



**THE CONSOLIDATION OF DEMOCRACY IN
LATIN AMERICA
-A Rapporteur's Report-**

Scott Mainwaring

Working Paper #73 - July 1986

Scott Mainwaring is the author of The Catholic Church and Politics in Brazil, 1916-1985 (Stanford University Press, 1986), as well as numerous articles on transitions to democracy, social movements, and the Catholic Church. He is Assistant Professor of Government and Member of the Kellogg Institute at the University of Notre Dame. He wishes to thank Caroline Domingo, Rosario Espinal, Albert Hirschman, Guillermo O'Donnell, Luis Pásara, Philippe Schmitter, and Laurence Whitehead for their comments.



ABSTRACT

In recent years, many Latin American countries have undergone transitions to democracy. One of the outstanding questions about these new democracies is whether they will be consolidated or, as has often happened in the past, be short-lived, only to give rise to a new round of authoritarianism. To discuss this issue and a number of related questions, Guillermo O'Donnell and José Nun have coordinated a working group on "Opportunities and Dilemmas in the Consolidation of Democracy in Latin America." This paper is a rapporteur's report based on the first meeting of this working group, held in São Paulo, December 16-17, 1985. The paper synthesizes the main discussions and debates of that meeting.

RESUMEN

En los últimos años, varios países latinoamericanos han experimentado transiciones a regímenes democráticos. En este contexto, se plantea la pregunta si las nuevas democracias se van a consolidar o si, tal como ha acontecido muchas veces en el pasado, van a durar poco, para después sufrir otra experiencia autoritaria. Para discutir este asunto y varios problemas afines, Guillermo O'Donnell y José Nun están coordinando un grupo de trabajo sobre "Oportunidades y Dilemas en la Consolidación Democrática en América Latina." El presente trabajo es un informe que se basa en la primera reunión de este grupo de trabajo, realizada en São Paulo, el 16 y 17 de diciembre de 1985. El trabajo sintetiza las principales discusiones y debates de dicha reunión.

In the early 1960s, many authoritarian regimes in Latin America fell, giving rise to new attempts to install democratic regimes. Both in the United States and in Latin America, many observers expected that Latin America was coming into its own. The new regimes would herald an age of democracy and economic growth. These expectations proved to be frustrated as the wave of "new authoritarianism" swept the region between 1964 and 1976, toppling one democratic government after another. Out of those that were inaugurated in the late 1950s and early 1960s, only the democracies of Venezuela and Colombia remained intact. Even the old, well-established democracies of Chile and Uruguay fell.

The period between 1978 and 1985 saw the twilight of the series of authoritarian regimes inaugurated between 1964 and 1976, and once again democratic regimes surfaced throughout Latin America. In Argentina, Brazil, Peru, Ecuador, Uruguay, and Bolivia, new democratic governments came into office. The critical question is whether once again these democratic governments will be short-lived, only to give rise to another set of authoritarian regimes, or whether democracy is here to stay.

The working group on "Opportunities and Dilemmas in the Consolidation of Democracy in Latin America," coordinated by Guillermo O'Donnell and José Nun, met for the first time in São Paulo, December 16-17, 1985, to begin discussing how to address this issue. This paper is a rapporteur's report based on that meeting.

Conceptualizing Democratic Consolidation

Studying democratic consolidation presents difficult methodological, theoretical, and conceptual problems. To start with, what constitutes a consolidated democracy is far from clear. No democracy is absolutely impregnable; it is impossible to assert that any

democracy will last forever. This shows that the criterion of impregnability is not feasible, but it does not say anything about what criteria are useful. On the opposite end of the spectrum, given the fragility of past democratic experiences in Latin America, there is well-grounded reluctance to conclude that a new democracy can be considered consolidated within a few years.¹

The fact that the project is studying a process that has not yet been completed--indeed, is in its incipient stages--compounds this difficulty. Social scientists and historians would certainly debate when democracy was consolidated in Sweden (to give one example), but retrospectively they would surely agree that it was consolidated. By contrast, in the cases of the Consolidation Project--Argentina, Brazil, the Dominican Republic, Peru, and Uruguay--we do not know whether the democracies are moving towards consolidation or breakdown. The latter might be verifiable in the next few years, for breakdown usually takes place at a clearly defined moment. Most likely only the implacable optimist would conclude within the next three years that consolidation has occurred.

There were three main positions on how to conceptualize democratic consolidation (hereafter, frequently abbreviated as DC). **Guillermo O'Donnell** initially defined DC in terms of how the relevant political actors interact. Political actors are always engaged in different "games." A characteristic of the pre-consolidation phase is that the coup game assumes considerable importance and demands considerable attention. During this period, the committed democratic actors (C actors) base much of their political strategy on avoiding a coup and constructing a democracy. Conversely, the committed authoritarian actors (B actors) base much of their strategy on undermining the democratic regime.

O'Donnell defined DC in terms of the move political actors make away from the coup game. "In consolidated democracies decisions about salient and important issues

may be made with an eye to consequences on public opinion and on future electoral support; but they are hardly ever made with the concern that such decisions might trigger, or greatly increase the possibility of, a military coup" (pp. 74-75).² After DC, the coup game thus becomes a very secondary part of political interaction. This formulation avoids defining DC in terms of longevity. The definition is admittedly subjective in the sense of depending on an evaluation of whether political actors are concerned with the coup game. But, O'Donnell noted, DC occurs at different paces in different societies, so arbitrarily choosing a number of years of democratic rule or a number of parliamentary elections is unsatisfactory. It is possible to gather information on when the coup game has become secondary. Interviews, newspaper reports, the discourse of different actors--all these provide indications as to whether major political actors are concerned with or interested in a coup.

Philippe Schmitter's paper defined the outcome of DC in terms of the attainment of a condition "when the rules and resources of basic democratic institutions are sufficiently entrenched--sufficiently protected by their own and other vested interests and sufficiently endowed with symbolic significance and narrative approval--that they can withstand foreseeable changes in their environments" (p. 20).³ Schmitter placed the parliament at the center of this process of institutionalization, suggesting that for practical reasons we could take about three legislative sessions (=approximately 12 years) as a frame for consolidation to be completed. Schmitter's paper was written for a Southern European working group that is analyzing organized interests and the consolidation of democracy in that part of the world. He recognized that there were some problems in transferring the Southern Europe analysis to Latin America. Specifically, the parliament is less central in Latin America, so it becomes more questionable to study DC using the parliament as an entry point.

Schmitter criticized O'Donnell's conceptualization of consolidation. He argued that at least for Southern Europe, it would not be productive to think about consolidation primarily in terms of avoiding a military coup. Democratic consolidation is about the period after which a coup is no longer regarded as a serious threat. It entails settling into the trenches, and therefore involves a diminishing of the military threat. The essence of democratic consolidation is competitive pressure. DC involves structuring the competition between parties, interest groups, and other major actors. "Regime consolidation consists in transforming the accidental arrangements, prudential norms, and contingent solutions that have emerged...during the uncertain struggles of the transition into structures, i.e., into relationships that are reliably known, regularly practiced and habitually accepted" (p. 10; also pp. 32-36).

The arguments of O'Donnell and Schmitter sparked a lively debate. **David Collier** found O'Donnell's model useful. He argued that in thinking about DC for Argentina and Peru, the possibility of a coup has to be a center point of discussion. The obsolescence clause at the end strengthens the model; when C actors eliminate coup games from their decision function, then we drop the model. But in contexts where a coup is a vivid possibility, this model is important.

Terry Karl sided with Schmitter in this debate. She argued that democratic consolidation involves the gradual construction of certainty. Uncertainty as salient of democracy, as discussed by Adam Przeworski, does not apply in the context of consolidation.⁴ Consolidation is about the way people, institutions, and organizations establish patterned interactions. Consolidation means the construction of loyalty to a system. It involves routinizing rules about competition for office, the appropriate role of the state, etc.

Responding to Schmitter and Karl, **O'Donnell** argued that in a new democratic regime, there are few structured rules. It is impossible to begin with the notion of

legitimacy, because in their nascent phases these institutions are not legitimate. "Legitimacy is not a necessary condition...for the endurance or consolidation of democracy, and legitimacy has no necessary connection with the institutionalization of democracy" (p. 19). Seeing consolidation as a series of strategic interactions implies attempting to see causality lines. He argued that his model does not suppose an anti-institutional bias. It cannot be supposed that during consolidation the coup game disappears. The low degree of institutionalization and of certainty are characteristics of the process of democratic consolidation. He doubted the wisdom of starting the analysis from the institutional side of politics, precisely because there are no structured institutions at the beginning of this process. "Substantive definitions (of DC) stress that democratic consolidation comes about when some political institutions...become established, or institutionalized, or legitimate... The problem with these definitions is that they all too often push the definitional problem one stop backwards: how do we recognize when certain institutions have acquired these characteristics?" (p. 10).

Laurence Whitehead began with a critique of O'Donnell and suggested a third approach to conceptualizing DC. He found O'Donnell's paper very interesting, but had four reservations about making the coup the major focus in studying consolidation. First, in democratic consolidation, we deal mainly with goal-oriented actors who are trying to establish their stake in the new game. A coup will be a secondary concern for these actors. Second, a breakdown can occur even if the forces in favor of it are relatively disorganized. A breakdown could result more from the divisions among C players as to what kind of democracy to construct, than from purposeful action on the part of B players. Third, one could have strong B forces but still have democratic consolidation. The French Fourth Republic would be an example; here, different B forces blocked one another. Finally, one could have an outcome that is not a breakdown, but that also did not represent clear progress towards democratic consolidation.

Whitehead suggested differentiating three phases in the construction of democracies: transition, beginning of consolidation, and consolidation. Those phases can be distinguished by who is in charge and by the nature of political rules. At the beginning of the transition, we do not know who is in charge. At the beginning of consolidation, we do know who is in charge, namely, a democratizing coalition. We also know a good deal more about the rules and constraints, but these rules and constraints are still being worked out. At the end of democratic consolidation, we know much more about the objective characteristics of the regime. Whitehead argued that analyzing concrete instances of consolidation is not a matter of developing the right objective indicators. Rather, all that is involved is developing well-grounded political judgments. Disagreeing with some criteria that he considered too stringent, he argued that one should not be too "purist" about judging a democratic regime as consolidated; there is no impregnable polyarchy. He observed that we need careful comparisons of the history and political traditions of each country in order to judge the likelihood of consolidation in any given case.

Over the course of discussion, there was some movement towards Whitehead's conceptualization. **José Nun** explicitly agreed with this view. **O'Donnell** agreed with earlier observations that there is a possibility of long-term survival of democracy, without a coup and without democratic consolidation. This fact rules out a single measure such as longevity or number of parliamentary elections. Moreover, no other single measure of consolidation is likely to prove adequate. **Schmitter** noted that while the most obvious means of conceptualizing DC is longevity (how long will the democracy survive?) other dimensions are also important. If it does survive, will the regime be able to govern? Furthermore, the democracies are likely to vary in their degree of openness. Will the democracies be open or frozen?

Models for Studying Democratic Consolidation

Much of the meeting addressed different models for studying democratic consolidation. The two main competing models were presented by Guillermo O'Donnell and Philippe Schmitter. **O'Donnell** employed a choice model based on coalitions of attitudinally defined actors, in contrast to Schmitter's approach which focused on actors and institutions. This model focused on strategic interactions among actors committed to consolidating democracy, those committed to breakdown, and those with equivocal positions on this score. The paper took as a starting point that "the central problem of democratic consolidation is to prevent a successful military coup" (p.1).

This does not mean that consolidation is simply a process of averting a coup. On the contrary, O'Donnell insisted on differentiating between coup avoidance and DC, and spent some time explicating this difference and indicating ways in which excessive preoccupation with the former can inhibit the effective governance required for the latter. There are direct forms of provoking a coup, but there are also passive forms of doing the same. Caution therefore does not necessarily ensure survival. O'Donnell noted that choice models are not necessarily conservative; it depends on the premises. O'Donnell argued that the absence of good studies on several topics on Latin America would make it difficult to reproduce Schmitter's strategy for studying consolidation in Southern Europe, precisely because Schmitter's approach required previously available good information on the various actors.

O'Donnell focused on blocks of forces without identifying specific actors or institutions as B, C, or N (non-committed) players; he moved from political interactions to specific actors and institutions. **Schmitter** reversed this; he started with specific actors and institutions and moved from these to strategic interaction. Schmitter argued that there is an epistemological shift in thinking about consolidation rather than transition. In

transition, he said, there is a high level of uncertainty and disaggregation. He argued that O'Donnell was carrying on the same mode of thinking about the consolidation process. For Schmitter, consolidation entails a shift back to the assumptions of a more normal social science.

Consolidation means developing stable institutions, so research should focus on the creation of institutions. Regime consolidation is a process of exclusion of some actors. There is a decrease in social mobilization, and the creation of mechanisms of representation necessarily implies the exclusion of some actors. Constitutionalism, which is frequently a part of consolidation, involves the transformation of ad hoc patterns into legal codes.

Schmitter disputed O'Donnell's claim that there is considerably more information about Greece, Portugal, or Spain, than about Brazil or Argentina. He questioned whether less knowledge about South America explains or justifies a different approach to the study of DC. He also noted that if a choice model approach were the primary focus of the Latin American project, it would make comparison with the Southern European project more difficult.

Schmitter suggested that the notion of partial regime might be useful. This concept refers to the set of rules that govern the way parts of the political system function, such as the party system or the system of interest intermediation (pp. 45-55). The Southern European group is particularly interested in organized interests, with how classes and sectors establish themselves as political actors. Also at the center of the project is the parliament, which in Southern Europe is hypothesized to be central to the consolidation process.

Schmitter posed the question of legitimacy, which he saw as central to DC, since DC involves the construction of legitimate institutions. "The mere existence of these (procedural and structured minimums of democracy) is insufficient to ensure

consolidation. They must be successfully legitimized, i.e. they must come to be valued in and by themselves, not just for the instrumental benefits they bring" (p. 33). He discussed four issues related to legitimacy and institutionalization. First, what is the site of legitimacy--family or political institutions? Second, what is the speed of legitimacy? Is it slow (related to generations) or rapid (related to political choice)? Third, what is the timing of legitimation? Fourth, what are the sequences of consolidation? Which partial regimes get formed first (party system, system of interest representation, etc.)?

Collier noted that the study of consolidation could become *ad hoc* if care were not taken. There are significant problems of coordination in a project like this, involving scholars with a diverse set of interests, coming from a diverse set of countries. Collier observed that O'Donnell's model involved an eclectic set of approaches, including game theory, cost/benefit analysis, threshold analysis, and collective action. He found the model a useful way of thinking about coalition and conflict. He suggested revising the model to bring out two points: First, the model is more straightforward than it sounds; second, the model could bring out more clearly some deductive interconnections, thereby helping to show the theoretical complexity of the issues. Finally, Collier observed that the model seemed more applicable to Argentina than elsewhere.

Karl questioned O'Donnell's view that the bourgeoisie is usually a key actor in the B players, avering that industrialists are often at the forefront of the transition. They want the construction of predictable rules, which are more likely under democratic rule. The consolidation period emphasizes institutions. We therefore frequently see a move from pacts (formal or informal) in the transition period to laws in the consolidation period. Agreements about accountability are important. She agreed with Schmitter that there is an epistemological switch from transition to consolidation. During the transition, the time frame is short--hours, days, weeks. In consolidation, the time frame is longer, essentially geared to the electoral cycle. Consolidation is a process of exclusion, not always by

concrete choices, but often by important non-decisions. In Venezuela, for example, the non-decision about the nationalization of petroleum was important. Game theory has difficulty dealing with non-decisions.

She proposed looking at how rules become routinized. Political rules are exclusionary in an important sense, particularly regarding the popular sectors. It is important to remember the O'Donnell/Schmitter argument that the transition is initially mobilizing and then inherently demobilizing.⁵ The left tends to be excluded, in part because it has never focused on the construction of rules, emphasizing instead socio-economic issues. Finally, the predominance of coup fears lead to cautious measures that reinforce the exclusion of the left and popular sectors. This pattern helps explain the conservative nature of the new democracies. Karl noted that in Central America and the Caribbean, international actors play a major role in political life. The rules that govern elections and other aspects of political life are largely promoted by the U.S. It would be impossible to study prospects for democracy in El Salvador without considering international recipes for democracy. Karl observed that there are differences in the way people were speaking of transition and consolidation. She argued that there is something between these two phases. It is during this intermediate phase that golpismo is still relevant; politics is still conditioned by the possibility of a coup. But during the consolidation phase, a coup is not a major consideration

Whitehead suggested that it would be useful to include Venezuela, Colombia, and Costa Rica, cases where there was successful democratic consolidation in Latin America. The five cases chosen so far are ones where democratic consolidation has not occurred. In Peru, although there may not be a breakdown, it is difficult to see evidence of a move towards consolidation.

Referring to the Dominican case, **Rosario Espinal** agreed with Whitehead that a democratic government could exist without moving towards democratic consolidation. She voiced a concern that O'Donnell's scheme did not identify the B and C actors.

O'Donnell responded to some of the criticisms of his scheme. He noted that the scheme intentionally avoids identifying any concrete actor as necessarily a B or C player, and that it does not state that the only game was that between B and C players. But it is fundamental to avoid decisions that favor the B players. This problem entails a key constraint, even though it is not the entire picture. O'Donnell argued that the issue is that the governments must both avoid a coup and govern.

Schmitter argued that democratic consolidation changes actors' perceptions of their interests. Game theory is limited in this sense; the real political game is reiterative, and game theory cannot deal adequately with reiterative games. The first elections and other critical moments change actors' perceptions of politics. Schmitter disagreed with O'Donnell's objection to starting with the study of institutions. He recognized that institutions may be more developed in parts of Southern Europe, especially Spain and Italy, than they are in Latin America. But in Turkey and Greece, the structures of civil society are not particularly strong, so one faces the same problem as in Latin America. You may discover that industrialist associations are not too important in Turkey--but you need to start somewhere. And you will discover something significant if you come to realize that they are not so important. Institutions are a point of entry into a research topic, even when the research reveals them to be less central to the eventual outcome.

Schmitter agreed that the model must recognize that there is a possibility of non-consolidation for both democratic and authoritarian regimes. For example, the authoritarian regime in Greece never went far towards consolidation. In a similar vein, in some democracies one could have rule by procedural minimum without moving towards

democratic consolidation. There would then be continued protracted uncertainty about the rules of the game.

Schmitter supported Whitehead's comment that breakdown may result from an unintended consequence of the lack of coordination among C players, rather than the intentional action of B players (eg., Weimar). If this is correct, then the game between B and C players may be relatively unimportant. There may be few B players until the C players make mistakes. Game theory cannot adequately address situations of multiple simultaneous games.

José Artur Giannotti said that there were epistemological problems in the debate between O'Donnell and Schmitter. Classical theory did not resolve the problem of the transformation from rules to institutions. It dealt with socialization, internalization, and other problems, but was not very helpful for explaining the construction of institutions. The problem is precisely how to explain this transformation into institutions. When Schmitter emphasizes institutions, he ends up relying on notions such as identity, loyalty and trust. There is implicit a psychologist bias; the issues of why and how trust and loyalty emerge are left unresolved. O'Donnell by comparison, wants to examine the transformation into institutions. He focuses on actors, and particularly the capacity of the rational actor to resolve certain problems. But game theory overlooks how and why rules are followed. This poses the problem of uncertainty. The problem of democracy is moving from a situation of uncertainty to one of relative certainty, where the rules of the game are more clearly defined. Democracy is a space where certainties and uncertainties can be worked out. Hence the importance of the parliament--a space where conflict is mediated, resolved, worked on. But O'Donnell is correct in saying that the parliament is of secondary importance in Latin America. We are polarizing an epistemological problem: institutions versus game theory. Game theory does not resolve the important issue of how the games are constructed. Therefore it tends to freeze empirical reality. We should

be more creative in epistemological terms. Giannotti would prefer an anthropological path that focuses on the formation of spaces.

Nun said that he shared Giannotti's concern and expressed reservations about O'Donnell's scheme. He argued that models always involve some reductionism, but that under many circumstances this is justified. However, constructing a model that sharply reduces reality, before any empirical work is undertaken, has problems. Game theory would be of limited use in guiding national research; it might lead to confusion in terms of comparative work.

Nun also prefers to focus on "spaces" rather than actors. He sees the notion of discursive practices as a key. Abandoning "mentalist" approaches is important. There are no mental constructions of reality, but rather collective representations. Generally speaking, ideologies, understood as a rational, coherent discourse, have had limited impact and use in Latin America. Such leading figures in Argentine politics as Yrigoyen and Perón clearly avoided ideological positions.

Nun focused on the theme of the construction of reality. Pre-ideological modes of articulating interests are important. Analyzing the logic of different discourses is a key to approaching these questions. We need to focus on the logic of the actors. O'Donnell's paper ignores the history of the actors. What have their discourses been? The political game is not something that starts at the present; it has a history that shapes the rules and the way different actors behave. For example, the C actor, par excellence, is the government. But the government faces limits that are not exclusively created by B actors or by any other actors. Alfonsín, concretely, is limited by the discourse of the Radical Party. The discourse and history of the different actors limit their current behavior.

O'Donnell reiterated that he never limited himself to game theory. Rather, his scheme drew upon the broad family of strategic games. His model does presuppose that actors are rational, in the sense of having certain objectives and means of reaching those

objectives, but it is not restricted to game theory. **Collier** agreed with this observation and noted that O'Donnell's paper is a very eclectic mixture of methods that covers many issues absent from game theory. Responding to criticisms of the scheme, Collier argued that O'Donnell's paper does not assume the transparency of society; that it does allow for the possibility of breakdown resulting from errors of C players; that it does talk about iterated games; that it does incorporate the sphere on non-decisions.

Luiz González argued that O'Donnell's paper manifests some problems of methodological individualism. In this sense, there is a displacement of the object of analysis. The problem with methodological individualism is that it is primarily collective actors that make the most important decisions.

Responding to Giannotti, **Schmitter** agreed that we do not know much about how you get from certain patterns to institutions, but argued that we can still recognize and measure the creation of institutions. They are based not just on identities and loyalties, but also on competitive interactions according to mutually accepted rules. He agrees with O'Donnell about the importance of strategic interaction; the divergence comes over what the games are. He agreed with González's observation; democratic consolidation is about developing the conditions to become collective actors. Schmitter argued that the multiplicity of simultaneous games tends to rob game theory of its elegant, but simplistic utility. Applied to iterative games, it makes even more serious assumptions about who is in the game and it cannot handle the introduction of new actors.

Alfred Stepan noted that both O'Donnell and Schmitter are interested in strategic interaction. Terry Karl is dealing with problems in a situation (Central America) where the left is more important than in O'Donnell's model. We really have three, rather than two, sets of countries, with different issues: Southern Europe, South America, and

Central America. In Brazil, there are few B players, but there are remarkably complex games among the C players. The president has used the military again and again.

Whitehead discussed what he termed the "authenticity problem," i.e., the reciprocal building of confidence among political actors. In Central America, for example, this problem is very serious; contending forces habitually view their opposition as the intractable instruments of international forces.

Scott Mainwaring commented on O'Donnell's model and the ensuing discussion. He argued that the coup game is indeed important, even if it does not appear as such in the period shortly after the transition. He also agreed with O'Donnell that issues like legitimacy, political culture, and efficacy are not necessarily determining factors for consolidation, at least in the short term. He agreed with Schmitter that consolidation involves much more than coup avoidance. But he questioned whether the routinization of practices necessary in consolidation could be traced to any particular institutions (like the parliament) in Latin America. He also concurred that it is possible that the outcome of the coup game depends more on what takes place in other games than in the coup game itself. This would reduce the utility of focusing on the coup game itself in understanding the dynamics that lead to consolidation.

Luciano Martins said that he was uncomfortable with the word consolidation. We can have easy transitions and difficult democracies. The discourse on democracy is so vague that there is a lack of strategy for democratization. The military question is generally ignored. Martins proposed focusing on conditions that are needed for democracy. There is a disarticulation among social, economic, and political levels. We need to relate institutions and behavior of actors to social and economic situations. He expressed his view that while consolidation is a historical process, the meeting was reducing it to politics. He posed the question of what forms of government are

compatible with different kinds of societies. How are state and society related in different regimes?

Schmitter responded to Martins by saying that he would avoid the theme of reproducibility of conditions for democracy. In Europe, war was the most important way of starting new democracies, yet war is hardly a situation that one can reproduce in the hopes of improving conditions for a new democracy. The disarticulation among social, economic, and political levels is normal and need not prevent consolidation. Finally, the emptiness of discourse is not necessarily a problem specific to Latin America; it occurs everywhere.

In a later discussion, **O'Donnell** agreed that since the issue at stake is regime consolidation and not simply the performance of a government, institutionalization is a key issue. But it is an issue to be treated carefully, for there is a high risk of tautologies. We need to continue discussing this question. What indicators of institutionalization are most useful? What kinds of institutionalization are (or are not) occurring? Although parliament may not be an important center of decision making in most countries, what takes place there is likely to be very suggestive about the nature of the regime. Moreover, the parliament is often a primary channel for becoming a professional politician. A key question here is the extent to which the parliament decides political issues. Where are the important spaces for doing politics? Public opinion polls should be a good instrument for measuring support for the regime, above and beyond immediate instruments. Legitimacy may be necessary for democratic consolidation. But it is not, O'Donnell argued, a good starting point, precisely because democratic institutions generally lack legitimacy in the nascent phases of democracy, and may acquire it over time.

Nun indicated his agreement with O'Donnell's statement. He noted that the threat of a coup can be a paper tiger. Interviews need to be done carefully or they will not be as revealing as we hope. Survey data can often be misleading.

Collier outlined a scheme for rethinking O'Donnell's model. O'Donnell's definition of consolidation can be used as a "sunset clause." If a coup is not a relevant political consideration, then O'Donnell's model is not relevant. He urged a number of comparative studies, much in the fashion of The New Authoritarianism volume, which had no country studies.⁶

Schmitter observed that there was a move towards some consensus. He reiterated his hope that there would be a strong relationship with the Southern Europe group. Schmitter noted that strategic interaction approaches imply a high level of interdependence in the way that actors calculate their moves. People do not act without considering the likely response of other actors. Strategic interaction also implies choice. People make some wrong choices and some good choices; the outcomes are underdetermined. Finally, the strategic interaction approach implies that there are learning effects; actors change their preferences because of the emerging nature of the game. We should think of consolidation as a process of multiple games: the inter-elite game among C actors; the coup game, the intra-C game, within unions, interest associations, etc. It is not clear a priori which is the dominant game. We need to analyze whether the games are played simultaneously or sequentially, whether they are contradictory or complementary in their logic. There are multiple kinds of actors in a game. We need to focus on a relatively small subset so as to make meaningful comparison possible. Following Giannotti's idea of spaces of interaction, Schmitter noted that the parliament is but one possible space for defining conflict and rules. But in Latin America, the parliament may not be the dominant space; we should also look at other spaces, eg., intergovernment actions (local versus federal government), social pacts (neo-corporatist bargains), and intra-party articulations.

O'Donnell expressed his agreement with most of what Schmitter had said. Part of the learning process is in institutions. He insisted on an argument of his paper, that the

problem of free riders is constant for these governments. The opposite problem also frequently appears: the government can say that actors are disloyal, thereby discrediting those actors, when in fact they are loyal democratic actors with a different set of goals than the government.

The problem with the frozen democracies theme is assessing when a democracy is frozen. It may be in a "sailing against the wind" pattern,⁷ i.e., the overall direction is forward, but a part of the trajectory is backwards, leading to the conclusion based on analyzing only that part that the overall direction is backwards.

Possibilities, Problems, and Constraints in Consolidation

Although methodological and conceptual issues predominated, some attention was devoted to possibilities, problems, and constraints in the consolidation of democracy. In contrast to the debates on conceptualization and models, there was a high degree of consensus around several points related to problems and opportunities. It is apparent that many of the objective conditions for DC are quite negative in contemporary Latin America. In particular, the severe economic crisis that has beset all of Latin America in the 1980s does not augur well for the new democracies. Authoritarian cultural patterns and the strength of key authoritarian actors are other unfavorable circumstances.

Yet numerous participants observed that these unfavorable conditions need not be determinant. Participants pointed to conclusions of Rustow and Hirschman, among others, to support this view.⁸ Furthermore, several participants noted that there appears to be a democratic temper unknown in the past. Whitehead, O'Donnell, and Hirschman particularly emphasized what the first called "the revolution of falling expectations."

Finally, several participants noted that although objective conditions need not be determinant, they nevertheless continue to be important. The social science reflections

about democracy have shifted considerably over two decades. In the mid-60s, democracy was often seen as almost necessarily linked to more developed economies and/or "a civic culture." In the mid-80s, the relative autonomy of politics vis-à-vis the economy and cultural patterns is a leading theme. But, as several participants noted, this autonomy has limits.

O'Donnell noted that possibilities for significant change at the macro level are very limited, given the objective constraints. But neither the need of the new regimes to survive, nor the conservative impact of the difficult objective situation, prevent the possibility of what he called micro struggles. There is a broad area of possibilities here. O'Donnell argued that there are two new hopeful factors in terms of values, although it is difficult to guess how much these factors will weigh. First, there are low economic expectations about the short and medium run. Second, there is a virtual unanimity about the importance of democracy. But the municipal election in São Paulo in November 1985 showed that the authoritarian forces are intact and can resurface at any moment.

Albert Hirschman argued that there are probably no necessary objective conditions for democracy. It would be presumptuous to lay down strict economic conditions for democracy. But he also noted that it would be a mistake to overlook that some objective conditions favor democracy more than others. Economic factors are not irrelevant for democratic consolidation. Economic constraints are important, and in the long run we need some balance between development and democracy. It is probably more useful to think of dilemmas of new democracies rather than conditions necessary for democracy. The new democracies frequently find themselves between Scylla and Charybdis. For example, they can fail to gain mass support because of immobility; conversely, they can incur problems on the right by attempting too rapid change. It is possible to be too peaceful and weak, to fail to promote enough change. Hirschman disagreed with Adam Przeworski's radical dismissal of the importance of cultural factors.⁹

He noted that Rustow's contribution on democracy was fundamental; democracy can develop out of a standoff of forces. This does not mean, however, that values and attitudes should be wholly disregarded. They are very important, and if democratic values are not acquired, the whole edifice rests on a shaky foundation. He noted a convergence between Schmitter and O'Donnell in that one of the opportunities of the current phase is that expectations are lower; in the past, exaggerated expectations contributed to the demise of many democratic governments. He recommended a new series of studies on civic culture, like those of the 1960s. He found O'Donnell's earlier papers on micro and macro considerations of democracy provocative in this regard. This kind of discussion on social relations and values was neglected in O'Donnell's paper for the meeting. We should not focus exclusively on interest groups, institutionalization, and behavior.

Espinal noted that for several decades, social scientists considered the existence of certain favorable factors to be indispensable for democracy. In recent years, analysis has emphasized the opposite, i.e., the relative autonomy of politics vis-à-vis cultural and economic factors. We might be going too far in denying the importance of these cultural and economic factors. We could end up saying that democracy is the product of a calculation, that it is not related to a determined political culture and economy. We cannot completely neglect the importance of conditioning factors.

Schmitter agreed with Espinal's observation that developmental imperatives, cultural conditions, and institutions are fundamental. We need a model of what attitudes are important, not as prerequisites for democracy, but as emergent factors. In Europe, two factors are critical. First, loyalty not based on instrumental calculations but loyalty to democracy as a regime--a feeling that democracy is the best kind of regime at a certain moment. Second, trust in interlocutors is important in the move to relatively structured interactions.

Whitehead agreed that it is essential to avoid economic reductionism. The role of perceptions is an important intervening variable. Although there has been a "revolution of falling expectations", some minimum level of economic performance is necessary over time. The question is whether elites blame democracy for poor economic performance, or see this performance as resulting from other causes. Here Latin America has an advantage over Southern Europe in the 1970s, since the European dictatorships presided over a good economic situation. Whitehead argued that it is important for the new democracies not to attempt to do everything at once. It is probably prudent to settle salient political issues first, then address the economy. As time passes, economic management becomes more important; in the early stages, you can more easily afford some mismanagement. While arguing against economic reductionism, Whitehead agreed with Espinal that we cannot completely dispense with economic or cultural factors. More economically developed countries are privileged because they can offer something to all sectors. Whitehead also noted that there is a possibility of reabsorbing authoritarian actors into the democratic game. The only unambiguous authoritarian actor in all five countries is Sendero Luminoso. Many forces that were undemocratic have bought into the democratic game. Democracy has various strategies and resources to bring actors into this game.

Ernest Bartell discussed some of the economic dilemmas facing the new democracies. Bartell wanted to identify an area of economic concern that would reach across the different countries. He focused on an aspect of strategic interaction that is usually ignored, namely, the international economy. The impact of the international economy on the Latin American democracies is greater than it was in the late 1950s and early 1960s, and there is a systematic bias against these countries. There is a market bias against the debtors, and the lenders came together almost immediately and imposed a situation of atomistic markets on the debtors. The monopoly side of the market initially set

the terms for the debtors. The same holds for commodity markets. Primary goods are still a major part of Latin American exports. Thus, for example, while there are only a few major buyers of coffee, there are many producers. Conditions for direct foreign investment have changed as bank money has dried up. But here, too, we can expect a bias. Latin America is a price taker, and the multinational corporations do not really constitute a competitive market. The corporations can put together packages that maximize their benefits and minimize costs. Because of the prisoner's dilemma, there is usually some difficulty in breaking the price taker characteristics of the market. Individual efforts by countries to change the terms of the international economy are not likely to be successful, nor are efforts by small groups of countries. Furthermore, there is a poor history of collective action on these questions. Bartell mentioned the possibility that Latin American countries could work towards a collective position on all three sets of markets (debt, trade, investment). This could be a countervailing force and could become a positive sum game.

Schmitter responded to Bartell's presentation by noting that international trade is not an area of free competition. He argued that Latin American governments have a higher capacity to barter than Bartell suggested. A number of governments are successfully demanding better economic terms on the grounds that they are new democracies. Alan García's attempt to play hardball in the international economic arena is an example. **Bartell** responded that these bilateral temptations are what prevent multilateral actions, even when multilateral actions might ultimately prove better.

Hirschman agreed that there are asymmetries in the international economy, but argued that Bartell had underestimated the changes from the 1945-1965 period, when Latin America was mostly an exporter of primary commodities.

Whitehead questioned Schmitter's argument that Latin American countries have gotten significant cash value out of having new democracies. Most of the new

democracies have been disappointed about how little aid they have gotten. By contrast, Greece was able to get considerable economic support for establishing a democracy.

Prospects for Consolidation in the Five Countries

One session was devoted to having participants from the five countries discuss the new democracies. **Luis Pásara** discussed the Peruvian case, focusing on four themes.

1) The Belaúnde government (1980-1985) was identified with the image of crisis in both the economy and the polity. The economic crisis began in 1975, but was seriously exacerbated under the Belaúnde government. Economic policy under Belaúnde affected all sectors of society (except some speculators) negatively. Belaúnde seemed to have a passive approach of simply avoiding problems and conflicts. An excessive concern with mere survival led to timid actions and weakened the government. The interesting question from this period is why, despite everything, there was no coup.

2) García has projected the opposite image: optimism, energy, enthusiasm. The government appears to be in charge of problems, and some of the connections between the state and civil society have been restored. García's economic policy has reduced inflation, and he has announced a new policy for dealing with the debt. But the economic prospects are terrible, and many people question how well thought-out his economic policies are. The new government has affirmed civilian control over the armed forces and has paid considerable attention to foreign affairs. García dominates the political stage; meanwhile, we do not see the emergence of strong political institutions. The possibility of a coup cannot be discarded, but it is not the main problem.

3) The political actors. It is difficult to say what is happening with the armed forces. They supported García, but his actions have adversely surprised them: reduction

of military spending, elimination of some military privileges, establishing stronger civilian control over the armed forces. Sendero Luminoso is the main threat to democracy. The opposition parties are temporarily neutralized. The Izquierda Unida, which won 25% of the vote, faces an internal debate over how to respond to García: alliance or rupture. Most interest groups have not yet defined their strategy vis-à-vis the government.

4) The spaces. There are two main spaces where democracy could be consolidated--parliament and the judiciary--but García's record on both scores is terrible. Neither occupies a central position in the current administration. APRA has undergone important changes as García has attempted to transform its social base to encompass the dispossessed. The party has also become more internally democratic. The municipios might become another important space of consolidation. At the current time, all other actors fade into the background because of García's domination of the political scene. It is above all within the administration that politics is defined. The coup game is not an important part of politics now, for several reasons: the temporal proximity of the last military government, the fear that a coup would legitimate Sendero, the strength of García.

Espinal discussed the Dominican case, where the question of a coup has always been on the political agenda. Indeed, the absence of a coup there is striking! Espinal gave a historical synopsis of the emergence of a democratic regime in the D.R. After Trujillo's assassination in 1961, the authoritarian forces did not recompose themselves. The period from 1961 until 1965 was characterized by considerable instability, followed by a period of stable civilian authoritarianism. These years saw rapid economic expansion, resulting in the strengthening of the bourgeoisie and middle sectors, and, more generally, in the invigoration of an extremely weak civil society. There was considerable political and economic control over the working class and over political parties, especially the Partido Revolucionario Democrático, PRD.

The electoral victory of the PRD in 1978 meant significant changes. Important sectors of society, including parts of the bourgeoisie, supported the new government, helping to neutralize the possibility of a coup. The inauguration of the PRD government in 1978 meant the beginning of the democratic transition. The PRD has been in power since then.

Notwithstanding the already lengthy existence of democratic politics in the Dominican Republic, we still have a situation of prolonged transition without DC. Two changes are required for a DC: stronger institutions and greater participation. Political institutions, and in particular the party system, continue to be weak. The PRD is the only party that is structured nationwide. The right party has not become a modern political party; it is very personalistic and authoritarian. The PRD, which is internally divided, acts as both the ruling and the opposition party. The PRD has not been interested in incorporating vast sectors of the society which support it, but which are excluded from real political participation. The PRD's failure to develop mechanisms of incorporation leads to a political vacuum. In summary, democratic consolidation requires more democratic actors than we now see in the DR.

Karl spoke about Central America and the Caribbean Basin. She argued that this is an important area, partially because past collaborative scholarly efforts have neglected this region. She plans to concentrate on Venezuela, Costa Rica, and El Salvador. The region shows a wide range of experimentation in terms of democratization, and a wide range of regime types, from socialist to authoritarian personalistic governments. The problems here are distinct from those in the southern cone for three main reasons. The small size of the countries and populations means that the governments face different problems. Second, the level of economic development is generally lower, and the pattern of economic development differs in key regards. Third, the extreme foreign penetration, and in particular the deep impact of the United States, makes the trade offs

between democratization and other desirable goods (such as socio-economic equity) starker. Most of Latin America's durable democracies (Jamaica, Costa Rica, Colombia, Venezuela) are in this region, but because of the starkness of the tradeoffs between democracy and other development goods, they are generally "frozen" democracies, i.e., democracies limited in their capacity for self-transformation. Costa Rica is a counterpoint against this argument; she hypothesized that this is so because many distributional outcomes (eg., the pattern of land distribution) were established prior to the establishment of democracy.

The mode of transition is one of the most important variables in whether a democracy becomes consolidated, and in what kind of democracy emerges. She presented a two by two matrix that outlines different modes of transition.

		Strategies of Transition	
		Compromise	Force
Relative Strength of Character	Elite Ascendent	Pact (Venezuela)	Imposition (Costa Rica)
	Mass Ascendent	Reform	Revolution

She plans to focus on elite ascendant transitions.

She then discussed three conceptual problems. First is definitional: what constitutes a consolidated democracy? Should Venezuela be considered a consolidated democracy? She argued that it has been consolidated more through oil wealth than through institutional forms. Second is the sequence for establishing democracy. A basic set of rules underlies procedural minimums, and some basic compromise must precede the form (elections). In El Salvador, however, the form (elections) preceded any basic compromise. Finally, except for El Salvador, these countries had few institutionalized forces at the moment of the transition. In such circumstances this probably means that the few extant institutions become extremely important.

Whitehead argued that we have serious conceptual problems if we do not consider Venezuela a consolidated democracy. By this criterion, none of the new democracies could be considered consolidated for a considerable time. In his view, Venezuelan democracy was consolidated by the late 1960s, when alternation in power had taken place without major convulsions, and when the guerillas were defeated. **Karl** responded that there was still a concern with a coup. Furthermore, the channels of access have not been institutionalized, particularly for elites. The regime is more consolidated as a party system than as a system of interest associations. **O'Donnell** remarked that El Salvador should not be considered a democratic government, even though it is an elected civilian government. **Karl** responded that it is becoming more difficult to evaluate whether El Salvador should be considered democratic. For example, in contrast to 1983, labor unions now exist and function.

Luis González began the discussion of Uruguay. The first nine months of democratic rule went well, but there are ominous problems, too: strikes, external debt, occasional threatening noises from military leaders. The new government faces the less-than-promising prospect of declining investment and per capita income, as Uruguay's economy continues to have poor medium run perspectives. González emphasized a crucial distinctive feature of Uruguay: the problem is not the construction of democracy, but rather its reconstruction. In 1960, Uruguay had a more consolidated democracy than any current Latin American democracy, not only because of longevity, but also because of the strength of its institutions. Uruguay has a stronger history of democratic institutions, and also knows the existence of a prior democratic political culture. Neither the parliament nor interest groups are weak. The party system is also unique. In Argentina and Chile, the right is weak in electoral terms, and very disloyal to democratic institutions. In Brazil, Peru, and the DR, the right is stronger electorally, and uses this strength to block the political representation of the popular sectors. In Uruguay, the right

is somewhere in between; it is reasonably strong, but is not so fiercely disloyal to democracy, nor so committed to blocking the articulation of popular demands. It is represented in both of the leading parties.

Juan Rial continued the discussion of Uruguay. The only interruption of elections since early in the century came between 1973 and 1980, highlighting González's point about the continuity of democratic institutions and practices. Democracy in Uruguay is conceived as a set of rules, but it also has a substantive component. Since early this century, the style of development benefited the middle sectors that constituted the bulk of the population. Today, much of the country longs for a return to this kind of development although the objective conditions for it are extremely unfavorable. Democratic institutions are strong and have a lengthy history and, in contrast to the other countries, the parliament is strong. But the new democracy faces the unenviable task of elaborating a development strategy in a country that has no resources and that has not seen any successful development since the 1950s. There are many relevant political actors: parties, unions, business groups, the military. The armed forces have attempted to obtain a guarantee of autonomy. Because of the economic situation, there are limited possibilities of going beyond a conservative democracy. Most actors seek a concertación, by which they would renounce economic expectations in favor of political liberties. There is a search to assure a minimum of governability.

Nun discussed the Argentine case. Fundamental changes in the social structure occurred under the military rule. There was an increasing homogenization at the top, and an increasing fragmentation (heterogenization) of the popular sectors. The sharp decline in industrial activity (-3% industrial growth per year, 1975-1982) resulted in a 36% decrease in the size of the industrial work force. This was accompanied by a rapid growth in services and commerce, and of self-employed workers. The last category saw an increase from 21% to 24% of the economically active population just from 1976 to 1981.

Of the 10 largest unions, six are in the area of services, and the overall number of unionized workers has declined.

Almost everyone expected the Peronistas to win the 1983 presidential elections. The results underscored the opacity of Argentine politics. Although not to the same extent as in 1983, the 1985 parliamentary elections reaffirmed the strength of the two leading parties, which captured 80% of the vote. The Radicals won among the ciudadanos, while the Peronistas won among the corporations, particularly the unions. This bifurcation makes it difficult to govern. Prior to the 1985 elections, many observers felt that Peronism faced an inexorable decline. The Peronist right, linked to the armed forces and the Church, had control of the unions. But again there was a surprise, as Antonio Cafiero, the candidate of the renewal faction, handily defeated Herminio Iglesias candidate of the Peronist right. This change may augur well for the institutionalization of the Peronist Party.

The Alfonsín government has made many mistakes. When he came to power, Alfonsín activated a discourse about "powerful Argentina." Stated objectives included rapid economic growth, increases in real wages, and elimination of inflation. Fortunately, most people did not pay attention to this discourse, and Alfonsín remains remarkably popular despite the severe economic problems. The Plan Austral has helped a lot in a country where the image of non-governability corresponded to a reality. The plan has had spectacular support, contrary to expectations. The dominant classes have, since 1900, favored rapid profit and liquid capital. This tendency was exacerbated during the 1976-1983 period, when fabulous fortunes were made on speculation as the national economy languished. The dominant sectors are generally B players and do what they can to destabilize the government.

The Radical Government performed poorly in its use of symbols, but the results have not been bad. Although the parliament continues to be of secondary importance in

formulating objectives and decisions, for the first time important political leaders are engaged in the parliament. Alfonsín has governed intuitively, with a series of shock measures. The brusque changes have enabled him to maintain the initiative. The problem is how to stabilize this. Given the impossibility of material incentives, what room for maneuverability is left?

Brasílio Sallum presented the Brazilian case. The transition in Brazil occurred without any rupture, without a substitution of the bases of the regime, through the inclusion of new sectors. The New Republic represents moderation, the absence of "revanchismo," and national unity. The transition was relatively consensual.

But the early period of democratic rule had several troublesome aspects. The period between March and November 1985 saw disorganization in the party system, as the parties failed to define themselves. This period was marked by many institutional changes: expansion of the suffrage to the illiterate, new party legislation. But there was no serious discussion of party and political differences; such discussions were postponed, awaiting the Constituent Assembly. The government attempted to preserve the initial unity, sometime at the expense of promoting needed changes. When business leaders opposed the agrarian reform and the new strike law, the government pulled back. Much of the political debate has focused around economic policy, which underwent a significant change in August, when a conservative monetarism was replaced by expansionist policies.

The November 1985 municipal elections showed the strength of the conservative rearticulation. The large press echoed business leaders' criticisms of the economic model. Meanwhile, the left has also expanded. Given the high and escalating inflation rate, the growth of the right, and the growth of the left, it may be difficult to preserve the conditions for political stability. The left's progress in the municipal elections will enable it to play a more central role.

Ruth Cardoso added that in the Brazilian case, it is essential to consider the fundamental changes the social structure underwent in 21 years of authoritarian rule. The rapid modernization process of these years changed the country in profound ways. However, the country does not have a system of representation that reflects these changes in the society. Changes in the society have outpaced changes in the political system, as the parties have failed to express the diversity of the society. The demands of civil society are at times a political game, not expressive of real needs. For example, all sides of society are mobilizing for the Constituent Assembly, but nobody is seriously debating the content of that Assembly. The threat of a coup, as discussed by O'Donnell, is not the problem. The separation between B and C actors does not capture the reality.

O'Donnell noted the importance of differentiating among parties in different countries. In Brazil, they are like jelly; politicians change parties from one day to the next. This quality has to do with the initial characteristics of the parties. Any discussion of Brazil must also address the terrible poverty of a large part of the population. In a country with a less dynamic economy, this theme might be less salient. Also, the extremely high military presence in the new regime is another distinctive feature of the Brazilian case. Although political leaders do not function exclusively in terms of a coup threat, O'Donnell argued that this is an important part of what is taking place.

Giannotti addressed the question of modes of citizenship in Brazil. The military regime incorporated vast sectors of the society into the capitalist system, but at the same time it excluded them from the effective exercise of citizenship. Now we see the masses demand some kind of symbolic participation and citizenship. But it is still not a rational, responsible citizenship; populist participation, with no real discussion of the substantive issues, still prevails. The model of citizenship will affect prospects for democratic consolidation.

Whitehead said that the presentation of the Brazilian case had suggested the presence of only one democratic actor, the PMDB. He questioned whether this corresponded to reality. **González** noted how different the Brazilian and Uruguan cases are from Peru and Argentina in the low profile of the presidents.

Doing Comparative Work

Another theme involved the most important dimensions for doing comparative work. What are the most important factors that affect prospects for DC? The problem is selecting a finite number of dimensions in a universe where an infinite number of factors are potentially relevant.

The trade off here is between allowing flexibility for the national teams and developing comparable data and approaches. Each country presents unique characteristics and some singular challenges and opportunities that affect possibilities for consolidation. What may be apposite in one country may have limited relevance elsewhere. For example, the issue of dealing with a guerilla left committed to undermining democracy is of utmost importance in Peru and Central America, but is not a consideration in the other countries. To neglect the most important specificities, in the name of imposing uniformity among the studies, would be absurd. But conversely, in a universe where there is an infinite number of relevant factors, it is essential to limit primary focus to a manageable number of themes.

The issue of most important comparative factors can be analytically broken down into background factors and characteristics of the democratic regimes and of the oppositions. **O'Donnell** discussed some of the background factors that are important in contrasting the five countries. The characteristics of the previous authoritarian regime are very important; they set parameters for the new democratic regime. Particularly important

in this regard is how the regimes are remembered--the (partially) subjective evaluation citizens make of the past. On this dimension, we can contrast those regimes that oversaw the modernization of the economies, and that had significant support in civil society (Brazil, Dominican Republic) with those that were an economic disaster, were far more repressive, and became enormously unpopular (Argentina, Uruguay). A second important factor is the kind of transition. Brazil underwent a long, slow transition, marked by considerable continuity; the Argentine transition was abrupt, prompted by the Malvinas/Falklands defeat. The other cases were somewhere in between these two. The relative weight of the popular sectors is also very important. On this dimension, Brazil and the D. R. stand at one end of the spectrum, where the popular sectors have had a very limited political impact, and the other countries are cases where the popular sectors have been better organized and stronger political actors.

Mainwaring also addressed this question. He agreed that the characteristics of the previous authoritarian regime are essential for contrasting the situations of the new democracies. Differences in the economic situation establish parameters that affect the new democracies. The overall level of development, the level of inequalities, and the current economic situation are significant economic variables. The relative degree of militarization varies considerably, with potentially important consequences for the democratic regimes. The existence (or lack thereof) of a prior democratic tradition is also important. Here, the countries range from Uruguay, with its lengthy history of democracy, to the Dominican Republic, where democracy had never existed before 1978. Finally, the strength of the far left varies considerably, from Peru and parts of Central America, where the far left is a powerful force, generally uninterested in or hostile to liberal democracy, to Brazil, Uruguay and Argentina, where the far left is not a determining factor in politics.

O'Donnell enumerated some of the themes that he considers essential.

1) Who are the principal actors in the five countries? There are important differences between cases. What is the level of aggregation at which these actors articulate themselves? Is it, for example, a peak level association of business leaders, or a group of business leaders?

2) What is the system of political mediation in the different cases, particularly the kinds of parties? The degree of personalization of politics varies sharply among the cases. How well structured is the party system?

3) How do the leading interest groups do politics? Particularly important are business associations and unions. In what form do they do politics? What kinds of demand do they have?

4) The role of the military is a key question. What are the different forms and degrees of militarization?

5) The economy. We do not want to dissociate politics from the economy. We should avoid exaggerating the autonomy of the political sphere. This poses the question of how the five countries are facing the economic crisis.

6) What are the struggles of civil society? What are the spaces available for struggle? We need to create more democratic spaces in these authoritarian societies.

7) O'Donnell argued for the importance of some public opinion work. This would help clarify the extent of specific support for particular issues and policies, as opposed to diffuse support for the regime.

8) He suggested focusing on critical stages in political life, such as elections, the moments of great fears and mobilization (such as a coup threat), and the moments of great inflections in public policies, particularly regarding economic policy and the military.

O'Donnell concluded by arguing for the importance of doing good interviews with important leaders of the different countries. The discourse of these actors is important.

Stepan appealed for doing serious comparative work on the military, a critical subject that has not received adequate attention. For example, the Brazilian Congress, anticipating the Constituent Assembly, has postponed the issue of the role of the armed forces in the new democracy; but the early discussions about the new constitution have completely neglected the subject. He further suggested that three or four people do comparative work in all five countries on a set of critical issues. The Cavarozzi project on parties is a good model, but otherwise very few people have worked on the entire set of countries. These three or four people engaged in comparative projects should then spend a lot of time talking with the people doing the country studies, both to offer and obtain ideas and information.

Stepan noted that democratic polities must develop a strategy for control of the military and of public power. The increasing costs of military intervention require the development of new capacities in civil society and the state. Routine monitoring of the intelligence service and the military is essential.

One critical dimension for comparison is the strength of the militaries' political resources. In Brazil, by statute there are six military ministers, compared to none in Argentina, one in the Dominican Republic, and three in Peru. The Brazilian military has an extraordinary range of political functions and powers, more so than is the case elsewhere. This means that the military has a lot of power in a relatively weak government. Military ministers helped to kill the agrarian reform and the new strike law.

Effective monitoring of the military requires knowledgeable people in Congress and in the universities who know how to debate the military budget, weapons system, etc. Yet the Brazilian Congress does not even have a standing committee on the armed forces. An exceptional committee does not perform the task, both because the members are not able to develop the necessary expertise, and because most such participants would be absolute friends or absolute foes. Moreover, there are no university courses in

Brazil on the military: Civil society could help with the task of monitoring the military, but is ill prepared to do so.

There is an extraordinary range in our countries in terms of military expenditures. Among the world's democracies, Brazil probably ranks lowest in terms of military spending as a percentage of the GNP, at 0.6% to 1.0%. Peru, by contrast, ranks among the highest in the world, with a military share of 12% of the GNP. This means that it is difficult to reduce the military budget in the Brazilian case. Indeed, in some cases it would behoove democratic actors to increase the military budget. For example, the Brazilian military has limited capacity for joint operations. By encouraging this kind of capacity, democratic actors could encourage professionalization and discourage politicization.

In terms of military expenditures, Argentina falls in between Brazil and Peru. The military's share in the GNP has fallen from 8.5% to 2.5% under Alfonsín, signalling a sharp decline. But the strategy for reducing military expenditure was the worst possible; Alfonsín reduced all units, without abolishing any. This means that the government offended all of the commanders, while weakening the military capacity of all the units. Stepan concluded by noting that an extremely different set of strategies for democratic consolidation results from the different situations.

Schmitter endorsed focusing on the military and capitalists as an entry point for comparative work. **O'Donnell** replied that while Schmitter's two actors--the military and business associations--are crucial, we may want to do more than this. **Whitehead** disagreed with Schmitter about the advisability of restricting the initial field to the military and capitalists. This unjustly focuses on the two leading potential B players. Equally important as objects of study are parties and the state. If you deal only with the military and capitalists, if consolidation occurs, you have left out the main actors. You could not, for example, explain the consolidation of democracy in Costa Rica or Greece through analyzing the military and capitalists.

Mainwaring questioned neglecting the government and particularly the executive in selecting what themes to focus on. He also noted that the subject of the popular classes had been almost entirely neglected. Although the popular classes are generally not the prime actors in the construction of democracy, their political activities are important in determining the quality of democratic life.

Commenting on Schmitter's choices, **Stepan** said that if he had to start with two actors, he would choose the consolidating coalition and political parties. As a third choice, he would focus on the opposition. Only then he would opt for the military. **O'Donnell** noted that the issue of which actors to focus on is an empirical question. Some actors are necessarily important in all the cases, but in the case of many other actors, it is difficult to pre-determine how important they will be. **Schmitter** agreed with **Stepan** that the government and parties are privileged actors. But, he argued, we may learn more about what is taking place by examining the military and the bourgeoisie. The direct route may not be the best one. **Stepan** responded that it is essential to look at the parties and the consolidating coalition.

Selecting Themes

O'Donnell noted that an enormous number of themes are important and relevant in studying democratic consolidation. The problem is developing themes and approaches that address the central issues and make comparative work possible. Therefore, the project needs to choose from among the vast set of possible themes. We need a comparative project, not a federation of individual projects.

Nun argued that we should study ideas about politics in the five countries. The literature discussed political pacts, but it does not discuss pactos de lectura (e.g. a

constitution). These pacts are decisive, because the political struggle takes place in different discourses.

Whitehead suggested focusing on five topics in particular:

- 1) When do you judge democratic consolidation to have occurred? What evidence do you use to make this judgment?
- 2) How are perceptions formed about economic performance? What are the economic constraints that shape possibilities for democratic consolidation?
- 3) What devices are used to lock the business community into a "democratic bargain?"
- 4) What is the role of the media? The media plays an important role in perceptions of what is an acceptable economic performance. How does it generate perceptions of democratic consolidation? Does it pose the issues in a democratic way?
- 5) What are the available strategies for the democratic regime to contain anti-democratic forces in different societies? How can different actors be encouraged to play by democratic rules? How can insurgents be domesticated?

O'Donnell argued that we need to focus on some themes for comparative research. This does not preclude studying other questions for the different countries. For example, the role of the U.S., Europe, and the Inter-American system in encouraging (or discouraging) democracy is important in some cases, but not in others.

Nun reiterated his emphasis on speaking about spaces and not actors. To speak about actors would be a category mistake. The places should be constructed by the researchers. Any given actor does not necessarily remain in the same space. For example, in Argentina parts of the labor movement were clear B actors in 1984.

O'Donnell disagreed with part of what Nun said about the implications of selecting particular actors as objects of study. O'Donnell's scheme does not identify B actors with any particular institution. Preferences change over time; you do not need to

define a priori what actors will do at different moments. **Schmitter** also disagreed with Nun, arguing that we need to talk about concrete actors. The problem is which actors to bet on.

Karl spoke about the issue of democracies that can transform themselves. It is difficult to get at this issue with these five cases because they are such new democracies. It would be useful to analyze Uruguay or Chile in the pre-1973 period to think about how democracies can transform themselves. This would involve more historical work to capture the self-transformative qualities. She also suggested studying a few specific policy arenas, such as the entrance costs into the political system or the distributive mechanisms in the economic arena.

O'Donnell addressed the theme of actors who do not appear on the stage, specifically, the popular classes. He noted that the popular classes could pay the bill for the new democracies. If we are not careful, the popular classes can easily be presented as a problem the democracies should worry about, rather than as legitimate political actors with urgent material needs. We want to avoid a technocratic, conservative vision of democracy that sees popular demands as a disruptive force.

The issue of the popular sectors underscores some of the difficult dilemmas in the consolidation of democracy. The new democracies often engage in considerable chantage in relation to the popular movements, attempting to isolate them as disruptive forces. **Hirschman** noted that the popular mobilization is often important in undermining authoritarian regimes. Does stable democracy require that these movements be quieted?

Cardoso observed that democracy creates difficult dilemmas for these movements. The movements opposed the state during the authoritarian period. Now, under democratic governments, they have more space and enjoy recognition of their legitimacy. But at the same time, they perceive themselves as coopted. They often feel that their movements are used by the government. This poses the theme of the

negotiations between these movements and the state. During the authoritarian period, this relationship was less complex because of the clear opposition stance of the movements. The state's recognition of their legitimacy poses new dilemmas.

In Brazil, there were local transformations in the state. Arguably the most important institutional transformations in the country have occurred at the local level. The state has expanded considerably in terms of its local organisms.

O'Donnell observed that Cardoso's remarks addressed two themes: social movements and local government. The problem is that it is extremely difficult to generalize about social movements and local government on the basis of one or two concrete cases. **Stepan** added that the social movements are an important part of the democratic struggles. The new democracies cannot let all of the new movements fall outside of democratic politics. **Rial** addressed the issue of micro and macro approaches. He noted that macro approaches make it easier to engage in comparisons across the five countries. He argued that comparative work on parties and some interest associations should be a key part of the project.

Nun asked Schmitter to synthesize how the Southern Europe group has organized national research teams. **Schmitter** responded that there are problems in the current Southern Europe project because of differences in research financing. From previous research on organized business, he suggested two things. First, there must be a common core commitment to a firm set of issues and variables. You need this core set to be able to do comparative work. He also recommended that the researchers for the national teams have clearly designated partners in other countries with comparable substantive responsibilities. This way, for example, it would be possible to design research so that two or three micro studies in Brazil could be compared to two or three micro studies in Argentina. Second, he argued that there needs to be some flexibility so that the national teams can consider questions of importance in their country, that are less

salient elsewhere. Each national team should have a person in charge. A team needs a clearly defined organizer.

Hirschman expressed interest in exploring the changes in mood and discourse relative to previous periods. This would give some idea as to the specificity of the current democratic period and would ground the project in some historical references. He would like to draw on several countries.

González discussed the viability of comparable surveys in all five countries. Getting strictly comparable material would be very expensive. But a more limited survey, for example, of 150 parliamentarians, would be viable. **Schmitter** noted that this limited survey approach is what the Southern Europe team has opted for, interviewing 50 Congress people from each country. **O'Donnell** said that it might be possible to pay survey firms to do a few questions for us. **Stepan** said that the survey firms may even do this for free, provided the questions be of sufficient interest. **O'Donnell** noted that the project is committed to feeding its information and principal conclusions to democratic actors in the five countries.

The discussion of themes closed with some decisions about what to focus on for the next meeting, which was scheduled for and subsequently held in Buenos Aires, March 21-23, 1986. The critical question was how much to push for a common agenda among the five national teams, and how much autonomy to leave them.

After some debate, it was decided to focus on working towards a common agenda by writing informes that examined the following questions:

- the military
- parties
- parliament
- principal events in relation to the bourgeoisie and unions
- changes in discourse about democracy

- crucial moments such as elections, major changes in public policies, military crises
- policies that address the economic crisis
- levels of support for the government and for democracy, according to available surveys.

NOTES

- 1 Guillermo O'Donnell discusses some of these methodological, theoretical and conceptual problems in his initial project proposal, "The Dilemmas and Opportunities of the Consolidation of Democracy in Latin America."
- 2 Bracketed numbers on O'Donnell's viewpoints refer to his paper for the conference, "Notes for the Study of Democratic Consolidation in Contemporary Latin America."
- 3 Bracketed numbers on Schmitter's viewpoints refer to his paper "The Consolidation of Political Democracy in Southern Europe (and Latin America)."
- 4 The reference is to Przeworski's paper, " Democracy as a Contingent Outcome of Conflicts."
- 5 The reference is to Guillermo O'Donnell and Philippe Schmitter, Political Life after Authoritarian Rule, in O'Donnell, Schmitter, and Laurence Whitehead, eds. (Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins University Press, forthcoming).
- 6 David Collier, ed., The New Authoritarianism (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1979).
- 7 The reference is to a term coined by Albert Hirschman in his paper for the gathering. See his "Dilemmas of Democratic Consolidation in Latin America."
- 8 Dankwart Rustow, "Transitions to Democracy," Comparative Politics 2 (April 1970), pp. 337-363, emphasized that democracy can emerge as a compromise for various actors; therefore it does not require deeply ingrained democratic values, at least initially. Hirschman's The Strategy of Economic Development (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1958) argued that economic development need not require entrepreneurial attitudes; such attitudes can be developed during the process of development, rather than constituting a necessary precondition of development.
- 9 Przeworski wrote a paper entitled "Suggestions for an Empirical Agenda" for the meeting. He stated that his own view "is radically anti-culturalist" (p. 3).

