Coding US Foreign Policy Toward Authoritarian and Democratic Regimes in Latin America, 1900-2007

Rather than simply following intuitive codings, we heeded the advice of Bowman et al. (2005) and Munck and Verkuilen (2002) (as well as our own—in Mainwaring, Brinks, and Pérez-Liñán 2007) regarding historical coding of political regimes, and applied this advice to the coding of US foreign policy. Specifically, this means developing coding rules that should be as clear as possible so that different scholars would come to the same conclusions about the coding. We coded each time period based on eight questions:

1) In public speeches and writings, did influential US policy leaders express a preference for democracy in Latin America even when there were tradeoffs with other important values such as stability, US economic interests, and US security interests? Or did policy makers express an opinion that meddling in other countries’ political affairs was a bad idea, and hence that the US should refrain from expressing a preference for democracy in Latin America? (Public statements)

Yes, US policy leaders usually expressed a preference for democracy even when there were tradeoffs with other important values (+1).

US policy leaders sometimes expressed a preference for democracy even when there were tradeoffs with other important values, or they expressed a preference for democracy that was quite conditional. (+1/2)

No, US policy leaders usually did not express a preference for democracy if they believed that there were important tradeoffs with other values (0)
2) Did the US support coups, armed rebellions, or US military interventions against
democratic and semi-democratic governments? To code this answer yes, the US needed
to support the coup ex-ante or to have been sufficiently hostile to a government that coup
leaders could assume US support. (Mere US opposition to a government is not
sufficient.) *(Diplomatic positions and covert operations)*

Yes (-1) / no (0)

3) Did US military interventions limit sovereignty (and hence limit democracy) of
democratic or semi-democratic governments? *(Military interventions)*

Yes (-1) / no (0)

4) Did the US actively promote the democratization of authoritarian regimes and/or
make efforts to bolster democracies when they were under threat? Did the US encourage
or pressure authoritarian regimes to move toward democracy? And did it actively
support democratic regimes so as to minimize the likelihood of democratic breakdowns?
*(Diplomatic positions and covert operations)*

Yes, the US actively promoted democratization of authoritarian regimes and/or
made efforts to bolster democracies when they were under threat (+1).

On isolated occasions, and as an exception, the US actively promoted
democratization of authoritarian regimes and/or made efforts to bolster
democracies when they were under threat (+1/2).

No, the US did not actively promote democratization of authoritarian regimes or
make efforts to bolster democracies that were under threat (0).
5) Did the US criticize authoritarian regimes that were not leftist? Did the US criticize human rights abuses and infringements on civil and political rights by regimes that were not leftist? (*Diplomatic positions and public statements*)

Yes, the US criticized authoritarian regimes, human rights abuses, and infringements on civil and political rights (+1)

On isolated occasions, and as an exception, the US criticized authoritarian regimes that were not leftist (+1/2).

No, the US did not criticize authoritarian regimes, human rights abuses, and infringements on civil and political rights (0).

We exclude leftist authoritarian regimes (e.g., the Cuban regime after 1959, the Nicaraguan regime of 1979-90) because US criticism of such regimes has been a historical constant. As such, US criticisms could stem from the leftist nature of the regime or from the regime’s authoritarian character.

6) Did US foreign policy leaders clearly support authoritarian regimes? By this, we mean more than accepting the existence of an authoritarian regime. Did US leaders praise those dictators and/or actively seek to help keep them in power? (*Diplomatic positions and public statements*)

Yes, the US clearly supported authoritarian regimes (-1).

No, the US did not clearly support authoritarian regimes (0).

7) Did US leaders express the view that Latin American countries could not be democracies because of cultural dispositions? i.e. that Latin Americans by temperament or cultural were indisposed to have democracies? (*Public statements or internal communications, personal writings*)
Yes (-1)/no (0).

8) Did the US practice a policy of non-recognition when a military coup or rebellion overthrew a democratic or semi-democratic government or clearly and credibly articulate ex-ante that it would impose a sanction in the event of a coup or rebellion against a democracy or semi-democracy? Or did the US impose some other kind of sanction (e.g., economic) if a coup or rebellion against a democracy occurred? *(Diplomatic positions)*

Yes, the US imposed some kind of sanction when a military coup or a rebellion overthrew a competitive political regime or it clearly and credibly articulated ex-ante that it would impose a sanction in the event of a coup against a competitive political regime (+1).

In exceptional cases, the US imposed some kind of sanction when a military coup or a rebellion overthrew a competitive political regime (+1/2).

No, the US did not impose a sanction when a military coup or a rebellion overthrew a competitive political regime (0).

Q2, Q3, Q6, and Q7 address US behavior and attitudes that are harmful to democracy in Latin America, while Q1, Q4, Q5, and Q8 address US behavior intended to be helpful to democracy in Latin America. We code Q2, Q3, Q6, and Q7 as a dichotomy. For these questions, even isolated incidents indicate US behaviors and attitudes that are very detrimental to democracy in Latin America. If the answer to questions 2, 3, 6, and 7 is yes, we score a -1 for that variable because it should be unfavorable to democracy in Latin America. Otherwise, we score 0 for that variable.
Questions 1, 4, 5, and 8 are underlying continuous variables, and treating them as dichotomies would create some misleading information. For example, some US administrations in isolated cases promoted democracy (Q4), whereas others did so on a reasonably consistent basis or at least more often than as the unusual exception. We wanted to be able to distinguish between these two situations. The information demands to treat them as truly continuous variables, however, are huge. Accordingly, we compromised and coded these variables in a trichotomous manner. A 1 for that question means that a practice in theory should be favorable to democracy in Latin America; a $\frac{1}{2}$ score means that as an exception, the US engaged in a practice intended to boost democracy in Latin America. Otherwise, we score 0.

A reasonable case could be made for a more fine-grained coding of these eight variables. However, we can capture the most important differences in US foreign policy toward democratic and authoritarian regimes in Latin America with this simple dichotomous or trichotomous coding. The information demands with a more nuanced coding would increase, and the likelihood of misclassifying some observations would also go up (although in compensation the cost of misclassifying a case as a $-0.5$ rather than a $-1$ if it should be coded as a 0 diminishes). Our reliance on objective information makes scoring the eight questions as a dichotomy or trichotomy relatively straightforward. More nuanced coding schemes would risk losing that advantage.

These eight questions focus specifically on US government behavior and attitudes regarding political regimes (and directly related issues such as respect for political and civil rights) in Latin America. Other aspects of US government policy often affect the stability and performance of democratic and authoritarian regimes in Latin America—for
example, US economic policy. However, these other aspects of US foreign policy are not part of our purview.

Our analysis excludes other US actors except for the US government and state. US companies, NGOs such as human rights organizations, and interest associations can influence political regimes in Latin America, but they fall outside our purview. So as to reduce the subjectivity of the coding, we focus on questions that have objective answers. The coding scheme is not intended to measure which US policy regarding political regimes in Latin America is normatively best, but rather is a factual assessment of what policies different administrations pursued.

Each president represents at least one time period. If there was an important change in US policy toward Latin America during the course of a presidency, as reflected by changes in the answers to these eight questions, we counted each time policy shifted as a new time period. Policy shifts occurred for at least one of the eight questions during the presidencies of Woodrow Wilson, Franklin Roosevelt, Harry Truman, Dwight Eisenhower, John Kennedy, and Ronald Reagan.

**Aggregation Rule**

Our aggregation rule is very simple. We add each administration’s (or specific years thereof if there was a change in the administration policy toward political regimes in Latin America) score for the eight questions. This produces a scale that ranges from -4 (a -1 score on all four questions on which a “yes” answer is bad for democracy and a 0 score on all for questions for which a “yes” answer is good for democracy) to 4 (a 1 score...
on all for questions for which a “yes” answer is good for democracy and a 0 score on all four questions on which a “yes” answer is bad for democracy).

This aggregation rule rests on the theoretical assumption that all eight questions should have equal weight. We would not vigorously defend such an assumption, but we do defend three related claims. First, even if all eight questions should not have equal weight, all of them are important aspects of US policy toward political regimes in Latin America. Second, it is not obvious which of them has greater importance and hence should be weighted more. Probably the most important US influence on political regimes comes when US action at a particular moment in time is decisive: the US sponsored invasion of Guatemala in 1954 or US involvement in the Dominican elections of 1978, for example. Both interventions arguably altered the course of political regimes in ways that affected subsequent decades. The coup in Guatemala led to long term dictatorship that ended only in 1986, while the fair vote count in the Dominican Republic in 1978 led to a competitive political regime that has endured ever since. But these moments of decisive US impact are relatively uncommon, and it is usually much harder to establish that the US action was decisive—a historical counterfactual that is difficult to prove—than it is to ascertain that the US acted in a certain way. We base our coding on the more objective data about US behavior rather than on a counterfactual about whether US involvement was decisive. Third, because the times when the US action was decisive are uncommon, and because their effect is already picked up with our coding, it is unlikely that weighting different questions differently would produce markedly different results.
The coding and aggregation scheme do not presuppose that US policy will actually have the hypothesized effect (i.e., that a more assertive pro-democracy policy will actually bolster democracy in Latin America). This is rather an empirical question to be tested.

The coding does not presuppose a normative bias that US policy should follow one path or the other.

**Intercoder Reliability**

One of the authors (Scott Mainwaring) and a research assistant (Melissa Rossi) each separately coded all eight questions (in principle) for each president, taking the liberty to divide a president’s term into two periods if there was a shift in how any of the eight questions should be coded. (In principle, we might have divided each term into more than two periods, but in practice, two was the maximum.)

The research assistant coded 149 cells (one question in one administration is one cell) and Mainwaring coded 164 before we checked intercoder reliability. Based on 128 common cells, the Spearman’s rho was .86 (p<.01), indicating high reliability. Both researchers then reviewed the discrepancies in coding and the evidence that had led to their own coding decision and the other person’s.
McKinley 1897-1900

1) Public support for democracy in speeches and policy statements: 0

McKinley and his advisors did not express the belief that democracy was the ultimate goal in the region but rather sought to protect US national interests in countries such as Cuba (Langley, 7).

2) Support for coups against democratic or semi-democratic governments: 0

No evidence regarding US support for coups against democracies mainly because there were very few democracies in LA during this period.

3) Military occupations that limited sovereignty: -1
   Cuba, 1898-1902 (Schoultz, 125-151).

The US waged a quick war against Spain and once Cuba was “liberated” the US War department promptly took over the administration of the island. Washington directly ruled over Cuba from 1899 until 1902 and then made it into a protectorate until 1909 (Langley, 38). The US also annexed Puerto Rico as a spoil of war (Smith 2000, 34).

In regards to Cuba’s independence after the 1898 war, Callcott argues that the US did not look favorably at an autonomous government led by the Cuban rebels. In Callcott’s words, “He [McKinley] did not want any recognition of a rebel government that would put his government in the position of having to ask permission for such action as this country might see fit to take” (Callcott, 102). To be sure, Cuba was supposed to become independent, but only as a US protectorate (Callcott, 104).

As Lieuwen (1965) points out, the Platt Amendment would fit perfectly with this principle by allowing Cuba to be free while also legally providing the US with a paternal oversight of its newly independent southern neighbor (Lieuwen, 36).

4) Active promotion of democracy: 0

Imbued with the ideology of the Monroe Doctrine and of Manifest Destiny, the US did not actively promote democracy in Latin America but rather acted as an imperial power intervening directly in the geographical and political domains of countries in the region (Smith 2000, 50; Langley, 14).

5) Criticisms of authoritarian regimes: 0

6) Active support of authoritarian regimes: -1
   Cuba
7) Did US leaders express the view that Latin American countries could not be democracies? 

As Smith points out, the US openly supported American intervention in the Caribbean by declaring war on Spain (supporting Cuba’s independence) and later claimed that Cubans were not yet fit to rule themselves (Smith 2000, 33). As Langley further points out, US political leaders’ views of the Caribbean were “reinforced by Social Darwinist credo’s and the nation’s tradition of paternalism” (Langley, 6). The author also affirms that “belief in the inferiority of tropical peoples was reinforced by the average American soldier’s experience in the war [against Spain]” due to the seemingly indifference of Cuban rebels toward American soldiers (Langley: 8, 9).

Callcott states that Secretary John Hay and “his associates themselves too often dismissed Latin Americans as Dagoes while with almost supercilious disdain they looked to Europe for culture and civilization” (Callcott, 111).

8) Did the US practice a policy of non-recognition when a military coup overthrew a democratic or semi-democratic government? 

In 1899, although caution was employed in accepting the rise of a de facto government in Venezuela, the US eventually recognized the authoritarian rule of General Cipriano Castro, as the following statement cabled by Secretary John Hay to the US Minister of Caracas expounds: “If the provisional government is effectively administering government of nation and in position to fulfill international obligations, you will enter into de facto relation” (Callcott, 115).

Roosevelt 1901-08

1) Public support for democracy in speeches and policy statements: 0 (none).

TR did not intervene in LA for the sake of spreading democracy but rather to guarantee US interests in the region and to avoid European influence in the western hemisphere (Drake, 10). This approach to US foreign in LA became known as the Roosevelt Corollary, a doctrine presented in Roosevelt’s 1904 state of the union address: “Chronic wrongdoing, or an impotence which results in a general loosening of the ties of civilized society, may in America as elsewhere ultimately require intervention by some civilized nation, and in the Western Hemisphere the adherence to the Monroe doctrine may force the US, however reluctant… to the exercise of an international police power” (Langley, 29).

2) Support for coups against democratic or semi-democratic governments: 0, but mostly because there were few democracies and semi-democratic governments.

3) Military occupations that limited sovereignty: Yes ( -1.)
In Cuba, leaders found themselves helpless in the midst of electoral fraud and conflicting interests and continually looked to Washington for help in resolving electoral and political huddles, which continued after the elections. Washington responded by sending in troops in 1906 and appointed Taft to lead the American occupation until new elections could be carried out in 1908 (Langley, 43).

4) Active promotion of democracy: Drake (1991: 10) states that Roosevelt did not intervene on behalf of democracy (0).

The US sent troops to Cuba in 1906 claiming entitlement under the Platt Amendment to establish order and to institute and monitor elections in the Caribbean nation. As Drake points out, the primary interest in doing so was not to further democracy but rather to protect US properties and business interests in Cuba (Drake, 10).

5) Criticisms of authoritarian regimes: 0 (none).

6) Active support of authoritarian regimes: -1

US supported authoritarian regimes that supported stability in the region and guaranteed the soundness of US interests (Langley, 49).

7) Did US leaders express the view that Latin American countries could not be democracies? Yes (-1)

US policy makers maintained their racial and cultural prejudices towards LA throughout this administration (Langley, 29).

8) Did the US practice a policy of non-recognition when a military coup overthrew a democratic or semi-democratic government? No 0

**Taft 1909-12**

1) Public support for democracy in speeches and policy statements: 0

Meyer 1991 says that Taft was indifferent about regime type. Drake 1991 agrees. He says that Taft’s main goal “was to stamp out disorder and civil wars, not necessarily to instill democracy.” P. 12.

2) Support for coups against democratic or semi-democratic governments: -1
The US ambassador to Mexico, Henry Lane Wilson, was hostile to the semi-democratic government of Madero, Lorenzo Meyer (1991) says that Madero was elected in free elections. He took office in November 1911 but was deposed in a coup 15 months later, in February 1913. The Taft administration openly opposed the rise of Madero’s SD government in Mexico in favor of the authoritarian rule of Diaz (Meyer, 220). But still, it might overstate the case to say that the US directly supported the coup. (Wilson was inaugurated in March 1913, so this episode fits under Taft). According to Schoultz, the US supported the ousting of Madero in Mexico in 1913.

Madero was elected with perhaps the most narrow electorate in all of Latin America at that time; a mere 0.1% of the population voted. Therefore, the political regime should be considered authoritarian. Nevertheless, we code this as -1 because he was elected in competitive elections.

3) Military occupations that limited sovereignty: -1

Nicaragua 1909-25; Cuba 1912. (Langley, 57).

4) Active promotion of democracy: 0 None

5) Criticisms of authoritarian regimes: 0 None

6) Active support of authoritarian regimes: -1

President Taft wrote his brother a most effusive note about Porfirio Díaz in 1911, quoted in Schoultz, pp. 237-238. Taft strongly supported Diaz, Schoultz pp. 237-239. Meyer 1991 quotes Taft as sending Díaz an effusive note after the former was defeated and forced to step down in 1911.

The US supervised 3 consecutive elections in Nicaragua from 1912. Schoultz (p. 261) reports that “The fraud was brazen, beginning with the first US-supervised election in 1912. Smedley Butler, who helped that year to arrange the unopposed election of Adolfo Díaz, later bragged that by manipulating the electoral rolls, ‘our candidates always win.’” P. Smith (p. 57) also notes US support for the authoritarian regime in Nicaragua.

In countries such as Nicaragua, the US intervened at will to guarantee political stability taking the side of authoritarian ruler Adolfo Diaz who carried out a coup in 1911 (Meyer, 238).

7) Did US leaders express the view that Latin American countries could not be democracies? -1

The US Ambassador to Mexico, Henry Lane Wilson, believed that Latin America was too backward economically, socially, and culturally to sustain democracy. Meyer 1991: 98. This view was held widely at the time.
As described by Langley, Secretary of State Lansing was quite open about his racist view towards Haitians and their innate “inability” to develop democracies (Langley, 73).

Another example of egregious racism: One of the commanders of the US occupation force in Haiti, Colonel Littleton Waller, said that “They are real niggers…” Quoted in Maingot 1996: 93.

8) Did the US practice a policy of non-recognition when a military coup overthrew a democratic or semi-democratic government? 0
According to Munro (426), Taft initiated the policy of non-recognition of some govs., but Taft used this policy to defend US economic interests, not as a mechanism to be employed against governments that overthrew a democracy or semi-democracy. Taft declared non-recognition of the Madriz government in Nicaragua, and he used this policy to bring about its overthrow. He also twice declared non-recognition of governments in Haiti in efforts to secure US economic interests. According to Munro, before Taft, US governments promptly recognized LA governments as soon as they established control and were able to honor international obligations (426).

Wilson 1913-20
We code 1919-20 differently than 1913-18 for Q4, Q5, and Q8.

Most analysts see Wilson as representing a significant break from Taft and Teddy Roosevelt. Munro (1964) disagrees. “The objectives which Wilson sought to obtain in the Caribbean were in fact not very different from his predecessors’, and his policy, in practice, was essentially a continuation of theirs.”

1) Public support for democracy in speeches and policy statements: 1/2
Wilson gave verbal support to democracy (P. Smith, p. 51, Drake 1991), but in an inconsistent manner. Drake emphasizes Wilson’s verbal support for democracy.

According to both Smith and Drake, Wilson’s foreign policy departed from that of his predecessors’ by emphasizing democratic promotion in LA as an American “moral duty.” Nevertheless, he still publicly acknowledged that sometimes “more essential steps” were needed prior to establishing solid democratic electoral processes in the region, as in the case of Mexico (Drake, 16; Smith 2000, 51-53). The exception of Mexico shows that Wilson was not favorable to establishing democracy above more pressing developments, such as stability.

2) Support for coups against democratic or semi-democratic governments: 0
Few democratic or SD governments at this time

3) Military occupations that limited sovereignty: -1
In 1916, the marines invaded the DR despite opposition from the DR’s president (Hartlyn 1991). The commander of the marines became the supreme ruler of the DR
The Marines remained in the DR until 1924, and the US ruled the country (Hartlyn 1991). (Langley, 78).

The marines also occupied Nicaragua 1909-25 (P. Smith, pp. 56-57) and Haiti (P. Smith, 58 ff.). According to P. Smith (p. 59), the US effectively ruled Haiti from 1915-30 although Haiti had puppet presidents. According to Schoultz, there was a military force in Mexico, 1914-17, also in Honduras and Panama.

P. Smith claims that many US military interventions in this era were justified in the name of democracy, but he gives almost little evidence except for the Wilson period to support this claim.

The US militarily occupied several Caribbean countries during this period, such as the Dominican Republic, Nicaragua, Haiti, and Mexico (port of Vera Cruz). In some cases US military occupations took place as a means to allow for democratic elections to take place while in others, such as in Haiti, the US presence was a direct “accomplice” in the suspension of direct elections (Drake, 18).

As Langley argues, US intervention in Haiti in 1915 led to a long term intervention and the complete takeover of Haitian electoral and constitutional processed by the foreign power. For example, the new Haitian constitution that was born from this occupation was written mostly by the State Department (Langley, 76).

4) Active promotion of democracy: 1/2 for 1913-18; 0 for 1919-20
This is tricky to code because the Wilson government was inconsistent. However, there were a few instances in which it did actively promote democratization.

In 1916, Wilson supported the staging of what he hoped would be free and fair elections in Nicaragua. “For the first time, the achievement of democratic government and the projection of the democratic process became an explicit feature of U.S. policy toward Nicaragua.” (Tulchin and Walter 1991: 118.).

Wilson did “on several occasions attempt to see that changes of government took place in a democratic way … (In 1914, Wilson) “insisted on a free election in Santo Domingo. … In 1916 and again in 1920, he tried, without great success, to see that fair elections were held in Cuba.” (Munro, p. 541).

5) Criticisms of authoritarian regimes: ½ for 1913-18; 0 for 1919-20
In 1914, the US went to great lengths to bring down Mexican dictator Victoriano Huerta after he overthrew Francisco Madero in a coup in 1913 (Drake 1991). However, this was something of an exception.
Wilson openly criticized Huerta’s brutal regime by stating that he would not “recognize a government of butchers” (Drake, 15) due to the poor record of human rights in Mexico at the time.

6) Active support of authoritarian regimes: -1
According to P. Smith (p. 59), the US effectively ruled Haiti from 1915-30 although Haiti had puppet presidents. Drake (p. 18) writes that “In Haiti, the United States became an accomplice in the suspension of direct elections and of an elected congress for over a decade.” Haiti “remained dominated by heavy US dictatorial control” under Wilson (Drake, 18).

According to Munro (1964: 216), the US supported the Conservatives in Nicaragua even though the Liberals would have won free and fair elections. The US believed that withdrawing its legation would enable a Liberal “revolution” (Munro’s word.) See also Munro p. 541—the US supported the Conservatives even though they were “obviously opposed by a majority of the people.”

According to Munro (pp. 489 ff.), the US very actively supported Cuba’s president, Menocal, despite the fact that he stole the 1916 presidential election. The US sold arms to Menocal at the outbreak of a revolt against him, and it issued a public statement supporting him.

According to Drake, often the US oversaw elections in Caribbean nations only to sponsor a US supporter. The US then guaranteed that its victorious candidate was maintained in power indefinitely, as in the case of Chamorro in Nicaragua (Drake, 19).

7) Did US leaders express the view that Latin American countries could not be democracies? -1

According to Drake Wilson presented a “paternalistic approach” toward LA based on his view that these countries would not be able to immediately grasp more complex democratic practices and principles beyond those of an electoral nature (Drake, 14).

8) Did the US practice a policy of non-recognition when a military coup overthrew a democratic or semi-democratic government? 1 for 1913-18; 1/2 for 1919-20.

The Wilson doctrine of 1913 called for non-recognition of all unconstitutional governments in Latin America (P. Smith p. 52, Drake 1991; Munro 426 ff.). Wilson initiated a policy of nonrecognition of authoritarian regimes in the aftermath of coups. Drake analyzes this point, pp. 13-14.

In 1913, Wilson refused to recognize Mexican President Victoriano Huerta, leader of the coup against Francisco Madero (Drake 1991: 15). According to Meyer 1991, Wilson’s action might have had some influence; Huerta was deposed. This was the first time that the US practiced this policy.

In 1913, the US said that it would not recognize a de facto govt. in the DR, and it threatened military intervention (and also withholding customs receipts). See Munro 277 ff.
In May 1916, the US carried out a military occupation when Arias seized power unconstitutionally in the DR (Munro 1964: 307 ff.)

In 1917, Wilson refused to recognize the government of Costa Rican dictator Federico Tinoco after he led a coup (Drake, 21-22; Munro 427 ff.). Drake writes that this episode was notable because the US promoted democracy even “in conflict with U.S. economic and strategic interests” (p. 22). Schwartzberg (forthcoming) agrees. Tinoco fled Costa Rica in 1919.

According to Tulchin (1971: 70), Wilson moved away from his policy of interventionism late in his term. The US immediately recognized the government of Leguía in Peru, who seized power in a coup in 1919 (see also Drake 1991: 13, 22). It also recognized de facto governments in 1920 in Honduras and Guatemala. In 1920, however, Wilson withheld recognition from the newly elected Obregón government in Mexico (Tulchin 1971: 77), but not on the grounds that the regime was authoritarian.

Munro writes that “Except in Costa Rica North American influence prevented serious disorders in Central America between 1912 and 1919, but in 1919 and 1920 successful revolutions in Honduras and Guatemala showed that the non-recognition policy could not always be applied.” (p. 449) 1919: US recognized the de facto govt. of López Gutiérrez in Honduras. 1920: The US recognized the de facto govt. in Guatemala (which replaced a brutal dictatorship of Estrada Cabrera). However, in 1920, the US did not recognize the “revolutionary” Nicaraguan government of Diego Chamorro until he promised to hold elections in 1924 (Tulchin 1971: 248).

**Harding 1921-23**

According to Tulchin (1971: 245 passim), the Republicans launched aggressive attacks on Wilson’s foreign policy, in particular, the policies intended to support democracy in Latin America. He states that the Harding government did not immediately undertake major changes in Latin American policy, but over time, there were some changes.

1) Public support for democracy in speeches and policy statements: 0
   According to Drake (1991) and Tulchin (1971), Harding moved away from public statements on behalf of democracy. Harding criticized the Wilson Doctrine by stating that he would not “empower an Assistant Secretary of the Navy to draft a constitution for helpless neighbors…and to jam it down their throats at the point of bayonets borne by US marines” (Drake, 22; Langley, 95).

2) Support for coups against democratic or semi-democratic governments: 0

3) Military occupations that limited sovereignty: -1
   Nicaragua 1909-25
   DR 1914-24
   Cuba 1917-22
Haiti 1915-30 (Langley, p. 102)

US Naval presence in Honduras for elections in the midst of civil strife in 1923

4) Active promotion of democracy: 0
Harding backed away from Wilson’s occasional practice of intervening on behalf of democracy (Drake 22; Tulchin 1971). In 1923-24, the US pressured for clean elections in Honduras, but it ultimately recognized the government even though it was elected in unfair elections (Drake 22). Drake states that “the crusade for democracy was gradually dismantled” under Harding.

5) Criticisms of authoritarian regimes: 0

6) Active support of authoritarian regimes: -1
According to P. Smith (p. 59), the US effectively ruled Haiti from 1915-30 although Haiti had puppet presidents.

The US directly aided Borno, the undemocratically elected leader of Haiti not only to gain power in 1922 but to maintain it for the remaining of the decade (Drake, 25; Langley, 102).

7) Did US leaders express the view that Latin American countries could not be democracies? -1
A high ranking State Department official held the following view in respect to Haitians:
“It is well to distinguish at once between the Dominicans and the Haitians. The former, while in many ways not advanced far enough for the highest type of self-government, yet have a preponderance of white blood and culture. The Haitians on the other hand are negro for the most part, and, barring a very few highly educated politicians, are almost in the state of savagery and complete ignorance…” (Drake, 24).

8) Did the US practice a policy of non-recognition when a military coup overthrew a democratic or semi-democratic government? 0
According to Tulchin (1971: 102), Secretary of State Charles Evans Hughes did not like Wilson’s policy of non-recognition. He gradually turned toward reserving this practice as a tool in economic conflicts.

Coolidge 1924-28

1) Public support for democracy in speeches and policy statements: 0
According to Smith, Coolidge issued statements in favor of US intervention in order to maintain stability and to secure American interests in countries such as Nicaragua (Smith 2000, 66).
2) Support for coups against democratic or semi-democratic governments: 0

3) Military occupations that limited sovereignty: -1
   Coolidge moves away from the interventionism of the Wilson years.
   Nicaragua 1909-25
   DR 1914-24
   Marine occupation of Nicaragua, 1926-32 (P. Smith 65-67).
   Haiti 1915-34
   Secretary of State Hughes sent US troops to Honduras in 1924 (Tulchin 1971: 246).
   The sole purpose of the intervention was to “protect American lives” (p. 246). The
   marines withdrew as soon as Sumner Welles was able to negotiate an agreement
   among Honduran political leaders.
   Withdraw troops from Nicaragua but soon was persuaded to send them back due to
   political tensions against Diaz’s government (Pastor, 20).

4) Active promotion of democracy: 0
   According to Drake pp. 27-28, because of US pressure and election monitoring, the
   Nicaraguan elections of 1928 were the cleanest ever. Bowman et al. (2005: 948)
   report the same. However, Drake also says that the US pressed the Nicaraguan
   government to “adopt a humiliating law” and that the US supervisory procedures
   violated provisions of the Nicaraguan constitution. The bulk of the evidence
   supports coding Q4 as 0.

5) Criticisms of authoritarian regimes: 0

6) Active support of authoritarian regimes: -1

Schoultz quotes a 1928 letter by Evan Young, a US minister, who evinced solid
support for President Horacio Vásquez of the DR. According to Schoultz (p. 260),
Vásquez was elected in a free election, but the regime quickly degraded. “These
countries have need of a many of his type at the head of their affairs. … For ye
ars the people have been accustomed to letting the political chieftains do their thinking
for them, and this condition will, for the most part, continue for much time to come.”
(p. 260). This qualifies as US support for authoritarian governments.

According to P. Smith (p. 59), the US effectively ruled Haiti from 1915-30 although
Haiti had puppet presidents. Drake (25) says that the US supported patently
authoritarian regimes in Haiti.

7) Did US leaders express the view that Latin American countries could not be
democracies? -1
Drake (1991: 25) quotes a marine leader in Haiti: “Despotism was the only government they could understand.” See also Sumner Welles’s comments in Drake, p. 26; also Drake p. 27.

See #6 above.

Kenworthy cites an American official in the mid 20’s commenting on LA nations:

“[A]s these young nations grow and develop a greater capacity for self-government, and finally take their places upon an equal footing with the mature, older nations of the world, … they will come to see the United States with different eyes, and to have for her something of the respect and affection with which a man regards the instructor of his youth and a child looks upon a parent who has molded his character” (Kenworthy, 30).

8) Did the US practice a policy of non-recognition when a military coup overthrew a democratic or semi-democratic government? 0

The US continued occasionally the policy of non-recognition after a coup—for example, Ecuador 1925-28 (Drake 27).

The chief of the Latin American Division, Francis White, wrote in 1924 that the US should give up on the policy of withholding recognition from non-elected governments. (Tulchin 1971, p. 103).

In 1924, when the incumbent president of Nicaragua, Martínez, committed egregious fraud on behalf of his hand picked successor, Carlos Solorzano, the US decided to recognize the government (Tulchin 1971, p. 249).

**Hoover 1929-32**

1) Public support for democracy in speeches and policy statements: 0

Herbert Hoover openly criticized former US policies towards LA by remarking that “True democracy is not and cannot be imperialistic” (Drake, 29). Langley also reinforces this point by citing Hoover’s speech during his first goodwill tour of LA. During his tour, Hoover spoke about the limitations of intervention (Langley, 123).

2) Support for coups against democratic or semi-democratic governments:

3) Military occupations that limited sovereignty: -1
  - Haiti 1915-34
  - Nicaragua 1926-33

The US military continued its presence in Haiti although it started to withdraw troops during this administration (Drake, 31). In Haiti, an American high commissioner ruled while a Haitian president simply obeyed American will. Although John Russell,
the American high commissioner was eventually moved in 1930 US direct influence in government still remained (Langley, 136).

Also, US Military presence in Nicaragua until after the 1932 elections (Drake, 33; Smith, 67; Langley, 125).

4) Active promotion of democracy: 0

As Drake argues, Hoover returned to the pre Wilson foreign policy era of accepting stable governments regardless of their ideology. His government quickly recognized several regimes established undemocratically in Latin America (e.g. Brazil, Argentina, Peru, Panama and Bolivia) and despite disagreeing with several coups in Central America it chose not to intervene, as in the case of the rise of Trujillo through fraudulent elections in the Dominican Republic in 1930 (Langley, 133).

*Langley notes that Hoover did uphold the Tobar Doctrine against Orellana’s coup in Guatemala in 1930. This approach was however short lived since a year later a similar coup took place in El Salvador, although this time the leader of the coup, Maximiliano Hernandez, did not abdicate and received support from other Central American countries. According to Langley, “El Salvador had not only defied the Tobar Doctrine and the treaties of 1923; it had defied the US and American policy” (Langley, 131).

5) Criticisms of authoritarian regimes:

The US expressed displeasure about an army coup in Guatemala in December 1930, but it then proceeded to recognize Ubico’s government, elected in patently fraudulent elections (Drake 1991).

According to Drake, formal criticisms against Machado’s repressive regime in Cuba were used by Washington to attempt to persuade Cuba’s government to curtail human rights abuses. Nevertheless, the US negative response to Cuba’s authoritarianism was more evident than in other Caribbean states since historically Washington was legally bound to interfere in the island due to the Platt Amendment.

* Cuba was an exception; that other authoritarian regimes (e.g. Dominican Republic and Honduras) did not meet such opposition.

6) Active support of authoritarian regimes: -1

Secretary of State Stimson wrote in his diary in 1930 that Rafael Trujillo “was panning out to be a very good man.” Cited in Schoultz p. 260. However, this was before Trujillo seized power.

According to P. Smith (p. 59), the US effectively ruled Haiti from 1915-30 although Haiti had puppet presidents.
The Hoover regime attempted to stay out of LA political brawls. As democratically elected leaders began to cling to power beyond what their constitutions established, the US eventually recognized their existence, as for example in Honduras and in the Dominican Republic (Drake, 30-31). This was also the case in Guatemala (Drake, 33).

7) Did US leaders express the view that Latin American countries could not be democracies? -1
See Drake p. 31: “The Latin mind is apt to scorn democracy.” Also Drake p. 32.

As Drake points out, the US diplomat responsible for Haiti issued the following statement to the State Department in 1930:
“In general, while the Anglo-Saxon has a deep sense of the value of social organization and the obligation of democratic government….the action of the Haitian, in common with the Latin in general, is in the main directed by emotion rather than by reason” (Drake, 31).
In the Latin American division in Washington this approach was also maintained: “The consensus was that Haitians were still not fit for democracy…” (Langley, 134).

8) Did the US practice a policy of non-recognition when a military coup overthrew a democratic or semi-democratic government? 0
Hoover moved away from the policy of nonrecognition of de facto governments (Drake makes this point at length). The US initially denied recognition to the government of Maximiliano Martínez in El Salvador. He led a successful coup in 1931. But nonrecognition became untenable (Drake). The US quickly recognized Trujillo in 1930 (Drake).

FDR 1933-42:
The cornerstone of FDR’s policy was nonintervention. We scored 1933-34 different than 1935-42 on Q3.

1) Public support for democracy in speeches and policy statements: 0
The policy of nonintervention precluded public statements of support for democracy. The major focus of this administration was on maintaining a policy of a “good neighbor” in which the US would aim at stability and non-intervention in LA. As Roosevelt stated: “Single-handed intervention by us in the internal affairs of other nations must end; with the cooperation of others we shall have more order in this hemisphere and less dislike” (Smith, 68; Dozer, 19).

2) Support for coups against democratic or semi-democratic governments. 0
The US supported the ousting of Grau San Martín in Cuba in 1933 (Schoultz 1998: 299-303; P. Smith 70-71), but San Martín had not been elected on this occasion. Therefore, this does not count as support for a coup against a competitively elected government. The US expressed retrospective support for the coup against Arnulfo Arias in Panama in October 1941 (Schoultz p. 311), but it is not clear from the
description if Arias was freely and fairly elected. Nor does retrospective support count as being sufficient.

3) Military occupations that limited sovereignty. -1 for 1933-34 until the end of the intervention in Haiti; 0 for 1935-42.

New no interventions. FDR sent warships to ring Cuba in 1933 or January 1934, but he refrained from an overt military invasion or occupation (Schoultz 1998: 299-303). Haiti 1915-34

4) Active promotion of democracy: 0

Drake argues that the US “refrained from vigorous democratic promotion in the sphere until the end of the war.”

5) Criticisms of authoritarian regimes: 0
The good neighbor policy allowed the US to maintain a neutral position vis a vis dictators in LA. There was no criticism of such regimes during this period.

6) Active support of authoritarian regimes: -1
Schoultz p. 316 says that the US actively supported some dictators, citing the example of Batista in 1942. P. Smith p. 71 says that the US embraced many dictators, but he does not offer evidence. Tulchin and Walter (1991) also say that the US embraced many dictators, but they, too, provide little evidence.

According to Langley (p. 125), Washington backed the rise of Somoza’s dictatorship and the assassination of Sandino.

Did US leaders express the view that Latin American countries could not be democracies? -1 Pike cites a conversation between Henry Stimson and Roosevelt in the mid 30's that expressed racist views regarding the inability of Haitians to govern themselves due to their racial composition (Pike, 133).

7)

8) Did the US practice a policy of non-recognition when a military coup overthrew a democratic or semi-democratic government? 0

FDR 1943-45

1) Public support for democracy in speeches and policy statements: 1
Schwartzberg (2003: 1-16, passim) argues that toward the end of World War II, the US embraced democracy in speeches and policy statements. Braden Spruille argued for extending democracy promotion to Latin America (from Cuba), and he won the day. P. Smith (2000: 129-130) makes a similar point notwithstanding his general cynicism about US policy toward LA. So does Schoultz (316 ff., p. 326 quoting Braden Spruille). See also Norman Armour’s quote in Bethell 1991: 50; Adolf Berle’s quote in Bethell pp. 50-51 and other quotes in Bethell, p. 51.
Langley refers to the war as an important external factor, which decidedly influenced a change in the US approach to LA: “The war brought new US demands for political conformity, this time in phrases extolling hemispheric unity as a proof of democratic worthiness...” (Langley, 184).

2) The US did not support any coups against democratic or semi-democratic governments during this period.

3) There were no military occupations.

4) US promotion of democracy: 1

The US actively promoted democracy in some cases. Schwartzberg shows (Chapter 1) based on careful research that US Ambassador Spruille Braden clearly supported Ramón Grau San Martín in the 1944 election against Batista (also Ameringer 2000). The US actively supported democracy in Brazil in 1945 (Bethell 1991: 53; Schwartzberg Chapter 2). It supported Ubico’s overthrow and the democratization process in Guatemala (Schwartzberg p. 48). Bethell 1991: 49-50 agrees that the US supported democratization in Guatemala but sees no evidence that it supported the ousting of Martínez in El Salvador and or that it supported democratization in Cuba in 1944. But Schwartzberg presents some evidence to the contrary. US policy toward Argentina also was influenced by the effort to promote democracy (Schoultz pp. 320 ff; Schwartzberg; Bethell 1991: 52-53).

Bethell asserts that there was a shift in the Roosevelt administration to pressure LA governments who had not yet taken a position in favor of the US during WWII to move towards democratic rule. He cites the position taken by US Ambassador to Asuncion, William Beaulac, supported by the State Department “to encourage democracy… and liberal institutions in Paraguay” (Bethell, 52).

Lowenthal (1991: 245) says that the US supported democratization in Paraguay, 1944-46, leading briefly to some reforms in 1946. In 1944, Washington “launched a democratic offensive aimed at democratizing Paraguay, which was not entirely enthusiastic in its support for the Allied cause” (Bethell, 52). The US pressured several other governments by forging alliances against pro-fascist political sympathizers in Bolivia, Argentina, and Brazil (Bethell, 52).

*Nevertheless, there are diverging views on this issue. Dozer argues that the US entrance in WWII actually helped to weaken the ties of cooperation and non-intervention in the western hemisphere since US attention was shifted to the conflict in Europe. This meant, according to the author, that the renewal of an intervention policy would swing back the inter-American relationship to “the kind of relationship that prevailed in the 1920’s” (Dozer, 389).

5) 1: The US was willing to criticize authoritarian regimes during this time. See Schwartzberg for documentation.
Several US ambassadors in LA openly expressed their country’s opposition to authoritarian regimes as for example in Argentina and Brazil. The US Ambassador to Argentina, Spruille Braden, entered into a true democratic crusade against Peron and called for the promotion of civil and political rights such as freedom of speech, assembly and freedom of the press (Bethell, 52; Rabe, 12). Adolfo Berle, US Ambassador to Brazil, exerted pressure against Vargas’ 15 year rule and called for democratic elections in the country (Bethell, 53; Schwartzberg). Also, Langley argues that authoritarian regimes that befriended the US during the war began to lose American support. US diplomats criticized Rafael Trujillo (Langley, 194).

In 1945 the US State Department denied export licenses for munitions to Trujillo’s government. Spruille Braden, who had been nominated Assistant Secretary of State openly charged the Dominican government as being totalitarian (Langley, 195).

Ciria claims that the US was more strongly opposed to the 1943-45 authoritarian government in Argentina then it was to Vargas Brazil mostly because of Brazil’s choice (although quite late in the game) to support the Allies war effort while Argentina remained neutral until the very end of the conflict (Ciria, 102).

6) The US did not actively support authoritarian regimes. 0

7) Did US leaders express the view that Latin American countries could not be democracies? 0

8) Did the US practice a policy of non-recognition when a military coup overthrew a democratic or semi-democratic government? 1

The US refused to recognize the government of Major Gualberto Villarroel in Bolivia after it came to power through a revolution in 1943. The US withheld both diplomatic recognition and economic assistance to the new regime due to its breach of “the security of the hemisphere…. And the war effort of the united nations” according to Secretary Hull (Dozer, 138).

According to Ciria, the US imposed economic and diplomatic sanctions on Argentina’s military governments starting in 1943. Among the sanctions were the cessation of commercial ties for vital US products, the non-recognition of the regime headed by General Farrell, and the freezing of Argentina’s gold reserves among other restrictions (Ciria, 79).

Francis agrees and adds that US non-recognition of Farrell’s de facto government in 1944 led to a series of harsher restriction measures by the US Department of State, including the prohibition of up to 65% of US imports from Argentina, the cessation of American armaments exports to the country, and the barring the sale of railroad engines, cars and automotive vehicles (Francis, 229).
**Truman 1945-47**
We use Spruille’s resignation in 1947 and the Rio conference as expressions of the clear change in policy.

1) Public support for democracy in speeches and policy statements: 1
Schwartzberg provides ample evidence of solid and consistent support for 1945-47. So do Schoultz (1998: 316-331), P. Smith (2000: 197), and Bethell and Roxborough (1988). After 1947 or 1948 (the exact timing is in dispute), there was a shift documented by Schwartzberg (pp. 187 ff.), Bethell 1991, and more briefly by Schoultz (332-335) and by Bethell and Roxborough (1988). Schwartzberg dates the shift to 1948, with the establishment of military governments in Peru and Venezuela. Bethell and Roxborough see the shift occurring slightly earlier (around 1947).

Bethell 1991 sees the change in attitudes toward Communism as a major shift. In 1944-45, the US supported Communist involvement in Latin American efforts to democratize. By 1947, this changed. Bethell and Schwartzberg see Braden’s resignation in 1947 as a turning point.

Bethell points out that the US policy shift after the end of WWII was disclosed officially during the Chapulepec Conference in which the US together with other LA states declared “a fervent adherence to democratic principles” (Bethell, 51; Langley, 187).

2) 0 The US did not support any coups against democratic or semi-democratic governments under Truman. And in fact, the US worked successfully to prevent a coup in Ecuador in 1947.

3) 0 No military occupations.

4) US promotion of democracy: 1
The US actively promoted democracy until around 1948 (according to Schwartzberg) or 1946-47 according to Bethell 1991. US intervention in Costa Rica in 1948 was important in supporting democratization (Schwartzberg 2003: 172-186; Schwartzberg forthcoming). Although less emphatically than Schwartzberg, Schoultz also notes US efforts at democracy promotion (325-327). The US supported democracy in Venezuela 1947-48 (Schwartzberg pp. 158 ff.), and it opposed the 1948 coup according to Schwartzberg. According to Bethell 1991, the US welcomed democratizing changes in Peru and Venezuela in 1945, but it had no role in those democratizing coups. Bethell (52) writes that the US did push for democratization in Paraguay.

Escudé 1991 notes that after 1947, the US stopped its policy toward Argentina of promoting human rights and civil liberties. He quotes a 1950 State Department report that indicates the desire to avoid intervening in the politics of Argentina.
In late 1947, the US opposed the “Cayo Confites” invasion, prepared by the Grau government and Dominican exiles in Cuba against the Trujillo regime. The US asked the Cuban army to dismantle the operation. Boats were captured, and the exiles moved to Guatemala (Ameringer 1996).

Lowenthal argues that the US did openly pressure authoritarian regimes to move toward democratization in a first moment. Washington exerted a strong indirect influence over dismantling Getulio Vargas’ authoritarian power in Brazil, along with other countries such as Bolivia, Argentina and Paraguay (Lowenthal, 386).

According to Rabe, the National Security Council feared that “there would be many cases in which such anti-communist agreements would be directed against all political opposition, Communist or otherwise, by dictatorial governments, with the inevitable result of driving leftist elements into the hands of Communist organizations” (Rabe, 15). Washington was on a crusade against all forms of authoritarianism, both left and right.

From the Latin American perspective, elites had perceived Washington’s foreign policy strategy to slowly move away from the USSR after the end of the war as a victory for the preservation of democracy in the continent (Dozer, 312).

5) Criticisms of authoritarian regimes: 1
During the early Truman years, the US was willing to criticize authoritarian regimes. Schwartzberg argues that Spruille Braden's opposition to Perón was part of this dynamic. Bethell and Roxborough, P. Smith (pp. 316-327), and Schoultz (Chapter 16) also note this point.

S. Braden was appointed as Assistant Secretary of State for Inter-American Affairs between September of 1945 and June of 1947. He argued that the US should not tolerate “friendly” dictators in Latin America. State (more than Defense) began showing hostility towards allies such as Rafael Trujillo (Ameringer 1996).

American Ambassador to Argentina Spruille Braden avidly took on the task of pressuring the Argentine government to “believe in the basic freedoms of speech, press, and assembly hoping to see them practiced widely, especially throughout the Americas” (Bethell, 52)

6) Active support of authoritarian regimes: 0
According to Schwartzberg, the US did not actively support authoritarian regimes. P. Schwartzberg claims that the US did not welcome the coups in Venezuela and Peru in 1948 and would have preferred maintenance of the democracies.

7) Did US leaders express the view that Latin American countries could not be democracies? 0
8) Did the US practice a policy of non-recognition when a military coup overthrew a democratic or semi-democratic government? 1/2

The US denial of recognition of a would-be dictator in Ecuador in 1947 was possibly decisive in rescuing democracy (Schwartzberg 169-172). However, the US failed to act decisively on behalf of democrats in Venezuela in 1948 and Cuba in 1952. Bethell 1991 goes beyond this: he notes that the US quickly recognized Pérez Jiménez and Odría after their coups in Venezuela and Peru, both in 1948.

A document issued by acting secretary of state Joseph C. Crew in 1945 entitled “Policy re Dictatorships and Disreputable Governments” recommended the cessation of military and financial assistance to authoritarian governments.

When Anastasio Somoza deposed his hand picked successor in 1947, the US refused to recognize Somoza (Tulchin and Walter 1991: 124).

In 1945, the US denied export licenses of arms to the government in the Dominican Republic based on the fact that the country was led by an authoritarian regime (Bethell, 51; Langley, 195).

**Truman 1948-52**

1) Public support for democracy in speeches and policy statements: 0.

After 1947 or 1948 (the exact timing is in dispute), there was a shift in policy documented by Schwartzberg (pp. 187 ff.) and more briefly by Schoultz (332-335) and by Bethell and Roxborough (1988). Schwartzberg dates the shift to 1948, with the establishment of military governments in Peru and Venezuela. Louis Halle's article (1950) is a clear sign away from the more consistent and solid support for democracy in policy statements. According to Schwartzberg (218), even during this latter period, Chile enjoyed an extraordinary position in US policy in part because it was democratic. Bethell and Roxborough see the shift to a more conservative policy occurring slightly earlier (around 1946-47).

P. Smith claims that 1950 was a decisive turning point after which Cold War logic prevailed. In 1950, George Kennan wrote that where there was a communist threat, “harsh government measures of repression may be the only answer.” Quoted in Bethell 1991: 65. Secretary of State Acheson had a similar view (Bethell 1991: 65; Rabe 18).

Bethell (p. 65) points out that US foreign policy was rapidly shifting full circle towards non interventionism and recognition of de facto governments in light of the perceived threat of global communism as expressed in George Kennan’s memo released in March 1950 that called for the support of military regimes as the “only answer” against the communist threat lurking in America’s backyard.
2) Support for coups against democratic or semi-democratic governments: 0
According to Schwartzberg, the US did not support any coups against democratic or semi-democratic governments under Truman. In fact, it rejected the suggestion of helping to overthrow Arbenz in Guatemala.

3) 0 No military occupations.

4) US promotion of democracy: 0
In the late 1940s, the US ceased promoting democracy. The US failed to act decisively on behalf of democrats in Venezuela in 1948 and Cuba in 1952. In Cuba, the US ambassador failed to issue a statement on behalf of democracy while Batista's coup was in progress (Schwartzberg, p. 207). Truman became more reluctant to intervene actively on behalf of democracy. Schoultz strongly agrees that the US became more reluctant to promote democracy. He quotes the article by Louis Halle in this regard (p. 341).

According to Rabe, US Secretary of State Acheson also made clear the movement away from democracy promotion when he addressed the Pan American Society in 1949. Acheson argued that Washington’s “long range objectives in the promotion of democracy” would be momentarily strengthened if the US accepted rightist authoritarian regimes that would bring stability and reject communism (Rabe, 18).

After Nicaragua threatened a pre-emptive strike against Costa Rica in 1948 and Dominican exiles attempted to invade the Dominican Republic from Guatemala in mid-1949, the US mobilized support in the OAS to dismantle the “Caribbean Legion.” The OAS mission recommended securing the principle of non-intervention in the Caribbean (Ameringer 1996; 2000).

5) Criticisms of authoritarian regimes: 0
During the later Truman years, the US was less willing to criticize authoritarian regimes. Most scholars see a shift toward greater tolerance of authoritarian regimes in the second Truman administration. Schwartzberg forthcoming is among them.

As can be seen in the 1950 Kennan memo mentioned in answer # 1, the US expressed its open support for regimes “whose origins and methods would not stand the test of American concepts of democratic procedure” if such regimes would stall the spread of communism in the Americas (Bethell, 65).

Rabe also refers to US policy makers as not deeming it wise to criticize internal human rights abuses of anti-communist allies (Rabe, 20).

6) Active support of authoritarian regimes: 0
According to Schwartzberg, the US did not actively support authoritarian regimes. In the later Truman years, it accepted them. It did not undertake active democracy promotion, but there is no indication that it actively preferred them even though the
US did open diplomatic talks with Argentina and recognized coups in Venezuela and Peru.

7) Did US leaders express the view that Latin American countries could not be democracies? -1

Louis Halle’s 1950 article in *Foreign Affairs* expressed grave doubts that LA countries could be democracies. The State Dept. clearly approved this publication. See Rabe p. 20. This publication argued that LA countries were like children “not yet ready to exercise for themselves the responsibility of adult nations” (Rabe, 20).

8) Did the US practice a policy of non-recognition when a military coup overthrew a democratic or semi-democratic government? 0

**Eisenhower, 1953-60**

*We code Eisenhower differently for 1959-60 on Q4.*

1) Public support for democracy in speeches and policy statements: 0

The first policy document on Latin America (March 18, 1953) did not even list democracy promotion as an objective. Bethell 1991: 66.

During the Eisenhower administration, Dulles made several notorious remarks, including the phrase “do nothing to offend dictators” during a meeting with US Ambassadors to LA (Rabe, 87).

2) Support for coups against democratic or semi-democratic governments: -1

Guatemala 1954 (Bethell, 66; Rabe, 46; Langley, 209; Schlesinger and Kinzer; Schoultz 337-345; P. Smith pp. 135-139). According to Bethell (p. 66), this was the first time the US had ever supported the overthrow of a democratic government in Latin America. (What about the overthrow of Madero in Mexico in 1913?)

As Dozer argues, US support for banning communist parties and leftist governments in Latin America, which had previously been accepted as part of the democratic fabric in several countries, took full force during the Tenth Inter-American Conference in 1954. The conference confirmed the “imminent” threat of international communism to the national security of western states, warning that “the domination or control of the political institutions of any American State by the international communist movement…would constitute a threat to the sovereignty and political independence of the American States” (Dozer, 340). This statement was supposed to prepare the way for the Guatemalan invasion.

3) Military occupations that limited sovereignty: -1

The US sponsored the invasion of Guatemala in 1954.

4) Active promotion of democracy. 0 for 1953-58, 1/2 for 1959-60
Both Rabe and Bethell argue that Eisenhower’s early policy towards LA did not include the promotion of democracy as a US goal (Bethell, 66; Rabe, 38).

Lowenthal (1991: 247) reports that the US withdrew support from Batista in 1957-58 and pressured him to hold free and fair elections. He views this change in policy toward Cuba as part of an overall change in appreciation of democracy in the late Eisenhower years. He says that the US withdrawal of support was important in making Batista more vulnerable.

The collapse of Batista and the Cuban revolution caused the US to begin rethinking its support of dictators. According to Hartlyn 1991, the US began to step away from Trujillo in 1959 as a result. He refers to this as a “massive” change in US policy toward the DR. In April 1960, an OAS body criticized the Trujillo government, the first time an OAS body had done so against a non-communist government (Hartlyn p. 71). For the first time, in 1960 the OAS imposed sanctions (no arms shipments to the DR); the US had already ceased arms shipments (Hartlyn, p. 71). At the urging of the US and Venezuela, the OAS imposed economic sanctions later that year. Tulchin and Water 1991: 127 also note that US policy toward democracy shifted late in the Eisenhower years.

Schwartzberg (forthcoming) says that the US intervention on behalf of Costa Rica when Anastasio Somoza threatened to invade might have been decisive in saving democracy.

In light of the evidence in Hartlyn 1991 on the DR, 1959/60 marks a new US policy toward democracy in LA.

5) Criticisms of authoritarian regimes
Escudé 1991 notes that the US cozied up to Perón during the Eisenhower years, and that the US no longer criticized the Perón government. Despite Eisenhower’s personal distrust of Peron, the US normalized relations with Argentina overlooking any criticisms of Peron’s record civil rights violations. As Rabe points out, US officials conveniently argued that by raising the flag against LA dictatorships’ civil rights violations the US would violate its commitment against intervention in the region (Rabe, 39).

However, Tulchin (1988) agrees with Hartlyn and Lowenthal that the Eisenhower administration became more concerned about the lack of democracy in Latin America in the late 1950s.

6) Active support of authoritarian regimes
P. Smith and Schoultz both see this period as one of strong US support for dictators. The US awarded Peruvian dictator Odría the Legion of Merit in 1953 and Venezuelan dictator Pérez Jiménez the Legion of Merit in 1954 (P. Smith p. 131; Schoultz p. 348). Vice President Nixon praised Batista and compared him to Abraham Lincoln (Schoultz p. 350; P. Smith p. 131, 199). US Secretary of State Christian Herter
explicitly prioritized security issues (anti Communism) over democracy promotion (P. Smith p. 141). P. Smith (199-200) emphasizes strong US support for Trujillo. The US also awarded the Legion of Merit to Fulgencio Batista’s Air Force commander, Colonel Carlos Tabernilla; Schoultz p. 350. Strong support for Castillo Armas in Guatemala (Schoultz, p. 351; P. Smith p.139).

The US supported several authoritarian rulers during this period including Trujillo in the Dominican Republic, Somoza in Nicaragua, Batista in Cuba, Magloire in Haiti, amongst many others (Langley, 203).

Although US support for dictatorships was not as open after Nixon’s tour in LA, the US supported Batista’s overthrow took place only to find itself faced with the rise of Castro, a more imminent international threat (Lowenthal, 387).

Rabe argues that due to the Cuban revolution, the US changes strategy once more by cutting its support for Trujillo’s fierce regime in the Dominican Republic. The US withdrew support from Trujillo fearing that the conditions under his rule were similar to those of Batista’s Cuba and the rise of a second leftist revolution was seen an international security threat (Rabe, 158).

Milton Eisenhower’s report acknowledged that the US had been “supporting Latin American dictators in the face of a strong trend toward freedom and democratic government.” Quoted in Schoultz, p. 353. And it called for changing that policy. According to Muñoz 1991: 47, by the late Eisenhower years, the US was concerned about the prevalence of authoritarianism in LA. Schwartzberg (forthcoming) agrees.

However, the US did continue to actively support some authoritarian regimes, e.g., Guatemala.

Washington provided military training, aid and assistance to several military governments in LA, such as to Paraguay and Venezuela (Rabe, 36). Although his support for dictators tended to shift throughout his administration (as in the cases of Batista and Trujillo) there was nevertheless a consistent underlying focus against the rise of Communism in LA, which in practice meant that the US acted to maintain its sphere of influence in the hemisphere through all necessary means.

Eisenhower personally commanded long term Nicaraguan dictator Somoza to be rescued and treated at a US hospital in the Canal Zone after suffering a fatal gun wound inflicted by a young Nicaraguan poet (Rabe, 87).

7) Did US leaders express the view that Latin American countries could not be democracies? -1

Rabe argues that both Eisenhower and Vice-president Nixon had a patronizing view towards Latin Americans (Rabe: 26, 88).
Park believes that the widespread adoption of the modernization paradigm during the 1950’s in the highest US academic circles explained Latin America’s underdevelopment as an institutional, cultural and traditional inheritance from its Iberian colonizers that could only be changed by completely discarding such LA characteristics and by adopting the American model. Furthermore, Park claims that “although the racial factor was less and less emphasized, Latin Americans were still portrayed as defective and, therefore, as impediments of progress” (Park, 202). Only by adopting the American economic and political models would Latin Americans be able to escape their undemocratic and feudal Iberian inheritance.

8) Did the US practice a policy of non-recognition when a military coup overthrew a democratic or semi-democratic government? 0

**JFK, 1961-63**

We code 1963 differently than 1961-62.

1) Public support for democracy in speeches and policy statements: 1/2
Tulchin (1988) says that JFK made democracy in LA a major priority in the 1960 presidential campaign.

Tony Smith (1991) and Packenham (1973) note strong US support for democracy at the level of discourse and public statements. When the Alliance for Progress was launched, August 17, 1961, the charter gave as its first goal “to improve and strengthen democratic institutions through application of the principle of self-determination by the people.” Quoted in Tony Smith: 72.

Although the Kennedy administration did emphasize the need for democratic development in LA through its Alliance for Progress initiative, the President remarked more than once that he would prefer authoritarian regimes to communist ones (Tony Smith, 81). The JFK quote on p. 143 of P. Smith shows support for democracy, but also indicates that the US would prefer a friendly authoritarian regime to a Communist regime. “There are three possibilities in descending order of preference: a decent democratic regime, a continuation of the Trujillo regime, or a Castro regime. We ought to aim at the first but we really cannot renounce the second until we are sure that we can avoid the third.”

2) Support for coups against democratic or semi-democratic governments: none 0

3) Military occupations that limited sovereignty: none 0

4) Active promotion of democracy. 1/2 for 1961-62, 0 for 1963

We code this as ½ because Kennedy of inconsistencies in the policy of promoting democracy. Kennedy did not promote democracy in cases where the administration was worried that doing so could boost a leftist.
Kennedy supported a return to democracy in Peru after the 1962 coup (P. Smith, p. 156). Schwartzberg (forthcoming) strongly agrees with this point. However, Kennedy was not willing to rock the boat in situations in which authoritarian regimes served as a bulwark against the left. More generally, he was loath to rock the boat (P. Smith pp. 156-157) by promoting democracy where it did not exist. P. Smith quotes extensively from the Asst. Secretary of State for LA Affairs, Edward Martin, October 1963 (p. 156-157). Martin expressed a clear preference for democracy in LA but evinced skepticism about how much the US could do.

The US helped prevent a direct continuation of Trujillismo after Trujillo’s death, and it supported the democratic elections held in 1962 (Hartlyn 1991: 69). In 1961, the US helped prevent Trujillo’s brothers from assuming power after the dictator was assassinated. However, when Juan Bosch was overthrown by a coup in September 1963 only months after taking office in February of that year, the US failed to support him. As Wiarda points out, the Kennedy administration supported the democratic left in LA at a first moment, but this support became less visible by the end of his presidency. Wiarda uses the examples of Bosch in the Dominican Republic and also argues that Kennedy preferred to allow a military junta to lead Honduras due to the alternative of a weak democratic government that was not properly equipped to deal with the leftist guerrillas. Wiarda further criticizes the US effort in Peru claiming that US support against the 1962 coup “probably led directly to the confrontation between the US and Peru that occurred in the late 1960’s” (Wiarda, 334).

Lowenthal 1991 describes JFK’s commitment to democracy promotion as conditional (which is certainly true).

For Tony Smith, Washington chose not to push the democratic cause too far when it had the chance to do so for fear of allowing communism to flourish. The example given by the author pertains to the Alliance’s backing out of its support for a project to promote land reform in the northeastern part of Brazil (Smith 1991, 79). Peter Smith argued that Kennedy did support centrist reformers and set off strong democratic offensives against authoritarian overthrows in Peru and Honduras (Smith 2000, 156).

JFK faced 6 coups in LA in 1962-63: Argentina (March 1962), Peru (July 1962), Guatemala (March 1963), Ecuador (July 1963), DR (Sept. 1963), and Honduras (October 1963).

Kennedy’s support for democracy depended on the type of regime that would ensue. If the administration feared that a leftist leader could come to power, it did not support the democratization of an authoritarian regime.

5) Criticisms of authoritarian regimes. ½ for the whole period.

US policy was inconsistent, depending on the situation. The administration criticized the Peruvian military after the 1962 coup (see point 4 above).

The US stopped aid to Haiti because of Duvalier’s repression (Langley, p. 235).

Although JFK became more willing to tolerate authoritarian leaders by 1963, he still criticized the Honduran coup that year.

6) Active support of authoritarian regimes
Guatemala

7) Did US leaders express the view that Latin American countries could not be democracies? 0

8) Did the US practice a policy of non-recognition when a military coup overthrew a democratic or semi-democratic government? ½ for the whole period

The Kennedy administration practiced a policy of non-recognition only when centrist regimes were toppled, and not when it feared that a leftist might otherwise come to the presidency.

Kennedy expressed displeasure at the Peruvian coup in 1962. He “suspended diplomatic relations, cut off economic aid, ordered technical personnel not to go on, their jobs, and considered suspension of the Peruvian sugar quota.” (P. Smith p. 156).

He also voiced displeasure at the Honduran coup in October 1963, which overthrew President Ramón Villeda Morales. Washington quickly criticized Honduran events “as a setback to democracy” suspending diplomatic relations and stopping military assistance to the country (Langley, 239).

Similarly, the US halted economic aid to the Dominican Republic when the fragile Bosch SD government was overthrown by a coup in 1963 (Langley, 235).

In contrast, the Kennedy administration did not utter any protests when Frondizi fell in a coup earlier in 1962 (Tulchin 1988: 23-24).

Tulchin (1988: 24) writes that “By mid 1963, the Kennedy administration had lost patience with the policy of intervention to support democracy in Latin America.”

According to Langley (237-238) and Schlesinger and Kinzer (238-244), the US accommodated the military overthrow of Manuel Ydigoras in Guatemala in 1963. The Kennedy administration feared that Juan José Arévalo would win the presidential election scheduled for 1963, and Ydigoras seemed unable to maintain political order.
Moreover, although Ydigoras was a former general who tilted toward the right, the US did not view him very favorably by 1963 (Schlesinger and Kinzer 238-244). Ydigoras had been elected to office for a 6 year term on March 15, 1958. There is no evidence of US involvement in the coup against Ydigoras, but the US did not object to it.

**LBJ, 1964-68**

P. Smith (p. 157) sees LBJ as a sharp turn toward the right. LBJ fired some of JFK’s policy leaders toward Latin America and promoted others who rejected democracy promotion. P. Smith interprets these dismissals as a turn to the right. Tulchin (1988) and Packenham do not fully agree; they argue that JFK had already given up on the idea of intervening on behalf of democracy in LA.

Thomas Mann became the main formulator of US policy toward LA.

1) Public support for democracy in speeches and policy statements: 0
According to P. Smith (p. 157-158), one of LBJ’s top policy leaders toward LA, Thomas C. Mann, did not believe that the US should articulate a public preference for democracy. However, the excerpt from Mann’s speech quoted on pp. 158-159 is not as dark as P. Smith’s conclusion.

2) Support for coups against democratic or semi-democratic governments: -1
Brazil 1964 (P. Smith 158-159). See also Black 1977; Lowenthal 1991; Parker 1979.

3) Military occupations that limited sovereignty: -1
The US invaded the DR in 1965 and prevented a democratically elected president (Bosch) from returning to power. Subsequently, in the summer of 1965, the US military had some role in governing the DR. Bosch had been overthrown by a coup in September 1963 and his supporters were trying to restore him to power in 1965 when the US invasion took place. The government at the time of the US invasion was authoritarian. (Smith 2000, 171; Langley, 252).

US unilateral intervention in the Dominican Republic demonstrated that under the communist threat treaties for multilateralism and non-intervention became irrelevant. The new “Johnson Doctrine” carried a strong resemblance to past interventionist policies and as Langley describes, “took the place in the hemispheric lexicon with the Roosevelt Corollary” (Langley, 257). According to Langley, “the Dominican intervention scarred that republic and disillusions a generation of Dominican leaders. Juan Bosch felt especially aggrieved as he lost faith in the ballot box and Anglo-Saxon democracy” (Langley, 265).

4) Active promotion of democracy: 0 none. See point 1 above. LBJ believed that JFK’s policy toward LA had been a mess.
According to Lowenthal, the US administration was clear that it “would no longer push for democratic transitions in the hemisphere” (Lowenthal, 389).

5) Criticisms of authoritarian regimes

6) Active support of authoritarian regimes: -1

Brazil (P. Smith 158-159). P. Smith reports (159) that the US also embraced Duvalier, Somoza, and Stroessner.

There were instances in which US diplomats openly praised and befriended authoritarian rulers, such as in the case of the Dominican Republic (Langley, 252).

Smith points out that LBJ issued a congratulatory telegram to the newly implemented military regime in Brazil. The US posture toward military leaders in Latin America “oscillated between passive acceptance and outright endorsement” (Smith 2000, 158-159).

The US Ambassador to the Dominican Republic, William Tapley Bennett, avidly supported undemocratic leader Donald Reid Cabral. As Langley points out, “Bennett’s support for Reid became so open that it proved an embarrassment to both” (Langley, 252).

7) Did US leaders express the view that Latin American countries could not be democracies? 0

8) Did the US practice a policy of non-recognition when a military coup overthrew a democratic or semi-democratic government? 0

LBJ moved away from the policy of nonrecognition (Packenham 1973; Tulchin 1988).

**Nixon and Ford 1969-76**

1) Public support for democracy in speeches and policy statements: 0

P. Smith (2000: 159-160) emphasizes the Rockefeller report, which explicitly devalued supporting democracy.

According to Lowenthal, US reports urged the country to maintain “normal diplomatic and economic relations with military regimes” (Lowenthal, 389).

2) Support for coups against democratic or semi-democratic governments: -1


3) Military occupations that limited sovereignty: 0

4) Active promotion of democracy: 0
P. Smith (2000: 159-160) emphasizes the Rockefeller report, which explicitly devalued supporting democracy.

5) Criticisms of authoritarian regimes 0

6) Active support of authoritarian regimes: -1

El Salvador, Chile (Schoultz, p. 361, P. Smith, p. 160). P. Smith reports (160) strong support for the Brazilian dictatorship. Muñoz 1991 reports solid support for the Chilean dictatorship until June 1976, when congress voted to suspend arm sales and to limit economic assistance until the Chilean regime made progress in human rights. On Chile, also see Robinson, 315).

The US administration actively supported military rulers in Latin America as long as they were US allies in the fight against communism (Smith 2000, 160).

Smith points out that “Washington worked together with dictatorial regimes throughout most of Central America” (Smith 2000, 160).

7) Did US leaders express the view that Latin American countries could not be democracies? 0

8) Did the US practice a policy of non-recognition when a military coup overthrew a democratic or semi-democratic government? 0

Washington immediately granted recognition of military dictatorships in Chile and Argentina (Smith 2000, 161; Robinson, 315).

Carter 1977-80

1) Public support for democracy in speeches and policy statements: 1
   Very strong. See P. Smith pp. 205-206; Schoultz
   According to Lowenthal, the Carter administration called for the acceptance of “ideological pluralism” in LA and denounced former US policy overly zealous about the actual threat of communism (Lowenthal, 389).
   As Pastor points out, the new focus of American foreign policy towards LA was to defend democracy and human rights. This became clear in the following assertion by Carter:
   “You will find the United States eager to stand beside those nations which respect human rights and which promote democratic ideals” (Pastor, 47).

2) Support for coups against democratic or semi-democratic governments: 0

3) Military occupations that limited sovereignty: 0
4) Active promotion of democracy: 1

The US helped support the DR’s transition to democracy in 1978 by countering electoral fraud and insisting on clean elections (Hartlyn 1991; Lowenthal, p. 390; Wiarda, 335).

The Carter administration supported the processes of abertura in Brazil, Peru, Ecuador and Uruguay. Pastor claims that Carter’s government had a significant impact on stirring democratic trends in authoritarian countries such as Peru, Ecuador, Bolivia, Brazil, Honduras, and the Dominican Republic. General Banzer from Bolivia remarked bitterly that “Mr. Carter didn’t send me a letter ordering elections, but we could feel the pressure” (Pastor, 62).

According to Pastor, the US pressured authoritarian regimes to move towards democratic transitions through meeting with the opposition to dictatorships, as in the case of Chile (Pastor, 49).

5) Criticisms of authoritarian regimes. 1

The US launched a major campaign on behalf of human rights. Carter withdrew support from Somoza in 1979. However, P. Smith (p. 161) sees criticisms of authoritarian regimes as cautious and qualified. Escudé (1991) acknowledges the public criticisms of authoritarian regimes (Argentina in particular) but says that US economic policy supported the Argentine dictators. Muñoz 1991 argues that the human rights policy saved many lives and shortened many jail sentences in Chile.

As Lowenthal explains, the major objective of the Carter administration was to curb the “gross violations of human rights - torture, disappearances and prolonged incarceration of political opponents” in LA (Lowenthal, 390). Carter extensively criticized the human rights records of rightist authoritarian regimes such as the brutal rule of General Augusto Pinochet in Chile (Carothers 1991b, 162). US pressures against human rights violations in Haiti led Duvalier to release political prisoners and to ameliorate the poor conditions in the country’s jails (Pastor, 49).

The US also criticized openly the military dictatorships of Brazil, Argentina and Chile (Carothers1991b, 118).

6) Active support of authoritarian regimes: 0

7) Did US leaders express the view that Latin American countries could not be democracies? 0

8) Did the US practice a policy of non-recognition when a military coup overthrew a democratic or semi-democratic government? 1
Carter pressured the government of Bolivia in 1980 after a coup d’etat by recalling US Ambassador from La Paz (Carothers 1991b, 127).

Reagan 1981-84

1) Public support for democracy in speeches and policy statements: 1
Carothers (1991) notes that at the rhetorical level, support for democracy was strong, and that in some areas of policy, it was genuine.

Carothers argues that throughout the 1980’s in several official speeches and conferences President Reagan and his advisors “declared that the US was committed to promoting the emergence and maintenance of democratic governments in L.A.” Citing examples from US statements calling for support for the El Salvadoran struggles to fight “the battle for democracy” in the early 80’s and its consistent support for the Contras in Nicaragua, naming them freedom fighters and claiming to support “true democracy” in the region are only a few examples of this public support for democratic rule in LA (Carothers 1991b, 3).

2) Support for coups against democratic or semi-democratic governments: -1
Nicaragua (not support for a coup, but for efforts to overthrow the government). The US attempted without success to topple the Sandinista government in Nicaragua by aiding the Contras and imposing economic and military bans on the elected government. Nicaragua is coded as SD from 1984 on, when the elections were held. The US helped also to train the Contras in Nicaragua in order to fight against the Sandinista government. The toll of this support amounted to 30 thousand Nicaraguans (Carothers 1991a, 104).


3) Military occupations that limited sovereignty: 0

4) Active promotion of democracy: 0

Nicaragua, but as a leftist regime, Nicaragua does not count.

As Carothers argues, the first half of the Reagan administration was heavily influenced by political hardliners who believed that an imminent communist threat was spreading through Central America. These hardliners pushed a foreign policy that supported arming the military in countries under attack by leftist rebels such as El Salvador. The US intervention helped to arm a corrupt military that had a poor human rights record and that was historically antidemocratic (Carothers 1991a, 93). Similarly, the Honduran military was also trained and strengthened by the US. Although there were reasonably free and fair elections in the country, the military remained a major power behind governmental decisions (Carothers 1991a, 99).

Despite Washington’s claim of being successful in democratic promotion in the region, the “achievement of elected civilian rule fell short of the achievement of
democracy…” (Carothers 1991b, 42). Another critique posed by Carothers was the constant US interference in LA sovereignty (Carothers 1991b, 46).

5) Criticisms of authoritarian regimes.
When he assumed office, Reagan immediately suspended the sanctions on Chile (Muñoz 1991: 43). But by 1984, according to Muñoz, the State Department openly criticized the Chilean government’s use of repression. The administration became more attuned to humanitarian issues.

6) Active support of authoritarian regimes:
P. Smith (183 ff) notes strong Reagan support for El Salvador. Carothers (1991: 92-97) provides more details. During the first few years, the Salvadoran regime was authoritarian, and the Reagan administration pumped up the far right through military aid even as it was supporting the Christian Democrats politically. According to Carothers, in late 1983, the balance between moderates and hard liners in the US shifted more favorably to the former. The US began to pressure El Salvador’s military to clean up the human rights abuses in December 1983, when Vice President Bush traveled to the country. After Duarte’s election in May 1984, the moderates in US policy gained further.

The US supported the El Salvadoran and Honduran military, both of which had poor human rights records and held a major influence on the political decision making process (Carothers 1991b, 16). Indeed, Washington not only maintained a silent approach to human rights violations in El Salvador, it continuously sent military aid (Carothers 1991b, 23). The 1st Reagan administration supported rightist authoritarian regimes in South America. Not only did Washington revamp diplomatic relations, it adopted a “quiet policy” towards human rights abuses in such countries and reopened military assistance to authoritarian regimes such as in Chile, Brazil, Uruguay, and Argentina (Carothers 1991b, 122).

According to Carothers 1991: 100-101, the Reagan administration supported the right wing authoritarian regime of Rios Montt (1982-83). He says that the US helped fend off coup attempts during the Cerezo administration (1986-).

The administration reversed Carter’s emphasis on human rights.

Until 1987, the US actively supported Noriega (Carothers 111).

Until 1985, the US supported Duvalier (Carothers 112-113).

Robinson states that US supported the rise of “CIA asset and close US ally” Manuel Noriega in Panama, who remained in office for a decade. This constituted support for an authoritarian rule, characterized by fraudulent elections and widespread repression (Robinson, 317; Carothers 1991b, 168).
7) Did US leaders express the view that Latin American countries could not be democracies? -1
According to Kenworthy, the Committee of Santa Fe position paper for Washington regarded LA as “a supportive wife in danger of sterilization by outside influences…” it then referred to the Caribbean as confronting “the natural growing pains of young nationhood” in a clear reference to the lacking capability of these countries to make sound political decisions, at least when referring to leftist oriented governments (Kenworthy, 34).

8) Did the US practice a policy of non-recognition when a military coup overthrew a democratic or semi-democratic government? 0

Reagan 1985-88

1) Public support for democracy in speeches and policy statements: 1

The second half of the Reagan administration was less dominated by the political hardliners of the first half. As Carothers points out it was also dominated by the false notion that the US was a central player in aiding democratic transitions in LA during this period. Elliot Abrams highlighted this point in a speech on the Reagan administration’s foreign policy towards LA: “The Reagan administration … is 100 percent in favor of electoral democracy in Latin America, and wants nothing to do with the overthrow of democratic governments by the military” (Carothers 1991b, 135).

2) Support for coups against democratic or semi-democratic governments: -1
Nicaragua (not support for a coup, but for efforts to overthrow the government). P. Smith pp. 184-188.

3) Military occupations that limited sovereignty: 0

4) Active promotion of democracy: 1

Panama (Carothers 111 ff.; P. Smith, pp. 294 ff). The US changed policy toward Noriega in 1987. By May 1988, President Reagan announced that the US goal in Panama should be Noriega’s removal.

El Salvador: This is a tricky case. The US supported some democracy programs and aided the Christian Democrats, but it also funded a very right wing and anti-democratic military.

Honduras: According to Carothers 1991, President Roberto Suazo Córdoba in 1985 was maneuvering to unconstitutionally extend his rule by postponing or canceling presidential elections. The US and the Honduran military exerted pressure to avoid this unseemly outcome. Carothers 1991: 99 concludes that by strengthening an anti-
democratic military, US policy actually impeded democratization. I am not certain his claim is right.

When military uprisings broke out against Alfonsín in 1987 and 1988, the US visibly backed him (Carothers 1991a).

When Peruvian military leaders considered a coup in late 1988, the US expressed opposition (Carothers 1991a, p. 107).

Chile and Paraguay: During the second Reagan administration, the US encouraged a transition (Carothers 109-111). From 1985 onwards Washington implemented political aid programs in Chile to support the organization of Pinochet’s political opposition that competed against the dictator during the 1988 Chilean plebiscite and during the 1990 elections (Robinson, 315).

In Chile, US Ambassador Harry Barnes supported the transition to democracy (Carothers 1991a, 155). Barnes pushed for having the 1988 plebiscite be fair despite General Pinochet’s resistance (Carothers 1991b, 155).

A similar attitude was taken by Ambassador Clyde Taylor in Paraguay who strongly supported a democratic transition in the country (Carothers 1991b, 164).

Mexico: In 1988, the US applied some pressure for political opening in Mexico (Meyer 1991).

Democracy aid became important during the second Reagan administration.

5) Criticisms of authoritarian regimes: 1
The appointment of Harry Barnes as ambassador pushed the US further into criticizing the Chilean military dictatorship (Muñoz 1991).
As Carothers points out, Washington urged some of the South American dictators still holding on to power to allow democratic transitions and to allow for political dialogue and respect for human rights (Carothers 1991a, 109). For example, this was the case of the Pinochet regime in Chile and the Stroessner regime in Paraguay (Carothers 1991b, 149).

The second Reagan administration criticized violations of human rights in a manner similar to what the Carter administration had done almost a decade earlier. Its criticisms revolved around the lack of civil and political rights in Chile, such as the right to assemble freely or the right to a free press (Carothers 1991b, 164).

6) Active support of authoritarian regimes: 0

Carothers 1991 notes that after the Falklands/Malvinas war, the Reagan administration stopped enthusiastically embracing right wing dictators. Late in the first administration, some policy makers who had favored supporting right wing dictators stepped down. Carothers emphasizes a shift in US policy during the second Reagan administration, away from the earlier embrace of the southern cone dictators.
The policy shift in Washington from openly supporting authoritarian regimes to a more moderate approach in LA was evident in the pressure build up against authoritarianism in South America as well as its support for free and fair electoral campaigns in Central America.

7) Did US leaders express the view that Latin American countries could not be democracies? 0
The shift in the Reagan policy towards LA is well resumed in the following statement issued by a State Department official: “We began to treat them [LA countries] like they were real countries, and that was a real change” (Carothers 1991b, 134).

8) Did the US practice a policy of non-recognition when a military coup overthrew a democratic or semi-democratic government?

**Bush 1989-92**

1) Public support for democracy in speeches and policy statements: 1
According to Carothers 1999, yes.

According to Kenworthy, the Bush administration echoed the democratic theme throughout its official speeches. On June 12th 1991 the President himself declared: “Here in the Americas we are building something unprecedented in human history—the world’s first completely democratic sphere” (Kenworthy, 5).

2) Support for coups against democratic or semi-democratic governments: 0

3) Military occupations that limited sovereignty: 0

4) Active promotion of democracy: 1

The US invaded Panama in 1989 (P. Smith pp. 293-300). The end result was more favorable to democracy. Nevertheless, it is not clear whether this invasion should be regarded as active promotion of democracy. The main objective was overthrowing Noriega.

According to Carothers 1999: 43, the US opposed coups in Venezuela, Haiti, Peru, Guatemala, and Paraguay. He does not give the dates but does say that these coups were in the 1990s. Presumably, these were the 1992 coup in Venezuela, the 1991 coup in Haiti, the 1993 coup in Guatemala.

Expansion of democracy aid—see Carothers 1999. Carothers writes in detail, however, that support of democracy is far from unconditional.

Carothers argues that the Bush administration’s policy towards LA “carried the transition initiated during the second Reagan administration away from a policy
dominated by military-oriented anticommunism to one aimed at promoting democracy and free market economics” (Carothers 2004, 25).

5) Criticisms of authoritarian regimes
Except for Cuba, there were few authoritarian regimes left in the region.

6) Active support of authoritarian regimes: 0

7) Did US leaders express the view that Latin American countries could not be democracies? 0

This message was clear in the Bush administration’s first important speech concerning LA. As Secretary of State James Baker remarked: “The democratic wave is sweeping Latin America today….we are committed to work with Latin and Central American democratic leaders to translate the bright promise of the Esquipulas agreement into concrete realities on the ground” (Pastor, 89).

8) Did the US practice a policy of non-recognition when a military coup overthrew a democratic or semi-democratic government? 1
The US signed OAS Resolution 1080.

The US resisted recognition when Aristide was overthrown in Haiti in September 1991, less than 9 months after taking office. The OAS called for Aristide’s reinstatement and imposed a trade embargo (P. Smith pp. 309-315). Secretary of State James Baker spoke out against the new government.

*In the case of Haiti, US sponsored elections and then did nothing to oppose a coup against democratically chosen leader Jean-Bertrand Aristide in 1990. According to Robinson, the US did not only not obstruct the coup, but also “provided tacit support for the consolidation of the military dictatorship” that would ensue (Robinson, 316)

**Clinton 1993-2000**

1) Public support for democracy in speeches and policy statements: 1

Throughout the Clinton administration the government held the official position of supporting democratic development in the world. This was already made evident during Clinton’s campaign in 1992 when he promised “an American foreign policy for engagement for democracy…” (Carothers 2004, 23).

2) Support for coups against democratic or semi-democratic governments: 0

3) Military occupations that limited sovereignty: 0

4) Active promotion of democracy: 1
Clinton’s military intervention and occupation in Haiti in October 1994 could be considered a move on behalf of democracy. P. Smith (313-314) views it more cynically, as an effort to stanch the flow of Haitian immigrants, but he notes that it was also a pro-democracy intervention. Shaw (2007) argues that the US advocated restoring Aristide to power—an attempt to restore a competitive regime.

According to Carothers 1999: 43, the US opposed coups in Venezuela, Haiti, Peru, Guatemala, and Paraguay in the 1990s. Presumably, this means the 1993 coup in Guatemala, and under George HW Bush, the 1992 coup in Venezuela, the 1992 coup in Peru. For Carothers US “opposition to attempted military coups in LA, such as in Guatemala and Paraguay, has helped discourage democratic reversals in that region” (Carothers 2004, 163).

Expansion of democracy aid—see Carothers 1999. Carothers writes in detail, however, that support of democracy is far from unconditional.

5) Criticisms of authoritarian regimes

6) Active support of authoritarian regimes: 0
The only question here is Clinton’s support for the Fujimori government. However, the Bush and Clinton governments pressured Fujimori into restoring competitive elections and a legislature, so the US did not actively support the Fujimori regime when it was openly authoritarian. The 1995-2000 period was semi-democratic.

7) Did US leaders express the view that Latin American countries could not be democracies? 0

8) Did the US practice a policy of non-recognition when a military coup overthrew a democratic or semi-democratic government? 1

The US was a signatory to OAS resolution 1080.

Bush 2001-08

1) Public support for democracy in speeches and policy statements: +1

During his presidential campaign in 2000, Bush spoke about the importance of keeping democracy alive in LA: “I see a hemisphere of 500 million people, striving with the dream of a better life. A dream of free markets and free people, in a hemisphere free from war and tyranny. That dream has sometimes been frustrated — but it must never be abandoned… Should I become president, I will look South, not as an afterthought, but as a fundamental commitment of my presidency. Just as we ended the great divide between East and West, so today we can overcome the North-South divide. This begins with a renewed commitment to democracy and freedom in this hemisphere - because human freedom, in the long run, is our best weapon against poverty, disease and tyranny” (Presidential campaign speech on US foreign policy
given on August 25th, 2000 and published on the site of the American Embassy in Brazil).

2) Support for coups against democratic or semi-democratic governments: 0

3) Military occupations that limited sovereignty: 0

4) Active promotion of democracy: 1
The Bush administration invested heavily in programs to promote democracy, especially after 9/11. Although this was directly mainly to the Middle East, the National Endowment for Democracy invested in programs in Argentina aiming at engaging shantytown dwellers in civic participation, among other projects to spur the growth of civil society (Diamond, 128).

5) Criticisms of authoritarian regimes: 0
The only ones left were Cuba and Haiti.

6) Active support of authoritarian regimes: 0

7) Did US leaders express the view that Latin American countries could not be democracies? 0

8) Did the US practice a policy of non-recognition when a military coup overthrew a democratic or semi-democratic government? 0

OAS resolution 1080 indicates US support for sanctions after a coup against a democracy or semi-democracy. However, in Haiti 2004, the US did nothing to impose sanctions, and even tacitly supported a coup against Aristide (Legler, Lean, and Boniface, pp. 1-2; Hawkins 2007).

Diamond and Dobson and Marsh point out that the Bush administration did not initially oppose the attempted coup against Hugo Chavez in 2002. The US eventually aligned itself with the OAS “after most major Latin American leaders denounced the unconstitutional seizure of power” (Diamond, 114; Dobson & Marsh, 191; Hawkins and Shaw 2007).
Sources


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