Effect of Supervision Hearings on Compliance with Reparation Measures Ordered by the Inter-American Court of Human Rights

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Summary

This report analyzes the effect of supervision hearings on state compliance with reparation measures ordered by the Inter-American Court of Human Rights (IACtHR). The study covers all reparation measures awaiting compliance between 2007 and 2018.

Our statistical findings indicate that:

1. **Supervision hearings** have no visible effect on partial compliance, but they **increase the probability of full compliance**.
2. The positive effects of **private** supervision hearings take place **on the year of the hearing**, while the positive effects of **public** hearings normally take place **a year later**.
3. Supervision hearings are **more effective once states have complied partially** with a measure.
4. **Private hearings conducted at the Court's headquarters** are more effective than hearings onsite.
5. **Hearings covering individual cases** are more effective than joint hearings.
6. **Hearings initiated by the IACtHR** appear to be more effective than those requested by parties in the case.
7. **Hearings involving several state agencies** appear to be more effective than hearings with participation of a single state agent.
8. **Supervision resolutions issued several months after** the hearing possibly reinforce the effect of **public hearings**.

Background

This report analyzes the effect of supervision hearings on compliance with reparation measures ordered by the Inter-American Court of Human Rights (IACtHR). We studied all reparation measures awaiting compliance between 2007 (the first year when supervision hearings took place) and 2018.[1] The sample includes 1692 measures, including those already pending by 2007 and those ordered between 2007 and 2018. For each one, we documented the year of compliance based on the information offered by the Court's supervision resolutions. The statistical procedure employed to analyze the data (described in the appendix) estimates the probability of compliance per year. Thus, for example, an estimated probability of compliance of 0.14 indicates that there is a 14% chance that the state will comply with the reparation measure within a year, given certain conditions.

We collected information on 169 hearings conducted between 2007 and 2018, based on the Court's annual reports and supervision resolutions. Of those hearings:

- 156 (92%) were private (i.e., restricted to parties and the IACHR) and 13 were public.
- 136 (80%) were conducted at the Court's headquarters, and 29 were conducted onsite (i.e., in the state's territory). Four additional hearings conducted outside San José but not in the territory of the specific country.
- 95 hearings (56%) addressed a single case, while the remaining 74 addressed several cases jointly.
- 105 hearings (62%) were initiated by the Court, while 20 were requested by parties in the case (the state, twice; victims, 11 times; and the IACHR, 7 times). We were unable to determine the proponent of the hearing in 44 cases. The statistical analysis below compares compliance after hearings initiated by the Court against all other hearings.
- 63 hearings (37%) included participation of several state agencies, while 48 involved participation of only one state agency. For 58 hearings, information was not available. The statistical analysis below compares compliance after hearings with documented participation of several agencies, against the rest.
- 112 (66%) were followed by a supervision resolution reporting on the hearing.

[1] We closed the analysis in 2018 to allow for the possibility that the Court has not issued all resolutions reporting compliance in 2019 yet. Our previous report identified a delay of about 11 months between the time of full compliance and the timing of resolutions ("Compliance with the Inter-American Court of Human Rights: Effective Dates of Compliance." NDRL, January 30, 2020).

We matched each hearing with specific reparation measures in our database. Because hearings may not cover all reparation measures ordered in a case, our analysis estimates the effect of hearings on the probability of compliance with the specific reparations discussed at each meeting. We estimate changes in the probability of compliance on the year of the hearing, one year later, and two years later.

Our statistical models account for the fact that different types of reparation measures experience different rates of compliance (e.g., states comply with monetary measures more often), and that the probability of compliance changes over time (i.e., reparation measures experience a life cycle, with a greater probability of compliance in earlier years). They also accommodate the fact that unobserved conditions make some states more likely to comply than others, or make compliance easier in some legal cases than others. The analysis of full compliance also controls for the prior occurrence of partial compliance. We do not discuss those ancillary variables in the report, but detailed results are available in the appendix.

The Effect of Supervision Hearings

Partial and Full Compliance. Our first set of tests explores whether supervision hearings induce partial or full compliance. The results indicate that **hearings have no visible effect on partial compliance, but they increase the probability of full compliance**. The null findings for partial compliance hold when we analyze the impact of hearings in the same year, one year later, or two years later.

Figure 1 illustrates this difference by comparing the expected probability of partial and full compliance in the year of the hearing. The left panel shows that the probability of *partial* compliance in the absence of a hearing is about 5% per year, while the expected probability of partial compliance in the year of a hearing is 4% (statistically indistinguishable from the 5% otherwise expected). The right panel shows that the probability of *full* compliance in the absence of a hearing is about 10% per year, while the expected probability of compliance in the year of a hearing increases to 14%.

Figure 1. Supervision Hearings Promote Full Compliance but not Partial Compliance



Note: Based on Models 1.1 and 1.2 (see the appendix). Bars present 95% confidence interval for the predicted probability.

The predicted probabilities presented in Figure 1—and in all figures below—are uncertain estimates rather than precise predictions. Due to the limited number of hearings and the large number of factors affecting compliance, the probability of compliance resulting from a hearing will vary in different contexts. Confidence intervals represent this uncertainty. For example, in the right panel, the expected probability of full compliance in the absence of a hearing is 10%. The confidence interval suggests that, if we repeated this study many times drawing new samples, the predicted probability would fall between 6% and 14% in 95 percent of the new studies. Uncertainty about the predicted probability (reflected by confidence intervals) is conceptually different from uncertainty regarding the positive effect of hearings. We are confident that hearings have a statistically significant effect on full compliance (see Table 1 in the appendix), even though it is difficult to anticipate the precise rate of compliance after a hearing takes place.

Figure 2. Private Hearings Have Faster (but Smaller) Effects on Full Compliance



Note: Based on Model 2.1 (see the appendix). Bars present 95% confidence interval for the predicted probability.

Private and Public Hearings. Our second set of tests compare the effects of private and public hearings, both in terms of their magnitude and in terms of their timing. Figure 2 summarizes the results, displaying the probability of full compliance on the year prior to a hearing, on the year of the hearing, and over the next two years. **Private hearings induce compliance almost immediately: the probability of full compliance increases modestly, from 8% to 12% on the year of the hearing. In contrast, public hearings produce effects later: the probability of compliance increases from 8% to 22% after a year.** Positive effects dissipate afterwards.

Because Figure 2 suggests that private and public hearings operate differently, in the rest of this report we focus on the effects of private hearings on the same year, and on the effects of public hearings a year later. The following sections analyze those effects under different conditions.

Figure 3. Hearings Are More Effective After Partial Compliance



Note: Based on Model 2.2 (see the appendix). Bars present 95% confidence interval for the predicted probability.

Hearings after Partial Compliance. Not surprisingly, states are more likely to comply in full with reparation measures once they have complied partially. In the absence of any supervision hearings, the probability of full compliance is about 8% before partial compliance, and 14% afterwards. Figure 3 shows that **supervision hearings can take advantage of the momentum created by partial compliance. The probability of full compliance following a private hearing is 12% before partial compliance and 20% after the state has complied partially. The probability of full compliance following public hearings is 20% before partial compliance, and 31% afterwards**. (The smaller number of public hearings makes estimates for this category more uncertain.)

Location. Since 2015, an increasing number of hearings have taken place in the territory of the state (onsite). The Court has conducted those hearings in private, as states are reluctant to host public hearings in their own territory. (Our study focuses only on onsite *hearings*, and excludes site visits from the analysis.)

Figure 4. Private Hearings Have Greater Impact When Conducted at the Court Headquarters



Note: Based on Model 3.1 (see the appendix). Bars present 95% confidence interval for the predicted probability. The category Headquarters includes a small number of hearings conducted outside of San José, but not in the target state. The category 'Private, Onsite' includes a hearing for the *Herrera Ulloa* case (2009), technically held at the Court's headquarters but referring to Costa Rica. The second hearing for Costa Rica during this period dealt with *Artavia Murillo* (2015), and it was public.

Figure 4 compares the effect of private hearings, based on their location:

- Private hearings held at the Court's headquarters produce an expected probability of compliance of about 14% (comparable to the general effect observed in Figure 1).
- Onsite private hearings, in contrast, produce no discernible effect on compliance when compared to baseline of 9% in a typical year without hearings.
- Public hearings hosted at the Court's headquarters increase the probability of compliance to 22% after a year (as already indicated in Figure 2).

The results therefore suggest that **private hearings have greater impact when they are conducted at the Court's headquarters**. However, readers must interpret this finding with caution. During the period covered by the report, three quarters of onsite hearings were joint hearings covering multiple cases. As we show in the next section, joint hearings are less likely to promote compliance.

Figure 5. Individual Case Hearings Are More Effective than Joint Hearings



Note: Based on Model 3.2 (see the appendix). Bars present 95% confidence interval for the predicted probability.

Individual and Joint Hearings. Figure 5 compares the effects of individual-case and joint hearings. **The results consistently show that individual hearings are more likely to promote compliance than joint hearings**. The effect of joint hearings, whether public or private, is statistically indistinguishable from zero—that is, the expected probability of compliance is indistinguishable from the 9% expected in the absence of a hearing. In contrast, **the probability of compliance grows to 15% after a private hearing focused on a single case, and increases to about 32% after a public hearing focused on a single case**. Joint hearings play an important role in highlighting structural problems and bringing them into the agenda, but they are less effective eliciting compliance in the short run.

Requesters and State Agencies. The remaining results, presented in Figures 6 and 7, are exploratory in nature, due to limitations in the data. Figure 6 compares the effect of hearings depending on the nature of the requesters (i.e., whether hearings were decided by the IACtHR *motu proprio*, or upon the request of parties in the case, including the IACHR). Figure 7 compares the effect of hearings depending on the presence state representatives (one or several agencies). Both analyses confront two data limitations. First, the limited number of public hearings makes it

difficult to estimate the effect of public hearings separately for each of those categories. Therefore, we separate the effects only for private hearings, and compare them to public hearings in general. Second, information for the relevant characteristic is incomplete. For example, we were unable to establish whether the hearing was summoned upon the parties' request in 44 instances (26%), and we were unable to determine how many state agents were present in 58 hearings (34%). Therefore, in both analyses we compare the effect of documented conditions (hearings decided by the IACtHR *motu proprio* and hearings with presence of multiple state agencies) against the effect of a residual category of hearings that includes ambiguous cases.

Figure 6 suggests that hearings initiated by the Inter-American Court may be more effective than other hearings. In this case, the reference category includes 20 hearings requested by parties in the case (the state, the victims, or the IACHR) plus 44 hearings for which we do not have information. The probability of compliance after private hearings initiated by the Court is about 15%—in line with previous estimates—but the probability of compliance after private hearings in the reference category is indistinguishable from the 9% expected in the absence of any hearings.

Figure 6. Hearings Initiated by the IACtHR May Be More Effective



Note: Based on Model 3.3 (see the appendix). Bars present 95% confidence interval for the predicted probability. The reference category (Requested by Parties) includes 44 hearings for which we do not have information. The limited number of public hearings makes it difficult to estimate the effect of requesters for this group.

Figure 7. Hearings with Participation of Several State Agencies May Be More Effective



Note: Based on Model 3.4 (see the appendix). Bars present 95% confidence interval for the predicted probability.
The reference category (One agency) includes 58 hearings for which we have no information.
The limited number of public hearings makes it difficult to estimate the effect of state agencies for this group.

Figure 7 suggests that hearings with participation of multiple state agencies may be more effective than other hearings. In this analysis, the reference category includes 48 hearings in which a single agency represented the state, plus 58 hearings for which we could not find information. The probability of compliance after a private hearing in the reference category is about 12%, not large enough to be statistically different from the 9% expected in the absence of a hearing (see Table 3, model 3.4 in the appendix). In contrast, the positive effect of hearings involving multiple agencies is statistically significant ($p < .01$). The expected probability of compliance after a private hearing involving several institutions is about 15%.

The Effect of Resolutions about Hearings

When is it more convenient for the Court to issue resolutions reporting on the details of supervision hearings? Is there any optimal timing that works best for boosting the effects of hearings? In this section, we analyze different ways in which the timing of resolutions may promote compliance.

The analysis of resolution effects is challenging, because we must consider the timing of any resolution from three different points of view:

1. **The timing of the resolution vis-à-vis compliance**. Resolutions may *promote* compliance ex-ante or *report* compliance ex-post. Of the 112 resolutions addressing supervision hearings, 61 also reported some form of compliance for at least one of the reparation measures discussed at the hearing. It would be a mistake to infer that resolutions facilitated compliance with those reparation measures, because the resolution *followed* the compliance event. We were careful in matching the timing of resolutions with each of the reparation measures discussed at hearings, to capture supervision resolutions only when they *predate* any compliance events.
2. **The timing of the resolution vis-à-vis the hearing**. The Court may issue resolutions *promptly* after the hearing, or *postpone* the resolution for several months. Almost two-thirds of the hearings in our sample were followed by a resolution, but the timing differed considerably across cases. On average, the Court issued a resolution 377 days after the hearing, yet this average hides considerable variation. For some hearings—such as those covering *Fermín Ramírez vs. Guatemala* (2008), *Raxcacó Reyes vs. Guatemala* (2008), or *Herrera Ulloa vs Costa Rica* (2009)—the Court issued a resolution within a day. For other hearings—such as those on *Suárez Rosero vs. Ecuador* (2009), *Comunidad Moiwana vs. Surinam* (2012), and *Niñas Yean y Bosico vs. República Dominicana* (2013)—the Court waited more than 2000 days to issue a resolution. In practice, however, the Court released 55 percent of all resolutions during the same calendar year of the hearing, and an additional 24 percent during the following calendar year. Only a fifth of all resolutions were released later. Therefore, the most important issue is whether the Court should release resolutions promptly after the hearing, or wait about a year to do so.
3. **The timing of the resolution vis-à-vis its potential effects**. Resolutions may promote compliance *immediately* after their release, or do so with some *delay*. This issue is analytically different from the point discussed in the previous paragraph. For example, the Court may issue a resolution on the same year of the hearing, but we may only observe the effects of this resolution on compliance one year later. Alternatively, the Court may issue a resolution one year after the hearing, but the resolution may have immediate effects. As with the timing of hearings, we analyzed the *immediate* effect of resolutions on the year their publication and their *delayed* effect one year later. Moreover, because private and public hearings affect

compliance with different delays (as shown in Figure 2), it is plausible that resolutions covering those hearings will act with different delays as well.

Alternative combinations of those factors led us to consider nine possible scenarios, summarized in detail in Table 4 of the Appendix. We were unable to assess three of the six scenarios statistically, because no event of compliance ever took place under some circumstances. Figure 8 below presents the main findings for the remaining six scenarios:

- Private hearings promote compliance in the short run, irrespective of the timing of the resolution. Even in the absence of any resolution, the probability of compliance after a private hearing increases from 9%, in the typical year without hearings (S1 in Figure 8), to 15% (S2). A resolution issued promptly does not reinforce the immediate effects of the hearing (S3).
- Private hearings do not have lasting effects after 12 months, as suggested by Figure 2. Even if a resolution is promptly released, the effect of private hearings vanishes within a year (S4).
- Most important, **the Court may reinforce effect of public hearings by postponing the publication of the resolution for a few months**. Figure 8 suggests that, in the absence of any resolution, public hearings have similar effects to private hearings (S8). Yet, the expected probability of compliance increases to 44% if the Court releases a resolution about a year after the hearing (S9). This result suggests that carefully timed resolutions may reinforce the dynamic of public hearings observed in Figure 2. However, readers must interpret results with caution due to the limited evidence available. Results are heavily influenced by the effects of the *Artavia Murillo* hearing (2015), which was followed by a resolution 176 days later.

Figure 8. Resolutions Issued after One Year Reinforce the Effect of Public Hearings



Concluding Remarks

The analysis presented in this document indicates that supervision hearings help promote compliance with the IACtHR's rulings. The evidence also suggests that public hearings, although less frequent, may have more visible effects on compliance. At the same time, our findings demonstrate that private and public hearings are more effective when they take place under certain sets of conditions. Our research provides two remarkable findings:

1. Public hearings appear to be the most effective supervision strategy. They increase the expected rate of compliance from 9% per year (in the absence of any hearing) to 22%. This effect may be even stronger if the Court issues a resolution a few months after the hearing. However, due to the small the small number of public hearings (and the strong influence of the *Artavia Murillo* case on the estimates), results must be taken with caution.
2. Private hearings have modest effects, but they also promote compliance. They appear to be more effective when conducted at the Court's headquarters, in part because most onsite hearings cover multiple cases. In addition, the probability of compliance increases when private hearings take place after the Court's initiative, and when they involve several state

institutions. Under such favorable conditions, the expected rate of compliance increases from 9% per year to about 15%.

Those findings may help design supervision strategies based on the optimal conditions to induce compliance. The monitoring system is flexible, and the IACtHR decides the hearings' modalities on a case-by-case basis. Although key decisions regarding the hearings' timing, location, and participants reflect specific needs and the context of each case, the Court can also take into account the patterns documented in this report to define the modality of supervision.

Further analysis of oversight instruments can yield useful lessons to guide the Court's supervision strategies. The IACtHR has emphasized the importance of states complying with its orders, not only as a matter of justice in specific cases but also as the *raison d'être* for the Court.[2] Systematic studies of particular oversight strategies may help establish best practices and models of supervision, not just within the Inter-American system, but for other courts as well.

[2] Case of *Baena Ricardo et al. v. Panama*. Competence. Judgment of November 28, 2003. Series C No. 104, para. 72.

Appendix: Statistical Models

We estimated the probability of compliance using discrete-time survival models with a complementary log-log link. Our sample includes all reparation measures since 2007 (i.e., pending compliance in 2007, or ordered after 2006). Units of analysis are reparations observed in any given year until the time of compliance; the dependent variable is coded 1 on the year of compliance, 0 otherwise. All models include frailties by country (state) and by legal case.

The main independent variables are dichotomous items indicating if a supervision hearing covered a particular reparation measure in any given year. Our models also control for the type of reparation measure (seven categories, with *restitution* as the baseline) and the time elapsed since the ruling (we account for non-linear duration dependence using a sixth-order polynomial).

Table 1. Effect of Supervision Hearings on Partial and Full Compliance (Hazard Ratios)

	(1.1) Partial		(1.2) Full	
Supervision				
Supervision hearing, t	0.64	(0.25)	1.65*	(0.31)
Type of measure				
Rehabilitation	0.99	(0.44)	0.18*	(0.08)
Satisfaction	3.12*	(1.17)	2.60*	(0.58)
Non-Repetition	1.04	(0.41)	0.49*	(0.12)
Prosecutions	0.35*	(0.17)	0.07*	(0.03)
Indemnifications	6.26*	(2.41)	2.00*	(0.46)
Legal costs[a]	2.62*	(1.06)	3.26*	(0.74)
Duration dependence				
t	39.82*	(19.80)	21.75*	(6.07)
t^2	0.09*	(0.04)	0.21*	(0.04)
t^3	1.88*	(0.29)	1.38*	(0.07)
t^4	0.92*	(0.02)	0.97*	(0.01)
t^5	1.01*	(0.00)	1.00*	(0.00)
t^6	1.00*	(0.00)	1.00*	(0.00)
Frailties				
var(State)	5.13*	(4.15)	6.14*	(4.55)
var(Case)	3.34*	(1.13)	2.85*	(0.59)
Observations	7567		9261	

Exponentiated coefficients; Standard errors in parentheses - * p<0.05

a. For statistical purposes, required contributions to the Victims' Fund were treated as legal costs.

In models with full compliance as the dependent variable, presented in Tables 2 and 3, we also control for partial compliance, taken as an indicator of political will. Because Table 1 shows no effect of hearings on partial compliance, it is unlikely that this variable will introduce post-treatment bias.

Table 2. Effect of Public and Private Hearings on Full Compliance (Hazard Ratios)

	(2.1) Time Lags		(2.2) Trimmed	
Type of hearing, timing				
Private, t	1.72*	(0.35)	1.75*	(0.35)
Private, t-1	1.02	(0.32)		
Private, t-2	0.42	(0.22)		
Public, t	1.36	(0.76)		
Public, t-1	4.57*	(2.31)	3.99*	(1.96)
Public, t-2	1.28	(1.33)		
Partial compliance	2.42*	(0.32)	2.42*	(0.32)
Type of measure				
Rehabilitation	0.17*	(0.07)	0.17*	(0.07)
Satisfaction	2.32*	(0.52)	2.32*	(0.52)
Non-Repetition	0.49*	(0.12)	0.49*	(0.12)
Prosecutions	0.08*	(0.04)	0.08*	(0.04)
Indemnifications	1.64*	(0.39)	1.64*	(0.39)
Legal costs	2.97*	(0.67)	2.97*	(0.68)
t	20.47*	(5.75)	20.32*	(5.69)
t^2	0.19*	(0.03)	0.19*	(0.03)
t^3	1.43*	(0.07)	1.43*	(0.07)
t^4	0.96*	(0.01)	0.97*	(0.01)
t^5	1.00*	(0.00)	1.00*	(0.00)
t^6	1.00*	(0.00)	1.00*	(0.00)
Frailties				
var(State)	4.36*	(2.71)	4.36*	(2.70)
var(Case)	2.77*	(0.56)	2.76*	(0.56)
Observations	9261		9261	

Exponentiated coefficients; Standard errors in parentheses
* $p<0.05$

In Table 3, several dichotomous variables help identify variation in the two effects detected in Table 2 (i.e., the effect of private hearings in the current year, or the effect of public hearings held last year). The main coefficient captures the effect of hearings when the attribute is not present, and the sum of the main coefficient and the coefficient for the subset captures the marginal effect of hearings when the attribute is present. For example, in model 3.1, the coefficient for *Private, t* reflects the effect of a private hearing held in the Court's headquarters, while the sum of *Private, t + Onsite hearing* captures the effect of a private hearing held in the state's territory. (Note that this procedure refers to the original linear coefficients. For exponentiated values displayed in the tables, the product of the two coefficients yields the joint effect.)

Table 3. Effect of Different Types of Public and Private Hearings (Hazard Ratios)

	(3.1) Location		(3.2) N of Cases		(3.3) Requester		(3.4) State agencies	
Full compliance								
Private, t	1.90*	(0.39)	2.24*	(0.47)	0.68	(0.41)	1.38	(0.47)
+ Onsite hearing	0.41	(0.32)						
+ Joint hearing			0.18*	(0.14)				
+ Requested by Court					3.08	(1.95)		
+ Several agencies							1.45	(0.59)
Public, t-1	4.04*	(1.99)	9.34*	(4.96)	4.10*	(2.02)	4.08*	(2.01)
+ Onsite hearing	n/a							
+ Joint hearing			0.08*	(0.10)				
+ Requested by Court					n/a			
+ Several agencies							n/a	
Partial compliance	2.42*	(0.32)	2.39*	(0.31)	2.42*	(0.32)	2.41*	(0.32)
Rehabilitation	0.17*	(0.07)	0.17*	(0.07)	0.17*	(0.07)	0.17*	(0.07)
Satisfaction	2.29*	(0.51)	2.36*	(0.53)	2.29*	(0.51)	2.33*	(0.52)
Non-Repetition	0.49*	(0.12)	0.50*	(0.13)	0.49*	(0.12)	0.50*	(0.12)
Prosecutions	0.08*	(0.04)	0.08*	(0.04)	0.08*	(0.04)	0.08*	(0.04)
Indemnifications	1.61*	(0.38)	1.65*	(0.39)	1.61*	(0.38)	1.65*	(0.39)
Legal costs	2.92*	(0.66)	3.00*	(0.68)	2.93*	(0.66)	2.99*	(0.68)
t	20.52*	(5.74)	20.77*	(5.81)	20.74*	(5.81)	20.56*	(5.77)
t ^2	0.19*	(0.03)	0.19*	(0.03)	0.18*	(0.03)	0.19*	(0.03)
t ^3	1.43*	(0.07)	1.43*	(0.07)	1.44*	(0.07)	1.43*	(0.07)
t ^4	0.96*	(0.01)	0.96*	(0.01)	0.96*	(0.01)	0.96*	(0.01)
t ^5	1.00*	(0.00)	1.00*	(0.00)	1.00*	(0.00)	1.00*	(0.00)
t ^6	1.00*	(0.00)	1.00*	(0.00)	1.00*	(0.00)	1.00*	(0.00)
Frailties								
var(State)	4.40*	(2.74)	4.34*	(2.68)	4.35*	(2.69)	4.34*	(2.69)
var(Case)	2.72*	(0.54)	2.66*	(0.52)	2.70*	(0.54)	2.79*	(0.57)
Observations	9261		9261		9261		9261	

Exponentiated coefficients; Standard errors in parentheses. n/a: limited number of events prevents estimation
* p<0.05

Table 4 summarizes the nine scenarios designed to test the effects of resolutions on compliance. We estimated a model in which the effects of private hearings (at *t* and *t*-1) and the effects of public hearings (at *t*-1) are potentially reinforced (moderated) by the timing of the respective resolutions, issued at times *t* (promptly) or *t*-1 (postponed). Based on this model, we assessed the expected probability of compliance when:

1. The Court conducts no hearing (the baseline category in all previous figures)
2. The Court conducts a private hearing, but issues no resolution.
3. The Court issues a resolution covering a **private hearing promptly**, and the resolution boosts the effect of the hearing **immediately**. In this scenario, the Court issues the resolution on the same year of the hearing, and the resolution reinforces the probability of compliance that same year.
4. The Court issues a resolution covering a **private hearing promptly**, but the resolution boosts the effect of the hearing with **some delay**. In this scenario, the Court issues the resolution on the same year of the hearing, but the resolution reinforces the probability of compliance one year after the hearing.
5. The Court **postpones the resolution about a private hearing** for some months. In this scenario, the Court issues the resolution a year after the hearing. *We discarded this scenario based on the lack of evidence*. In practice, none of the 75 reparation measures covered in a private hearing with a postponed resolution ever experienced compliance on the year following the hearing. Thus, this moderator created perfect separation in the model.
6. The Court conducts a public hearing, but issues no resolution. (In line with previous sections, we analyze the effects of the public hearing after one year.)
7. The Court issues a resolution covering a **public hearing promptly**, and the resolution boosts the effect of the hearing **immediately**. In this scenario, the Court issues the resolution on the same year of the public hearing, and the resolution reinforces the probability of compliance that same year. *We discarded this scenario based on the lack of evidence*. None of the 13 reparations covered in a public hearing followed by a prompt resolution experienced compliance in the same year.
8. The Court issues a resolution covering a **public hearing promptly**, but the resolution boosts the effect of the hearing with **some delay**. In this scenario, the Court issues the resolution on the same year of the public hearing, but the resolution reinforces the probability of compliance

one year after the hearing. *We discarded this scenario based on the lack of evidence*. Only 4 reparation measures covered in a public hearing followed by a prompt resolution were pending by the following year, and none of them experienced compliance.

9. The Court **postpones the resolution covering a public hearing for some months** (the resolution, once published, boosts compliance immediately). In this scenario, the Court issues the resolution one year after the public hearing, and the resolution reinforces the effects of last year's hearing.

Table 4. Predicted Probability of Compliance in Nine Scenarios

Scenario	Hearing	Resolution	Timing	Resolution effects	Predicted probability of full compliance
1	No				0.09
2	Private, t	No			0.15*
3	Private, t	Yes	Same year	Immediate	0.11
4	Private, t-1	Yes	Same year	Delayed	0.07
5	Private, t-1	Yes	Next year	Immediate	n.d.
6	Public, t-1	No			0.14
7	Public, t	Yes	Same year	Immediate	n.d.
8	Public, t-1	Yes	Same year	Delayed	n.d.
9	Public, t-1	Yes	Next year	Immediate	0.44*

* Marginal effect of a hearing (as moderated by resolution) is significant at .01 level
n.d. No sufficient data (items create perfect separation)