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AUTHORITARIAN REGIMES:
STABILITY, CHANGE, AND PATHWAYS TO DEMOCRACY, 1972–2003[*]

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ABSTRACT

In this paper, we present a new typology of authoritarian regime types, covering 191 countries in the world from 1972–2003. To assess the usefulness of our typology, we explore the extent to which it helps explain the survival (and breakdown) of nondemocratic regimes. We also investigate the impact of different types of authoritarian regimes on democratic development. Our results demonstrate that different types of authoritarian regimes face different propensities to survive and to develop towards democracy. Hence an institutional attribute—the nature of the authoritarian regime in question—deserves to be added to the list of democracy's essential preconditions. In particular, one regime type—the limited multiparty system—stands out as the prime stepping-stone to democracy. The fact that this regime type has become the most common form of authoritarianism can be seen as a promising sign for the future.

RESUMEN

En este artículo presentamos una nueva tipología de regímenes autoritarios que cubre 191 países entre 1972 y 2003. Para evaluar la utilidad de nuestra tipología, exploramos en qué medida ayuda a explicar la supervivencia (y la caída) de los regímenes no democráticos. También investigamos el impacto de diferentes tipos de régimen autoritario sobre el desarrollo democrático. Nuestros resultados demuestran que diferentes tipos de régimen autoritario tienen distinta inclinación a sobrevivir o a desarrollarse en un sentido democrático. De este modo, un atributo institucional, "la naturaleza del régimen autoritario en cuestión," merece agregarse a la lista de las precondiciones esenciales de la democracia. En particular, un tipo de régimen, "el sistema multi-partidario limitado," se destaca como el más firme primer paso hacia la democracia. El hecho de que este tipo de régimen haya devenido la forma más común de autoritarismo puede ser visto como un signo promisorio para el futuro.

Systematic research on the preconditions of democracy has been pursued for about 50 years. Over this time several things have been learned. We know, from an extensive body of evidence, that a number of domestic and international factors play a role for democratic advancement (e.g., economic development, religious composition and heterogeneity, the presence of oil, diffusion). Even so, the great majority of studies have one feature in common: they assume all nondemocratic countries face similar obstacles to democratic advancement. Yet, this is not the case. As we shall see in this article, democratization is harder for some forms of autocracy than for others.

There is a growing literature on how to classify both authoritarian regimes and the "hybrid" regimes located in the gray zone between democracy and autocracy (Geddes 1999; Diamond 2002; Levitsky and Way 2002; Schedler 2002a; Linz and Stepan 1996; Linz 2000). Yet the usefulness of these efforts can be questioned. Evidence is often lacking to show that the proposed distinctions among authoritarian regime types really pay any dividends (Geddes 1999, 121; Snyder and Mahoney 1999, 108).

In this paper, we present a new typology of authoritarian regime types, covering 191 countries in the world from 1972–2003. While based on Geddes' (1999) seminal contribution, our typology improves upon it considerably. To assess the usefulness of our typology, we explore the extent to which it helps explain the survival (and breakdown) of nondemocratic regimes. We also investigate the impact of different types of authoritarian regimes on democratic development. Our results demonstrate that different types of authoritarian regimes face different propensities to survive and to develop towards democracy. Hence an institutional attribute—the nature of the authoritarian regime in question—deserves to be added to the list of democracy's essential preconditions.

PREVIOUS EFFORTS TO CLASSIFY TYPES OF AUTHORITARIAN REGIMES

The classical theories on nondemocratic regimes devised during the 1950s and 1960s were based primarily on a distinction between totalitarianism and authoritarianism. Yet this typology soon grew obsolete, a casualty of the emerging awareness that scarcely any regime fit the totalitarian type, while the authoritarian category was instead too

inclusive (Brooker 2000). Linz and Stepan (1996), for their part, have refined the typology by adding the categories of "post-totalitarianism" and "sultanism" to the classical distinction; we would argue, however, that the payoff of this typological strategy is limited. The criteria entering the classification are sketchy, and no attempt is made to apply the model systematically over time, or to a broad range of cases. As Snyder and Mahoney (1999, 117) put it, several of the insights furnished by Linz and Stepan are "idiosyncratic" and "apply to just one country."

A more ambitious and wide-ranging attempt at regime classification is the one done by Diamond (2002). Diamond's chief interest is in exploring the "hybrid" regimes located between democracy and what he calls "politically closed authoritarian[ism]." Depending on the degree of competitiveness within such hybrid regimes, he classifies them as "competitive authoritarian" or "hegemonic electoral authoritarian"; he also leaves a residual category of "ambiguous regimes." He then applies this typology to 192 countries in 2001, clearly showing into which category each country falls (2002, 25–31).

We have several objections to this analytical schema. To begin with, as Diamond himself admits, the country classifications "are offered more in an illustrative than a definitive spirit" (2002, 28). The exact coding criteria—especially for the judgment of blurry borderline cases—are never stated explicitly. Nor is any attempt made to classify countries over time, or to assess the usefulness of the typology in terms of independent outcomes.

Still more important is the fact that, instead of fastening on truly categorical regime traits (and thus on the *qualitative* differences between authoritarian regimes), Diamond's classificatory schema marks out groups of countries located at different intervals along a single underlying continuous (i.e., *quantitative*) dimension: the degree of competitiveness. As we see it, this is the main drawback of the regime classifications most closely associated with Diamond's (and from which he partly draws his terminology): those of "competitive authoritarianism" (Levitsky and Way 2002) and "electoral authoritarianism" (Schedler 2002a; 200b). If the degree of competitiveness were the only dimension along which authoritarian regimes differed, we would need no regime typology. Instead, a continuous measure of competitiveness—which would serve as a rough proxy for the level of democracy—could do the job for us.[1] Having said this,

the designation of a particular regime type characterized by multiparty competition, while not being a fully-fledged democracy, is an important contribution that we shall ourselves draw upon.

One of the key features of Geddes' (1999, 2003) typology, in contrast with the literature on "competitive/electoral authoritarianism," is that it highlights qualitative distinctions among authoritarian regimes. Drawing partly on Huntington (1991, 110–113), Geddes distinguishes personalist, military, and single-party regimes; she also includes "amalgams" or hybrids of these three generic types. In our view, Geddes' study is the single most important contribution to the literature on nondemocratic regime types.

Using data with extensive country coverage from the post-war period, Geddes shows that some types of regimes are more easily changed than others. Military regimes are the most fragile, and their life expectancy is the briefest. Personalist regimes tend to last longer. Most long-lived, however, are the one-party states. Geddes offers an elegant explanation—expressed partly in game-theory terms—for this pattern of variable stability.

The fact that military regimes leave the stage with relative promptitude is explained by two factors in Geddes's model. First, these regimes have weak roots in society, which means they find it hard to control or to withstand popular protests. In addition, the military tends to prefer negotiated solutions to total conflict. The officer corps strongly desires, as a rule, to maintain its internal cohesion and hierarchy. Such internal structures are easily threatened when the regime comes under pressure from the outside. Furthermore, the military has a safe place to which it can retreat (assuming it is professionally recruited): it can return to the barracks. Such future prospects mean it also has an interest in safeguarding its resources and autonomy.

Personalist regimes, quite naturally, display a greater cohesion, and so do not break up as easily. They also tend to root themselves in society through more developed networks. These networks are typically structured on a clientelistic basis. The result is to ensure loyalty among important groups in society. Such loyalty is rather pragmatic, however, based as it is on a far-reaching distribution (and consumption) of economic resources. At the same time, the future prospects of personalist regimes are usually dim. As a rule, those who have made their way to the top within the regime are completely

dependent for their position on the ruling leader. They lose everything when the leader falls. They have a strong incentive, therefore, to resist change as long as possible. All in all, according to Geddes, this gives personalist regimes greater staying power than military regimes.

One-party regimes also display a relative cohesion. Different groups within the party have a common interest in monopolizing power (and they are also, sometimes, held together by a common ideological identity). In addition, they have typically built up an elaborate system for rooting themselves, and thus controlling both the state apparatus and the larger society. In the more pronounced cases, the different branches of the state and the various areas of social activity have been strictly subordinated to the leadership of the party. This makes one-party regimes more resistant to opposition. They have access to a stronger organization of supporters within the population, and at the same time they find it easier to control dissidents. This endows them with a longer life expectancy (Geddes 1999: 121–134.

Notwithstanding the merits of Geddes's contribution, we believe there is considerable room for improvement. First, her study leaves out some important types of nondemocratic regime (most notably, monarchies and limited multiparty autocracies). Second, we feel hesitant to designate "personalism" as a regime type of its own. A better approach, we shall argue, is to treat personalism as a continuous trait that may be more or less present in the other types. Third, Geddes makes no distinction between true one-party regimes (where no opposition is allowed) and dominant party regimes (where a single party rules yet leaves some room for opposition). Finally, unlike Geddes, we do not restrict our attention to the effect of regime type on survival. The fact that an authoritarian regime has fallen does not necessarily mean democratization has begun. All that may have happened is that one authoritarian regime has given way to another. There is also reason, accordingly, to look at the effect of regime type on the prospects for democratization. To our knowledge, this is the first time such a study has been carried out on a global scale, and with such extensive time coverage.

A NEW TYPOLOGY OF AUTHORITARIAN REGIMES

When trying to develop a typology of authoritarian regimes, we first face the problem of how to identify the type. This presupposes a qualitative (dichotomous) distinction between democracy and autocracy. It could be argued that it is an advantage, in general, to apply a continuous conception in which degrees of democracy (or autocracy) could be distinguished, but in which no discrete cutoff point separating the two need be singled out (Hadenius and Teorell 2005a, 2005b). For certain research questions, however, a dichotomous approach is called for. To find out whether different regimes at lower levels of democracy (i.e., authoritarian regimes) are more or less stable, and provide more or less favorable soil for democratic advancement, we must first of all distinguish the broad authoritarian "family." Using the mean of the Freedom House (FH) and Polity scales (but converted to range from 0–10: lowest to highest),[2] we draw the line at 7.5. We chose this threshold value by estimating the mean cutoff point separating democracy from autocracy in five well-known categorical measures of democracy: those of Przeworski et al. (2000), Mainwaring, Brinks, and Pérez-Liñán (2001), and Reich (2002), together with Freedom House's and Polity's own categorical thresholds for democracy.[3] Since the Freedom House data only go back to 1972, our period of investigation starts in that year.

Having established this cutoff point, we proceed to our classification of authoritarian regime types. At the core of our typology is a distinction between three different modes of political power maintenance (probably the three most widely used throughout history): (1) hereditary succession, or lineage; (2) the actual or threatened use of military force; and (3) popular election. These three modes of power maintenance correspond to three generic types of regime: monarchy, military regime, and electoral regime. As will become clear, however, these three types are not mutually exclusive (although one of the three possible combinations—military monarchy—never appears in our data).

We define *monarchies* as those regimes in which a person of royal descent has inherited the position of head of state in accordance with accepted practice and/or the constitution (one cannot proclaim oneself a monarch).[4] It bears stressing that we only

apply this classification to countries where the sovereign exercises real political power; ceremonial monarchies are thus excluded. However, primogeniture—the passage of crown from father to eldest son—need not obtain for the state in question to be a monarchy. The "dynastic" Gulf monarchies, where the successor is chosen by royal family consensus (Herb 1999), serve as a forceful reminder of this. Moreover, the mere fact that power has once passed from father to son, as in Syria and North Korea, is not enough to make a "monarchy." The transfer of power must take place in accordance with accepted practice and/or the constitution. The regime in Saudi Arabia is a typical example of a monarchy.

Military regimes are states "in which military officers are major or predominant political actors by virtue of their actual or threatened use of force" (Nordlinger 1977, 2). Thus the armed forces may exercise political power either directly or indirectly (i.e., by controlling civilian leaders behind the scenes). Regimes where persons of military background are chosen in open elections (which have not been controlled by the military) thus should not count as military. Chile in the 1973–89 period was a typical military regime. *Rebel regimes* form a special subcategory. They include cases where a rebel movement (one not formed out of the regular armed forces) has taken power by military means, and the regime has not as yet been reconstituted as another kind of regime. Congo-Kinshasa since 1997 is an example.

Electoral regimes form a heterogeneous set, the definitional requirement of which is that popular elections be held for parliament or the executive office. We must distinguish, however, among at least three types of electoral regime. The first is the *no-party regime*, where elections are held but *all* political parties (or at least any candidate representing a party) are prohibited. Elections in no-party regimes may display an element of competition, but only among individual candidates. The Maldives serves as examples of this regime type.

In *one-party regimes*, all parties but *one* are forbidden (formally or *de facto*) from taking part in elections. North Korea is a notable example. A small number of non-party candidates may also be allowed to take part and get elected (as was the case in Iraq under Saddam). There may further be satellite parties which are autonomous in name, but which cannot take an independent position (as in China). Competition between

candidates from the same (ruling) party may also obtain (as in Tanzania up to 1995). It is not enough, we must stress, that a regime calls itself a one-party state; elections in such a structure must also be held. In Cuba, for example, the Castro-led regime that took power in 1959 described itself in such a fashion. Not until 1976, however, was a constitution instituted that required one-party elections to be held. Up until that year, therefore, Castro's rule qualified as a rebel regime; only thereafter was it a one-party state.

We define a *limited multiparty regime* as one that holds parliamentary or presidential elections in which (at least some) candidates are able to participate who are independent of the ruling regime. This classification holds even when opposition parties refrain voluntarily from taking part in elections (such boycotts are typically carried out to protest against prevailing conditions).[5] The point is that elections take place where there is a degree of competition between candidates who either represent different parties or who choose to act as individuals. This does not mean the elections in question are otherwise free and fair (we are talking here, after all, about authoritarian regimes): certain groups may be excluded, and the process may in various ways favor one side. This is thus the category in our schema that corresponds most closely to "competitive" (Levitsky and Way 2002) and "electoral authoritarianism" (Schedler 2002a; 2002b). The Mexican regime up to the year 2000 was a typical example of a limited multiparty system.

Here we part company with Geddes (1999, 125) and others (e.g., Przeworski et al. 2000), who portray Mexico and similar cases as one-party states. Geddes for her part uses two criteria: (i) whether or not shifts of government have taken place, and (ii) whether or not the governing party takes the largest share (more than two-thirds) of the vote in elections. The purpose of the first criterion, it appears, is to focus on systems where the electoral process—some token elements of competition notwithstanding—is tilted to such an extent that the government always wins. If the purpose, however, is to probe patterns of change and stability among different regime types, it is not well-advised to define a regime type on the basis of government turnover, which in itself involves an implicit time factor. We therefore choose not to rely on government stability as a criterion for distinguishing among regime types.

The second criterion (share of the vote) is more useful. There is little prima facie reason, however, to treat cases where a party has achieved heavy dominance through

multiparty elections as equivalent to those where a true one-party regime prevails, and just a single party is allowed to take part in elections. It may be that regimes of the two types in fact behave the same way (this seems to be the argument); this, however, is a question that should be left open for empirical inquiry. Accordingly, we allow for two ways to control for party dominance *within* limited multiparty regimes. First, we create a nominal subcategory called *dominant party regimes*, among which (following Geddes) we place regimes with parties taking more than two-thirds of the vote.[6] In the descriptive analysis that follows, we use this categorical notion to probe the significance of party dominance within multiparty regimes. Since a cutoff point of 2/3 is arbitrary, however, we also include a continuous measure of party dominance: the proportion of seats held by the largest party (within limited multiparty systems).

To sum up, we have five main regime types: monarchical, military, no-party, one-party, and multiparty. In appendix A, we provide the coding rules and sources for taking these theoretical distinctions to the data. As we saw above, there can also be hybrids (or amalgams) combining elements from more than one regime type. Monarchies may carry out elections in various forms: multiparty elections, no-party elections, and also—in one case, Iran in the 1970s—one-party elections. The same goes for military regimes.

In addition to the main types and their amalgams, we have identified several minor types of authoritarian regimes. In a *theocracy,* decisive political power lies in the hands of a religious elite (as has been the case in Iran since 1979). Temporary regimes, whose purpose is to carry out a transition, are classified as *transitional regimes* (e.g., Togo in 1991–93).[7] Furthermore, there are countries in which the official government does not in reality control the territory. This may be due to *civil war* (as in Somalia since 1991) or *occupation* by foreign troops (as in Afghanistan in 1979–89). Finally, we have a residual category called *others* that includes a few cases that do not fit under any other regime type, given the definitions applied (the major examples being Libya since 1977 and Lesotho in 1972–85).

One question of particular interest has to do with the element of personalism in political life. Experience tells us there is good reason to consider this aspect: personalist regimes (or "sultanist" regimes, as they sometimes are called) display certain distinctive features, such as discretionary rule and the concentration of power in the hands of a

single person (see, e.g., Linz and Chehabi 1998). Geddes (1999, 2003), as we have seen, views personalism as a regime type of its own. Yet, we concur with Brooker (2000, 37), who argues that the existence of personal rule is "only a secondary or supplementary feature of a regime." Instead of classifying personalism as a regime type of its own, therefore, we treat the *degree of personalism* as a property that may be more or less present in any regime (Brooker 2000, 129–32; Slater 2003: 84–86).

The frequency with which the head of government is replaced serves as our indicator of the degree of personalism characterizing a regime. In personalist systems, the thinking goes, such changes at the top are rare, for the logic of the system precisely requires a personal persistence in power. For each regime spell, accordingly, we have calculated the mean years of tenure for presidents/heads of government (for computational details, see Appendix A). Admittedly, this is a crude proxy for the concentration of power in the hands of a single person. A regime might grant its leaders absolute power, even as these leaders are then rapidly replaced. We would argue, however, that, as a rule, the longer each chief executive stays in power, the more power will be concentrated in his or her hands.

THE DISTRIBUTION OF AUTHORITARIAN REGIMES

The graph featured in Figure 1 shows broad trends over the years from 1972–2003. In the 1970s and 1980s, military regimes and one-party states were the most common type of authoritarian government. Since the early 1990s, however, regimes of this type have receded sharply. From that time on, limited multiparty regimes have been the most frequently found form of authoritarianism. One kind of authoritarian government, however, has not varied much during the period under study: the governing monarchy (which prevails mainly in the Muslim world). With only marginal changes over time, the number of such regimes has remained remarkably stable: 15 in 1972, 13 in 2003. This result is of course largely determined by the time period under investigation. During the span of, say, the last 100 years, many monarchic autocracies in the world have ceased to exist. Those still in place in the early 1970s, however, have proved to be highly resilient to change.

FIGURE 1

**Regime Type Frequencies by Year**

Note: In order to avoid multiple observations per country year, we have classified hybrid monarchies in this figure as monarchies, and hybrid military regimes as military regimes. An almost identical pattern emerges, however, if the partially overlapping "main" categories are used instead. The diverse "other" category, including from 4 to 12 countries each year, has been excluded from the figure.

Figure 2 gives a more detailed account of the different regime types, including both main types and combined forms (looking this time at the total number of years the various regimes have existed). As can be seen, the most frequent type of authoritarian rule over the period has been limited multiparty-ism, followed by the one-party and military type. In the case of combined forms, we find a mix between military and one-party regimes to be the most frequent. Other common forms are military/multiparty and monarchy/no-party.

FIGURE 2

Regime type frequencies 1972–2003 (n=valid country years)

No-party Total: n=225 Trad: n=35		
n=137	n=53	Rebel: n=61
Monarchy Total: n=400 Trad: n=207	**Military** Total: n=852 Trad: n=401	
n=52	n=132	n=205
n=4	**Multiparty** Total: n=1277 Trad: n=618	**One-party** Total: n=969 Trad: n=760
Partyless: n=7	Dom: n=468	n=4

Democracy	n=2020
Civil war	n=64
Occupation	n=36
Theocracy	n=30
Transition	n=44
Other	n=50

Figure 3 shows the average level of democracy for the various regime types. The group with the highest score, not surprisingly, is that formed by the limited multiparty systems. Among the different types of multiparty system, the traditional or "pure" form (in which the largest party takes less than two-thirds of the vote) in particular stands out. Here the level of democracy is clearly higher than it is for most other types of multiparty system (the only exception being the infrequently found party-less system). Among the other main regime types, no-party states score higher than do monarchies or military regimes.

FIGURE 3

Average level of democracy by regime type 1972–2003 (n=valid country years)

Democracy	9.19 (2020)
Civil war	3.27 (64)
Occupation	1.68 (36)
Theocracy	2.38 (30)
Transition	3.89 (44)
Other	1.70 (50)

One-party states score lowest on the scale of democracy. The military/one-party hybrid is also marked by a particularly low score. This is nothing to be surprised at; regimes of this kind combine two forms of government, each of which tends to be highly repressive. Another difference worth noting is that between dominant multiparty systems and one-party systems: the former score significantly higher on the democracy scale than do the latter.

## THE BREAKDOWN AND SURVIVAL OF AUTHORITARIAN REGIMES

In Figure 4, we present the average life spans for our different regime types.[8] According to Geddes (1999, 2003), military dictatorships are more short-lived than one-party regimes. Our data confirm this finding. Yet among the five main types (according to our "Total" scores), it is limited multiparty regimes which are the most fragile. Only next on the scale of fragility are military regimes found, followed by no-party regimes. In a class by themselves, however, are the governing monarchies. They have a life span some 8 years longer than that of one-party states—and approximately 16 years longer than that of limited multiparty regimes. One might add, in fact, that they exhibit a greater stability than do democratic multiparty systems. The latter had a life span of 17.5 years during the period investigated, as against 25.4 years for the governing monarchies.

Turning now to the subtypes, we also find a large difference between one-party states and dominant multiparty systems. The latter have, to be sure, a somewhat longer life span than do traditional multiparty systems; however, the size of the gap separating dominant multiparty systems from the one-party states (their "twins," as some scholars have it) is much larger.

What then is the situation regarding personalism? Here we have proceeded, as mentioned, differently from Geddes. We expect a degree of personalism to be found in regimes of all kinds (which we calculate according to the mean years of tenure for persons exercising executive power). Figure 5 shows the scores in this regard for the various regime types. Among the main types, it is not surprisingly the monarchies that have the longest tenure for persons wielding executive power. They are followed by the one-party and no-party states, which look rather alike in this respect. Next in degree of personalism are the military regimes, closely followed by limited multiparty regimes.

FIGURE 4

**Average life span by regime type 1972[†]–2003** (n=regime periods)

	No-party	
	Total: 12.9 (22)	
	Trad: 17.5 (2)	

		14.0 (14)	8.83 (6)		Rebel: 6.08 (12)

	Monarchy			Military	
	Total: 25.4 (18)			Total: 11.1 (87)	
	Trad: 15.1 (16)			Trad: 6.99 (74)	

4.0 (1)	11.3 (6)	8.40 (20)	12.7 (18)

	Multiparty		One-party	
	Total: 9.03 (158)		Total: 17.8 (73)	
	Trad: 5.87 (118)		Trad: 19.6 (55)	

Partyless: 17.0 (1)	Dom: 9.97 (54)	4.0 (1)

Democracy	17.5 (139)
Civil war	5.82 (11)
Occupation	5.14 (7)
Theocracy	15.0 (2)
Transition	1.76 (25)
Other	10.7 (6)

[†] The starting years for regimes already in place in 1972 have been backdated to 1960.

FIGURE 5

Mean years of executive tenure by regime type 1972–2003 (n=regime periods)

No-party Total: 8.89 (22) Trad: 17.5 (2)		
8.55 (14)	6.83 (6)	Rebel: 3.51 (12)
Monarchy Total: 19.3 (18) Trad: 10.9 (16)	**Military** Total: 6.37 (89) Trad: 4.09 (74)	
4.0 (1) / 8.67 (6)	5.02 (20)	11.0 (18)
Multiparty Total: 5.93 (158) Trad: 3.93 (118)	**One-party** Total: 11.4 (73) Trad: 11.4 (55)	
Partyless: 2.33 (1) / Dom: 7.70 (54)	4.0 (1)	

Democracy	4.84 (139)
Civil war	4.12 (11)
Occupation	2.81 (7)
Theocracy	8.75 (2)
Transition	1.50 (25)
Other	8.33 (6)

This general pattern—that relatively greater power is concentrated in the hands of the leader in monarchies and one-party dictatorships, whereas both military and limited multiparty systems are less dependent on the particular person at the helm—makes intuitive sense. The relatively frequent changes of person at the top level of military regimes would appear to reflect the tensions often found in military ranks: between different branches (army, air force, etc.); between different command levels (top brass vs. lower-level officers); and between different generations and cohorts—and all this, as we have seen, in the context of a relatively brief life span for regimes of this type. For regime

types within the military family, the turbulence is greatest of all in the case of rebel regimes, which also stand out for their exceptionally short life span. The explanation here is presumably that structures making for cohesion and dampening down conflict are even less developed among such military usurper regimes.

The relatively brief executive tenure characteristic of limited multiparty regimes would appear to reflect the dynamics of party competition, combined with a relatively high degree of democracy, and thus a more prominent role for mechanisms of electoral accountability. But there are also great variations within the main multiparty family. The small group of governing monarchies that hold multiparty elections shows a higher level of personalism. Dominant-party regimes, for their part, also allow for longer tenure than do traditional multiparty systems—yet the level of personalism is lower in their case than in that of the one-party states.

In general, there is a strong correlation between years of executive tenure and the life span of authoritarian regimes (r=.79 among 448 nondemocratic regime periods).[9] Thus we are able yet again—although with different and, as we see it, better methods—to confirm the findings of Geddes (1999). Personalist regimes last longer as a rule.

What about the robustness of these findings? One obvious cause for concern would be that our depiction of the patterns of regime duration merely reflects "right censoring," as reflected in the fact that our period of observation stops arbitrarily in 2003. A quick glance back at Figure 1, for example, tells us that since the large majority of authoritarian regimes in 2003 were limited multiparty systems—whereas most of the military and one-party systems had come to an end around 1990—the former will appear (artificially) to be less stable than the latter two. In order to remedy this, we will turn to survival analysis. In Table 1 we thus fit a successive number of Weibull regression models,[10] where the dependent variable is the breakdown of an authoritarian regime; democracies are left out of the picture.

TABLE 1

Survival of Authoritarian Regimes (Weibull regression)

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
Regime type:				
Monarchy	.201***	.202***	.207***	.128***
Military	1.56***	1.72***	1.32	.810
Multi-Party	1.22	1.87***	1.28	.240***
No-Party	0.488	.424	0.443	.216
Other Regime	2.42***	2.51***	1.50	0.698
Size of largest party		.425***	.573**	.676
Mean executive turnover			3.34***	2.42***
Level of democracy				2.43***
(Level of democracy) χ^2				.943***
σ	1.50***	1.34***	1.23***	1.21***
No. of observations	3363	3267	3267	3262
Time at risk	4050	3267	3267	3262
No. of countries	149	149	149	149
No. of regime breakdowns	241	241	241	236
Log Likelihood	−177.9	−141.6	−115.6	−67.9
χ^2 (d.f.=5)	25.4***	27.6***	15.3***	42.5***

* significant at the .10-level. ** significant at the .05-level. *** significant at the .01-level.

Note: Entries are hazard ratios estimated from a Weibull regression, with robust standard errors to account for clustering over time within countries. The dependent variable is regime breakdown. The excluded reference category among regime types is One-Party systems. Democracies are excluded from the analysis. σ is an ancillary parameter estimating the degree and direction of duration dependence. χ^2 is a chi-square test for the null hypothesis that hazard rates are equal across all regime types.

It turns out that the general pattern of stability is maintained (we concentrate here on the same coarse regime classification as the one used in Figure 1). Even when tested in terms of statistical significance, monarchies are the most stable regime type, followed by one-party states, which in turn are significantly more stable than military and limited multiparty regimes. The difference between multi-party systems and one-party systems only becomes substantial and significant, however, once we control for our proxy for party dominance: the proportion of seats held by the largest party (this is the difference between model 1 and 2).

In model 3 we include a variant of our measure of personalism: the mean number of times a change has occurred in the executive during the regime spell (called mean executive turnover).[11] The result again confirms the hypothesis that more personalized regimes are more stable. Moreover, there no longer appears a statistically significant

difference in the probability of regime breakdown between one-party regimes on the one hand, and military and multi-party regimes on the other. Thus, the relative longevity of one-party regimes may be explained to some extent in terms of the fact that personal changes at the helm of one-party regimes occur at such low frequency.

This, obviously, is a different explanation of the longevity of one-party regimes than the one suggested by Geddes (which is focused on organizational capacity and roots in society). At the same time it illustrates the fruitfulness of *not* treating personalism as a regime type of its own—but as a continuous trait that may be more or less present in all types of government.

Finally, if we look at regime stability at different levels of democracy, we find a curvilinear relationship (model 4). Replicating the finding of Smith (2004), the most durable regimes are either highly authoritarian or strongly democratic; it is those in between (semi-authoritarian/semi-democratic regimes) which stand out as the most fragile.

REGIME TRANSITIONS AND DEMOCRATIZATION

The breakdown of an authoritarian regime is not equivalent to a turn towards democracy. Typically, authoritarian regimes that fall are replaced by another authoritarian regime. Of the shifts observed during the period investigated, 77 percent were of this variety. Only 23 percent of authoritarian regime changes, in other words, resulted in democratic government.[12]

If we look at the patterns of change (results not shown), it becomes apparent that, when traditional monarchies change, it is most often into non-party monarchies (i.e., in which party-less elections are held). Sometimes the result is a multiparty system within the monarchical framework. In most cases there is a subsequent return to a traditional monarchy. Such oscillations back and forth—with periodic and usually highly restricted elements of electoralism—are the typical pattern for monarchies.

Traditional one-party states show a more complex pattern of change. The shifts that take place are typically in the direction of two other forms of authoritarian rule: to a dominant multiparty system, or to a traditional military regime.

When traditional military regimes are changed, the most frequent result is a limited multiparty system of a traditional sort. In the case of military/one-party regimes, the most common change is to a traditional military regime. This would seem to indicate it is the military component within this combination that weighs most heavily (only in a single case is the change to a traditional one-party state). Where military/multiparty systems are concerned, however, the direction of change is a different one. A turn towards democracy is the most frequent outcome here. In this combination, in other words, it is the plural component that tends to win out. Finally, it may be of interest to note that, in a majority of cases where military rebel regimes undergo change, the outcome is a traditional one-party system. Regimes of this type seem to carry a strong monolithic tendency.

At last we come to authoritarian multiparty states. For the dominant variety, a shift to a traditional system is the most common outcome. In the case of the traditional type, the majority of changes result in a democratic multiparty system. It is seldom, in other words, that the outcome is some other type of authoritarian regime. An authoritarian multiparty regime of the traditional kind is, apparently, the typical stepping-stone on the way to full-blown democratization.

This conclusion is further confirmed when we reverse the process, and ask whence the regimes have come that have turned into democratic multiparty systems. In a majority of such cases, the preceding regime was a limited multiparty system of the traditional sort. Less common by far is the change from a dominant system or a traditional one-party state into a democracy. In this regard, then, we find a similarity between these two systems: both are quite resistant to crossing the democracy threshold. Most resistant, however, are the governing monarchies. Among these, as we have seen, very few changes away from the main type occurred during the period investigated, and precisely none of these changes resulted in democracy.

Figure 6 illustrates the main pathways to democracy. Each path illustrates the probability (expressed as percentages) of a regime changing in a certain direction. As can be seen, the main avenue to democracy goes from a dominant to a traditional limited multiparty system, which in turn has the strongest likelihood of being transformed into a democracy. For dominant systems to reach democracy, in other words, they must pass

through the traditional system as an intermediate stage. A direct path to democracy is highly unlikely.

FIGURE 6

Pathways to Democracy

Note: Entries are the raw probabilities, expressed as percentages, of each pathway occurring (*n*=5191 valid country years). Only pathways occurring more than 10 times have been included.

TABLE 2

Effects of Regime Type on Democratization (dynamic OLS regression)

	(1) OLS	(2) Fixed Effects	(3) Control variables	(4) Control variables
Regime type:				
Monarchy	.078	0.179	.167**	.165**
Military	.055	0.143	.037	.034
Multiparty	.608***	1.06***	.718***	—
No-Party	.101	−.065	—	—
Level of democracy t-1	.270***	.794***	.767***	.771***
Other Regime	1.42***	2.11***	1.61***	1.60***
Size of largest party	−.071*	−.049	−.010	−.094
Mean executive turnover	.322***	.428***	.435***	.423***
Turning into multiparty				.830***
Staying multiparty				.701***
Leaving multiparty				.093
No. of observations	4835	4835	2740	2740
No. of countries	193	193	145	145
Mean years observed/country	25.1	25.1	18.9	18.9
R^2	.182	.134	.275	.276

* significant at the .10-level. ** significant at the .05-level. *** significant at the .01-level.

Note Entries are unstandardized regression coefficients; significance tests are based on panel-corrected standard errors in models (1), (3), and (4), and on robust standard errors accounting for clustering over time within countries in model (2). The dependent variables are the average FH/Polity scores, with missing values imputed from the FH scores. The excluded reference category among regime types is One-Party systems. In all models three lags of the dependent variable are included. In model (2), fixed country-effects are controlled for. In models (3) and (4), the following control variables, lagged one year, are included: British, French, Spanish, Portuguese, and Belgian/Italian/Dutch colonial background; the proportion of Protestants, Orthodox Christians, Christians of other denominations, Buddhists, Hindus, Muslims, Nonreligious and of other denominations; ethno-linguistic and religious fractionalization; the log of the population; a composite index of socioeconomic modernization; oil and minerals; trade and capital flows; democratic diffusion at the level of neighboring states, within regions, and globally; growth and inflation; demonstrations, strikes, and riots; regional dummies for Eastern Europe and Central Asia, Latin America and the Caribbean, Middle East and North Africa, Asia and the Pacific, and the West.

For traditional military systems, as well, there is one main route to democracy: via multiparty government. For one-party systems, however, the main route passes through a transformation to a dominant party system. In both cases a one-step path to democracy is highly unlikely. For states of these sorts, it is a change to authoritarian multiparty government of traditional sort, first of all, that can raise their likelihood of eventually being part of the democratic community.[13]

Once again, it behooves us to check the robustness of these findings. In particular, does multiparty-ism remain the prime pathway to democracy when other factors of

interest have been controlled for? In an effort to answer this question, we have in table 2 performed a series of dynamic regression analyses with change in the level of democracy as the dependent variable. With the lagged democracy scores included in the model, all parameters should be interpreted dynamically as the immediate (or short-run) impact on change in the level of democracy from a unit change in the independent variable.[14] In model (1), we simply control for the ancillary regime characteristics party domination (size of the largest party) and personalism (mean executive turnover). As can be seen, party domination only marginally affects the prospects for democratization negatively. More personalized regimes, however, are more resistant to changes in the level of democracy.

Turning to our variables of interest, the regime types, there is one pattern that clearly stands out: whereas the differences among monarchies, military, and one-party states are mostly negligible, the existence of a limited multiparty system implies a relative advantage over these other types where prospects for democratization are concerned. This result also holds within countries over time, as estimated by the country-fixed effects model (2). Moreover, the relative advantage of multiparty-ism is robust to the inclusion of a large number of control variables (not shown) in models (3) and (4). These include a wide range of hypothesized determinants of democratization, including: colonial background, religious composition, societal fractionalization, country size, modernization, resource wealth, international dependence, democratic diffusion, economic performance, and popular mobilization as well as regional effects (for details, see Teorell and Hadenius 2005).

One might suspect that the apparent effect of multiparty-ism is a methodological artifact stemming from the fact that when regimes *turn into* multiparty systems, a short burst in their democracy score is likely to occur. Moreover, when regimes *move away* from multiparty-ism into one of the other regime types, their democracy score might be similarly affected. What we would like to measure, however, is the effect of *being* a multiparty system on the prospects for further democratization. In order to accomplish this, we have in model (4) split up the multiparty category into three separate dummies: one coded 1 for the first year of a multiparty regime spell (0 otherwise), the other coded 1 for years immediately following a multiparty regime spell (0 otherwise), and the third

coded 1 for all remaining multiparty regime years. As should be clear, the effect of staying within the multiparty regime type (partialling out the effects of turning into and leaving) is still positive and statistically significant. Thus, there seems to be something about multiparty systems that makes them more prone to move further up the democratization ladder.[15]

Finally, we would like to say a few words about the level of explained variance achieved when regime types are taken into account. The control variables added to model (3) and (4) when included by themselves only account for some 10 percent of the variance in the yearly democratization rate (Teorell and Hadenius 2005). As Table 2 makes clear, however, this figure rises by nearly 30 percent when the regime typology is added. True, this may be an effect in part of having added a set of explanatory variables that in the causal chain are fairly proximate to the phenomenon we are trying to explain. Yet, it is not merely a reflection of the degree of democracy, as we control for that through the lagged dependent variable. Hence, we would argue that our findings indicate that taking type of authoritarian regime into account should be given priority in future research on democratization.

WHY MULTIPARTY-ISM BREEDS DEMOCRACY

As we have seen, the different types of authoritarian regimes have different likelihoods of breaking down and of being transformed into democracy. The limited multiparty system stands out as the most promising in this regard. It is the most fragile form of authoritarianism. When it is dismantled, moreover, it has the highest propensity by far of being transformed into a democracy. Two things in particular contribute to this outcome:

- Multiparty regimes normally occupy the middle range in terms of level of democracy. Regimes at this intermediate level are generally more fragile than regimes which are more obviously authoritarian or more fully democratic. In other words, a curvilinear (U-shaped) relationship obtains between regime stability and level of democracy.

- Once in place, multiparty regimes are more prone to develop democratically (in a gradual way) than are other authoritarian regimes. This is not surprising, since they hold elections offering at least a degree of openness and contestation, and furnish at

least some rudimentary political liberties. As a result, regimes of this type are more amenable to step-wise improvements—however marginal and slow (Schedler 2002b; Lindberg 2006).

Our global inquiry thus supports the findings of Bratton and van de Walle in respect to Africa (1997, 273): "Getting to democracy is easier from a regime in which competition is encouraged and the main challenge is to broaden participation; getting to democracy is much more difficult from a regime that has no tradition of political competition, however inclusive and participatory it might be."

The fact, then, that multiparty government has become the most frequent form of authoritarianism in recent years can be seen as a hopeful sign for the future.

APPENDIX A

Coding rules and sources for classifying regime types

The main source: For the period 1972–1999 (and for backdating the starting years of regimes to 1960) we relied on the following variables from Banks (2002):

1. Type of effective executive (field S21F5) [*effexerv*]
2. Type of regime, civilian or military (field S20F7) [*civmilrv*]
3. Degree of legislative effectiveness (field S22F4) [*legeffrv*]
4. Number of seats for the largest party in legislature (field S19F1) [*larparrv*]
5. Size of legislature, number of seats in the lower house (field S19F2) [*sizlegrv*]
6. Party legitimacy, i.e., degree of exclusion of parties (field S19F6) [*parlegrv*]
7. Changes in effective executive (field S22F3) [*chaexerv*]

In some cases we found Banks's coding to be incorrect or incongruent, and his data archive only reaches to 1999. Therefore we also relied on other sources documented below in order to construct revised versions (including the years 2000–2003) of Banks's original variables (hence the suffix "rv"). We also constructed a new variable, *partsz* = *larparrv* / *sizlegrv* (set to 0 where *sizlegrv*=0), to capture the fractional size of the largest party in parliament. The democracy scale, *ifhpol*, is computed by taking the average scores of political rights and civil liberties reported by Freedom House (reversed and converted to a 0–10 scale) on the one hand, and the revised combined autocracy and democracy scores derived from the Polity IV data (converted to a 0–10 scale) on the other; we have then imputed missing values by regressing the index on the FH scores, which have better country coverage than Polity. By combining the information in these variables we deduced the main regime types of each country and year according to the following logic (the minor regime types have been coded on a country by country basis):

1a. If *ifhpol* >= 7.5: **democracy**
1b. If *ifhpol* < 7.5:
    2. If *effexerv* = 1 : **monarchy**
    3. If *civmilrv* > 1 : **military**[*]
    4. If *legeffrv* > 0 :[†]
        5a. If *partsz* = 0:
            6a. If *parlegrv* = 0: **no-party**
            6b. If *parlegrv* > 1: **partyless**
        5b. If *partsz* > 0:
            7a. If *partsz* = 1: **one-party**
            7b. If *partsz* < 1: **multiparty**

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[*] Note that this coding rule does not distinguish the rebel regimes: they have been coded on a country by country basis.
[†] This criterion singles out the diverse class of electoral regimes. We classify a legislative body as an elected parliament only if at least 50 % of its members are popularly elected (direct or indirectly). Furthermore, we regard a parliament as popularly elected until 10 years have passed since the last election.

The hybrid regimes are identified by combining conditions 2 or 3 with conditions 4–7 (since they are not mutually exclusive). We provide two versions of the regime coding: one with and one without the **dominant** party systems treated as a nominal subcategory of the limited multiparty systems (defined as $0.67 <= partsz < 1$). In order to provide a continuous control for the size of the largest party among multiparty systems, we have constructed the variable *partsz,*[*] which is set equal to *partsz* except for one-party systems, where it is set to zero (0). Finally, to control for personalism, we estimate the mean years in *tenure* of the executive per regime spell as the years of regime spell duration divided by the sum of *chaexerv* (i.e., the total number of changes of the executive during the regime spell). In case no change of executive occurred during a regime spell, *tenure* is set equal to the regime spell duration. To avoid this problem, in our Weibull and OLS regressions we instead measured personalism as the *mean executive turnover*, that is, the total number of changes of the executive during the regime spell divided by the years of regime spell duration.

Complementary sources (for checking, correcting, and expanding the Banks data):
- Elections in the World http://www.electionworld.org/
- IFES Election Guide http://www.electionguide.org/index.php
- Journal of Democracy: Election Watch http://muse.jhu.edu/journals/journal_of_democracy/election_watch/
- Parties and Elections in Europe http://www.parties-and-elections.de/index.html
- The Interparliamentary Union http://www.ipu.org/english/home.htm
- Political Database of the Americas http://www.georgetown.edu/pdba/
- Rulers http://www.rulers.org/
- Keesing's Record of World Events http://keesings.gvpi.net/keesings/lpext.dll?f=templates&fn=main-h.htm
- The Swedish Institute of International Affairs, Country Guides http://www.landguiden.se/
- The US Library of Congress Country Studies (Federal Research Division of Library of Congress) http://memory.loc.gov/frd/cs/cshome.html#toc
- Banks and Mueller: *Political Handbook of the World 1979*
- *The Europa World Year Book*, various years
- The Economist Intelligence Unit: Quarterly Economic Reviews, Country Profiles and Country Reports, various years
- The CIA World Fact Book https://www.cia.gov/cia/publications/factbook/index.html
- Country Reports on Human Rights Practices (Report submitted to Congress by US Department of State) , various years, later editions on http://www.state.gov/g/drl/hr/c1470.htm
- Encyclopedia Britannica http://search.eb.com/

APPENDIX B

Regime Classification by Country and Years

Multiparty traditional
Albania 1992–1995, 1997–2001, Angola 1995–1997, Antigua and Barbuda 1994–1998, Argentina 1974–1975, Armenia 1991–2003, Azerbaijan 2000–2003, Bangladesh 1992–2000, Belarus 1991–2003, Botswana 1966–1972, Brazil 1992, 1996–1998, Burkina Faso 2001–2003, Cambodia 1993–2003, Cameroon 1992–2001, Central African Republic 1993–2002, Chad 1996–2003, Colombia 1988–1989, 1994–2003, Comoros 1990–1995, 2002–2003, Congo, Rep. (Brazzaville) 1992–1996, Cote d'Ivoire 2000–2003, Croatia 1991–1999, Czechoslovakia 1992, Djibouti 1977–1980, Dominican Republic 1966–1973, 1992–1995, Ecuador 2000–2003, El Salvador 1982–1990, Estonia 1991, Fiji 1986, 1992–1997, 1999–2003, Gabon 1990–1997, Gambia 1981–1985, 1993, Georgia 1991–2003, Ghana 1979, 2000, Greece 1974, Grenada 1976–1976, Guatemala 1985–2003, Guinea 1993–2001, Guinea-Bissau 1994–1998, Guinea-Bissau 2000–2001, Guyana 1966–1972, Haiti 1990, 1994, Honduras 1992–1995, 1998, India 1975–1976, 1990–1994, Indonesia 1997–2003, Kazakhstan 1994–2003, Kenya 1992–2001, 2003, Kyrgyz Republic 1995–2003, Lebanon 1992–2003, Macedonia, FYR 1991–2001, Madagascar 2001, 2003, Malawi 2000–2003, Mali 1997–1998, Malta 1981–1985, Mexico 1988–1998, Moldova 1991–1996, Moldova 2001–2003, Mongolia 1990–1991, Mozambique 1994–2003, Nepal 1992–2001, Nicaragua 1960–1978, 1984–1994, Niger 1993–1995, 1999–2003, Nigeria 1999–2003, North Yemen 1971–1973, Pakistan 1962–1976, Pakistan 1989–1998, Panama 1991, Paraguay 1993–2001, 2003, Peru 1989–1999, Philippines 1984–1986, 1992–1993, Portugal 1975, Romania 1992–1994, Russian Federation 1991–2003, Samoa 1979–1987, Senegal 1998–2000, Sierra Leone 1961–1972, 1996, Solomon Islands 1999–2003, South Africa 1989–1992, Sri Lanka 1989–2003, Sudan 1986–1988, Suriname 1988–1998, Taiwan 1992, Tajikistan 1995–2003, Thailand 1975, 1988–1990, 1992–1993, Timor–Leste 2002–2003, Togo 1994–1998, Turkey 1961–1972, 1992–2003, Uganda 1980–1982, Ukraine 1991–2003, Uruguay 1960–1972, 1984, Uzbekistan 1999–2003, Vanuatu 1981–1987, Venezuela, RB 1998–2003, Yemen, Rep. 1993–1996, Yugoslavia, FR (Serbia/Montenegro) 1992–1999, Zambia 2001–2003, Zimbabwe 1980–1986, 2000–2003

Partyless
Samoa 1962–1978

Dominant party
Albania 1991, 1996, Antigua and Barbuda 1990–1993, 1999–2003, Azerbaijan 1992–1999, Bangladesh 1973–1974, 1978–1981, 1988–1990, 2001–2003, Brazil 1967–1973, Burkina Faso 1991–2000, Burundi 1993–1995, Cameroon 2002–2003, Comoros 1996–1998, Congo, Rep. (Brazzaville) 2002–2003, Cote d'Ivoire 1990–1998, Djibouti 1992–2003, Dominican Republic 1974–1977, Egypt, Arab Rep. 1976–2003, El Salvador 1961–1973, 1978, Equatorial Guinea 1993–2003, Ethiopia 1995–2003, Gabon 1998–2003, Gambia 1997–2003, Ghana 1992–1999, Grenada 1974–1975, Guatemala 1960–1973,

Guinea 2002–2003, Guyana 1973–1991, Haiti 1995–2003, Iran, Islamic Rep. 1960–1974, Korea, Rep. (S) 1973–1977, Kyrgyz Republic 1991–1994, Lesotho 1993–2000, Liberia 1985–1989, Liberia 1997–2002, Madagascar 1977–1991, Malaysia 1960–2003, Mauritania 1992–2003, Mexico 1960–1987, Niger 1996–1998, Paraguay 1960–1991, Philippines 1978–1983, Romania 1990–1991, Senegal 1978–1997, Seychelles 1993–2003, Sierra Leone 1973–1977, 2002–2003, Singapore 1965–2003, South Africa 1960–1988, Sri Lanka 1981–1988, Swaziland 1968–1972, Taiwan 1986–1991, Tajikistan 1991–1994, Tanzania 1995–2003, Togo 1999–2003, Tunisia 1994–2003, Uganda 1983–1984, Uzbekistan 1991–1998, Yemen, Rep. 1997–2003, Zambia 1964–1972, 1992–2000, Zimbabwe 1965–1978, 1987–1999

Military multiparty
Algeria 1997–2003, Bangladesh 1986–1987, Brazil 1974–1984, Burkina Faso 1970–1973, El Salvador 1974–1977, Guatemala 1974–1981, Guinea-Bissau 1999, Honduras 1980–1982, Indonesia 1971–1996, Korea, Rep. (S) 1978–1987, Nigeria 1992, Pakistan 2002–2003, Panama 1984–1988, Rwanda 1994–2003, South Vietnam 1967–1974, Thailand 1979–1987, Turkey 1983–1985

Military traditional
Afghanistan 1973–1977, Algeria 1962–1976, 1992–1996, Argentina 1966–1972, 1976–1982, Bangladesh 1975–1977, Bangladesh 1982–1985, Benin 1960–1978, Bolivia 1964–1977, 1980, Burkina Faso 1974–1977, 1980–1990, Burundi 1966–1981, 1987–1992, 1996–2000, Central African Republic 1965–1978, 1981–1986, 2003, Chad 1975–1978, Chile 1973–1988, Comoros 1999–2001, Congo, Rep. (Brazzaville) 1968–1972, 1977–1978, Cote d'Ivoire 1999, Ecuador 1972–1978, El Salvador 1979–1981, Equatorial Guinea 1979–1982, Ethiopia 1974–1986, Fiji 1987–1991, Gambia 1994–1996, Ghana 1972–1978, 1981–1991, Greece 1967–1973, Guatemala 1982–1983, Guinea 1984–1992, Guinea-Bissau 1980–1983, 2003, Haiti 1986–1989, 1991–1993, Honduras 1963–1978, Iraq 1960–1979, Korea, Rep. (S) 1972, Lesotho 1986–1992, Liberia 1980–1984, Libya 1969–1976, Madagascar 1972–1976, Mali 1968–1981, Mauritania 1978–1991, Myanmar 1962–1973, 1988–2003, Niger 1974–1982, Nigeria 1966–1978, 1983–1991, 1993–1998, Pakistan 1977–1981, Pakistan 1999–2001, Panama 1980–1983, Peru 1968–1979, Portugal 1974, Rwanda 1973–1980, Sierra Leone 1992–1995, Somalia 1969–1978, Sudan 1985, 1989–1995, 1999, Suriname 1980–1986, Thailand 1971–1972, Thailand 1976–1978, Thailand 1991, Togo 1967–1978, Turkey 1980–1982, Uganda 1971–1979, 1985, Uruguay 1973–1983

Rebel regime
Angola 1975–1979, Cambodia 1975, Chad 1982–1992, Comoros 1975–1977, Congo, DR (Zaire, Congo–Kinshasa) 1997–2003, Cuba 1960–1975, Eritrea 1993–2003, Ethiopia 1991–1994, Grenada 1979–1983, Mozambique 1975–1976, Nicaragua 1979–1983, Uganda 1986–1988

Military no-party
Niger 1983–1988, North Yemen 1974–1989, Pakistan 1982–1987, Panama 1972–1979, Sudan 1972–1973, Uganda 1989–2003

No-party traditional
Haiti 1973–1978, Maldives 1975–2003

Military one-party
Algeria 1977–1991, Central African Republic 1987–1992, Congo, DR (Zaire, Congo–Kinshasa) 1970–1996, Congo, Rep. (Brazzaville) 1973–1976, 1979–1990, Ethiopia 1987–1990, Iraq 1980–2002, Mali 1982–1990, Myanmar 1974–1987, Niger 1989–1990, Rwanda 1981–1993, Somalia 1979–1990, Sudan 1974–1984, 1996–1998, 2000–2003, Syrian Arab Republic 1963–2003, Taiwan 1960–1975, Togo 1979–1990

One-party traditional
Albania 1960–1990, Angola 1980–1991, Azerbaijan 1991, Benin 1979–1989, Bulgaria 1960–1989, Burundi 1982–1986, Cambodia 1960–1974, 1976–1978, Cameroon 1971–1991, Cape Verde 1975–1989, Chad 1962–1974, China 1960–2003, Comoros 1978–1989, Cote d'Ivoire 1960–1989, Cuba 1976–2003, Czechoslovakia 1960–1989, Djibouti 1981–1991, East Germany (GDR) 1960–1989, Egypt, Arab Rep. 1964–1975, Equatorial Guinea 1970–1978, 1983–1992, Gabon 1967–1989, Guinea 1960–1983, Guinea-Bissau 1974–1979, 1984–1993, Haiti 1979–1985, Hungary 1960–1988, Kazakhstan 1991–1993, Kenya 1969–1991, Korea, DPR (N) 1960–2003, Laos, PDR 1975–2003, Liberia 1960–1979, Malawi 1966–1993, Mauritania 1964–1977, Mongolia 1960–1989, Mozambique 1977–1993, Niger 1960–1973, Poland 1960–1988, Portugal 1960–1973, Romania 1960–1989, Rwanda 1965–1972, Sao Tomé and Principe 1975–1989, Senegal 1960–1977, Seychelles 1979–1992, Sierra Leone 1978–1991, South Yemen 1971–1989, Spain 1960–1974, Taiwan 1976–1985, Tanzania 1965–1994, Tunisia 1964–1993, Turkmenistan 1991–2003, USSR 1960–1990, Vietnam 1960–2003, Yugoslavia, FPR 1960–1991, Zambia 1973–1990

One-party monarchy
Iran, Islamic Rep. 1975–1978

Traditional monarchy
Bahrain 1971–1972, 1975–2001, Brunei 1984–2003, Jordan 1974–1983, 1988, Jordan 2001–2002, Kuwait 1976–1980, 1986–1989, Kuwait 1991, Morocco 1965–1976, Nepal 2002–2003, Oman 1960–1999, Qatar 1971–2003, Saudi Arabia 1960–2003, Swaziland 1973–1977, United Arab Emirates 1971–2003

No-party monarchy
Afghanistan 1965–1972, Bahrain 1973–1974, 2002–2003, Bhutan 1960–2003, Ethiopia 1960–1973, Jordan 1967–1973, 1984–1987, Kuwait 1963–1975, 1981–1985, 1992–2003, Nepal 1960–1988, Oman 2000–2003, Swaziland 1978–2003, Tonga 1970–1995

Multiparty monarchy
Jordan 1989–2000, 2003, Morocco 1977–2003, Tonga 1996–2003

Civil war
Afghanistan 1978, 1990–1995, Angola 1992–1994, 1998–2002, Bosnia and Herzegovina 1992–1995, Congo, Rep. (Brazzaville) 1997–2001, Laos, PDR 1972–1973, Lebanon 1975–1989, Liberia 1990–1995, Sierra Leone 1997–2000, Somalia 1991–2003

Occupation
Afghanistan, 1979–1989, 2001–2003, Bosnia and Herzegovina 1996–2003, Cambodia 1979–1989, Iraq 2003, Kuwait 1990, South Vietnam 1975

Theocracy
Afghanistan 1996–2000, Iran, Islamic Rep. 1979–2003

Transition
Benin 1990, Bolivia 1978–1979, 1981, Burundi 2001–2003, Cambodia 1990–1992, Central African Republic 1979–1980, Chad 1979–1981, Chad 1993–1995, Congo, Rep. (Brazzaville) 1991, Guatemala 1984, Honduras 1979, Laos, PDR 1974, Lebanon 1990–1991, Liberia 1996, Liberia 2003, Mali 1991, Nepal 1989, Niger 1991–1992, Seychelles 1977–1978, Sierra Leone 2001, Spain 1975–1976, Thailand 1973–1974, Togo 1991–1993, Yemen, Rep. 1990–1992, Zimbabwe 1979

Other
Angola 2003, Guinea-Bissau 2002, Haiti 1960–1972, Lesotho 1970–1985, Libya 1977–2003, Philippines 1972–1977

Democracy
Albania 2002–2003, Antigua and Barbuda 1981–1989, Argentina 1973, 1983–2003, Australia 1960–2003, Austria 1960–2003, Bahamas 1973–2003, Bangladesh 1971–1972, 1991, Barbados 1966–2003, Belgium 1960–2003, Belize 1981–2003, Benin 1991–2003, Bolivia 1982–2003, Botswana 1973–2003, Brazil 1985–1991, 1993–1995, 1999–2003, Bulgaria 1990–2003, Burkina Faso 1978–1979, Canada 1960–2003, Cape Verde 1990–2003, Chile 1960–1972, 1989–2003, Colombia 1960–1987, 1990–1993, Costa Rica 1960–2003, Croatia 2000–2003, Cyprus 1960–2003, Czech Republic 1993–2003, Czechoslovakia 1990–1991, Denmark 1960–2003, Dominica 1978–2003, Dominican Republic 1978–1991, 1996–2003, Ecuador 1979–1999, El Salvador 1991–2003, Estonia 1992–2003, Fiji 1970–1985, 1998, Finland 1960–2003, France 1960–2003, Gambia 1965–1980, 1986–1992, Germany 1960–2003, Ghana 1980, Ghana 2001–2003, Greece 1975–2003, Grenada 1977–1978, 1984–2003, Guyana 1992–2003, Honduras 1983–1991, 1996–1997, 1999–2003, Hungary 1989–2003, Iceland 1960–2003, India 1960–1974, 1977–1989, 1995–2003, Ireland 1960–2003, Israel 1960–2003, Italy 1960–2003, Jamaica 1962–2003, Japan 1960–2003, Kenya 2002, Kiribati 1979–2003, Korea, Rep. (S) 1988–2003, Latvia 1991–2003, Lebanon 1960–1974, Lesotho 2001–2003, Lithuania 1991–2003, Luxembourg 1960–2003, Macedonia, FYR 2002–2003, Madagascar 1992–2000, 2002, Malawi 1994–1999, Maldives 1965–1974, Mali 1992–1996, 1999–2003, Malta 1964–1980, 1986–2003, Marshall Islands 1986–2003, Mauritius 1968–2003, Mexico 1999–2003, Micronesia 1986–2003, Moldova 1997–2000, Mongolia 1992–2003, Namibia 1990–2003, Nepal 1990–1991, Netherlands 1960–2003, New Zealand 1960–

2003, Nicaragua 1995–2003, Nigeria 1979–1982, Norway 1960–2003, Pakistan 1988, Palau 1994–2003, Panama 1989–1990, 1992–2003, Papua New Guinea 1975–2003, Paraguay 1992, 2002, Peru 1980–1988, 2000–2003, Philippines 1987–1991, 1994–2003, Poland 1989–2003, Portugal 1976–2003, Romania 1995–2003, Samoa 1988–2003, Sao Tomé and Principe 1990–2003, Senegal 2001–2003, Seychelles 1976, Slovak Republic 1993–2003, Slovenia 1991–2003, Solomon Islands 1978–1998, South Africa 1993–2003, Spain 1977–2003, Sri Lanka 1960–1980, St. Kitts and Nevis 1983–2003, St. Lucia 1979–2003, St. Vincent and the Grenadines 1979–2003, Suriname 1975–1979, 1987, 1999–2003, Sweden 1960–2003, Switzerland 1960–2003, Taiwan 1993–2003, Thailand 1994–2003, Trinidad and Tobago 1962–2003, Turkey 1973–1979, 1986–1991, United Kingdom 1960–2003, United States 1960–2003, Uruguay 1985–2003, Vanuatu 1980–1980, 1988–2003, Venezuela 1960–1997, Yugoslavia, FR (Serbia/Montenegro) 2000–2003, Zambia 1991

ENDNOTES

[1] That is the approach taken by Bratton and van de Walle (1997) in their study of transitions to democracy in sub-Saharan Africa. Using a second dimension as well (the level of participation), they show how higher levels of competition in the *ancién regime* had the effect of improving prospects for democratization in the early 1990s.

[2] As we have shown in a recent paper, this combined FH/Polity index outperforms all rival indices in an independent assessment (Hadenius and Teorell 2005b). For details on the construction of this measure, see Appendix A.

[3] More precisely, two mean values of the FH/Polity scale were computed for each dichotomous measure: the mean democracy score in country years immediately following a transition from autocracy to democracy, and the mean democracy score in country years immediately preceding a transition from democracy to autocracy. For the Przeworski et al. (2000) measure, we used the updated codes that also cover the years up to 2002 provided by Cheibub and Gandhi (made available by Pippa Norris at (<http://ksghome.harvard.edu/~pnorris/Data/Data.htm>). For the Freedom House data, we used their own free vs. partly free/unfree classification, and for the Polity measure the threshold value of +7 or more on the revised combined Polity score (following Jaggers and Gurr 1995, 479). The country-year-weighted average of these ten means (covering the time period from 1972–2003) is 7.49 (*n*=387).

[4] This applies to Jean Bédel Bokassa, military dictator of the Central African Republic, who in 1977 declared himself "emperor of the Central African Empire." By our reckoning, he was still a military ruler, not a monarch.

[5] It also embraces cases where parties are absent, but where this is not the result of any prohibition against party activities; the candidates in question have simply chosen to stand for election as individuals. These latter we classify as *party-less* limited multiparty systems (the only actual case being Samoa in 1972–78).

[6] It should be noted that we use the term differently from Sartori, who writes about "predominant-party systems" when, under basically democratic conditions, one party" is significantly stronger than the others" (1976, 193). As for undemocratic systems, he uses the term "hegemonic parties" (230), which are distinguished from single parties. The hegemonic parties are defined by their way of constantly winning, despite some competition in elections. In consequence, there is no alternation. These regimes accordingly, are defined (implicitly) by their long life span. As for different empirical indicators of such regimes, see Schedler (2004).

[7] A transitional regime can only last in our schema for up to three years; after that, it is given a different and more fitting classification.

[8] It bears noting that the total number of cases within each main square in Figure 4 does not equal the sum of components. Take monarchy as an example. Regimes of this type may hold periodic elections, in multiparty or non-party form; they may then alternate between these or return to the traditional form. Yet such regimes are classified as belonging to the main group "monarchy" throughout. This is also part of the reason why the life span for the main group ("Total") is substantially longer than for the subgroups.

[9] This correlation is to some extent inflated by the fact that in regimes that have never experienced a change in the executive (during our observation period), the mean years of tenure is set equal to the regime spell duration. If we instead would measure personalism by a measure of the mean executive turnover across a regime spell (that is, the inverse of

mean tenure, except in regimes with no change in the executive, in which case the mean executive turnover is zero), the correlation is only −.31.

[10] The Weibull distribution assumes that duration dependence is a monotonic function of time. To check this assumption, we inspected the predicted survival rates from a Cox semi-parametric regression (which assumes no particular pattern for duration dependence over time); these plots strongly confirm the assumption of monotonicity.

[11] In the regression analyses we prefer this measure over mean tenure, since the latter inflates the effect of personalism on survival by the fact that tenure is set equal to regime duration in regimes that have not experienced any executive turnover (see footnote 9 above).

[12] This figure is based on the most fine-grained regime classification (including dominant multiparty systems as a nominal category, as well as the minor types) used in figures 2–5. Among 344 authoritarian regime periods that ended in regime change, the result was democracy in 79.

[13] We have tested the sensitivity of the results in Figure 4 to three alternative specifications. First, we excluded all transitions from traditional multiparty systems to democracy in which the country in questions has before transited in the opposite direction, that is, from democracy to multiparty-ism. In this way we avoid double counting cases like Brazil and Honduras, which hover around our threshold criterion 7.5 and thus make multiple transitions from multiparty-ism to democracy. Nevertheless, the path from multiparty systems to democracy is by far the most frequent one (its probability decreases from .87 to .52).

Second, we shifted the threshold criterion for democracy up to 8.0 and down to 7.0, neither of which changed the results substantially.

Third, we counted all former countries of the Soviet Union and the People's Republic of Yugoslavia as transitions from traditional one-party systems. In our original analysis, we instead treat these cases like all post-colonial countries, that is, as new regimes without a regime legacy. If this decision is reversed, the most notable change of the results is that the path from one-party to traditional multiparty regimes is substantially strengthened (from .15 to .35). Also, the path from one-party regime to democracy now passes the threshold of occurring more than 10 times (its probability becomes 0.21). The still-strongest path, from multiparty systems to democracy, is of course unaffected by this change.

[14] For technical reasons, we also need to include the democracies in this analysis, since leaving them out would constrain the variance in the dependent variable and thus bias our results.

[15] These results are also robust to changes in the democracy cutoff up to 8.0 or down to 7.0.

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