



NEW SOCIAL MOVEMENTS, POLITICAL CULTURE,  
AND DEMOCRACY: BRAZIL AND ARGENTINA.

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### Abstract

This paper discusses the role of "new" social movements in the erosion of the authoritarian regimes and the transitions to democracy in Brazil and Argentina. We analyze both the contributions and limits of these social movements in helping to promote a more democratic order. The paper considers five movements: ecclesial base communities, neighborhood associations, and the feminist movement in Brazil; human rights organizations in Argentina; and ecological associations in both countries.

### Resumen

Este trabajo trata del papel de algunos movimientos sociales "nuevos" en la erosión de los regímenes autoritarios y en las transiciones a la democracia en Brasil y Argentina. Analizamos tanto las contribuciones como también los límites de estos movimientos en la construcción de un orden más democrático. El trabajo considera cinco movimientos: comunidades eclesiales de base, asociaciones de barrios y el movimiento feminista en el Brasil; organizaciones de derechos humanos en la Argentina; y asociaciones ecologistas en los dos países.



New Social Movements, Political Culture, and  
Democracy: Brazil and Argentina.

One of the most important phenomena in contemporary South America has been the tendency towards more democratic forms of rule in recent years. After protracted periods of authoritarian rule, Brazil, Argentina, Uruguay and Bolivia appear to be heading in a more democratic direction. This process has awakened political hopes and attracted intellectual reflection, especially regarding Brazil and Argentina, the largest and most influential nations of South America. Both countries are in different moments, with different timings, in transitions which could lead to the establishment of stable democratic regimes.

This paper discusses a number of new social movements which emerged during the military regimes and have been significant actors in the struggle for democracy. We focus on five "new movements": ecclesial base communities, neighborhood associations, and the feminist movement in Brazil; human rights groups in Argentina; and ecological associations in both countries. These social movements contributed to the erosion of military rule, and they may also play a role as bearers of a more democratic political culture. Our principal argument is that the new social movements are an important and generally underexamined actor in the transition to democracy. They question the semi-democratic political culture of Brazil and Argentina and bring new values, perspectives, methods, and approaches to the political arena. In countries which have an

authoritarian political tradition, these movements could be a democratizing force. Yet, while the movements have grown quickly in recent years, we also argue that they face many obstacles and problems.

### 1. Defining Some Basic Concepts

By political culture, we mean the political values which are the basis of political discourse or ideologies and of political practices. Political values are basic orientations which determine the way reality is comprehended. They are embodied in political discourse and the style of doing politics.

This definition assumes that actors are not always conscious of their political values. In this sense, the notion of political values cannot be equated with discourse or ideology, even though discourse and ideology express elements of values. Discourse reflects an actor's conscious or instrumental attitude towards politics and is therefore a key element in understanding aspects of values. Nevertheless, actors do not have full consciousness of the factors which form their world view and orient their action, and in this sense their discourse does not perfectly reflect that world view. In addition, they may create a discourse for instrumental purposes, which would therefore not even reflect their values as self-perceived.

Our understanding of political culture differs from that which was employed by modernization theory.<sup>2</sup> We place the notion of political culture in a more historical perspective, underscoring the potential for development or erosion of

democratic values at a particular conjuncture. Thus, the development of a democratic political culture is not seen as a unilinear process, nor is the presence of an authoritarian political culture seen as inhering in Latin traditions.<sup>3</sup> Furthermore, in contrast to the early 1960s discussions on political culture, we link the concept to socio-economic life. Political cultures represent configurations of values which are formed historically, not value choices for autonomous individual actors, as suggested by most modernization theorists. Modernization theory failed to take behavior into account or to consider the possible gap between verbalized citizen attitudes and behavior. Finally, it failed to recognize the extent to which new behavior patterns may create new values. Thus, whereas modernization theory assumed that political values determined political behavior, we see a mutual interaction between the two factors.

The emphasis on political culture breaks with the Marxist tradition since Marxism reduces political values and culture to questions of class interests, which are seen as determining political interactions. By contrast, we believe that values are a crucial part of the political interactions in a society. Values are related to class, but cannot be reduced to class; they are related to economic patterns, but have autonomy with respect to economics. Political culture, then, is not the same as ideology as conceived by Marxism.

We differentiate political cultures along two main parameters: democratic or authoritarian political values and elitist or egalitarian social values. The work differentiates five main political cultures: right authoritarians, left authoritarians, semi-democrats, liberal democrats, and radical democrats. This conceptualization distinguishes principally between democratic and authoritarian values and only secondarily along the classical left/right division. This differentiation of political cultures is not a general theory, but rather a set of ideal types which are useful for conceptualizing the problem.

The right authoritarians combine political authoritarianism and social elitism. They do not believe in political democracy, and they see force as a legitimate and necessary political instrument. Although some right authoritarians prefer non-interventionist social and economic policies, they are statist in the political realm; they limit the scope and/or autonomy of civil society in relation to the state. Right authoritarians perceive some political actors as delegitimate. Whereas liberal and radical democrats accept a level of uncertainty as part of the democratic struggle, none of the authoritarians do.

Left authoritarianism combines social egalitarianism and political authoritarianism. It is usually linked to Marxist-Leninist thought, the vanguard party, the ideology of the party-state, and the dictatorship of the proletariat. While Marxism-Leninism is the most important example of left authoritarianism, other examples exist, including Islamic Revolutionaries and some



Black African revolutionary movements.

Semi-democratic political actors have an instrumental attitude towards democracy. They do not reject democracy (like left and right authoritarians) nor do they pursue it as vigorously as liberal and radical democrats. Depending on the circumstances, they could favor representative democracy, restricted democracy, or authoritarianism. In terms of social values, semi-democrats encompass a wide ideological spectrum, of which the semi-democratic left, the populists, and conservatives are the most significant.

Liberal democrats are committed to representative democracy in a non-instrumental way. They embrace a wide ideological spectrum, from relatively conservative to social democratic positions. The issue of social equality is secondary to institutional values, even though progressive democrats are concerned with overcoming some inequalities. They perceive the political struggle principally as a series of negotiations among elites. In contrast to radical democrats, liberal democrats believe in expertise and technocracy. They are pluralistic yet believe that the masses necessarily have a limited role in politics. Like radical democrats but in contrast to the other three blocks, liberal democrats believe in the value of diversity and have more open mentalities.

Radical democrats combine a belief in political democracy with a concern about social egalitarianism. Radical democrats agree with liberal democrats about the importance

of institutional mechanisms and basic civil liberties. However, in contrast to liberal democrats, they insist on the transformation of institutions so that the society can become more fully democratic. Radicals place a high value on participation and on public spaces of normative communication. They are critical of technocratic approaches to modern life, including technocratic, elitist styles of doing politics. They stress socio-economic equality more than liberal democrats; for some liberal democrats, out of the Toqueville tradition, high levels of equality are seen as eroding freedom.

We are exclusively concerned with a number of social movements which have a relatively new value pattern. "New" social movements are inclined towards affective concerns, expressive relations, group orientation, and horizontal organization. Old social movements are inclined towards material concerns, instrumental relations, orientation towards the state, and vertical organization. The distinction between new and old movements is an ideal type; all social movements with a vision of social change combine some elements of the values of the "new" and "old" movements. While there is a tendency towards coherence in the clusters of values, any given movement could combine some values characteristic of new movements with others characteristic of old ones. In addition, a particular movement can change its values over time towards becoming closer to the opposite ideal type. Finally, the term "new" is relative; the values of the movements are not absolutely novel, and some of the movements

have precursors. What is new is that values which were relatively weak or absent in the past are now embodied in movements which were also weak or nonexistent. With the exception of the neighborhood associations, which have more elements of old movements, the movements we study approximate the ideal type of new movements.

The new social movements do not fall within the traditional interest group pattern of politics. Most conventional interest groups focus on negotiable demands, usually material in nature, which they attempt to win from the state. By contrast, the new social movements focus to a large extent on social relationships, sometimes to the point of being relatively apolitical. To the extent they deal with the state, the demands are frequently symbolic and moral in nature and non-negotiable. One of the paradoxes of these new movements is that part of their political impact derives from this new, "apolitical" way of doing politics. But this very aspect of their political impact is also linked to a significant limitation and internal contradiction, for the "apolitical" means of doing politics may curtail their ability to transform political regimes. In this case, even though they represent something new in terms of political culture, they may ultimately be marginalized as small alternative cultural movements with limited capacity to transform the whole society. This relationship between the "apolitical" and political character of the movements, between the impact and limits of the movements, forms one of the major questions of this

article.

While the basis of classification of new and old movements depends on values, there is some rough fit with historical origin. The four movements we discuss as being characteristic of "new" social movements have emerged in the last two decades. However, it should be noted that other movements which have emerged during this time do not embody these values. The neighborhood associations represent a case of some transformation of values, from the constellation associated with old movements towards the constellation associated with new ones. The most important defining characteristic of liberal democratic regimes is the existence of free competitive elections without major proscriptions, in which there is universal adult suffrage. Democratic regimes afford freedom of political association, freedom of the press and speech, and individual guarantees. They have a division of powers, with autonomy of the executive, judiciary, and legislative branches. Stable democracy does not require all citizens to have democratic values, but most major political actors must share such values.

While this definition suffices to characterize a liberal democracy, democracy as a political regime can always be expanded, both in competitiveness and in participation. According to different levels of competition and participation, we can differentiate between restricted, liberal, and radical democracy. Restricted democracy would limit the forms and/or levels of participation and competition while nevertheless observing some

important aspects of democratic rule. Radical democracy involves an expansion of the competitiveness or the participatory elements of liberal democracy. Radical democratic regimes would respect the institutions of liberal democracy but combine them with elements of direct participation, such as referendum by popular initiative. Although no regimes in the world are radical democracies, some liberal democratic regimes, most notably the Scandinavian ones, have components of radical democracy. All of the regimes with more radical democratic components involved an expansion of participation and competition from liberal democracy, but a revolution could also conceivably create a regime with strong radical democratic elements.

The distinctions between restricted democracy, liberal democracy, and radical democracy are important in analyzing the relationship between the current political transitions and the new social movements in Brazil and Argentina. Both countries have had difficulty in moving from authoritarian or restricted democratic to stable liberal democratic regimes; contemporary political struggle revolves around the attempt to do precisely that. Although a radical democracy seems unattainable, it is the objective of the new social movements.

Our analysis of the role of new social movements in the transition to democracy draws upon the European discussion of social movements, the Latin American discussion of authoritarianism and democracy, and the Latin American discussion of social movements, but in all cases we diverge somewhat from the

predominant focus. While the Latin American discussion about democracy has focused on the bipartite distinction between authoritarians and democrats, the European discussion about new social movements has focused on a different bipartite distinction, between frozen (or limited or conventional) liberal democracy, and radical (or participatory) democracy.<sup>4</sup> The European discussion has taken as its starting point and object of criticism a liberal democracy which is precisely one of the major objectives of the South American movements. Clearly in discussing the South American movements, the resilience and strength of authoritarian elements remains a major factor. Nevertheless, even allowing for the sharp differences between Europe and South America, the European emphasis on the potential significance of the new social movements in producing a new political culture raises interesting questions about the potential of the South American movements.

We also draw somewhat upon the Latin American discussion of social movements, but again with some divergences. Most of the Latin American discussion has fallen into two main tendencies. On the one hand, a number of noncritical studies have exaggerated new social movements' capacity to create a new society. Without ignoring the innovative elements of these social movements,<sup>5</sup> it is important to be aware of their limitations. Many works have failed to analyze the political efficacy of the movements and other considerations in the political struggle. It is easy to imagine a scenario in which democratically oriented social movements are

expanding, but in which the political system as a whole is moving in a more authoritarian direction. Ultimately, changes in political regime affect social movements more strongly (by repressing them, for example), than social movements affect the state. On the other hand, some critical studies have emerged which emphasize the movements' limits, but which understate the extent to which they are important elements in the transition to democracy or can help create a more democratic political culture. These more critical studies have made interesting contributions, but in neglecting political values and political culture and in focusing exclusively on empirical questions, they have understated the potential of the social movements.<sup>6</sup>

Finally, we also draw upon the current discussions about transition to democracy in Latin America--and hope to add to this discussion. Most of the discussion about the transition has focused on political blocks and alliances; it is equally important to think about political values, for although democracy may be possible for a short term in an authoritarian political culture, the consolidation of a stable democratic regime probably requires a transformation of political values. Furthermore, the discussions about the transition to democracy have focused on four blocks (right authoritarians, left authoritarians, semi-democrats and liberal democrats) to the exclusion of the radical democrats. The discussion has thereby excluded analysis of the new social movements or has subsumed the radicals either in the liberal or the left authoritarian

categories. A minimalist conception of the transition, focusing on institutional questions and the strengthening of the liberal democrats, has prevailed. This minimalist perspective may safeguard democracy, but it also tends to overlook important questions posed by radical democrats related to the normative content of the kind of democracy which is emerging. Radical democrats are committed to working for forms of democracy which differ markedly from those of liberal democrats: more participatory, less statist, and more concerned with the popular classes. To the extent that radical democrats affect the transition, new questions will emerge, new answers will be given to some problems, and a new political culture may develop.

## 2. The Semi-Democratic Political Culture in Argentina and Brazil

Democracy is a relatively uncommon form of political regime in the world, and both Argentina and Brazil have manifested the difficulty in creating stable, democratic regimes. Both countries have experienced only occasional and unstable periods of democratic rule in the twentieth century. Since 1930, Brazil has enjoyed only 18 years of democratic rule, 1946 to 1964. Argentina has had an even higher propensity towards authoritarian regimes. No government which was democratically elected in open elections finished its mandate, except that of Juan Perón (1946-1952), who became one of the few examples of an authoritarian ruler who was elected in competitive democratic elections.

One of the consequences and causes of the absence of democratic political regimes has been the formation of a



semi-democratic political culture. In both societies, important sectors of the population have manifested an indifference to institutional pluralism and have sought short term benefits (material or political) even at the expense of subverting a democratic order. Authoritarianism has not only been a characteristic of political life, but has also marked many elements of social relationships.

While both countries have some similarity in their difficulty in establishing democratic political regimes and in the authoritarian political culture, there are marked differences in the way the political culture is authoritarian. Brazilian authoritarianism has been characterized by a high degree of elitism and considerable consensus. The affirmation of social difference and hierarchy has led to a marginalization of the popular sectors from most major institutions--political, religious, social, economic. The dominant ideology legitimates and even demands this popular marginalization and subordination,<sup>8</sup> as well as sharp inequalities in the socio-economic plane. The elitist, authoritarian, and hierarchical character of social life has cut across multiple forms of relations. Relations outside the home have been so elitist and authoritarian that a leading Brazilian anthropologist has argued that the expression "Você sabe com quem está falando?" (Do you know whom you are speaking to?), widely used to establish social differentiation<sup>9</sup> and hierarchy, captures the essence of Brazilian social life.

Argentina's history of social and political authoritarianism differs in significant regards. By 1930, Argentina had one of the highest standards of living in the world, a lengthy tradition of constitutionalism, and a significant degree of social egalitarianism. In terms of political presence of the popular sectors--especially the working class--Argentina is the opposite of Brazil. There is a much stronger history of populist mobilization of the masses as part of intra-elite struggles and also a stronger history of autonomous popular mobilization and organization. Where the poor Brazilian accepts the social differentiation implied by "Você sabe com quem está falando?" the Argentine is known for insolent rejections of similar attempts at creating social hierarchy: "A mí que mierda me importa." (What the hell do I care who you are).<sup>10</sup> Because of the dominant ideology established through the educational system and the legal framework, Argentina formed a unified conception of citizenship, more similar to the North American and European pattern of citizenship than to the Brazilian.<sup>11</sup>

Corresponding to these differences in social relations and culture are equally marked differences in political patterns in the two countries. The Brazilian political system has always been elitist, and the elites have manifested an exceptional capacity to expand the system when necessary, while always maintaining its basically closed nature. Elites established the basic rules of the game, limited attempts to change the society, and coopted new sectors as part of the system. The only moment

when this pattern seemed threatened was 1963-1964, when the elites and military responded with a coup. This well established elitist pattern has allowed considerable political stability.

In Argentina, the political struggle has been less elitist than in Brazil. Since 1930, the political system has been extremely unstable and has been characterized by a high level of factionalism, that is, the tendency to favor short term self-interest at the expense of long term societal concerns, including institutional questions like democracy. Both the intermittent attempts to create a more elitist system (1930-1943, 1966-1973, 1976-1983) and other endeavours to more fully include and incorporate the masses (1943-1955, 1963-1966, 1973-1976) have failed. The traditional sectors have destabilized the political system in their attempts to exclude, while those who have favored a more open political order have also failed, partially because of sharp divisions (Peronists vs. Radicals) about how to establish rules for a democratic system.

One of the peculiarities of Argentine politics is the high level of polarization which occurred during the Perón presidency (1946-1955), and which continued to mark the political system during subsequent decades. This polarization exists in a society in which all sectors have accepted the capitalist order, and in which until the late 1960s there were no major demands for radical socio-economic change. Different parties, social classes, and interest groups formed alliances with sectors of the military and supported coups as a way of defending their

immediate interests. The militarization of politics produced much higher levels of political violence than in Brazil, especially from the early 1970s until 1983.<sup>12</sup>

Despite marked differences, the military regimes in both countries (Brazil, 1964-present; Argentina, 1976-1983) attempted to reshape the political culture in a more authoritarian direction. The Brazilian regime consciously encouraged political demobilization and passivity, and was quite successful in attaining this objective over a sustained period of time. It reinforced authority patterns in a wide range of social relations, including the education system. The repression against popular movements had the effect of encouraging fear of contesting the owner's authority. The military government also attempted to partially change political identities. This effort was especially clear--and successful--in the attempt to restructure the party system. The party system which emerged after 1980 had little resemblance to that which existed prior to 1964.<sup>13</sup>

The Argentine regime was far more radical in its attempts to change the previous political culture. The level of terror helped reinforce extremely hierarchical authority relations, from the elementary school system to the universities, from the work place to the jails. The most extreme example of the hierarchical authority relations occurred in the concentration camps; no relationship could be more unequal than that between torturer and prisoner. However extreme this example

may be, the social psychology of imposing absolute obedience to authority was pervasive. All forms of "non-conforming" behavior were subject to punishment: homosexuality, long hair for males, beards and mustaches, pants for women, unmarried men and women living together. The regime wanted to implant a more nationalistic, militaristic political culture, based on values of machoism, female subordination, heroism, and patriotism. It attempted to destroy the most important previous political identities, especially aiming at the unions and the political parties. Like the Brazilian regime, but in more extreme and self-conscious ways, it attempted to destroy knowledge and concern about democracy.

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One of the dilemmas the transition to democracy poses is how to transform the semi-democratic political culture. While the military regimes collapsed (Argentina) or initiated a gradual transfer of power (Brazil), the values which made possible support for authoritarian rule have not disappeared overnight. Indeed, one could easily surmise that the advent of long term authoritarian rule could reinforce authoritarian aspects of political culture.

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At the same time, a central theme throughout this paper is that the new social movements may help challenge and counteract the authoritarian tendencies in political values and behavior. Because the nature and cause of authoritarianism differs between Brazil and Argentina, the challenges to the new social movements in creating a democratic order are somewhat different.

In Brazil, the primary challenge in creating a more democratic order is eroding the social elitism, and in Argentina it is overcoming the social-political factionalism. Significantly, the movements which have assumed the greatest importance in the respective countries, the human rights organizations in Argentina and the ecclesial base communities in Brazil, have addressed exactly those issues.

### 3. Five New Social Movements

This section discusses five new social movements in Brazil and Argentina. These movements differ significantly from one another, and there are also marked differences within each movement.

The ecclesial base communities of the Catholic Church, found in many Latin American countries but strongest in Brazil, first emerged in the early 1960s in response to the Church's attempt to create more effective linkages to the popular classes. During the early 1960s, particularly in rural areas, progressive priests who could not say Mass every Sunday began to encourage their parishioners to meet for a religious service in community groups of approximately twenty people. These religious services came to focus on Bible reading and reflections on local social reality. The II General Assembly of the Latin American Bishops' Conference, held in Medellín, Colombia, in 1968, affirmed that the base communities were one of the most promising innovations in the Latin American Church. They became known for pedagogical approaches which emphasized participation, egalitarian ideals, and community. During the most repressive

period of the Brazilian military regime (1968-1974), they were virtually the only popular organizations which developed critical political perspectives. Of the movements under consideration here, the base communities are numerically the most widespread; by the early 1980s, some people estimated that there were 80,000 communities involving 2 million people. The base communities have helped transform Brazilian Catholicism, which is by far the society's predominant religion. The communities are very heterogeneous according to region of the country, local reality, and local Church. Even though the great majority of participants have relatively rudimentary political consciousnesses, the base communities have played a major role in Brazilian politics. They have also become the center of the controversy regarding the political role of the Latin American Church.

Of the Brazilian movements, the base communities had the most national impact and received the most international attention. In a society which has traditionally marginalized the popular sectors, the base communities represent a new space in terms of democratic, participatory practices. They were initially part of the Church's efforts at creating community and at encouraging lay responsibility. Only when the political repression became more significant (1968-1974), closing other channels of popular mobilization, did the base communities start to assume political significance.

Neighborhood associations are nothing new in Brazilian history; some associations date back to the 1940s. Neverthe-

less, since around 1974 some of these associations have changed enough that they share some values of the new social movements. In general terms, the contemporary neighborhood associations maintain a higher degree of autonomy vis-à-vis the state and traditional clientelistic relations, and they emphasize community and human relations more than in the past. There are significant differences between middle and popular class neighborhood associations. The latter frequently sprang from the ecclesial base communities and have been oriented towards basic urban services such as sewers, electricity, transportation, health posts, and schools. The more innovative middle class associations have been interested in breaking down traditional communication barriers, encouraging new patterns of communication, and developing an ecological consciousness.

The neighborhood associations are the furthest from the ideal type of a new social movement. Again, however, there is a great deal of internal heterogeneity. A limited number of middle class associations have been oriented towards developing a sense of neighborhood and towards the affective dimensions of life, with little concern about obtaining material goods from the state. Associations whose primary purpose is to extract resources from the state are close to the paradigmatic old movements.

The women's movement in Brazil has a long history, but it received a new specifically feminist infusion during the mid 1970s. The first leaders of the movement were university



educated women who in many cases had lived abroad and brought a foreign influence to the movement. After an initial period of relatively few and small collectives, concentrated in Rio de Janeiro and São Paulo, the movement began to expand and to produce some journals with restricted circulation yet significant influence. During the late 1970s, the movement grew to all of the major cities. Despite the fact that the movement has had trouble reaching broad sectors of the population, it helped create more democratic relations within the left and within most intellectual circles. <sup>18</sup> Where the ecclesial base communities and neighborhood associations have derived part of their influence through the number of participants, the feminist movement has influenced Brazilian social and political life through elite means such as political parties, the mass media, and cultural associations. Like the other movements, the feminist movement is internally heterogeneous, with some elements closer to our liberal democratic and others to our radical democratic ideal type.

Since the late 1970s, one of the major concerns of the feminist movement has been to strengthen linkages with the popular classes. Middle class feminists recognized that in a society of great poverty, their concerns could not be translated directly into the popular class world. At the same time, they believed that their questioning of male dominance had relevance for popular class women. The attempt to develop linkages with the popular sectors had many difficulties. There were profound cultural barriers to communication, and in some cases popular

women rejected feminist ideas, especially those linked to the family. Despite these tensions, however, there has been some communication between feminists and popular class women. Women from the middle class and popular classes have worked together at congresses, and through feminist television shows the intellectual women were able to penetrate the popular class world.

Ecological associations have had some impact in both countries despite the relatively small number of participants. In Brazil, the movement began in the early 1970s with the emergence of middle class rural communities committed to simple, healthy life styles. A majority of the participants were young people frustrated with the low quality of life in urban areas and with the political repression of means of expression. The associations wanted to create new linkages to nature, and while some were relatively traditional in terms of human relations, others broke from the dominant Brazilian norm. Towards the end of the '70s, in urban areas the ecological movement grew, and by the early 1980s some national level associations and journals emerged. The movement's major concerns have been to question the devastation of the natural environment produced by the industrialization process and to introduce discussion of post-materialistic values. The movement has a limited number of people and thus far has had limited impact on public policy. In a society where basic survival issues remain central for major parts of the population, ecological questions have a tendency to

remain subordinate. Nevertheless, the movement has put new questions on the agenda, and given the international character of the ecological movement and the severe pollution problems in Brazil, its chances for growth are good.

In Argentina, the ecological associations emerged during the military regime. The movement focused on questions of health and life style and was "apolitical" because of the severe repression. The collapse of the authoritarian regime permitted the rapid politicization and growth of the movement.

The ecological movement in both countries must be differentiated from the environmental movement, which has focused on more specific concerns related to the preservation or protection of the environment, such as pollution, protection of forests, or land conservation. The ecological movement shares these concerns about the natural environment, but also proposes and practices alternative forms of social organization. The ecology movement has generally raised questions about forms of human interaction, relationship to one's work, and other questions about life style.

Although the ecology movement has been strongly influenced by the international ecology movement, there are also some differences. The movement in Brazil and Argentina faces the dilemmas produced by attempting to deal with ecological concerns in societies which still have significant levels of poverty. This raises questions about the linkages to the popular classes and their need to increase rather than diminish consumption

levels.

The human rights organizations have been the most significant of Argentina's new social movements. Like the feminist and ecological movements, the Argentine organizations for the defense of human rights involved a relatively small number of middle class individuals. They appeared in direct response to the state terrorism of the post-'76 military regime, specifically the widespread practice of illegal kidnappings and long term disappearances of individuals, who were usually held in concentration camps, tortured, and killed. The best known movement was the Mothers of the Plaza de Mayo, a movement of mothers of disappeared victims. The mothers marched in front of the government house every Thursday to protest the terrorism. These movements were isolated for several years, and the discussion of human rights did not become widespread until after the Malvinas/Falklands debacle. In fact, for several years they had a stronger impact internationally than in Argentina. With the collapse of the military regime, these organizations encouraged a national political debate about state terrorism, human rights, and the disappeared victims.

The human rights movement was both a direct product of the nature of the regime and also the most important attempt to challenge and limit the regime at its core--the terror. The novelty of the movement was the absolute, non-negotiable character of its major demand--protection for human rights, especially the right to live. This demand entered into contra-

diction with a state predicated upon determining who was allowed to live. Without international support for the human rights organizations, the Argentine state could have--and probably would have--destroyed the human rights organizations. Thus the limits to the state terror were set in part by the international community of which the regime itself aspired to become a more central part. The military regime was successful at destroying most of its targets, including the "subversives" (in the regime's all encompassing definition) and the political parties, but in doing so it created a new kind of challenge and enemy. The human rights organizations became the non-negotiable memory and conscience of a claim to the right to life which the state attempted to destroy. Whereas the other social movements did not attempt to frontally challenge the authoritarian regimes, the *raison d'être* of the human rights organizations was to oppose the logic of state terror. The other social movements did not constitute an immediate, direct threat to the regime, even though in Argentina the definition of "subversive" was so wide as to include any social movement. Consequently, the human rights movement immediately entered the macro-societal debate about the nature of the political regime. Thus a movement with relatively few participants had a significant international impact and became the major challenge to a regime with an immense capacity to control civil society.

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The differences between the base communities, the most significant new social movement in Brazil, and the human rights

movement, the most important in Argentina, are noteworthy. Whereas the human rights organizations involved limited numbers of mostly well educated people, the base communities are a mass movement drawn from the popular classes. The human rights movements contested the state terror, while the base communities fundamentally challenged the elitism and authoritarianism of Brazilian social relations and only secondarily challenged the authoritarian political regime. In contrast to the Argentine human rights organizations, the base communities only indirectly and after a period of time began to challenge the authoritarian regime. Thus, the reasons why the base communities became important differed markedly from the Argentine case; they challenged social elitism in Brazil and became a major influence in the international Catholic Church.

Although these movements have some common characteristics, there are also marked differences. It is important to differentiate the movements according to their public policy impact (significant vs. weak), their social base (popular class or middle sectors), the number of participants, and the country where they are strongest. The following table summarizes those dimensions in an admittedly schematic fashion.

<u>Movement</u>	<u>Public Policy Impact</u>	<u>Social Base</u>	<u>No. of Parti-cipants</u>	<u>Country</u>
base communities	limited	popular	mass	Brazil
neighborhood associations	limited	popular & middle	mass	Brazil
feminism	limited	middle	small	Brazil
ecology	limited	middle	small	Brazil, Argentina
human rights	marked	middle	small	Argentina

One further differentiation is essential. All of the movements have some leaders who can discuss the global nature and goals of the movements and can articulate a sophisticated vision of society and social transformation, including an awareness of the movement's importance in the contemporary Western world. By contrast, most of the grass roots participants are committed to specific, short term, or more local or immediate objectives, but lack a sophisticated political vision. Grass roots people may reject traditional politics so far that they avoid political participation. The difference between the leadership and the grass roots participants is sharpest in the ecclesial base communities, where some of the advisors are among Brazil's most sophisticated intellectuals. Most grass roots participants have relatively rudimentary visions of society, are not very aware of the movement as a whole, and do not understand mechanisms of political power at the societal level. The feminist movement is the most homogeneous of the five movements; almost all of the participants are well educated and have an awareness not only of immediate concerns, but also of the overall process of social change.

#### 4. Conditions of Emergence of the Movements

The new social movements have emerged relatively recently, since 1964 in Brazil and since 1976 in Argentina. Their emergence and development is linked to the failures of three of the domestic political cultures we discussed above--left authoritarianism, right authoritarianism, and populism--as well as to the stimulus provided by an international radical political culture. Despite the differences between the movements, four common conditions help explain their emergence and values: the adverse political consequences of the military regimes under which they emerged, the crisis of the traditional left, the questioning of the populist style of politics which preceded the military regimes, and the development of new social movements in the North, especially Western Europe and the United States. In this section we discuss the way these four factors contributed to creating the conditions for the emergence and development of the new social movements in Brazil and Argentina.

In both Brazil and Argentina, in sharp contrast to the European cases, the new social movements emerged under an authoritarian regime. Despite the marked differences between the Brazilian and Argentine regimes, in both countries the authoritarian experience was a major factor in the emergence and organization of the new social movements. Both regimes produced a rupture in political life by limiting the available channels of political expression and dissent. Under the authoritarian



regimes, traditional political institutions were suppressed or greatly limited. During the most repressive phases, both regimes severely limited popular mobilization, freedom of the press, and all forms of political opposition. In Argentina, political parties were legally suspended and in practice prohibited, and in Brazil the only two parties which were allowed to exist were both created by the regime. Because of the restrictions placed on political activity in societies which had a history of political mobilization, there was a sense of impoverishing not only political life, but also social life in general. This feeling was especially acute in Argentina because of the severe repression against any forms of unusual behavior. In combination with the impossibility of doing politics in a traditional way, which encouraged new forms of sociability, the impoverishment of social existence stimulated thinking about different dimensions of social life (community, relations between men and women, etc.) which became central concerns of the new social movements.

The new movements responded to the dual closing of political and social space by attempting to find forms of protection against the authoritarian abuses and new forms of sociability. They contained both a defensive side in the response to the authoritarian regimes, most clearly expressed in the human rights organizations in Argentina, and an attempt to find new dimensions of social life. They tried to recover some of the space "lost" because of the closing of civil society, yet they

also tried to create some new spaces. In this sense, the suppression of some traditional rights produced a redefinition and expansion of the understanding of rights. Thus, whereas in Western Europe and the United States the new social movements attempted to conquer new rights in a democratic expansion, in Brazil and Argentina they attempted to check the power of authoritarian regimes and discover new forms of sociability which would not be repressed by the state. In the advanced Western societies, the new social movements attempted to expand a basically accepted and institutionalized set of rights. In Brazil and Argentina, they have attempted to reconquer rights which traditionally existed and to fight for new rights.

A second major element which helps explain the emergence of the new social movements in both countries was the crisis of the traditional left under the military regimes. <sup>24</sup> Parts of the left in both societies had an impeccable democratic heritage, but especially under the military regimes, the Leninist left predominated, with its elitist, authoritarian, and often militaristic profile. The failures of the traditional left forced progressive sectors of the two societies to re-examine both the viability and the desirability of Leninist revolution as a path to social change. The left's dismal military defeat and failure to develop popular support led to a profound re-evaluation of methods of doing politics. Violence had not only failed to overthrow the capitalist order and generate popular support, it had also led to the destruction of the left. Along

with the re-evaluation of methods of effecting social change came a critical reconsideration of the problems of revolutionary societies. As the newly emerging radical democrats reflected on the kind of society which was possible and desirable, they became more critical of the repressive, technocratic, and elitist elements of Leninist revolution. This tendency was reinforced by the international questioning of Marxism and Communism. The Western European left became increasingly critical of Marxism, and the Eastern European efforts to resist Communist domination called attention to adverse effects of Marxist-Leninist systems. The traditional left revolutionary paradigm was rejected as unviable and undesirable, while the traditional liberal paradigm was not sufficient. The paradigm which emerged, democratic revolution, responded to the new commitment to transforming social life and the political order in non-violent ways. In Brazil and Argentina, parts of the left remained traditional or became semi-democratic leftists; others converted to liberalism or became apolitical; and many became radical democrats.

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A third factor which helps explain the emergence and orientation of the new movements was the failure of populist style politics in both countries. In both countries, though to varying extents, the new social movements have responded to a tradition of populism. Populism, as used here, refers to a heteronomous mobilization of the popular classes. This mobilization is controlled and limited by charismatic leaders who

use popular support for their own political ends. While populism rejects traditional authoritarianism and purports to respond to popular demands, it reflects and perpetuates the social elitism and the huge gaps between the popular classes and elites.

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The crisis and collapse of the populist regimes led to new perspectives on both the right and the left. On the right, more explicitly authoritarian ideologies and practices became predominant, and for much of the left, the failure of populism initially led to a growing radicalization. However, other sectors of the left--those identified with the new social movements-- responded differently to the failures of populism, developing the values of the radical democrats. Especially in Brazil, where it has resurged with remarkable resiliency, authoritarian populism is one of the major targets of the new social movements.

The fourth major factor which helps account for the emergence of the new social movements is the development of similar movements in the United States and Europe. The new social movements of Brazil and Argentina are part of a world wide phenomenon and have been influenced by movements in the Northern countries. In the United States and Europe, the student, feminist, minority, anti-nuclear, and ecology movements, have been among the most important. These new social movements in the North influenced the emergence and development of movements in the South. This influence was especially clear in the feminist and ecology movements because many activists in the South had been exiles in the North. The new social movements of Brazil and

Argentina have strong international networks, but in contrast to Marxist internationalism, these networks reject strong centralized, hierarchical organizations and emphasize coordination and sharing of experiences among equal local units. The leaders of the movements have international profiles, travel a lot, and have influenced movements in the North. The Northern movements generally have a global perspective and have been concerned with developing solidarity with the South, while the Southern leaders have been concerned with encouraging the North to become more involved in South/North questions. There has also been a reciprocal influence in thinking about the meaning of life and about new paths to social transformation. The reciprocal influence is stronger in countries like Brazil and Argentina because of their close linkages to Northern Occidental culture.

In the case of the base communities, the nature of the international linkage was especially important but differs markedly from the linkages of the other movements. The emergence of the base communities was linked to the international transformation of the Catholic Church. Without the development of new theological conceptions which emphasized the connections between faith and social justice and which encouraged greater lay participation, the CEBs would have been unthinkable. At the same time, however, it is important to note that the international character of the Catholic Church does not result in similar pastoral initiatives in all countries. In fact, the Brazilian and Argentine Churches have evolved in very different ways.

While in Brazil the Church has produced some of the most important movements working for change, in Argentina it produced one of the most significant pillars of support for the military.

Despite the fact that the social movements form an international network, there are differences between the most important movements in Brazil and Argentina and those in the United States and Europe. These differences reflect the cultural, economic, and political situations of the respective countries. In Argentina and especially Brazil, poverty and social inequality remain salient issues for large sectors of the population. Both countries are characterized by authoritarian social and political traditions which are much weaker in Western Europe and the United States.

These differences in situations have generated different kinds of movements. Especially in Europe, the new social movements consider themselves part of a "post-materialistic" culture. Post-materialism involves several dimensions, including anti-consumption values, simple life styles, ecological concerns, and new forms of human relationships. The social movements of Brazil and Argentina share similar perspectives about human relationships but differ on the issue of reducing consumption. The ecological movement has addressed the question of excessive consumption and simplified life styles as a central issue in much the same fashion as in the United States and Europe. To a lesser extent, the feminist movement and human rights organizations have also demonstrated some concern with post-materialistic values.

In the base communities and popular neighborhood associations, however, the basic issue is the opposite: how to consume enough to be able to survive. Even the leaders of these movements have not addressed the issue of post-materialist values, although they are generally critical of the consumption patterns of the advanced industrial societies. Conversely, the social movements of Brazil and Argentina have been more concerned with basic civil liberties and socio-economic equality than movements in the Northern countries. While in the Northern movements, the nuclear issue has become a major focal point, raising the question of global survival, in the South, the issue of immediate survival continues to have priority, and the debate about nuclear energy and armaments has not gone as far.

## 5. Values of the New Social Movements

In this section we discuss some of the values of the new social movements. The section focuses on values found throughout most of the movements, but it is important to note that the various movements have placed primary emphasis on different values. Some of the values are stronger in Brazil, others in Argentina; some are stronger among popular class movements and others among middle class movements. At times, there have been conflicts between different movements; for example, the base communities and the feminist movement have conflicted over the issues of abortion and divorce. Feminists are frequently critical of the traditional values most base community women share regarding the family, divorce, and abortion. Conversely, many popular class women who participate in neighborhood associations or base communities feel that feminism raises "middle class" issues relatively unimportant in their lives.

Despite the great heterogeneity between the five movements, they share some important values. Perhaps the outstanding characteristic which links all the movements is a strong emphasis on democratic, participatory practices. This emphasis cuts across different levels of social reality, from internal group processes, to local social reality, to political regime. The movements value high levels of participation in internal decision making and seek consensual (as opposed to majority) bases of decisions. They reject elitist, hierarchical modes of relationships, value solidarity, prefer personal



expression over instrumental relations, and favor cooperation over competitive relationships. In the base communities, this solidarity and cooperation is expressed through the emphasis on respecting different points of view and through community work projects. This pattern represents a difference from the prevalent norm among the popular classes since most peasant families were generally isolated, and in urban areas patterns of solidarity coexisted with significant difficulties in establishing ongoing forms of communication and organization.<sup>27</sup> In the ecological movement, the search for cooperative relationships has taken the form of communal living arrangements. The movement rejects the prevalent middle class view of time, linked to productivity, and values interpersonal relations. The feminist movement has created collectives and women's groups, similar to those in the United States and Europe, which emphasize personal sharing. All of the movements have emphasized the affective dimensions of life.

In contrast to the general pattern of authoritarian leadership, whether expressed through populism, right wing authoritarianism, or left wing vanguardism, the new social movements value equal social relationships. They attempt to develop leadership as animador (facilitator) and supercede leadership as dirigente (director). The animador stimulates autonomous popular action and mobilization. The logic of the social movement is not pre-established according to the animador's orientation. The animador respects and values the logic of the movement and

attempts to establish a relationship of mutuality and respect  
with the members of the movement. <sup>28</sup> By contrast, the dirigente  
attempts to control the nature of popular mobilization and to  
orient this mobilization towards his/her objectives. The  
dirigente believes in expertise and technocracy.

The movements' attitude towards leaders is fraught with a  
permanent and inevitable tension which can be conceptualized as  
the conflict between freedom (autonomously established rules),  
order (heteronomously established rules), and anarchy (anomie)  
which confronts all innovative social movements. Progressive  
social movements seek to reorder social relations to  
maximize freedom in the form of autonomously established rules of  
the game, but this search frequently produces a fear of breakdown  
of social norms leading to anomie. Despite the efforts to  
develop leadership as animador, charismatic leaders provide  
answers at a time when movements need some stability. In the base  
communities, for example, the attempt to give more responsibility  
to lay leaders has sometimes led to the creation of "mini-  
priests", lay leaders who are as domineering as the priests were.  
And as Max Weber emphasized, new social movements frequently  
arise because of charismatic leaders, whose authority must then  
be challenged if the movement is to create the kind of egali-  
tarian social relations they purport to seek. <sup>29</sup>

In all the social movements, the emphasis on participatory  
democratic relationships has led to valuing local reality and  
community. Small autonomous groups are a major focus of social

life. The emphasis on small groups and the local level leads to ambivalent attitudes towards big, centralized bureaucratic organizations. A significant number of people within all the movements reject large scale organizations, sometimes with a high degree of self-awareness (as in the ecological communities which made a self-conscious choice to live in rural areas), other times out of unconscious preference (as in the case of most base community participants). Other individuals, who do not go so far in their rejection of large organizations, prefer small groups but are aware of the significance of large organizations in contemporary society. Consequently, they opt to work within large organizations (like political parties) in order to transform them.

The emphasis on grass roots democracy has led to new thinking about the role of local government. In Brazil, the new social movements have inspired some attempts to encourage high levels of grass roots participation and communitarian control in local government.<sup>30</sup> Although Argentina lags behind in this process, progressive parties and groups raised the question of province and municipal autonomy in the 1983 elections.

Alongside the innovative elements in the experiences of local participatory democracy have been some important limitations. First of all is the difficulty of beginning such an experience; even at the local level, participatory democracy depends on changing the state so that it supports the innovations, and, as we have emphasized, the attitude of the new

social movements towards the state (sometimes even at the local level) is ambivalent. Second, these experiences can contain elements of traditional populism disguised in a participatory democratic discourse. In fact, the traditional left tends to dismiss local experiences of community participation as a means of diverting attention from the true issues (i.e., political power). Third, even where these experiences have demonstrated significant innovative capacity, they have a limited diffusion in an authoritarian system. Especially in Brazil, where the federal government controls so much, the experiences of participatory local government have had very limited capacity to encourage other similar experiences, notwithstanding the considerable interest they have aroused. Finally, these experiences have been somewhat fragile. In Lages, Santa Catarina, where the best known Brazilian case occurred, the group responsible for the innovations lost the 1982 municipal elections. Middle and upper class opposition, traditional forms of clientelism resurfaced within the PMDB, and the massive support the state government gave to the local PDS helped overturn the previous leaders.

Attitudes towards democracy as a political regime have ranged from skepticism or indifference to strong commitment. Some participants of the new social movements are involved exclusively in questions concerning the local community or the group itself, to the point of being "apolitical". By contrast, most leaders have been deeply concerned about the state and political regime.

They are aware of the limits of local level democracy and of the importance of democratizing the state in order to further enhance prospects for grass roots democracy. Even the most politically indifferent participants in the movements reject political authoritarianism, though they may not actively engage in efforts to construct democracy or even believe that the macro level of society is important.

In different ways and to varying extents, the movements have emphasized human rights. Under a regime where the right to life was determined by the state, the human rights associations rejected terror of both the right and the left. They were "apolitical" in the sense of understanding their defense of human rights as above politics. They considered this right to life an absolute, not subject to political bargaining, nor to be limited by state coercion, whether through torture, arbitrary searches, or imprisonment. The base communities have also emphasized the right to life, though from a different perspective, focusing principally on socio-economic needs, protection from the police brutality which has been so common in Brazil, and the right to employment. These rights seem closer to the Marxian emphasis on socio-economic rights, but the base communities differ from the Marxian conception in emphasizing the affective dimensions of life and in perceiving political rights as significant.

Linked to the emphasis on human rights is a rejection of militarism. The military is perceived as responsible for committing authoritarian abuses, leading an unjust society, and

perpetuating violence. In most cases, the emergence of these movements was linked to an opposition to the military regimes which ruled and attempted to militarize the respective societies. There is a sharp opposition between military values and the values of the movements.

Although in different and sometimes contradictory ways, all of the movements have questioned macho values. This questioning has gone farthest in the feminist movement, where it is the primary focal point. Most participants in the ecological movement also question traditional male/female relationships and emphasize an equal division of labor and equal opportunities between the sexes. The issue of relationships between men and women arises because of a commitment to a different life style, but in the rejection of dependency on domestic servants, the ecology movement has gone farther than the feminist movement. Although the relationship between men and women was not a focal point of the human rights organizations, the dominant presence of women produced some reflection about this question. The participants in the human rights movements did not consciously intend to question macho values, but the majority participation of women had an impact on the social psychology of the opposition to state terror. Under the ubiquitous threat of repression and death, the women became known for remarkable courage and heroism which dramatically reversed the traditional image of courage, linked to violence and macho values rather than affirmation of life and feminine presence.

The women participants in the neighborhood associations and base communities are not part of the feminist movement and question many feminist ideas. Nevertheless, these popular class women have rejected violence against women and have insisted on the right of women to leave the household to participate in the neighborhood association and the base community. The leadership role women have played in neighborhood associations and base communities has affirmed their potential in a public arena which was traditionally an exclusively male domain.

While not all of the participants would be able to articulate this fact, the movements have embodied values which question the basic meaning of life. They have emphasized community, sociability, friendship, and the affective dimensions of life. The social movements have put affective dimensions of life into the discussion about human needs. In doing so they have challenged both the conventional liberal and Marxian notions of human needs. The liberal notion focuses principally on the need for freedom and assumes that through market mechanisms and personal initiative, most individuals resolve the basic questions of their lives. The Marxian notion focuses on socio-economic needs, arguing that the foremost needs in life are material, and that other questions are secondary. The social movements have not rejected either of these conceptions; rather, they have incorporated them and attempted to go beyond them by including the affective dimensions of life.

The new social movements also raise important questions

about the nature of a good social order. Here again the contrast with conventional liberalism and Marxism is illuminating.

Liberalism considers the question of the meaning of life an individual matter; the important thing is to ensure that the state does not impinge on individual consciousness. For this reason, a democratic political order which ensures individual freedoms is essential. Within this order, the individual would determine his/her objectives and pursue them. Marxist theory subordinates the question of the meaning of life to the emphasis on basic socio-economic needs. Marxist theory generally assumes that a revolution which restructures the socio-economic order will resolve the basic questions about the meaning of life. The new social movements are part of a tradition which questions that any political order, whether liberal democracy or socialism, resolves basic affective needs.

The more sophisticated leaders of the movements have articulated a vision of radical social transformation which rejects both capitalism and communism. They criticize capitalism because of its failure to resolve basic material needs, its propensity to generate great social inequalities in the Third World, and its tendency to promote an individualistic ethos. Because of their emphasis on individual freedoms and liberties, they also reject communism as a statist, totalitarian system. The leaders are committed to pluralism, and while they do not prescribe any particular forms of socio-economic organization, they frequently favor small property and generally promote



cooperatives and participatory forms of management and control. They also criticize the Leninist emphasis on violence as a means of effecting social transformation. At a metaphysical level, the movement leaders believe that non-violence does not imply a rejection of political activism, and many have been leaders in active non-violent movements. In societies where politics was conventionally channeled through legality or through violence, some leaders introduced civil disobedience as a means of expressing dissent.

The theoreticians of the new social movements are critical of imperialism. On this score, there is a continuity with the traditional left, but within the traditional left, anti-imperialism was associated with statism and nationalism, ideologies which the leaders of the new social movements oppose. The movements shift the primary concern from economic effects of imperialism to cultural effects of dependency; they value indigenous culture. The traditional left focused principally on U.S. imperialism and secondarily on Western European imperialism, and had a relatively uncritical view of real socialism. By contrast, the intellectuals of the new social movements, while sharing a critical view of the United States, are critical of the Soviet Union and generally perceive positive aspects in Western Europe. The questioning of nationalism is linked to the fact that the movements do not perceive the nation-state as the most important unit of social life.

The rejection of capitalism and communism and the commitment to non-violent transformation place the leaders of the new social movements within a tradition of "third paths", of which the Catholic Church has historically been the most articulate advocate. However, while significant segments of the Catholic hierarchy traditionally used this discourse in a relatively conservative way, as an anti-Communist ideology, most leaders of the new social movements are committed to radical social transformation. This search for a third path to social transformation places the new social movements of Brazil and Argentina in an international network, some of whose outstanding examples include the Green Party in Western Germany, the Solidarity movement in Poland, the Italian Radical Party, and Scandinavian ecologism.

While the rejection of communism and capitalism is clear, the leaders of the new social movements are less than clear about how to promote social change and even about some characteristics of the society they envision. The new movements challenged aspects of authoritarian domination, but their capacity to construct a "new society" is far less clear. In this sense, it is important to note that it is always easier to criticize extant forms of social and political organization than to construct proposals for new forms. Without dismissing the importance of the emphasis on the local level and on grass roots participatory practices, the absence of a proposal about how to change the

state also implies a certain vagueness--and sometimes even paralysis--regarding how to effect political change.

To state that these movements offer innovations in their way of doing politics does not address the question of how influential these innovations will be in societies traditionally marked by a prevalent semi-democratic political culture. Will the new social movements effectively encourage the transformation of this semi-democratic political culture? Or will they remain isolated romantic movements which reject the prevalent order and have limited impact upon that order? The answers to these questions and the capacity of the movements to affect political culture will depend on their efficacy and on the political struggle as a whole. This then poses the question of the movements' ability to help work towards democratic regimes. We turn to this relationship between the social movements and the political order in the final two sections.

## 5. Impact and Limits of the Movements

This section discusses the impact and limits of the new social movements in creating a more democratic political culture and regime. The social movements have had a clear impact in creating more democratic social relationships in societies in which authoritarian practices have predominated. The democratizing impact on social relations is especially significant in Brazil, where the movements have helped erode the elitism which is an essential bulwark of authoritarianism. The human rights organizations in Argentina have helped increase toleration in social relations, thereby potentially contributing to the creation of a more democratic political culture. However, the relationship between democratizing social relationships and creating a more democratic political order is unclear. In this regard, the development of the feminist movement in the United States is instructive. The women's movement has grown during the past decade and has contributed to democratizing social relations, but the political order has become more conservative, with some authoritarian tendencies.

Despite the fact that many movement participants are relatively unconcerned with political parties, the movements have also influenced the parties in both countries. In Brazil, the new social movements have helped erode the legitimacy of authoritarian populist discourse. Notwithstanding the continuation of populist practices, even the government party has felt obliged to generate some discourse about more egalitarian, democratic values.

The impact of the social movements upon the parties has varied according to region and party. The movements have been strongest in the states of São Paulo and Rio Grande do Sul, where they have helped produce a well developed party system with high levels of participation. In Rio Grande do Sul, for example, where the ecology movement is strongest, ecological concerns became an issue of debate among the political parties. The movements have had the least impact in poor rural areas, especially in the Northeast.

The political party which has been most influenced by the social movements is the Workers Party, PT, which has a self-perception of embodying a new political culture closely linked to the social movements. The PT was influenced by all four Brazilian movements and has attempted to be responsive to the demands of the movements. A large number of PT leaders participated actively in new movements, and the party's platform emphasized the outstanding demands of all the movements. In São Paulo, where it is strongest, the PT has been closely linked to the base communities. A small party, it has nevertheless had a major impact on the political debate in Brazil. In a less profound way, other parties have also been influenced by the new social movements.

In Argentina, the human rights organizations raised a number of questions which became central in the party debate in 1983 and which are at the center of the attempts to create a more democratic political culture: human rights, the question of the

"disappeared" people, tolerance for political opposition, non-violence, basic democratic freedoms. Two minor parties, the Christian Democratic Party and the Intransigent Party, largely ran on banners first launched by the human rights movements, and President Alfonsín himself participated peripherally in the human rights movements. The greatest influence of the human rights organization on public life occurred when the Radical Party adopted some of the human rights banners in the electoral campaign. By the time the military regime fell in 1983, political actors at least temporarily tended to leave behind the factionalism which had characterized the past. The campaign and elections proceeded without violence, the discourse about the importance of democratic rules of the game was stronger than in the past, and the tendency to perceive electoral opponents as enemies was weakened. The campaign was marked by a self-critical awareness of the extent to which factionalism had supported military regimes and by a commitment to avoid future military takeovers. At the current political conjuncture, social movements are likely to emerge and expand, and they may have some impact in democratizing the parties and the unions, which were notorious for their authoritarian tendencies in the past.

Finally, the new social movements have strengthened other movements in civil society. In Brazil, in many regions of the country, the base communities became the springboard from which neighborhood associations emerged. Both the base communities and the neighborhood movement have had an impact on the new labor

movement in Greater São Paulo, which has been the most significant union movement in Brazil. The base communities and other grass roots Church organizations, especially the Pastoral Land Commission, have also been closely linked to peasant unions in the Amazon and in parts of Northeastern Brazil.

In Argentina, the new social movements have had some impact on other social movements, although this influence is more embryonic, given the limited character of social movements during the authoritarian regime. The Justice and Peace Service influenced a number of neighborhood associations in Greater Buenos Aires and Córdoba, most notably in Quilmes, where a strategy of civil disobedience similar to that favored by the Justice and Peace Service appeared. However, the most significant potential impact of the new social movements on extant movements may occur in the labor movement, traditionally characterized by indifference or rejection of political democracy, authoritarian internal organization, high capacity to mobilize, pervasive linkages to the Peronist Party, and an orientation towards the immediate material interests of the working class regardless of the political costs. During the 1983 presidential campaign, one of the major issues was this authoritarian character of the labor unions. Developing themes which emerged in the social movements, the opposition to the traditional labor leadership has emphasized internal democracy, rejection of violence, and democracy as a political regime.

The social movements have already had some impact in encouraging democratic values, but they also have significant limits. The participants in the social movements are a small minority of the population in societies with deeply entrenched authoritarian traditions. The extent to which any small minority can change an entire society is open to question. Social movements which attempt to democratize the society can coexist with the perpetuation of mechanisms of authoritarian domination.

The lack of political sophistication of many participants is a second limitation the movements face. The movements sometimes overlook the complexity of translating local level democratic practices to the national state, where there is a greater need for expertise and efficiency. While the values of the movement are clear, the mode of constructing a new society is far less so.

This lack of sophistication can lead to withdrawal from the political arena and to political inefficacy. The question of political efficacy becomes particularly acute during democratic periods. During the authoritarian regimes, even relatively unsophisticated movements which defend human rights can have a democratizing influence. However, as the political arena opens up, the question changes from challenging authoritarianism to constructing a democratic system. The movements need to define their place in a system which, in contrast to the authoritarian regime, allows their existence. In the process, new questions such as the role of parties and linkages to other social movements come into play. At this point, the rejection of politics



and the lack of sophistication can be very limiting.

All of the social movements have faced new dilemmas during  
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the process of political liberalization. The issue about  
political parties is likely to be divisive along two lines: how  
much distance to maintain vis-à-vis the parties, and which party  
to support. With the re-emergence of political parties, the  
social movements face the question of autonomy versus participa-  
tion in a given party. If they opt for greater autonomy, the  
question of political efficacy arises, and if they decide to  
actively participate in a party (or create a party, as frequently  
occurred in Europe), the social movement is channeled through the  
party and runs the risk of cooption. Thus arises a paradoxical  
situation: the new social movements embody democratic values, but  
they emerged in an authoritarian situation which continues to  
mark their reflection about politics. The democratization  
process they help encourage creates conditions for internal  
division and competition.

The problems generated by political liberalization can be  
exemplified through the Brazilian CEBs and the Argentine human  
rights organizations. During the most repressive period, the  
base communities were virtually the only opposition popular  
organizations in Brazil. Despite the relatively rudimentary  
political consciousness of most participants, they became an  
essential part in the opposition efforts to rearticulate civil  
society because the regime perceived any popular organization as  
a challenge. With political liberalization, this monopoly of

popular organization changed as neighborhood associations, unions, and political parties re-emerged. The base communities then faced the difficult question of what their role in the new political conjuncture should be, and specifically of their relationship to parties, unions, and neighborhood associations. While their discourse was committed to working towards a new society, the base communities remained part of an ecclesial institution committed to maintaining a distinction between religion and politics. The question, then, became how to encourage political change while preserving the specifically ecclesial identity of the communities.

The human rights organizations in Argentina face equally difficult dilemmas resulting from the democratization process. The movements now function in a far more favorable moment, with a president responsive to human rights issues. Nevertheless, since Alfonsín assumed office, they have had difficulty in developing strong linkages to the State. The future of some human rights organizations remains in question because their existence was so closely linked to issues which arose specifically because of the terrorist state. For example, because the Mothers of the Plaza de Mayo limited their movement to protesting the issue of the disappeared victims and other elements of state terror, it seems likely that at some point the movement will decline.

## 7. Conclusion: The New Social Movements and Prospects for Democracy

The preceding section discussed impact and limits of the social movements thus far. In this section we address the future prospects of the new social movements in relation to the transition to democracy. Both Brazil and Argentina have undergone processes of political change in a democratic direction--though at different paces. In this process of democratization, a struggle about the normative content of democracy is taking place. The critical question is what conceptions of democracy will prevail. The new social movements, as the major part of the block of radical democrats, could help promote the participatory components in democracy.

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During the period of authoritarian rule, there was some convergence between radical and liberal democrats in the opposition to the authoritarian regime. This convergence did not crystallize immediately, but as the liberal democrats became more disenchanted with military rule, they allied with the radical democrats in their opposition to authoritarianism. The radicals consequently enjoyed the sympathy of liberals in critical times of the struggle against authoritarianism.

With political liberalization, a redefinition of positions occurs, and the differences between the radical and liberal democrats surface more clearly. The convergence in the opposition to authoritarianism does not lead to a convergence in

the construction of democracy. In Brazil, in 1980 with the party reorganization, these differences between liberal democrats and radical democrats became more significant. There was, however, some convergence again in early 1984 because of the campaign for direct elections. In Argentina, the tempo was different: the strongest alliance between liberals and radical democrats existed between May and November 1983, and immediately after Alfonsín assumed office, marked differences emerged. At the same time, the semi-democratic sectors, which had supported authoritarianism, become proponents of limited democracy. This support of semi-democratic sectors for a democratic regime reinforces the liberals' position in the struggle to define the normative character of democracy.

At this moment of defining the nature of the emerging democratic regime, the new social movements face four broad possibilities. The first is an authoritarian involution, which is a distinct possibility in both countries. The fall of an authoritarian regime does not inherently, or even usually, imply the construction of a stable democratic regime. Indeed, both Brazil and Argentina are characterized by cyclical fluctuations between authoritarian and democratic regimes, even though these cycles are much shorter and involve more rapid alterations in  
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Argentina. Although a temporary transition to democracy could occur in either country without changes in political values, a stable democratic regime will require a transformation in political culture. In the event of an authoritarian involution,

the social movements would again be sharply repressed. Some of the movements might survive at the expense of becoming depoliticized, and the others would have extremely limited impact.

The second possibility is that the movements will be isolated, repressed, or marginalized within a restricted democracy. Despite their dynamism and political impact during the authoritarian period, these movements have involved a small minority of the societies. This minoritarian character and the sharp differences between their objectives and those of most proponents of liberal democracy place the movements in a difficult position. On the one side, the semi-democrats and some liberals, especially those who had supported the authoritarians at an earlier historical time, will attempt to marginalize the radicals. On the other side, the social movements themselves may tacitly encourage their isolation by withdrawal from the political struggle. Among movement participants, this pattern will produce frustration and disappointment, leading either to apathy or to sectarian radical opposition and isolation. This possibility implies the most conservative redefinition of the democratic regime. Indeed, many conservative advocates of liberal democracy consciously believe that the radicals need to be marginalized as a way of creating a more stable democratic system. The support by semi-democratic actors who backed the military regime and by some liberals for a conservative, elitist democracy, and the concomitant attempt to marginalize the new

social movements have been clear in Brazil.

The third possibility is cooptation. In this scenario, the new social movements would be incorporated into the democratic system, partially lose their autonomous identity, and in doing so, give up their radical criticisms of the system. In this scenario, the democratic regime would incorporate some peripheral demands of the new social movements, but the incorporation of the movements into the system would be dictated more by the latter's terms. The system would change in marginal ways, but in doing so would eliminate what some elements perceive as a radical threat. For the new social movements, this outcome will produce some combination of ambivalence and accommodation. The redefinition of the kind of democracy will depend on the extent to which the liberal democrats and the radicals make accommodations, but in any case, the changes will be limited. The social movements might become stronger, but they would have limited impact on the parties and limited linkages with other movements. Whereas the second possibility involves an elitist conservative democracy, this scenario implies the construction of a liberal democracy.

The fourth possibility is that the radicals would establish strong alliances with the liberals, but maintain a separate identity and change the identity of the liberals in a progressive direction. In this scenario, extant social movements will grow and new ones will emerge, sometimes being redefined as the political and social struggle evolves. This alternative implies

the relative marginalization of the semi-democratic actors. For both the strength and autonomous identity of the new social movements and the redefinition of democracy in a more progressive direction, this is the most favorable outcome. This possibility would mean a significant social and political space for the movements, even though they would not accomplish all of their objectives. Whereas the second scenario implies an alliance between the semi-democrats and liberals and the third a clear hegemony of the liberals, this final possibility would mean an alliance between radicals and liberals. It would imply the construction of a progressive, more participatory democracy.

This fourth outcome faces significant barriers. The authoritarian and semi-democratic forces remain strong; in Brazil, they continue to control the state. This means that the social movements need a high level of creativity to form a decisive alliance with the liberal democrats. The model of this fourth scenario would be the Scandinavian countries. But whereas the Scandinavian countries went through a lengthy process of eliminating the authoritarian elements before the appearance of the new social movements, in Argentina and Brazil these movements emerged in an authoritarian period whose remnants will not disappear overnight in the process of political liberalization.

We have stressed that the potential of the new social movements is closely linked to the potential for democracy in both countries. What outcome, then, seems most likely for the

social movements and for democracy in the two countries? In Brazil, the social movements have influenced the liberalization process, but this influence remains limited. The social movements are better established than in Argentina and have been working for democratization for many years, yet without producing dramatic results in what remains an authoritarian society and political regime. In much of the country, the traditional pattern of elitist domination and marginalization of the popular sectors continues to prevail. The elitist, authoritarian political style also remains characteristic of the national state. Despite the political liberalization, there has been a strong continuity in the military regime in terms of leaders and style of doing politics. Power is highly centralized in the federal state, especially the executive. The content and decision making of economic policy is closely controlled by the military regime; the significant changes in the political arena have thus far produced few concessions in economic policy.

Despite the fact that Brazil's most modernized states have changed their political style markedly, at the federal level the changes are slow in coming. The federal bureaucracy, where the authoritarians and semi-democratic conservatives still prevail, retains a high degree of autonomy. The radical democrats have had no ability to penetrate the federal state in what is still a highly centralized system. In much of the country, not only the radical democrats, but also the liberal democrats, remain weak. The regime as a whole has displayed a remarkable pattern of



continuing the Brazilian tradition of coopting and accommodating some sectors while preserving an elitist system.

A full democratization process in Brazil will need to challenge several pillars of the authoritarian system. First, it must change the style and content of economic policy in a period when the space for maneuvering is limited because of the external debt. Despite political liberalization, the regime has maintained a closed process of economic decision making. In fact, economic policy has less legitimacy than it ever did during the twenty years of military rule. Second, the sharp gap which characterizes the differences between federal politics and the politics of the most developed states will have to diminish. The impact of the liberalization process will remain limited if the opposition cannot challenge at the federal level. This will also entail strengthening the parliament and curtailing the executive's authority. Third, a full democratization process which would create a more significant space for the social movements would need to challenge the dominant pattern of social elitism. The huge gap between the marginalized masses and the technocratic, modernized sectors of society would have to diminish. In this regard, the liberalization process has been very limited, even in the states where the opposition controls the government. Some inroads have been made against elitism in the southern states, but the limited nature of the PMDB governments which were elected in November 1982 underscores the remarkable resiliency of the elitist system. Finally, a full

democratization process would need to find means to submit the armed forces to civilian control. Since the beginning of the liberalization process, the separation between the military institution and the government has been more clear. The armed forces control far less of the political process today than a decade ago. Nevertheless, they continue to be a very important political force, with significant autonomy. The paramount example is the high level of autonomy the National Information Service enjoys.

After the November 1982 elections, the regime began to erode in a linear way for the first time. The economic crisis, with inflation reading 230% and the foreign debt hitting 100 billion dollars by 1984, contributed to this erosion. So did the opposition's campaign for direct elections in 1984. What seemed almost impossible as late as April 1984--the election of an opposition president in the January 1985 elections--appeared highly likely only six months later.

The Brazilian transition is still an open ended process. The space for the social movements and radical democrats seems smaller than it was at the beginning of the 1980s. Nevertheless, some cracks continue to exist in the authoritarian system, and the social movements may be able to exploit these cracks. In the Center South and South, the liberal democrats remain opposed to key elements of the authoritarian system, opening up the possibility for alliances (realized in the campaign for direct elections) with the radical democrats.

Of the four scenarios we described above, the last one is almost impossible to imagine in Brazil, given the regime's high capacity to marginalize radical elements and maintain elements of authoritarian rule. The current struggle is to define the combination of elements from the second and third scenarios while attempting to avert an authoritarian involution. Although the first three scenarios are possible, the most likely appears to be a cross between the second and third. The system will probably continue to evolve in a more democratic direction, but it will probably also reproduce some of the traditional Brazilian patterns of elite accommodation.

Where the Brazilian transition is already a decade old and has some relatively well defined features which make possible some reasonable guesses about the future, the Argentine transition is much younger, has proceeded more quickly, and its course is more difficult to foresee. The role of the social movements; the relationship between authoritarians, semi-democrats, liberal democrats, and radical democrats; and the possibilities for developing a democratic political culture are all open questions. Nevertheless, it is possible to identify four general and related conditions which will play a significant role in determining the outcome of these questions.

The first is the future of the movements themselves--whether they will grow, and, if they do, in what direction. Before the Falklands/Malvinas war, the human rights organizations were

virtually the only major social movement in Argentina. After the war began the process of rebuilding the social web, but until the 1983 elections, this process was channeled largely through the electoral campaign and the party system. After the elections, particularly when a president relatively sympathetic to the demands of the human rights organizations was elected, new possibilities for social movements opened up. A society which had been severely repressed for eight years began to organize and experience new forms of associative life. Although it is too early to tell how far this process will go, the first year of the Alfonsín presidency suggested a potential for limited growth of new movements. Since the elections, the feminist movement, the ecology movement, and neighborhood associations have expanded, while the human rights organizations encountered greater difficulties than they expected. Another important development has been the emergence of elements in the labor movement committed to political democracy. Although the labor movement itself cannot be considered a new social movement, some of the features of this opposition union movement are new, specifically, the commitment to political democracy and the questioning of the unconditional linkages to the Peronist Party.

Excluding the human rights organizations, which have a clearly established presence, the social movements in Argentina still do not have a clear profile. Nevertheless, the chances for growth seem reasonably good, given the reaction to eight years of severe repression, the traditional Argentine tendency to high

levels of political involvement, and the incipient changes towards a more democratic political culture--changes which the social movements could significantly influence.

A second major question which will affect not only the social movements, but also the quality of democracy which emerges in Argentina, is the relationship between the new social movements and the political parties. Despite the fact that social movements have become an important element in the political struggle of many countries, their linkage to parties remains a critical issue in defining how far they influence the political system. For it is through the party system that social movements can directly affect the state, and even though a major objective of social movements is to define new, non-statist arenas of politics, the state (whether federal, provincial, or local) remains the most important arena of politics. If the social movements are to have a stable and significant impact, they must encourage some parties to assume the issues of the social movements. Otherwise, a possible scenario would be the proliferation of atomized social movements which have little connection with each other and little capacity to change the society.

The Argentine new social movements were fairly closely linked to the Christian Democratic Party and the Intransigent Party, and they had some influence in the Radical and Peronist Parties. Nevertheless, all of these parties are characterized by some limitations in relation to the social movements. At this

point, there is no Argentine equivalent of Brazil's Workers Party or Germany's Green Party. The Christian Democratic Party, while a strong supporter of human rights demands, has limited capacity to channel the demands of other social movements, in part because it has defined itself as a Christian Party. Although the Intransigent Party attracted the support of many parts of the new left, the leaders themselves are part of a traditional democratic left. Finally, despite the support of some elements of the new social movements for Alfonsín before the elections, since December 1983 conflicts have emerged between the new government and the human rights organizations. Thus there is a relative vacuum in the party system, with no clear options for the radical democrats, who have been only peripherally involved in the party debate. In response to this vacuum, an inchoate debate about creating a Green Party has appeared, but thus far the party system is relatively insulated from the social movements.

A third major issue which will affect both the new social movements and the transition as a whole is the extent to which the authoritarians are effectively marginalized and the semi-democrats are converted. Some positive signs exist in this direction; Alfonsín's election represented an unequivocal victory for the liberal democrats, and during his first months in power, the radical democrats (through the human rights organizations) rather than the authoritarians presented him with his greatest challenge. The military, the outstanding authoritarian actor, and the unions, the most vociferous element of the semi-

democrats, suffered a major temporary setback with Alfonsín's election. In fact, during the campaign Alfonsín made it clear that he intended to attack the authoritarian elements in the armed forces and labor unions. Furthermore, the Peronists' stunning defeat could encourage a conversion in a more democratic direction; the party's debates in the aftermath of the defeat clearly raised this question.

The marginalization of the authoritarians and semi-democrats is essential if Argentina is to develop a stable democracy. While the early moments of Alfonsín's government have produced some promising signs, nobody knows how far the democratic transformation of different social actors will go. Other traditional bastions of authoritarianism, dominant class institutions such as the Argentine Rural Society (SRA), the Argentine Industrial Union (UIA), the Stock Exchange, the Argentine Rural Confederation (CRA), and the Bank Association of Argentina remain fully intact.

Finally, the extent to which the factionalism which has been the core of Argentine authoritarianism will erode remains undetermined. The military regime fell into disgrace, but the values it embodied--authoritarianism, militarism, violence, homogenization of the society, lack of tolerance for different points of view--have not disappeared. It is impossible to determine how deeply military rule affected the formation of social and political values among the population. The new democratic regime is fragile and faces many difficult problems;

if the traditional pattern of factionalism prevails, the authoritarian tendencies which are currently present could re-emerge stronger than ever. <sup>36</sup> To some extent, this level of factionalism will depend on the marginalization of the authoritarians, as noted above. Alfonsín's skills as a political leader could play a major role in this regard. <sup>37</sup> Finally, it should be noted that the movements' future is not only affected by, but also influences, the level of factionalism. Strong social movements could help change the factionalism by legitimizing diversity and overcoming the idea of cultural homogeneity which has inspired the various authoritarian experiments.

Having outlined some of the major factors which will determine the future correlation between authoritarians, semi-democrats, liberal democrats, and radical democrats, we must emphasize again that the outcome of this struggle is open ended, even more so than in Brazil. As in Brazil, the fourth scenario, radical democracy, seems out of the question, but any of the other three alternatives are realistic possibilities.

Paradoxically, Argentina's great hope lies in the fact that its history has been so tragic. The catastrophic episodes of the recently deposed military government, in combination with the country's long term problems, may encourage different political forces to develop more democratic values. In this sense, Argentina is in a unique historic moment, for alongside the formidable obstacles to creating a democratic regime, there seems



to be a democratic temper which the country has not known in the past. It is important to note that democracy does not require that all citizens and political forces be committed to democracy; for if this were the case, no democratic regime would ever have emerged.

The second scenario, restricted democracy, would imply the continuity of the unions and Peronist party inside semi-democratic values, a limited challenge to the big bourgeoisie, and a limited transformation of the military. The social movements would be marginalized or isolated. In the third scenario, liberal democracy, the liberal penetration of the unions, Peronists, bourgeoisie, and armed forces would be significant. The social movements would be largely coopted or isolated yet they would have some impact on the political system. In this scenario, the traditional parties (Radical and Peronists) would dominate the political arena, the Peronists would become clearly committed to democratic rules of the game, and the armed forces would be under strict civilian control. This possibility would mean the development of a stable liberal democracy. Although this scenario faces difficult obstacles, it may happen for the first time in Argentine history.

## Notes

1. Questions such as the patterns of conflict and cooperation between the different movements, the way they have faced the dilemmas resulting from the liberalization process, their linkages to political parties, and even their history, need to be explored in greater depth. Over the next few years we plan to do a book-length study which would address these questions.
2. The classical 1960s' studies on political culture were Gabriel Almond and Sidney Verba, The Civic Culture: Political Attitudes and Democracy in Five Nations (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1963); and Lucian Pye and Sidney Verba, eds., Political Culture and Political Development (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1965). For especially useful critiques of this approach to political culture, see Richard R. Fagen, The Transformation of Political Culture in Cuba (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1969), especially 5-6, 149-158; Carole Pateman, "Political Culture, Political Structure and Political Change," British Journal of Political Science I (July 1971), 291-306; Lucian Pye, "Culture and Political Science: Problems in the Evaluation of Political Culture." Social Science Quarterly 53 (September 1972), 285-296, Robert Tucker, "Culture, Political Culture, and Communist Society," Political Science Quarterly 88 (June 1973), 173-190.
3. Most of the political development literature of the early 1960s supposed a linear path towards more democratic values and regimes. Among the most important contributions to questioning this assumption were Samuel Huntington, Political Order in Changing Societies (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1968); Guillermo O'Donnell, Modernization and Bureaucratic Authoritarianism (Berkeley: Institute of International Studies, 1972); Juan J. Linz, Crisis, Breakdown, and Reequilibration, Vol. I of Linz and Alfred Stepan, eds., The Breakdown of Democratic Regimes (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins, 1978).
4. An extensive literature had emerged on these social movements and their potential for invigorating democracy. Among the most important contributions are Alain Touraine, La Voix et le Regard (Paris: Seuil, 1981); A. Touraine, Z. Hegedus, F. Dubet and M. Wieviorka, La prophétie anti-nucléaire (Paris: Seuil, 1980); Alain Touraine, et, al., Solidarité: Analyse d'un mouvement social, Pologne

1980-81 (Paris: Fayard, 1982); Johan Galtung "The Blue and the Red, the Green and the Brown! A Guide to Movements and Countermovements" (Genève: Institut Universitaire d'Etude du Development, 1981); Pietro Ingrao Tradizione e Progretto (Bari: de Donato, 1982); Alberto Melucci L'invenzione del presente. Movimenti, identità, bisogni individuali (Bologna: il Mulino, 1982); Claus Offe, "New Social Movements as a Meta-Political Challenge" (Forthcoming article).

5. Many of the ideologues of the different social movements have been excessively optimistic, as were several European authors who influenced the Latin American discussion; see especially Manuel Castells, Movimientos sociales urbanos (Mexico: Siglo XXI, 1974); Manuel Castells, Cidade, Democracia e Socialismo (Rio de Janeiro: Paz e Terra, 1980); Jordi Borja Movimientos sociales urbanos (Buenos Aires: Siap, 1975); and Jean Lojckine, Le Marxisme, l'Etat et la Ouestion Urbane (Paris: Presses Universitaires de France, 1970). Among the best works which are optimistic about the movements, yet are aware of some limitations, are José Alvaro Moises, "Classes Populares e Protesto Urbano" (Ph.D. dissertation, University of São Paulo, 1978); José Alvaro Moises, "Experiência de Mobilização Popular em São Paulo," Contraponto III, No. 3 (1978), 69-86; Paul Singer, "Movimentos de Bairros" and "Movimentos Sociais em São Paulo: Traços Comuns e Perspectivas," both in Paul Singer and Vinicius Caldeira Brant, eds., São Paulo: O Povo em Movimento (Petrópolis: Vozes/CEBRAP, 1980), 83-108 and 207-230.
6. Among the most important critical studies are Luiz Antonio Machado de Silva and Adélia Zilocardi, "Notas para uma Discussão sobre Movimentos Sociais Urbanos," Cadernos do Centro de Estudos Rurais e Urbanos 13, first series (1980), 79-95; Renato Boschi, "Movimentos Sociais e a Institucionalização de uma Ordem," (IUPERJ, July 1983); Renato Boschi, ed., Movimentos Coletivos no Brasil Urbano (Rio de Janeiro: Zahar, 1983); Ruth Cardoso, "Movimentos Sociais Urbanos: Balanço Crítico," in Sebastião Velasco e Cruz, et. al., Sociedade e Política no Brasil Pós-64 (São Paulo: Brasiliense, 1983), 215-239; Vanilda Paiva, "Anotações para um Estudo sobre Populismo Católico e Educação Popular," Kellogg Institute Working Paper #4 (December 1983); Fernando Henrique Cardoso, "Regime Político e Mudança Social," Revista de Cultura e Política 3 (November 1980/January 1981).
7. A major forthcoming contribution is Guillermo O'Donnell, Philippe Schmitter, and Laurence Whitehead, eds., Transitions from Authoritarian Rule: Southern Europe and

Latin America. See also Guillermo O'Donnell, "Notas para el estudio de procesos de democratización política a partir del estado burocrático-autoritario," Estudios CEDES II, No. 5 (1979); Guillermo O'Donnell, "Tensions in the Bureaucratic-Authoritarian State and the Question of Democracy," in David Collier, ed., The New Authoritarianism in Latin America (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1979), 285-318; Fernando Henrique Cardoso, Autoritarismo e Democratização (Rio de Janeiro: Paz e Terra, 1975); Wanderley Guilherme dos Santos, Poder e Política: Crônica do Autoritarismo Brasileiro (Rio de Janeiro: Forense Universitária, 1978); Dankwart Rustow, "Transitions to Democracy: Towards a Dynamic Model," Comparative Politics II (April 1970), 337-363; Manuel Antonio Garretón, "Evolución política del régimen militar chileno y problemas de la transición a la democracia" (Forthcoming article).

8. On these general patterns in Brazilian political culture, see Raimundo Faoro, Os Donos do Poder (Porto Alegre: Globo, 1958). On the weakness of liberal institutions, see Wanderley Guilherme dos Santos, Ordem Burguesa e Liberalismo Político (São Paulo: Duas Cidades, 1978).
9. Roberto Da Matta, Carnavais, Malandros e Heróis: Para uma Sociologia do Dilema Brasileiro (Rio de Janeiro: Zahar, 1979).
10. See Guillermo O'Donnell's excellent article, "¿Y a mí, que me importa? Notas sobre sociabilidad y política en Argentina y Brasil," Kellogg Institute Working Paper #9 (January 1984).
11. Among the classic studies on the question of citizenship are T.H. Marshall, Class, Citizenship and Social Development (Garden City: Doubleday-Anchor, 1965); and Reinhard Bendix, Nation-Building and Citizenship (Garden City, N.Y.: Anchor Books, 1969). Wanderley Guilherme dos Santos wrote a fundamental book about "regulated citizenship" in Brazil. See Cidadania e Justiça: A Política Social na Ordem Brasileira (Rio de Janeiro: Campus, 1979).
12. A number of studies deal with the general characteristics of the Argentine political system in recent decades. See Guillermo O'Donnell, El estado burocrático-autoritario, 1966-1973: Triunfos, derrotas, crisis (Buenos Aires: Editorial del Belgrano, 1982); Alain Rouquie, Poder militar y sociedad política en la Argentina (Buenos Aires: Emecé, 1981); Eduardo Viola, "Autoritarismo e Democracia na Argentina Contemporânea," (Ph.D. dissertation, University of São Paulo, 1982); Marcelo

Cavarozzi, Autoritarismo e Democracia, 1955-1983 (Buenos Aires: Centro Editor, 1983); Gary Wynia, Argentina in the Postwar Era (Albuquerque: University of New Mexico Press, 1978); Guillermo O'Donnell, "Democracia en la Argentina: micro y macro," Kellogg Institute Working Paper #2 (December 1983).

13. The most important works on the military regime include Maria Helena Moreira Alves, "The Formation of the National Security State: The State and the Opposition in Military Brazil" (Ph.D. dissertation, Massachusetts Institute of Technology, 1982); Alfred Stepan, ed., Authoritarian Brazil: Origins, Politics, Policies, and Future (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1973); Peter Flynn, Brazil: A Political Analysis (Boulder: Westview Press, 1978); Cardoso, Autoritarismo e Democratização; Bolivar Lamounier, ed., Voto de Desconfiança: Eleições e Mudança Política no Brasil (Petrópolis: Vozes/CEBRAP, 1980).
14. At least 10,000 people were killed and hundreds of thousands emigrated or went into exile. The arbitrary character of repression was comparable to that of Russia (1929-38) and Germany (1933-34). Important components of the logic of total power (Hannah Arendt, The Origins of Totalitarianism) were present, especially from 1976 to 1978. On this question, see Juan Corradi, "The Mode of Destruction: Terror in Argentina," Telos 54 (Winter 1982-83), 61-76. A few works have been produced about the 1976-83 military regime in Argentina. Among the most important are Eduardo Duhalde, El Estado terrorista argentino (Buenos Aires, 1983); Guillermo O'Donnell, "Argentina: La cosecha del miedo" in Alternativas 1 (1983); Oscar Landi "Conjeturas Políticas sobre la Argentina post-Malvinas," Revista Mexicana de Sociología 44 (1982); Alain Rouquie, ed., Argentina hoy (Buenos Aires: Siglo XXI, 1982); Peter Waldmann and Ernesto Garzon Valdez, eds., El poder militar en la Argentina, 1976-1981 (Buenos Aires: Galerna, 1983).
15. While little work has been done on the impact of authoritarian rule on political culture in South America, some evidence suggests that long term authoritarian rule did impact political culture in southern Europe. For example, José Maravall argues that four decades of authoritarian rule in Spain bred political passivity and apathy. See The Transition to Democracy in Spain (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1982), 75-117. In a similar way, R.D. Putman emphasizes the long term impact of Fascism upon Italian political culture, including the level of political tolerance and trust, in The Beliefs of Politicians: Ideology, Conflict and Democracy in Britain and Italy (New

Haven: Yale University Press, 1973), 84.

16. On the base communities see Scott Mainwaring, The Catholic Church and Politics in Brazil, 1916-1985 (Stanford: Stanford University Press, forthcoming); Thomas Bruneau, "Basic Christian Communities in Latin America: Their Nature and Significance (Especially in Brazil)," in Daniel Levine, ed., Churches and Politics in Latin America (Beverly Hills: Sage Publications, 1979), 111-134; Frei Betto, O que É Comunidade Eclesial de Base (São Paulo: Brasiliense, 1981); Clodovis Boff, Comunidade Eclesial, Comunidade Política (Petrópolis: Vozes, 1979); Affonso Felipe Gregory and Maria Ghisleni, Chances e Desafios das Comunidades Eclesiais de Base (Petrópolis: Vozes, 1979); Sérgio Torres and John Eagleson, eds., The Challenge of Basic Christian Communities (Maryknoll, NY: Orbis, 1981).
17. Among the most important works on neighborhood associations are Moises, "Experiência de Mobilização Popular em São Paulo;" Singer, "Movimentos de Bairros;" Boschi, ed., Movimentos Coletivos no Brasil Urbano; R. Cardoso, "Movimentos Sociais Urbanos;" Anna Luiza Souto, "Movimentos Populares Urbanos e suas Formas de Organização Ligadas à Igreja," mimeo, October 1979.
18. The first journals, Brasil Mulher (Londrina) and Nos Mulheres (São Paulo) were published in the second half of the seventies. In 1981 Mulhério (São Paulo) started to be published bimonthly, responding to high intellectual standards. Among the most important works about feminism and politics in Brazil are Marianne Schmink, "Women in Brazilian Abertura Politics" in Signs: Journal of Women in Culture and Society (Autumn 1981); Eva Blay "A Participação das Mulheres na Redemocratização; Aspectos das Eleições de 1982" (ANPOCS Congress, São Paulo, 1983); Silvia Pimentel, "A Mulher e as Eleições de 1982" (ANPOCS Congress, 1983); Paul Singer, "O Feminino e o Feminismo," in Singer and Brant, eds., São Paulo: O Povo em Movimento, 109-142.
19. The most significant exception was the ecology movement's ability to transform the question of the vast deforestation of the Amazon into a national level political debate. On this question, see Roberto Santos, "Para Deter a Calamidade ou uma Alternativa ao Projeto Oficial sobre a Floresta Amazônica," Encontros com a Civilização Brasileira 23 (May 1980), 65-86; and Pandolfo Clara, A Floresta Amazônica Brasileira: Enfoque Econômico-Ecológico (Belém: SUDAM, 1978). For an article by one of Brazil's outstanding intellectuals and leaders of the largest opposition party on the linkages between the environmental issue and different models of development, see Fernando Henrique Cardoso, "Perspectivas de Desenvolvimento e Meio

Ambiente: O Caso do Brasil," Encontros com a Civilização Brasileira 20 (February 1980), 31-70.

20. The journal Pensamento Ecológico came out in 1979 (São Paulo) and had reached 20 numbers by the end of 1983. It represents the more innovative wing of the movement. Comunidade, which represents a more traditional part of the movement, was first published in 1981. By the middle of 1982 the group "Desobedeça", inspired in the European ecological parties (principally the Italian Radical Party) became established within the Workers Party in São Paulo, Rio Grande do Sul, and Rio de Janeiro. In the November 1982 elections, Desobedeça elected one representative in the State House of Rio de Janeiro.
21. The journal Mutantia, expressing the points of view of ecological groups started to be published in 1980 (Buenos Aires). By the end of 1983, 17 numbers had come out, and the journal began to promote the discussion about the creation of an ecological party.
22. In 1983 the Peace and Justice Service, led by Nobel Prize winner Adolfo Perez Esquivel, started to publish the journal Paz y Justicia. On the significance of the human rights organizations, see José M. Gomez "Derechos Humanos, Política y Autoritarismo en el Cono Sur" (Forthcoming article).
23. Some analyses of social movements, including the influential formulations by Castells, failed to differentiate them sufficiently. For example, middle class and popular class movements were considered in the same category. For criticisms which insist on differentiating movements according to class, see Machado and Ziccardi, "Notas para uma Discussão," and Klaus Offe and Helmut Wiesensthal, "Two Logics of Collective Action: Theoretical Notes on Social Class and Organizational Form," Political Power and Social Theory 1 (1980), 67-115.
24. On the evolution of various factions of the Brazilian left, see among others Denis Moraes and Francisco Viana, eds., Prestes: Lutas e Autocríticas (Petrópolis: Vozes, 1982); Moises Vinhas, O Partidão (São Paulo: Hucitec, 1982); Wladimir Pomar, Araguaia: O Partido e a Guerrilha (São Paulo: Brasil Debates, 1980); Leandro Konder, A Democracia e os Comunistas no Brasil (Rio de Janeiro: Graal, 1980); Artur José Poerner, O Poder Jovem: História da Participação Política dos Estudantes Brasileiros (Rio de Janeiro: Civilização Brasileira, 1979); Herbet José de Souza, "Betinho," in Pedro Celso Uchoa Cavalcanti and Jovelino Ramos, eds., Memórias do Exílio: Brasil 1964/19?? (São Paulo: Livramento, 1978); Alfredo Sirkis, Os

Carbonários: Memórias da Guerrilha Perdida (São Paulo: Global, 1980). Among the most important sources dealing with the evolution of the Argentine left in the seventies are Viola, "Democracia e Autoritarismo na Argentina Contemporânea"; Richard Gillespie Soldiers of Perón: Argentina's Montoneros (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1982); Peter Waldmann, "Anomia social y violencia," in Rouquie, ed., Argentina, hoy, 206-248.

25. The reappraisal of political democracy in Brazil is discussed in Bolivar Lamounier, "Representação Política: A Importância de Certos Formalismos," in Bolivar Lamounier, Francisco Weffort, and Maria Victoria Benevides, eds., Direito, Cidadania Participação (São Paulo: Tao, 1981) 232-257; and Robert Packenham, "Interpretations of Brazilian Politics," forthcoming article. Among the most important works by well known members of the left on the question of democracy are Carlos Nelson Coutinho, A Democracia como Valor Universal (São Paulo: Ciências Humanas, 1980); and Konder, A Democracia e os Comunistas no Brasil.
26. On the populist tradition see Francisco Weffort, O Populismo na Política Brasileira (Rio, Paz e Terra, 1978); and Ernesto Laclau, Populism and Ideology in Marxist Theory (London: NLB, 1977).
27. The subject of patterns of isolation and solidarity among the popular classes has been addressed by many social scientists, including Anthony Leeds and Elizabeth Leeds, A Sociologia do Brasil Urbano (Rio de Janeiro: Zahar, 1978); Janice Perlman, The Myth of Marginality: Urban Poverty and Politics in Rio de Janeiro (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1976); Renato Ortiz, A Consciência Fragmentada (Rio de Janeiro: Paz e Terra, 1980).
28. The best known articulator of these positions is Paulo Freire. See Pedagogy of the Oppressed (New York: Herder and Herder, 1970), and Educação como a Prática da Liberdade (Rio de Janeiro: Paz e Terra, 1980).
29. On the capacity of charismatic leaders to provide stability, see Serge Moscovici, L'âge des Foules (Paris: Fayard, 1981). On the tendency for lay leaders to develop domineering qualities, see Eduardo Hoornaert, "Comunidades de Base: Dez Anos de Experiência," Revista Eclesiástica Brasileira 38 (1978), 474-502; and Beatriz da Costa, "Para Analisar uma Prática de Educação Popular," Cadernos de Educação Popular 1 (1981), 7-48. By Weber, see especially The Theory of Social and Economic Organization (New York: Free Press, 1964), 358-392.



30. In Lages, Santa Catarina, the innovative thrust came principally from above, whereas in Boa Esperança, Espírito Santo, and Diadema, São Paulo, the new social movements played a key role in generating more innovative local governments. On these experiences, see Marcio Moreira Alves, A Força do Povo: A Democracia Participativa em Lages (Rio de Janeiro: Brasiliense, 1980); Herbert José de Souza, "Município de Esperança: Participação Popular e Poder Local," in José Alvaro Moises, et. al., Alternativas Populares da Democracia (Petrópolis: Vozes/CEDEC, 1982), 99-120; Maria Helena Moreira Alves, "Diadema: An Experience of Popular Government within an Authoritarian Context," (XI International Congress of Latin American Studies Association, 1983).
31. On the Oppressed PT, see José Alvaro Moises, Lições de Liberdade e de Opressão (Rio de Janeiro: Paz e Terra, 1982); and Margaret Keck's forthcoming Ph.D. dissertation, Columbia University.
32. A significant literature on social movements emphasizes their cyclical character or potential for decline. Mancur Olson, The Logic of Collective Action (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1965); Charles Tilly, From Mobilization to Revolution (Reading, MA: Addison-Wesley, 1978); Albert Hirschman, Shifting Involvements: Private Interests and Public Action (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1982); Boschi, "Movimentos Sociais e a Institucionalização de uma Ordem." However, it should also be noted that the value orientation of the new social movements has specificities (as discussed earlier) which could produce different dynamics. The dynamic of the new movements should not be confused with that of social activation. As O'Donnell and Schmitter note, social activation is likely to decline after the initial mobilization period.
33. Because of the defeat and transformation of most of the authoritarian left, thus far its presence has been insignificant in the current transitions. Therefore we do not discuss the authoritarian left in the following pages. Nevertheless, especially in Argentina, there is some possibility that the authoritarian left could reemerge as a significant actor.
34. On these oscillations between authoritarianism and democracy see Albert Hirschman, "The Turn of Authoritarianism in Latin America and the Search for its Economic Determinants," in David Collier, ed., The New Authoritarianism in Latin America (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1979), 61-98; and Douglas Chalmers, "The Politicized State in Latin America," in James Malloy, ed., Authoritarianism and Corporatism in Latin America

(Pittsburgh: University of Pittsburgh Press), 23-46.

35. On the political liberalization process and its limits, see among others Paulo Krischke, ed., Brasil: Do Milagre à Abertura (São Paulo: Cortez, 1983); José Alvaro Moises, "Crise Política e Democracia: A Transição Difícil," Revista de Cultura e Política 2 (August/October 1980), 9-37; Sebastião Velasco e Cruz and Carlos Estevam Martins, "De Castello a Figueiredo: Uma Incursão na pre-História," in Velasco e Cruz et.al., Sociedade e Política no Brasil Pós-64; Bolivar Lamounier, "O Discurso e o Processo: Da Distensão as Opções do Regime Brasileiro," in Henrique Rattner, ed., Brasil 1990: Caminhos Alternativos do Desenvolvimento (São Paulo: Brasiliense, 1979), 88-120; Alfred Stepan, "Civil Society and the State: Patterns of Resistance to Domination in the Southern Cone," forthcoming; and the sources listed in note 8 above. On the continuation of highly repressive styles of politics in rural areas, especially the Amazon, see José de Souza Martins, Expropriação e Violência: A Questão Política no Campo Brasil (Petrópolis: Vozes, 1981); José de Sousa Martins, Os Camponeses e a Política no Brasil (Petrópolis: Vozes, 1981).
36. The possibility of the re-emergence of a more radical authoritarian or a totalitarian regime is discussed in José María Gomez and Eduardo Viola, "Transición desde el Autoritarismo y Potencialidades de Invención Democrática en la Argentina de 1983," in Oscar Oszlack, ed., El 'Proceso', Crisis y transición democrática (Buenos Aires: Centro Editor, 1984).
37. In our emphasis on political leadership, we follow Linz, Crisis, Breakdown, and Reequilibration; Viola, "Autoritarismo e Democracia na Argentina Contemporânea"; and Robert Dahl, Polyarchy: Participation and Opposition (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1971), 124-188.