Democracies and Dictatorships in Latin America: 
Emergence, Survival, and Fall 
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Codebook for Replication Dataset (DDLA)

1. Case Identification

country : Name of the country
cc_cow : Correlates of War country code (Polity IV)
sc_wb : ISO Alpha-3 country code (World Development Indicators)
year : Year of the observation (1900-2010)

Variables are coded reflecting their status on December 31st, with the exception of actors’ preferences, which reflect their status at January 1st (to explain events that took place during the year).

admin : Name of the chief executive

2. Political Regimes

r : Trichotomous regime classification (Mainwaring, Brinks, Pérez-Liñán)
0 authoritarian
1 semi-democratic
2 democratic

Note: See Appendix 3.1 in the book for detailed coding rules.

e : Free and fair elections
0 major violation (mv)
1 partial violation (pv)
2 no violation (nv)

f : Inclusive franchise
0 mv
1 pv
2 nv
9 not coded (if e = 0)
cl : Respect for civil liberties
0  mv
1  pv
2  nv
9  not coded (if e = 0)

p : Civilian power
0  mv
1  pv
2  nv
9  not coded (if e = 0)

trans2 : Transitions from authoritarian rule
0  no transition
1  transition to semi-democracy
2  transition to democracy
Note: competitive regimes are coded as missing values

break : Breakdown of competitive regimes
0  no breakdown
1  breakdown
Note: authoritarian regimes are coded as missing values

a_1 : Authoritarian regime (t-1)

s_1 : Semi-Democratic regime (t-1)

age : Age of the regime (in years)
Note: coded since 1945. For competitive regimes, age usually indicates the number of years elapsed since the last transition. For authoritarian regimes, age indicates the age of the specific authoritarian regime (see Chapter 4 for details).

age2 : Age of the regime, squared

age3 : Age of regime^3
time3 : Years since the Third Wave transition (first transition after 1977)

lntime3 : Natural logarithm of time3

fh : Freedom House score (1972-2010)

Note: Freedom House scores were recoded to range between 0 and 12, where 12 is most democratic (fh = 14 - Civil liberties - Political rights)

aclp2 : Cheibub-Gandhi classification of political regimes (1945-2005)

Extension of the Alvarez-Cheibub-Przeworski-Limongi classification:

1    mixed democracy (with parliamentary component)
2    presidential democracy
3    civilian dictatorship
4    military dictatorship


3. Political Actors’ Preferences

Note: for the list of political actors and information for the variables coded at the actor level, see the list of actors (Actors.xlsx), the Coding Rules, and the country reports included as ancillary materials.

npr_all : Normative regime preferences (all actors, 1944-2010)

Average score for Normative Preferences (support for democracy minus support for dictatorship) among all political actors in a given country-year (coded by January 1st). This item ranges between -1 and 1, with negative values indicating greater support for dictatorship and positive values indicating greater support for democracy.

npr_gov : Normative regime preferences (ruler and allies, 1944-2010)

Average score for Normative Preferences for the chief executive and its allies in a given country-year (coded by January 1st). This item ranges between -1 and 1, with negative values indicating support for dictatorship and positive values indicating support for democracy.

npr Opp : Normative regime preferences (opposition, 1944-2010)

Average score for Normative Preferences for the opposition forces in a given country-year (by January 1st). Ranges between -1 and 1, with negative values indicating support for dictatorship and positive values indicating support for democracy. Neutral or divided actors were counted as “half” government and “half” opposition when computing the means.
rad_all : Radicalism (all actors, 1944-2010)

Average score for Radicalism among all political actors in a given country-year (coded by January 1st). This item ranges between 0 and 1, with 1 indicating that all actors are radical.

rad_gov : Radicalism (ruler and allies, 1944-2010)

Average score for Radicalism for the government and its allies in a given country-year (coded by January 1st). This item ranges between 0 and 1, with 1 indicating that all actors in the ruling coalition are radical.

rad_opp : Radicalism (opposition, 1944-2010)

Average score for Radicalism among opposition forces in a given country-year (coded by January 1st). This item ranges between 0 and 1, with 1 indicating that all actors in the opposition are radical.

npr_all1 : Normative regime preferences (all actors), t-1

Lag of npr_all

4. International Conditions

region : Level of democracy in the Latin American region, t-1

Proportion of democratic regimes among other countries in the region during the previous year, using the Mainwaring et al. classification (variable r). Semi-democracies are counted as “half” a democracy.

d_nonla : Average Polity score outside Latin America, t-1 (1900-2005)

Average value for the Polity IV index for all countries in other regions of the world during the previous year. The index ranges between -10 (institutionalized autocracy) and 10 (institutionalized democracy).

us_t : United States policy towards democracy in Latin America (1900-2007)

This index ranges between 0 (when the U.S. offered no support for democracy in the region) and 1 (when the U.S. offered consistent support for democracy). The calculation of the index adds 0.25 when U.S. administrations (1) expressed a preference for democracy even when there were tradeoffs with U.S. economic or security interests; (2) promoted the democratization of authoritarian regimes or made efforts to bolster democracies under threat; (3) criticized authoritarian regimes that were not leftist; or (4) practiced a policy of non-recognition when a military coup overthrew a competitive regime. It subtracts 0.25 when U.S. administrations (1) supported coups or armed rebellions against competitive regimes; (2) limited the sovereignty (and hence democracy) of Latin American countries through military interventions; (3) clearly supported authoritarian regimes; or (4) expressed the view that Latin American countries could not be democracies because of cultural dispositions. See Appendix 3.2 in the book for the coding rules.
dif08 : Polity IV spatial lag, t-1 (1945-2005)

This index reflects the average Polity score in the rest of the world (including the Latin American neighbors) during the previous year, weighting each country according to the distance with the country in question. The formula for the index is

\[ \text{dif08}_{it} = \sum (d_{ij}^{-1} / \sum d_{ij}^{-1}) \times \text{Polity}_{jt-1} \]

where dif08_{it} is the value of the index for country i at time t, d_{ij} is the distance between the capital of country i and any other country j, and Polity_{jt-1} is the Polity score for country j during the previous year. The expression \((d_{ij}^{-1} / \sum d_{ij}^{-1})\) weights Polity scores according to the inverse of the distance between the two countries.

5. Social and Economic Variables

pgdp : Gross Domestic Product per capita (1900-2010)

Measured in thousands of 2000 US dollars. For years after 1960, the source is World Development Indicators (The World Bank). For years prior to 1960, the value of this variable was calculated retrospectively, based on the economic growth rate:

\[ \text{pgdp}_{it-1} = \text{pgdp}_{it} / (1 + \text{g}_1) \]

where \(\text{g}_1\) is the growth rate for country i at year t-1 (see below).

gdp_1_ : Per capita GDP, t-1 (natural logarithm)

Measured in 2000 US dollars, as \(\text{gdp}_1_{it} = \ln(\text{pgdp}_{it-1} \times 1000)\)

gpgdp : Growth in per capita GDP (as a proportion, 1900-2010)

The source for years after 1960 is World Development Indicators (The World Bank). For years prior to 1960, growth rates were obtained from the following sources:

Bergés, Ame, Valpy FitzGerald, and Rosemary Thorp. 2007. Oxford Latin American Economic History Database. Latin American Centre, Oxford University. Available at http://oxlad.qeh.ox.ac.uk/


When national accounts series were not available from any historical source (a problem for few countries before 1945), the economic growth rate was estimated as a linear function (OLS) of growth in exports during the previous year and growth in imports during the following year (taken from Bergés, FitzGerald, and Thorp’s OXLD database).
\( g_1 \) : Per capita growth, t-1
Lag of gpgdp

\( \text{ghist10} \) : Average economic growth over the past decade
Average rate of growth (gpgdp) over the past ten years. If the age of the regime is less than 10 years, the average is computed since the establishment of the regime.

\( i \) : Inflation, natural logarithm (1945-2005)
\[ i_{it} = \ln(1 + \text{CPI}_{it}/100), \text{ or } -\ln(1 + |\text{CPI}_{it}|/100) \] for years of deflation, where CPI\(_{it}\) is the annual percent change in the consumer price index (i.e., the rate of inflation) in country \( i \) in year \( t \). CPI series were compiled from the World Development Indicators (1961-2005), and from the Global Financial Database and ECLAC (Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean) reports for 1945-60.

\( \text{ihist10} \) : Inflation over the past decade, natural logarithm
Average rate of inflation (\( i \)) over the past ten years. If the age of the regime is less than 10 years, the average is computed since the establishment of the regime.

\( \text{wfm} \) : Proportion of fuel and mineral exports over Gross National Income
Data from World Development Indicators (World Bank)

\( \text{oilmin} \) : Dependence of oil and mineral exports (1944-2010)
0 Oil and mineral exports \( \leq 10\% \) of Gross National Income
1 Oil and mineral exports \( > 10\% \) of Gross National Income

\( \text{indust} \) : Percentage of the labor force in the industrial sector (1945-2010)
Data compiled from the World Development Indicators and ECLAC (Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean) reports.

\( \text{lit} \) : Literacy as percentage of the population 15 and over (1945-2005)

\( \text{gini} \) : Gini Index of Income Inequality (1961-2005)
Measured in a 0-100 scale (higher values indicate greater inequality). Data was compiled from three sources:


The World Bank. World Development Indicators (2007)

Note: To maximize the comparability of the data, we kept observations that satisfied three criteria: (1) they were based on nationally representative surveys; (2) they covered the entire population rather than subsets such as urban or rural areas; and (3) they included all types of income. Moreover, (4) we eliminated any figures that reflected a change of 15 or more points in income inequality relative to the immediately antecedent or subsequent estimate within a five-year period. Using the remaining data points, we interpolated the missing values in the dataset.

6. Domestic Political Conditions

iac       : Internal armed conflict (1945-2005)

0    No conflict
1    Internal armed conflict


multip    : Multipartism in the legislature (1945-2005)

0    Effective number of parties lower than 3.0
1    Effective number of parties of 3.0 or greater

Note: Based on the composition of the lower house. Country-years with no legislature were coded as missing values. Information on the composition of the legislature was compiled from multiple historical sources. For the definition of the effective number of parties, see Markku Laakso and Rein Taagepera. 1979. “Effective Number of Parties: A Measure with Application to Western Europe.” Comparative Political Studies 12(1):3-27

shugart   : Shugart and Carey index of presidential powers (1945-2005)

The range for this variable in our dataset is 5-22, with higher values indicating greater constitutional powers for the Executive Branch. The index reflects the sum of two point-score measures: an index of legislative powers, reflecting proactive and reactive powers vis-à-vis the legislature, and an index of non-legislative powers, reflecting presidential control over appointments and over the dissolution of congress. We followed Shugart and Carey’s (1992) operational definition but coded all country constitutions for the period under study. On the index, see Matthew S. Shugart and John M. Carey. 1992. Presidents and Assemblies. Constitutional Design and Electoral Dynamics. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
7. Regime Legacies

\textbf{d\_00\_44} : Average level of democracy between 1900 and 1944

Proportion of the 45 years (1900 through 1944) during which the country was democratic according to the Mainwaring et al. classification (variable r). Semi-democracies are counted as “half” year. The value for this variable is fixed for each country in 1945-2010.

\textbf{npr\_45\_77} : Average Normative Regime Preferences for the period 1945-1977

Average value for npr\_all in 1945-1977. Value is fixed for each country in 1978-2010.

\textbf{rad\_45\_77} : Average level of Radicalism, 1945-1977

Average value for rad\_all in 1945-1977. Value is fixed for each country in 1978-2010.

\textbf{npr\_t} : Interaction term, npr\_45\_77*\text{ln(time3)}

\textbf{rad\_t} : Interaction term, rad\_45\_77*\text{ln(time3)}

\textbf{idsampler} : Stratum variable for regime change patterns

10 breakdown
21 stable authoritarian (prior to 1978)
22 stable authoritarian (after 1977)
30 transition to semi-democracy
40 transition to democracy
51 stable competitive regime (prior to 1978)
52 stable competitive regime (after 1977)

Please cite this dataset as: