AGRARIAN REFORM AND THE PEASANTRY IN THE TRANSITION TO SOCIALISM IN THE THIRD WORLD

Carmen Diana Deere*

Working Paper #31 - December 1984

Carmen Diana Deere is an Associate Professor of Economics at the University of Massachusetts, Amherst. During the Fall of 1984 she was a Faculty Fellow at the Kellogg Institute of the University of Notre Dame. She has written extensively about Latin American agrarian reform processes, peasant household economics and rural women in Latin America.

*This paper was prepared for the PACCA-CRIES-Social Science Research Council Seminar on "The Problems of Transition in Small, Peripheral Economies," held in Managua, Nicaragua, September 3-8, 1984. I am indebted to Lynn Duggan, Mieke Meurs, Hannah Roditi and Antonella Stirati for skillful research assistance, and to the Graduate School of the University of Massachusetts for a Faculty Research Grant to finance the research effort. Several colleagues were of tremendous assistance in this undertaking: Carollee Benglesdorf, Frank Holmquist, Nancy Wiegersma, Jeanne Henn, and Teodor Shamin. The participants in the Managua seminar considerably enriched my own thinking on the topic, particularly the two discussants, Peter Marchetti and Joe Collins. Most useful comments on the first draft of this paper were also provided by David Ruccio and by the members of the Western Massachusetts women in development study group.
Abstract

This paper is a preliminary attempt at a most difficult and challenging task—a synthesis of the agrarian reform experience of thirteen Third World countries which consider themselves to be in a transition to socialism. Particular emphasis is given to the relationship between the organization of production in the transition (whether state farms, production cooperatives or individual peasant holdings are favored) and the degree of rural worker and peasant participation in shaping the agrarian reform and the process of transition.

Resumen

Este ensayo representa un intento preliminar de sintetizar la experiencia de reforma agraria de trece países del Tercer Mundo que se consideran en transición hacia el socialismo. Se da atención especial a la relación entre la forma organizada de la producción (sea en forma de fincas estatales, cooperativas de producción o parcelas individuales) y el grado de participación de los trabajadores rurales y campesinos en la determinación del tipo de reforma agraria y el proceso mismo de la transición.
# Table of Contents

I. Introduction

II. Theoretical Conceptions of Socialist Agriculture
   - Capitalist and Socialist Agriculture
   - The Dictatorship of the Proletariat and Peasantry
   - The Organization of Production in the First Transition

III. The Transformation of Land Tenure and Property Relations in the Transition

IV. The Organization of Production in the Transition: the Emphasis on State Farms in the Third World
   - Cuba
   - Nicaragua
   - Algeria
   - Angola and Mozambique
   - Other Experiences
   - Summary

V. Collectivization and the Peasantry
   - Massive Collectivization Attempts: Vietnam and Tanzania
   - Production Cooperatives as a Product of Land Reform: Algeria and Nicaragua
   - Other Collectivization Experiences
   - The Cuban Case

VI. Concluding Thoughts: Forms of Organization of Socialist Agriculture and Worker-Peasant Participation
   - Notes

Appendix A: The Structural Composition of Gross Domestic Product and of the Economically Active Population

Appendix B: Distribution of Farmland by Sector: Eastern Europe and USSR

References
AGRARIAN REFORM AND THE PEASANTRY IN THE TRANSITION TO SOCIALISM IN THE THIRD WORLD

"Thus events which were strikingly analogous, but which took place in different historical circumstances led to entirely dissimilar results."

Karl Marx (1877)*

I. INTRODUCTION

No issue has been more debated, nor problem considered more important, than the agrarian question in the transition to socialism. How can the conditions for socialist development be engendered when the working class is numerically small and the peasantry the largest social force? And can a socialist transformation take place, where agrarian capitalist development has been limited, "riding into socialism on a peasant's nag?"[1]

This paper considers the process of agrarian transformation in the small, peripheral countries of the Third World which have embarked on a transition to socialism. Our theoretical concern is how these countries have viewed the question of what is socialist agriculture? Our empirical inquiry focuses on how each has attempted to bring it about, fostering new social relations of production in the countryside. Here our focus is two-fold: the organization of production in the transition, and peasant and rural worker participation in shaping the process of agrarian reform.

For the purposes of this review, we have included as many Third World countries as feasible which have declared themselves to be "socialist" or in a transition to socialism. As will be seen, the 13 countries chosen differ markedly in their leaders' conception of socialism; not all are inspired by Marxism. What these 13 countries have in common is that all of them have attempted to bring about a revolutionary social transformation, particularly in agriculture, in the name of "socialism." But they also differ with respect to the political and economic means which they have chosen to bring such about.

These 13 countries, spanning Africa, Asia, the Middle East and Latin America, differ not only with respect to where they are going, but also, as to their initial conditions for a socialist transformation. The one structural characteristic which they share is that at the moment of their revolutionary rupture, the majority of their population was rural, engaged in agricultural production (see Appendix A). They differ, however, as to the importance of agriculture within the national economy. Only seven of the countries, Cuba, Ethiopia, Guinea Bissau, Mozambique, Nicaragua, Somalia and Tanzania, are still agro-
export economies, with the agricultural sector generating over half of export earnings. The other six countries reviewed, Algeria, Angola, Syria, Vietnam, The People’s Democratic Republic of Yemen, and Zimbabwe, while not agro-export economies, were characterized by the agricultural sector generating over half of GDP at the initiation of their respective transitions.

The paper is organized as follows. In the first section, we present a summary of the writings of Marx, Engels and Lenin on socialist agriculture, since their work has informed in crucial ways the goals of agrarian socialist transition in the Third World. We argue that the main elements which Marx and Engels theorized as constituting socialist agriculture found their preconditions in capitalist development: 1) the nationalization of land; 2) a high development of the productive forces; and 3) collective control over the labor process and the surplus thereby produced. A fourth element, the worker-peasant alliance, on the other hand, responds precisely to the fact that capitalist development usually coexists with a large peasant class.

In this section we review in some detail Lenin’s writings on the “dictatorship of the proletariat and peasantry” since we consider it one of Lenin’s major theoretical innovations within Marxism, and contributions to the theory of socialist transition. We present a reading of his work that will undoubtedly be controversial. For we stress the importance that Lenin placed on the relative autonomy of the peasantry in shaping the agrarian reform both in the bourgeois-democratic and in the socialist revolution. Moreover, we highlight the development of what we call the substantive principle of the worker-peasant alliance: the process of collectivization of the peasantry must be voluntary and democratic.

In the next section we begin the analysis of socialist agrarian reform in the small, peripheral countries of the Third World with a review of the transformation of land tenure and property relations. Here we consider the conditions under which revolutionary governments have found it necessary and possible to nationalize land. We also consider the extent to which these socialist agrarian reforms have found it necessary to protect and sometimes to create peasant property, and even to guarantee capitalist property.

Subsequently, we turn to the analysis of the organization of agricultural production in the transition. Here we find that in few of the 13 countries is the majority of land cultivated collectively. Moreover, in most of these small, transitional societies state farms predominate over production cooperatives. (By a production cooperative we refer to those forms of productive organization where means of production are held in common and worked collectively, with membership control over the productive process). In this section we consider why state farms have been prioritized in the transition and analyze the implications this has for the transformation of the relations of production.
In the fifth section, we review a number of processes of attempted collectivization of the peasantry in order to analyze under what conditions peasants have voluntarily pooled their land and formed successful production cooperatives. We find that it has often been easier to encourage the development of production cooperatives through the collective adjudication of land in an agrarian reform rather than through moral and material incentives to pool peasant property. In the concluding section we attempt to synthesize the debate over the organization of production in socialist agriculture—whether state farms or production cooperatives should be favored—and analyze the implications for rural worker and peasant participation in the transition to socialism.

II. THEORETICAL CONCEPTIONS OF SOCIALIST AGRICULTURE

Marx and Engels provided the theoretical basis for an understanding of socialism quite different from that of their utopian predecessors. At the same time, they did not provide a blueprint of the process of transition to socialism, nor of what socialism, and specifically, socialist agriculture, should look like. True to their own method, the process of transition and socialist construction hinged on political and economic conditions peculiar to each historical moment and social formation.

In this section, we first consider the basic elements of socialist agriculture which can be deduced from the work of Marx and Engels. Then, we review Lenin’s development of the concept of the worker-peasant alliance in the Russian revolutionary experience. Finally, in order to locate current debates on the peasantry and the organization of production in the transition, we review Lenin’s 1917-1923 writings on collectivized agriculture.

Capitalist and Socialist Agriculture

From Marx and Engels’ writings it is possible to deduce four basic elements of their theoretical vision of socialist agriculture:

1. The nationalization of land
2. A high level of development of the productive forces
3. The socialization of production based on collective control over the labor process and of appropriation and distribution of surplus labor
4. The worker-peasant alliance

We will argue that the theoretical basis for the first three of these emerges out of their analysis of capitalism. For in the analysis of Capital, it is precisely the process of capitalist development that engenders the objective conditions for socialist development. The fourth principle, the worker-
peasant alliance, has a different status. It reflects the fact that capitalism may not be predominant in a social formation, or at least, that capitalism co-exists with other forms of production and class relations. An alliance between the working class and the peasantry may be necessary to bring about a revolutionary transformation.

For Marx, the nationalization of land was a pre-condition for the collective ownership of the means of production in socialist agriculture. Perhaps surprisingly to some, Marx also considered the nationalization of land to be necessary for successful capitalist development. Marx first developed his critique of private property through the lens of humanism, in the 1844 Manuscripts. Here, private property was the basis of alienation. But in concert, Marx sketched out his theory of rent, and private property in land appears as a contradiction in capitalist development itself.[2]

As fully developed in Volume Three of Capital, private property in land gave rise to absolute rent. As a payment by capital to a landlord class due to their monopoly ownership of a crucial means of production, absolute rent prevented the equalization of the rate of profit between agriculture and industry and lowered the rate of accumulation of capital in agriculture. Thus, for Marx, private property in land was both a condition of existence and a fetter on capitalist development.

This analysis found its political expression in the Communist Manifesto of 1850. The demand for the nationalization of land was among the most important of the ten measures to be advocated by the working class as reforms which could be achieved within the formal limits of bourgeois democracy (Carr 1972:9). Marx and Engels considered it to be a capitalist reform, but one that would provide an important precondition for the transition to socialism. But it was also a demand which Marx and Engels later recognized to be at odds with an alliance between the peasantry and working class in either the bourgeois or proletarian revolutions.

Socialism would also require a high development of the productive forces as a material base. Marx’s admiration of capitalist development in this regard is well known. The force of capitalist competition unleashed not only an unending chain of technological innovation, but also provided the basis for the concentration and centralization of capital. Marx and Engels assumed that the process of capitalist development in agriculture would be similar to that of industry, leading to the predominance of large-scale scientific farming.

Marx also assumed that the process of capitalist development would entail the ruin of the peasantry and their subsequent proletarianization.[3] In a well-known passage Marx notes the limitations of small-scale peasant production:

"This mode of production presupposes the fragmentation
of holdings, and the dispersal of the other means of production. As it excludes the concentration of these means of production, so it also excludes co-operation, division of labour within each separate process of production, the social control and regulation of the forces of society" (Marx 1967: Vol. I, Sect. 8).

The process of primitive accumulation and of the concentration of capital would lead to another important pre-condition for socialist development: a fully proletarianized and socialized work force. And the contradiction between private ownership of the means of production, private appropriation of the surplus, and a socialized labor process would engender the objective basis for the transition from one mode of production to another.

One can see quite clearly in one of Engels' last works, "The Peasant Question in France and Germany" (1894), the manner in which socialist agriculture could readily be built upon the agrarian capitalist enterprise:

"The big estates thus restored to the community are to be turned over by us to the rural workers who are already cultivating them and are to be organized in cooperatives. They are to be assigned to them for their use and benefit under the control of the community. Nothing can as yet be stated as to the terms of their tenure. At any rate the transformation of the capitalist enterprise into a social enterprise is here fully prepared for and can be carried into execution overnight... And the example of these agricultural co-operatives would convince also the last of the still resistant small-holding peasants, and surely also many big peasants, of the advantages of co-operative, large-scale production" (Engels, 1955:37).

Three of the elements of socialist agriculture—the nationalization of land, large-scale scientific agriculture, and a rural proletariat collectively working the means of production—were to be engendered by the process of capitalist development. They would provide the foundation for socialist agriculture and, by the replacement of planning for market forces, allow the efficient allocation of resources and a rapid growth of the marketable output and of accumulation (Ellman 1979: chpt4).

The fourth principle, the worker-peasant alliance, was a result of Marx and Engels' recognition that the process of capitalist development was uneven and incomplete. Moreover, it responded to Marx's recognition that the transition to socialism depended on subjective factors, the degree of organization of the working class, class alliances and class struggle.

Marx and Engels focus on the question of class alliances, and in particular, on the potential for a revolutionary alliance between the proletariat and peasantry in their writings of the 1850s. Marx's "Class Struggles in France 1848 to 1850" is often cited as the text where Marx first developed his theory of the
dictatorship of the proletariat. Yet, it was in this same text where he first sketched the main features of an alliance between the working class and the peasantry. Marx treated the issue of the peasantry as an ally as a conjunctural question. The alliance depended on the particular situation, the weight of the peasantry, their degree of organization, and their particular grievances and demands. Out of his analysis of the experience of revolutionary struggle in France in this period, Marx concluded that the proletariat could ally with the peasantry in the bourgeois-democratic revolution; in the socialist or proletarian revolution, it must ally with the rural proletariat.

Engels, in his major historical work of this period, "The Peasant War in Germany" (1850) identified the primary interest of the peasantry as a class, the anti-feudal struggle. The peasantry was thus a natural ally of the proletariat in the bourgeois-democratic revolution. This insight subsequently led Marx to concede that the proletariat might have to back a program of peasant proprietorship in the democratic revolution when such was an anti-feudal demand (Carr 1972:387).

Later on, Engels was to recognize that the support of the peasantry would be crucial to the success not only of the bourgeois-democratic revolution, but also, of the proletarian revolution. Moreover, a socialist program might require the protection of peasant private property. In "The Peasant Question in France and Germany" he struggled with the fact that: "...we can win the mass of the small peasants forthwith only if we make them a promise which we ourselves know we shall not be able to keep. That is, we must promise them not only to protect their property in any event against all economic forces sweeping upon them but also to relieve them of the burdens which already now oppress them..." (Engels 1955:27).

He concluded with what we have called the substantive principle of the worker-peasant alliance:

"...when we are in possession of state power we shall not even think of forcibly expropriating the small peasants...as we shall have to do in the case of the big landowners. Our task relative to the small peasant consists, in the first place, in effecting a transition of his private enterprise and private possession to co-operative ones, not forcibly, but by dint of example and the proffer of social assistance for this purpose. And then of course we shall have ample means of showing to the small peasant prospective advantages that must be obvious to him even today" (Engels 1955:28).

It is perhaps because of the thorniness of building a worker-peasant alliance on a program that has the abolition of private property as one of its main components, that Marx began to consider attractive the possibility of constructing socialism on the basis of the pre-capitalist peasant commune. As Shanin (1983) and others argue convincingly, Marx devoted a good deal of attention in the latter part of his life to conditions in rural
Russia and the debate among Russian populists and Marxists concerning the possibility of building socialism on the basis of the Russian peasant commune, the mir.

To briefly summarize this debate, the theoretical issue was whether a stage, capitalist development, could be skipped in the transition to socialism. The empirical issue was the degree of disintegration of the Russian commune and attendant capitalist development in Russia. While Marx and Engels' views on the empirical issue fluctuate over the 1875 to 1894 period, their writings present a fairly conclusive answer to the theoretical question.[4] A noncapitalist path of socialist development was indeed theoretically possible. This they stated most unequivocally in the Preface to the Second Russian edition of the Manifesto of the Communist Party (1882): "If the Russian revolution becomes the signal for proletarian revolution in the West, so that the two complement each other, then Russia's peasant communal land-ownership may serve as the point of departure for a communist development" (Shanin 1983:139).

As Shanin (1983:29) points out, Marx in the Grundrisse (1857-58) had already accepted the multiplicity of roads of social development in pre-capitalist societies; in the last period of his life he came to accept the multiplicity of roads to socialist development.

One of the important implications of this, although not developed by Marx or Engels, is in terms of the nature of the alliance between the proletariat and peasantry. For if Russia was "to skip a stage" and proceed as a result of the revolution to build socialism, capitalist development would not yet have created a proletariat of significant size or strength, and the task of socialist construction, by default, would have passed to the peasantry.[5]

The Dictatorship of the Proletariat and Peasantry

It is now a fact of history that most socialist revolutions have taken place in countries where the peasantry form the majority of the population. In this regard, the small peripheral economies of the Third World differ little from the Russian case. In the first decade of the century, 80% of Russia's population was rural, and agricultural activities contributed approximately 50% of national income (Carr 1972:24). In Russia, as in the Third World, the socialist revolution depended critically on the support of the peasantry.

Here we argue that, while Lenin drew on Marx and Engels' insights regarding the potential role of the peasantry as a revolutionary force, he elevated the concept of the worker-peasant alliance from a tactical consideration to a theoretical innovation within Marxism.[6] Moreover, underpinning Lenin's conceptualization of the alliance was the autonomous organization of the peasantry and democratic structures and practices, aspects of his work too often ignored. We then show how the worker-
peasant alliance informed the praxis of the Bolshevik party in the peasant revolution and agrarian reform of 1917.

Lenin first elucidated the concept of the worker-peasant alliance in 1905 in "Two Tactics of Social Democracy in the Democratic Revolution" when he called for the establishment of a revolutionary-democratic dictatorship of the proletariat and peasantry in the context of the bourgeois-democratic revolution. But, as Levine (1982) has argued, Lenin did not simply discover the peasantry in the course of the first (1905) Russian revolution. In the 1895-1905 period Lenin had a singularly important impact in directing the attention of the Russian Social Democratic Party to the "agrarian question."

While Marx devoted a considerable portion of the last years of his life to the analysis of whether a noncapitalist road to socialism was theoretically, and in the Russian case, empirically possible, the nucleus that was to form the future Russian Social Democratic Party, the Emancipation of Labour Group, had already resolved the issue in the negative (Carr 1972:11; Hussain and Tribe, 1981). By the 1880s Plekhanov, a former Narodnik and considered by most the "father of Russian Marxism," was convinced that Russia was to follow the route outlined in Capital and The Communist Manifesto: capitalist development was already well advanced in Russia and the task of the party was to focus on the emerging working class, first to carry out the bourgeois democratic revolution, and subsequently, the proletarian revolution.

Lenin's first major intellectual work, The Development of Capitalism in Russia (1895) set out to document the process of capitalist development in the countryside argued by Plekhanov. But his analysis gave him an acute sense of the complexity of agrarian class relations which would lead him to the position that the peasantry could not be simply written off as a revolutionary force. For example, in 1899 he wrote of his concern about the party's attitude towards the peasantry and pleaded that "we must begin to discuss basic principles of work among the peasantry if we want the Social Democratic working class party to become a vanguard fighter for democracy" (Lenin 1960, Vol.IV:247).

In the pre-1905 period Lenin viewed the worker-peasant alliance primarily as an anti-feudal alliance. Thus in "The Worker's Party and the Proletariat" (1901) Lenin argued that the Social Democratic program must include such anti-feudal demands as the abolition of redemption payments and the restitution of the lands of which the peasantry had been deprived in the Tsar's 1861 agrarian reform (the so-called "cut-off" lands). He also noted that the party's work in the countryside must include the establishment of peasant committees so that its work would be focused on the concrete and most pressing needs of the peasantry (Lenin 1971:14).

In "To the Rural Poor" (1903) Lenin gives his first full
explanation of the role these committees could play in developing the class struggle in the countryside as well as in the worker-peasant alliance. The peasant committees were to be elected at the village or district level and represent each class segment in the countryside (including the middle and rich peasantry). They were to be at least relatively autonomous from the party and formulate their own demands based on local conditions:

"No one knows better than the peasants themselves what bondage oppresses them. No one will be able to expose the landlords, who to this day live by keeping the peasants in thrall, better than the peasants themselves. The peasant committees will decide what cut-off lands, what meadows, pastures, and so forth, were taken from the peasants unfairly; they will decide whether those lands shall be expropriated without compensation, or whether those who bought such lands should be paid compensation at the expense of the high nobility...The peasant committees will rid the peasants of interference by officials; they will show that the peasants themselves want to and can manage their own affairs; they will help the peasants to reach agreement among themselves about their needs and to recognise those who are really able to stand up for the rural poor and for an alliance with the urban workers. The peasant committees will be the first step towards enabling the peasants even in remote villages to get on to their feet and to take their fate into their own hands" (Lenin 1971: 70).

Lenin never wavered in his view of the proletariat as the vanguard of the worker-peasant alliance. But what is striking about this work is the degree of autonomy that Lenin gives to the peasantry in formulating its own demands.

In his 1903 piece, Lenin commits the party to what we previously termed the substantive principle of the worker-peasant alliance: "the Social-Democrats will never take away the property of the small and middle farmers who do not hire labourers" (Lenin 1971:50). He points out that the interest of the Social Democrats is only in expropriating the property of landowners, "those who live on the labour of others."

In the pre-1905 period, debate raged within the party not only over whether the peasantry was a potentially revolutionary force, but on the political feasibility of this latter demand. The expropriation of landlord's land as well as nationalization in general was thought by most Social Democrats to be too divisive (Haimson 1967:145; Baron 1963:229). Thus the Social Democratic position at this time was that the maximum demands for which the peasantry would act as a class were anti-feudal demands such as the return of the cut-off lands.

Events during 1905 proved beyond a doubt that the Russian peasantry was a revolutionary force, and settled the debate over the character of the peasantry in Lenin's favor. From the beginning of that year, in concert with the urban industrial strikes, the peasantry was seizing land, including landlord's
land. The Social Democratic party quickly had to adjust its program to catch up with the revolutionary peasantry. At the Bolshevik Third Party Congress in April of 1905 full support was given to the peasant movement. Moreover, it was agreed that the party "stands for all revolutionary measures capable of improving the condition of the peasantry, not halting at the expropriation of the landed estates to this end" (Lenin 1971: 87).

It was in this context that Lenin developed the slogan of "the revolutionary-democratic dictatorship of the proletariat and the peasantry."[7] But Lenin’s theoretical innovation to Marxism was not received lightly. Plekhanov and others objected that the proletariat and the peasantry could not act with a "single will." Plekhanov was even to accuse Lenin of leaning toward populism for his pro-peasant deviations (Shanin 1983:19,37).

In Lenin’s writings of this period, the worker-peasant alliance was contingent upon the role of the peasant committees. Lenin saw these as the both the means of raising peasant consciousness and of carrying out a revolutionary land reform. Moreover, they would also serve to articulate the autonomous demands of the peasantry.

This is clearly seen in Lenin’s position in the 1906 party debate over forms of land tenancy in the bourgeois-democratic revolution. Lenin was to argue forcefully for the demand to nationalize all land which he saw, following Marx, as the maximum demand of a bourgeois-democratic revolution, and the demand that would create an important precondition for socialist agriculture. However, in keeping with the relatively autonomous role that he saw for the peasant committees he noted that whether the nationalization of land was included in the party platform must depend on whether it was a demand of the peasantry. In a most important footnote to his draft agrarian program Lenin noted that he had attached a variant to the nationalization clause of his draft in order "to remove any idea that the workers’ party wants to impose upon the peasantry any scheme of reforms against their will and independently of any movement among the peasantry..." (Lenin 1971:132).

The 1906 party congress (the so-called Unity Congress of Bolsheviks and Mensheviks) failed to approve land nationalization among its demands, agreeing to call only for the confiscation of church, state and landlord land. Lenin continued to argue the importance of nationalizing all land, but directed his attacks primarily at the other Marxist party, the Social Revolutionaries (the heir of Narodism), and at the liberal parties participating in the various parliaments convoked under the Stolypin government. The Social Revolutionaries’ agrarian program of 1906 called for the "socialization" of land and the distribution of land to the peasantry based on the principle of equalization (this takes into account the number of workers and consumers in each household). The various liberal parties, in turn, were attempting to promote agrarian reforms which would leave the landlord’s land intact.
Meanwhile, the Stolypin agrarian reform of the 1906-1911 period proceeded on a frontal attack on the peasant commune. Intending to promote the development of a class of rural entrepreneurs that would stabilize the countryside after the revolutionary upheaval of 1905, the Stolypin decrees made it progressively easier for peasants to leave the mir and to claim their communal allotments as private property. As Kingston-Mann (1980: 133) points out, the reforms posed a dilemma for Marxists. The reforms did represent a rational program for capitalist development; however, revolutionary peasants were demanding the defense of the mir.

In response to these developments, Lenin in 1907 wrote one of his most important treatises on the agrarian question, "The Agrarian Programme of Social Democracy in the First Russian Revolution 1905-1907." His objective was to propose a revision of the Social Democratic agrarian program, based on an overall assessment of events in the 1905-1907 period. In this work he noted that the 1906 party program was adopted before the public appearance of representatives of the peasantry with their own peasant agrarian program. In July of 1905 the first All-Russian Peasants Union Congress had been organized by the Socialist Revolutionaries and several months later this organization claimed 200,000 members (Wolf, 1969: 86). While the basic peasant program focused on the abolition of feudal property and the transfer of land to the peasantry, the demand for the socialization of all land had been raised at the peasant congress. And, peasant representatives in the parliament were arguing that only by socializing all land could peasants be freed from the obligations of both the village commune and the feudal allotment system.

Lenin certainly agreed for he was convinced that nationalization (what the Socialist Revolutionaries called "socialization") would most rapidly clear the path for capitalist development in agriculture. And this was the standard that he applied to the analysis of the Stolypin reforms as well.

It was in "The Agrarian Programme of Social Democracy in the First Russian Revolution 1905-1907," that Lenin developed the conceptualization of the now famous "two paths" of capitalist development: the Junker path, based on the internal transformation of the feudal estate, and the American path, based on individual family farming. He analyzed the Junker path as primarily favoring the landlord class and concluded that this was the main intent of the Stolypin reforms. In contrast, the American path favored the peasantry and since the whole rural population would be involved, it should result in a more rapid development of agrarian capitalism. The outcome, of course, would be a rapid process of social differentiation, leading to the creation of a rural proletariat and the concentration of land in the hands of a peasant bourgeoisie. The American farmer path was thus the "revolutionary" path of capitalist development (1971: 157).
As Kingston-Mann (1980:133) points out, by reconceptualizing the problem, Lenin was able to extricate Marxists from the dilemma of supporting either the Stolypin reforms as progressive, or if they defended the commune, peasant stagnation. In doing so, Lenin actually cast the Social Revolutionary program in a favorable light. For their program of land socialization and parcelization according to the principle of equalization would in effect create the best conditions for the development of capitalist farming. Lenin challenged them for thinking that they were putting forth a socialist program; it would create the pre-conditions, but the task of socialists was to move beyond, to the proletarian revolution based on the alliance between urban and rural workers and the poor peasantry.

The Peasantry's Agrarian Reform, 1917-1918

After almost a ten year lull, peasant mobilization began again several months after the fall of the Tsar in February of 1917. As in 1905, the peasant land take-overs were synchronized with, but autonomous from, the development of industrial strikes all over Russia, and the growing desertion of soldiers from the front (Wolf, 1969: 85). The Provisional Government installed in February included the Social Revolutionaries who were placed in charge of the agrarian program. But as the peasant land take-overs escalated over the summer months, the Socialist Revolutionaries refused to declare an agrarian reform due to their support for the war effort. In these months, the party that had considered itself to be the voice of the peasantry found itself participating in legislation banning land take-overs while using "draconian" measures to secure the food supply for the war effort (Hussain and Tribe, 1981: 92-94). Only the Bolsheviks fully backed the peasant land take-overs as well as an end to the unpopular war.

Already in April, Lenin had announced the strategy that would move the revolution sequentially from its first stage, the bourgeois-democratic revolution, to the second stage, the proletarian revolution based on an alliance with the poorest strata of the peasantry (Carr, 1972: 26). Thesis 6 of the "April Theses" provided for the confiscation of all landlord estates which were to be put in the hands of the Soviets of poor peasants and the peasant deputies. But how land is then to be apportioned is left ambiguous, except for a clause that noted that large estates were to be turned into model farms worked under the control of poor peasants.

Meanwhile, the peasantry was already developing its own guidelines for the agrarian reform. At the May-June Peasant Congress a draft was written, composed of 242 instructions compiled by local peasant deputies. Lenin, commenting on the instructions in an article in August, 1917, noted that the majority of the demands followed the Social Revolutionary principles and moreover, that the peasants really did want to retain "small-scale" farming (Owen, 1963: 239-241). Further:
"As for us, we are not doctrinaires. Our teaching is not dogma, but a guide to reality. We do not claim that Marx or Marxists know the road to Socialism in all its concreteness. That would be nonsense. We know the direction of the road. We know what class-forces lead along it; but a concrete and practical means will be shown only by the experience of millions when they take up the work... Only in a close alliance with the workers, will you be able to commence to accomplish in fact the programme of the 242 instructions" (Ibid.: 241).

By August, the peasantry was implementing its own agrarian reform, confiscating and redistributing landed estates; by the end of the year, the poor peasantry had moved on to the holdings of the rich peasantry. In October, Lenin made good on his promise and simply confirmed the course of events.

The main features of the October 26th "Decree on Land" were as follows: 1) the abolition of landlord ownership without compensation; 2) the placement of landlord, crown and church lands at the disposal of the land committees and the Soviets of Peasant Deputies pending the convocation of a Constituent Assembly; 3) the adoption of the "Peasant Mandate on Land" as the main guide to implementation of the reform until legislated otherwise by the Constituent Assembly (Lenin 1971:202).

Lenin, of course, highly supported the main provision of the Peasant Mandate, the abolition of private ownership of land. All land was to become the property of "the whole people" and form part of a national land fund. Local and central self-government bodies were to be in charge of its distribution and all citizens "without distinction of sex" were to be given the right to use it as long as they worked the land with their own labor. Land was to be distributed according to the equalization standard of the Social Revolutionaries. A provision was also made for farms with a high level of "scientific farming" to be turned into model farms either under state or commune control. Most interestingly, the Peasant Mandate emphasized that there were to be no restrictions on the form of land tenure that might arise; included as possibilities were the "household, farm, communal, cooperative" or whatever was decided at the individual village or settlement level (Ibid.: 202-204).

Thus, in 1917, Lenin confirmed the principle that he had argued in 1903 in "To the Rural Poor":

"As a democratic government, we cannot ignore the decision of the masses of people, even though we may disagree with it... We trust the peasants themselves will be able to solve the problem correctly, properly, better than we could do it... The point is that the peasants should be firmly assured that there are no more landlords in the countryside and that they decide all questions, and they arrange their own lives" (1971: 205).
The Organization of Production in the First Transition

The final Soviet land reform decree, promulgated in February of 1918, made clear the purpose of a socialist agrarian program: collectivization. Article 11 stipulated the objective:

"To develop the collective system of agriculture, as being more economic in respect both of labour and of products, at the expense of individual holdings, in order to bring about the transition to a socialist economy" (In Carr 1972: 44).

In Lenin’s writings it is clear that he was convinced that mechanization and the application of scientific advances in farming were what would pull Russia out of its backwardness. And this could only be accomplished by collectivizing the millions of individual small-holdings that represented Russia’s past. For him, small scale farming was not only technologically primitive but it represented a waste of "human toil", a waste that was responsible for "ruin and want" (1971: 245).

Moreover, the vision of a future classless society required the conversion of the peasantry, individual producers, into workers (1971: 300). Only when the rural population collectively worked the means of production would their objective conditions merge with the industrial proletariat, ending the distinction between town and country.

The specific form that collective agriculture would take, however, and how it was to be achieved, could only be determined by actual practice. Lenin was well aware that the path of collectivization would be difficult in underdeveloped Russia. He often stressed that the transition to socialist agriculture would in fact be different in countries where large-scale agriculture predominated vis à vis countries characterized by small-scale peasant production (1971: 211, 243, 260). In countries where large-scale agriculture was well developed, land was already concentrated and worked by a rural proletariat. The collectivization of agriculture here only required the expropriation of the capitalists; the farms could be worked either by the state or a cooperative organization of the workers. In contrast, in countries where small-scale agriculture predominated, the process of collectivization had to be gradual and go through a series of stages (1971: 244). The peasantry had to be shown the superiority of large-scale farming by proof of example. Only then would the peasantry voluntarily pool their individual plots and move gradually towards more advanced forms of cooperation. Lenin took quite seriously Engels’ 1894 dictum on the process of collectivization of small producers noted previously.

An integrative reading of Lenin’s works on the development of socialist agriculture in the 1917-1923 period suggests that Lenin saw collectivized agriculture as composed of both state farms and production cooperatives. Nowhere in his writings are state farms considered to be a "higher form" of collective
enterprise than cooperatives.

In fact, his writings in the pre-revolutionary period focused only on production cooperatives as the future form of collective agriculture. For example, in "To the Rural Poor" (1903) he notes that "When the working class has defeated the entire bourgeoisie, it will take the land away from the big proprietors and introduce co-operative farming on the big estates, so that the workers will farm the land together, in common, and freely elect delegates to manage the farms" (1971: 66).

However, the various draft agrarian programs of the Social Democratic party in the pre-1917 period usually contained a plank providing for the most advanced, scientific farms to become model state farms. And this was maintained in the 1917 decree on land.

Lenin first mentions state farms as the equivalent of socialist agriculture in a 1918 speech delivered to the Delegates from the Poor Peasants' Committees:

"To transform a vast number of small-scale peasant farms into large-scale production is something that cannot be done immediately. Agriculture, which hitherto has been conducted on individual lines, cannot immediately be socialised and transformed into large-scale state enterprises, the products of which would be equally and justly distributed among the whole of the working people under a system of universal and equal labour service" (1971: 223; our underlining).

But in this same speech he notes:

"Salvation from the disadvantages of small-scale farming lies in communes, cultivation by artels, or peasant associations. That is the way to raise and improve agriculture, to economise forces and to combat the kulaks, parasites, and exploiters" (Ibid.: 226-227).

In one of Lenin's major writings of this period, "Economics and Politics in the Era of the Dictatorship of the Proletariat," he also notes the place of both state farms and production cooperatives in the transition:

"The state organisation of large-scale production in industry and the transition from 'workers' control' to 'workers' administration' of factories and railways—this has, by and large, already been accomplished; but in relation to agriculture it has only just begun ('state farms', i.e., large farms organised by the workers' state on state-owned land.) Similarly, we have only just begun the organisation of various forms of co-operative societies of small farmers as a transition from petty commodity agriculture to communist agriculture" (1971: 297).

Lenin's most forceful statement on the importance and role of production cooperatives is to be found in the article "On Cooperation" written in 1923. It is apparent from his comments
that he was concerned with the negative attitude of many of his comrades towards the cooperative movement and that he believed insufficient priority and resources had been directed towards this sector. The New Economic Policy had been underway for more than a year, and Lenin stressed that cooperatives were now more important to the transition than ever. In order to be sure that cooperatives not be written off as a form of capitalist cooperation, Lenin goes to great pains to theoretically locate the cooperatives in the transition to socialism:

"Under our present system, co-operative enterprises differ from private capitalist enterprises because they are collective enterprises, but do not differ from socialist enterprises if the land on which they are situated and the means of production belong to the state, i.e., the working class. This circumstance is not considered sufficiently when co-operatives are discussed. It is forgotten that owing to the special features of our political system, our co-operatives acquire an altogether exceptional significance...co-operation under our conditions nearly always coincides fully with socialism...Now we are entitled to say that for us the mere growth of co-operation...is identical with the growth of socialism..."(1971: 372-373).

Lenin was also quite clear in this article about the difficulties entailed in organizing cooperatives. He saw the illiteracy of the peasantry as a major obstacle and called for nothing less than a "cultural revolution" in the countryside to raise the level of peasant education and consciousness (1971: 373). Moreover, he stressed the need for material incentives, special "economic, financial, and banking privileges," in order to spur cooperative development (1971: 370).

But more than any other theme, Lenin continually returns to the importance of organizing the cooperatives on a voluntary basis. In his report on work in the countryside at the Eighth Party Congress in 1919, he repeatedly warns about the dangers of using coercion or force to organize the peasantry. The task is to persuade the peasantry to form associations, to "gain the peasants' voluntary consent," and this is done by practical deeds (1971: 267).

Lenin's remarks resulted in the following clause being adopted in the party congress resolution "On the Attitude to the Middle Peasants":

"While encouraging co-operatives of all kinds as well as agricultural communes of middle peasants, representatives of Soviet power must not allow the slightest coercion being used in setting them up. Only those associations are worth while which have been set up by the peasants themselves on their own initiative and the benefits of which they have verified in practice. Undue haste in this matter is harmful, for it can only strengthen prejudices against innovations among the middle peasants. Representatives of Soviet power who permit themselves
to employ not only direct, but even indirect compulsion to bring peasants into communes must be brought strictly to account and removed from work in the countryside" (1971: 272).

Lenin later commented that the party congress had confirmed that "there can be no question of forcibly imposing socialism on anyone" (1971: 309).

What followed in the Soviet Union is well known. Stalin's forced collectivization of the peasantry, and its costs, is now history (Lewin 1968). In a period of seven years, between 1928 and 1935, 94% of Soviet farmland was collectivized (Nove 1982: 150, 174). Subsequent socialist agrarian reforms, in China and Eastern Europe, would conform more closely to the gradual vision of collectivization of the Marxist classics.

In all of the early socialist agrarian reforms land initially was redistributed to the peasantry, conforming to what perhaps may be called the "classical" path of socialist agrarian transformation. But in contrast to the Soviet Union, in China and Eastern Europe land was not nationalized; it was redistributed to the peasantry as private property. In the latter countries, collectivization of the peasantry proceeded by stages. In Poland and Yugoslavia, private peasant property to this day predominates. In none of the socialist countries do state farms predominate over production cooperatives in terms of the distribution of farmland, with the exception of the Soviet Union (see Appendix B).

What is perhaps not well understood, and important to our subsequent analysis, is the fact that the Soviet industrialization drive was based on production cooperatives (the kolkhoz) (Dunman 1975). Not until the late 1950's was emphasis placed on building the state farm sector (see Appendix B). State farms as the "highest form of socialist agriculture" is part of the Stalinist legacy. As we have tried to demonstrate, it is not part of the legacy of Marx, Engels, and Lenin on the agrarian question.

III. THE TRANSFORMATION OF LAND TENURE AND PROPERTY RELATIONS IN THE TRANSITION

We begin our analysis of the agrarian reforms carried out in the transition to socialism by the small, peripheral countries of the Third World first focusing on the transformation of land tenure and property relations. Space precludes a detailed comparative analysis of the pre-revolution agrarian structure of the 13 countries under consideration. But obviously, such factors as the inherited distribution of landed property and the existing relations of production, as well as the level of development of the productive forces and person-land ratios, condition the feasible paths of socialist agrarian development.

Apart from the African countries, few countries have found it
possible, or necessary, to nationalize all land as part of a socialist transformation. More common has been for the state to intervene in the regulation of property relations through an agrarian reform which limits the amount of land any individual may own as private property. Most often, the expropriated land is "nationalized" or constitutes a new form of social property, what we will generically term "agrarian reform property." The main characteristic of such property, distinguishing it from bourgeois private property, is that the land cannot be sold; it is no longer a commodity. Usually, the land can be inherited, but not sub-divided.

As Table 1 shows, seven countries, six of them African, have nationalized all land. In these countries the nationalization of land was often possible, and in some cases seen as absolutely necessary, due to the legacy of pre-colonial and pre-capitalist tenure patterns. In all except southern Ethiopia and Yemen, where feudal tenancy predominated, pre-colonial land tenancy had been based on some form of communal land ownership. The process of colonial rule was one of the gradual alienation of the African majorities from the lands to which they held hereditary tenure.

In Tanzania, Somalia, and Guinea Bissau, settler colonies were never of the same import as in some parts of Africa. European "leaseholders" in Tanzania, for example, held only 1% of the nation's land (Kaplan 1978:6). Nonetheless, the impact of colonial rule had been to spur the individuation of land rights among Africans (McHenry 1979:45-46). The nationalization of all land in 1967 was designed to stop this colonial trend and seen as a return to traditional African patterns of collective landholdings or ujamaa (the extended family, in Swahili) (Kaplan 1978:196-197).

In Somalia, where pastoral activities predominate, the nationalization of land in 1975 served primarily as a guarantee of traditional clan rights over grazing land (Kifle 1983:78). Similarly in Guinea Bissau, where there had been no rurally settled European population, nationalization simply confirmed communal land ownership (Rudebeck 1979: 41,88).

While the northern part of Ethiopia was governed by strong kinship-based communal land tenancy, the south was characterized by what has been called one of the most intricate systems of feudal tenancy arrangements in the world (Cohen 1984:2). The nationalization of all land was apparently the most straightforward way of overturning the power of the feudal landlord class. Similarly, in Yemen, where two-thirds of the arable land was worked by tenants, a complex feudal system involving monopoly ownership of land by sheiks and nobles characterized pre-revolution land tenure. Their power was broken through the nationalization of all land (Efrat 1982:172; Nyrop 1972:121).

In Mozambique and Angola, land nationalization was both a vindication of pre-colonial norms of land tenure and a direct
response to the particular form of agrarian capitalist development. Under Portuguese colonial rule, Africans in both Mozambique and Angola were restricted to "Native Reserves"; these lands were part of the state domain and ceded in usufruct to tribal chiefs for redistribution. The best lands, of course, became the private property of Portuguese settlers who developed them as capitalist farms (Guerra 1979:96). In Mozambique, upon independence in 1975, all land was "socialized" but private property was to be respected (Wuyts n.d.:6). The massive exodus of Portuguese settlers (90% fled) resulted in the nationalization of their properties. In Angola, private property was to be protected, but here as well, the exodus of the settler colony resulted in their land being nationalized by default (Kaplan 1979:119). In both countries all land, in effect, became the domain of the state.

In Cuba, Nicaragua, and Algeria, the nationalization of some land has been carried out in quite a different context than in the African case. Partial land nationalization was a response to particular processes of capitalist development: the concentration of land in the hands of foreign or settler capital or, in the Nicaraguan case, by a dictator. Thus in Nicaragua, nationalization in 1979 involved only the farmland owned by Somoza and his close associates (approximately 20% of the nation's farmland); in Algeria in 1963, the 1 m. hectares of agricultural estates owned by the departing French settlers (also, approximately 20% of cultivable land) (Blair 1969:56); and in Cuba, the U.S.-owned sugar cane estates and other lands exceeding the agrarian reform ceiling on property size in 1959.

While significant amounts of prime agricultural land were nationalized in Cuba, Nicaragua, and Algeria, all three countries also protected private property not exceeding the limits on landholdings provided for in the agrarian reform legislation. In the Cuban case, however, capitalist private property was effectively eliminated by the 1963 agrarian reform law which provided for the expropriation of all landholdings above 67 hectares in size. Individual peasant farmers, however, were assured of their right of land ownership. By early 1963 52% of Cuba's farmland had been nationalized; as a result of the second agrarian reform law another 20% of the cultivable land was expropriated (MacEwan 1981:45).

Huberman and Sweezy (1969:115) note that there was no policy of the Cuban government more firmly established in the 1960s than its commitment to respect the status of the independent peasant producer. The Cuban agrarian reform had, in fact, created an important sector of smallholding property owners. In 1959 there had been only some 40,000 to 45,000 smallholders (owning farms under 67 has. in size). By granting every tenant, sharecropper, and squatter the right to claim the land upon which they worked up to this limit, some 110,000 households received land under the first reform (MacEwan 1981:56-57). By the time that the 1963 agrarian reform law was implemented, the smallholder sector had mushroomed four-fold, to approximately 200,000 households.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>COUNTRY &amp; YEAR OF REVOLUTION</th>
<th>LAND NATIONALIZATION</th>
<th>LAND EXPROPRIATIONS</th>
<th>LAND REDISTRIBUTION*</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Vietnam (1954)</td>
<td>None</td>
<td>1954: Landlord class</td>
<td>Peasant property</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Syria (1963)</td>
<td>None</td>
<td>1963: 55/300 has. ceiling, public land</td>
<td>Peasant property &amp; a.r. holdings</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Yemen (1967)</td>
<td>All</td>
<td>1970: anti-feudal; 20/40 has. ceiling</td>
<td>Peasant holdings</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tanzania (1967)</td>
<td>All</td>
<td>1967: settler farms Ujamaa</td>
<td>State farms Peasant holdings</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ethiopia (1974)</td>
<td>All</td>
<td>1975: anti-feudal; 10 has. ceiling commercial farms</td>
<td>Peasant holdings State farms&amp;coops</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Guinea Bissau (1974)</td>
<td>All</td>
<td>1975: no one to exprop.</td>
<td>Peasant holdings</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mozambique (1975)</td>
<td>All</td>
<td>1975: settler farms</td>
<td>State farms</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Angola (1975)</td>
<td>All</td>
<td>1975: settler farms</td>
<td>State farms</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note*: Refers to predominant beneficiary; the term peasant holding is used to distinguish agrarian reform titles from peasant private property (also shown as peasant p.).
In the Cuban case, each peasant household was entitled to a minimum of 27 hectares of land free; the balance, up to 67 hectares, could be purchased from the state.

In both Nicaragua and Algeria, not only peasant property, but also capitalist property was protected by the agrarian reform. The 1979 Statute of Rights and Duties of Nicaraguans guaranteed the right to private property as long as it functioned in the social interest. This was further amplified in the 1981 agrarian reform which not only guaranteed the right of private property, but did not set a size limitation on holdings that were efficiently managed as capitalist enterprises. Only abandoned estates were to be confiscated; to be expropriated with compensation were lands farmed in sharecropping or labor service arrangements (on farms greater than 35 to 70 has., depending on the region) and idle, underutilized or rented land on estates larger than 350 to 700 has. (again depending on the region of the country) (MIDINRA 1982).

In the case of Algeria, private property was never viewed as problematic (Leca 1975: 134). But under the 1971 agrarian reform law, lands owned by absentee landlords could be expropriated as well as "excess" lands, loosely defined as holdings capable of generating an income three times that of a permanent worker on a state farm (Sutton 1978:54). Capitalist enterprises (other than the French estates nationalized in 1962) have not been affected by the agrarian reform law.

Syria's agrarian reform has also been compatible with private capitalist property, which has been guaranteed. The agrarian reform of 1963 expropriated land above certain ceilings, 15 to 55 has. if irrigated and above 80 to 300 has. if rain fed (depending on the region of the country) (Nyrop 1979). The 1.4 million hectares of expropriated lands were not nationalized but, rather, distributed as private and agrarian reform property (Havens 1980).

Zimbabwe has also sought to protect private property (that of the White settler community) while generating a new sector of African property holders through the agrarian reform. According to 1980 decrees, the state was first to redistribute unused or abandoned land and absentee landlord holdings; subsequently underutilized land would be affected and redistributed (Cleary 1980:30). As of 1983, only 25,000 Africans had received parcels (of up to 20 acres), of an estimated 410,000 to be resettled (Abron 1984:1).

Interestingly, North Vietnam, which has achieved the highest degree of collectivization of agriculture among the Third World countries here examined, neither nationalized land nor prohibited the existence of private property in land. The 1954 agrarian reform primarily expropriated the land of the landlord class which was then redistributed as individual private property to some 8 million peasants (Moise 1976). An insignificant amount of land (less than 1%), consisting of highland plantations, was
nationalized and turned into state farms.

A number of countries have created what we term "agrarian reform property," property distributed through an agrarian reform which guarantees inheritable usufruct rights but which cannot be freely sold. In Algeria, Nicaragua, Syria, Ethiopia and Yemen, this form of property has been distributed both to individuals and to collectives of various sorts. In Algeria, as of 1974, the vast majority of agrarian reform land had gone to a rather complex assortment of producer cooperatives, of which the majority (72%) are production cooperatives. Some 7% of the land had been distributed to independent peasants not in cooperatives, although joining a cooperative was a requirement of the agrarian reform (Pfeiffer, 1981b:147,170).

Initially in Nicaragua production cooperatives received priority in the distribution of agrarian reform land; they received 68% of the land distributed through the agrarian reform as of October 1982 (Deere, Marchetti & Reinhardt 1984). By the spring of 1984, as the war against the U.S.-sponsored "contras" intensified within Nicaragua, more and more land was distributed in the form of individual private holdings. In addition, significant amounts of national land were titled to squatters. As a result, as of July 1984, 54% of the land titled through the agrarian reform had been to individuals (CAHI 1974b). Peasants receiving individual land titles were encouraged, but not required, to join credit and service cooperatives.

In Yemen, the majority of land expropriated (57% of the total cultivated area) was distributed to individual households who were encouraged to join a cooperative (Efrat 1982:189). The majority of the 44 cooperatives formed have been service cooperatives, although recently, the number of production cooperatives appears to be increasing (Halliday 1983:45).

The Ethiopian land reform of 1975 granted possessory rights to tenants and hired laborers over the land they were working. It has been estimated that in the south of Ethiopia some 61% of the cultivated area was worked by tenants (Abate 1982:60) As in Yemen, all feudal obligations and rents were prohibited. A ceiling of 10 hectares was decreed on all holdings; the intent of the reform was to equalize the size of holdings among peasant producers (Cohen 1984:10).

This review of the forms of property in the transition to socialism in the Third World illustrates, above all, the diversity of agrarian reform experiences, given such different initial conditions. Only one point appears common to all of these agrarian reforms: indirect forms of tenancy have been proscribed. Thus almost uniformly, countries in the transition to socialism in the Third World have successfully abolished feudal class relations.

The nationalization of all land has come about in quite a different circumstance than originally envisioned by Marx.
Rather than removing a fetter on capitalist production, land nationalization has often been a vindication of pre-capitalist landholding systems. Here, Marx’s insights concerning the Russian mir seem particularly relevant: pre-capitalist collective ownership can provide a pre-condition for socialist agrarian development.

Where agrarian capitalism was well developed, nationalization of all land was, indeed, impossible. But, the significance of capitalist private property in these transitions has been quite heterogenous. While on the one hand, the existence of capitalist agriculture has facilitated the partial nationalization of land under specific circumstances (settler, foreign and dictator owned lands), and, as we will see, the creation of state farms, the strength of the agrarian bourgeoisie has often been sufficient to prevent a more fundamental restructuring of property relations. Lying behind these agrarian reforms, are course, complex internal class struggles, often shaped by strong external pressures. These we will examine in more detail as we turn to the organization of production in the transition to socialism in the Third World.

IV. THE ORGANIZATION OF PRODUCTION IN THE TRANSITION: THE EMPHASIS ON STATE FARMS IN THE THIRD WORLD

In examining the organization of production in the small, peripheral countries in the transition to socialism in the Third World, one is struck by the fact that in few of them is the majority of land cultivated collectively. As Table 2 shows, only in Cuba and Vietnam do collective forms (state farms and production cooperatives) predominate over private, individual production. These two are followed by Algeria and Nicaragua where approximately one-third of the cultivable land is farmed in collective forms; interestingly, both these countries also feature an important agrarian capitalist sector. In the socialist countries of Africa, individual peasant production predominates.

Within the socialized sector of production, the relatively more important place of state farms vis-à-vis production cooperatives is apparent. State farms account for a significantly larger share of the cultivated area in Cuba, Algeria, Nicaragua, Angola, Mozambique, Somalia and Ethiopia. Production cooperatives constitute the bulk of collective production in only Vietnam and Tanzania.

The main thesis of this section is that the important role of state farms in the socialist third world is largely explained by the pre-revolution concentration of land in capitalist farms of foreign, settler or dictatorship ownership. As the main focus of both capitalist development in agriculture and, usually, of agro-export production, these modern, commercial farms were generally seen to be of such significance to the economy that there was no question of dividing them up, or, usually, of turning them into cooperatives.
Table 2: Distribution of Cultivable Land According to Organization of Production

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>COUNTRY</th>
<th>STATE FARMS</th>
<th>PROD. COOPS</th>
<th>SERV. COOPS</th>
<th>PEASANT HOLDINGS</th>
<th>PEAS.&amp; CAP FARMS</th>
<th>TOTAL</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Vietnam</td>
<td>5%</td>
<td>90%</td>
<td></td>
<td>5%</td>
<td></td>
<td>100%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>(1975)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cuba</td>
<td>80%</td>
<td>11%</td>
<td></td>
<td>9%</td>
<td></td>
<td>100%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>(1983)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Algeria</td>
<td>27%</td>
<td>14%*</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>59%</td>
<td>100%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>(1980)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Syria</td>
<td>1%</td>
<td>23%</td>
<td></td>
<td>76%</td>
<td></td>
<td>100%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>(1977)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Yemen</td>
<td>10%</td>
<td>70%</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>20%</td>
<td>100%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>(1980)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tanzania</td>
<td>*</td>
<td>8%</td>
<td></td>
<td>92%</td>
<td></td>
<td>100%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>(1979)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Somalia</td>
<td>4%</td>
<td>9%</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>87%</td>
<td>100%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>(1980)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ethiopia</td>
<td>4%</td>
<td>3%</td>
<td></td>
<td>93%</td>
<td></td>
<td>100%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>(1981)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mozambique</td>
<td>4%</td>
<td>1%</td>
<td></td>
<td>93%</td>
<td>2%</td>
<td>100%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>(1982)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Angola</td>
<td>12%</td>
<td>2%</td>
<td></td>
<td>86%</td>
<td>*</td>
<td>100%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>(1980)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nicaragua</td>
<td>24%</td>
<td>6%</td>
<td>16%</td>
<td></td>
<td>54%</td>
<td>100%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>(1983)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Sources & Notes:
Vietnam - Bhaduri (1982); the bulk of peasant holdings are cooperative lands distributed for family farming.
Algeria - Kifle (1983); only 72% of the land noted above in production cooperatives was farmed collectively in 1977 (Pfeiffer, 1981b).
Syria - Havens (1980)
Yemen - derived from Halliday (1983); production cooperatives reported to be growing in number out of the service cooperatives.
Tanzania - Ellis (1982) estimate of use of village lands only; there are some state farms encompassing approximately 1% of cultivable lands (Kaplan 1978).
Somalia - Kifle (1983); some production cooperatives are included among the service cooperatives.
Ethiopia - Kifle (1983); majority of peasant holdings belong to peasant associations and service cooperatives.
Angola - Government of Angola (nd); there are still a few capitalist settler farms.
In most countries, attempts to develop production cooperatives have centered on the collectivization of the peasantry: encouraging individual peasants to pool their own private parcels or land acquired through the agrarian reform. As we will see, such attempts have proved difficult in the majority of countries in the transition. Where collectivization of private parcels has succeeded, this has required both significant political mobilization of the peasantry and strong economic incentives. Moreover, we will show in the subsequent section that in many of these countries successful production cooperatives appear to be those created not through the collectivization of private parcels, but rather, by the adjudication of what once were capitalist farms to landless and poor peasants.

In this section, we examine the conditions that have given rise to this emphasis on state farms within the socialist Third World. We do not analyze in any detail the performance of the state farm sector since insufficient data is available for such an evaluation. However, changes in state policy often speak to the problems of this sector. We will see that a number of countries have re-evaluated the priority initially placed on state farms, and have increasingly focused state resources on previously neglected peasant producers and on cooperative development.

We have chosen to focus our inquiry into the state farm sector on the transformation of social relations and thus to consider in more detail the available evidence on the form and the extent of worker participation in management and decision-making on the state farms. We first consider the Cuban case, where state farms dominate the agricultural sector. Subsequently, we analyze the creation of state farms in Nicaragua, Algeria, Angola and Mozambique. In the other countries in the transition, either data is insufficient, or state farms are less important, and we consider these experiences more superficially.

Cuba

In is worth noting that only in Cuba, of the countries here reviewed, are state farms explicitly viewed as the goal of socialist agriculture. At the First Party Congress in 1975, Fidel noted that there were two roads toward "superior forms of production": state plans and production cooperatives. While thereafter production cooperatives, to be formed by peasant producers pooling their land, were to be promoted, he made clear that state farms were the far superior path. State farms were considered a more advanced form of socialist agriculture because they represented ownership by all of the people; the wealth they generated would benefit the society as a whole. Moreover, state farms were also viewed as being technologically superior, allowing for faster advances in productivity, required to continually improve rural standards of living.[9]
At the time of the 1959 revolution, Cuba was the classic agro-export economy. The agricultural sector was characterized by extreme land concentration (farms greater than 500 ha. held approximately 50% of the cultivable land), and dominated by sugar cane plantations and cattle estates producing for export (Politt 1982:Figure 1). The preponderant place of the agricultural proletariat within the economically active population (EAP) in agriculture distinguishes Cuba from other Third World socialist countries at the eve of revolution. According to the 1953 census, agricultural workers comprised 61% of the agricultural EAP (Ibid.:Table 1). While perhaps an overestimation, as Politt has argued, it is clear that the majority of agricultural semi-proletarians and proletarians were dependent upon the sugar sector for their livelihood.

The 1959 agrarian reform law set a ceiling of 400 ha. on agricultural properties, but this could be doubled for highly productive farms, partially exempting the sugar estates, many of which were U.S.-owned, from total expropriation. The hostile reaction of the U.S. to the Cuban revolution, summarized briefly by the cutting off of Cuba’s sugar quota in the U.S. market and then the Bay of Pigs, led to the total expropriation of U.S.-owned agricultural enterprises. As a result, almost 3/4 of the land expropriated under the 1959 reform had not been foreseen in the law itself (Collins, et. al., 1984: chpt. 12).

The 1959 law provided for the expropriated estates to remain intact and to be worked as cooperatives. There was little question of dividing up these estates, both due to the perceived economies of scale of large-sized production units and the fact that it was not a demand of the rural proletariat (MacEwan 1981:48; Rodriguez 1965:64). What initially emerged on the expropriated estates were cooperatives based on wage labor, with managers appointed by the Agrarian Reform Institute (INRA). While in theory, the members were to elect their own councils to play a role in the administration of the enterprises, participatory forms of management never were consolidated. MacEwan (1981) suggests that rural workers had not participated actively in the revolutionary struggle and hence, were unprepared to take a more active role in shaping the agrarian reform. While Cuba had a long history of labor conflicts on the sugar estates, these were limited to struggles over wages and security of employment. The rural proletariat had no administrative or even land-utilization experience, and as a result, they put little pressure on administrators for the development of a fully cooperative form.

The reform did create uncertainties among the rural working class which produced the demand for "land or work" (Politt, 1982:15). But as government administration of the estates became consolidated, the delegates to the Cane Cooperative Congress in 1962 voted for the estates to become state farms (MacEwan, 1981:51).
Among the other reasons cited for the decision to operate the large estates as state farms, rather than as production cooperatives, was the fear that the heterogeneous production conditions and productivity of the estates would lead to severe inequality among rich and poor cooperatives. Moreover, it was felt that cooperatives run by permanent workers would do nothing to ameliorate the seasonal unemployment problem of temporary workers, exacerbating income inequalities among the rural workforce. Further, the lack of experienced administrators and technicians at the local level favored the centralization of production decisions within INRA. This, combined with the state’s concern to assure sufficient exports and food supplies, led to the conversion of the cooperatives into state farms by late 1961 (MacEwan, 1981: 49-51; Collins, et.al., 1984: chpt.12).

With the nationalization of banking, external commerce and the major share of transportation, construction and industry, the bulk of the Cuban economy was in state hands by 1962 (MacEwan 1981:70). The 1963 agrarian reform law responded to the growing tension between state control of the economy and the still important sector of capitalist producers in agriculture. On the one hand, the state did not want to build up the economic strength of this sector. It was, thus, not providing the incentives nor even agricultural supplies to stimulate this sector. On the other hand, medium-sized farmers controlled some 20% of the farmland and should have been producing an important share of foodstuffs and export crops. Another issue, was that this sector relied on wage labor which was increasingly viewed as incompatible with the now explicitly socialist character of the Cuban revolution. Moreover, ideologically, they inhibited the organization of small farmers by their vocal denunciations of the threat they perceived to private property. These tensions were finally solved by their expropriation in 1963. (Collins, et.al., 1984: chpt. 12; MacEwan 1981: 71; Rodriguez 1965, 65-66).

As a result of the application of the 1963 agrarian reform law, the state sector mushroomed to occupy 63% of the cultivable land. But as Table 3 shows, the private peasant sector gained as well, and the government reiterated its commitment to the maintenance of a smallholder sector in agriculture.

In the late 1960s, in the face of the renewed emphasis on increasing sugar exports, the state began pressuring independent farmers to sell or lease their land to the state (Eckstein, 1981:192).[10] Social and demographic factors (old age, lack of heirs, labor shortage) also contributed to the growing tendency for private farmers to sell their land to the state (Valdes Paz 1980:94). Between 1967 and 1970 the state purchased 24,000 farms which accounts for the expansion of the state sector, to 70% of cultivated land area, by 1975 (Collins, et.al.1984: chpt. 12). In the 1980s, as a result of the policy decision to support production cooperatives as another path to socialist agriculture, the state sector stabilized in size.

Workers within the state farm sector are organized into the
Table 3: Evolution of the Cuban Agrarian Reform—
Distribution of Cultivable Land

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>YEAR</th>
<th>STATE</th>
<th>PRIVATE</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Cooperatives</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1959</td>
<td>44%</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1963</td>
<td>52%</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(before 2cd a.r.)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1963</td>
<td>63%</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(after 2cd a.r.)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1975</td>
<td>70%</td>
<td>6%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1982</td>
<td>80%</td>
<td>11%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1983</td>
<td>80%</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Sources:
- MacEwan, 1981: derived from Tables 6.1, 6.2
- Ibid., p. 175.
- Pollit, 1982: 12.
Confederation of Cuban workers (CTC). Formal mechanisms for worker participation in decision-making on the state farms are limited. However, some important changes have been noted in labor union activity in the 1970s as compared to the 1960s. Most agree that labor unions in the late 1960s (to the degree that they existed at all) were institutions of the state, rather than organizations of workers. Their main activity was to maintain labor discipline and encourage workers to work harder (MacEwan 1981:152). As part of the general re-emphasis on mass organizations in the 1970s, the CTC began to play a greater role at least in national level decision-making (Carciofi 1983). The first trade union congress in 1973, for example, provided occasion for workers at all levels to discuss such policy issues as work incentives and wage structures. However, it is unclear from the available literature how much this re-orientation has resulted in greater participatory structures within the state farms themselves.

Nicaragua

The constitution of Nicaragua's state farm sector was facilitated by Somoza's concentration of lands. Not only was there national unity behind the confiscation of the properties owned by him, his families and close associates, but there was near unanimity that these farms should be run by the state in the interests of the "whole people."

The confiscation of the Somozista properties began during the last months of the war, largely as a result of land takeovers organized by the Rural Worker's Association (ATC). The farms were initially farmed collectively by landless peasants under FSLN direction in order to assure the provision of foodstuffs for the armed struggle. Upon the Sandinista victory on July 19, 1979, the farms were officially confiscated and re-organized as state farms under the direction of the newly created Nicaraguan Institute for Agrarian Reform (INRA).

Dividing these properties up into individual holdings was never an issue. First, there was no pressure from the landless peasants and rural workers on the estates to do so. Accustomed to working as wage workers in the agro-export economy, security of employment was a much more important issue than access to land as direct producers. Second, the majority of the ex-Somozista properties were modern large-scale operations; as in Cuba, it was generally assumed that for reasons of efficiency they would continue to be worked under centralized management (Deere, Marchetti, Reinhardt, 1984).

A potential issue was whether these farms should be organized as production cooperatives or as state farms. The factors that favored their organization as state farms, as in the Cuban case, had to do with their importance in the productive structure of the Nicaraguan economy, and concerns over ameliorating inequalities in the countryside. Nicaragua is an agro-export economy, with the agricultural sector in the pre-
revolutionary period generating close to 70% of the country's foreign exchange. The ex-Somoza farms, which represented approximately half of the estates over 355 has, in size and some 20% of the nation's farmland, generated an important share of sugar and tobacco exports in particular. [11] The state's concern was how to reactivate production as quickly as possible, in the face of considerable war damage, to maintain foreign exchange earnings necessary for the task of reconstruction and development.

The Sandinistas also wanted to avoid creating new disparities in the countryside between more and less well endowed cooperatives and between permanent and seasonal workers on the estates. In the late 1970s, permanent workers made up 20% of the agricultural EAP while landless seasonal workers made up 17% (Ibid.: Table1). An important challenge for the revolution was the generation of additional employment opportunities in the agricultural sector. In addition, it was argued that creating a socialized sector would allow the surplus produced on these farms to be directed towards social investments that could benefit a broader segment of the rural population. As a result, the thrust of agrarian reform efforts in the 1979-1981 period focused on the consolidation of the state farm sector, known as the APP (People's Property sector). But state attention did not focus exclusively on the state farms as we will see in the next section. Important new initiatives were directed at organizing credit and service cooperatives among small and medium producers and production cooperatives among landless workers who rented land.

It was initially planned for INRA and the Rural Worker's Association (ATC) to have joint responsibility for managing the state farms. The ATC quickly organized the permanent state farm workers into unions; the next task was to train rural workers for their future responsibility in participatory decision-making within the state enterprises (Deere and Marchetti, 1981:53).

Worker participation was to be assured through worker representation in the administration of the enterprises as well as through periodic general meetings of workers and management. Each productive unit (UPE) was to elect their representative to the production consultative council, responsible at the base level for planning production, organizing the work process, and evaluation. The members of the production consultative council, in turn, would participate in the larger administrative unit, the consultative council of the complex, which grouped several production units. The administrator of the complex, just as of the production unit, was to be appointed by INRA in consultation with the ATC.

This participatory decision-making structure was slow to be implemented. Only in 1983 was a major effort launched to experiment with greater worker participation on a selected number of state enterprises (Barricada, 1983). But this had to be abandoned in 1984 due to the war effort. Nonetheless, the ATC
has been a relatively effective representative of rural workers' concerns, demanding social services and access to plots for basic grain production by worker collectives at the state farm level, and participating vigorously at the national level in struggles over wage levels, prices, and the pace of the agrarian reform.

Discussion surrounding the formulation of the 1981 agrarian reform law re-kindled debate as to whether the agrarian reform should favor state farms or production cooperatives. Those favoring state farms saw them as being superior forms of organization for both theoretical and economic reasons. They argued that the agroexport sector should be the motor force of accumulation in the transition period. This required heavy investment in modern infrastructure and machinery which would be better managed directly under state control. Others questioned the performance of the state sector in the first two years; while production had largely been reactivated on these farms, organizational and production difficulties remained. The majority felt that the agrarian reform should prioritize production cooperatives over state farms since the former were more participatory structures and were favored by landless and poor peasants (Deere, Marchetti and Reinhardt, 1984).

The agrarian reform legislation (which would provide for the expropriation of another 20% to 40% of the nation's farmland) left the issue of the organization of production on the expropriated lands unresolved. This did give the Sandinista leadership considerable flexibility in the coming years to be responsive to rural worker and peasant demands and changing economic, political and military conditions. By 1982 arguments favoring the expansion of the state sector were heard less frequently as the Sandinistas adopted a more decentralized state structure and allowed the mass organizations considerable autonomy in the shaping of the agrarian reform. During 1983 some state farms which could not be managed efficiently as part of a given productive unit were turned into cooperatives and some state farm lands were also given to individual producers (CAHI 1984a). But these policy developments responded to the growing organizational capacity of the mass organizations in an environment of heightened class struggle, and the military and economic pressures of the counter-revolution, rather than to a failing of the state sector.

Algeria

At the time of independence in 1962 the majority of the best agricultural lands in Algeria were owned by French settlers. They held approximately one-third of the cultivable land (approximately 2 million hectares) in 17,991 farms that produced primarily cereals, wine and fruit for the export market (Blair 1969:62). At this time, agriculture contributed 81% of exports (World Bank 1982: 127). In the main, these were capitalist farms, with some 170,000 permanent employees (1954) corresponding to 10% of the EAP (Pfeiffer 1981b: 44). In the final year of the liberation struggle the French settlers began to leave in
mass, creating chaos in the agricultural sector. Rural workers, organized in the Union Générale des Travailleurs Algériens (UGTA), began seizing the settler farms and estates. These were then organized as cooperatives, largely at the initiative of the workers (Foster and Steiner 1964:21).

In 1962 the newly independent state attempted to bring these ex-colonial estates under state control. Apparently, the workers on the cooperative-estates resisted, since it was rumored that these would later be resold to Algerian landlords. Finally, workers were granted the right to use the estate land in perpetuity, although property rights passed to the state. Autogestion or worker-management of the estates was accepted, with production on them to be integrated into a national plan (Leca 1975:131).

The initial structure of these farms suggests that they were highly participatory enterprises. Workers were paid a fixed salary as well as a share of the profits which they themselves determined. The general assembly of the enterprise (made up of all the permanent workers) elected a workers council which in turn elected a management committee and a president to make the day to day farm decisions. The president of the management committee shared ultimate management responsibility with a director appointed by the National Office of Agrarian Reform (Foster and Steiner 1964: 24, 62).

According to most accounts, over the years these auto-gestion farms have gradually lost their participatory character as they have become increasingly managed by state-appointed managers and integrated totally into a centralized planning apparatus. There now appears to be little worker participation in decision-making (Pfeiffer 1981:6; Smith 1975:267; Blair 1969: 108).

The end of auto-gestion appears to parallel the general demobilization of the mass organizations and unions after the 1965 coup by President Boumediene (Pfeiffer 1981: 58). The 1965 Chartre d'Alger decreed that the period of combative syndicalism was over; the role of unions in Algeria would be to cooperate with the state. And since 1969, UGTA has been under direct state control (Blair 1969:116).

The state farm sector has remained relatively stable in size since the 1960s, and continues to play an important role in the Algerian economy. In 1966 the state farm sector comprised 2.2 million hectares (approximately what had been owned by the French settlers), employed 10% of the national EAP, and contributed 60% of the agricultural GDP (Blair 1969: 64-65). Over the subsequent decade, agriculture’s share in GDP and exports plummeted as Algeria developed both its industrial base and oil exports; by 1977 agriculture provided only 1% of total exports (World Bank 1980:392). The state farm sector remains, however, even after the 1972 agrarian reform, a major source of employment in rural areas. In 1980, the auto-gestion farms held 27% of the
cultivable land but were responsible for 77% of the permanent employment and some 45% of the temporary agricultural employment reported in 1977 (Kifle, 1983: 64).

Angola and Mozambique

In both Angola and Mozambique, the development of the state farm sector responded to the pressing need to organize production on the farms abandoned by the departing Portuguese settlers in 1975. In Angola, Portuguese settlers had held approximately 35% (3.3 million hectares) of the occupied lands in some 8,000 farms largely devoted to export agriculture (coffee and cotton) (Kaplan 1979: 207). In Mozambique, Portuguese settlers, along with other foreign capital, occupied approximately half of the cultivable land. Their farms included both large-scale plantations producing for export and modern, capitalist farms oriented toward domestic foodstuff production.

The massive flight of the Portuguese required that the newly independent states move quickly to expropriate the farms and reanimate production. But not only had the management and technical skills of the Portuguese settlers been lost, severe damage had also been levied at the productive infrastructure. (Mozambique in particular suffered wide-spread sabotage, Wuyts, n.d.:6). As a result, in both countries, the cultivable area in state farms is now less than that previously farmed by the Portuguese. State farms now occupy 12% of the cultivable land in Angola and 4% in Mozambique; however, not all of the cultivable land previously held by the Portuguese had been in production.

Both countries concentrated human and financial resources almost exclusively on the state farm sector in an attempt to reactivate production. Initially in Mozambique, communal villages and production cooperatives were prioritized (Roesch 1984:5); but by the 1977 Third Party Congress state farms were established as the focus of the socialist transformation of agriculture (Isaacman 1983:148). It was hoped that by focusing resources on the state farms, the severe food shortages in the cities could be overcome and the balance of payment crises ameliorated.[12] Investments were thus to be concentrated in the state farm sector which, in effect, meant mechanization (Wuyts, 1981). Nonetheless, it was hoped that employment on the state farms could be slowly increased, absorbing the peasant sector (the settler farms had previously absorbed less than 7% of the EAP; Mittleman 1979:310).

In both countries, the 1980s produced a reevaluation of priorities. In Mozambique, the almost exclusive focus on the state farms produced a crisis in production, due to the lack of attention to the peasantry (Roesch 1984:1). Food imports in 1980 constituted almost 50% of total imports (Isaacman 1983: 150). Moreover, while state farms were producing some 56% of the marketed output in 1981 this was far below target, and the state farms, characterized by low productivity, were financially insolvent (Ibid.).
At the 1983 Fourth Party Congress it was decided both to support independent farming and to streamline the state sector through decentralization (in order to increase efficiency) and to diversify production (in order to generate more year-round employment). Moreover, unproductive state lands were to be redistributed to the peasantry (Isaacman 1983:198; Roesch 1984:36).

A similar trend is evident in Angola where state farms control a much larger share of the cultivable land than in Mozambique. Angolan state farms have been plagued by difficulties in recruiting a labor force and this initially favored rapid mechanization (Wolfers & Bergerol, 1983: 139). Since 1982 investment on the state farms has been scaled back in favor of individual peasant producers (Southern Africa 1982:8). Planning is also being decentralized to take place at the level of the productive unit rather than at the national level (Zafiris 1982:73). Here too, some state land is being redistributed to the peasantry and some state farms converted into production cooperatives (Kaplan 1979).

Neither Angola nor Mozambique have advanced very far with respect to worker participation in management of the state farms. In Angola, state farm workers are organized into the National Union of Angolan Workers (UNTA); they comprise 80% of all unionized labor in the country (Wolfers and Bergerol 1983:120). Angola began with a strong commitment to worker participation, seen in the 1976 Law of State Intervention which provided detailed guidelines for state/worker management on the state farms. Management teams were to be composed of only one state delegate and two worker delegates; they would have collective responsibility for the enterprise. Apparently, this structure was ineffective because by the next year the law was amended so that a state appointed director had responsibility for running the firm, charged with following guidelines established by the central planning authority. The management committees were expanded to include more representatives of management, but these had no decision making power; neither did the workers assemblies which, while still to be convened monthly, were limited to an advisory role (Ibid.: 119).

State farm workers in Mozambique are not unionized. The production councils which are organized in the state enterprises are considered as the primary mechanism to engender worker participation and new socialist relations of production. However, the production councils (which have been fairly successful in urban industry) were not organized on the state farms until 1980 (Isaacman 1983:152). Up until then, there was a low level of political mobilization among state farm workers. It was hoped that by extending the production council structure to the rural enterprises both the skill and education level and consciousness of rural workers would be raised, a continuing problem in rural Mozambique.
Other Experiences

Little information is available on the state farm sector in either Yemen or Vietnam. The most recent estimates suggest that there are 35 state farms now in operation in Yemen, cultivating 10% of the arable land (Halliday 1983:45), and employing 5,000 workers (Efrat: 1982:189). Much of this land has been reclaimed from the desert. The state farms produce perhaps as much as 20% of the nation’s crops (derived from Efrat 1982: 199 and Halliday 1983:45).

State farms accounted for only 1% of the arable land in North Vietnam after the initial agrarian reform. These consisted primarily of plantations in the highlands (Gordon 1981:2). The state farm sector expanded somewhat over the next decade so that by 1975 it accounted for 5% of the arable land (Bhaduri 1982:43). In 1979, after reunification with the south, 63 state farms were reported in existence, covering more than 200,000 has. (Kurian 1981:1931). Many of the new state farms in the south appear to have been plantations, dedicated to the production of export crops.

The 1975 nationalization of land in Ethiopia included the expropriation of the approximately 5,000 commercial farms and plantations in the country. These were both foreign owned (producing sugar cane, cotton, fruits and vegetables) and Ethiopian owned capitalist enterprises (producing cereals and pulses). Given their importance in the national economy, it was originally envisioned that approximately two-thirds of the farms would be organized as state farms while approximately one-third would be set aside for landless workers grouped in production cooperatives (Cohen 1984:24).

From 67,000 hectares in 1975, the area incorporated into state farms has grown rapidly, reaching 245,000 hectares or 4% of the cultivated area in 1981 (Cohen 1984:24). This expansion has responded to the pressing need to increase foodstuffs and export production in light of the loss in marketed output from the peasantry as a result of the agrarian reform (Ibid). The state sector now accounts for close to 100% of sesame and 80% of cotton production, the two main export crops, and 20% of wheat and 10% of maize production. It also provides the lion’s share of marketed output of basic grains purchased by the state marketing agency (Kifle 1982: 91-92). While the state sector has assured food supplies to the cities, it reportedly has done so at a high cost. The state farm sector is currently absorbing the majority of government credits (80% in 1981/82) and inputs, to the detriment of peasant production (Cohen 1984: 25).

In the remaining countries, state farms appear to play a relatively minor role. In Somalia, state farms account for 3.6% of the cultivable land, 11% of the irrigated land, and close to 40% of the controlled irrigated farmland (Kifle 1983: 81). But this has not translated into a significant share of total production. Moreover, the most important sector of the Somalian
economy is livestock raising which accounted for 45 to 50% of GDP and 80 to 85% of export earnings in 1980 (Ibid.,79). This important subsector is outside of state control and planning.

In both Syria and Tanzania state farms account for less than 1% of the cultivated land. State farms were envisioned to play a more important role in Syria than has actually transpired (Springborg 1981:197). In 1977, they accounted for only 1.2% of the cultivable land, some 44,600 hectares (Havens 1980:13). Springborg (1981:197) reports that there were fewer than 10 state farms in existence in 1981, several having been carved up among the workforce and others turned into cooperatives.

In Tanzania, the state farms have been constituted on the basis of settler commercial agriculture and plantations which were relatively unimportant in terms of land concentration in the pre-independence period (they accounted for only 2% of the farms and 1% of the total land area). These enterprises initially were turned into long-term government "leaseholds" when land was nationalized in 1967. Hyden (1980:104) reports that most of Tanzania's capitalist farming came to an end during the period of the intensified ujamaa campaign during 1971-1972 (discussed in the subsequent section). Most then became state farms, although a few were turned into cooperatives (Kaplan 1978:6). The state farms produce the bulk of sisal exports and wheat for internal consumption (Ellis 1982:67).

Summary

This review of the composition of state farms in the countries in the transition to socialism shows that, as expected, the state farm sector has been based on the expropriation of capitalist farms and plantations. And, in all except Nicaragua and Algeria, the size of the state farm sector loosely corresponds to the degree of capitalist development at the eve of revolution. What Nicaragua and Algeria share with the other experiences is that what facilitated partial nationalization as well as the constitution of a state farm sector was foreign-settler or dictator control of a sizable portion of the nation's farmland.

Subdivision of these capitalist estates was not considered seriously in any of these countries, for they represented the modern, capitalized core of the agricultural sector. Moreover, these estates were generally worked by a proletarianized labor force and there was little pressure from the base for their subdivision. The more important issue is why these estates have generally been converted into state farms, rather than production cooperatives.

The main argument given for the conversion of the expropriated capitalist farms into state farms has been their importance in the national economy. In the majority of countries, these capitalist enterprises were the focii of the agro-export sector. Whether or not they were the base of an
agro-export economy, their contribution to export earnings was sufficiently significant to support the argument for state control. In Mozambique, Algeria and Ethiopia, these capitalist farms also produced a disproportionate share of marketable foodstuffs. Moreover, in Nicaragua, Mozambique and Angola, the devastation of the economy through war and sabotage was another compelling reason for the state to directly assume economic reactivation. Thus, not just balance of payments considerations, but assuring a food supply for the cities, have been among the reasons justifying the creation of a state farm sector.

The other major reason for the conversion of these capitalist estates into state farms was that in the majority of cases, their conversion into cooperatives was not demanded by the workers. Only in Algeria did a well organized and mobilized rural proletariat put forth the demand for the conversion of the estates into self-managed farms, on a cooperative model. What is important to take into account is that this happened only after the estates had been taken over by their workers and managed by them, apparently successfully, for a period of time.

Thus, it is not just rural worker and peasant participation in the revolutionary struggle that produces the demand for economic democracy at the point of production (for in Nicaragua, Angola, Mozambique and Guinea Bissau, they participated actively as well), but rather, the experience of "learning by doing." This is important because it is precisely the lack of training and preparation of rural workers for self-management which is often cited as the main reason why expropriated capitalist estates cannot be turned into production cooperatives. The role of these ex-capitalist farms in the economy is usually seen to be too important to leave their productive performance "to chance."

Related to this argument are, of course, equity considerations, which are important. It is often felt that the adjudication of highly capitalized enterprises to the workers within them would exacerbate income inequalities in the countryside between less and more well endowed enterprises, permanent and temporary workers, and between cooperative members and independent peasant producers. If one assumes a neutral state policy with respect to taxation, pricing, investment, etc., this certainly could be the case; but an interventionist state policy could certainly have enough mechanisms at its disposal to ameliorate such a result.

Another reason given for the need for these farms to be converted into state farms is the lack of sufficient technicians and trained cadre to service a cooperative sector. Moreover, this is often the justification for the centralization of management and decision-making of the state farms under a national planning apparatus. But centralization of management and decision-making, of course, can only lead to a de-emphasis of worker participation in management and decision-making.
What is quite disheartening in this review, is that it seems that no country in the transition to socialism in the Third World has had a successful experience in participatory management. And even more alarming, while most consider worker participation as an integral aspect of the transformation of social relations, few have even experimented with worker participation at the point of production.

The reasons for this lack of attention to worker participation are varied. The lack of trained cadre and their demand for other urgent tasks such as defense is, of course, an important consideration. But it does raise some fundamental questions about the nature of the state and of the vanguard party in the transition as well as about the content of socialist relations of production. These issues we will consider in more detail in the concluding section.

V. COLLECTIVIZATION AND THE PEASANTRY

All of the countries reviewed in this study have viewed the collectivization of the peasantry as a goal of socialist agriculture. They differ as to the time path—whether collectivization is to be achieved immediately or evolve gradually—and as to the means. They also differ tremendously with respect to the initial conditions for such a transformation of the relations of production. The objective of this section is to analyze the factors which have facilitated or encumbered collectivization, as well as peasant participation, in the general cooperative movement.

Only two countries have attempted massive collectivization drives: Vietnam and Tanzania. Their experience could not be more different. Within nine years, 95% of peasant households in Vietnam belonged to production cooperatives. In Tanzania, a decade after ujamaa, collective production was being carried out on perhaps only 8% of village land (see Table 2). In the first part of this section we contrast these two experiences.

A number of countries have sought to foster the development of production cooperatives as part of a land redistribution process. Nicaragua and Algeria are among the countries that have successfully spurred the development of production cooperatives through such means, while supporting to a greater or lesser extent peasant wishes to acquire land as independent producers. Both have relied upon material incentives to promote collective rather than individual production on agrarian reform lands. But the experience of these two countries differs markedly, as we will show in the subsequent part, with respect to the role of autonomous peasant organizations within the cooperative movement.

The majority of countries have viewed the collectivization of individual peasant producers as a gradual process. Angola, Mozambique, Guinea Bissau, and Somalia did not need to undertake
significant land redistribution (as did the above countries) and have only recently turned state attention towards peasant producers and their organization into cooperatives. Ethiopia, Yemen and Syria distributed lands primarily in individual usufruct but required peasant beneficiaries to join multi-purpose cooperatives. These were seen as a first step towards the development of more collective practices. In the third part of this section, we examine these often trying experiences and then conclude with the Cuban case. Here, some 20 years after the initial agrarian reform, a very rapid process of voluntary collectivization of peasant producers has taken place.

**Massive Collectivization Attempts: Vietnam and Tanzania**

The Vietnamese collectivization process represents the most successful in the socialist Third World. It was carried out on a voluntary basis, with reasonable peasant enthusiasm, implemented fairly quickly, and resulted in short-term production increases. Nonetheless, the consolidation of the production cooperatives as the basis of socialist agriculture in Vietnam has been marked by ups and downs. Twenty-five years later, private, household-based production within the cooperatives is being officially encouraged.

The Viet Minh envisioned collectivization to pass through three gradual stages, similar to the Chinese process. First, mutual aid teams were to be encouraged, based on labor exchanges among households, to demonstrate the advantages of pooling labor. Then, low-level cooperatives were to be promoted. In these, land, tools and work animals would be pooled, although they remained the private property of the household. The cooperative would remunerate the households for their use. Labor on the cooperatives would be carried out collectively with each member remunerated according to his/her contribution. The high-level cooperatives were to be based on the collective ownership of the means of production as well as collective labor. In these households would no longer receive income based on property in the means of production.

As we noted earlier, the land reform carried out between 1954 and 1956 was based on the expropriation of the land of landlords (identified as such by local peasant committees) and distributed on the basis of equalization of holdings. Given Vietnam’s high population density, this resulted in extremely small holdings: survey data showed that after the reform the average middle peasant owned .161 has., poor peasants, .144 has., and laborers .141 has. (Moise 1976:Table 3). While the lot of poor peasants and laborers had been much improved through the reform, their living standards were still quite low. There was no question of trying to squeeze a surplus from the peasantry; the challenge was how to raise production.

The development of production cooperatives offered a number of advantages in this country of intensive rice cultivation. Vietnam is land poor and pooling land would result in less land
being wasted on boundaries and small dykes. Moreover, there could be better use of existing irrigation, and an improved division of labor would allow the mobilization of labor for capital investment—new irrigation and drainage works. Finally, greater specialization could be achieved and, it was hoped, more rapid technological development (Ibid).

The peasantry apparently agreed as well, for by all accounts, the initial process took place relatively smoothly, without physical coercion (White 1983:248).[13] But as Bhaduri (1982:36) stresses, the cooperative movement was essentially a political movement, guided by the party, rather than a spontaneous reaction among the peasantry to perceived benefits. It was conducted according to "the triple principle" of voluntariness, mutual benefit and democracy, and based on the poor and lower middle peasants who had the most to gain from collectivization.

Perhaps voluntary cooperative development was also facilitated by the provision in the regulations allowing members to leave the cooperative with their own means of production (if a low-level cooperative) or the right to an average-sized share of land (if a higher-level cooperative) (Ibid: 44). In addition, family security was provided for by the equal distribution of 5% of the cooperative land to households for garden and animal production.

In 1958, only 4.8% of all peasant families belonged to cooperatives. By 1960, 73.4% of peasant families belonged to low-level cooperatives and another 12.4% to high-level cooperatives (Vickerman 1982:Table 2). In this period, over 20,000 small hydraulics works were built. As the irrigated crop area increased, so did per capita rice production, providing concrete evidence to other peasants of the benefit of collective work (Bhaduri 1982:31-43).

The process of collectivization was virtually complete by 1968.[14] By that year, 88.1% of peasant families were in high-level cooperatives, 6.7% still in low-level cooperatives, and only 5.2%, independent farmers (Vickerman 1982: Table 2).[15]

The move toward high-level cooperatives took place from 1963-65 as an attempt to increase production and rationalize labor use in the face of the growing war effort against U.S. imperialism (Vickerman 1982:493). Cadres and technicians were mobilized to the cooperatives, and it appears that in this period, both organizational consolidation and considerable technological development took place (Gordon 1981:35-36; White 1983:248).

High-level cooperatives were usually constituted by the fusion of several or all of the low-level cooperatives in a given village. The average size of these was 200 has., farmed by 500 households (Bhaduri 1982:43-44). The high-level cooperatives are important not just as a productive unit, but also as a political unit. They serve as the primary vehicle for peasant political
participation for those who are not party members. There has never been a peasant mass organization in Vietnam. Perhaps this was never felt to have been necessary, given the high number of peasant cadres in the party (Gordon 1978:30).

There have been recurrent drives to assure democratic decision-making processes in the cooperatives. Bhaduri (1982:48) reports that one of the most democratic aspects of the cooperatives is the manner in which the organization of work and of remuneration is determined. Structurally, the cooperative general assembly elects by secret ballot all important administrative committees and boards as well as the chief accountant and the manager. The managing committee is the key administrative link to the relevant organs of the state, entering into contracts regarding production targets, the provision of inputs, and state procurement levels (Bhaduri 1982:45).[16] It is reported that the genuine participation of the membership at the cooperative level does not necessarily influence the higher state apparatus or party organs in terms of agricultural planning (Bhaduri 1982:54).

The war both increased the local autonomy of the cooperatives and stimulated family-based farming. The loss of cadres to the war front required an intensified labor effort; many cooperatives resolved this by sub-contracting tasks and land to families. By the time the bombing ended temporarily in 1968, considerable privatization of land had taken place. But local self-sufficiency had been key to the successful defense effort (White 1983:251).

At this point there was considerable debate within the party as to the significance of family-based farming within the cooperatives (Ibid:249). The party finally responded with a new constitution for cooperatives which made the alienation of cooperative land illegal and ended its use by individual families. Private trade was also curtailed. But four years later, in 1974, it was estimated that some 20% of cooperative land was still effectively privatized (Gordon 1978:32-33).

In 1980, as part of the general economic liberalization, cooperatives were once again encouraged to subcontract their land to either individual households or groups of households for cultivation (White 1983:252). Despite significant productivity increases since collectivization, per capita food production had decreased substantially from the early 1960s to the late 1970s, primarily due to rapid population growth (Hiebert 1984:6). White (1983:251) suggests that during the late 1970s the leadership became increasingly aware of the limits of the cooperative system as the basis for further growth in productivity. Moreover, the new policy also emerged out of a critique of the bureaucratic style of agricultural management which was seen to place "administrative fetters" on economic decision-making (Ibid:256-258).

Under the new system, cooperative members negotiate with the
cooperative management to produce a specified output on a given amount of land, with the inputs (seed, fertilizers) supplied by the state. Peasants may sell any surplus above this, as well as what they produce on their individual allotment, on the private market. Households are also encouraged to raise their own buffalo and cattle, and to rent them to the cooperative (Wiegarsma 1983:102).

Over 90% of the cooperatives now use the contract system. And agricultural production reportedly increased by 20% in the first three years of the new policy. A survey revealed that families under the contract system put in 109 more work days than those outside the system, and used three tons more manure and considerably more chemical fertilizer. Moreover, the average family produced 38% above their quota (Hiebert 1984b:7). As a result of the new system, households are generating somewhat more than 50% of their income from private activity (Wiegarsma 1984).[17]

The contract system has also been effectively used in cooperative development in southern Vietnam. Upon unification, collectivization proceeded rapidly only in the central region of Vietnam, where socio-economic and political conditions were similar to the North (White 1983:252-255). In the 1980s, approximately 90% of peasant households in this area are members of high-level cooperatives (Hiebert 1984a). Conditions are quite different in the southern portion of Vietnam that experienced both extensive war devastation and, in the Mekong Delta, an agrarian reform under the U.S. occupation. Cooperative development in this region moved quite slowly until the 1980s; reportedly now thousands of cooperatives have been organized (Hiebert 1984a). But many of these, particularly among the better off farmers of the Mekong Delta, appear to only be mutual assistance teams (Hiebert 1984b:3-4).

One can only speculate on the future of the private economy within Vietnam's cooperatives. White (1983:252) reports that it is unclear if it represents a tactical retreat or the inauguration of a new and more flexible economic system. Debate continues inside Vietnam.

Tanzania

The Arusha Declaration of 1967 set the framework for the development of a uniquely Tanzanian path of socialist development, based on the concept of ujamaa. In Swahili, ujamaa means literally "familyhood" and implied the creation of communal village production units (Hyden 1980:96). The goal was to transform independent peasant production to communal farming in ten years (McHenry 1979:210). The policy of ujamaa did result in the largest resettlement effort in African history, with perhaps five million or more rural Tanzanians moved into villages within ten years (Hyden 1980: 130). But compulsory villagization did not produce collective agriculture.
First, it is important to note that 94% of the Tanzanian population in 1967 lived in rural areas, and 91% of the rural population lived in scattered homesteads (McHenry 1979:2,44). The creation of villages was seen as a prerequisite for rural development, not only to facilitate the provision of social services, but to engender the spatial conditions for cooperation among peasant producers.[18] Nyerere envisioned the ujamaa villages as something more than just rural settlements: "in a Socialist Tanzania then, our agricultural organisation would be predominantly that of cooperative living and working for the good of all" (Nyerere 1975:13).[19]

In the first two years, the development of ujamaa villages, and communal production within them, was limited. Only 5% of the rural population responded favorably to the new policies (McHenry 1979:150). Although the principle of ujamaa stressed self-reliance and popular participation, the lack of trained party cadre to do the job of political education and mobilization convinced the government in 1969 to begin offering material incentives to spur villagization. These included access to land (where this was scarce), agricultural supplies and equipment, credit, schools, medical dispensaries and potable water. Only another 10% of the rural population responded, however. Barker (1974:100) explains the failure of ujamaa in this period as centering on the fact that the material benefits of villagization were not widely demonstrated and the peasantry remained skeptical of rural socialist policy.

Finally, in 1972, it was made compulsory for rural Tanzanians to live in villages. The goal for full implementation was set as 1976, and to accomplish it, the use of force became government policy. By 1976, 90% of the rural population lived in villages.

Each household in the new village was guaranteed a usufruct plot and then expected to provide labor for a communal plot or other community enterprises such as small industries or shops. It was up to each village to determine how land would be distributed between individual and collective production. On average, each household received between 2 to 5 acres, sufficient to guarantee their subsistence food requirements. It is also reported that some households received up to 50 acres, requiring that they employ wage labor (Maeda 1982:19). In the villages constituted in the 1974-1975 drive, "block" farming was instituted: households received their individual plots side by side, in the hopes that this would lead to future collectivization.

Collective farming appears to have been most successful in those villages formed in the 1967-1969 period, since these had been formed voluntarily, apparently by people who wanted to experiment with collective forms of production (ibid:19). In the majority of villages, diverse sanctions had to be imposed (usually fines) to enforce people to carry out communal work (McHenry 1979:173).
By 1974 some 5,008 villages were in existence but only 7.8% were registered as cooperatives. McHenry (Ibid:193) reports that registration as a cooperative did not necessarily signify that the village constituted a production and marketing cooperative. In his 1974 survey of four regions he found that only one-third of the adults in the villages participated in communal farming or fishing; they averaged only 23 days of communal labor per year. Some 40% responded that they participated in collective work only because they felt compelled or obligated to do so (Ibid:159).

The policy of requiring communal farming was reversed in 1975, following two bad harvests. The 1975 Villages and Ujamaa Villages Act established communal farming as voluntary, but reaffirmed the aim of encouraging cooperative village industries and shops. The Act also made an official distinction between villages where communal farming was and was not carried out—only those with extensive communal farming would be known as ujamaa villages.

Less than one-third of the villages practiced any form of communal farming in 1977 (Ibid:191). Subsequently, Ellis (1982:68) estimated that approximately 8% of the land under village cultivation was farmed collectively in 1979. But while production cooperatives have not advanced very far in rural Tanzania, it appears that most villages do have some kind of cooperative activity, whether a shop, a grinding mill or a small communal farm (Holmquist: 1983:27).

A voluminous literature has been generated trying to explain what went wrong with ujamaa.[20] Two factors of particular importance to consider are the nature of peasant-state relations and the issue of the relationship between technology and collectivization.

Hyden (1980:105) notes that ujamaa "carried its own seed of contradiction" as a policy framed in revolutionary terms which invited the state to play a major role in the transformation of rural areas. Most observers agree that ujamaa was implanted upon the countryside by the state and party with little peasant participation. McHenry (1979:22) concludes that the net result was a peasantry unconvinced of the benefits of complying with the state's development strategy.

Moreover, what participatory structures had existed in rural areas before ujamaa (district councils and marketing cooperatives) were dismantled as threats to the implementation of central government policy.[21] These were replaced by a new set of village level political and self-help structures which generated little popular enthusiasm. As Holmquist (1983:27) put it, "bureaucratic initiative inevitably pre-empted peasant initiative."

Other authors, while critical of the rural development bureaucracy, give a more optimistic view of the degree of popular
participation in rural areas. Maeda (1982:31), for example, writes that "through the emerging Ujamaa village structures an increasing number of peasants are being involved in making and implementing decisions that affect their lives and the general welfare of their communities. Likewise, the decentralisation of government administration has had the effect of allowing the masses the opportunity to influence both government's actions and, though more indirectly, the government's administrative behaviour at the local level."

Holmquist (1983:23-24) suggests that in the last several years the Tanzanian government has been reevaluating the ujamaa experience and that now there is an attempt to revive some of the local structures that had been dismantled in previous years, such as the marketing cooperatives.

The technological issue has to do with whether there are economies of scale in rainfed agriculture based on hoe technology. While it was asserted that the organization of a larger labour force would bring benefits, villagers remained unconvinced. This was compounded by the policy of allowing peasants to farm a private plot for their own subsistence with the communal farm viewed as the mode to generate a marketable surplus. Hyden (1980:114) argues that many peasants did try to comply with collective farming but that it conflicted with their own priorities of guaranteeing subsistence from the household plot. Not only did most peasants not view the generation of a surplus as an end in itself, but few of the poorer peasant households could afford "to gamble with their food supply" (Hyden 1980: 115). Since in a rain-dependent farming system the timing of agricultural activities is crucial, most peasants saw it as necessary to attend to their own fields first. And since communal farming was given such limited attention, it was unprofitable, discouraging peasants even further. Thus for Hyden (Ibid:124), the "real problem of ujamaa is that the material base of the peasant mode was far too narrow for a rapid social transformation."

In comparing the collectivization experiences of Vietnam and Tanzania, the differences in technology and the type of farming system certainly stand out. In the Vietnamese case, the benefits of economies of scale and a more extensive division of labor could be readily demonstrated in hydraulic agriculture. In the case of hoe agriculture and the cultivation of root crops such is not self-evident. Here, mechanization appears to be a precondition for economies of scale.

Another important difference between these two countries relates to the pattern of settlement. For not only are villages the primary form of settlement in Asia as compared to much of Africa, but in Vietnam these have traditionally been important socio-economic units. They often had precisely the kind of collective responsibility for the communal activities (such as irrigation works) further developed by collectivization.
But just as important in distinguishing these two experiences, was the form and content of peasant mobilization. The Vietnamese certainly had more experienced cadres, trained by the trial and error of the land reform experience. Moreover, they had a clearer class line in a situation where perhaps class differences were more acute and the poorer peasantry had substantial amounts to gain. The process was also sufficiently gradual to prepare the peasantry for each step toward further cooperation and full collectivization.

Looked at comparatively, the Tanzanians attempted to skip a stage—to pass from individual peasant production to full collectivization without the learning process of cooperation among households (Bhaduri & Rahman 1982:4). Moreover, doing so in the context of villagization, particularly where forced, appears to have been a factor of alienation rather than of preparation for further cooperation. As Hyden (1980:105) put it, ujamaa "asked the peasant farmers to accept a social relation that they did not conceive as necessary for their own reproduction."

Production Cooperatives as a Product of Land Reform: Algeria and Nicaragua

In Algeria, the 1962 Tripoli Program laid out extensive plans for an agrarian reform based on a "land to the tiller plus cooperativization" program, but it was almost ten years later before such was implemented. By that time, the agrarian reform was seen by most analysts to serve the requirements of capitalist development in Algeria rather than socialist development (Leca 1975:142; Pfeiffer 1981a:6).

In 1971, when the "Agrarian Revolution" was announced, close to 900,000 peasants were landless or lacked adequate land to reproduce their families (Sutton 1978:10).[22] These were to be the beneficiaries of the reform. By 1974, only 85,788 households (less than 10% of the potential beneficiaries) had received 1.2 m. has. of potentially useful agricultural land (Pfeiffer 1981a:7).

The beneficiaries were required to join a cooperative in order to receive land. A wide assortment of cooperatives were created, with the most advanced form being the production cooperative (CAPRA) and the lowest, mutual aid societies (GEP) (Pfeiffer 1981b:167-169). These cooperatives (along with the auto-gestion state farms and private farms) were to be linked by a district-level service and marketing cooperative to facilitate the provision of inputs and sales (Sutton 1978:10).

Peasants were not given the opportunity to choose which form of producer cooperative to join. This was decided by the Asociacion Popular Communal (APC) (Pfeiffer 1981b:131).[23] The APC's apparently favored production cooperatives, for these constituted 72% of the 5841 cooperatives organized by 1977. Although joining a cooperative was an agrarian reform
requirement, reportedly around 10% of the beneficiaries had not done so in 1977. Nonetheless, it is reported that a significant number of potential beneficiaries did not acquire land precisely because of the requirement that they would be forced to join a production cooperative (Ibid.:147). Moreover, the cooperatives also have quite a high withdrawal rate; reportedly, the cooperatives have lost approximately 10% of their membership since they were constituted (Ibid.:185).

The degree of peasant participation in these cooperatives appears to be minimal. The director of the cooperative is appointed by the state, and is charged with assuring that the cooperative's production fits into the national plan (Ibid.:166). Cooperative members also belong to the National Union of Algerian Peasants (UNPA) which was created in 1971 to mobilize peasants for the "Agrarian Revolution." But this association appears to be dominated by the larger private farmers. Until 1973, when it was expanded to include agrarian reform beneficiaries and landless peasants, its membership had been restricted to property owners. In that year, 44% of the membership owned more than 25 hectares of land; this group controlled most leadership positions (Ibid., 156-7). Although the UNPA is a mass organization (reportedly of 800,000, 52% of the rural EAP; Balta and Rulleau 1978:194) it does not appear to be an organization which represents the interests of the cooperative membership, or of the vast majority of rural poor excluded from the agrarian reform.

As Pfeiffer (1981b:134) argues, it appears that the major effect of this agrarian reform has been to create a large pool of seasonally employed wage workers or urban migrants. Sharecropping, renting and other pre-capitalist relations were abolished, yet 90% of the potential agrarian reform beneficiaries did not receive access to land. This fact certainly supports the argument that the reform simply bolstered capitalist development in rural Algeria.

Nicaragua

Nicaragua’s approach to cooperative development differs markedly with that of Algeria in that cooperative development has been carried out at the behest of the rural mass organizations. Not only have they had primary responsibility for organizing production cooperatives and service and credit cooperatives, but they have effectively represented peasant demands before the state, significantly shaping the course of the agrarian reform.[24]

In the first six months of the revolution, state attention focused almost exclusively on the reactivation of production on state farms, as already described. By early 1980 it was evident that in order to attack the problems of rural unemployment and poverty, as well as of foodstuff production, the agrarian reform had to be broadened. But the Sandinistas’ options were constrained by the policy of national unity with the patriotic bourgeoisie. That depended upon Sandinista commitment to the
mixed economy and to private property. A fundamental restructuring of property relations was considered to be impossible at this time.

The Sandinistas, however, had to respond to popular demands for access to land and employment opportunities. Throughout the fall the Rural Worker's Association (ATC) had been leading land take-overs of non-Somocista land. In February of 1980 the ATC organized a massive demonstration demanding the legalization of these take-overs as well as the reduction in land rental prices and a more liberal credit policy for peasant producers.

The Sandinistas responded to these pressures with a series of guarantees and land-rental decrees. The properties under ATC membership control were expropriated; however, they attempted to assure landlords of their commitment to guarantee private property by making it clear to the ATC that more land take-overs would not be tolerated. At the same time they required landlords to abide by a new set of land rental regulations which lowered rents by 85% and prohibited the eviction of tenants. The government also began to cede, rent free, unused and underutilized state farm land to groups of workers willing to work the land collectively.

The other thrust of Sandinista policy in this period was the diffusion of massive amounts of credit to peasant producers and the new collectives. It was hoped that this would stimulate basic grain production as well as cooperative development. Production cooperatives could acquire credit at 7% interest, credit and service cooperatives at 8%, while unorganized producers paid 11%.

The task of organizing rural workers and peasants into cooperatives fell upon the ATC with some support from the ministry. The response in rural areas was tremendous: by June 1980 2,512 cooperatives had been organized with 73,854 members, encompassing approximately 60% of rural households. Over half of the cooperatives were some form of production cooperative on either state or rented private land. The greatest number of cooperative members, however, were individual peasant producers, members of the 1,184 credit and service cooperatives.

ATC membership also expanded in the process; by June of 1980 it claimed approximately 120,000 members. But it was also beginning to represent too broad a membership, ranging from landless proletarians on the state and capitalist farms to medium-size farmers who employed wage labor. It increasingly found it difficult to attend to the heterogeneous demands of this constituency.[25] Finally, in the spring of 1981, the ATC gave birth to a new mass organization, the Union of Agriculturalists and Cattlemen (UNAG). It would subsequently have responsibility for organizing small and medium producers as well as all cooperative members.

UNAG quickly took up the demand for a thorough agrarian reform. Demonstrations were held and evidence presented of the
failure of landlord compliance with the land rental decrees, the existence of substantial amounts of idle land, and of decapitalization by landlords. Added to this pressure, was the government's concern over basic grain production. The credit program had been relatively successful the previous year in raising peasant consumption levels but marketable output was less than sufficient. It was also becoming apparent that if the production cooperatives were to become consolidated, security of tenure was a precondition.

Discussion of a comprehensive agrarian reform was thus reinitiated, with UNAG and the ATC actively participating, leading to the enactment of the July 1981 agrarian reform law. The law provided for expropriated lands to be distributed to individuals, collectives and state farms. But it did not prioritize one form of agrarian reform property over another, reflecting the diversity of opinion over the organizational form to be favored by the reform sector as previously mentioned.

UNAG had argued forcefully that any form of cooperative association must be voluntary, and that peasants and rural workers should be given the opportunity to choose the form of access to land and of productive organization they wished. While they viewed production cooperatives as the long-term goal of the transition, they favored a gradual policy, one that meant giving land to peasants as independent producers if they so demanded it. As they saw it, these peasants could be encouraged to join credit and service cooperatives as a first step towards more collective practices.

Others feared that the distribution of land to individual producers would be counterproductive to the goals of the transition. It would emphasize individual rather than collective interests and perhaps spur the development of capitalist class relations. Many in this group favored distributing land only as collective property, but allowing peasants to work individual parcels if they so chose. These were termed "cooperatives with dead furrows" and were seen as a middle road between production cooperatives and credit and service cooperatives. Nonetheless, most agreed that priority attention should be given to the development and consolidation of production cooperatives.

The implementation of the agrarian reform law was initially quite slow, reflecting the on-going debate over the organization of production in the reformed sector and the consensus that cooperatives should be on a strong organizational footing before receiving land. Moreover, great care was taken to identify and expropriate only those landlords that fell strictly within the scope of the agrarian reform law in order not to alienate those of the private sector cooperating with the revolution.

Of the agrarian reform land distributed as of October, 1982, some 68% had gone to production cooperatives. The majority of these had been formed on expropriated estates and were composed of landless workers and poor peasants. Some of the latter had
voluntarily pooled their private parcels into the production cooperative, but production cooperatives formed totally this way are few.

The internal organization of the cooperatives is most democratic. The membership elects the cooperative officers and, in some cases, the members of the various commissions (such as production, finances, services, etc.). In smaller cooperatives (30 members or less), every member will sit on one commission, leading to a highly participatory structure. The cooperatives are totally independent of the Ministry of Agriculture. While they receive technical assistance from the ministry, and credit from the National Development Bank, cooperative members themselves draw up their production plans, organize the work process and decide upon the allocation of the surplus produced.

At the time of the 1982 cooperative census, production cooperatives (CAS) made up 20% of the total number of cooperatives. What are known as "dead furrow" cooperatives (those where land was allocated collectively but production is still individual) made up 13%. The vast majority of cooperative members (63%) were independent producers organized in credit and service cooperatives which made up 45% of the total 2,849 cooperatives in existence. Women constituted 6% of the total cooperative membership of 68,434 (CIERA 1984).

By the fall of 1982, the agrarian reform process was being increasingly decentralized (paralleling a decentralization of the state and of the party) and at the same time, speeded up. Both factors were a response to the defection of much of the agrarian bourgeoisie to the counter-revolution, and to the military situation. The intensity of the attacks of the U.S.-backed contras based in Honduras had escalated throughout 1982. The military urged a quicker implementation of the reform to increase the defense capabilities of the war zone. Combined with the pressure for redistribution from the rural organizations, this led to a sharp increase in the pace of expropriation and titling.

While in the first 18 months only 93,000 hectares had been redistributed, over twice that amount was titled in 1983. By the end of 1983, 26,000 families had received approximately 319,500 hectares of land (Ibid). At this point, as Table 2 showed, production cooperatives held 6% of the cultivable land and peasants organized into credit and service cooperatives, 16%. [26] By the time of the fifth anniversary of the revolution, in July 1984, the rapid pace of titling had raised the total amount of distributed land to close to one million hectares, nearly 20% of the cultivable land. At that point 42% of the land had gone to production cooperatives, 4% to indigenous communities on the Atlantic Coast, and 54% to individual producers. The total number of households receiving land through the agrarian reform amounted to 45,000, 32% of Nicaraguan rural households (CAHI 1984b).

The increased pace of the reform, and the increase in titles
given to individuals, is a clear response to the counter-revolution; but it also reflects Sandinista commitment to popular participation, and the role of the mass organizations in shaping the agrarian reform. In this regard, the Nicaraguan agrarian reform could not differ more from the Algerian. The Sandinistas have created important preconditions for both economic and political democracy, while it is fairly clear that Algeria has not.

Other Collectivization Experiences

In Angola, peasant production cooperatives are viewed as equal in status to state farms with respect to socialist collective production (Angola, n.d.). They are to develop on a voluntary basis alongside state farms and smallholdings (which have received state protection). As President Neto said in 1975:

"The way to transform the peasants’ private property into a special kind of property is through production cooperatives. But this will only happen with the will of our peasants. It is a task that will take years of organizing and educating" (in Wolfers and Bergerol 1983:140).

The process of collectivization was initiated in 1978 with the formation of peasant "associations." These could be considered pre-cooperatives, focusing primarily on marketing and purchasing arrangements. Based on individual private landholdings, members were to contribute to a fund to purchase farm equipment collectively (Ibid., 140). They were viewed as the first stage of a process which would gradually lead to collective farming.

The formation of the peasant associations got off to a good start. Some 92,000 peasants joined in 1976/77 and by the late 1970s 417,800 peasants were organized in 3,521 associations (Angola, n.d.)[27] Initially, the associations had been promoted by ministry of agriculture technicians with limited success. Subsequently, it was decided that peasants should organize themselves: "rural dynamizers" were chosen from the villages and given a short training course. Going by the response of the peasantry, this approach seems to have been quite successful (Wolfers & Bergerol 1983:141).

The problem soon became that the government was unable to deliver on the support that was promised to the associations and to collective production within them. Not only land (which was plentiful) but seed, fertilizer, equipment and the provision of country stores had been promised; but the means and organization to deliver on these promises were not in place. Consequently, collectives that had been organized began to fall apart and the process of constituting production cooperatives has moved slowly (Ibid).

In 1977, 150 production cooperatives, farming 9,000 hectares, were in existence (Kaplan 1979:207). Subsequently, it
was reported that some 60,000 hectares (the bulk of coffee plantations) were being farmed collectively (Angola, n.d.), corresponding, perhaps, to some 304 production cooperatives in 1980 (Wolfers & Bergerol, 1983:141). The bulk of these functioned on ex-settler farms. The peasant members continued to farm their usufruct parcels outside the cooperatives.

Available reports suggest that the Angolan peasantry has been receptive to the development of cooperative organizations, perhaps as a result of their long experience in collaborative forms of organization as a result of the lengthy independence struggle. More than by peasant resistance, cooperative development has been plagued by the lack of trained cadre as well as the minimal capacity of the state to deliver on technical assistance, means of production, and transportation. And marketing problems at times have been severe (private traders predominate in rural areas) (Ibid; Davidson 1981:117). Of course, the overwhelming problem that plagues any development effort in Angola is the war being waged against it by South Africa. But these difficulties were compounded by the allocation of scarce human and material resources to the state farm sector, rather than to peasant producers, in the initial years.

Mozambique

Mozambique's approach to the peasantry in many ways parallels the Tanzanian experience. Collectivization of peasant production was to follow from "villagization." The latter was seen as a precondition not only to develop collective forms of work, given the sparsely settled and scattered rural population, but to allow the delivery of basic services to the rural population. But villagization in Mozambique has not proceeded as rapidly as in Tanzania, perhaps because it has been strictly voluntary. In 1982 only 19% of the population were in communal villages (Isaacman 1983:Table 4). Mozambique has been generally as unsuccessful as Tanzania in promoting production cooperatives.

Communal villages were initially seen to be the "backbone" of the country's rural development strategy. They were conceptualized in the 1976 resolution on communal villages as "integrated economic, social, political and cultural totalities" (Roesch 1984:5). The economic base of the communal village was to be a production cooperative based on collective access to land and collective labor; social services—schools, health centers, etc. would be built by the villagers around this productive kernel (Isaacman 1983:155).[28]

Production cooperatives were to be formed by first, promoting the use of collective labor on groups of family plots. It was expected that production cooperatives and the communal villages would subsequently develop rapidly (Harris 1980: 340). Reality turned out to be quite different. Various case studies show that both peasant integration into cooperatives and their movement into communal villages was slow. Peasants appeared to show little enthusiasm for either (Roesch 1984: 17; Harris 1980).
Part of the problem was that, while in this period the state formally favored cooperative development, few resources were put at its disposal. Neither were trained cadre available to foster cooperativization. Recognizing the limitations of its resources, and the need to quickly solve the impending food crisis, in 1977 the third FRELIMO Congress switched strategies, to concentrate now on state farms. In the 1977-1982 period, only 2% of total state agricultural investment went to the development of production cooperatives (Ibid: 6). State farms were favored not only with credit, but inputs, machinery and trained personnel.

This only aggravated the crisis in rural areas, and cooperative development came to practically a standstill. In 1982 only 37,000 farmers (a large proportion of them women) belonged to production cooperatives (Kifle 1983: 72; Urdang 1984: 12). This represents less than 2% of the agricultural EAP. In total, only 229 out of 1,352 communal villages had production cooperatives (Isaacman 1983: Table 7.4). Again, in the case of Mozambique, many of the successful cooperatives were constituted on ex-settler farms (CEA 1980; Harris 1980).

Many of the cooperatives which have been analyzed in detail have been found to be quite weak, with a low level of participation of the membership in either collective work or in decision-making (which often falls to the cooperative officers) leading to general apathy (Ibid). Since cooperative members are usually allowed to keep farming their own usufruct plots for subsistence purposes, the time dedicated to collective production can be minimal.

Production of marketable surpluses by the peasantry—without inputs, marketing channels, or consumer goods—reached a crisis level by 1983. (It is important to keep in mind that the peasantry still produces close to 80% of Mozambique's total agricultural output). This crisis of "reproduction of the peasantry" as it is called in this literature, was especially severe in the south due to a major flood in 1979 and the drying up of seasonal labor migration possibilities to South Africa (Ibid: 28; Wuyts, 1981 and n.d.).

FRELIMO recognized that a change in policy was once again called for, and at the Fourth Party Congress in 1983, reoriented its agricultural development strategy to favor the peasantry. It was recognized that given the present difficulties, collective forms of production would not solve the crisis and that if the peasantry is to deliver adequate levels of agricultural output, it must be supplied with the means to do so (Roesch 1984: 36). The development of production cooperatives, however, was not abandoned; these were to receive increased state support (Isaacman 1983: 198).

Perhaps one of the problems in rural Mozambique is that peasants have not been organized into their own mass organization, capable of expressing their needs before the state.
It was perhaps assumed that peasant participation would be assured through the new institutions of self-government—poder popular—whereby local assemblies throughout the country would in turn elect district, provincial and national assemblies. But this form of broader political participation is quite different from being organized on a class basis. Moreover, peasants were to be integrated to the Party cells; but their extension into the countryside has been limited and concentrated in a few areas (Isaacman 1978:35). It was also assumed that peasant membership in cooperatives and communal villages would expand rapidly, assuring another form of participation. But given that these did not expand at a rapid rate, one is left with the impression that the period of socialist transition has been characterized by the demobilization of the peasantry.

Guinea Bissau

In Guinea Bissau, similar to Angola and Mozambique, agrarian reform has not involved a significant redistribution of land. Rather, it is premised on the reorganization of peasant production. The 1975 land law established production cooperatives and state farms as the goal of socialist transition. However, the party planned to proceed slowly (Rudebeck 1979:339). A government official recently reported that: "there is a cooperative sector, if a small one as yet. We are not forcing its growth; we do not want to make the peasants and working people do what they have not arrived at by themselves" (Cabral 1984:59).

Ethiopia

While peasant collectivization is still incipient in Ethiopia (3% of cultivable lands are in cooperatives) the government has set a goal of having one half of the country’s cultivated land worked in production cooperatives by 1990 (Cohen 1984:23). The issue at present is whether this will be carried out at the behest of the peasantry or the military.

In order to implement the agrarian reform, the Ethiopian government formed "Peasant Associations" on a territorial basis (to encompass 800 hectares). Besides land expropriation and its redistribution (based on the principle of equity), the peasant associations were given broad political powers and development duties. They were to establish judicial tribunals to hear land cases (thus substituting for previous state structures and traditional local leaders), build schools, clinics and other social services (with state support), carry out villagization programs, and establish marketing and credit cooperatives. Initiated with the help of high school and university students (the Zemacha), by 1981 there were 23,497 of these associations with a membership of 5.1 million households (Cohen 1984:9,16).[29]

On many of the peasant associations organized by the Zemacha in the south, experimental communal farms were set up in 1975.
These were to be complementary to the individual peasant holdings distributed through the agrarian reform. But by 1978, the number of peasant associations with communal farms, as well as their size, was dwindling (Abate & Teklu 1982:75-80). At this point the state turned its attention to cooperative development. Service cooperatives were set up to service a number of peasant associations. These were charged with the distribution of agricultural inputs, machinery rental, grain storage, the operation of consumer stores, and the development of small rural industries. The 3,603 service cooperatives were seen as an interim move to the development of production cooperatives (Cohen 1984:21).

According to government guidelines, the development of production cooperatives is to pass through three stages, corresponding roughly to the low-level (shared means of production) and high-level (collective ownership of the means) cooperatives of the Vietnamese and Chinese experience. The third stage (highest level) resembles the Chinese commune; several peasant associations and the high-level cooperatives within them would be fused to create large-scale collectives [30].

The government has offered fairly strong incentives for collectivization. Production cooperatives receive credit subsidies, tax advantages, and priority access to farm inputs and extension services. Yet as of 1982 only some 1,006 low-level cooperatives had been formed with some 60,000 members (representing only 1% of Peasant Association members). The majority of these had been formed on the ex-capitalist farms and their membership consists of formerly landless peasants or poor peasants without oxen (Ibid:22-23).

The available literature differs markedly in its interpretation of why production cooperatives have been slow to form on a voluntary basis as well as on the nature of the Peasant Associations. Cohen (1984:23), for example, claims that in the south, former tenants want to control their own land, farming it individually, while in the north, peasants "have strong traditional ties to their holdings that are incompatible with group farming approaches."

Left critics of the Ethiopian military government, on the other hand, argue that the peasant associations have been taken over by the rich peasantry and that they are simply an organ of state control. Bekele (1982:62-63) argues that the peasant associations are effectively controlled by the rich peasantry since no significant redistribution of land (which had been provided for in the agrarian law) has taken place within them.[31] Halliday and Molyneaux (1982:108) share this view, adding that the rich peasantry gained a disproportionate amount of land in the initial reform.

What stands out is the extremely small size of holdings in Ethiopia. In 1976/1977, 48% of peasant households had holdings less than 1 hectare in size while only 3.7% had between 5 to 10
has. (the maximum allowable holding). Given the prevailing technology, a household can only farm about two to three hectares with another two or three required for grazing (Ibid). The rich peasants would thus appear to rely on wage labor of land poor households in the associations. It would certainly seem that collectivization would be in the interests of the majority of the peasantry. Bekele (Ibid), however, argues that they have become "disenchanted with the state" and were "moving away from the idea of collective farming."

Besides being taken over by rich peasants, Bekele (Ibid) argues that the peasant associations have been transformed into "organs of central state power with overlapping interests between the two." He notes that the role of the associations is simply to carry out central government decisions at the local level and that they are not accountable to the local population even though their leadership is elected. Moreover, the peasant associations (through the defense squads) are accountable to the Ministry of Interior. He suggests that the main preoccupation of the state has been to use the peasant associations as a recruitment and financial base to wage the war against Eritrea. He concludes that these factors are what have alienated and demobilized the peasantry.

Yemen

In contrast to Ethiopia, in the People's Democratic Republic of Yemen, peasant mobilization in the anti-feudal reform seems to have maintained its momentum in the period of cooperative development. Here, too, peasants acquired the usufruct of land they formerly farmed as tenants and were urged to join a service cooperative as a first step. The 1972 land law established three kinds of producer cooperatives: mutual aid teams, low level and high level production cooperatives. The strategy was similar to the Vietnamese, in that peasants were to be urged to gradually, but continually, move to a higher form of cooperation (Nyrop 1972:121; Halliday 1979:15).

In 1972, there were only 21 cooperatives in existence (Ismail 1982:765). By 1980, there were 44 with 40,000 members farming 70% of the cultivable land. According to Halliday (1983:45) the number of these which are production cooperatives is increasing steadily.

Syria

The Ba'th party in Syria has always supported the collectivization of peasant producers in theory. In practice, while 23% of the cultivable land is farmed by peasants who belong to service cooperatives, there are only six production cooperatives in the country (Havens 1980:13,38).

The 1963 land reform favored the creation of independent peasant producers. Agrarian reform beneficiaries were required to join service cooperatives. An important incentive to do so was
that service cooperative members only had to pay one-quarter of the value of the land adjudicated to them. Moreover, this sum went directly to capitalize the cooperative (Ibid:8). Up to the 1970s, even the limited form of cooperative development implied by a service cooperative was slow. In 1968 there were only 994 cooperatives of this type, including those formed by the state for agrarian reform beneficiaries and those established voluntarily by other farmers. The government finally turned its attention to cooperative development in the 1970s in an apparent effort to raise peasant productivity and agricultural production in general. It attempted to do so by increasing state control over peasant production.

In 1974, the cooperative movement was fused with the national Peasants' Union (a mass organization created by the Baathists in 1963) in an apparent attempt to further cooperative development. While the number of service cooperatives has grown (by 1977 half of all peasant farmers (267,265) belonged to 3,432 service cooperatives; Ibid: 38-40), cooperative production and practices have not.

Havens attributes the lack of peasant interest in cooperative production to the role of the peasant union as a new form of control over the cooperative and the peasantry's rejection of what it perceives to be state control over its production. One of the major functions of the peasant union is to assure the peasants' compliance with the production licensing system, a system whereby peasant production targets are set by the ministry and credit and inputs allocated accordingly. If a cooperative member deliberately evades the plan, his land can be taken over for one crop cycle by the cooperative-Peasant Union leadership. Havens (Ibid:42) reports that the peasants resented the system and that it had reinforced individualistic attitudes rather than cooperation. Other authors also suggest that there is little collaborative decision-making within the cooperatives. Khader (1974:52) notes that a ministry-appointed bureaucrat makes all of the important decisions within the cooperative and peasants simply see him as the new boss.

The Syrian case certainly attests to the difficulties of too gradual a process of cooperativization. Moreover, it suggests how increasing state control does not lead to more cooperative relations among producers, relations necessary for the development of a collectivized form.

The Cuban Case

In contrast to many of the above experiences, Cuba offers a model of successful, voluntary collectivization of the peasantry. As we noted earlier, the 1959 and 1963 agrarian reforms in essence created an important small farm sector, holding some 37% of the cultivable land (MacEwan 1981:175). Over the next fifteen years, the holdings of this private, peasant sector would be diminished both through attrition and state policies aimed at containment (Huberman & Sweezy, 1969:120-129). However, not
until the late 1970s did it become official state policy to encourage these private producers to pool their land into production cooperatives. The peasantry responded remarkably quickly to the new incentives. Within five years, over half of all peasant households belonged to production cooperatives.

The National Association of Small Producers (ANAP) had been formed in 1961, replacing all previous agrarian associations. Membership was restricted to farmers with less than 67 has., which would become the landholding ceiling with the 1963 agrarian reform law. At that time, the land ceiling served to exclude the 10,000 or so capitalist farmers (MacEwan 1981:57).

While in theory, ANAP was an interest group of the beneficiaries of the agrarian reform and other smallholders, according to its bylaws it was integrated into INRA and charged with carrying out many of the functions usually carried out by a ministry of agriculture (Amaro & Mesa-Lago 1971: 359). However, while the general administrator of ANAP was appointed by INRA, the peasant membership elected its local, regional and provincial representatives (MacEwan 1981:57). Membership in ANAP was voluntary, but access to services in effect required membership.

In the early 1960s, ANAP was charged with credit provision, the supply of inputs, the purchase of peasant production, as well as with organizing various forms of cooperative organizations. While cooperation was viewed as the first step towards an eventual transition to collective forms, little stress was placed on organizing either credit and service or production cooperatives in this early period.

By the mid-1960s the majority of peasant households (60%) belonged only to loosely organized peasant associations that facilitated their coordination with ANAP's annual production plans. Credit and Service Cooperatives claimed 28% of peasant households, primarily tobacco and sugar cane producers. These 884 cooperatives facilitated not only credit and inputs, but undertook collective marketing arrangements. Only 3,200 households (3%) belonged to some 270 Agricultural-Livestock Societies, where land was worked collectively and the profits distributed according to the amount of labor contributed. Nine percent of peasant households belonged to no association (Amaro & Mesa-Lago: 1971:360).

The production cooperatives (the Agricultural-Livestock Societies) represented a semi-spontaneous peasant movement; these were given only erratic official support in this period (Pollitt 1982:21; Gomez 1983:64). [32] Carlos Rafael Rodriguez (1965: 69) explained why:

"It should be born in mind, however, that the imperialists, using all the propaganda means at their disposal, have been conducting an intensive campaign to deceive the peasants into believing that a cooperative movement "imposed" by the Party and government would be the first step towards
depriving them of their land. To this lying propaganda the revolution has replied with the firm promise by Fidel Castred that the peasants have every right to own their plots and to till them either individually or collectively as they wish. We, the members of the government and revolutionary leaders, will in no way force them into cooperation; the peasants will make the choice themselves. For these reasons the voluntary principle, the strict observance of which Lenin urged at the very inception of the cooperative movement, acquires special significance in Cuban conditions."

While in this article Rodriguez (1965:69) affirms the advantages of production cooperatives as a collective form of property and production, various authors suggest that the lack of official support for them in the 1960s also had to do with the preference Cuban planners had for state farms as the superior form of organization (Collins 1984: chpt. 12; Pollitt 1982: 21). Fidel noted as much in his 1977 speech to the Fifth ANAP congress: "The truth is that we, and I myself, six years ago still believed in the idea of only one path [to socialist agriculture]. We had not understood reality clearly and the advantages of not using only one path" (in Gomez 1983:157).

In the 1960s it had been assumed that the peasant sector would eventually disappear once the benefits of state farms were apparent in terms of higher productivity and the higher standard of living of the workforce. Only for a brief period in the late 1960s was economic coercion used to encourage peasant producers to sell or lease their lands to the state farms.[33] In this period, farmers were increasingly required to plan their production in collaboration with a state farm plan, to work part time on state land, and were prohibited from hiring labor. Private sales of agricultural products were also prohibited. This regulation of peasant sector activities appears primarily to have been designed to increase the supply of labor for the sugar cane export drive and to make available increased acreage for the planned production of foodstuffs (Eckstein 1981: 192) It did succeed in reducing the number of peasant producers and expanding the state sector as was seen in Table 3.

In the early 1970s, the state once again relaxed its controls over the peasant sector allowing it to hire labor and carry out private sales. Moreover, there was less pressure for peasants to work on state farms or join plans. As a result, the number of peasant associations integrated to state plans dropped by half between 1973 and 1977 (Eckstein 1981:192-193). Eckstein suggests that the relaxation of controls was a response to strong peasant dissatisfaction and a recognition that the private farms were more productive than state farms in the production of labor and quality-intensive crops. Coffee, tobacco and vegetable production had been in decline.

A new strategy was required to deal with the peasantry and support for voluntary collectivization was the result. At the First Party Congress in 1975 Fidel offered two roads toward
superior forms of production: peasant integration into state farms or the development of production cooperatives. As we noted previously, state farms were still considered the superior road for theoretical reasons, but the development of production cooperatives was from now on to receive full support (Gomez 1983: 69). Their promotion was to be carried out by ANAP.

The theses emanating from the Party Congress were discussed by the ANAP membership over the subsequent year. At their Fifth National Congress in 1977, they officially adopted the promotion of production cooperatives (CPA, Agriculture and Livestock Production Cooperatives) as a priority for the organization. Great emphasis was placed on the need for this pooling of private holdings to be voluntary in nature (Pollitt 1982:21; Gomez 1983: 165). Regulations were adopted governing the independent valuation of land and means of production, for these cooperatives would be immediately what the Vietnamese would call "high level cooperatives." Guidelines for self-management and democratic participation were also approved.

The state provided a very strong package of incentives for peasants to join the production cooperatives. Among these were preferential access to equipment, inputs and lower interest credit as well as tax advantages. For the first time, the social security system (which guarantees a fixed income in old age, death insurance and maternity leave) was extended to these farmers (Collins et al. 1984:chpt. 13). Another important incentive was priority access to construction materials for the members to build what are termed the "agricultural communities." Up to then, these had primarily been built for workers on state farms. They are full service communities, with a school, day care facility, laundry, store, recreational facilities, besides good quality housing with electricity, indoor sanitary facilities, etc.

Peasant women were often among the most interested in pooling their private plots to join the production cooperatives because of the benefits offered them and their families. The agricultural communities potentially ameliorated the burden of housework and child care. Moreover, women were guaranteed their place as full members of the cooperatives with the right to employment and their own incomes (Deere 1984; Gomez 1983:105-108).

It is impressive how the number of production cooperatives has grown so quickly: In 1977 there were only 44 of these; two years later there were 725. By 1983 there were 1,480 with 78,000 members; 26% of the members were women. The production cooperatives in 1983 covered 53% of the land in the private sector; the goal is that by 1990, 90% of the private farmland will be so organized (Collins et al. 1984:chpt. 13).[34]

Collins et al. (Ibid) report that the production cooperatives have thus far been a success in productive terms. Most are profitable whereas the state farms continue to run at a loss.
They suggest that this is due to two factors: motivation and democratic participation in decision-making.

Summary

What can we learn from this broad range of experiences of collectivization of peasant producers? The most salient feature of voluntary collectivization is that it must make economic sense to the peasantry. As Engels warned almost a century ago, the peasant smallholder will pool his/her plot when, by show of example, it makes sense to do so. In the particular conditions of Vietnam, the peasantry stood to gain through economies of scale at a low level of technological development, due to the features of the specific farming system. These advantages have not been repeated elsewhere without mechanization. In the Cuban case, the possibility of mechanization along with other strong economic incentives, is what appears to have made collectivization attractive to the peasantry after 25 years of revolution.

Another strong incentive for production cooperatives is the adjudication of land, particularly capitalized farms, that already constitute a modern productive unit. Where these have been adjudicated to landless workers and poor peasants, such as in Nicaragua, and on a more modest scale in Ethiopia, Angola and Mozambique, there has been little pressure for the subdivision.

Economic incentives provided by the state and potential economic benefits from economies of scale may be necessary conditions for the formation of production cooperatives, but neither are sufficient. The political aspects of the process have certainly been central to successful collectivization efforts. Whether due to the role of the party in Vietnam (and its numerous peasant cadre) or autonomous rural organizations in Nicaragua. What seems to fail, is collectivization at the behest of the state.

The Vietnamese "stages" model allowed the peasantry to gain confidence in cooperative forms and democratic processes, while the party provided leadership towards the goal. Many of these experiences seem to get "stuck" at the pre-stage of collectivization, the service cooperatives, particularly when these are structurally an agency of a ministry of agriculture. What has to be kept clearly in mind is that receiving credit or inputs from the state is not necessarily a cooperative practice, one that fosters participatory democracy or builds a new social relation. Receiving a specified sowing plan from the state is also not the equivalent of collective decision-making or praxis. The first stage, mutual assistance, does seem to play a very important role in fostering cooperative practices where this has been tried.

Nor has it worked very well to attempt to skip stages, as in Tanzania, where the peasantry was expected to go from independent production to a fully collective form without experiencing
successive collective practices. On the other hand, if a process is too slow, or if there is insufficient state attention, the danger of demobilization of the peasantry is clear, such as in Mozambique. What emerges from these comparative experiences is the thin line that must be traversed between a continuous, yet gradual process of collectivization and state support, but not control, of cooperative development.

VI. CONCLUDING THOUGHTS: FORMS OF ORGANIZATION OF SOCIALIST AGRICULTURE AND WORKER-PEASANT PARTICIPATION

This review of 13 small, peripheral countries of the Third World which have embarked on a transition to socialism has, above all, illustrated the tremendous diversity of experience in attempts to build a socialist agriculture. However, all too clear, is the difficulty of building socialist agriculture on a non-capitalist base.

In historical retrospect, Marx and Engels' theorization of capitalist development providing certain preconditions for socialist development appears most insightful. At the micro level, the socialization of the agrarian capitalist enterprise is certainly an easier task than the socialization of individual peasant producers. Nonetheless, collective ownership of the means of production does not necessarily assure economic and political democracy at the point of production or in the society at large.

One of the most difficult theoretical and policy issues is in fact what constitutes socialist relations of production and how this is expressed in the relationship between the micro (productive enterprise) and macro (societal) level. This is at the heart of the debate over the forms of organization of socialist agriculture.

The basic issue has usually been defined in terms of whether state farms or production cooperatives better serve the purpose of social accumulation. But just as important an issue is which organizational form better fosters new social relations of production, particularly if one considers participatory democratic norms integral to socialist relations of production.

As we have seen in this review, the majority of Third World countries in the transition have favored state farms due to the economic importance within the national economy of the capitalist farms expropriated through the agrarian reform. The argument for state farms is that they are easier integrated into a national planning apparatus, assuring state control over the generation of a marketable surplus.

It is useful to contrast here the stylized differences between state farms and production cooperatives. In a state farm, wages are a cost of production and the state directly appropriates whatever surplus is produced. The risks of
production fall directly on the state; but the state is also assured of whatever output is produced, whether to guarantee food supplies and/or the generation of foreign exchange. The state enterprises need not be financially viable to guarantee certain minimum levels of output.

In a production cooperative, the level of worker remuneration (irrespective of whether an "advance" is paid) is what is determined by the surplus produced. Here the risk of production falls primarily on the membership. It may be shared by the state, depending on whether taxation is proportional to output or fixed (in the latter case it would be equivalent to a cost of production for the cooperative) and on credit policy. The productionist argument favoring production cooperatives centers on motivation, since the size of the surplus directly determines the level of worker remuneration.

Various writers have suggested that production cooperatives are a much better vehicle for socialist accumulation than state farms. Kifle (1983) for example, argues that this is what the Soviet experience shows, and in fact explains why the kolkhoz predominated over state farms up until the 1950s (see Appendix B). He also suggests that this is why production cooperatives have been favored over state farms in Eastern Europe. The argument is that the state, through fixed taxation policies, can assure itself of a target level of deliveries, and leave the level of remuneration of the membership to their collective motivation. In the Soviet Union, until very recently, the level of remuneration on the kolkhoz was significantly less than that of the average state farm worker (Dunman 1975). The state can also indirectly influence the level of output and of membership remuneration through price policy and the terms of trade.

Whether collectivization based on production cooperatives in the Soviet Union actually provided the basis for socialist accumulation and the industrialization drive is the object of a major debate, beyond our immediate concerns (see Millar 1974; Ellman 1975). What is interesting, is that the majority of the socialist Third World countries (the major exception being Vietnam) have gone a different route, prioritizing state farms.

The most disconcerting aspect of our review of state farms in the Third World countries examined is the minimal degree of worker participation in management and decision-making within this sector. There appears to be very little progress in instituting changes in the relations of production as capitalist enterprises are converted to state enterprises.

The view that state farms are a superior form of production to cooperatives rests on the state representing the interests of the whole society; that only the state can assure the collective control over production and the appropriation and distribution of the surplus. The problem here, of course, is the relationship between the state and the meaning of socialist democracy. And can one have socialist democracy without participatory
mechanisms, not just in a formal political sense, but at the point of production?

We think not, and this is the case for the importance of production cooperatives in societies in the transition. What production cooperatives offer is worker control over the labor process and over the appropriation and allocation of the surplus produced.[35]

As Lenin noted, production cooperatives offer worker control of the labor process in either a capitalist or socialist society. In a capitalist society, where the means of production are private, production cooperatives function similarly to a capitalist firm. But in a socialist society, where the principal means of production, land, is socialized, production cooperatives take on a different rationale. As he said, they are "the equivalent of socialism."

Social ownership of the means of production is what can guarantee that these collective, but still "private" enterprises, function in the interests of the whole society. And the state has a considerable number of mechanisms at its disposal to ensure that they do just that. The problem (as we have seen in a number of cases—Algeria, Syria) is that the state may intervene to such an extent that worker control over the labor process is lost.

The issue for countries in the transition to socialism is at whose behest is collectivization to take place? The Nicaraguan experience thus far is encouraging for it offers a new model, one based on the autonomous organization of rural workers and peasants. This has already shaped the course of the agrarian reform in a more participatory and democratic way than any other transitional experience. Thus far it comes closest to the reading of the classics offered in this paper.

NOTES


[1] The phrase was used to describe Bukharin's NEP policy (Kifle 1983:14).


[3] See Levine (1982) for a convincing rebuttal to those who consider Marx and the Marxist legacy to be "anti-peasant." He also provides an interesting analysis of the continuity in the
thinking of Marx, Engels, Lenin and Mao on the agrarian question.

[4] Their writings and correspondence on this issue have been collected in Shanin (1983) and in Blackstock and Hoselitz (1952).

[5] Nonetheless, it is quite clear in Marx and Engels' writings that they considered it feasible for Russia to "skip a stage" to socialism only in concert with a proletarian revolution in Western Europe. First, Russia would have to rely on the advanced socialist countries to develop its productive forces. Also, in their internationalist vision, they assumed that the borders of nation-states would melt away. Thus, perhaps, it was the proletariat of Western Europe that was to provide the leadership for the Russian peasantry.

[6] While Western analysts of the Russian revolution have often chosen to interpret Lenin as opportunistic and anti-peasant, his contribution was certainly not lost on Lenin's Social Democratic colleagues. Owen (1963: 89) quotes Zinoviev in 1924 as writing: "The first new idea that Lenin introduced [into Marxism] was his outlook upon the peasantry...the union of a working class revolution with a peasant war."


[8] Syria appears to be the only country that considers itself socialist and still tolerates absentee landlords (Hinnebusch 1982:126-7).


[10] Eckstein (1981:192) argues that the 10 million ton sugar cane harvest goal in Cuba required the state to seek new sources of labor: peasant farms provided one such source. Moreover, many peasant farms were also net users of hired workers, competing with the state. The drive to absorb private farms into mini-plans linked with state farms also responded to the need to rationalize production of foodstuffs given the export drive.

[11] In 1980, the state farms in Nicaragua accounted for 44% of national sugar production, 42% of tobacco, 20% of cotton and 15% of coffee and livestock production. They also produced 30% of rice production (Barraclough 1982:52).

[12] Exports in Mozambique declined dramatically. In 1970 they had constituted 80% of total exports while in 1977 agricultural exports comprised only 49% (World Bank, 1980:390). Wuyts (n.d.:6) reports that the marketed output of export crops dropped by more than 40% in the 1974-76 period with respect to 1973;
settle farm production of food went down by 50% in the same period.

[13] While it had been envisioned that collectivization would move slowly, through the stages noted above, it actually proceeded fairly quickly. Two bad harvests had produced a food crisis as well as rapid differentiation among peasant producers. After considerable debate, it was concluded that the situation of the poor peasantry could only be bettered through cooperative development. (Gordon 1981:26-27).

[14] It is interesting that those who compare the Vietnamese collectivization with the Russian or Chinese case consider the Vietnamese process slow. Gordon (1981:20) notes that it took China three years to collectivize 80% of agriculture, the Soviet Union seven years, and Vietnam nine years.

[15] The implication of moving from a low-level to a high-level cooperative can be seen in the following data on household income composition of cooperative members in Thai Binh province. In 1959, rents on land and other means of production constituted 30% of the average member's income; by 1962, rents had decreased to 15%; by 1965, they constituted only 3% of income (Bhaduri 1982:43-44). In 1959, about 40% of household income was derived from the family plot (the 5% land) (Lam Quang Huyen 1961:9).

[16] Since their inception, the cooperative management committees have been required to be one-third female (Gordon 1981: 29-30). Women provide a very important share of the agricultural labor (Wiegersma 1983).

[17] See White (1982) for an analysis of the implications of this renewed focus on the family economy for women's workload and status.

[18] Colonial governments (German and then British) had attempted at various times to promote resettlement schemes, but these had largely been unsuccessful (Kaplan 1978:196). In the early independence period, a pilot program was attempted whereby the government built a new village, fully provided with services and amenities, but this model was abandoned for being too resource intensive (McHenry 1979:59).

[19] Hyden (1980:98-100) points out this conceptualization went far beyond anything in Tanzanian pre-colonial history. Mutual aid and reciprocity among neighbors (ujima) was a traditional practice, but ujamaa applied only to the household, not the community. A similar point is discussed in Barker (1979:102-103).

[20] Barker (1979) provides an excellent summary of the debate up to the mid-1970s. He breaks down the contending interpretations of ujamaa into two camps: the production liberals and the production socialists. The production liberals saw the failure of ujamaa in the fact that it didn't corresponded to the
individualist orientation of the peasantry. Production socialists, on the other hand, accept the premiss of ujamaa, but fault the way it was implemented by the state.

[21] See Saul (1972) for an interesting analysis of the history of these marketing cooperatives and government policy.

[22] Since in Algeria the settler estates had been expropriated previously, land in the private sector was not so much highly concentrated as unequally distributed and under indirect forms of tenancy; 79% of the farm units held plots under 10 ha. in size whereas farms larger than 100 hectares (0.5%) held 11% of the land. Moreover, approximately half of all farm units were sharecropped or rented (Pfeiffer 1981b:138, 69).

[23] The APC's are elected local assemblies (reportedly from an FLN prepared list). They appear to be dominated by the rural petty bourgeoisie (middle level proprietors, shopkeepers, civil servants). Also charged with expropriating land during the agrarian reform, they were slow to do so and facilitated evasion (Pfeiffer 1981b: 153-156).

[24] This section on Nicaragua draws heavily on Deere, Marchetti and Reinhardt (1984) and will not be referenced in detail.

[25] The developing class struggle in rural areas over the loyalties of the middle and rich peasants also was an important factor here. The bourgeoisie had begun to organize this group into their own producer organizations. The peasant vanguard within the ATC had been calling for a separate peasant organization, both to respond to their challenge and to better represent peasant interests.

[26] However, not all peasants in credit and service are agrarian reform beneficiaries. At the end of 1987, individual beneficiaries of the reform organized in CCS had received 2% of the cultivable land (Deere, Marchetti & Reinhardt 1984).

[27] Wolfers and Bergerol (1983: 141), however, report a somewhat lower figure, 2,542 associations, for 1980 than this Angolan government report.

[28] Membership in the communal villages was to be limited to wage laborers and poor peasants. Small farmers could join the villages and the production cooperatives only if they agreed to collectivize their means of production (Harris 1980:339).

[29] Initially membership in the Ethiopian associations was limited to heads of households. Recognizing the minor role that women were playing, membership was broadened in 1982, extending general assembly membership to any person, regardless of sex (Cohen 1984:18).

[31] That the leadership of the peasant associations is in the hands of the rich and middle peasants is also acknowledged in government reports (Bekele 1982:63).

[32] The reduction in the number of production cooperatives in Cuba throughout the 1960s perhaps reflects this. In 1963, 3,28 were reported with 3,884 members (Amaro & Mesa-Lago, 1971:360). By the early 1970s there were only 43 of these left with some 400 members (Gomez 1983:65).

[33] Mesa-Lago (1971:301) reports that in late 1967 Fidel also announced that private land tenure would be guaranteed only during the lifetime of the farmer, implying that lands could no longer be inherited. This, however, was not confirmed in other readings. The regulations governing the sale of private land are also not clear to this author. Mesa-Lago (Ibid) reports that at this time Fidel noted that the state had priority in buying land if a farmer wished to sell it, but other sources suggest that since the early 1960s the state could purchase land.

[34] Currently, the number of peasants in credit and service cooperatives (100,000+ in 2,034 cooperatives) does exceed the number in production cooperatives (Collins et.al.1984:chpt. 13). This implies that an important component of those who have joined the production cooperatives are fairly large size farmers.

[35] Dunman (1975) has argued that recent Soviet experience points to the convergence of state farms and production cooperatives. Over time, the differences between the two forms of organization of production are fading as more worker participation in decision making is introduced on state farms and the level of remuneration is more closely tied to an incentive structure. On the production cooperatives, the form of remuneration has increasingly shifted to a monthly payment which is guaranteed, and production is tightly coordinated with an overall plan. He argues these changes have made the two forms more like each other, and that only minor differences remain in their respective levels of mechanization and capitalization. In the countries in the transition to socialism in the Third World, "conversion" seems to be far off. And to the extent that production cooperatives are to be formed primarily through the collectivization of peasant plots, the differences between the capitalized state sector and the socialized peasant sector will remain broad for some time to come, particularly if resources are not channelled specifically towards the peasantry.
## Appendix A1

**Structural Composition of Gross Domestic Product, the Economically Active Population and Exports**

| Country and Year Initial Transition | Pre-Revolution |  |  |  |  |  |  | Current |
|------------------------------------|----------------|-----------------|---------------|-----------------|-----------------|-----------------|-----------|
|                                    | Ag/GDP         | Ag/EAP          | Ag/GDP        | Ag/EAP          | Ag EAP (in millions) | Exports |
| **ALGERIA**                        |                |                 |               |                 |                 |                 |           |
| (1962)                             | 21%            | 67%             | 6%            | 25%             | 2.09             | 2%              |           |
| (1960)                             |                | a               | a             |                 |                 |                 |           |
| **ANGOLA**                         |                |                 |               |                 |                 |                 |           |
| (1975)                             | 45%            | 64%             | 48%           | 59%             | 1.08             | 26%             |           |
| (1970)                             |                | d               | d             |                 |                 |                 |           |
| **CUBA**                           |                |                 |               |                 |                 |                 |           |
| (1959)                             | 22%            | 40%             | 15%           | 23%             | 0.69             | 87%             |           |
| (1962)                             |                | f*              | f*            |                 |                 |                 |           |
| **ETHIOPIA**                       |                |                 |               |                 |                 |                 |           |
| (1974)                             | 56%            | 84%             | 50%           | 80%             | 10.26            | 72%             |           |
| (1970)                             |                | d               | d             |                 |                 |                 |           |
| **GUINEA BISSAU**                  |                |                 |               |                 |                 |                 |           |
| (1974)                             |                |                 |               |                 |                 |                 |           |
|                                   | 87%            | 84%             | 0.14          |                 |                 | 72%             |           |
| (1970)                             |                | d               | d             |                 |                 |                 |           |
| **MOZAMBIQUE**                    |                |                 |               |                 |                 |                 |           |
| (1975)                             | 44%            | 73%             | 44%           | 66%             | 2.55             | 49%             |           |
| (1970)                             |                | d               | d             |                 |                 |                 |           |
| **NICARAGUA**                      |                |                 |               |                 |                 |                 |           |
| (1979)                             | 26%            | 51%             | 24%           | 43%             | 0.35             | 69%             |           |
| (1977)                             |                | g               | g             |                 |                 |                 |           |
| **SOMALIA**                        |                |                 |               |                 |                 |                 |           |
| (1976)                             | 31%            | 85%             | 60%           | 82%             | 1.43             | 92%             |           |
| (1975)                             |                | a               | d             |                 |                 |                 |           |
| **SYRIA**                          |                |                 |               |                 |                 |                 |           |
| (1973)                             | 22%            | 51%             | 23%           | 33%             | 1.09             | 22%             |           |
| (1970)                             |                | d               | d             |                 |                 |                 |           |
|------------------|------|------|------|------|------|
| TANZANIA         | 39%  | 89%  | 52%  | 83%  | 5.93 |
| (1967)           |      |      |      |      |      |
| (1960)           |      |      |      |      |      |
| (1981)           |      |      |      |      |      |
| (1980)           |      |      |      |      |      |
| (1978)           |      |      |      |      |      |
| VIETNAM          | 84%  | 90%  | -    | 71%  | 17.31|
| (1954)           |      |      |      |      |      |
| (1937)           |      |      |      |      |      |
| (1980)           |      |      |      |      |      |
| (1980)           |      |      |      |      |      |
| (1977)           |      |      |      |      |      |
| YEMEN, D.R.      | 19%  | 65%  | 13%  | 45%  | 0.29 |
| (1970)           |      |      |      |      |      |
| (1970)           |      |      |      |      |      |
| (1981)           |      |      |      |      |      |
| (1980)           |      |      |      |      |      |
| (1975)           |      |      |      |      |      |
| ZIMBABWE         | 12%  | 69%  | 18%  | 60%  | 1.42 |
| (1979)           |      |      |      |      |      |
| (1960)           |      |      |      |      |      |
| (1981)           |      |      |      |      |      |
| (1980)           |      |      |      |      |      |
| (1979)           |      |      |      |      |      |

Sources:

a  World Bank, World Development Report, various years.
b  Food and Agricultural Organization, FAO Production Yearbook, various years.
f  MacEwan, A., Revolution and Economic Development in Cuba (London: MacMillan, 1981: Table A.2.1); these estimates are for agriculture as a share of gross material product.
g  CIERA, UNAG, ATC, Producción y Organización en el Agro Nicaragüense (Managua, 1982).

Note: * means rough or unofficial estimate.
**Appendix B**

Distribution of Farmland by Sector: Eastern Europe & USSR

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>State</th>
<th>Collective</th>
<th>Private</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>East Germany</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1950</td>
<td>5.7%</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>94.3%</td>
<td>100.0%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1960</td>
<td>8.1%</td>
<td>72.8%</td>
<td>19.1%</td>
<td>100.0%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1970</td>
<td>6.0%</td>
<td>n.d.</td>
<td>n.d.</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1978</td>
<td>9.4%</td>
<td>n.d.</td>
<td>n.d.</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Bulgaria</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1955</td>
<td>3.2%</td>
<td>61.0%</td>
<td>35.0%</td>
<td>99.7%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1960</td>
<td>10.9%</td>
<td>79.9%</td>
<td>9.1%</td>
<td>99.9%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Hungary</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1950</td>
<td>13.5%</td>
<td>3.6%</td>
<td>82.7%</td>
<td>99.8%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1960</td>
<td>19.3%</td>
<td>48.6%</td>
<td>32.1%</td>
<td>100.0%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1970</td>
<td>11.6%</td>
<td>n.d.</td>
<td>n.d.</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1978</td>
<td>19.3%</td>
<td>n.d.</td>
<td>n.d.</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Poland</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1950</td>
<td>9.6%</td>
<td>0.8%</td>
<td>89.6%</td>
<td>100.0%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1960</td>
<td>11.6%</td>
<td>1.1%</td>
<td>87.3%</td>
<td>100.0%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1970</td>
<td>13.3%</td>
<td>n.d.</td>
<td>n.d.</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1978</td>
<td>18.2%</td>
<td>n.d.</td>
<td>n.d.</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>-------------</td>
<td>------</td>
<td>------</td>
<td>------</td>
<td>------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rumania</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1950</td>
<td>21.5%</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1960</td>
<td>29.3%</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1970</td>
<td>23.5%</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1978</td>
<td>30.6%</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Czechoslovakia</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1950</td>
<td>13.0%</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1960</td>
<td>20.9%</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Yugoslavia</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1954</td>
<td>3.8%</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1960</td>
<td>5.4%</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>USSR</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>a</td>
<td>1.5%</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>b</td>
<td></td>
<td>1.2%</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>c</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>97.3%</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>d</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>100.0%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>e</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>100.0%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>f</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>100.0%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>g</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>100.0%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>h</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>100.0%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
| Sources: Eastern Europe compiled from Kifile (1983: Tables 8, 9, 10); USSR from (a) Nove (1982:150, 174); (b) Strauss (1969: Tables 28, 37, 38); (c) Great Soviet Encyclopedia (N.Y.: MacMillan, 1979).
REFERENCES

General


Ellman, M., "Did the Agricultural Surplus Provide the Resources for the Increase in Investment in the USSR during the First Five Year Plan?" The Economic Journal, 85, 1975: 844-63.


Food and Agricultural Organization, FAO Production Yearbook (Rome: FAO, various years).


--------, *The Development of Capitalism in Russia* (1895), (Moscow: Progress Publishers, 1974).


**Algeria**


Angola


Cuba


Gomez, O., De la Finca Individual a la Cooperativa Agropecuaria (La Habana: Editora Política, 1983).


Mayo, J., Dos Decadas de Lucha Contra el Latifundismo: Breve Historia de la Asociacion Nacional Campesina (La Habana: Editora


Ethiopia


Guinea Bissau


------, "Socialist-Oriented Development in Guinea Bissau," in Rosberg, Carl G. and Callaghy, Thomas M. (eds.), *Socialism in Sub-Saharan Africa*, (Berkeley: University of


Centro de Estudos Africanos, A Transformação da Agricultura Familiar na Provincia Nampula, (Maputo: Eduardo Mondlane University, 1980).


Isaacman, Allen, A Luta Continua, (Maputo: Eduardo Mondlane University, 1978).

------, and Isaacman, R., Mozambique: From Colonialism to Revolution, (Boulder, 1985).

Kile, Henock, "State Farms and the Socialist Transformation in Agriculture," OP. CIT.

Lappe, Francis-Moore and Beccar-Varela, Adele, Mozambique and Tanzania: Asking the Big Questions, (San Francisco: Institute for Food and Development Policy, 1980).


Nicaragua


Barracough, Solon, A Preliminary Analysis of the Nicaraguan Food System, (Geneva: UNRISD, 1982).


Centro de Estudios e Investigación de la Reforma Agraria (CIERA), La Mujer en las Cooperativas Agropecuarias en Nicaragua, (Managua: CIERA, 1984).

CIERA/ UNAG/ ATC, Producción y Organización en el Agro Nicaragüense, (Managua: CIERA, 1982).


------, and Peter Marchetti, S.J., "The Worker-Peasant Alliance in the First Year of the Nicaraguan Agrarian Reform," Latin American Perspectives, 8:2 (Spring), 1981.


------, "Desarrollo del Movimiento Cooperativo Nicaraguense y la Participación de los Campesinos en la Transformación del Agro," mimeo, Managua, 1982.


Syria


Tanzania


Hyden, Goran, Beyond Ujamaa in Tanzania (Berkeley: University of


Vietnam


Personal Interview by Lynn Duggan, July 1984b.


Yemen


Zimbabwe


Cleary, Seamus, Zimbabwe is Born, (Johannesburg: S. A. Institute of Race Relations, 1980).

Economist Intelligence Unit, Quarterly Economic Review of Zimbabwe and Malawi, 3rd Quarter and Annual Supplement, 1982.

