive stance towards unions during its first two years in office, faced considerable social unrest from the very beginning and massive strikes once it initiated a political opening and called for elections to a constituent congress. Both the Morales Bermúdez economic policies, and especially those of the Belaúnde government that took office as the first democratically elected administration, were, in comparison to those of Velasco, detrimental to workers' interests.^{xxxv} If there were a political change in Mexico towards a fully polyarchic regime, the labor movement response would probably also take this form if the ruling party were to lose power in favor of the right.

IV. The Modalities of the Transition to Democracy, and the Relationship Between the Labor Movement's Political Leadership and the Main Transition Elites

As is well known, the end of an authoritarian regime and the beginning of a process of democratic transition may occur abruptly and by breaking the mold of the authoritarian regime's political institutions, or it may occur over a lengthy period of perceptible change, as a result of protracted negotiations and reforms, and by following the institutional framework of the authoritarian regime. The Portuguese or Greek transitions exemplify the first, *ruptura* type of change, and the Spanish or the Brazilian ones are signal examples of the second, *reforma* model, although in all transitions some elements of both may be identified.

Unless they are preceded by periods of liberalization, transitions following a *ruptura* route to change are likely to face the outbreak of social mobilization at the same time that the process of democratic transition begins. Workers will perceive that a dramatic change in the political situation has taken place, signalling a sudden freedom from the prior regime's restrictions, especially if the latter was syndically harsh. The political transition will also be perceived initially by the broader public as being more secure, since the *ruptura* will have apparently broken the back of the discredited pro-authoritarian regime forces. And if the *ruptura* occurs in a regime which has been singularly narrow and repressive, social groups, including the labor movement, will be less organized at the moment the change begins. Organizational goals will therefore tend to be a high priority for their leaders, particularly given the momentary certainty of the transition. Hence, the resolution of pent-up labor and other social conflicts, the recreation of union organizations, the reestablishment of links to parties, the pressures for a revamping of labor-management relations, and so on, will occur at the same time the new national political institutions are built. The tensions that emerge within the labor movement given the previously discussed dimensions will appear more sharply. The forces in ascendancy during the transition will be tempted, as occurred in Portugal, to mold the political and industrial relations institutions in a way that will buttress their positions in the evolving socio-economic conflicts. This may detract from the legitimacy of the new institutions among adversarial political and social groups, and may lead to significant conflict threatening the democratic regime in the future if they are not altered.

By contrast, the mobilization followed by restraint sequence is more likely with reforma routes to change. Such routes are normally preceded by a liberalization of the authoritarian regime which actually appears to blend into the democratic transition, the beginning of which is difficult to date clearly. In any event, the upsurge in mobilization can take place before the actual redemocratization process begins. The immediate goals of workers and labor leaders may be partly realized by the time the transition becomes possible, at which point restraint is less costly for

them. Moreover, the perception of uncertainty of the transition will be greater, leading the labor movement's union and political leaders to adopt a more cautious approach to the pursuit of their specific goals in order to insure the political change—assuming their short term goals to favor the transition.

A significant determinant of the labor movement's attitude towards the transition is the relationship it has with the principal political agents leading the change. The following situations may occur: firstly, the party or parties associated with the labor movement can become the main force in the transition government. Secondly, the labor linked party or parties may be part of the transition coalition, and occupy a place in the government but as a junior partner to another group or groups. Thirdly, the labor movement and its party or parties may be part of the transition coalition, but not formally occupy any government positions, leaving these to a group or groups with whom labor has a good working relationship and considerable mutual trust. And fourthly, the labor movement or important segments within it, while sympathizing to a greater or lesser degree with the transition, may have a deep-seated mistrust of the main political group or groups leading it.

In general, the third type of relationship seems better overall in terms of securing a smoother transition, the future stability of the democratic regime, and even—partly as a result of the former—long term gains for the labor movement. This for several reasons. Belonging to the transition coalition (which means both that the labor movement is strongly committed to insuring the transition and that it is not excluded by other forces from the political segments pressing for it) should press the labor leadership to contribute worker mobilization or restraint, each whenever appropriate, to the redemocratization process, increasing the probability of a favorable mobilization followed by restraint sequence. Not forming direct part of the government should spare the labor linked political leadership from becoming identified with possibly unpopular economic measures, allowing the labor movement leadership as a whole to focus more on rebuilding and extending labor's political and union organizations. Moreover, by remaining out of the government the labor movement linked leadership would not be directly responsible for designing and implementing new industrial relations legislation; if this were the case, while the resulting legislation may be highly favorable to labor, there is a significant risk that the business sector would not be willing to accept it, possibly becoming disaffected from the transition process itself, which could have negative consequences for the long term stability of the democratic regime. Finally, the fact that the labor leadership has a relationship of trust, relatively free of competition and a history of antagonisms with the leading governmental elites, should insure that the labor movement's restraint will not lead to a wholesale neglect of its demands or reduction of its rights, quite possibly in collusion with business interests, at a critical time of change in labor management relations and of renewing union organizations.

The Uruguayan case, and to a lesser degree the Spanish one, provide examples of this type of relationship between the labor movement and the leading governmental elites of the transition. The Uruguayan case featured a virtual alliance between the Colorado party in government and the Communist party, which made efforts to secure worker restraint. In return, it obtained Colorado support for some rank and file demands, and the restoration of an industrial relations system to its liking. It also obtained tacit state recognition for the preeminent position of the Communist led union federations within the labor movement, this at a time when that position was being challenged by competition from other, mainly Leftist, groups and considerable rank and file pressure.

The other relationships between labor and the leading governmental elites of the transition can lead to difficulties for the transition as well as for the labor movement. If the labor linked political leaderships or their close allies occupy the main governmental positions they may, as occurred in Portugal with consequences still being felt in that country a decade and a half after the transition, press for labor and industrial relations legislation that the private sector will be loathe to accept. In such settings, it would be best if the labor linked political leadership were to forge specific agreements or pacts with business interests to insure their acceptance of the new arrangements. This was done successfully in Venezuela in 1958 by *Acción Democrática*, which, although a very moderate party with catch-all characteristics, was nonetheless the main political force linked to labor.^{xxxvi} And where labor becomes the junior partner in the transition government it may not have the capacity to press for its views and programs. In these cases it may find itself having to try to enforce restraint on the rank and file for the sake of facilitating the transition without obtaining, in exchange, any significant changes in social and economic policies to benefit workers. This will produce significant tensions within the labor movement as some labor leaders, including those of competing groups, press for changes of policy riding on rank and file discontent.

In those situations in which there is a deep mutual distrust between labor and the leading elites of the transition, the labor movement, while supporting the redemocratization process in general, may nonetheless fear that the transition government will restructure political and industrial relations institutions, including the unions themselves, in a manner that the labor leadership sees as detrimental to workers' and its own organizational interests. Once the transition process is underway, the labor movement's political and union leaderships may well relegate it to a second priority in these circumstances, opting to focus on building the strongest possible confrontational labor organizations by stressing worker demands and by stimulating rank and file mobilization. This strategy should serve as a constant warning to the leading elites of the transition not to press for policies labor dislikes. Binding socio-economic pacts are unlikely to

occur in these settings, and the perception of the new democratic regime's legitimacy in worker circles may suffer given such a relationship of tension and confrontation.

The most recent redemocratization in Argentina, where there has been a deep mutual distrust between the Radical party government elites and the Peronist labor leaderships, illustrates this type of situation. In the first three years of the Alfonsín government there were nine general strikes called by the Peronist labor leadership to protest the government's socio-economic policies. Relations between the Radical government and the Peronists got off to a rocky start as a result of President Alfonsín's proposed legislation to call union elections with new rules. Despite the fact that union elections were long overdue and that significant rank and file insurgencies were at that point demanding a democratization of union governance, the proposed rules were seen as a direct challenge to the established Peronist leaders, and the Peronist party majority in the senate rejected the proposal. Elections were subsequently held following new regulations that reflected a compromise reached with some difficulty between the two forces. Various shades of Peronist leadership were retained in an overwhelming majority of unions.^{xxxvii} The redemocratization in Peru also faced this type of situation, since there was a high level of antagonism between the Belaúnde government and the unions, despite the fact that union pressures through repeated general strikes were instrumental in pressing the Morales Bermúdez government to allow a return to democracy.

In the Argentinian and Peruvian cases the transition government elites faced the principal forces in union leadership. It is also possible for such elites to be allied with only a segment of the union leadership, and to have a difficult relationship of mistrust with other important sectors in the labor movement. In these cases, the competition between leadership sectors in the labor movement may involve the transition elites in attempts to support their favored group or groups. The other segment or segments will react by attempting to stimulate rank and file mobilization, and by focusing primarily on building its or their organizations. If the transition to democracy were led in Chile by the Christian Democrats, who have important union bases, this scenario may well occur with sectors linked mainly to the Communist party pressing for maximal worker mobilization.

CONCLUSIONS

The limitations authoritarian regimes place on the capacities of labor organizations to act in favor of worker interests—limitations generally dictated by their efforts to prevent unions from being used by oppositions as a power resource—lead labor movements to view processes of transition to democracy as singular opportunities to regain and even overtake lost ground. Workers will attempt to air long held unsatisfied grievances and demands; labor leaders, some of them suppressed by the authorities, will seek to recreate their unions both locally and nationally, to place themselves firmly as interlocutors for worker interests before employers and the state,

and to try to refashion the industrial relations system in their favor; party leaders associated with the labor movement will try to rekindle their links to unions, try to assert a guiding influence over labor organizations as a whole, and seek an influential place in the evolving political scene.

Much of the analysis in this paper has revolved around the notion that the pursuit of these specific labor movement goals can run counter to ensuring the precarious overall transition process, given economic crisis, determined employer resistance, the reactions of still powerful hard-line groups, etc. As a result, periods of transition can lead to significant tensions between segments of the labor movement as they assign different priorities to contributing to the overall transition or to pressing for their more narrow objectives. In general, the higher levels of union and political leadership will be more sensitive to the uncertainties of the transition. This is due in part because one of their specific objectives, i.e. the recognition by the transition government and employers of their interlocutory role in favor of worker interests, often requires that they exert a restraining influence over the labor movement as a whole.

From the labor movement's perspective an ideal transition is one in which there is a complementarity between its specific objectives and the overall change. For this reason, the more the transition permits realizing labor's specific objectives (excepting the revolutionary goals some labor movement sectors may hold for the short run change), the more the labor movement will view the transition positively, and the more legitimacy it will accord the ensuing democratic regime. The sacrifices incurred by the labor movement during the transition may vary in severity, but should not be so extreme that they generate a feeling of great alienation and potential disloyalty in labor circles from the resulting democratic regime.

The sacrifices and tensions within the labor movement normally appear after the political moment includes the possibility, uncertain as it may be, that a transition to democracy is possible as long as all forces favoring it play their cards well. For there can be an explosive moment, triggered by a crisis or liberalization of the authoritarian regime, in which the labor movement will participate in a broad efflorescence of mobilization and be one of its central actors. At this point the mobilization can focus mainly on the specific objectives of the various segments of the labor movement, each trying to recoup lost positions and gains. And yet, by airing grievances and demands the authorities cannot meet, the mobilization can help to convince the soft-liners within the regime that only a transition to democracy can resolve the resulting breakdown of political order. Hence, the pursuit of the narrow goals of labor movement segments can be largely compatible at that point with an overall opposition strategy of confronting the regime.

The specific objectives of the labor movements will vary according to the condition they find themselves in at the end of the authoritarian regime, and the manner in which the transition, once initiated, occurs. Therefore, the degree to which there will be an incompatibility between the narrow goals of labor movement segments and the overall transition, the extent to which

tensions will develop within the labor movement, and the ultimate assessment of the virtues or deficiencies of the new democratic regime by the labor movement will also differ from case to case. This paper has presented some of the main dimensions which account for such variations. Each dimension was discussed individually, but of course all are at work at once in each situation; thus every case of transition must be examined from the point of view of each successive dimension in order to form a complete picture of the relationship between labor and the transition.

For instance, let us follow hypothetical transitions where labor movements are relatively strong. Given this characteristic, the labor movements have a greater capacity to impose their narrow goals on other elites during the transition, and can, if they are successful in doing this, minimize the degree to which the overall process is incompatible with their objectives. However, if such movements encounter strong resistance from other elites, they will have to restrain their actions without reaching their goals or risk affecting the transition, and tensions over the degree of such restraint are likely to surface within the labor movement.

Such tensions will be exacerbated if the labor movements are sharply decentralized or politically divided. In these cases the lower ranking labor leaders will focus more on the demands of the rank and file than on the overall transition, since the circumstances will dictate that they pay primary attention to the objective of establishing or retaining their place at the head of local unions. By contrast, the tensions will be minimized if the labor movements are strongly centralized, and devoid of competing political loyalties and ideological attachments.

Similarly, if the authoritarian regimes have been especially harsh, it will be difficult for the labor and political leaders to restrain rank and file activation over their long-held demands, and again, all the more so if the labor movements are decentralized and divided. Milder authoritarian regimes will blunt the edge of the rank and file mobilization, and restraint accompanied by the development of labor management institutions which allow unions to exercise their market power through collective organization and action, a primary labor leadership objective, will be all the more possible. Moreover, if the authoritarian regimes have been politically closed as well as harsh, there will be a closer connection between labor and political leaders, which should aid the labor movements in responding to the transitions with a political strategy aimed at securing them, although, again, the decentralization of the unions and the political divisions in the movement could derail this strategy. If the regimes have been politically open as well as harsh, they will have stimulated the separation between labor and political leaders such that a subordination of the former to the political strategy of the latter, who will presumably focus more on the exigencies of the transition, will be more difficult.

If the authoritarian regimes collapse and enter a transition abruptly, the explosion of mobilization around the specific demands of the labor movements will coincide with the initiation of the transitions, increasing the chance that the narrow objectives of the various segments of the

labor movements will conflict with securing the transitions in the longer term. And again, both the social explosion and the pursuit of narrow goals will be magnified where unions are decentralized and labor is politically divided. With such *rupturas*, the initial retreat of hard-line forces and the possible decrease in the political capacity of business may make pursuing the specific gains of the labor movements easier, and the transitions may appear to be instruments that facilitate these gains. But the redemocratizations may ultimately be aborted by authoritarian reversions, or the labor movements gains drastically rescinded as the balance of political forces changes, in which case labor may develop a sense of alienation and potential disloyalty towards the democratic regime. If the transitions occur through *reformas*, it is more likely that the expression and some resolution of the specific demands of labor will occur during early crises or liberalizations of the authoritarian regimes. This should make restraint at the moment the transitions begin easier and more probable.

Finally, the labor movements should feel more committed to contribute restraint to the transition if the process is led by elites with whom labor has a good working relationship. This should insure that the labor movements' narrow goals will not be completely neglected in the course of redemocratization, while the fact that the transitions' leading elites are not directly identified with labor should facilitate the creation of industrial relations and other labor related institutions that business will accept. If the labor movements' associated political leaderships should become the main transition government elites, it is best if they actively seek to engage employers in negotiations to reach mutual agreements over labor legislation and general socio-economic policies; not doing so will risk the development of disloyalty towards the new democratic regime by capitalists and their political allies. Were the transition government to be led by forces the labor movements distrust, it is likely that many labor movement segments will risk taking a confrontational attitude to achieve their specific goals regardless of the consequences for the transition.

Thus, the relationship between labor movements and processes of redemocratization in each case may be explained, following this analysis, in terms of the particular mix of circumstances which are present. Given the complexity of the determinants of labor movement attitudes during the transition, it is virtually impossible for a case to occur in which all segments of the labor movement single-mindedly pursue their narrow goals with complete disregard for their possible incompatibility with the political exigencies of the transition. In any event, were a labor movement to pursue collectively and deliberately such a course of action, it would probably end up sacrificing most gains in the end to an authoritarian reversion which may take the form of a harsh democracy or a new dictatorship. Most cases will present a far more mixed record.

ENDNOTES

ⁱ Redemocratization refers to the contemporary process of recreating democratic regimes out of postwar authoritarianisms. Democratization refers to the original process of creating a democracy from the oligarchic, semi-competitive regimes typical of the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. The distinction is admittedly not as neat as it seems at first glance for some recent cases, such as the Dominican Republic, which never really did have a democratic regime in the past.

ⁱⁱ These themes are developed primarily in Guillermo O'Donnell, Philippe Schmitter, and Laurence Whitehead, eds., *Transitions from Authoritarian Rule: Prospects for Democracy* (Baltimore, [Md.]: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1986). See in particular Guillermo O'Donnell and Philippe Schmitter's "Tentative Conclusions about Uncertain Democracies," part IV of that volume, and Alfred Stepan's "Paths Towards Redemocratization: Theoretical and Comparative Perspectives," in part III.

ⁱⁱⁱ O'Donnell and Schmitter, pp. 48-56. This "resurrection" includes all sorts of creative activities, including artistic ones.

^{iv} These possibly contradictory effects of popular mobilizations are discussed in O'Donnell and Schmitter, pp. 26-28.

^v Only the case studies that have specifically focused on labor movements in transitional settings have examined this aspect of the problem as well as the previous one. The most notable because of its thoroughness is Robert Fishman's work on the labor movement in the Spanish transition. See his "El movimiento obrero en la transición: Objetivos políticos y organizativos," *Revista Española de Investigaciones Sociológicas*, (April-June 1984), pp. 61-112; and his *Working Class Organization and Political Change: The Labor Movement and the Transition to Democracy in Spain*, Yale University, Ph.D. dissertation, 1985.

^{vi} Even the Nazi regime created worker organizations to substitute for the unions it destroyed, although there is little evidence that workers were in fact able to use them to channel their demands. See Timothy Mason, *Sozialpolitik in Dritten Reich. Arbeiterklasse und Volksgemeinschaft* (Wiesbaden: Westdeutscher Verlag, 1978).

^{vii} For an analysis of this process under Pinochet's Chile, see Arturo Valenzuela and J. Samuel Valenzuela, "Party Oppositions under the Chilean Authoritarian Regime," in J. Samuel Valenzuela and Arturo Valenzuela, eds., *Military Rule in Chile: Dictatorship and Oppositions* (Baltimore, [Md.]: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1986), pp. 216-218. The same phenomenon can be examined in the Spanish case as documented by José María Maravall, *Dictatorship and Political Dissent* (London: Tavistock, 1978).

^{viii} Philippe C. Schmitter, "Still the Century of Corporatism?" in, among other sources, Philippe C. Schmitter and Gerhard Lehmbruch, eds., *Trends Toward Corporatist Intermediation* (Beverly Hills, [Ca.] and London: Sage Publications, 1979), p. 20.

^{ix} For Philippe Schmitter's description of the "pre-emptive, preventive, defensive, and compartmental" characteristics of these organizations see his *Corporatism and Public Policy in Authoritarian Portugal* (Beverly Hills, [Ca.] and London: Sage Publications, 1975), p. 58.

^x This distinction between corporative and market strategies of labor control by authoritarian regimes emerged during discussions held at a workshop I organized on the subject. A summary

of the discussions can be found in J. Samuel Valenzuela and Jeffrey Goodwin, *Labor Movements under Authoritarian Regimes* (Cambridge, [Mass.]: Harvard University Center for European Studies *Monographs on Europe*, no. 5, 1983). I thank, in particular, Alessandro Pizzorno, Charles Maier, Adam Przeworski, Peter Lange, Laurence Whitehead, Marcelo Cavarozzi, Victoria de Grazia, John Hammond, George Ross, and Maria M. Alves for their generous contribution to the workshop.

^{xi} The concept of “organizational space” and the four dimensions required to occupy it (gaining the allegiance of the work force, establishing links among local unions to form a national network and leadership, securing a plant level presence and a bargaining relationship with employers, and obtaining state recognition) are discussed in J. Samuel Valenzuela, “Uno schema teorico per l’analisi della formazione del movimento operaio,” *Stato e Mercato*, 1 (December 1981).

^{xii} This is a specific form—in the context of redemocratizations—of what Alessandro Pizzorno has called “political exchange.” See his “Political Exchange and Collective Identity in Industrial Conflict,” in Colin Crouch and Alessandro Pizzorno, eds., *The Resurgence of Class Conflict in Western Europe since 1968* (New York: Holmes and Meir, 1978) vol. 2, *Comparative Analysis*.

^{xiii} O’Donnell and Schmitter, p. 27.

^{xiv} The importance of loyalty, semi-loyalty, and disloyalty for the stability or instability of democratic regimes has been underlined by Juan Linz, *The Breakdown of Democratic Regimes: Crisis, Breakdown, and Reequilibration* (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1978).

^{xv} The highest levels of union density are found in Northern Europe, in countries where Social Democratic parties have long been a predominant or a major force.

^{xvi} See Jon Amsden, *Collective Bargaining and Class Conflict in Spain* (London: Weidenfeld and Nicolson, 1972).

^{xvii} John Humphrey, *Capitalist Control and Workers’ Struggle in the Brazilian Auto Industry* (Princeton, [N.J.]: Princeton University Press, 1982).

^{xviii} See Francisco Nemenzo, “The Philippine Labour Movement and the Continuing Struggle for Democracy,” paper presented at the Conference on Labor Movements in Transitions to Democracy at the Helen Kellogg Institute for International Studies, University of Notre Dame, April 26-28, 1988.

^{xix} Jelle Visser, *The Position of Central Confederations in the National Union Movement; A Ten Country Comparison* (Florence [Italy]: European University Institute Working Paper, no. 102, 1984).

^{xx} For a discussion of labor in the Uruguayan transition, see Juan Rial, *El movimiento sindical uruguayo ante la redemocratización*, unpublished book manuscript, 1986. See also Martín Gargiulo, “El desafío de la democracia: la izquierda política y sindical en el Uruguay post-autoritario,” paper presented at the Latin American Studies Association Meetings, Boston, October 22-25, 1986.

Although most workers voted for the Colorado Party candidates, the Communist Party was the dominant force in unions. For a historical treatment of the Uruguayan labor movement see Alfredo Errandonea and Daniel Costabile, *Sindicato y sociedad en el Uruguay* (Montevideo: Biblioteca de Cultura Universitaria, 1968).

xxi I refer here only to political and ideological divisions, since those labor movement divisions based on adscriptive characteristics of the labor force, such as language, ethnicity and even religion, which encapsulate whole communities of workers, do not generate the same competition for rank and file support between labor leadership groups as do the former. This point is developed in J. Samuel Valenzuela, "Movimientos obreros y sistemas políticos: Un análisis conceptual y tipológico," *Desarrollo Económico*, 23 (October-December 1983), pp. 343-44.

xxii See Uwe Optenhogel and Alan Stoleroff, "The Logics of Politically Competing Trade Union Confederations in Portugal: 1974-1984," in Eduardo de Sousa Ferreira and Walter C. Opello Jr., eds., *Conflict and Change in Portugal, 1974-1984* (Lisbon: C.E.D.E.P. and Editorial Teorema, 1985), pp. 182-186.

There are now many good general accounts of the Portuguese events. One of the most informative is Thomas C. Bruneau, *Politics and Nationhood: Post-Revolutionary Portugal* (New York: Praeger, 1984). The Communist party in the transition is discussed by Kenneth Maxwell, "The Portuguese Communists and the Revolution," *Dissent*, (Spring 1980), pp. 194-206. Rural labor is the object of Nancy Gina Bermeo, *The Revolution Within the Revolution: Workers' Control in Rural Portugal* (Princeton, [N.J.]: Princeton University Press, 1986). The changes that occurred in the unions and the mobilization of workers after the 25 April 1974 events are reviewed in Antonio de Lemos Monteiro Fernandes, "Dallo stato corporativo alla libertà sindacale: l'Esperienza portoghese," *Politica del Diritto*, 15 (March 1984), pp. 37-46.

xxiii I thank Robert Fishman for his observations correcting factual errors in this section of an earlier version of this paper.

xxiv On the Chilean case, see Guillermo Campero and José Valenzuela, *El movimiento sindical chileno en el capitalismo autoritario (1973-1981)* (Santiago: ILET, 1981); and Manuel Barrera and J. Samuel Valenzuela, "The Development of Labor Movement Opposition to the Military Regime," in J. Samuel Valenzuela and Arturo Valenzuela. For Argentina see Bernardo Gallitelli and Andrés A Thompson, eds., *Sindicalismo y regímenes militares en Argentina y Chile* (Amsterdam: CEDLA, 1982), part II; and Alvaro Abós, *Las organizaciones sindicales y el poder militar (1976-1983)* (Buenos Aires: Centro Editor de América Latina, 1984).

xxv The effects of repression on union leadership selection were first noted systematically by Selig Perlman, *A Theory of the Labor Movement* (New York: MacMillan, 1928), although his points are clouded by the use of the term "intellectuals" to refer to radicalized leaders.

xxvi An exception to this is the redemocratization of Argentina in 1973. The military governments between 1966 and 1973 were certainly politically "closed," and yet they ended in an electoral transfer of power to the Peronist party after an inconclusive record of negotiations, with the return of Perón himself to the country. For a detailed analysis of the period see Guillermo O'Donnell, *1966-1973: El Estado burocrático autoritario: Triunfos, derrotas y crisis* (Buenos Aires: Editorial de Belgrano, 1982), chapter VIII.

xxvii For a general discussion of the Uruguayan case see Charles G. Gillespie, "Uruguay's Transition from Collegial Military-Technocratic Rule," in Guillermo O'Donnell, Philippe C. Schmitter, and Laurence Whitehead, part II.

xxviii This period is discussed in considerable detail in Gianfranco Pasquino, "The Demise of the First Fascist Regime and Italy's Transition to Democracy: 1943-1948," in O'Donnell, Schmitter, and Whitehead, eds., pp. 52-59.

xxix Optenhogel and Stoleroff.

xxx See David A. Rosenberg, "The Philippines: Aquino's First Year," *Current History* (April 1987), pp. 160-163, for a brief discussion of the events since the Aquino election. See also Carl H. Lande, "The Political Crisis," and Carolina H. Hernandez, "Reconstituting the Political Order," in John Bresnan, ed., *Crisis in the Philippines* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1986). The Bayan, a Leftist party formed by a coalition of mass organizations in which the Communists predominated, boycotted the presidential elections declaring that Aquino was not a real alternative to Marcos. The resignation of Labor Minister Augusto Sanchez, and later, the assassination of labor leader Rolando Olalia, hardened the attitudes of the Leftist leadership against the new government just months after it was inaugurated.

xxxi For a detailed analysis of the Workers' Commissions, including survey results which indicate the options of plant level union leaders on a series of political issues related to the transition, see Robert Fishman, *Working Class Organization and Political Change*, chap. 4.

xxxii For a general discussion of the Brazilian transition, see Scott Mainwaring, "The Transition to Democracy in Brazil," *Journal of Interamerican Studies and World Affairs*, 28 (Spring 1986); the lack of unity between the social movements and the political parties, with the exception of the campaign for direct presidential elections, is discussed in pp. 166-167. Brazilian labor and labor politics are the subject of excellent studies. See in particular Maria Hermínia Tavares de Almeida, "O Sindicalismo Brasileiro entre a Conservação e a Mudança," in Bernardo Sorj and Maria Hermínia Tavares de Almeida, eds., *Sociedade e Política no Brasil Pós-64* (São Paulo: Editora Brasiliense, 1983); John Humphrey; Margaret E. Keck, "From Movement to Politics: The Formation of the Workers' Party in Brazil," Columbia University, Ph.D. dissertation, 1985; and Amaury de Souza and Bolivar Lamounier, "Governo e Sindicatos no Brasil: A Perspectiva dos Anos 80," *Dados*, no. 2 (1981).

xxxiii Although he had been elected to the presidency, by his second term in office, and certainly by its end, Perón's government had assumed characteristics of an authoritarian regime.

For an analysis of the Argentinian labor movement after the fall of Perón, see Sebastião Velasco e Cruz, "Estado, sindicato e instabilidade política: Argentina 1955-1970," *Dados*, no. 5 (1977), and Marcelo Cavarozzi, *Sindicatos y política en Argentina, 1955-1958* (Buenos Aires: Estudios CEDES, vol. 2, no. 1, 1979). The politics of the period are discussed in Guillermo O'Donnell, *Modernization and Bureaucratic-Authoritarianism: Studies in South American Politics* (Berkeley: Institute of International Studies, 1973) chap. IV.

xxxiv The Velasco government years are discussed in Abraham Lowenthal, ed., *The Peruvian Experiment: Continuity and Change under Military Rule* (Princeton, [N.J.]: Princeton University Press, 1975); and in Abraham Lowenthal and Cynthia McClintock, eds., *The Peruvian Experiment Reconsidered* (Princeton, [N.J.]: Princeton University Press, 1983). Labor is analyzed by Alan Angell, "Peruvian Labour and the Military Government since 1968," University of London, Institute of Latin American Studies Working Papers, no. 3, April 1980, and by Evelyne Stephens, *The Politics of Workers' Participation: The Peruvian Approach in Comparative Perspective* (New York: Academic Press, 1980).

xxxv For a general discussion of the Peruvian transition, see Luis A. Abugattas, "Populism and After: The Peruvian Experience," in James Malloy and Mitchel Seligson, eds., *Authoritarians and Democrats: Regime Transition in Latin America* (Pittsburgh, [Pa.]: University of Pittsburgh Press, 1987). The upsurge in mobilization is discussed in pp. 132-133. See also Eduardo Ballón E., "Los movimientos sociales en la crisis: el caso peruano," in Fernando Calderón G., ed., *Los movimientos sociales ante la crisis* (Buenos Aires: UNU, CLACSO, ISUNAM, 1986), pp. 203-207, for a discussion of labor in the transition.

xxxvi On the Venezuelan transition, see Terry Lynn Karl, "Petroleum and Political Pacts: The Transition to Democracy in Venezuela," in O'Donnell, Schmitter, and Whitehead, Part II.

xxxvii On Argentinian labor in the transition see Marcelo Cavarozzi, Liliana de Riz, and Jorge Feldman, "El contexto y los dilemas de la concertación en la Argentina actual," in Comisión de Movimientos Laborales (CLACSO), *El Sindicalismo latinoamericano en los ochenta* (Santiago: ILET, 1986). These authors attribute the absence of any binding socio-economic pact in the Argentine transition to, among other factors, the distrust between Peronist labor and political leaders and the Radical government. For an analysis of union elections see Héctor Palomino, "El movimiento de democratización sindical," in Elizabeth Jelin, ed., *Los nuevos movimientos sociales; Derechos humanos. Obreros. Barrios* (Buenos Aires: Centro Editor de América Latina, 1987). See also Alvaro Abós, "Sindicalismo, autonomía y política," in Elizabeth Jelin, ed., *Movimientos sociales y democracia emergente* (Buenos Aires: Centro Editor de América Latina, 1987).