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

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NOTE FROM THE DIRECTORS

We are proud to present this inaugural issue of the ***Journal of Undergraduate Research on Mexico***, *Inclusive Exclusions*. Thanks to support from the Kellogg Institute for International Studies, this volume is the product of an interdisciplinary forum at the University of Notre Dame organized by the **Mexico Working Group**. It brings together the best three papers presented during our first biennial **Undergraduate Student Conference on Mexico (UCOM)** in early 2011—"Looking Abroad for Answers: Mexico's Confidential Embassy Communications of 1968" by Joseph VanderZee (awarded Best Paper on Mexico); "Reconstructing the Constructions: Media Representations & Arizona SB1070" by Bridget Flores; and "Comparing Generations: Literary Voices & Mexican-American Youth" by Nicole Ashley, Cari Pick, & Elizabeth Young.

The idea of putting UCOM together emerged from informal conversation while we were co-teaching a course called *The Mexican Revolution: One Hundred Years of Images and Interpretations* (Fall 2010). Initially, we considered creating an academic forum to examine the difficult situation Mexico had experienced over the previous decade, primarily as a result of its war on drugs. But we ultimately decided to expand our scope by giving undergraduate students an opportunity to share common interests in Mexico and its diaspora through their research. With this intention in mind, we titled the conference ***Mexico: 1810, 1910, 2010*** to commemorate the bicentennial of Mexico's independence and the centennial of its revolution. We invited all undergraduates at Notre Dame to participate, then asked graduate students of History and Political Science to serve as commentators and moderators.

These choices paid off. Undergraduate and graduate students from a wide range of disciplines found fertile ground for collaboration through Mexico-related topics. In addition to History and Political Science, the conference also attracted students majoring in Business, Engineering, Pre-Medicine, Romance Languages, Sociology, and Theology. This interdisciplinary environment engaged the audience in lively discussions concerning various aspects of Mexican experience, including identity politics, state formation, modernity, political violence, and immigration. To deepen the dialogue, we also invited special guests: our keynote speaker, Dr. Enrique Ochoa (UCLA), examined Mexico's struggles for food sovereignty in an era of globalization, while Chicago ensemble *Sones de México* offered a workshop concert to highlight Mexico's diverse music from regional-historical perspectives.

UCOM 2013 remains committed to the professionalization of our students and the interdisciplinary nature of our Working Group. To broaden the impetus of Mexican studies, we have now extended the invitation to undergraduates at universities throughout the Midwest region. This year's theme, ***¿México?,*** begins by observing how the 2012 return to power of the Institutional Revolutionary Party (PRI) highlights resilient continuities *and* massive changes in Mexico at the dawn of the 21st Century. This implies many questions for discussion during the conference, among them: How will an old regime adapt to the new rules? Once a revolutionary inspiration and a cultural powerhouse, what does Mexico represent in the world today? How does an ever-present history combine with ever-increasing globalization to define what it means to be "Mexican", both at home and abroad?

To answer these questions and more, the Working Group has invited key influential figures in Mexican Studies to participate in **Mexico Week @ ND**, a new series of academic events leading to the conference on April 27, 2013. These guests include democracy advocate Cuauhtémoc Cárdenas, whose 1988 presidential run opened up the political process in Mexico; Alejandro Lubezki, whose film *El Ingeniero* (2012) received the Best Documentary award at The Mexican Film Festival of the Americas (MFFA) in Chicago; and two of the world's leading historians of Mexico—Enrique Krauze and Alan Knight.

Since its inception, the Mexico Working Group has actively facilitated events relevant not only to our academic community but also to public conceptions of Mexico and its diaspora in the United States. In January 2012 the Working Group co-hosted an event with Mexico's Federal Electoral Institute (IFE) in Chicago on Mexican citizens' right to vote abroad. Entitled **Constructing Mexican Democracy**, this high-level conference resulted from collaboration between the Kellogg Institute, the ND Institute for Latino Studies, the ND Office of Internationalization, the University of Chicago, and De Paul University. It welcomed representatives from all seven major Mexican political parties, remarkable international media coverage, and a full, eclectic audience—from academics and students to national migrant groups and members of Chicago's Mexican community.

In addition, the Working Group has organized monthly workshops for our graduate students, faculty, and guests; led the planning of Notre Dame's annual Day of the Dead (*Día de los Muertos*) celebration; teamed with the Snite Museum of Art to better expose their extensive print collection from the ***Taller de Gráfica Popular***; and launched an innovative series called ***Diálogos*: Conversations with Mexico**. By the end of the 2012-2013 academic year, *Diálogos* will have brought together a towering group of international visitors and Notre Dame faculty—Elisa Servín (Professor of the Instituto Nacional de Antropologia e Historia), Guillermo Trejo (Associate Professor of Political Science at Notre Dame), Manuel Camacho Solís (Federal Senator of Mexico), Michael Coppedge (Professor of Political Science at Notre Dame), Enrique Krauze (Director of *Letras Libres*), Cuauhtémoc Cárdenas (Hewlett Visiting Fellow for Public Policy at the University of Notre Dame), and Alan Knight (Professor of History and Fellow of St. Anthony College at the University of Oxford). Past presenters also include Ted Beatty (Associate Professor of History at Notre Dame), José Antonio Aguilar Rivera (Professor and Researcher in Political Science at the Centro de Investigación y Docencia Económicas), Emilio Kourí (Professor of History and Director of the Katz Center for Mexican Studies at the University of Chicago), and Eric Zolov (Associate Professor of History at Stony Brook SUNY and Senior Editor of *The Americas*).

Beyond demonstrating the quality of our students' research, we hope our first *Journal of Undergraduate Research on Mexico* will give you a sense of our institutional and personal commitment to continue strengthening ties between Mexico, the University of Notre Dame, and academia at large. We invite you to contact us for more information, or to find ways to become involved.

Saludos Cordiales,



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NOTE FROM THE EDITOR

The fundamental categorical pair of Western politics is not that of friend/enemy but that of bare life/political existence, zoē/bios, exclusion/inclusion. There is politics because man is the living being who, in language, separates and opposes himself to his own bare life and, at the same time maintains himself in relation to that bare life in an inclusive exclusion.

~ Giorgio Agamben, *Homo Sacer*, 1998

All three articles here concern discourse. How do parameters of communication construct meaning, and how does meaning interact with power? No matter the moment in history, let us resist illusions of removal; even when we digest the words in this volume, the forces they examine rumble in our bellies.

Traditionally, Western civilizations have built systems of education that prioritize hierarchy. From Plato's Academy to early Clare College to the modern university, students have advanced by adopting the expertise of their academic superiors. Even as paradigms have transformed over centuries, ladders of intellectuals have mediated access to discursive voice.

Insofar as power and knowledge are mutually inextricable, categories of rank within a society's collective self feed exclusion just as well as othering does; ladders and fences bound membership in tandem. We value the merits of a quality liberal arts education, yet do we question the perpetuation of its origins? "Liberal arts" arose to distinguish the free and civilized from those who were not.[1]

Progressive wings of higher education flap furiously against traditional elitism, but they often suspend flight by invoking rights of the marginalized, which reinforces the labels they wish to dissolve. In my own undergraduate experience, I was far too entranced with humanism to notice how humanitarian institutions are fundamentally complicit to structures of violence—too busy salivating over the rhetoric of global citizenship so eloquently bestowed from lectures and books.[2]

Drawing from Hannah Arendt, Giorgio Agamben discusses the concept of *refugee* as "the paradigm of a new historical consciousness."[3] The refugee disturbs the liberal nation-state's conceptual foundations because she is touching the fence, an abject other whose bare life cannot be characterized by the features of citizenship which normally protect inalienable rights. To Agamben, the politics of inclusive exclusions have allowed humanist discourse to sustain without dismantling the power structures that contradict it. However, he imagines an "extraterritorial space" that could heal the rupture between unqualified life (*zoē*) and qualified life (*bios*)—a land where "the citizen acknowledges the refugee that he himself is."[4]

In the same fashion, this publication is an effort to transcend the dichotomies that underpin modernity. It brings the undergraduate student out of the ladder's shadow, up to a sunlit balcony. It brings the American reader to a mirror with Mexico—the refugee just over the fence. And it points to a wider storyline, an historical progression that leads to new conceptualizations of the self, both individual and collective.

We begin with our winner of Best Paper on Mexico (2010), Joseph VanderZee's "Looking Abroad For Answers." VanderZee critically engages the literature on the Tlatelolco massacre of 1968 to problematize its tendency to construe the Mexican state as an enraged father. As he dives into primary sources that reveal a research-oriented bureaucracy concerned with its international context, I invite you to contemplate state identity and its relation with the nation.

Then arrives our runner-up, Bridget Flores' "Reconstructing the Constructions." Flores conducts a discourse analysis of media representations surrounding the controversial

[1] For more on the history of liberal arts, see Ernst Robert Curtius, *European Literature and the Latin Middle Ages* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1973).

[2] For more on this complicity, see Michalinos Zembylas, "Agamben's Theory of Biopower and Immigrants/Refugees/Asylum Seekers: Discourses of Citizenship and the Implications for Curriculum Theorizing," *Journal of Curriculum Theorizing* 26, no. 2 (2010).

[3] Giorgio Agamben (Translation by Michael Rocke), "We Refugees," *Symposium* 49, no. 2 (Summer 1995), 114.

[4] Ibid., 119.

Arizona immigration law (SB 1070). As she examines coverage from *The New York Times* and *The Arizona Republic* in terms of their contribution to deliberative democracy, I invite you to reflect upon how your own participation in public dialogue interacts with deviant labeling.

Finally our runner-up, "Comparing Generations" by Nicole Ashley, Cari Pick, & Elizabeth Young, takes it home for us. They innovate a comparative framework to examine the relationship between migrant voices in Chicano Rennaissance Literature and those of contemporary Mexican-American youth in South Bend. As they exhibit the transformational wisdom inherent to Participatory Action Research, I invite you to conceive of at least one way you will help bridge the gap between academia and community organizations in the coming year.

A recent undergraduate myself, I have felt quite honored at the opportunity to usher these papers from their original conference drafts to the form you see today. Like any other working paper, these pieces have been subjected to rigorous peer review prior to the point of publication. Still, they maintain the special quality of student perspective.

So let us celebrate these achievements yet remain privy to polarizations hiding behind the mirror, rippling our reflections into waves of dominant ideologies. For while we certainly must acknowledge the already excluded, we must take equal care to avert the trap of that label. Following Arendt and Agamben, perhaps we could start by recalling the fence between our own bare life and political existence—W*e Refugees*.

In Peace,

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Looking Abroad For Answers: Mexico's Confidential Embassy Communications in '68

Joseph VanderZee

ABSTRACT

On October 2, 1968, the Tlatelolco massacre shuttered Mexico's student movement, yet also opened a reactive, restorative process in which grassroots voices provided a persuasive alternative to the government's official story. Even after historians gained access to confidential documents, those powerful efforts have proven invaluable. However, the allegory of their emergent narrative—an enraged father lashing out against his children's misbehavior—has stunted our understanding of the motives behind the regime's deadly decisions. To deconstruct this trope, I trace the breadth of analytical perspectives on '68 along two spectral dimensions: grassroots/government and personal/institutional. This "Eye-Lean Model" asks from whose eyes and with which explanatory lean chroniclers present their narratives. Upon discovering how consistently they have overlooked the historical construction of the enraged father, I return to source-based analysis in search of deeper insight about government motives. I examine previously overlooked files from the Secretary of Foreign Relations archive that detail how the administration looked abroad for answers to their puzzling situation in the months leading up to the massacre. Contrary to the portrait of the father state's delusional paranoia or naked embarrassment, these documents expose the government as a rational, research-oriented bureaucratic apparatus.

INTRODUCTION

After Mexican military forces opened murderous fire on students protesting in Tlatelolco Square on October 2, 1968, reporters started questioning their government's control of media, the nature of the student movement, and the motivations behind such drastic measures. This latter concern may be most frustrating, as the federal government never strayed from its official yet falsified claim that the students fired first. As Mexico City made final preparations for the Olympic Games, government leaders thoroughly established their story in the press, but others began to voice their versions of the story as years and decades passed.

In the face of federal silence, historical accounts emerging in this process struggled to confront their government directly. Early grassroots interpretations looked primarily to Mexico's internal political culture—its paternalistic presidency and emphasis on ruling Party order—to describe a government convinced of foreign communist threats to their authority meriting violent intervention. Meanwhile these explanations maintained that the students most certainly did not pose such threats. Still, the state remained reticent, and the grassroots accounts transformed into a new official history of Tlatelolco as their proponents entered the ranks of Mexico's political and intellectual elite.[1] Their omnipresent narrative fixates on a model of state authority based on disgruntled paternalism, which I call the *enraged father syndrome*. This line served to redeem the student movement's leaders and participants while indicting the state for its crimes.

The story leading up to the massacre, however, is more complicated than this narrative suggests. Even as more internal government sources have come to light, accounts of '68 have continued to overlook the historical construction of the enraged father. While the government's crimes were very real, so were the men who committed them and the institutions they inhabited. To make inroads into the study of '68, historians should revitalize source-based analysis by resisting the broad literary, political, and theoretical strokes that plague most of the extant literature. If we believe the most sympathetic rendering of historical subjects from sources closest to their own perspective will help us understand them properly, then neither official history of '68 is satisfactory.

Until now, Herbert Braun may be the only historian who has transcended the enraged father narrative without resorting to broad explanatory sweeps. In his 1997 article, "Protests of Engagement", Braun foregoes the tendency in Mexican historiography to investigate how state agents oppress and exploit civil society or how societal members rebel against and concede to the state. Instead, he tells "the story of a relationship between a president who faced students who in turn were seeking both to contest him and to attract him, that is, to engage him."[2] This endeavor takes a vital first step to reconstruct the narrative of '68, but it focuses on the motives of the protestors rather than the government. So while Braun's insights present the interactions of '68 under new light, we still lack an in-depth portrait of the government's decision-making process.[3]

To better paint that picture, I examine declassified files from the Secretary of Foreign Relations. In light of these records, I argue the state did not resemble an enraged father so much as a bureaucratic apparatus undertaking a rational (albeit misguided) process of research-based professionalism. While President Díaz Ordaz's patriarchal soul-searching influenced his interpretation of events, he was also digesting factually presented information before taking action. The archive I review reveals that one month before the massacre, the Secretary of Foreign Relations sent Mexican embassies an encrypted telegram requesting information about recent disturbances, movements, or uprisings, "principally of student character" in their respective countries.

[1] See Herbert Braun, "Protests of Engagement: Dignity, False Love, and Self-Love in Mexico during 1968," *Comparative Studies in Society and History* 39, no. 3 (July 1997): 512.

[2] Braun, 518

[3] With regard to making declassified documents on the Tlatelolco massacre accessible to researchers, Kate Doyle's work at the National Security Archive of George Washington University deserves special mention. For more, see "The Dead of Tlatelolco: Using the archives to exhume the past", *National Security Archive* . That said, Doyle's publications make no mention of the documents I present from the archive of the Secretary of Foreign Relations.

Over a dozen ambassadors from at least four continents sent quick and thorough responses. The Secretary's study of the Cold War's international student protest phenomenon highlights a clearly documented path to help us understand what prompted the government's deadly decision—without the limits of sensationalism and overgeneralization.

WHOSE EYES? WHICH LEAN?

Before we can appreciate the explanatory relevance of the Secretary's global inquiry, we must first envision the current range of analytical approaches to the massacre. The earliest publications responded to a lack of reliable information from "the top" (internal government sources) by looking to the participants and public records (e.g. speeches and paid press inserts) to tell the story "from below." As official documents and personal memoirs from federal leaders later became available, chroniclers of '68 began to incorporate more government perspectives in their analyses. All these studies address both grassroots and government actions, but they tend to focus on voices from one group more than the other.

At the same time, publications on '68 interpret their sources with varying emphasis between institutional and personal factors; while agents of the state saw '68 with very different eyes than grassroots participants, analysts have derived meaning from these perspectives through very different explanatory leans. The figure below illustrates these two spectrums in Cartesian form. I call it the "Eye-Lean Model" because it asks: Whose eyes? Which lean?

Eye-Lean Model:
Analytical Perspectives on '68



The utility of this model depends on contextualizing some nuances among the concepts to which they refer. The y-axis concerns *political* hierarchy during the movement of '68, without regard to economic class. "Government Elite" umbrellas all state authorities, whether official personnel or bureaucratic agencies. Likewise, "Grassroots Actors" umbrellas all agents of protest, whether individual participants or collective bodies (such as the National Strike Council, CNH). Actors within each of these two groups could be split into subcategories with relative degrees of political authority, but few interpretations have systematically distinguished them. As we consider glossed-over layers of the story, the model's broad structure highlights consistencies across various accounts to help us problematize the general thrust of literature on '68.

Up front, two distinctions among grassroots actors deserve special attention. Whereas most publications on '68 cling to a straightforward dichotomy between "the students" and "the government" as functionally homogeneous groups, Braun reminds us that the student movement was organized by militant activists and intellectuals whose motives differed substantially from the student masses they mobilized: "[The students] did not share the well-defined contestatory ideas of the militants. Indeed, their actions can be understood precisely because they came to protest without forming any notions of politics and society prior to springing into action."[4] Furthermore, the militants themselves began divided between leftists (*los ultras*) and centrists; the former wing actively invoked Marxist ideology to incite socialist motives among students and the working class until it became clear that their capacity to mobilize the masses relied on the relatively conservative rhetoric of democracy that centrists preferred.[5]

The fact that the militants have produced so much of the post-massacre literature should call our attention to nuances along the x-axis. Even as

[4] Braun, 518.
[5] In addition to Braun, for an account of how the movement formed within UNAM, see Gilberto Guevara Niebla, "Nace el movimiento", *Nexos* 121 (1988), http://www.nexos.com.mx/?P=leerarticulo&Article=267386

the state seemed to crush their momentum, members of this group successfully projected their personal interpretations of '68 into an institutionalized narrative. Braun highlights one key moment in that process: at the 10th anniversary of the massacre, when several thousand young Mexicans gathered in the plaza, "Many turned their heads upward to the balcony of a residential building that faced the plaza to hear Carlos Monsiváis, a well-known intellectual who had savored the protests, tell them that they 'no longer saw the state as a tyrannical and omnipresent father.'" [6] The role of these elites within the grassroots of '68 highlights how social action occurs simultaneously at both ends of the x-axis; in modern society an individual cannot exert personal agency without participating in its institutional context, and vice versa.

Nevertheless, since the question at hand concerns the motives behind the government's violent act, the Eye-Lean model can help us assess the causal weight between personal and institutional factors. As we review various interpretations of the massacre, even those which do not attempt to systematically explain the government's motives will inform the inquiry. Accounts across the spectrum of explanatory dispositions all play a role in the emergence of the enraged father syndrome.

Grassroots: We Saw It with Our Own Eyes

THE PERSONAL LEAN

Some writers collected and published oral testimony to contradict the official history in the massacre's aftermath. Mexican journalist Elena Poniatowska published her famous *La Noche de Tlatelolco* (1971) in this vein; as a special contribution to the volume, Mexican poet Rosario Castellanos captures its cathartic premise: "Don't search in the files, because no records have been kept. But I feel pain when I probe right here: here in my memory it hurts . . . I remember, we remember. This is our way of hastening the dawn."[7]

A similar strategy pervades early works from academics. Two years before Poniatowska, centrist militant Ramón Ramirez published various public statements from the movement by schools, unions, political parties, and student organizers. [8] His volume offered little commentary but dared readers to judge the movement on its own terms. Meanwhile, leftist professor Juan Miguel de Mora of the National Autonomous University of Mexico (UNAM) published his 1973 volume with more explicit intentions: to offer a compelling alternative to the "official", "tranquilized" government version of the massacre.[9]

Such personal accounts presented sufficient evidence to delegitimize this tranquilized history; the government organized the massacre, and "everyone already knew it."[10] Eyewitnesses agreed on telling details: the plainclothes snipers wore white gloves to signal their membership in a special government battalion, and tanks and helicopters had fired on the crowd as well. As one of Poniatowska's interviewees put it, "I can assure you—because those of us who were there saw it with our own eyes and know it's true beyond the shadow of a doubt—that the sharpshooters were agents playing their part in the government's plan."[11] These testimonials consistently accuse the government of a wider conspiracy to discredit and vilify the students, pointing to government influence (if not control) over the press as they juxtapose eyewitness narratives with whitewashed headlines.[12]

Aggregating these impressions heightened a sense of innocence on the part of the participants as well as senseless violence on the part of the state. They privilege the individual experience of

[6] Braun, 511.

[7] Elena Poniatowska, *Massacre in Mexico*, trans. Helen R. Lane (Columbia, Missouri: University of Missouri Press, 1975), 172. Originally *La Noche de Tlatelolco*, published in 1971.
[8] Ramón Ramirez, *El movimiento estudiantil de México : Julio / diciembre de 1968* (Mexico City: Ediciones Era, 1998). (Originally published in 1969.)
[9] Juan Miguel de Mora, *Tlatelolco 1968* (Mexico City: Editores Asociados, S. A., 1975).
[10] Mora, 164.
[11] Poniatowska 1975, 221-222.
[12] Mora, 133. Poniatowska 1975, 200-202. Also see the account of a government intimidation of a journalist, Poniatowska 1975, 162. Also, the refusal of every single paper to publish a simple statement of grief and list of the dead, Poniatowska 1975 1975, 321.

participants wrapped up in a vague but noble and democratic movement—the foil to a harsh authoritarian state which would stop at nothing to undermine them. In one student's words, the government was so convinced of a violent conspiracy that "in order to fight back they're doing exactly what they've been accusing us of: engaging in all sorts of subversive activities."[13] As grassroots chroniclers set out to settle this blame game, they began to contemplate why the government would do such things. Mora muses:

> A game, magical and mysterious . . . of understood values: lies are told, everyone knows they are lies, but everyone—and especially the press—go on as if they were truths . . . There is an invisible line, very difficult to cement, that should not be passed; the opposition is permitted while the highest authorities decide to tolerate it; but passing the impossibly imprecise line, there will be nothing illegal that the repressive forces won't do against those who cross it.[14]

Meanwhile ordinary students who had protested the government's violent tactics could not understand why the government considered them such a threat. Nevertheless, chroniclers sympathetic to this perspective vindicated the students as "pure and incorruptible" young people who "were encouraged because they never imagined the extremes of perversity to which a paranoiac system—personified at the time by 'the Mandril' (President Díaz Ordaz) and his band of assassins—would go."[15] As with Mora's "invisible line," the government becomes a mystical other to the scattered voices of its innocent victims. It is paranoid and controlling. Poniatowska reflected in a later article that "The president is the father . . . an angry father who smashed a chair over our head and killed his disobedient child."[16] Enraged and dazed upon encountering unprecedented disrespect in open protest, the father commits filicide. We imagine a man sputtering and confused, searching for explanations and grabbing the available ones—a foreign Marxist specter has taken hold of his child whom he no longer knows how to control. According to these images, in their "fiesta" the students had unknowingly crossed an invisible line at the wrong time.[17]

The tragic shock of personal experience permeates these early testimonials and commentary. Even in reference to institutional factors, their initial attempts to make sense of the massacre appear as reactionary opinions. For example, consider the interviews Poniatowska presents to address the possible motive of protecting the Olympic Games: one tourist remarked, "The eyes of the entire world were focused on Mexico … They had to stop the students any way they could, at whatever cost!" Another asserts, "If they're killing students so they can have their Olympics, it would be better not to hold them at all."[18] Meanwhile, Poniatowska points to the CNH publication that "this Committee has no intention of interfering with [the Olympics] in any way."[19] This indicates that she does not see the Olympics as a plausible motive, thus reinforcing her image of the paranoiac *Mandril*.

THE INSTITUTIONAL LEAN

As years passed, grassroots accounts of the massacre began to incorporate more reflections on the institutional factors at play. In a later, English edition of Poniatowska's book (1975), poet Octavio Paz gives the government slightly more credit for rational action. He argues that leaders were *willfully* blind to the movement's true democratic character, for "in their eyes, acknowledging the existence of the Student Movement would have been tantamount to self-betrayal" in a "political system founded on a single, implicit, immutable belief: the President of the Mexican Republic and the official government Party are the incarnation of the *whole* of Mexico."[20] A quasi-religious legalism under the presidential father figure "is the real explanation of

[13] Ibid, 258.
[14] Mora, 118.
[15] Elena Poniatowska, "The Student Movement of 1968" in *The Mexico Reader*, ed. Gilbert M. Joseph and Timothy J. Henderson (Durham: Duke University Press, 2002), 556, 562.
[16] Poniatowska 2002, 564.
[17] Ibid., 245
[18] Ibid., 307.
[19] Ibid., 53. Also see 310.
[20] Octavio Paz, introduction to *Massacre in Mexico* by Elene Poniatowska, trans. Helen R. Lane (Columbia, Missouri: University of Missouri Press, 1975), x.

the terrible violence visited upon the students . . . not only a political act [but] Divine vengeance. Exemplary punishment."[21]

Paz's interpretation reflects an emergent transformation in the angry father narrative: the image of delusional paranoia became one of defensive autocracy. As consensus that the government had organized the massacre grew, the impetus to disprove the students' culpability expanded to elevate their heroism. By emphasizing the logic of the authoritarian state, post-massacre militants promoted the official ideology of the student movement. As Braun explains, "they constructed a teleological vision in which they viewed themselves as leaders whose actions in 1968 freed Mexicans from their paternalistic submission to the President and the state and helped them initiate their journey toward citizenship."[22] In this vein, references to the CNH became less about discrediting the fear of communist threat and more about redefining the nature of the threat they posed.

By the massacre's 20th anniversary, the new definition had crystallized: the students "dared to lead in a frontal and uncompromising opposition to the paternal and authoritarian Mexican state."[23] These are the words of Mexican journalist Hugo Hiriart, which appear in *Pensar el 68*, a special issue of *Nexos* from 1988 devoted to centrist militants' reflections on the student movement. The meticulous accounts in this issue accentuate the movement's democratic formation as the substance of its contestation against the violent state—a new flame of anti-authoritarianism. They present their organizational strategies as predecessors of the state's liberalization over the past two decades.[24]

According to this line of interpretation, their father was not delusional; the state's story about foreign agitators and Marxists who wanted nothing less than the destruction of Mexico was a reaction to the movement exposing the state for what it really was: a traitor to the principles of the Mexican Revolution.

Beyond the centrists of *Nexos*, leftist leader Paco Ignacio Taibo II also approaches the movement in terms akin to revolution-era national identity. He refers to the six demands of CNH as "the call for democracy."[25] According to Taibo II, the students marched for "an unmasking of the Mexican state as an emperor with no clothes," and proclaimed, "We were true Mexicans now; and they . . . even if they did occupy the presidential palace, were less Mexican than we were."[26] He observes that the government's escalating use of violent force solidified the movement: "We had seen signs that such a thing [the movement] might exist, but this would be confirmed in our minds only if they—the invisible enemy—believed in it too."[27] As the government's violent provocations became blatant, the oppressive emperor became visible, and with that he could be stripped of his authoritarian robes.

Though Taibo II clearly advances the image of a naked, embarrassed father, he is keener to reflect upon the movement's constrained scope than his centrist counterparts in *Nexos*. Whereas *Pensar el 68* projects the movement's ideology and form onto nationwide institutional reforms, Taibo II emphasizes the distance between the students and the rest of the nation:

> [The movement's] limitations lay in its message, so student-centered, exclusive, private, egoistic:

[21] Ibid., x.
[22] Braun, 547.
[23] Hugo Hiriart qtd in Braun, 512. (Braun cited for his translation.)
[24] See Hugo Hiriart, "La revuelta antiautoritaria", *Nexos* 121 (1988), http://www.nexos.com.mx/?P=leerarticulo&Article=267378; Gilberto Guevara Niebla, "Nace el movimiento", *Nexos* 121 (1988), http://www.nexos.com.mx/?P=leerarticulo&Article=267386; Rodolfo Sanchez Rebolledo, "Punto Crítico: Una historia de familia", *Nexos* 121 (1988), http://www.nexos.com.mx/?P=leerarticulo&Article=67525. Despite thematic consistency in these narratives, other intellectuals of the time were more critical of Mexico's democratic progress. In the same year, *Nexos* published an article by Lorenzo Meyer of El Colegio de México (a child in '68 who touched the movement only by watching his father participate) where he argues that the political system's resistance to democratic reformation has to do with a fundamental limitation of the movement: "In all cases of protest that surpassed the institutional channels of conflict resolution between 1958 and 1968, none of them achieved a national, pluri-class character." (Lorenzo Meyer, "La democratización del PRI: ¿misión imposible?" *Nexos* 126 (1988), http://www.nexos.com.mx/?P=leerarticulo&Article=267510.
[25] Paco Ignacio Taibo II, *'68*, trans. Donald Nicholson-Smith (New York: Seven Stories Press, 2004), 48. (Taibo's account was originally published in Spanish in 1991.) The CNH published their famous six demands in August 1968. Taibo II summarizes them: "freedom for political prisoners; repeal of the law against "social dissipation," which was used to justify the jailing of political dissidents; dismissal of the police leadership; apportionment of the blame for repressive measures; compensation for the wounded and the families of those killed; and abolition of the riot police" (48). Also see Ramírez, 278, 396; Poniatowska, 53.
[26] Taibo II, 49, 72-73.
[27] Taibo II, 29.

> we had *our* dead, *our* victims of repression, *our* freedoms—even *our* police, which we wished to abolish. But Mexican society was full of other dead, other wounded, other police (not to mention corrupt union leaders, factory bosses, suburban caciques, and venal functionaries). There were other authoritarianisms, which this first wave of students were just beginning to recognize but which they could not yet make into their enemy.[28]

By this mode of analysis, Taibo II's highly personal storytelling deeply reflects on the structural-institutional factors of the movement and the massacre. He crosses this bridge through insight about the relationship between the students and the Mexican nation. Even as the students directed their actions against their angry father, Taibo II asserts that, "far more than anything else, [the movement] meant the reengagement of a generation of students with their own society, their investment in neighborhoods hitherto unknown to them, … a breaking down of barriers … the closest encounter yet with a mass of 'others.'"

Parallel to his insight about the students' exposure to perspectives of the *pueblo*, Taibo II was among the first militants to reflect on the government's point of view regarding the movement's demands. He refers to the CNH's call for a *diálogo público* as reflecting "our inflated idea of power";[29] looking back he acknowledges it was unreasonable for CNH to demand what amounted to "the unconditional surrender of the state."[30] To Taibo II, CNH's refusal to work with intermediaries, visit offices, or return telephone calls from the President's administration led to self-contradiction: "We talked about a diálogo público but we did not want to dialogue with Díaz Ordaz."[31] And in light of the students' reckless actions—burning buses; desecrating fences, Olympics advertisements, and the national palace with graffiti; calling the President a "dumb ox" and insulting his mother; distributing propaganda to the working class—the enraged father's delusion could appear more like calculated retaliation than irrational impulse.[32] Two years after Taibo II published his memoir, centrist Luis González de Alba explained in *Nexos* the consequence of CNH refusing to respond to a phone call inviting them to negotiate in person: "The government became convinced that we did not desire a solution to our demands, that its suspicions regarding our wicked ends were true."[33]

Still, such observations have floated quietly in the subtext of narratives on '68. Here we see how Ramirez's seemingly neutral collection of public statements contributes to the movement's postmortem redemption; the official CNH line—especially when isolated from student misbehavior and radical militant leftism—paints a clean picture of democracy and order. Though construed to represent participant perspectives on their own terms, Ramirez's publication exhibits institutional utility by emphasizing civil rights, democratic freedom, and nonviolent resistance. But how did paternal government see the movement? Was the father delusional and paranoid, or naked and embarrassed?

Government: Can We See It from Their Eyes?

As we delve deeper into these questions of motive, the next step is to probe how historians have interpreted internal government sources, which have been released in pieces over the past several decades. However, let us first consider an earlier effort: in 1970, a student editorial published hundreds of judicial records from those arrested during the movement, with the stated aim to "find out the government's point of view surrounding the events of 1968."[34] According to the editors (including González de Alba), these records explicitly and consistently reveal the government's official thesis:

> There existed an International Subversion Outreach Plan for Mexican institutions. This 'plan' was conceived in Havana and Prague, and various Mexican representatives of leftist

[28] Taibo II, 50.
[29] *Diálogo público* means *public dialogue*.
[30] Taibo II, 69.
[31] Taibo II, 67.
[32] Poniatowska 1975, 95, 25, 135, 145. Also see Braun, 526.
[33] Luis González de Alba, "1968: La fiesta y la tragedia," in *Nexos*, 189 (1993), http://www.nexos.com.mx/?P=leerarticulo&Article=447311.
[34] Raúl Álvarez Garín, Luis González de Alba, Gilberto Guevara Niebla, Félix Lucio Hernández Gamundi, and Miguel Eduardo Valle Espinoza, ed., *Los Procesos de México 68* (Mexico City: Editorial Estudiantes, 1970), vi.

> political associations . . . elaborated and executed it. Afterwards, everything that occurred from July to October of 1968, manifestations, rallys, assemblies, street brigades, clashes with the police, up to the massacre of October 2 were part of that 'plan.'[35]

In turn, the editors point to the judiciary's obvious legal violations, including total lack of trial evidence, to conclude that "in Mexico, political ideas opposed to the official ones are prosecuted and the only requirement to condemn a citizen is for a police officer to characterize him as a leftist." With this conspiracy theory, the judicial system was "trying to cover the responsibility of the highest government functionaries … by blaming the detained."[36]

Astute as it is, this volume's analysis projects emotions and identities onto the government rather than seeking to understand the regime on its own terms. In later accounts, historians with more declassified access have supported the earliest projects to debunk the government's official narrative while also maintaining more emotional distance from the experience of '68; however, overall their analytical frameworks still fall subject to the enraged father syndrome. Most commonly they point to the cultural context of unruly youth, the presidency's authoritarian nature, and the corporatist ruling Party's obsession with order to explain the massacre—arguing that these factors enabled an unquestionably warped view of the students as a menacing, communist threat meriting violent intervention. While these interpretations may have found a raging father because he accurately reflects the government's decisions, we must ask whether available documents tell us that story themselves, or whether their interpreters have imposed it.

THE PERSONAL LEAN

Studies on '68 that prioritize personal factors of the government's perspective have depicted members of the ruling Party—especially Díaz Ordaz—as willing to take any action and accept any interpretation of the facts to maintain total control. In his 1982 book about student protests in Mexico, American historian Donald J. Mabry argues that both students and the government "labored under delusions" in '68.[37] According to Mabry, the students were sorely mistaken to assume that their just cause would lead victoriously to lawful government response, while the regime was irrationally presumptuous too: it assumed that students concerned about anything besides grades or exams must be under the influence of "outside agitators or Communists or foreigners or some other group of devils who wanted to embarrass Mexico before the world, or get the Olympics moved to some other country, or start a revolution."[38] He emphasizes how leaders reached a point of fear, then paranoia, and ultimately hysteria which led to the massacre.

Mabry's construal of the delusional father came without any sources documenting the actual thought processes of these leaders, but even after Mexican historian Enrique Krauze gained the first access to Díaz Ordaz's personal memoirs in the 90s, the portrait retains similar themes. In in his 1997 book, *Mexico: Biography of Power,* Krauze agrees the demands for *diálogo público* threatened the Institutional Revolutionary Party (PRI) to the core—to "submit official truth to public scrutiny" meant "stripping the PRI naked."[39] In Krauze's presidential portrait, Díaz Ordaz fantasizes that a public dialogue would put "the President of the Republic, seated on the bench of the accused . . . enduring insult and ridicule."[40] He was used to "a universal pattern of subordination," and "believed, religiously, that the system could not yield a particle of power without losing its very existence."[41]

This father appears nude as well as paranoid. Even speaking one year before the movement, he exclaimed, "No one has rights against Mexico!" Similar to Paz's observation about Mexican identity,

[35] Garín et al., vi.
[36] Garín et al., xi-xii.
[37] Donald J. Mabry, *The Mexican University and the State: Student Conflicts, 1910-1971* (College Station: Texas A&M University Press, 1982), 248.
[38] Mabry, 247.
[39] Enrique Krauze, *Mexico: Biography of Power,* trans. Hank Heifetz (New York: HarperCollins, 1997), 700. Also see 701.
[40] Krauze, 707.
[41] Krauze, 734, 735.

Krauze writes, "All [Díaz Ordaz] had to do was look into his own mind" to see "what 'Mexico' meant."[42] Rhetoric questioning the character of his person or the PRI presented "a fearful image for Díaz Ordaz, a synonym for chaos."[43] He also had "very thin skin for political criticism," which the students poked at mercilessly with their sexualized taunts.[44] From perspectives conflating the President and his Party with Mexico at large, the students obviously intended to destroy the Mexican nation. But '68 is not a story of one raging father, no matter the power of that emblem. The President lived and worked within a network of bureaucrats; even apart from institutional agency, other individuals have played crucial roles in Mexican governance.

One year after Krauze published his chronicles, Julio Scherer Garcia's 20-year endeavor to access the private documents of Marcelino García Barragán (Díaz Ordaz's Secretary of Defense) came to fruition; upon his son's death in late 1998, Barragán's account, "The Truth for History," was inherited by his grandson, who promptly shared the text with Scherer.[45] Together with Carlos Monsiváis, Scherer published *Parte de guerra* in 1999 to distribute and analyze Barragán's memoir.[46] Interestingly, the collection includes military briefings penned by another general which place strong restraints on the use of force against the students, but otherwise clear provisions for encountering snipers or student fire highlight paranoia over student militarism.[47] Meanwhile, as Scherer and Monsiváis stress how Barragán's associates (such as the Presidential Chief of Staff and Interior Minister) exhibit an impressive aversion to accountability, we see the naked father evading embarrassment.

Although it marks an important milestone by providing the first internal documentation that proves top officials ordered the Tlatelolco shooting, *Parte de guerra* does not explicitly contribute to answering why the government decided to do so. Nevertheless, in an essay from the volume, "El Tigre Marcelino", Scherer's description of García Barragán serves as a case study of the authoritarianism the students allegedly threatened. The general's long experience with subordination to the brutality of one's elders began in military school, where his creed of "iron tempering character" and obedience initially developed.[48] His appointment as Secretary involved a private meeting in which he swore personal loyalty to the President—an oath he kept even after he knew the truth about the massacre.[49] "The Truth for History" reads, "the President, who obeys and enforces the constitution, is not guilty [for the massacre]."[50] Barragán even stuck to the official history in a conversation with senior statesman and former President Lázaro Cárdenas.[51] Thus we find a culture among political elites in which the patriot respects higher authority without question. In this respect, Scherer and Monsiváis shed light on the personality traits of Mexican bureaucrats that would have motivated them to scour the palace for robes when the emperor was exposed.

THE INSTITUTIONAL LEAN

Less personal explanatory efforts developed alongside the works reviewed above. In 1971, UNAM alumnus Salvador Hernández published *El PRI y el movimiento estudiantil de 1968*, which he first drafted for his MA thesis in sociology and anthropology at the University of British Columbia.[52] With his structural approach to repression, Hernández describes the development of the Mexican political system, the Party, and the student movement to frame an historical-

[42] Krauze, 690.
[43] Krauze, 735.
[44] Krauze, 703.
[45] Julia Preston & Samuel Dillon, *Opening Mexico: The Making of a Democracy* (New York: Firrar Straus Giroux, 2004), 381.
[46] Julio Scherer García & Carlos Monsiváis, *Parte de guerra : Tlatelolco 1968. Documentos del General Marcelino Garcia Barragán. Los hechos y la historia* (Mexico City: Aguilar Nuevo Siglo, 1999). In 2002, A new version of the book in 2002 included a collection of pictures of the Olimpia battalion allegedly taken by Luis Echeverria's personal photographer. They also published conversations with the anonymous individual who submitted the photographs and with former President Miguel de la Madrid that illustrate the lingering political pressures to keep documentation from the public. The authors also interpret the modest amount of attention the Mexican press dedicated to the pictures as a hint of continued self-censorship. Subsequent citations are from the 1999 edition.
[47] Scherer & Monsiváis, 76, 83.
[48] Scherer & Monsiváis, 31.
[49] Scherer & Monsiváis, 28.
[50] Scherer & Monsiváis, 42.
[51] Scherer & Monsiváis, 50
[52] Salvador Hernández, The PRI and the Mexican Student Movement of 1968: A Case Study of Repression, *Masters Thesis*, Department of Anthropology and Sociology, University of British Columbia (1970), https://circle.ubc.ca/bitstream/id/124204/UBC_1970_A8

institutional explanation of the government's recourse to violence. To Hernández, contradictions in government rhetoric during the movement reflect an aim to preserve the appearance of goodwill while delaying dialogue, waiting for opportunities to increase "'legitimate' repression."[53] The regime constructed this legitimacy from the President's constitutional authority to use the military "for interior security and foreign defense," but ultimately it had to "reach unprecedented new magnitudes" of repression to match the movement's size and broad support from the upper and middle classes.[54] That said, Hernández goes beyond matters of technique to ask why the government was so set on repressing the students. He argues that "this violence was not accidental or unique, but has rather always been the traditional strategy in the PRI's history to deal with conflicts that the government has perceived *as a threat to its power*."[55] In this case, the movement's biggest crime was demanding *el diálogo*, "for the nature of public dialogue opens channels of influence" to new sectors, which would definitively "restructure the nature of the one party system."[56] The father had to strike back while upholding his paternal image—to avoid being discovered as the authoritarian he was.

Given his immediate historical context, it is no surprise that Hernández cast aside any consideration as to whether the demand for *el diálogo* was reasonable or even possible. More strikingly, later endeavors gazing at institutional factors to explain government perspectives on the movement have also glossed over this question. Take, for example, a 1989 article from Mexican political scientist Soledad Loaeza, who focuses on the contemporary logic of state autonomy more than historical precedents of repression.[57] She defines autonomy in terms of the state's accountability only to its own authority, with leeway to favor whichever interests match its own "in any given moment."[58] Until 1968, revolutionary heritage, minimal public participation, and industrial development had cloaked the PRI's authoritarianism before the students "stripped it naked so effectively."[59] State violence was "a defensive movement not as much against the students themselves, but in relation to economic interests, determined only in maintaining such a beneficial status quo," because "to attend to the movement's petitions would have meant that society could have placed limits on the State's autonomy."[60]

Loaeza reads the government's actions as their "desperate intent to retake the established tradition that all political change could only come from the government."[61] And while she acknowledges how the students' denunciation of this tradition would have appeared to the state as insolence, she assumes that the state rejected *el diálogo* and returned to military force because it saw compliance with the students' demands as a kind of defeat. Loaeza draws this conclusion without due consideration of the ways in which government officials might have understood their attempts to converse with CNH leaders vis-à-vis the movement's demands. As the insights of Taibo II and Gonzalez de Alba suggest, the regime may have viewed its offer for open-ended dialogue as a feasible avenue to meet CNH's demands. If so, its subsequent recoil may reflect a drive to protect its international sovereignty in the face of Communist agitation more than the drive to protect domestic autonomy from the will of its own middle class. Ironically, Loaeza's sophisticated theoretical moves about the ideology of authoritarianism overlook their wider ideological context—the Cold War. In Loaeza's account we find our calculating, naked father to be ossified after decades of complacency, not dynamically engaged with the thrust of the times.

In 1998 Loaeza's colleague, Sergio Aguayo, published his landmark book, *Los archivos de la*

[53] Salvador Hernández, *El PRI y el movimiento estudiantil de 1968* (Mexico City: Ediciones "El Caballito," 1971), 93. Also see 16.
[54] Ibid., 105, 108, 113.
[55] Ibid., 116. Emphasis mine.
[56] Ibid., 116.
[57] Of course, she does use the latter to frame the former.
[58] Soledad Loaeza, "México 1968: los orígenes de la transición," *Foro Internacional* 30, no. 1 (1989): 66-92. 68, 76.
[59] Ibid., 71.
[60] Ibid., 82.
[61] Ibid., 87.

violencia, after working for a truth commission in various American and Mexican government archives, the latter of which were "all mutilated deliberately." [62] Nonetheless, *Los archivos* offers robust internal documentation to prove what many victims and speculators were claiming from the start. He finds no evidence of foreign communist agitation, nor is it recorded anywhere that the CIA or any other US agency assisted the students.[63] At least one student who had advocated violence and later declared that students formed security columns to fight back was in fact working for the government.[64] The President, the Interior Minister, and Secretary of Foreign Relations were all aware of the decision to stop the movement before the Games, if not also the Federal Security Director and Presidential Chief of Staff.[65] Here we finally see formal correspondences detailing military plans and meetings among top officials. [66] And while Aguayo doesn't find a "master plan" in the archives, his reconstruction of its primary features highlights the ruling party's intentional, calculating acts of violence as an extension of its oppressive legacy.[67]

Such framing echoes Hernández, but Aguayo is able to connect this general impetus with more specific factors surrounding '68. He offers a concise list of government motivations that achieves greater nuance than the typical paranoia/shame tension we have seen across the enraged father narrative: "the closing in on the Olympiad and international pressure, the internal and foreign support for the regime, the conviction that it faced a dangerous conspiracy revealed by the confrontations on September 21 and 24 in the Polytechnic schools," and student refusal to budge on *diálogo público* and their six points.[68] Yet this picture of government logic matches the one framed by Octavio Paz (and echoed many times over) when Aguayo writes, "the homeland comes first, and this sometimes demands the blood of its children."[69] We find a father (whether the President or the state apparatus) pressed into violence in an attempt to balance an array of complex factors, including conviction of a conspiracy for which there appears to be no evidence. We are left to wonder by what process that conviction arose.

Where can we find a fresh look through government eyes with an institutional lean to escape the limited dimensions of our enraged father cosmos? As historians of '68, we should demand sources that reveal the institutional workings of ruling elite for at least four reasons. First and foremost, they can offer an invaluable degree of independence from the overbearing moral calculus the grassroots have so firmly instilled in public memory. This cultural construction certainly helped a generation find restorative justice—a worthy cause I do not wish to demean—but it has also inhibited deeper reflections on the nature of the Mexican state, which could ultimately enable more progressive political transformations.

Second, these sources help keep our tendency toward broad theoretical brushstrokes in check. Likewise, they can balance personal leans on government leaders that so easily fall subject to larger-than-life conflations. Finally, they can remind us how decision-makers' recourse to violence occurred not in isolation but rather through the assent of a bureaucratic community, informed by relationships and investigations throughout various ligaments of the governing body. Barragán illuminates one mechanism to this anatomy—the *modus operandi* of loyalty to higher authority, especially the President. But a less personal, administrative archive might shed clearer light on the facts (not just attitudes) the state brought to bear on their interpretation of the movement. Otherwise we must be content with piecemeal assent to a literary edifice which did not evolve from primary sources appropriate to the question: "What was the motive, why?"

[62] Sergio Aguayo Quezada, *Los archivos de la violencia* (Mexico City: Concorcio Interamericano de Comunicación, 1998), 16.
[63] Ibid., 192, 193.
[64] Ibid., 235. Poniatowska hints at this possibility and describes his suggestion to use violence, see Poniatowska 1975, 128, 129, 100, 105.
[65] Ibid., 205.
[66] Ibid., 218 and 222.
[67] Ibid.., 217.
[68] Ibid., 205.
[69] ibid., 218.

LOOKING ABROAD FOR ANSWERS

From the first populist reflections on '68, eyewitnesses, journalists, and visitors suspected the Olympics played part in the violent crack-down. Around the year 2000, British Journalist John Rodda confirmed a longstanding rumor that the International Olympic Committee had given Díaz Ordaz an ultimatum in mid-September: "Should there be any trouble on any games site, the celebration would be canceled."[70] Meanwhile, our literature review suggests the regime, who inherited a legacy of oppressive tactics, also regarded the student movement as a genuine threat to its survival. We have explored how the students' uncompromising demand for *diálogo público* escalated the tensions, and we have considered the movement's size and class bias as unprecedented merits for repression.

But as the archive of the Secretary of Foreign Relations reveals, Mexico's leaders saw their situation not only in these frustrating contexts but also in a wave of disruptive student protests across the globe. Hernández quotes a French communist who supposed that the May, 1968 student movement in France showed "the degree to which the 'small motor' of a student movement can activate the 'big motor' of the working class," yet he stops short of claiming the PRI agreed.[71] Though the students had attempted to find allies in the proletariat, Taibo II describes their efforts to distribute propaganda and ignite workers as naïve and futile. Yes, some union representatives attended the rally on October 2, but one of Poniatowska's interviewees captured the common conclusion: "Why beat around the bush? Why not say straight out that we failed with the workers?"[72]

Whether or not they failed, PRI leaders were evidently concerned that the militant students aimed to provoke widespread, socialist rebellion in Mexico. And though centrists and unsophisticated student masses muted the most radical voices of the movement, the trail of unsettling evidence did not run dry; the archive at the Secretary of Foreign Relations shows that the regime did some educated digging. Rather than actors suffering from rage, hysteria, or a nudity complex, these documents reveal a hierarchical, bureaucratic apparatus moving efficiently to meet the goals of interconnected stakeholders.

By the end of July, 1968, the Secretary had asked all of his foreign embassies and consuls to forward local press about the Mexican protests; consequently, hundreds of unflattering responses began to flood his office. Media across the globe questioned the administration's control of the streets, the violence of its police forces, and even its ability to host the Olympics.[73] Reports of students chanting, "We don't want Olympic Games, we want a revolution!" and headlines such as "Marchers Hurl Insults at Mexican President" or "Mexican students call for new party" had stolen the spotlight from its arduous Olympic preparations.[74]

The French Case

In the middle wave of mailings, Mexico's embassy in France sent the Secretary a detailed report of the French student movement earlier that year, dated August 12. In comparison to the wider collection of brief reports, this document's lengthy, careful analysis—framed for the Secretary and other top officials—indicates it was likely a special request. In turn we could reasonably infer that the Secretary, if not his boss, had expressed concern among his colleagues about the situation in Europe. Indeed, the foreign press was making the comparison between the French and Mexican protests. As Krauze discovered, Díaz Ordaz had studied the French case carefully, construing it to justify his own decisions. But Krauze is unsure how the President collected his information, especially

[70] John R. Rodda, "'Prensa, Prensa,' A Journalist's Reflections on Mexico '68." *Bulletin of Latin American Research* 29, Issue Supplement s1 (2010): 11-22. 19.
[71] Hernández, 117.
[72] Poniatowska 1975, 34.

[73] *Archivo "Genaro Estrada" de la Secretaría de Relaciones Exteriores, México* (Henceforth referred to as *AREM*), Classification (III-5890, III-5891). Stories about the protests arrived from Belgium; Australia; France; Sweden; Lebanon; Canada; Jamaica; Tucson, Arizona; Argentina; Guatemala; Houston, Texas; Switzerland; New York; Cuba' Washington D. C.; El Salvador; Japan; Turkey; Italy; Greece; Haiti; Brazil; Portugal; Honduras; Belgium; Chile; India; Canada; Argentina; Egypt; the Dominican Republic; Indonesia; Denmark; Nicaragua; Uruguay; Venezuela; Colombia; Costa Rica and Germany.
[74] *AREM*, III-5890-1 (2ª), "Se remiten recortes de prensa.", New York, August 14, 1968. "Información periodística.",. Kingston, Jamaica, August 23, 1968. "Motínes estudiantiles. – Recortes de prensa.", Tuscon, Arizona, August 28, 1968. SRE

considering he "did not read foreign languages nor was he interested in acquainting himself with stories that criticized his actions."[75] Now, in light of the Secretary's archive, we know that foreign news articles about the Mexican student movement were translated or at least summarized in Spanish for the President and his top officials to study. The embassy in France was particularly diligent in following this request.

The French report first notes that student and worker movements make poor, short-lived allies because of mutual distrust. It described students as exploding easily and often into protest, while workers (who are more oppressed) can cause a bigger bang but are less easily "detonated." However, the report's meticulous summary of the two groups coming together in France would have looked alarming. At the University of Paris, arrests of students involved in Vietnam protests provoked student groups from the "extreme left" to protest the university and demand dialogue with the teachers. As they rallied against "fascist attacks," leftist students even tried to dismantle a University Council meeting.[76]

Soon the leader of the movement called for an exam boycott, and a Communist Revolutionary Youth representative suggested that the students seek out solidarity with the unions. In the face of potential violent confrontations between these students and their counterparts from the extreme right, the rector was forced to cancel classes, pleading for this small number of students not ruin exams for the 160,000 students at the university. Classes remained on hold as demonstrations grew in size and violence. Students built barricades against arrest. The Communist party arranged for unions to support the students, inaugurated with a strike on May 13. According to the Mexican embassy, "this movement, initially limited in its scope and objectives should, one week later, paralyze practically all industrial activity."[77]

Apparently, Communist influence in both the student and worker camps led to an explosive mixture. By May 24, students, urban workers, and farmers joined a host of diverse organizations holding demonstrations. The students continued the protests and clashed with the police, despite President de Gaulle's offer for more direct and active democratic participation. As the embassy puts it, in a speech on May 30 de Gaulle would "refer openly for the first time to the danger of a 'communist dictatorship,'" as he threatened the use of force. In turn, the Prime Minister gave a condescending speech on June 9, scolding the students to remember who pays for their schools, and the students began losing public support shortly after. Eventually the police had to extract the students from one school, injuring just one student in the process. After the movement had finally died down, the government blamed malign foreign influences for various disturbances. They deported 161 foreigners for their participation and dissolved the International Communist Party's French section, the Student Revolutionary Federation, Communist Revolutionary Youth, and other ultra-leftist groups. As it tells of banned groups developing a conference and further official statements, the Embassy's report ends somewhat ominously: "the university problem remains latent."[78] Perhaps the French government had not taken their repression far enough.

Confidential Circular 51928

Díaz Ordaz's first public treatment of the student protests arrived in his national address on September 1. Scholars have done well to consider his words here, as they offer an unfiltered view of the man in his own terms. He discussed the protests in the context of the Olympic Games, but he also compared the movement at hand to other student movements timed to coincide with important local events. He cites Uruguay, Venice, and Paris—where discussions about peace in Vietnam "were darkened by the so called 'May Revolution.'" The father figure lectured that while

[75] Krauze, 704, 705.
[76] *AREM*, III-5890-1 (2ª), "Política interior francesa. Discurso del Ministro del interior, Sr. Raymond Marcellin.", Paris, August 12, 1968.
[77] Ibid.
[78] Ibid.

youth are historically anxious to imitate others, these Olympics were not for personal grudges: "What matters is Mexico." Díaz Ordaz referred to "a world of juvenile disturbances" which suddenly arrived and spread as a "vulgar affront" to this working country, ignorant of his previous warnings. [79] He also justifies controversial laws against social dissolution in terms of preventing "the submission of the country to a foreign government." [80] This speech alone illuminates Krauze's characterization of a president who saw his students' protests as part of an international, conspiratorial puzzle he would have to solve.

Within days of the President's speech, foreign embassies started to receive the Secretary of Foreign Relation's encrypted Confidential Circular 51928, which stated:

> I ask you to prepare and send by airmail a brief and comprehensive history about disturbances, particularly of a student character, having occurred in recent years in that country, means that the government has adopted (administrative, legislative, military, or by police, suspension of rights or martial law, etcetera) and the results that have been obtained including, in any case, what the situation is in this moment. In the interest to receive said inform as soon as possible, I ask you prepare it with facts you have at hand without soliciting the government with whom you are established.[81]

The Secretary received at least twenty-one responses before October 2.[82] On September 18, his director in chief sent him the twelve which had already arrived. This implies that the responses were not always transmitted upward the instant one arrived, but the Secretary did not necessarily wait for someone to compile the reports either. On September 25, he received communication from the Venezuelan embassy that its host government had news of Venezuelans entering Mexico to work with the students. According to this report, the foreigners were trained in guerilla warfare, thus leading to the presumption that they were members of the extreme left's so-called "General Caribbean Command," set to sabotage the Olympics.[83] The secretary himself sent a note that same day to Interior Minister Luis Echeverria, to "communicate it with you for your knowledge and consequent actions." [84] Evidently, the administration was in fact capable of swift response to intelligence it deemed important. From the runner who first retrieved the embassy cable to the Secretary himself, this information from Venezuela triggered a sense of urgency. In other words, the bureaucratic apparatus was already on alert for news of foreign agitation among their students. Whether this constitutes delusional paranoia or legitimate fear appears a blurry, circular choice.

As for Secretary of State Antonio Carrillo Flores (then on his fifth consecutive major government appointment), it might be impossible to find out if he was involved in deciding how to deal with the students beyond collecting and forwarding information. But he does appear to be part of an informed inner circle. Daniel Cosío Villegas describes Carillo, his longtime acquaintance, as a superficial man not driven by ideology: "he didn't try to govern, but rather follow." [85] Given the corporatist structure of the PRI and Carillo's primary aspiration to political success, this strategy made sense.[86] Certainly the best interests of Carillo and other PRI officials demanded an end to the destabilizing student movement. Carillo's office propagated official statements about the movement, instructing his ambassadors how to respond to foreigners who questioned their government. [87] Meanwhile, as Sergio Aguayo discovered, Echeverria and Carrillo independently but similarly assured United States' "embassy functionaries that the Díaz Ordaz government

[79] Ramírez 195-197.
[80] Ibid., 201.
[81] *AREM*, III-5890-1 (2ª) , "Telegrama para cifrar", Mexico City, September 3, 1968. Aguayo also provides this text, observing only the circular's demand for "speed and discretion" and that this reveals how Díaz Ordaz "considered all the instruments of power at his disposition" (190). In the corresponding footnote note he remarks that the response was "considerable" and "surely was used in the planning that was done toward the ends of controlling the movement" (190). Yet he inexplicably moves on without exploring their contents.
[82] I have reviewed 18, while the others which are mentioned do not appear in the archive.
[83] *AREM*, III-5891-1 (3ª), "Traducción de telegram cifrado", Caracas, September 24, 1968.
[84] *AREM*, III-5891-1 (3ª), "Venezolanos inmiscuidos entre estudiantes que promueven actos violentos en nuestro país.", Mexico City, September 25, 1968.
[85] Daniel Cosío Villegas, *Memorias* (Mexico City: Joaquin Mortiz, 1976), 249
[86] Ibid., 246.
[87] Aguayo, 175.

would end the student agitation before the Olympic Games, which will not be affected."[88]

These were the internal conversations happening as Mexican ambassadors' reports of student and popular uprisings abroad flowed in. These ranged from detailed explanations of events and government responses in the context of their legal-constitutional systems to more generic responses in the lack of in-depth sources. If Díaz Ordaz or another decision-maker read them seriously (as implied by the urgency and secrecy of the request), he would have seen an international wave of student protests with multiple alarming elements, rife with examples of nearly every possible form of state response.

All but two embassy reports mention at least one of the following: student participation with working-class/union politics (or vice versa), militarization of student protest, communist or far-left influences among student activists, and foreign agitators. Virtually all reports legitimated fear of widespread social unrest, as they recounted how student demands initially focused on internal university matters tended to grow into broader social and political agendas—as was already manifest in Mexico's current debacle. Beyond the French case, workers and students joined forces in seven of the countries who sent reports.[89] The ambassador to Lebanon notes how broad worker support of the students led to a fear of general strikes throughout the country.[90] Students had joined violent union protests in Peru, while Italian students' explicit goals included coordinating with the workers to say "no to a school of 'classes.'"[91] Half of the countries with student activism experienced deliberate, preemptive violence from the students. In Panama, students went on a rampage, attacking "shops, destroying cars and passenger busses, burning [a palace hall], toppling statues, even looting . . . breaking windows [etc.]."[92] And while authorities in Ecuador uncovered a student plot to bomb an armored vehicle on their campus, youth in Turkey were bold enough to attack United States Marines at a port.[93]

The specters of Communism and foreign agitation likely sparked even greater concern. Six reports mention Communist or extreme leftist activity; the same number (but not all the same ones) document foreign agitators or influences.[94] In Lebanon the students communicated with revolutionary French students. In Indonesia Communist students developed a conspiracy against Western power bases in Asia, and Egyptian authorities uncovered foreign elements among the students who represented a "large-scale plot.[95] In early 1968 Peru arrested Brazilian, Argentine, and Spanish agitators, while a raid in Venezuela uprooted handfuls foreign students and Communist propaganda "calling for fighting and rebellion in Latin America following the guidelines of Fidel Castro."[96] The Peruvian embassy's report argues this government intervention kept the university from transforming into a guerilla base. Venezuelan intelligence, however, is the only source to implicate Mexico directly. The ambassador to Venezuela reported that an ultra-leftist university President was currently in Mexico along a tour of various countries to invite them to a conference, no doubt related to his worries about a "hovering threat" of budget reductions in Latin American universities, "especially Argentina, Brazil, Uruguay, El Salvador, and Mexico."[97]

[88] Ibid., 201. 189.
[89] I have not investigated the truth of all these alleged facts about each movement. However for the purpose at hand I find it unnecessary to continue qualifying the information's accuracy (e.g. "according to the ambassadors/reports"). Because the Mexican government would have treated the information as reliable and the project at hand is to explore the information they considered and how they interpreted it, I will treat the contents of the reports as factual.
[90] *AREM*, 5890-1 (2ª), "Desórdenes en Líbano y medidas de represión.", Beirut, September 7, 1968.
[91] *AREM*, III-5890-1 (2ª), "Se envía la información solicitada.", Lima, September 9, 1968. "Disturbios ocurridos en Italia durante los últimos años.", Rome, September 12, 1968.
[92] *AREM*, III-5890-1 (2ª), "Traducción de telegrama cifrado", Panama, September 6, 1968.
[93] *AREM*, III-5890-1 (2ª), "Informe sobre disturbios y huelgas", Quito, September 6, 1968. "Agitacion y disturbios estudiantiles", Ankara, September 6, 1968.
[94] Even more included socialist-sounding rhetoric or violence against upper class, but I am only counting explicit references to communism, socialism, or communist leaders.
[95] *AREM*, III-5890-1 (2ª), "Desórdenes en Líbano y medidas de represión.", Beirut, September 7, 1968. "Disturbios en Indonesia.", Djakarta, September 7, 1968. "Disturbios ocurridos en la R.A.U. durante los últimos años.", Cairo, September 10, 1968.
[96] *AREM*, III-5890-1 (2ª), "Se envía la información solicitada.", Lima, September 9, 1968. "Se acompaña Informe confidencial solicidado por esa Superioridad.", Caracas, September 13, 1968.
[97] Ibid.

ELEMENTS PRESENT IN EMBASSY REPORTS RE: CIRCULAR 51928				
Embassy	Working class involved	Militant or violent students	Communists or far-leftists	Foreign agitators or influence
Panama	No	**Yes**	No	No
Bolivia	**Yes**	**Yes**	***Possibly***	***Possibly***
Ecuador	No	**Yes**	***Possibly***	No
Turkey	**Yes**	**Yes**	**Yes**	No
Lebanon	**Yes**	No	**Yes**	**Yes**
Indonesia	No	No	**Yes**	**Yes**
Peru	**Yes**	**Yes**	**Yes**	**Yes**
Yugoslavia	**Yes**	No	No	No
Poland	No	No	No	No
Egypt	No	**Yes**	No	**Yes**
Argentina	No	**Yes**	No	No
Italy	**Yes**	No	No	No
Venezuela	No	**Yes**	**Yes**	**Yes**
Finland	**Yes**	No	No	No

Assembling Our Pieces

From his reading of the President's private memoirs, Krauze tells us that, "assembling his pieces," Díaz Ordaz saw "confirmation of the [global] plot" against Mexico, even when this contradicted certain facts.[98] Insofar as other protests appeared very similar to those in Mexico—from students' bullet-point demands to volatile escalations between protestors and armed forces—the conspiratorial themes pervading responses to Circular 51928 suggest these embassy reports were prominent pieces of the President's deadly puzzle. In comparison to various versions of the enraged father, the Secretary's study provides a less sensational but better sourced explanation for his suspicions of foreign, Communist agitation. Emotionally sensitive as he was, Díaz Ordaz's deep-seated fears seem to have resulted at least equally from the reasoned intelligence his administrative apparatus was feeding him. Of course, if regime officials sensed the President desired or expected certain content, it would tend to bend information accordingly. So while personal paranoia could easily have played a part, now that we have the Secretary's archive in our records, we need not hinge answers to important historical questions on villainous tropes. In fact, these sources contain clues not only to the government's conviction to stop the threatening movement but also its strategic planning toward this goal.

Could the President have taken advice, or at least evaluated methods of dealing with the movement from the reports? No matter which explanation we prefer for the impossibility of *diálogo público*, the regime had to find a way to shut down the movement without accepting its demands. While the French President had called his students to order with a condescending speech, Ordaz's September 1 call for unity amid more subtle, ideological phrases of reproach resolved nothing. But the Mexican ambassador to Bolivia seems to have understood what his government was looking for when he listed the components of his response to Circular 51928: "the type of disturbance, the motive that provoked them, who were the principal actors, and HOW THEY WERE SUPPRESSED."[99]

[98] Krauze, 704.

[99] *AREM*, III-5890-1 (2ª), "En contestación a circular confidencial 51928", La Paz, September 6, 1968. Emphasis in the original.

Indeed, the reports offer a wide menu of possible government action. Political concessions (even small symbolic ones like acknowledging the legitimacy of demands), back-room agreements, or intra-university negotiations helped matters in El Salvador, Turkey, Italy, Egypt and Yugoslavia. But Mexican students obstinately refused such offers. Meanwhile Polish and Egyptian students responded to threats of suspension or missing their exams, but Mexican students were much more interested in the movement than their degrees or grades considering that the movement kept going strong months into the strike.[100] On the other extreme, following Venezuela, Bolivia, or Indonesia by declaring martial law or exiling movement leaders would have strangled the Olympics' viability and further desecrated Mexico in the foreign press.[101]

In Poland, students were intimidated by the threat of one-year sentences, but more arrests in Mexico fueled the fire as students marched against the holding of political prisoners and for their peers' releases. The embassy's version of Venezuela's Communist-influenced movement concludes the arrest of 700 students in 1966.[102] Though Mexico would outdo that by arresting as many as 2000 Tlatelolco participants, it was already obvious that arrests alone could not stifle the movement.

In a more creative approach, Brazil hatched an elaborate plot to provoke its student protestors. It sent jeeps and similar vehicles, all in very poor condition, into the university, hoping the students would jump brashly to attack them. The forces would then portray themselves as seriously wounded during the clash. Although the plan went awry when the students stayed away from the bait, when troops got out of control and beat and shot some students, the event did spark divisions within the student left.[103] Similarly, student infighting in Ecuador helped keep the protests out of the public sphere. Perhaps the Mexican regime could find a way to rupture CNH's unity so as to prompt extreme elements within to pull a trigger that would legitimate heavy-handed retaliation.

If, as Hernández suggests, Díaz Ordaz had been biding his time for an opportunity to delegitimize or unmask the students, he would have duly considered the already-tested methods of provocation in these case studies. Military occupation of the offending group's territory—whether universities or mining zones—appeared to either contain groups or provoke them. The Peruvian ambassador warned that sending in the military tended to ruin any chance of dialogue, but it was too late to heed such advice. While sending the military into UNAM territory did not goad students into blatant malice, their next try at the IPN on September 24 provided very different results. The ensuing battles "represented a qualitative jump in the levels of violence" as students fought back with whatever they had at hand.[104] More arrests resulted, and the students' aggressive behavior finally replaced headlines of police brutality in the foreign press.[105] However, student violence died off while the movement kept on; soon the CNH prepared another rally for October 2. The students had also organized meetings with government officials for that day, exercised restraint by cancelling a post-rally march to avoid clashing with troops, and won legitimacy in the eyes of union representatives who attended. Thus the President and his inner circle would use other methods to fulfill their promise of order to themselves and the international community.

The Mexican government might have noted another detail in the embassy reports—the use of snipers by protesters in Bolivia. Instructions to fire back at snipers had already appeared in the military's instructions for taking the UNAM on September 18.[106] In the Bolivian account, rebellious miners used snipers to repel the government and the ensuing battle left 20 dead and 100 wounded. This caused the government to send the army,

[100] *AREM*, III-5890-1 (2ª), "Traducción de telegrama cifrada", Warsaw, September 10, 1968. "Disturbios ocurridos en la R.A.U. durante los últimos años.", Cairo, September 10, 1968.
[101] *AREM*, III-5890-1 (2ª), "En contestación a circular confidencial 51928", La Paz, September 6, 1968.
[102] *AREM*, III-5890-1 (2ª), "Se acompaña Informe confidencial solicidado por esa Superioridad.", Caracas, September 13, 1968.
[103] *AREM*, III-5891-1 (2ª), "Disturbios en el Brasil – Circular telegráfica 51928.", Rio de Janeiro, September 12, 1968.
[104] Aguayo, 171.
[105] Headlines in the United States, for example, included "Police Throw Tear Gas at Snipers' Nests." *AREM*, III-5891-1 (3ª), No title (Número 2648), New York, September 25, 1968. Also see Aguayo, 179.
[106] Scherer and Monsiváis, 79.

then ultimately nationalize the mines and codify harsh laws against the subversion of order.[107] The protestors' drastic action made room for the government to strangulate them. Likewise, the Mexican military's directions for October 2 suggested opening fire after "having five deaths by firearms." [108] Since the students failed to offer sharpshooters, the government would do it with plainclothes paramilitary forces. Even upon firing the first shots, the government may have expected the militant leftists to pull out their own weapons, thus revealing the true colors of rebellion.

Though the pieces in this puzzle could very well morph into multiple shapes, one observation seems to carry across them: the foreign case studies provided both warnings and suggestions. Given a wave of militant students across the globe, student plots for international Communist revolution, and a strange report of Venezuelan agitators in Mexico, Díaz Ordaz's administration saw a story as sensible as many narratives in the literature of '68. At the very least, the urgently requested reports from Circular 51298 reinforced Díaz Ordaz's emotional interpretations, and even if they did not inspire the plan directly, they reinforced the rationale in his own case of student protests and "HOW THEY WERE REPRESSED."

CONCLUSIONS

As the government resolved to end the protests, wholesome behavior became even more frustrating than unwholesome behavior. Violent means were necessary because the political regime did not see a way to respond to the students' demands without surrendering its own legitimacy. To justify repression it had to convince itself and (because of the Olympics) the rest of the world that the students were dangerous. The government executed a plan to achieve these goals and succeeded, at least in the short term. While some commentators point to the movement as the catalyst for gradual democratic changes in Mexico, the Olympics went off without a hitch, and the PRI's presidentialism and growing corruption dominated Mexican politics for three more decades.

Ironically, the massacre's success in stopping the movement also illustrates fallacy in the government's vision of the students. Had most students represented maleficent foreign ideologies, they would probably not have been shut down so easily. The movement sputtered to a halt because the grand majority of its constituents were idealistic, imaginative youth who were successfully converted into a bunch of scared (and exhausted) kids. Taibo II represents both militants and students after the massacre when he writes, "we all found ourselves in the same trench with bullets really whistling through the air, because in the real Mexico the true 'others'—enemies under the command of a malign President—were killing real people." [109] Even to average participants, the government did make itself the true other by betraying them with violence. They no longer had reason to seek *diálogo público* or the President's recognition because he had said "No" to them as clearly and finally as possible.

For militants like Taibo II, "as survivors . . . we were becoming older, angrier, and more alone . . . The nights were the worst." [110] Each group of students we left with no choice but to acknowledge that their government and their movement were not what they had thought. The militants had failed to spark the revolution they debated. The students had failed to win public acknowledgement through their ill-conceived *diálogo*. Mexico was not a progressive constitutional democracy ready for reform, and the movement was not an invincible front of united crusaders. Protest activity halted during the Olympics, and even the most dedicated protesters returned to classes within a month. Taibo II admits, "We returned to defeat."[111]

However, this defeat was perhaps of their own making as much as the regime's. The militants obscured things enough to build their chimerical revolution under a guise of vague democratic

[107] *AREM*, III-5890-1 (2ª), "En contestación a circular confidencial 51928", La Paz, September 6, 1968.
[108] Scherer and Monsiváis, 79.
[109] Taibo II, 59.
[110] Ibid., 96, 98.
[111] Ibid., 117.

principles that appealed to their peers, while making it impossible for the state to negotiate with them. As Braun puts it, "the call for a *diálogo público* was the clearest indication that the students could not be relied upon or that there were secret agents working behind the scenes to promote a reformist face on a revolutionary endeavor." [112] The student masses did not understand what they were asking, but the state knew it was a threat regardless; Regardless of the movement's formal claims, the Secretary of Foreign Relations' archive shows how it was indeed embarrassing Mexico and did indeed involve international, communist agitators. Nevertheless, the student masses were scarcely concerned with revolutionary ideology. Braun argues that ordinary student protesters would have been satisfied with some recognition of their dignity and right to participate in society; a simple appearance on the balcony "to speak broadly to the moral rectitude of their actions, to tell them that together they would right the wrongs through which the social order had been violated" might have sufficed to break the students away from their militant motivators and neuter the movement. Instead, as the violence escalated and the President maintained his silence and disregard for their six points, students felt the bonds between themselves and their leader break.[113]

According to Braun, one obstacle to Díaz Ordaz recognizing the true nature of the student masses was the rupture between the modern bureaucracy Mexico had become and the expectation of a paternal, "deeply moral and organic social order that the students wished to experience," which stemmed from Mexico's colonial past. [114] This rupture resulted in an information gap: the administration looked abroad for answers to a conspiratorial puzzle, rather than looking closer at the masses themselves. It had stopped seeing the students as its children and begun examining them in terms of the intimidating global stage its developing bureaucracy had just entered. Its own misguided gaze outward produced Confidential Circular 51928 and the data it collected and reviewed. The state was less a father (whether naked or paranoid) and more a bureaucracy, less paternal and more a web of officials and paperwork. The President occupied the center, but the sources reveal that his information and relationships were mediated by the world of confidential circulars and meetings.[115]

The time has come not to justify the regime, but to write its members' history with the sources they left behind and tell the story from their own eyes. By tracking the government's own leans, the Secretary of Foreign Relations' archive helps answer the question "why" more completely than the enraged father paradigm allows. Perhaps more sources will emerge to further complicate our picture, but as it stands we can conclude this much: though brutal, Díaz Ordaz and his advisors were largely rational bureaucrats who found an effective solution to a problem they had defined in their own terms. They informed—and misinformed—that project by looking abroad for answers.

[112] Braun, 531
[113] Ibid., 534.
[114] Ibid., 544. Also see 517.

[115] As Braun notes, it was a fantasy to expect him to know his "subjects with some personal form of knowledge, if not intimately. The difficulty was that Mexico had become large and complex, already too … anonymous and individualized" (543).

Reconstructing the Constructions: Media Representations of Arizona SB 1070

Bridget Flores

ABSTRACT

In this article I conduct a media discourse analysis of coverage on Arizona law SB 1070 in The New York Times (NYT) and The Arizona Republic (AR). My methods draw from two discourse analytical approaches to the media: moral panic (MP) and the Propaganda Model (PM). While both are valuable frameworks for problematizing mainstream media representations, neither systematically addresses normative standards for how news media should report. I fill that gap by adopting the Habermasian standard for quality public dialogue in democratic societies laid out by Clifford Christians et al. in Normative Theories of the Media. I then integrate this standard with elements of MP and the PM to develop my own discourse analytical apparatus, the Representation Model (RM). Using the RM, I assess how NYT and AR each contribute to quality public dialogue on undocumented immigration through their reporting on SB 1070. I find that NYT offers stunted, insufficient contributions to democratic dialogue. While the AR's coverage has its faults, its contributions to public dialogue are more constructive. I conclude by calling for more research that investigates how media coverage directly affects undocumented immigrants in real, tangible ways.

INTRODUCTION

On April 30, 2010, Arizona passed Senate Bill 1070, the "Support Our Law Enforcement and Safe Neighborhoods Act." SB 1070 obligated law enforcement officers to interrogate the legal status of persons who appear to be undocumented and gave citizens the right to sue local police for not pursuing undocumented migrants—most of whom come from Mexico.[1] The law created a national controversy, including a federal injunction from U.S. District Judge Susan Bolten along with a surge of contentious media coverage.

My goal is to examine and interpret U.S. media constructions of SB 1070 through discourse analysis of coverage in *The New York Times (NYT)* and *The Arizona Republic (AR).* My methodology is influenced by two discourse analytical approaches: moral panic (MP) and the Propaganda Model (PM).[2] While both approaches offer valuable tools for examining mainstream media representations, neither systematically address their normative predispositions.

How *should* the news media go about reporting? I address that neglected question by adopting the Habermasian standard for quality public dialogue in democratic societies laid out by Clifford Christians et al. in *Normative Theories of the Media.*[3] Drawing from the tools and insight of research on MP and the PM, I add this normative standard to develop my own apparatus for media discourse analysis: the Representation Model (RM). As I employ the RM for my case study, I find that *NYT* offers stunted, insufficient contributions to the public dialogue that is necessary to maintain American democracy. While the *AR*'s coverage has its faults, its contributions to public dialogue are more constructive. I conclude by calling for more research that investigates how media coverage directly affects undocumented immigrants in real, tangible ways.

DISCOURSE ANALYSIS & NORMATIVE THEORIES OF THE MEDIA

As Pirjo Nikander summarizes, discourse analysis (DA) refers to methodologies that study how structures of language and rhetoric construct the "ideas, social processes, and phenomena that make up our social world."[4] According to Nikander, despite variations all methods of discourse analysis share three common themes: they focus on discourse as the topic of their analyses, they consider how people utilize words for their own purposes, and they analyze how persuasive language can have moral consequences. She identifies two primary types of discourse analysis: critical and constructionist. Critical DA approaches processes of power with an explicit ideological lean, then studies language and rhetoric to explain those power processes. On the other hand, constructionist DA begins with language and rhetoric, then describes understandings of power as they occur in the discourse under study. Constructionists may imply ideological bias, but they do not directly examine structures of power. Meanwhile, each of these types may focus more on sociopolitical context or on the microdynamics of discourse. Based on these distinctions, Nikander provides a map of the DA field:[5]



Figure 1: The Field of Discourse Analysis (DA)

[1] Several key figures were involved in passing, supporting, and contesting SB 1070. Arizona Governor Jan Brewer and Senator Russell Pearce strongly supported the law. Another proponent, Sheriff Joe Arpaio of Maricopa County, is known for controversial raids of Latino neighborhoods. Judge Susan Bolten, the U.S. District Judge who filed an injunction against SB 1070, prevented the most controversial elements of the law from being enacted.

[2] Though many researchers have employed the PM, it was created by Noam Chomsky & Edward Herman (Manufacturing Consent: the Political Economy of the Mass Media, New York: Pantheon Books, 1988).

[3] Clifford G. Christians, Theodore L. Glasser, Denis McQuail, Kaarle Nordenstreng, and Robert A. White, Normative Theories of the Media: Journalism in Democratic Societies (Chicago: University of Illinois Press, 2009).

[4] Pirjo Nikander, "Constructionism and Discourse Analysis" in James A. Holstein & Jaber F. Gubrium, Handbook of Constructionist Research. (New York: Guilford Press, 2006), 413.

[5] Nikander, 417-421.

As tools of discourse analysis, moral panic (MP) and the Propaganda Model (MP) fall on opposite sides of the map. The PM belongs in the top right quadrant, as it is critical discourse analysis focusing on macro context.[6] Though there is more variation in MP research, it tends to fall in the bottom left quadrant, focusing on microdynamics without trying to explain the structures of power they reveal.

Moral Panic

Since Stanley Cohen introduced the term in 1972, sociologists have used the concept of moral panic (MP) to study public reactions to perceived threats against society by emphasizing how media coverage compounds or represents this reaction.[7] Debate surrounds the origin and definition of MP. Cohen argued MPs originate with interest groups, whereas Stuart Hall et al. prioritized elite origins.[8] Later Goode & Ben-Yehuda have asserted that MPs grow mostly through grassroots but always involve the other two actors.[9] I adopt Goode & Ben-Yehuda's insight about interplay between the three sets of actors, along with their "attributional model" of MP, which identifies five defining factors: concern over a certain group or category; hostility toward the labeled enemy; consensus that a threat exists; disproportionality of public reaction to the perceived threat; and volatility between eruption and decline of panic.[10]

As a tool for DA, MP is relevant to my research because it specifies characteristics of media discourse on immigration, especially undocumented immigration. Roberto Suro argues that the media inconsistently cover immigration, only reporting on the issue when controversy arises.[11] Furthermore, Yolande Pottie-Sherman draws from moral panic literature to analyze coverage of the 2007 Immigration Reform Bill in *The New York Times* and *The San Diego Union Tribune*. Similarly, Michael Costelloe (2008) employs moral panic DA to study how citizens perceive immigration as a threat using evidence from letters to the editor in *The Arizona Republic* throughout 2005.[12] However, neither Pottie-Sherman nor Costelloe address how the media *should* report, and they focus on cultural meaning more than structures of power.[13]

The Propaganda Model

Understanding power structures is crucial for comprehensive media DA. In their 1988 book, *Manufacturing Consent*, Noam Chomsky & Edward Herman propose the Propaganda Model (PM) as a tool for revealing the political economy behind mass media. According to the PM, news passes through five filters set up by the market before it reaches the public: ownership, advertising, sourcing, flak, and rival ideology.[14] Additionally, the PM poses three hypotheses. First, when elite consensus surrounds an issue, media coverage will reflect that consensus by drowning out opposing voices. Second, when corporations control mainstream media, news coverage follows the whims of a "guided market system," passing through the five filters. Third, the PM will be marginalized in academic debate over the media.[15]

In one sense, this study fills a void in PM research; most PM research on immigration has focused on refugees/asylees outside of the United States, while I focus on undocumented

[6] Critics and commentators sometimes refer to discourse analysis as a distinct methodology from the PM, but Chomsky & Herman have clarified that the PM is in fact a form of (critical) DA; see Noam Chomsky & Edward S. Herman, interview by Andrew Mullen, "The Propaganda Model after 20 Years," Westminster Papers in Communication and Culture, Vol. 6(2), University of Westminster (2009), 12-22.
[7] Stanley Cohen, Folk Devils and Moral Panics (London: MacGibbon and Kee, 1972); Yolande Pottie-Sherman, "Moral Panic Over Merit-Based Immigration Policy: Talent for Citizenship and the American Dream," Masters Thesis, Ontario: Queens University (2008), 20.
[8] Stuart Hall, Chas Critcher, Tony Jefferson, John Clarke, & Brian Roberts, Policing the Crisis (London: Macmillan, 2008).
[9] Pottie-Sherman, 20-21; Erich Good & Nachman Ben-Yehuda, Moral Panics: The Social Construction of Deviance, Oxford, England: Blackwells, 1994.
[10] Chas Critcher, "Moral Panic Analysis: Past, Present, and Future," Sociology Compass, Vol. 2, No. 4 (2008), 1131-1132.
[11] Roberto Suro, "The Triumph of No: How the Media Influence the Immigration Debate," A Report on the Media and the Immigration Debate, Governance Studies at the Brookings Institution, 2008.
[12] Michael T. Costelloe, "Immigration as Threat: A Content Analysis of Citizen Perception," The Journal of Public and Professional Sociology. Vol 2, No. 1 (2008).
[13] Admittedly, both Costelloe and Pottie-Sherman demonstrate more rigorous empirical analysis than I am able to offer here. Limited to an undergraduate context at the time of my inquiry, I had not developed robust, systematic methods for qualitative analysis. Rather, my DA takes the form of general observations supported by examples.
[14] Chomksy & Herman (2009), 12-15. Originally, the fifth filter was "anti-communism," but in later editions Chomsky & Herman have said the "war on terror" substitutes for the Cold War as the new rival ideology in Western politics.
[15] Ibid. ,1-3.

immigration in the US.[16] On the other hand, the PM does not meet the needs of this study. To begin, SB 1070 did not enjoy elite consensus; the federal government, along with other elites, blatantly opposed the law. Also, I examine the microdynamics of media discourse, while the PM does not. And finally, despite their unabashed ideological bias, Chomsky & Herman assess media performance without establishing how mass media *should* perform.

Normative Ground

Since studies of MP and the PM do not directly address their normative predispositions, I depart from their methodologies to engage this crucial gap. In *Normative Theories of the Media*, Christians et al. hold that news media are necessary for healthy, functioning democracy. Though they allow for flexibility among different cultural and political interpretations of democracy, by limiting their normative inquiry to democratic societies Christians et al. aim to avoid moral relativism.[17] They distinguish between two overarching views of democracy: civic republicanism and procedural liberalism. Civic republicanism focuses on the general well-being of society and the values shared by society, while procedural liberalism emphasizes the interests of free individuals.[18] While these two traditions have different ideals, Christians et al. assert one standard over all types of democratic public discourse:

> We argue here that a key condition for establishing a satisfactory normative formula that harmonizes the moral claims of all social actors is the quality of dialogue between social actors (Habermas 1990; Pasquali 1997). If dialogue evokes a sense of respect for the moral claims of all actors and sustains the collective search that does not cease until all moral claims are dealt with, then it is fulfilling its central role.[19]

By adopting Habermas' approach to discursive ethics, Christians et al. ground their normative theory of media in deliberative democracy. I share their prescriptive stance, with a lean toward civil republicanism: the media should promote quality public dialogue for the greater good of society.[20] However, since my research analyzes media representations of undocumented immigration in their current empirical context, I assess media performance in light of the roles they already play. Christians et al. identify four "social roles" of the news media, each of which involve both empirical and evaluative dimensions:

> The radical role is characterized by the perspective of power, whereas the facilitative role is focused on citizenship, the collaborative role is defined in terms of the state or other powerful institutions, and the monitorial role falls between citizenry and institutions. While the distinctive feature of the monitorial role is to expose, that of the facilitative role to deliberate, and that of the collaborative role to mobilize, the keyword for the radical role is to oppose, to contradict.[21]

These roles exist on two spectrums, between strong and weak institutional power, and between media autonomy and media dependency. I will refer mostly to the monitorial role, which falls under strong institutional power and media autonomy, because of its relevance to undocumented immigration. Nevertheless, all four roles interact and contribute to the media coverage I study.

The news media, like every other collective actor, is made up of people who bring their own beliefs and understandings to the subjects they investigate and interpret. Likewise, the consumer base that fuels news demand is made up of people with their own life experiences and beliefs. The

[16] For examples of PM research on immigration, see Natascha Klocker & Kevin M. Dunn, "Who's Driving the Asylum Debate? Newspaper and Governement Representations of Asylum Seekers," Media International Australia, 109 (2003), 71-92; Matthew Randall, Rubbing Salt in the Wounds – A study of media, power, and immigration (Munich, GRIN Publishing GmbH, 2003), grin.com/en/e-book/124100/rubbing-salt-in-the-wounds-a-study-of-media-power-and-immigration.
[17] Christians et al., 17.
[18] Ibid., 93-94.
[19] Ibid., 78.
[20] For an argument on media responsibility that prioritizes civic republicanism, see David Croteau & William Hoynes, The Business of Media: Corporate Media and the Public Interest (Thousand Oaks, CA: Pine Forge Press, 2001). The authors maintain that a news source should always represent the various perspectives on an issue, that it should be creative and original in what it reports and how it investigates, and that it should report on issues important to society.
[21] Christians et al., 135. This is not intended to be an exhaustive list of media roles; the authors focus on these four to highlight tensions between them.

causal relationships between the news media, the people who provide and receive news information, and the public discourse in which they participate are complex and interconnected. As the Pew Research Center has shown, Americans rely heavily on the news media as their source of information on the world around them.[22] Therefore, the voices represented in American news media will greatly influence public dialogue in the United States. To have optimal democratic dialogue, news media must allow diverse actors to be heard, including marginalized actors such as undocumented immigrants.

The Representation Model

Having drawn from MP, the PM, and Christians et al., I am ready to propose my own methodology for assessing media coverage of undocumented immigration: the "Representation Model" (RM). I use the RM to analyze the microdynamics of news articles as well as the macro-level factors that affect quality of coverage. It consists of three "discourse categories" and two filters.

The first discourse category, *News Rhetoric*, examines articles both individually and generally across the sources' entire coverage of the issue in question (in this case SB 1070). The second discourse category, *Editorial Bias*, examines various citizen perspectives on the subject; editorials can offer information that news articles neglect, often including more radical voices. The third discourse category, *Excluded Information*, examines the comprehensiveness of coverage by identifying relevant facts absent from the articles and editorials.

The first filter, *Reporter Context*, broadly accounts for the geographical, economic, and political factors that affect a given news institution's coverage of the issue under study. Finally, the second filter, *Xenophobia*, combines the public fear of moral panic with Chomsky & Herman's rival ideologies by utilizing Leo Chavez's "Latino Threat Narrative," which describes the primary stereotypes and fears that the U.S. government, citizens, and media apply to Latinos and Latino immigrants.[23]

Hypotheses

Despite the findings of previously mentioned literature on MP and the PM, I approached my empirical analysis of *The New York Times* (*NYT*) with more optimistic expectations. Knowing that a diverse audience across the United States views it as a quality news source, I hypothesized that *NYT* coverage of SB 1070 would positively contribute to quality public dialogue. Conversely, I assumed that *The Arizona Republic* (*AR*) would reflect Arizona's support for SB 1070. Following this line of thinking, I hypothesized that *AR* would not sufficiently encourage quality public dialogue by focusing only on the politics, protests, and legal issues surrounding SB 1070 while neglecting the migrant perspective and other contextual elements.

ISSUE CONTEXT

Before testing these hypotheses, let us consider the historical and contemporary context surrounding undocumented immigration (hereafter "UI") in the United States. Though the United States' history of immigration from Mexico and other Latin American countries goes beyond my scope here, I can point to some resources and general observations that inform my study.[24]

To begin, a common trend pervades US history: in times of prosperity demand for low-wage labor has welcomed immigrants to the "land of opportunity", but in times of economic downturn US government and citizens target the same

[22] According to the Pew Research Center, 92% of adult Americans use "multiple platforms" to get the news each day, including the Internet, television, print news, and the radio, and 7% use one platform. Thus 99% of adult Americans use the news media as their major source of information. [Kristen Purcell, Lee Rainie, Amy Mitchell, Tom Rosensteil, & Kenny Olmstead, "Understanding the Participatory News Consumer." Pew Internet and American Life Project, The Pew Research Center (2010), pewinternet.org/Reports/2010/Online-News.aspx.]

[23] Chavez, Leo R. The Latino Threat: Constructing Immigrants, Citizens, and the Nation (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2008, 23.

[24] For information on the politics of immigration and controversy surrounding UI from Latin America throughout US history, see David G. Gutierrez, "Migration, Emergent Ethnicity, and the 'Third Space': The Shifting Politics of Nationalism in Greater Mexico," The Journal of American History, Vol. 86, No. 2 (1999), 481-517; Mae Ngai, Impossible Subjects: Illegal Aliens and the Making of Modern America (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2004). For a comprehensive understanding of how Mexican immigration to the United States has influenced society and culture, see George J. Sánchez, Becoming Mexican American: Ethnicity, Culture, and Identity in Chicano Los Angeles, 1900-1945 (New York: Oxford University Press, 1993); Mario T. Garcia, Mexican Americans: leadership, ideology, and identity, 1930-1960 (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1989).

migrants they invited with hatred, dehumanizing sanctions, and deportation.[25] In the past century, this push-pull relationship is evident in policies such as the Bracero Program (1942-1964), Operation Wetback (1954), and the Immigration Reform and Control Act (1986), Operation Gatekeeper (1994), California Proposition 187 (1994), and of course, SB 1070 (2010).[26]

Since the turn of the Century, rapid influx of UI, the 9/11 attacks, and economic recession have made public discontent with UI intense. A June 2010 Pew poll reported that 30% of the US public believe immigrants take away jobs from U.S. citizens; 50% believe immigrants are a burden on the country because they take jobs, housing, and healthcare; and 44% believe immigrants "threaten traditional American customs and values." [27] Additionally, 42% of poll respondents believe the main way to address UI is increased border security (as opposed to policy reform), while 61% approve of SB 1070 despite well-publicized accusations that it legalized racial profiling.[28]

Contrary to these opinions, immigrants positively contribute to the US economy through entrepreneurship, purchasing power, and raising wages for most U.S. citizens. From 1997-2004 immigrants caused a 0.4% rise in US citizen wages, and in 2009 Latinos had a purchasing power of $978.4 billion. Furthermore, undocumented immigrants redeem fewer healthcare benefits than US citizens, and they are not eligible for food stamps or welfare. Still, they pay taxes; in 1997, the average undocumented immigrant paid $1800 more than he or she cost in benefits. As for stereotypes associating UI with crime, statistics show that crime rates in the US are actually the lowest where immigrant growth is the highest. The incarceration rate for native-born men is five times higher than it is for immigrant men.[29]

So if the stereotypes are false, how do nativism and xenophobia persist? Do news media contribute to these trends?

EMPIRICAL INQUIRY

To approach this question, I examined all articles and editorials related to SB 1070 in *NYT* and *AR* from April 14, 2010 to November 2, 2010, which I accessed through each source's website. [30] *NYT* represents an influential, widely read newspaper that caters to national and international audiences, while *AR* is the most popular newspaper in Arizona—most likely to represent those who passed SB 1070 or have a vested interest in the issue. Both papers have generally positive reputations, so we may also consider them exemplary to other American media outlets.

Employing the RM, I analyze its three discourse categories for each newspaper individually. Then I offer a comparative discussion to explore evidence of the RM's two filters as I connect my empirical findings to thematic and contextual elements.

The New York Times (*NYT*)

NEWS RHETORIC

In general, I found that *NYT* attempts to maintain rhetorical neutrality and objectivity when reporting on SB 1070 by covering different perspectives on the issue. The main areas in which the periodical's article rhetoric shows ideological lean are 1) Arizona resident experiences with immigration and 2) the federal government's role in the immigration debate.

NYT almost always presents the perspectives of both those who oppose the law and those who support the law, though the type of coverage allotted to each group reveals a slight bias against SB 1070. Articles on the issue regularly quote extreme emotive sentiments from both supporters and opponents; *NYT*'s main message is that the

[25] For a thorough account of this hospitality-hostility complex, see Ali Behdad, A Forgetful Nation: On Immigration and Cultural Identity in the United States (Durham: Duke University Press, 2005).
[26] Douglas Massey & Jorge Durand, Crossing the Border (New York: Russel Sage Foundation, 2004), 17-19; Joseph Nevins, Operation Gatekeeper and Beyond: The War on Illegals and the Remaking of the U.S.-Mexico Boundary. (New York: Routledge. 2007);
[27] Nevins, 166-167.
[28] "Public Favors Tougher Border Controls and Path to Citizenship." Pew Research Center for the People and the Press, 2011, http://people-press.org/report/707/.
[29] "Giving the Facts a Fighting Chance: Answers to the Toughest Immigration Questions." Immigration Policy Center, American Immigration Council, 2010, 4-10.
[30] To reduce clutter, my citations from NYT and AR use those abbreviations and omit the specific URL. You may find these articles by title at each website: nytimes.com and azcentral.com/arizonarepublic/.

issue is polarizing and divisive with no easy solution. Rather than blame Arizona residents or immigrants, these articles tend to consider the government as the main party at fault—sometimes the state government, but usually the federal government.

There is very little favorable coverage of Sherriff Joe Arpaio and Senator Russell Pearce. Often the statements and facts reported on both figures have little to do with the topic of the article; their presence in the article only emphasizes controversial behavior.[31] For example, an article about Latino organizations calling for a boycott of Arizona concludes with a statement reporting a raid Arpaio conducted to arrest twenty-four immigrants.[32] Rather than speak to the boycott, this statement portrays supporters of the law, particularly Arpaio, as extreme and inhumane. In this case, *NYT* seems to play the radical role, but their inflammatory approach further polarizes the debate.

In some cases, however, *NYT* articles sympathize with proponents of the law—particularly residents of Arizona who support SB 1070 as tool to persuade the federal government to act on immigration reform. In these examples, the paper uses fewer subjective qualifiers to describe supporters of the law, or it justifies their views by describing conditions of tension, fear, and frustration in Arizona.[33] Through its sympathetic and critical leanings, *NYT* engages the monitorial and facilitative roles.

EDITORIAL BIAS

Most *NYT* editorials on SB 1070 disagree with the law and express sympathy for its likely effects on undocumented immigrants. They tend to offer extreme expressions of opinion against the law and in favor of comprehensive immigration reform—as titles such as "Arizona Goes Over the Edge," "Stopping Arizona," and "Another Bad Idea in Arizona" indicate.[34] However, they also tend to be more informative about the issues that challenge immigrants and immigration reform than the news articles. Although the editorials provide relevant information about UI and surrounding factors, their informative impact is minimal because the facts are presented as subjective, emotional interpretations.[35]

EXCLUDED INFORMATION

While *NYT* remains relatively objective in its news reporting on SB 1070, its most significant fault lies in what is missing from its coverage. Naturally, descriptions of public sentiment or opinions quoted within the articles include many false stereotypes about immigrants, immigration policy, and the societal effects of immigration. While it is important to represent these views, the articles do not provide an informative context for the reader to judge the legitimacy of stereotypical claims.

One example is an article entitled "Obama to Send up to 1,200 Troops to Border," in which *NYT* focuses on the call from conservative-leaning politicians to continue to militarize the border and Obama's decision to send National Guard troops to Arizona. Throughout the article the reporter quotes various politicians praising the decision and asserting its necessity because of "rampant border violence," including Senator John McCain's remark that the measure is "'simply not enough.'"[36] The article emphasizes the need for further measures, yet offers no discussion of what immigration reform should include; the focus remains on increased border security. In this way, *NYT* spreads the highly disputable idea that heightened border security can address the root causes UI without considering counterarguments, which stress the need for drastic changes to US immigration law,

[31] Randal C. Archibold, "Immigration Bill Reflect's a Firebrand's Impact," NYT, 4/19/2010.
[32] "Latino Groups Urge Boycott of Arizona Over New Law," Editorial, NYT, 5/6/2010.
[33] Randal C. Archibold & Steinhaur, Jennifer. "Welcome to Arizona, Outpost of Cotnradictions," NYT, 4/28/2010; Randal C. Archibold, "In Wake of Immigration Law, Calls for an Economic Boycott of Arizona," NYT, 4/26/2010; Randal C. Archibold "Growing Split in Arizona Over Immigration," NYT, 4/25/2010.
Adam Nagourney, "Immigration: Complex Test for 2 Parties," NYT, 4/28/2010.

[34] "Arizona Goes Over the Edge," Editorial, NYT, 4/17/2010; "Stopping Arizona", NYT, 4/29/2010; "Courage in Arizona," Editorial, NYT, 5/19/2010; "Another Bad Idea in Arizona," Editorial, NYT, 6/19/2010.
[35] In addition to the previous citation, other examples include: "Come Back, John McCain," Editorial, NYT, 4/22/2010; "Courage in Arizona," NYT, Editorial, 5/19/2010; "Troops and the Border," Editorial, NYT, 5/27/2010; "Border News," Editorial, 9/24/2010.
[36] Randal C. Archibold "Obama to Send Up to 1,200 Troops to Border." NYT. 5/25/2010.

employee-worker regulations, and US-Mexico trade relations. As Benjamin Radford once put it, "a poorly informed public, prompted in part by manipulation by and through the media, pressure lawmakers to enact laws that don't solve the problems."[37] By reducing immigration reform to a function of increased militarization, this article encourages more laws like SB 1070.

Though the *NYT* articles occasionally include quotes or facts that counter faulty suppositions, these challenges rarely follow the claims they falsify; instead they are reported as a side note. For example, in an interview with Arizona resident Ron White, the reporter asks him about his opinion of SB 1070, noting "he felt a sense of relief that something was finally being done about 'the illegals'—whom he blames for ills like congregating on the streets, breaking into homes in his neighborhood, draining tax dollars, and taking jobs from Americans."[38] Mr. White's position stands for 11 paragraphs before the reporter mentions how, according to Arizona police, undocumented immigrants commit no more crimes than the average Arizona resident. This bit of truth is valuable but very limited, especially since after that the reporter quotes two more residents who believe the crime myth without debunking it. Also, the reporter never points out the misunderstanding in Mr. White's claims about taxes and jobs.

NYT tends to neglect these important topics, with more dramatic stories taking their place. For example, several articles describe sports teams protesting SB 1070, but very few articles describe the economic causes and effects of UI. In addition to taxes and the labor market, the most poorly covered subjects are crime rates, government services, and the content of comprehensive immigration reform. There is also a significant lack of discussion on other relevant factors: the history of US immigration; the reasons migrants come to the US without documents; the inefficiencies of the visa process; the impacts of US border policy on human rights, migratory trends, and the environment; the myth of connections between UI and drug trafficking; and the ways immigrants and their children assimilate to American culture. Without thorough exploration of these topics, *NYT*'s limited coverage of SB 1070 and UI does not encourage educated, balanced public discourse. And considering *NYT*'s 2010 circulation numbers—about 900,000 each weekday plus 1.3 million each Sunday—the American democratic system is likely to suffer from this failure.[39]

The Arizona Republic (*AR*)

NEWS RHETORIC

Like *NYT*, most rhetoric in the *AR* news articles on SB 1070 try to be objective by offering multiple perspectives, quotes, and unbiased writing tone. On certain issues, namely the economic effects of SB 1070 and the federal government's actions on immigration, the news articles' rhetoric takes more of a bias, giving more attention to the perspectives of frustrated citizens and information about why they are frustrated. Although reporters cover these issues with emotive language, they are rooted more in factual claims than myths. For example, many articles heatedly discuss the inability of police departments to handle the costs of enforcing SB 1070.[40]

As opposed to focusing on voices that blame UI for economic hardship, *AR* news articles discuss economic downturn in terms that consistently connect SB 1070 with failing businesses, cancelled events, and declining tourism rates.[41] In these articles, the writers' rhetoric reflects the frustration Arizona's citizens feel toward the new law. For example, in a July 14th article entitled "Brewer Announces Tourism Campaign to Combat SB 1070 Fallout," the paper states that "[hotels] and resorts report millions of dollars of canceled business and

[37] Benjamin Radford,. *Media Mythmakers: How Journalists, Activists, and Advertisers Mislead Us*, (Amherst: Prometheus Books, 2003.), 223.
[38] Archibold (4/25/2010).
[39] "The New York Times Circulation Data (Audit Bureau of Circulations 6-month Average)," The New York Times Company, nytco.com/investors/financials/nyt-circulation.html
[40] Bob Christie, "SB 1070 Boycott Costly, Study Says.," *AR*, 11/19/2010..
Ed Masley, "National Music Convention Sidesteps Arizona Boycott," *AR*, 1/14/2011.
[41] "SB 1070 Boycotts Cost State Dozens of Meetings," The Associated Press in *AR*, 8/3/2010.

say leads on new meetings are drying up because of the controversy."[42]

Though *AR* reporters heavily cover the various lawsuits against SB1070 when discussing politicians for and against the law, they regularly emphasize extreme statements and controversial decisions of figures such as State Senator Russell Pearce and Sherriff Joe Arpaio.[43] Rhetorical subjectivity is most apparent in the inflammatory pictures the articles paint of these figures and others like them. Despite the articles' tendency to be harshly critical, their main interest appears to lie in Arizona and its residents—no matter race or documentation—rather than opposing or supporting the law.

EDITORIAL BIAS

The ideologies represented in the editorials vary from article to article, representing extreme and moderate views both for and against SB 1070 with heavily emotive language. In general they tend to be critical of the federal government, Arizona politicians, and the economic effects of SB 1070. However, the articles cover almost all points of view well enough that a regular reader could gain fairly thorough understanding around the range of public debate.

Like *NYT,* the editorials also tend to provide much more important contextual information than the news articles, such as specific facts about undocumented immigration, SB 1070 and its application, or the politicians involved in supporting and opposing the bill.[44] For example, blog journalist for *AR,* E.J. Montini, criticizes the lack of definition for how SB 1070 will be enforced.[45] This editorial raises legitimate concern about the implementation of SB 1070, and it opens a forum of discussion on the issue of federal vs. state immigration enforcement.

Although the *AR* editorials are colored by opinions and emotions, their deliberative impact is stronger than those of *NYT* because they cover a wider range of perspectives. And as the next section helps clarify, their informative (monitorial) impact is stronger because their coverage of crucial facts is not isolated from the news articles, which provide more relevant information than the *NYT* articles.

EXCLUDED INFORMATION

Approaching *AR,* I had formed a list of important topics for understanding UI from what was lacking in *NYT*'s coverage (see the parallel section above). While it does not address all of these topics and its coverage of the ones it does address is not always thorough, *AR* is more comprehensive in explaining UI than *NYT*. Together, *AR* news articles and editorials address many commonly misunderstood topics. They discuss the history of U.S. immigration, even mentioning fluctuations between hospitality and hostility.[46] They make the critical distinction between drug violence and undocumented migrants, and they explain the impact migrants have on the labor market, consumer experience, taxes, and social services.[47] And crucially, they expose the role of current US border policies in UI, including hundreds of migrant deaths that occur in the Arizona desert each year.[48]

However, individual articles in *AR* do not optimally communicate relevant information about UI. As in *NYT,* they often report false assumptions and misunderstandings without directly countering them. Their coverage of the important topics listed above is rather erratic, sometimes slipped in the middle of an article about something else. Thus, people who are not faithful, daily readers could easily take faulty claims as fact. As Croteau & Hoynes explain, "the news media's depth of coverage of events tends to be fragmented and episodic with little depth or context…It becomes almost impossible to understand what any of the fleeting coverage

[42] Dawn Gilbertson, "Brewer Announces Tourism Campaign to Combat SB 1070 Fallout," *AR*, 7/14/2010.
[43] "11 States Join to File Legal Brief in Support of SB 1070," The Associated Press in *AR.* 9/5/2010; Alia Beard Rau, "Proposals to Deny Citizenship to Illegal Immigrants' Children in the Works, Lawmaker Says," *AR,* 10/19/2010.; Alia Beard Rau, "Judge to Hear Lawsuit vs. Arizona's Immigration Law" *AR,* 7/15/2010.
[44] For example, on the *AR* "Livewire Blog," Ronald J. Hansen brings up the legal-defense fund being collected from donors nationwide to defend SB 1070, and the costs that tax payers still may have to cover, even with the fund ("Livewire Blog: Taxpayers Could Dodge SB 1070's Legal Costs," 7/16/2010).
[45] E.J. Montini, "SB 1070 Enforcement Will NOT Be Uniform," *AR,* 7/27/2010.
[46] Alia Beard Rau, "Immigrant Cycle Familiar to United States," *AR,*" 7/3/2010.
[47] Richard Toon, "The Role of Fear in SB 1070 Debate," *AR.* 5/18/2010.
[48] Linda Valdez, "Migrant Deaths a Moral Issue for U.S.," *AR,* 8/31/2010.

means because news stories contain little or no context about why the events occurred."[49] In the same vein, *AR* reports rather inconsistently. While many articles excellently describe SB 1070 in the greater context of US immigration, too many others fall short—focusing instead on sensationalistic statements or actions by politicians and protesters, as common in *NYT*.

Despite its flaws, *AR*'s reporting is respectably thorough. It consistently voices diverse perspectives on the SB 1070 topics it covers, and it devotes space to fully explain the legislation's potential effects for both Latinos and non-Latinos. Overall, *AR* offers a more comprehensive understanding of SB 1070 and UI than does *NYT*.

MEDIA COVERAGE OF SB1070: DISCOURSE CATEGORY RESULTS		
Newspaper	**NEW YORK TIMES**	**ARIZONA REPUBLIC**
News Rhetoric		
Support v. Opposition	usually even, sometimes more space to opponents of the law (particularly in editorials)	shares views of both sides, but the newspaper comes out against the law and the reporting often leans toward anti-SB 1070 sentiments
Subject Matter	high variance; most common: legal-political process of SB 1070, federal gov't critique, call for immigration reform	effects of SB1070 for AZ residents/economy and immigrants, legal-political process of SB 1070, contextual UI info
Emotive Language	some emotive language, mostly in quotes & editorials; occasionally the authors' prose contained emotive language, but for the most part it remained objective	more emotive language, mostly in quotes & editorials, but in authors' prose about federal responses to immigration, SB 1070 boycott, and extreme behaviors of well-known political figures;
Use of Facts	most facts relevant only to direct subject, very few UI facts	most facts relevant to direct subject, noteworthy UI facts
Use of Quotes	high variance of perspectives quoted (moderate to extreme); emphasis on AZ resident interests; less relevant info on well-known figures	high variance of perspectives quoted (moderate to extreme); emphasis on dissatisfaction w/ federal gov't & AZ economy; less relevant info on well-known figures
Editorial Bias		
Opinions Expressed	mostly extreme opinions; most against SB 1070; most critical of federal gov't & call for immigration reform	many extreme opinions; some balanced analyses; some for the law, most against; responses to outcry against the law; calls for immigration reform and heavy criticism of federal gov't
Use of Facts	higher concentration of relevant, contextual info on immigrants/UI than news articles	higher concentration of relevant, contextual info on immigrants/UI than news articles, although news articles do provide relevant info
Excluded Information		
Unexamined Subjects	visa process, reasons for coming, economic impact of UI (labor market, purchasing power, taxes), crime/UI empirics, inefficacy & harmfulness of US border policy, content of policy reform, trade policies, aging US pop.	Discusses most relevant subjects in relative detail; only a few topics are missing, including border wall's negative effects, the visa process, and the gap the aging US population leaves in the labor market
False Claims Unchallenged	very common	frequent, but less than *NYT*

COMPARATIVE DISCUSSION

Reporting Context

The degree to which the evidence from each discourse category indicates contributions to quality public dialogue depends in part on each paper's reporting context. I consider three contextual factors most important: market, geography, and readership.

With regard to market factors, *NYT* is owned by The New York Times Company, a large corporation which owns almost two-dozen newspapers and many websites, along with partial ownership of the Boston Red Sox and Fenway Park.[50] Almost all of the members of the company's Board of Directors have connections to or once worked for major corporations or investment firms; and Mexican businessman Carlos Slim—the wealthiest person in the world—has given *NYT* Company a $250 million loan to keep the company afloat.[51] Meanwhile, *AR* is owned by Gannett Company. Gannett, like *NYT* Company, owns many other news media outlets and websites, and its eleven board members have various

[49] Croteau, David & Hoynes, William. The Business of Media: Corporate Media and the Public Interest. Thousand Oaks, CA: Pine Forge Press, 2001. 204-205.

[50] "Resources, Who Owns What: The NYT Company," Columbia Journalism Review, 12/24/2010, cjr.org/resources/index.php?c=nyt

[51] "About the Company: Board of Directors," The NYT Company, 3/10/2011, nytco.com/company/board_of_directors/index.html; Jim Efstathiou Jr., "New York Times to Repay Carlos Slim's $250 Million Loan Three Years Early," Bloomberg. 10/3/2010, bloomberg.com/news/2010-10-03/new-york-times-to-repay-carlos-slim-s-250-million-loan-three-years-early.html

connections to other large corporations and investment firms.[52]

Given the periodicals' market-oriented structure and powerful stakeholders, profit motive and elite interests are likely to influence their coverage in general. Between 2009 and 2010, *AR's* circulation fell by 2.49%, and between 2009 and 2010 *NYT*'s circulation dropped 5.52%, so the articles I analyze were produced at a time when their publishers needed to make an economic comeback.[53] While both newspapers gave excess attention to political caricatures and sensational remarks, *NYT* may have been more sensationalistic than *AR* because its circulation decline was twice as drastic.

At the same time, it may have been in *AR*'s economic interest to thoroughly report on SB 1070 because of its geographical perspective, which is mostly based in Arizona. Regardless of population demographics, the economic boycott of Arizona and a lack of low-paying migrant labor are unattractive prospects for businesses in Arizona—businesses who could be valuable advertisers. Interestingly, this appears to be a case in which economic motivations actually result in good journalism.

That would explain why *AR* offers factual challenges to supporters of the law, but not necessarily its balanced attention to marginalized voices; here we must consider demographics. According to the 2010 census, 30.8% of Arizona's population is of Hispanic or Latino origin (as opposed to 16% nationally), 25.9% speak a language other than English at home, and 12.8% are foreign-born. Between 2000 and 2009, the state population rose by 28.6%, and in 2009 its poverty rate was 14.7%, which is 1.5% higher than the national average.[54] These data help illustrate how UI affects Arizonans more tangibly than in most areas of the country. Given its readership's economic difficulty, population spikes, and a high Latino population, *AR* is likely to filter its reporting in response to these conditions; thorough coverage on SB 1070 appeals to Arizonans.

Xenophobia

Here it is useful to return to the concepts of moral panic and Chavez's "Latino Threat Narrative." In my case study, fear of threat and prejudice against undocumented foreigners are most evident in the bombastic rhetoric and gaps in coverage of SB 1070. The heavy surge of reporting on SB 1070 and UI also indicates a rapid build-up of public concern with immigration.

Notably, *NYT* allows false and exaggerated understandings about the effects undocumented immigrants have on American society to stand as true—for example, the belief that immigrants are burden on US jobs and social services—giving foundation to Chavez's claims that the media contribute to xenophobic public sentiment.[55] The newspaper is effective in presenting the SB 1070 and the politics and opinions surrounding it, but it neglects to report on the actual issue of undocumented immigration itself. This indicates that widespread xenophobia in American culture filters information that would delegitimize anti-immigrant sentiments.

Consequently, most responses to moral panic over UI from authorities and opinion-makers involve enacting stricter legislation to target undocumented migrants as criminal and expensive, favoring heightened border security. For example, in response to the public outcry for federal action after the passing of SB 1070, President Obama ordered 1,200 National Guard troops to guard the border.[56] *NYT* reported on this without discussing other contextual facts, thus emphasizing disproportional reactions.

It is also helpful to consider the broader situation of xenophobia in the US at the time of SB 1070's passage: Russell Pearce and other legislators nationwide were calling for the change of the

[52] "Gannett: Our Locations." The Gannett Company, 3/10/11. gannett.com/section/WHOWEARE06; "Gannett: Board of Directors," 3/10/11. www.gannett.com/section/WHOWEARE01

[53] Peters, Jeremy W. "Newspaper Circulation Falls Broadly but at a Slower Pace," *NYT*, 10/25/2010. mediadecoder.blogs.nytimes.com/2010/10/25/newspaper-circulation-falls-broadly-but-at-slower-pace/

[54] "State and Country Quickfacts: Arizona," US Census Bureau, 11/4/2010, quickfacts.census.gov/qfd/states/04000.html

[55] Chavez, 2-6.

[56] Archibold (5/25/10); "Obama to Deploy National Guard to Ariz. Border," CBS News, 5/25/2010. cbsnews.com/stories/2010/05/25/national/main6518192.shtml.

Fourteenth Amendment to deny birthright citizenship to children born of undocumented immigrants. Speaking on this topic, *Time* magazine quoted Pearce as saying that undocumented immigrants "'hijacked'" the Amendment, and that "'this is an orchestrated effort by them to come here and have children to gain access to the great welfare state we've created.'" [57] The extreme language in this quote reflects how nativist, fear-driven responses of policymakers are represented as a national standard in public discourse.

In the case of *AR*, Chavez's argument is more relevant to particular articles and editorials than overall coverage of SB 1070. While ethnic prejudice does exist in Arizona, because of the state's high Latino population and tangible experience of UI, presenting information that questions xenophobic sentiments is less risky—maybe even profitable. Still, like *NYT*, *AR* articles feature many statements that emphasize fear and panic without directly countering them. Nevertheless, by more comprehensively explaining the issue of UI and how it affects the United States, *AR* dispels many misconceptions that contribute to xenophobia.

dialogue on UI. I derived this normative standard from Christians et al.'s adoption of discursive ethics, which prioritizes deliberative democracy. My interpretation of democracy leans toward civic republicanism, so I suggest that the ideal function of news media is to give voice to all actors for the greater good of society. I combined research on moral panic and the Propaganda Model to develop my own discourse analytical approach, the Representation Model, to test media coverage of UI against this Habermasian standard. Through my empirical analysis, I found *NYT* and *AR* both falter in their contributions to public discourse—failures that result from economic, political, and cultural factors. However, *AR* was much more thorough in its coverage of the contextual elements surrounding SB 1070 and UI, so its contribution to deliberative democracy was more valuable.

While this study focuses on how media coverage of UI promotes quality dialogue, more research needs to be done on how the media's coverage actually affects undocumented immigrants. This research would involve studies of public opinion on immigration, some of which has

MEDIA COVERAGE OF SB1070: FILTER RESULTS

Newspaper	NEW YORK TIMES	ARIZONA REPUBLIC
Reporting Context		
Market	Owned by a corporation, relies on sales & market fluctuations to function, utilizes corporate advertisers, board of directors has deep-seated connections to the market	Owned by a corporation, relies on sales & market fluctuations to function, utilizes corporate advertisers, board of directors has deep-seated connections to the market
Geographical Perspective	New York City base with national/international focus	Phoenix, Arizona base with state/national focus
Readership Demographics	USA/World; mostly educated, politically moderate adults; high variance of experience with immigrants/UI (many with no personal exposure)	Mostly Arizona; ≈30% Latino; above avg. aged pop., poverty rate, and immigrant pop. (domestic, agricultural, service workforce--many cross AZ-Mexico border); personal exposure
Xenophobia		
"Latino Threat"	mostly in quotes carrying false statements/assumptions that aren't negated; also in overall lack contextual info	mostly in quotes carrying false statements/assumptions that aren't negated
Moral Panic & Fear	author's prose does not express panic/fear, quotes & editorials sometimes do; not usually countered with fact	author's prose does not express panic/fear, quotes & editorials sometimes do; these cases usually are countered with fact or other articles providing contextual info dispel this prejudice

CONCLUSIONS

This study has examined the ways in which coverage of SB 1070 in *The New York Times* and *The Arizona Republic* contributes to quality public

already been done.[58] More importantly, however, it would investigate how media coverage of immigration affects the public's treatment of individual undocumented immigrants. From there, researchers could concretely demonstrate the

[57] Adam Klawonn, "Arizona's Next Immigration Target: Children of Illegals," *Time Magazine*, 4/11/2010. time.com/time/nation/article/0,8599,1996064,00.html

[58] See Costelloe.

connection between media coverage and individual well-being. In turn, we could better understand the roles of undocumented immigrants in American society and what needs to change to increase public access to their perspectives.

The news media have amazing potential to help provide and strengthen just democracy. Unfortunately, in the case of immigration coverage, the results of this study indicate they fall short of this potential. At the same time, however, the results indicate points for improvement; with more comprehensive coverage that allows all voices to be heard without condoning misinformed conclusions, the news media could make real strides to enhance conditions for vulnerable immigrants as well as the quality of democracy in the United States.



Comparing Generations: Literary Voices & Mexican-American Youth

Nicole Ashley, Cari Pick, & Elizabeth Young

ABSTRACT

Authors of the Chicano Movement voiced immigrant experiences to counteract their marginalization in American society and assert their collective identity. Just as they used literature to include excluded perspectives, researchers can learn more about the experiences of contemporary Mexican-Americans through their literary voices. We used Participatory Action Research (PAR) with Latino youth at a community organization in South Bend, Indiana to compare immigrant experiences across generations. We argue that continuities between the voices of each group reveal enduring forces of marginalization, while differences reflect the evolution of American culture as youth become disconnected from experiences of the previous generation.

INTRODUCTION

In 1950s and 60s America, Mexican immigrants began to press for the rights that would make America an appealing destination for decades to come. As Mexican-Americans asserted their cultural identity and called upon their heritage, their efforts became known as the Chicano Renaissance. Writers and activists voiced their experiences to fight for inclusive discourse. To borrow a phrase from Vivian Garcia Lopez, their expressions served as "venues for becoming human."[1] They looked to their ancestors to work for their future, but how do the voices of these early migrants and champions of civil rights relate to those of contemporary Mexican-Americans?

To approach this question, we analyze Chicano Renaissance literature alongside literary expressions of contemporary Latino youth, which were produced through Participatory Action Research (PAR) at La Casa de Amistad in South Bend, Indiana. We argue that continuities between the voices of each group reveal enduring forces of marginalization, while differences reflect the evolution of American culture as youth become disconnected from experiences of the previous generation. Our comparative perspective takes root in the historical and sociocultural contexts of both groups, with special focus on the hardships contemporary Latino youth encounter in their daily lives. We call for more robust intercultural dialogue between universities and Mexican-American migrant communities.

IMMIGRATION & IDENTITY

At its most foundational level, this paper's primary concern is identity: who are Latino youth and how do they construct individual and collective identities in the United States? How has Latino identity been portrayed throughout the history of Mexican presence in America? How do youth voices in Chicano Renaissance literature compare to those of Latino youth in a small Midwestern city with an international university? As we consider how these youth define themselves, we must also consider how non-Latinos define these youth as "others". It is therefore helpful to first explore the sociological notion of *identity* and define some of the concepts that lay the groundwork for this study, especially as they apply to the subject at hand.

Pamela Quiroz employs the Latino experience as an example of identity negotiation in her studies of autobiographies and narratives composed by Latino youth:

> No Latino, assimilated or bicultural, escapes the quandaries and paradoxes of prejudice, paternalism, or personal dissonance, and their effects on identity. Carving an identity involves struggles between one's ethnic group and the dominant group, as well as within one's ethnic group. It is an ongoing dilemma of negotiation, resilience, and angst.[2]

Notice her distinction between two types of Latinos: *assimilated* and *bicultural*. Though these categories can classify any immigrant group's adjustment to American society, for the sake of clarity and consistency, here we employ *assimilated* to mean adopting American cultural identity; meanwhile we use *bicultural* to refer to individuals who participate evenly with both Mexican and American cultural identity.[3]

New immigrants often become involuntary targets of ascribed, collective identities. Host societies tend to perceive immigrants as members of a homogeneous cultural entity, which downplays variety among individual and group experiences. This tendency exemplifies the danger of *essentialization* as articulated by Heriberto Godina and Rachelle McCoy, who draw from Cameron McCarthy:

> Identity can be "essentialized" or otherwise represented in a manner that neglects the wide range of differences marked by gender and class (McCarthy, 1998). The interrelationships of race,

[1] V. G. Lopez, "*Forging a path of action toward liberation: How indigenous research provides opportunities for conscientizacion in a group of Mexicanas along a U.S./Mexico border town*" (PhD Diss., New Mexico State University, 2008), ProQuest 3338059.

[2] Pamela Quiroz, "The Silencing of Latino Student 'Voice': Puerto Rican and Mexican Narratives in Eighth Grade and High School," *Anthropology & Education Quarterly 32*, no. 3 (2001), 335 www.jstor.org/stable/3195991.

[3] For a more in-depth discussion of styles of adaptation (particularly ethnic flight, adversarial styles, and transculturation) and their effect on identity formation in immigrant children, refer to Carola Swarez-Orozoco and Marceclo M. Swarez-Orozoco, *Children of Immigration* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2001).

> gender, class (and we would argue language), are "nonsynchronous" with one another because they self-disrupt generalized assumptions about cultural groups (McCarthy, 1988).[4]

When essentialized notions of identity become social norms, such "nonsynchronicity" goes widely unnoticed. For example, in the United States the words "Latino" and "Hispanic" have become accepted nomenclature for our most recent wave of immigrants. While this universal lexicon is a useful tool for government policy, it fails to acknowledge the variety of origins that span the US Latino population. According to the Pew Research Center, of the 50.7 million Hispanics currently living in the United States, nearly 33 million (65%) identify themselves as Mexican. Non-Latinos often associate or equate "Latino" with "Mexican", despite the presence of 18 million Latinos who are not Mexican. In addition to their distinct geographical origins, the other nine largest groups of Hispanic origin—Puerto Ricans, Cubans, Salvadorans, Dominicans, Guatemalans, Colombians, Hondurans, Ecuadorians and Peruvians—report significant variance among demographic indicators including education, age, and income.[5] These factors shape cultural beliefs heavily, but perceived similarities between different groups of Latinos dominate public understanding of immigrant identity in the US.[6]

COMPARATIVE PERSPECTIVE

The study of history opens windows to generations past, yet it also illuminates our moment now. In this particular study, we employ literature as a gateway between past and present. The Chicano Renaissance works we have selected provide a glimpse into the experiences of Mexican youth in the mid-20th Century America; meanwhile our PAR with youth at La Casa de Amistad produced literature that voices the experiences of contemporary Latino youth—most of whom were Mexican.

Exploring the Chicano Renaissance through the eyes of adolescent protagonists, we can observe processes of identity construction guiding literary plots, then assess how the societal-institutional factors described above impacted those processes. How did these protagonists balance their bicultural identities, both at home and in the public sphere? By critically engaging Chicano history and literature, we aim to present a robust picture of the first generation Latino migrant experience.

The next step is to compare these characters and their adolescent transformations to the experiences of the Latino students we worked with during our community-based learning project in a Mexican neighborhood on the west side of South Bend. This project culminated in an illustrated literary work, *Voces de La Casa*, which empowered the students to express their perspectives on the world. Like the generation before them, these youth struggle to negotiate their identities, but the social and economic forces influencing this challenge have changed.[7]

As examined in the following section, the Chicano literature movement evolved through an era of American history when numerous marginalized groups—blacks, immigrants, women, homosexuals—simultaneously encountered the opportunity to liberate themselves by publicly expressing the unique yet equal nature of their collective identities. Thus, the pioneers of Chicano literature offer insight into previously hidden experiences of first generation migrants because they employed writing as a tool for incorporating excluded perspectives into the living history of the United States. Similarly, PAR reaches out to overlooked sectors of present-day society, striving

[4] Heriberto Godina & Rachelle McCoy, "Emic and etic perspectives on Chicana and Chicano multicultural literature" *Journal of Adolescent & Adult Literacy* 44, no. 2 (October 2000): 174. The McCarthy references here are: Cameron McCarthy, "Reconsidering liberal and radical perspectives on racial inequality in schooling: Making the case for nonsynchrony," *Harvard Educational Review* 58, (1988): 265-279; Cameron McCarthy, *The uses of culture* (New York: Routledge, 1998).

[5] These statistics can be found in the following Pew Research Center report: www.pewhispanic.org/2012/06/27/the-10-largest-hispanic-origin-groups-characteristics-rankings-top-counties/

[6] For previous work on the Latino experience, especially in South Bend, see Hector Avitia, Fatima Monterrubio, and Karen Richman. "Language and Identity of Latinos in South Bend." *Institute for Latino Studies Student Research Series* 3, no. 4 (2009). latinostudies.nd.edu/publications/pubs/3.4_Latino_Language.pdf; Kimberly Tavarez, Jenna Adsit, Emilie Prot, and Karen Richman. "Latino Immigrants in South Bend." *Institute for Latino Studies Student Research Series* 1, no. 1 (2008). latinostudies.nd.edu/publications/pubs/Student_Brief_1.1_Latino_Immigrants.pdf.

[7] For Hector Avitia, Fatima Monterrubio, and Karen Richman. "Language and Identity of Latinos in South Bend." *Institute for Latino Studies Student Research Series* 3, no. 4 (2009). Retrieved from http://latinostudies.nd.edu/publications/pubs/3.4_Latino_Language.pdf

to include perceptions and values of that community in the research and future action plans they evoke. Though an historico-literary approach differs from PAR as a mode of inquiry, our comparative perspective takes root in parallel modes of *action* between PAR and the literature we analyze.

Chicano Literary Movement

A story is never complete without its heritage. As Godina & McCoy put it, mid-20th Century Latino activists began to "recognize their indigenous Mexican ancestry and share a postcolonial social conscience through their awareness of a historically oppressive relationship with the United States and Mexico." [8] "Chicano/Chicana" emerged as a distinctive ethnocultural label embraced by the minority community itself.

Raymund Paredes defines Chicano writing as "works in which a writer's sense of ethnic identity (*chicanismo*) animates his or her work manifestly and fundamentally, often through the presentation of Chicano characters, cultural situations, and patterns of speech." [9] The first hint of literary renaissance appeared in 1945 with Josephina Niggli's *Mexican Village*. Written in English, Niggli's novel was the first Mexican-American work to reach American readers at large. As World War II stimulated demand for factory workers, it attracted Mexican-American laborers to big cities, which drastically influenced processes of acculturation. As Rudolfo Anaya's 1972 *Bless Me, Ultima* would later portray, 1940s industrialism transformed the cultural isolation of rural immigrant communities.[10]

In turn, the modern urban context put Mexican-American writers closer in touch with the 1960s Civil Rights movement. With its call for social and political activism to support minority groups, the Civil Rights movement brought the Chicano Renaissance into full force.[11] So while Raso and Herrera-Sobek cite four distinct phases in the development of Chicano literature, we are primarily concerned with this last phase: "the flowering, blossoming, or renaissance of Chicano literature" from 1960 to the present.[12] Parallel to literary movements emerging from other minority communities, this blossoming not only marks the explosion of literature voicing the migrant experience; it also invigorated and renewed traditional forms of American literature.

Participatory Action Research

Though the Chicano Renaissance unfolded on a much wider scale, our research shares its goal to yield socially significant results. We employed a less-conventional methodology that has been gaining popularity in social science and health-related fields. For the purposes of this study, we use terminology commonly accepted in the social sciences, referring to our approach as Participatory Action Research (PAR), though scholars often use other titles such as Community-Based Participatory Research (CBPR, more common in medical and public health research). Laura Smith et al. offer a brief yet informative summary of PAR's evolution in social science research:

> Emerging from the confluence of Paulo Freire's revolutionary pedagogy (Freire, 1970), the liberation sociology of Orlando Fals-Borda (Fals-Borda, 1991), and feminist critiques and reconceptualizations of sociocultural power (Maguire, 1996), community-based participatory action research (PAR) stands conventional research methodology on its head. In PAR, professional researchers do not enter communities to conduct studies on community members. Rather, they form partnerships with community members to identify issues of local importance, develop ways of studying them, collect and interpret data, and take action on the resulting knowledge.[13]

PAR is founded on "bottom-up analysis" that emphasizes the integrity of community insights and places value on knowledge produced actively

[8] Godina and McCoy, 173.
[9] Raymund Paredes, "Teaching Chicano Literature: An Historical Approach," *The Heath Anthology of American Literature Newsletter* 12 (1995). www9.georgetown.edu/faculty/bassr/tamlit/newsletter/paredes.html
[10] Ibid.
[11] Ibid.
[12] Manuel Villar Raso and María Herrera-Sobek, "A Spanish Novelist's Perspective on Chicano/a Literature," *Journal of Modern Literature* 25, no. 1 (2001): 17-34, http://www.jstor.org/stable/3831864, 19.
[13] Laura Smith, Lucinda Bratini, Debbie-Ann Chambers, Russell Vance Jensen and LeLaina Romero, "Between idealism and Reality: Meeting the Challenges of Participatory Action Research," *Action Research* 8, no. 4 (2010), 407.

and collaboratively.[14] PAR treats participation from non-academics as a partnership designed to benefit all participants and community members through direct intervention or positive results that inform progressive action.[15] Dialogue and reciprocity are critical to the achievement of mutual benefit.[16]

PAR primarily functions as a vehicle for social change, but Cahill outlines additional roles PAR holds for the production of new knowledge. Among these roles, most relevant to our study is the inclusion of the excluded, or the involvement of underrepresented perspectives in knowledge production. The execution of a PAR project thus requires strict attention to issues of power and social capital.[17] According to Cahill, PAR operates with the understanding that all people, especially groups who have been marginalized and oppressed throughout history, harbor deep knowledge of their life experience, which can enhance both the design and implementation of community-based research. These individuals may be considered participants, collaborators, or co-researchers—but never subjects. Cahill explains: "to include the excluded is to push scholarship in new directions, ask new questions, question old assumptions and 'think outside the box' beyond the privileged perspectives of the ivory tower."[18] PAR provides community partners avenues of self-representation as they guide research projects toward deeper visions of their identities, values, and interests.

Since dominant ethnocultural groups often marginalize or silence immigrant perspectives, immigrant communities make ideal partners for PAR. Abraham and Maney argue that by reflecting on and altering existing social and symbolic boundaries, PAR can contribute to the development of more inclusive discourses that redefine immigrants as valued and valuable community members rather than threats to society.[19] Likewise, Cahill emphasizes "collective creative-making processes" that confront and reframe stereotypical, exclusionary notions of immigration and immigrants.[20]

Several studies have utilized PAR to explore and respond to the needs of diverse immigrant youth groups, from settlement and acculturation patterns of young Assyrian women in New Zealand to experiences of Latino parents with the American education system.[21] Appeals to the creative side of adolescence, as in our own study, have been particularly successful for PAR with Latino youth. For example, photovoice dialogue and *testimonies* have encouraged creative expression and provided safe spaces for individual and collective reflection.[22]

During our participation with *La Casa de Amistad*, we exposed our Latino youth counterparts to some of the personal narratives we had encountered in our class on US Latino literature. Early on we came to a fundamental realization about our literary approach with the students: they had no context for the lessons we were trying to impart. While we had much to learn about the students' own challenges, they had much to learn about how their marginalization emerged throughout history.

COMPARING GENERATIONS

Chicano Renaissance

Due to their diversity of genre, literary context, and personal background, for this study we have selected works by Tomás Rivera, Sandra Cisneros,

[14] Caitlin Cahill. "Including Excluded Perspectives in Participatory Action Research." *Design Studios* 28, no. 3 (2007). 325-340.
[15] Barbara A. Israel, Amy J. Schulz, Edith A. Parker, and Adam B. Becker. "Review of Community-Based Research: Assessing Partnership Approaches to Improve Public Health." *Annual Review of Public Health* 19 (1998): 173-202. Also see this source for an outline of PAR and its key principles, foundational rationale, and challenges, refer to the Israel et al. (1998) article.
[16] Gaby Jacobs. "Conflicting Demands and the Power of Defensive Routines in Participatory Action Research." *Action Research* 8 no. 4 (2010). 367-386.
[17] Jacobs. Also, Smith et al. offers examples of other challenges and pitfalls that researchers often encounter when conducting a PAR project in *Between idealism and reality: Meeting the challenges of participatory action research.*

[18] Cahill 2007, 330.

[19] Margaret Abraham and Gregory M. Maney. "Transforming Place and Belonging through Action Research, Community Practice, and Public Policy: Comparing Responses to NIMBYism." *Current Sociology* 60, no. 2 (2012): 178-201. doi: 10.1177/0011392111429220
[20] Caitlin Cahill. "Why Do they Hate Us? Reframing Immigration through Participatory Action Research." *Area* 42 no. 2 (2012). 152-161. doi: 10.1111/j.1475-4762.2009.00929.x. 159.
[21] See, respectively, Phillippa Collie, James Liu, Astrid Podsiadlowski, and Sara Kindon. "You Can't Clap with One Hand: Learnings to Promote Culturally Grounded Participatory Action Research with Migrant and Former Refugee Communities." *International Journal of Intercultural Relations* 34 (2010): 141-149. doi: 10.1016/j.ijintrel.2009.11.008. And, Harry Robert Harper. "Hearing the Voices of Mexican Immigrant Parents: Participatory Action Research Building a Space to Explore and Report on how Parents Experience their Children's Schools in California" (PhD Diss., University of California, Santa Cruz: 2008). ProQuest 3318549.
[22] See, regarding photovoice dialogue, J Matt Streng, Scott D. Rhodes, Guadalupe X. Ayala, Eugenia Eng, Ramiro Arceo, and Selena Phipps, "Realidad Latina: Latino adolescents, their school, and a university use photovoice to examine and address the influence of immigration," *Journal of Interprofessional Care* 18, no. 4 (2004): 403-415, doi: 10.1080/13561820400011701. Regarding *testimonios*, see Lopez.

Luis Rodriguez and Rodolfo "Corky" Gonzales. We analyze one work from each of these four writers to access migratory experiences that speak to our comparative framework.

TOMÁS RIVERA

Rivera's 1971 novel *…y no se lo tragó la tierra* depicts the struggles of Mexican migrants in Texas in the 1940s. Rivera, who worked alongside his parents in the fields as a child, describes a migrant boy's experiences of discrimination in the American educational system. After fighting with several other boys in self-defense, two teachers comment on what should be done to rectify the situation. One remarks, "They could care less if I expel him… They need him in the fields." The other responds, "I know you warned me, I know, I know."[23]Throughout the novel, American students and staff maintain certain expectations of their Mexican students—that these students are troublemakers, that education is insignificant for youth who are destined to be nothing more than manual laborers.

Growing up, Rivera himself experienced discrimination in schools that prohibited the use of Spanish.[24] He illustrates how figures of authority fail to invest in Mexican students' behavior and education, yet the immigrant parents he depicts have come to seek economic opportunity and a better future for their children. One mother describes her dreams for her son: "I only pray to God to help him finish school." [25] Despite the generally pessimistic societal view of the Mexican immigrant's educational future, Rivera emphasizes migrant parents' positive outlook on their children's futures. Considering that Rivera obtained a graduate degree despite growing up in the fields, his act of publishing *…y no se tragó la tierra* gives credence to that optimism.

Still, Rivera is an exception to the trend. He shows confusion and frustration among children stuck in cycles of poverty and manual labor. The protagonist questions, "Why? Why you? Why Father? Why my uncle? Why my aunt? Why their children? Tell me why… Why are we nothing more than buried in the earth like animals without any hope of anything? You know that the only hopes are those of coming here every year." [26] The farmworker children of the 1940s were directly connected to the physical suffering associated with border crossing and seasonal labor. The protagonist refuses to be devoured by the earth, both literally and metaphorically, rejecting the notion that everything will be all right in the end simply because, as his parents say, the poor go to heaven.

A final point to draw from Rivera concerns the use of language in *…y no se lo tragó la tierra*. The novel is written in Spanish, suggesting a desire to maintain the native language and a resistance of more "mainstream" life. However, dialogue among figures of authority appears only in English. Much of the novel's English dialogue involves gossip or generalizations about Mexicans: "I don't like Mexicans because they steal. You hear me?" [27] Rivera presents English as a "language of power" to expose the hierarchy in which white English speakers dominate.

SANDRA CISNEROS

While Rivera describes the struggles of 1940s farmworker youth, Sandra Cisneros's 1984 novel *The House on Mango Street* places special emphasis on the persistence of racial segregation in 1960s Chicago, where she was raised. Cisneros has been hailed as a pioneer Chicana author, voicing perspectives of not only immigrants but also women.[28]

Esperanza, the narrator, explains the configuration of her neighborhood and the fear of venturing outside the familiar: "All brown all around, we are safe. But watch us drive into a neighborhood of another color and our knees go shakity-shake and our car windows get rolled up tight and our eyes look straight. Yeah. That's how it

[23] Tomás Rivera, *…y no se lo tragó la tierra* (Houston: Piñata Books, 1996), 23.
[24] Juan Bruce-Novoa. *Chicano Authors: Inquiry by Interview* (Texas, University of Texas Press, 1980).
[25] Rivera, 25.
[26] Ibid., 45-46.
[27] Ibid., 22.
[28] Jim Sagel, "Sandra Cisneros: Conveying the Riches of the Latin American Culture is the Author's Literary Goal," *Publishers Weekly* (1991): 74-75.

goes."[29] Esperanza's immigrant friend, Alicia, later reminds us, "Like it or not you are Mango Street."[30] In Alicia's mind, each resident of Mango Street is inseparable from the pre-constructed identity that living in the neighborhood entails; Mango Street is synonymous with marginalization, poverty, and lack of upward mobility.

At first, Esperanza accepts these conditions as reality beyond her control, but over time she gains a sense of empowerment to rise above injustice. Esperanza (whose name means *hope* in Spanish) departs from preconceived notions of Mexican immigrant youth behavior as she dreams to be her own person. Cisneros uses descriptive, personal narration to represent Esperanza's creative, symbolic mindset. For example, Esperanza describes four trees that to her represent something more:

> When I am too sad and too skinny to keep keeping, when I am a tiny thing against so many bricks, then it is I look at trees. When there is nothing left to look at on this street. Four who grew despite concrete. Four who reach and do not forget to reach. Four whose only reason it is to be and be."[31]

At the end of the novel, Esperanza shows that she can escape the cycle by pursuing writing, but she is not content with just her personal salvation; she vows to return "for the ones who cannot out."[32] From her final words, Esperanza admits that her ability to rise above the prejudice and marginalization associated with Mango Street is unusual, yet Cisneros' story is designed to inspire young readers to dream like Esperanza.

RODOLFO "CORKY" GONZALES

Whereas our examples from Rivera and Cisneros cover the role of novels in Chicano literature, Rodolfo "Corky" Gonzales brings poetry into the picture. Written in the height of the Civil Rights movement, his 1967 poem "Yo soy Joaquin" highlights the struggles of integration in a new society:

I am Joaquin,
Lost in a world of confusion,
Caught up in a whirl of a
gringo society,
Confused by the rules,
Scorned by attitudes,
Suppressed by manipulation,
And destroyed by modern society.
My fathers
have lost the economic battle
and won
the struggle of cultural survival.
And now!
I must choose

Between the paradox of
Victory of the spirit,
despite physical hunger
Or
to exist in the grasp
of American social neurosis,
sterilization of the soul
and a full stomach.[33]

To Joaquin, modern society dictates socially acceptable conduct. He rejects the notion that the culture should be lost, yet accepts that increased time in the United States leads to inevitable cultural shifts, if even just to put food on the table. Still, Joaquin acknowledges the importance of maintaining ties to one's country of origin, something he fears may be lost as Mexican immigrant families settle and acclimate to typical American society.

LUIS RODRIGUEZ

For our final sample, we selected another poetic voice. Luis Rodriguez, a former gang member turned social activist in East Los Angeles during the 1960s and 70s, formed his own printing press to publish *Poems Across the Pavement* in 1989.[34] Similar to "Yo soy Joaquin", his poem "Running to America" from this volume depicts the ruggedness of Mexican immigrant experiences. In contrast, however, Rodriguez focuses on migration itself rather than its consequences.. "Running to

[29] Sandra Cisneros, *The House on Mango Street* (New York: Vintage Books, 2009), 28.
[30] Ibid., 107.
[31] Ibid., 75.
[32] Ibid., 110.
[33] Rodolfo Gonzales, ed. Nicolas Kanellos. *Herencia: The Anthology of Hispanic Literature of the United States* (New York, Oxford University Press, 2002). 195.
[34] Luis Rodriguez, "Poems Across the Pavement" (Chicago: Tia Chucha Press, 1989).

America" shows the physical and emotional brutality of border crossing out of sheer economic desperation:

> *And the men,*
> *some hardened, quiet.*
> *Others young and loud.*
> *You see something like this*
> *in prisons.*
> *Soon they will cross*
> *on their bellies; kissing*
> *black earth.*
>
> *Running to America* (26-34).

The oneness of man and earth is a recurring theme in literature of the migratory experience; the land can represent harshness and suffering as well as its universality among this particular community.

PAR with La Casa de Amistad

Driven by our shared interests in community service, literary analysis, and Latin American cultures, we enrolled in "Migrant Voices"—the first "Community-Based Learning"[35] class offered by the University of Notre Dame's Department of Romance Languages and Literatures (Spring 2011). The new course had emerged through Notre Dame's renewed focus on community outreach and grounding education in real-world experience. Alongside studying migrant voices through Chicano literature on campus, the course required volunteering at a community organization at least once a week, and we chose La Casa de Amistad. Located in a neighborhood on the west side of South Bend known to residents as "Lil' Mex", La Casa provides free programs to Hispanic families—education, literacy, healthy living, and other social services.[36]

We partnered with 7-10th grade students enrolled in La Casa's after-school program, Adelante America. Our primary volunteer assignment was to offer tutoring and academic support during their two-hour meetings, 3-4 days a week. These sessions provided space for us to develop relationships with the students; though we were considered mentors, the students taught us too through casual conversations, educational field trips, and eventually our final project collaboration.

As we learned more about their needs and interests, we began to develop programming that challenged them to explore the history of race relations and Latino identity in their hometown and to relate with Latino authors by expressing themselves through writing. These efforts evolved into a published booklet entitled *Voces de La Casa,* a collection of poems, drawings, and memories from Adelante youth juxtaposed with reflective responses from members of our "Migrant Voices" class. *Voces* provided an outlet for these youth to record their own histories by expressing their frustrations, challenges, achievements, and joys in dialogue with university volunteers. In turn, the opportunity to present our work through Notre Dame's inaugural Undergraduate Student Conference on Mexico has incorporated their voices into wider academic discourse on immigration and identity.

So, how do these migrant voices compare to the Chicano Renaissance voices we have reviewed? Our observations suggest that some phenomena have endured across generations, while others have changed.

CONTINUITIES

Poverty & Ethnic Enclaves

All four of our Chicano Renaissance examples speak to the struggles of poverty, and *The House on Mango Street* shows how poverty marginalizes immigrant groups into homogeneous neighborhoods. In turn, most residents of Lil' Mex are low-income Latinos. In fact, La Casa de Amistad was founded in 1972 as a youth outreach program to meet the special needs of neighborhood youth; our experience with the organization four decades later reflects how these needs continue. Just like the parents Rivera and Cisneros depict, the parents of Adelante youth must work long and hard hours

[35] During this semester-long project we used the term "Community-Based Learning" to describe our collaboration with *La Casa de Amistad,* since our experience was an academic pursuit facilitated by and supplemented with a class. However, for the purposes of this paper, we will continue to use the term Participatory Action Research (PAR) as defined earlier,

[36] For more information on the mission and services of La Casa de Amistad in South Bend, refer to the organization's website, www.lacasadeamistad.org.

to make ends meet, occasionally losing income to unavoidable circumstances—such as the 2010 closing of a local South Bend factory that employed several of the students' parents. Many students were enrolled in the program because their family was unavailable to look after them until much later in the evening.

Whereas non-immigrant families can often look to relatives for after-school care, immigrants more commonly face geographic isolation from their extended and sometimes immediate family members. In the *House on Mango Street,* Esperanza's mother comes to the US well after her father has been living there, and later she recounts when her father had to leave for Mexico because her grandmother died. Even more poignantly, one of our students, Hector, writes:

> In 2006, fourteen years after moving my family to South Bend, my dad was found working without citizenship papers and given the choice to return immediately to his native Mexico or fight for his place in the United States in court. The law proved an unbeatable obstacle; my dad was forced to leave my family for Mexico despite his and my family's best efforts. I am a citizen, but many of my relatives are not; indeed, many people like me around the country continue to feel both the threat and effects of deportation.

Despite all this separation, we noticed how the ethnic uniformity of Lil' Mex promoted solidarity among Adelante youth, bolstering peer relationships much like Esperanza's group of friends. Just as Esperanza was inspired to dream beyond Mango Street, we saw these relationships positively reinforce the students' desires to stay in school, work hard, and go to college.

Racial Tension & Criminalization

Our interactions with the youth of *La Casa* also revealed that their lives are fraught with racial conflicts and criminal stigma. Zuri's poem "Only God Can Judge Me Now" reads like a modern response to the teachers in *…y no se tragó la tierra*:

> *It funny when people look into my eyes.*
> *They see a kid that got no future*
> *he's headed to da cemetery*
> *or to the penitentiary*
> *or even in a wheelchair*
> *… But when I look in the mirror*
> *I see a man.*

Just as our four famous Chicano authors wrote as "a form of resistance to social erasure and exclusion" Zuri too feels ostracized by society's expectations and uses poetry to voice his self-identity.

Adelante youth spoke openly about pressure to join gangs, sell or use drugs, and physically or verbally fight for respect. In his rap, "Life on the Streets", Carlos describes the apparent contradictions that plague the gangster lifestyle:

> *Pride, respect, hate*
> *People getting shot everyday*
> *Out selling drugs for low pay*
> *Might seem abnormal for the white race*
> *Its just every day life; that's the case*
> *… They call it the gangster way.*

Carlos questions the purpose of this violence, which supposedly maintains pride, wondering if this mentality will change within his lifetime: "Why can't the community get on their feet and fight back?"

Although Zuri and Carlos tend to focus on the difficulties of life as a Mexican-American on South Bend's west side, they both vow to rise above low expectations. Similarly, their classmate Javier writes, "I know at times my race might not be the best, but I take as a test & try my best not to stress because I'm proud of who I am." Like Esperanza, the students of Adelante America are not content to endure prejudices and discrimination. Instead, they strive to take advantage of every opportunity to surpass society's preconceived notions of Latino youth without letting go of their collective identity as Mexican or Latino.

CHANGES

Economy & Spatial Displacement

Although poverty and ethnic enclaves have continued across generations, the American economy has shifted, and migrants have moved with it. Rivera describes a world of high demand for seasonal farm labor, drawing imagery from *la tierra* (earth) that reflects daily experience at the

time. In contrast, the urban imagery Zuri and Carlos use reflects how Latino labor moved from farming to manufacturing and then service industries.[37]

Once migrant families are in the United States, they are especially vulnerable to changes in the labor market because lack of documentation or skills limits the jobs available to them. Janet, another Adelante student, reflects on her move from New Jersey to Indiana as her father found better work:

> The hardest thing about the move was starting over again from the beginning. But the worst part was that I wanted to come here, and my dad did too, but my mom didn't want to. Sometimes, when I'm in my room listening to music, I want to go back, and wish that I had never come here. It feels like I don't fit in here. But I realized it's too late for that.

Although Janet has lived in the United States for as long as she can remember, her life was uprooted by this recent cross-country move. Instead of struggling to fit in apart from ethnic heritage, Janet felt more at home on Jersey Beach than she does in Lil' Mex.

Janet's story also illustrates the difference between border crossing and interstate migration. Rodriguez's poem "Running to America" emphasizes the severity and life-threatening conditions migrants face when crossing over from Mexico to the United States, but Adelante youth did not express any personal connection with this dangerous experience.

Education & Human Rights

Even though Adelante youth did not demonstrate deep awareness of the previous generation's struggles to establish Chicano (and Latino) community and identity, their contemporary context still reflects the results of those struggles. Whereas the teachers in *…y no se tragó la tierra* blatantly dismiss Chicano youth potential, Adelante youth have a well-established organization to support Latino education, and their educators even reach out to colleges and universities for volunteer support. Second-generation Latinos may lack access to the informal tutoring available to their white peers from family members who have also gone through American schooling, but the Chicano Renaissance seems to have inspired alternative routes to tutoring by institutionalizing migrant voices. Rivera depicts teacher dialogue in English to show it as a language of power, yet La Casa de Amistad provides education and other social services in a bilingual environment.

Another product of the Chicano literary movement and the Civil Rights movement at large was the rise in human rights values throughout American society. Writers like the four we discuss and activists like Cesar Chavez and Martin Luther King, Jr. fought for rights based on human equality; we saw these values echoed in the opinions of Adelante youth. Students of La Casa repeatedly expressed the belief that they should not have to constantly fight to defend themselves and their ethnic identities. They invoked their right to walk to school without fearing recruitment or revenge from gangs, to walk the halls without being subjected to racial slurs and taunts. In discussions of these conflicts, Adelante youth often brought up the desire to change the state of racial prejudice within their schools. Carlos writes:

> I hate it how kids in high school give up on learning and do bad things instead. I think the world would be a better place if everyone graduated high school and college and have an excellent moral conduct. If everyone was a good person and no one hated each other.

In our dialogues about equality and fair treatment, Adelante students held that stereotypes are wrong and should not be applied unilaterally. This reveals another big shift: whereas writers of the Chicano Movement used the power of their collective identity to call for recognition and social change, Adelante youth focused more on individual identities.[38] In this sense, their rejection

[37] Marlene A. Lee and Mark Mather. "U.S. Labor Force Trends," *Population Bulletin* 63 no. 2 (2008). prb.org/pdf08/63.2uslabor.pdf

[38] In *The House on Mango Street*, Cisneros appeals more to Esparanza's individual identity more than the other works we review, but notice the novel was written in 1984, as this shift from collective to individual rights began to spread.

of racial stereotypes shows how they have moved away from essentialized notions of identity. As Janet reflects on her new life in South Bend, she tells us, "I miss laughing and hanging out and just being me with my friends that I've known my whole life." Meanwhile, Janet's classmate, Liliana, writes:

> As a little girl, I have always imagined fairies and ghosts and monsters and witches and wizards. But I guess I never matured. My life is full of magical stuff. I see and think that everything has a purpose cuz every day is another day of wonder, and every day is different and unique in its own way.

PROGRESANDO ADELANTE

While the students we worked with during our semester of fieldwork believe that all human beings should be treated with respect, they also feel a sense of hopelessness at the challenge of transferring these abstract ideals into everyday interactions. Together, we have helped build a movement to encourage respect, solidarity, and equality among their peers, neighborhood residents, and South Bend at large. Our PAR reveals how the continuities and changes across migrant generations are sources of both struggle and inspiration.

Indeed, a primary goal of this study was to contribute to a body of work that strengthens community participation as a basis for academic research. This type of approach is fundamentally built on reciprocity and mutual benefit: while equipping youth with the skills to construct their identities and inspiring their drive to express themselves, our collaboration with La Casa de Amistad also helped to break barriers between Notre Dame and the surrounding community and to bring literature to life for university students.

We hope this project will serve as a model for other universities and research institutions. If we want our research to cultivate an appreciation for cultural diversity and the struggles of marginalized groups, we must treat research as a method of social action—as a venue for becoming human.