



**DOES LOOTABLE WEALTH BREED DISORDER?
A POLITICAL ECONOMY OF EXTRACTION FRAMEWORK**

Richard Snyder

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Richard Snyder is Associate Professor of Political Science at Brown University. He is the author of *Politics after Neoliberalism: Reregulation in Mexico* (Cambridge University Press, 2001) and the editor of three volumes on the transformation of rural Mexico published by the Center for US–Mexican Studies at the University of California, San Diego (1998–2000). His articles on regime change and the political economy of development have appeared in journals such as *World Politics*, *Comparative Politics*, *Studies in Comparative International Development*, *Journal of Democracy*, and *British Journal of Political Science*. He has been a visiting fellow at the Center for US–Mexican Studies at the University of California, San Diego; the Harvard Academy for International and Area Studies; and the Helen Kellogg Institute for International Studies at the University of Notre Dame.

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ABSTRACT

This article proposes a political economy of extraction framework that accounts for political order and state collapse as alternative outcomes in the face of lootable wealth. Different types of institutions of extraction can be built around lootable resources—with divergent effects on political stability. If rulers are able to forge institutions of extraction that give them control over the revenues generated by lootable resources, then these resources can contribute to the maintenance of political order by providing the income with which to govern. In contrast, the breakdown or absence of such institutions increases the risk of civil war by making it easier for rebels to get income. The framework is used to explain two puzzling cases that experienced sharply contrasting political trajectories in the face of lootable resources: Sierra Leone and Burma. A focus on institutions of extraction provides a stronger understanding of the wide range of political possibilities—from chaos, through dictatorship, to democracy—in resource-rich countries.

RESUMEN

Este artículo propone una economía política de la extracción que da cuenta del orden político y el colapso del estado como resultados alternativos de la existencia de riqueza que puede ser saqueada. A partir de la disponibilidad continua de recursos que pueden saquearse se pueden construir distintos tipos de instituciones de extracción. Si los gobernantes están en condiciones de forjar instituciones de extracción que les permitan controlar el rédito generado por los recursos depredables, esos recursos pueden contribuir al mantenimiento del orden político a través de la provisión del ingreso con el cual gobernar. La caída o la ausencia de esas instituciones, en cambio, aumenta el riesgo de guerra civil al facilitar ingresos a los rebeldes. El marco propuesto se utiliza para explicar dos casos desconcertantes, que a partir de la disponibilidad de recursos para el saqueo recorrieron trayectorias marcadamente distintas: Sierra Leona y Birmania. El foco sobre las instituciones de extracción provee un entendimiento más acabado del amplio rango de posibilidades políticas que existe en los países ricos en recursos.

Does lootable wealth breed disorder? This question commands great interest in current research because of the proliferation of civil wars and collapsed states since the end of the Cold War. The most common answer in the fast-growing literature on civil wars is that lootable wealth, defined as lucrative, easy-to-transport resources, such as gems, precious hardwoods, and illicit drugs, generates disorder by supplying the motive and means for armed rebellion (Collier and Hoeffler 1998; Collier and Hoeffler 2000; De Soysa 2000; Keen 1998; and Klare 2001). Pointing to a strong and positive statistical association between lootable resources and political disorder, scholars argue that lootable wealth is a “honey pot” that fuels “greed-based” insurgencies in the collapsed states of the contemporary developing world.¹ Gripping journalistic accounts of “blood diamonds” in Sierra Leone, Angola, and Congo, “logs of war” in Cambodia and Liberia, and “narco-guerillas” in Colombia seem to support the argument that there is a close connection between lootable wealth and chaos (Campbell 2002; Harden 2000).

Despite these prominent cases, an historical and comparative perspective reveals that the relationship between lootable wealth and disorder is far more complex. An *historical* perspective highlights that many countries currently regarded as paradigmatic cases of state collapse in the face of lootable resources were previously ruled by some of the world’s most durable political regimes. For example, in Congo (formerly Zaire), the dictator Mobutu Sese Seko held power for more than 30 years (1965–1997). In Liberia, William Tubman ruled 27 years (1944–1971) and was succeeded by William Tolbert, who ruled 9 years. And in Sierra Leone, Siaka Stevens held power for 17 years (1968–1985), transferred the reins of government peacefully to his chosen successor, and retired comfortably. Indeed, writing in 1989, two Africanists noted that “when compared with a number of other African countries, Sierra Leone is remarkable for its *stability and relative lack of disorder and fundamental political change*” (Luke and Riley 1989, 134, italics added). These cases suggest that lootable wealth is not always associated with chaos, and they raise important questions: How were stable, long-lived regimes possible in the face of the same lootable resources that fuel rebellion and instability today? Why are lootable resources associated with stability in one period and instability in another period?

A *comparative* perspective provides further evidence of stable political regimes that operate in economies dominated by lootable resources. For example, Africa's leading exporter of diamonds is Botswana, which has had a stable democracy for 40 years. The leading exporter of hashish to Europe is Morocco, where the Hassan dynasty has maintained a firm grip on power for many decades. Bolivia has had both a large cocaine industry and a consolidated democratic regime since the mid-1980s. Moreover, in Burma, a major *expansion* of the narcotics industry in the 1990s occurred during a period that also saw the ending of civil war, demobilization of ethnic and communist insurgents, and the successful restoration of a military regime's grip on power.² Thus a comparative vantage point raises more questions about the relationship between lootable wealth and disorder: Why are lootable resources associated with instability in some places and stability in others? Why, as in Burma, are *more* lootable resources sometimes associated with *less* disorder and with episodes of regime "reequilibration"?³

Taken together, the historical and comparative evidence exposes an important limitation of existing research on state collapse and civil war: the lack of a theory that explains why lootable wealth is linked with chaos in some instances and order in others. This article contributes to building such a theory by providing a political economy framework that focuses on institutions of extraction. Defining lootable wealth as high-value goods with low economic barriers to entry, I argue that different types of institutions of extraction can be constructed around such goods—with contrasting consequences for political stability. If rulers are able to forge institutions of extraction that give them control over the revenues generated by lootable resources, these resources can actually contribute to the maintenance of order by providing the income with which to govern. In contrast, the breakdown or absence of such institutions can produce instability in two ways: first, by causing a fiscal crisis of the incumbent regime that renders it vulnerable to collapse and, second, by making it easier for rebels to organize and gain access to income. In short, I propose a political economy framework that highlights how institutions of extraction help determine who controls the loot—rulers or rebels—and thus mediate the relationship between lootable resources and political order. With this framework I aim to advance a more powerful theory of collapsed states and civil war, one that accounts both for disorder *and* order in the face of lootable resources.

The next section develops the political economy of extraction framework. First, I define four distinct institutional outcomes: private extraction, public extraction, joint extraction, and no extraction. Second, I build a model of the interaction between two core agents—rulers and private economic actors—as they compete for control over lootable resources. This competition between rulers and private actors is driven by their divergent preferences over the four institutional outcomes. A subsequent section provides an empirical analysis of Sierra Leone and Burma. These two cases are important because they show the range of sharply contrasting political outcomes that can occur in countries with lootable wealth. In Sierra Leone lootable resources were linked initially with a stable patrimonial regime (1968–1990) and subsequently with chaos (1991–2002), whereas in Burma lootable resources were linked initially with chaos (pre-1990) and subsequently with a stable military regime (post-1990). These divergent political trajectories in the face of lootable resources present a strong explanatory challenge that I tackle with my framework. A concluding section summarizes the argument about how a focus on institutions of extraction helps explain the varied political consequences of lootable resources. The conclusion also proposes an agenda for future research on lootable wealth and political order.

INSTITUTIONS OF EXTRACTION AND POLITICAL ORDER: A POLITICAL ECONOMY FRAMEWORK

Understanding the relationship between lootable wealth and political order requires that we focus on the question of who controls the income generated by economic resources.⁴ To achieve this focus, I build a model around two agents—rulers and private economic actors—and show how their interaction as they compete for control over lootable resources is driven by their preferences over four alternative institutional outcomes.⁵ I do not claim to offer a full explanation for political order and civil war: institutions of extraction, while important, are not the only link in the causal chains that connect lootable resources to political order or, alternatively, to civil war. Still, a focus on these institutions helps us better understand the contrasting political consequences of lootable resources.

Institutions of Extraction and the Preferences of Actors

At the most general level I distinguish four modes of extraction. *Private* extraction refers to situations where private economic actors enjoy exclusive, unregulated, and untaxed control over the income generated by resources, thus denying rulers a share of the wealth. Examples of private extraction include warlord mining economies in contemporary collapsed states, such as Sierra Leone and Congo, as well as frontier economies during the 19th century gold rushes in the North American West. By contrast, *public* extraction refers to cases where rulers have a monopoly over the extraction process and fully control the income generated by resources. Many state-owned petroleum companies in contemporary oil-producing countries are good examples of public extraction.⁶ Between the extremes of private and public extraction, a variety of *joint* extraction institutions are possible. Joint extraction refers to cooperation between private and public actors who share the income generated by exploiting resources. This income sharing can take a variety of forms, ranging from public taxation of privately extracted resources to government-run protection rackets.

In addition to private, public, and joint extraction, a fourth possibility exists: *no* extraction. For example, rulers who are unable to achieve control over resources by themselves through public extraction can face powerful incentives to try to prevent private extraction, because they may see the accumulation of wealth and power by private actors as a significant threat. Depending on the rulers' capacity to deny private actors independent access to resources, a situation of no extraction can result. Indeed, the ability of rulers to make a credible threat of no extraction is a powerful tool for getting private actors to participate in joint extraction and share their wealth.

Assuming that rulers wish to stay in power and that both rulers and private actors are rent and revenue seekers, we can deduce the following preference ordering over the four institutional outcomes I have defined. As seen in Figure 1, rulers prefer public extraction because a government monopoly over resources maximizes the revenue available to them and also makes it harder for private rivals to get the income with which to build autonomous bases of power and challenge the rulers. Moreover, revenue-seeking rulers have economic incentives to prefer public over joint extraction, because the former

internalizes resource extraction within hierarchical, government-controlled institutions and thus reduces transaction and agency costs, such as the expense of monitoring and enforcing compliance with bargains (Levi 1988, 30–32).⁷ Joint extraction is the rulers' second choice, because it at least gives them a share of the income generated by resources. Finally, rulers prefer no extraction over private extraction. Private extraction is the worst outcome because it makes it easier for private resource holders to accumulate wealth and power which can be used to challenge the rulers' authority. Thus, if neither public nor joint extraction is feasible, rulers will choose a spoiler strategy aimed at ensuring that *no* extraction occurs.

Figure 1

**Preferences of Rulers and Private Actors
Over Institutions of Extraction**

Rank Order of Preferences		
Mode of Extraction	Rulers	Private Actors
Public	1	4
Private	4	1
Joint	2	2
None	3	3

Private actors prefer private extraction because it maximizes their income. Joint extraction is their second choice. And they prefer no extraction over public extraction, because the latter strengthens rulers, making it easier for them to regulate and potentially repress societal actors.⁸

Why Rulers Can't Have Their First Choice:

The Unfeasibility of Public Extraction of Lootable Resources

Although rulers prefer public extraction, this is not a feasible option in the face of lootable resources. First, the *low economic barriers to entry* characteristic of lootable resources make it difficult for rulers to gain monopoly control over them.⁹ For example, to mine alluvial diamonds, a pick, shovel, sieve, and sweat are usually the only

requirements. This means that a mass of small, wildcat miners can easily get into the business. And because of their low bulk, lootable resources are easy to transport, conceal, and smuggle. As Paul Richards (1996, 41, 100–101) notes, “In an emergency a [diamond] can even be swallowed.” Moreover, many lootable resources are geographically widespread. For example, alluvial diamonds can be found in riverbeds scattered across large expanses of territory.¹⁰ These attributes of lootable resources pose formidable impediments to government control over extraction, especially in “soft” states with weak regulatory, surveillance, and border enforcement capabilities.

A further impediment to public extraction concerns the *illegality* of some lootable resources. Rulers who earn revenue from illicit drugs risk international sanctions. Thus illegality essentially poses a barrier to entry for the public sector: it is not feasible to have a Ministry of Cocaine or a Ministry of Opium that controls the income generated by these illicit products.¹¹

Taken together, these properties of lootable resources limit the strategies available to rulers, leaving joint extraction as the only viable way to get access to the income generated by lootable wealth.¹² Rulers should thus be looking to build institutions of joint extraction with private actors who have access to lootable resources. Yet societal resource holders are driven to resist overtures from rulers, preferring private extraction, which lets them keep their profits, over joint extraction, which requires them to share profits with rulers. To understand how joint extraction is possible—and thus how political order can be achieved in the face of lootable resources—we need to explore the methods available to rulers for getting private actors to share their wealth.

Building Institutions of Joint Extraction

Rulers can deploy a mix of negative and positive inducements, or “sticks” and “carrots,” to get private actors to cooperate in joint extraction by sharing their wealth.

Sticks

Coercion is an important tool rulers can use to build institutions of joint extraction. Depending on their military and bureaucratic capabilities, rulers may be able to form a protection racket in which private actors pay for protection from harassment by

the government itself. Such protection rackets are especially likely to emerge around illicit products, because the “service” of non-enforcement of the law will have a high value to private actors.¹³ Mercantile diaspora groups, such as Lebanese in West Africa and overseas Chinese in Asia, are among the most vulnerable to the threat of coercion because they are not citizens and thus have tenuous property rights and legal standing. These groups are likely to participate in joint extraction, sharing their income with rulers in exchange for protection.

The threat of blocking extraction of lootable resources—that is, no extraction—is another important method that rulers can use to build institutions of joint extraction. Although the government may lack the ability to monopolize lootable resources itself through public extraction, it may nevertheless be able to prevent others from exploiting these resources. For example, rulers can shut down production of illicit drugs through aerial spraying or other forms of eradication. And in the case of lootable resources that are not susceptible to eradication, such as alluvial diamonds, rulers may be able to close trading routes. Rulers with these capabilities can make a credible threat of no extraction. This is a powerful tool for inducing private resource holders to cooperate by sharing their income with the rulers: faced with a choice between no income and some income, they will opt for the latter.

One might object that the threat of no extraction is not credible because it is not in the rulers’ self-interest: enforcing no extraction by eradicating illegal crops or shutting down smuggling routes is more costly to the government than doing nothing. Yet the cost of doing nothing should not be underestimated: unchecked private extraction makes it easier for rivals to build autonomous bases of wealth and challenge the rulers. Moreover, blocking the extraction of lootable resources can yield lucrative international rewards for rulers. For example, the United States government bestows prestige and, more importantly, military and financial aid on countries that help fight its War on Drugs. And in the absence of joint extraction, international aid is especially valuable to rulers, because it may be one of the only ways to get the revenue needed to counter threats from rivals engaged in private extraction. Thus it may indeed be in the self-interest of rulers to pursue a spoiler strategy, threatening no extraction if private actors do not share their wealth.

The ability to make a credible threat of no extraction, and hence to induce private actors to cooperate in joint extraction, depends in part on the distinct properties of different types of lootable resource. For example, the threat of no extraction should be especially credible in the case of illegal drugs, because international rewards are readily available for their eradication and interdiction. Similarly, it should be easier to make a credible threat of no extraction in the case of opium or coca, which are grown in open fields and are thus relatively detectable, than in the case of methamphetamine or ecstasy, which are produced in small, concealed laboratories. Thus variation in the legality and “detectability” of different lootable resources influences the capacity of rulers to use threats of no extraction as a way to get private actors to share their wealth.

Carrots

In addition to the “sticks” of coercion and the threat of no extraction, rulers may also have a variety of selective benefits, or “carrots,” at their disposal which can be used to build institutions of joint extraction. For example, the provision of protection from competitors can induce private actors to share their income.¹⁴ The ability to supply protection, which may include forcing the rivals of allies out of business, depends on the rulers’ coercive capacities. Yet even if the rulers’ coercive capacities are modest and they can only supply limited protection, protection may nevertheless command a high value if it is scarce, as in situations where there is no rule of law or societal actors lack their own private armies, and in the case of minority diaspora groups.

Legalization is another selective benefit rulers can use to build joint extraction. In exchange for a share of their income, rulers can use the law to make it easier for criminals to launder profits from illegal resources.¹⁵ Rulers can also extend the benefits of amnesty and “legal cleansing” to entrepreneurs involved with illicit resources. Entering the “legal fold” is attractive to these entrepreneurs because it can (1) allow them to exchange a harsh, fugitive existence for an opulent, legitimate lifestyle; (2) lower business costs by allowing them to downsize and even dispense with the private armies required to fend off government forces; and (3) open new investment opportunities in the legal economy, perhaps in partnership with government actors. Thus the law is a powerful tool with

which revenue-hungry rulers can generate income, especially in the case of illicit resources.

It bears emphasis that the ability to use the law to build institutions of joint extraction around illegal resources depends partly on how vulnerable the rulers are to scrutiny from international actors. Joint extraction of illegal drugs, for instance, is far easier if rulers are relatively insulated from US pressures to participate in its “war” on drugs (for example, in Burma and North Korea, as opposed to Colombia). Rulers contemplating joint extraction of illegal resources will weigh the risks of international isolation against the anticipated benefits of joint extraction.¹⁶ In some instances (contemporary Colombia, for example), international pressure renders joint extraction of illegal resources infeasible by imposing high costs on government participation. This externally-induced prohibition against joint extraction is a cause of violence and disorder because it forces the government into a lethal confrontation with drug cartels.

In sum, these various sticks and carrots provide the means by which rulers can build institutions of joint extraction and thus get a share of the income generated by lootable resources. Joint extraction is most likely to emerge where the ruler (1) can make a credible threat of enforcing no extraction if private actors refuse to share their income; (2) if the ruler can offer selective benefits such as legalization and protection from rivals; and (3) in the face of vulnerable diaspora groups with transnational business networks that give them access to overseas markets. If rulers succeed at building institutions of joint extraction, lootable wealth produces not disorder, but stability.¹⁷ This is the very opposite of what most existing research predicts.

The Breakdown of Joint Extraction

The breakdown of institutions of joint extraction deprives rulers of the revenue generated by lootable resources. This in turn contributes to instability by causing a fiscal crisis and making it easier for challengers to organize and get income. I highlight four key factors that can lead to the decay of joint extraction: shifts in the balance of power between private actors and rulers, a decrease in the value of lootable resources, bequeathability problems, and grievances.

Shifts in the Balance of Power

Shifts in the balance of power between rulers and private actors can destabilize joint extraction. Over time, private actors involved in joint extraction under the rulers' protection may accumulate enough wealth to acquire their own military forces, a situation that decreases the value of protection supplied by the rulers and makes it easier to resist their demands for revenue. Private actors who can supply their own protection (both from the rulers and competitors) may thus try to shift from joint to private extraction.¹⁸ In calculating whether to attempt such a move, private actors weigh the cost of fielding their own armies against the cost of sharing income with the rulers. They also consider the rulers' capacity to defeat their efforts to escape from joint extraction.

A weakening of the rulers' coercive capacities can also cause the decay of joint extraction, because loss of coercive capacity undermines the rulers' reputation as an actor to be feared and as a credible source of protection. Loss of coercive capacity can result from defeat in war and the failure to invest the revenue earned from joint extraction in maintaining the armed forces.

Decreasing Value of Lootable Resources

A decrease in the value of lootable resources can also undermine joint extraction and thereby reduce the amount of revenue available to rulers. Ironically, the very accumulation of wealth made possible by joint extraction with rulers can eventually cause private actors to seek to withdraw from such arrangements. As their fortunes grow, private actors face diminishing marginal returns from further resource extraction. Hence their costs of "exiting" from joint extraction should decrease over time, especially if they have managed to invest their fortunes overseas, beyond the reach of the rulers. Changes in the price and supply of a resource can destabilize institutions of joint extraction in a similar manner. For example, in the case of non-renewable resources, like precious gems and minerals, the anticipated value of future returns—and hence the costs to private actors of exiting from joint extraction—diminishes as the supply nears exhaustion.¹⁹

“Bequeathability” Problems

Institutions of joint extraction are often informal bargains rooted in personal ties among rulers, their cronies, and private elites.²⁰ Because of their personalistic nature, institutions of joint extraction may be difficult to transfer from one set of rulers to another. Hence these institutions are often vulnerable to collapse during episodes of leadership succession. Although such “bequeathability” problems may be especially acute during violent changes of leadership, they may nevertheless arise during peaceful successions. In peaceful transitions, the old rulers may aim to guarantee a large “pension” by taking their networks of joint extraction with them when they leave power. This move, which essentially converts the old framework of joint extraction into a framework of private extraction, can pose formidable obstacles for new rulers looking to control lootable resources.

Grievances

A final factor that can lead to the breakdown of joint extraction involves the grievances such institutions may generate among both included and excluded groups. With regard to included groups, grievances can emerge over how the income is divided. Also, problems of free-riding and shirking may arise, problems which the informal and personalistic nature of joint extraction is likely to exacerbate. With regard to excluded groups, the important role in joint extraction often played by mercantile diaspora groups, for example overseas Chinese and Lebanese, can generate a “nativist” backlash among local elites.

In sum, institutions of extraction mediate the effects of lootable resources on political order. If rulers are able to build institutions of joint extraction, lootable resources can produce political order by providing the revenue with which to govern. Conversely, the breakdown of joint extraction increases the risk of civil war by causing a fiscal crisis of the incumbent regime and making it easier for rebels to organize. Thus the political economy of extraction framework gets beyond an important limitation of existing research because it accounts both for disorder *and* order in the face of lootable wealth.

THE CONTRASTING CONSEQUENCES OF LOOTABLE WEALTH: SIERRA LEONE AND BURMA

This section applies the political economy of extraction framework and shows how a focus on institutions of extraction helps us better understand why lootable resources are linked with chaos in some instances and order in others. I select two countries—Sierra Leone and Burma—where lootable resources are associated with sharply contrasting political trajectories. In Sierra Leone, alluvial diamonds initially contributed to the maintenance of a *stable patrimonial regime* during the 1960s and 1970s, because rulers built institutions of joint extraction that gave them control of the income generated by diamonds. The subsequent breakdown of these institutions at the end of the 1980s caused a fiscal crisis that helps explain the country's collapse into civil war and *chaos* during the 1990s. Conversely, in Burma, opium initially fueled *chaos* by providing a key source of income for rebel armies. After 1990, however, lootable resources had a different effect: they contributed to the consolidation of a *stable military regime* that ended the civil war and forcibly imposed political order. The successful construction of institutions of joint extraction by the Burmese military transformed opium from a source of conflict into a source of order. In sum, the cases of Sierra Leone and Burma are important because they show the wide range of variation in political outcomes that can occur in countries with lootable resources: from a patrimonial regime, to a military regime, to chaos. These cases thus serve to demonstrate how my framework can be deployed in empirical analysis to explain the contrasting political consequences of lootable wealth.

From Order to Chaos: Diamonds and the Breakdown of a Patrimonial Regime in Sierra Leone

Sierra Leone during the 1990s is arguably the paradigmatic case of a collapsed state. It held the dismal title of “the worst place on earth” (Traub 2000). Yet until recently the country was not plagued by civil war and disorder. Siaka Stevens (1968–85) ruled Sierra Leone for nearly two decades and was able to transfer power peacefully to his chosen successor.²¹ Moreover, the very same lootable resources that later fueled Sierra

Leone's civil war—alluvial diamonds—provided the revenue with which Stevens governed. What explains the contrasting effects of diamonds across these two periods? Why were diamonds associated initially with political order and subsequently with chaos?

I argue that Stevens used a mix of negative and positive incentives to forge institutions of joint extraction with a minority diaspora community of Lebanese diamond merchants. These institutions gave Stevens access to the income generated by alluvial diamond mining, which, in turn, provided the resources he needed to maintain his patron–client networks and govern. Subsequent shifts in the balance of power between the ruler and the Lebanese merchants as well as bequeathability problems caused the decay of these institutions under Stevens's successor, Joseph Saidu Momoh (1985–1992). This institutional decay deprived the government of revenue, caused a deep fiscal crisis that rendered the state vulnerable to collapse, and made an important source of income—diamonds—more readily available to rebels.

Joint Extraction and Political Order: Economic Foundations of A Patrimonial Regime

When Stevens came to power in the late 1960s, he quickly moved to control Sierra Leone's diamonds. Although Stevens's political party—the All Peoples' Congress (APC)—had won national elections in 1967, it was initially prevented from taking office by a military coup in favor of the former ruling party, the Sierra Leone People's Party (SLPP). A countercoup in 1968 finally led to Stevens's installation as prime minister. The most pressing task facing the new ruler was to end the unregulated access to alluvial diamonds that traditional chiefs, who formed the core of the old ruling party, enjoyed in the country's principal diamond producing area (Clapham 1982; Cox 1976). To achieve this goal, Stevens aimed to build an alternative coalition among other groups in the diamond industry, especially the economically powerful Lebanese dealers, most of whom were involved in illicit diamond trading.

The Lebanese dealers had gained control of a large share of Sierra Leone's diamonds by financing gangs of poor African miners. A system of “supporters” and “tributors” emerged in which African miners supplied diamonds to Lebanese dealers in

exchange for food, equipment, and credit (Van der Laan 1965; Zack-Williams 1990; and Zack-Williams 1995). Because of their transnational connections in the Middle East and Europe, the Lebanese dealers had access to networks for raising capital and marketing diamonds. The important position of the Lebanese in the diamond trade combined with their connections abroad, which gave them access to credit, made the Lebanese dealers attractive business partners for Stevens. Their status as foreigners further strengthened their appeal as allies: because they were not citizens, the Lebanese were excluded from seeking office and thus posed little direct political threat to Stevens. Thus Stevens aimed to make the Lebanese diamond traders the cornerstone of his strategy for securing revenue (Reno 1995, 72–73; and Van der Laan, 1975).

The Lebanese were in a weak position to resist Stevens's efforts to make them share their wealth. First, the Lebanese dealers were pariah "outsiders" who were far more vulnerable to threats of legal sanctions than native, African dealers. Indeed, after Sierra Leone's independence from Britain in 1961, the Lebanese were denied citizenship, and, under Stevens's predecessors, they increasingly became targets of government discrimination. Thus the threat of government harassment or prosecution was a potent tool for earning the allegiance of the Lebanese. According to William Reno (1995, 110), "For dealers, Stevens's favor was one of the only ways to protect their access to diamonds."

In addition to the negative incentive of the threat of government harassment, Stevens also used selective benefits to cement his alliance with the Lebanese. First, the Ministry of Mines pursued an active policy of favoritism toward Lebanese in the issuance of mining and dealing licenses. Lebanese dealers received the bulk of new licenses: during the first five years of Stevens's rule, the share of diamond dealing licenses held by individuals of Lebanese heritage increased from 15 to 78 percent (Reno 1995, 90). Moreover, Stevens used government troops to weaken economic competitors to the Lebanese. His paramilitary force, the Internal Security Unit (ISU), suppressed illicit alluvial mining outside Lebanese-controlled channels.²² Stevens even put ISU detachments at the disposal of his Lebanese cronies. This favoritism soon led to the consolidation of the diamond industry under Lebanese control.

Stevens's collaboration with the Lebanese subsequently extended beyond the diamond industry. During the late 1970s and early 1980s, the Lebanese dealers were a key source of finance for a wide array of government activities. Lebanese capital helped finance imports of rice and oil, construction of police barracks, and the building of facilities for a major Organization of African Unity (OAU) conference. Lebanese dealers also procured loans from foreign banks to cover shortfalls in government revenues. These private creditors, which included Beirut banks, accepted illicit diamond exports as collateral (Reno 1995, 135–37).

In sum, Stevens's success at building institutions of joint extraction provided the revenue that made it possible to maintain a stable patrimonial regime for nearly two decades.

The Breakdown of Joint Extraction: Fiscal Roots of State Collapse

The institutions of joint extraction built by Stevens began to decay during the latter period of his rule. First, the Lebanese merchants become increasingly less dependent on Stevens. Ironically, the wealth the Lebanese acquired under Stevens allowed them to hire personal armies that made the dictator's protection increasingly dispensable.²³ This build-up of private armies was paralleled by a weakening of the regime's coercive capabilities. In a pattern typical of patrimonial dictators, Stevens undermined the regular army in an effort to prevent a military coup. He limited military recruitment to a mere 2000 troops (in a country of 4.2 million) and relied increasingly on paramilitary forces loyal to his person. Thus the balance of coercive power began to shift in favor of the Lebanese diamond traders, leading some Sierra Leoneans to wonder whether Stevens had become the client of a "White [i.e., Lebanese] President" (Reno 1995, 151).

In the context of these factors weakening the incentives for the Lebanese to share their wealth with the ruler, the transfer of power in 1985 from the aging Stevens to Major General Joseph Momoh led to the breakdown of joint extraction. Momoh faced mounting problems when he took office. The country was in the grip of an economic crisis and faced increasing pressure from international creditors. To resolve this crisis, Momoh desperately needed to gain control of the country's diamonds. However, the network of

rogue state officials and Lebanese traders inherited from the Stevens era posed a formidable barrier to Momoh's efforts to achieve this goal. Moreover, Momoh lacked the coercive resources of his predecessor, given that Stevens had reduced the size of the army to just 2000 troops. Indeed, it was precisely Momoh's weak power base that made him attractive to Stevens as a successor, because the old dictator intended to stay in Sierra Leone and enjoy his wealth there.²⁴ Stevens thus wanted to insure that his successor would be too weak to threaten his business networks with the Lebanese (Reno 1998, 115–18).

Momoh proved incapable of challenging the personal control Stevens and his Lebanese associates held over the country's resources—they continued to dominate commerce in Sierra Leone. Momoh's inability to loosen the grip of the old dictator and his cronies over the country's mineral wealth can be seen in the fact that official diamond exports were only \$22,000 in 1988, whereas Momoh's rivals, the Lebanese syndicates, were exporting diamonds estimated to be worth \$250 million per year. And in 1989, only twelve carats, or 0.0003 percent of the amounts common in the mid-1970s, were exported through official channels. This led to a sharp drop in government revenues (Reno 1995, 160; and Reno 1998, 120).

The trend of declining government revenue had begun under Stevens: by the mid-1980s, an estimated 70 percent of exports left the country through non-formal, non-taxable channels, and little revenue went into the state treasury (Reno 1995, 151–52). Yet the “informalization” of export revenues under Stevens did not immediately jeopardize political stability, because most of the income still went into the hands of the ruler, his supporters, and his paramilitary forces. In Momoh's case, however, the informalization of export revenues caused a destabilizing fiscal crisis because he had failed to inherit, penetrate, or supplant the informal commercial networks formed under Stevens. Lack of revenue made it impossible for Momoh to pay the army. When a rebel force, the Revolutionary United Front (RUF), launched an invasion from Liberia in 1991, Sierra Leone's underfunded and disorganized military disintegrated.²⁵ Thus the RUF swiftly seized control of Sierra Leone's diamond fields and used the income from diamonds to finance a decade of violence and chaos.

From Chaos to Order: Drugs and the Reequilibration of a Military Regime in Burma

Until 1990, Burma seemed to fit the view that lootable resources breed disorder. Some 25 ethnic armies mobilized in Burma's remote frontiers, and many of these insurgencies were financed through cultivation and trafficking of opium. After 1990, opium production increased dramatically, and this illegal crop became the country's most important export. Yet the opium boom of the 1990s did not strengthen the hand of the rebels. Rather, the boom was associated with the *demobilization* of the largest insurgent groups and with the successful imposition of political order by the military regime. Why did *more* lootable resources produce *less* disorder? I argue that the opium boom contributed to the emergence of political order in the 1990s because (1) opium provided a lucrative "exit option" for rebels, making it easier for the military to demobilize them, and (2) the military built institutions of joint extraction with the erstwhile rebels that gave it a large share of the opium revenues.

Demobilization into Narcotics: Opium as an Exit Option for Insurgents

The transformation of opium from a source of disorder into a source of order began with a political crisis in Burma's urban areas in the late 1980s. After the military brutally suppressed anti-government riots by university students, thousands of students fled to the border areas, which were under the control of insurgent ethnic armies. Thus the military government faced the strong threat of an alliance between students and ethnic insurgents (Lintner 1998, 168). This situation made it imperative for the government to resolve the longstanding insurgencies in the hinterlands. The opium economy provided an important tool for achieving this goal. In exchange for signing "standfast" agreements and refraining from attacking the Burmese army, insurgent groups were tacitly given control over the drug trade in their zones.²⁶ The most powerful insurgent army—the Communist Party of Burma (CPB)—was essentially demobilized into opium, as CPB commanders were given free rein to engage in any kind of business to sustain themselves, which "in the mountainous parts of the CPB's former 'liberated area,' inevitably meant developing the local drug industry" (Lintner 1998, 166). As a result of the cease-fire,

production of opium boomed, more than doubling between 1986 and 1996, and heroin refineries proliferated across the CPB's former territory. Thus the CPB became the "most heavily armed drug trafficking organization in Southeast Asia" (Lintner 1999, 368). By 1997, the Burmese military had forged similar steadfast agreements with most of the country's insurgent groups. Narcotics became Burma's largest export, pumping more than half-a-billion dollars annually into the economy, an amount that exceeded the government's official tax revenues (Dapice 1998, 154; Gelbard 1998, 186–87; Lintner 1998, 170–72; Lintner 1999, 403).

In sum, narcotics helped make political order possible in Burma during the 1990s by providing a lucrative incentive for insurgent groups to demobilize and cease their rebellions. Ironically, had this lootable resource *not* been available as an exit option for insurgents, it is likely that Burma's protracted civil war would have lasted even longer.

Joint Extraction and Political Order: A Narco-Military Regime.

In addition to helping the Burmese army demobilize insurgents, narcotics also became an important revenue source for the military government. During the 1990s, the government built institutions of joint extraction with former insurgents, thereby gaining a large share of the income generated by narcotics. This revenue enabled the regime to weather the international embargo imposed after the suppression of university students and pro-democracy activists in the late 1980s.

The military government provided a range of positive inducements for rebels-turned-drug-traffickers to share their wealth. First, the government made it easier to launder ill-gotten profits by offering a "tax amnesty" in 1990, which gave businessmen the chance to declare and pay a flat, 25 percent tax on assets they could not document had been obtained legally. The program generated an estimated 100 million dollars in revenue for the government (Lintner 1999, 387). Moreover, the introduction in 1993 of Foreign Exchange Certificates denominated in US dollars helped drug traffickers repatriate their off-shore foreign exchange deposits. Thus drug profits that had previously been earned and banked outside Burma were increasingly deposited in domestic banks run by the military (Gelbard 1998, 191). The Union of Myanmar Economic Holdings, Ltd. (UMEH), owned by active and retired military personnel and registered in 1990 under the

Ministry of Defense's Directorate of Procurement, reportedly served as a major conduit for laundering drug money.²⁷

The military government also used its legal authority to provide selective benefits to drug traffickers. For example, Lo Hsing-Han, who was known as the "King of the Golden Triangle" in the 1970s and later helped broker the cease-fire agreement between the military and the CPB, lived in luxury in Rangoon, where he played golf with senior Burmese generals and ran his business empire. Khun Sa, who had been indicted on charges of drug trafficking by a US federal grand jury in 1989 and whom the US Ambassador to Burma called "the worst enemy the world has," turned himself in and demobilized his M \ddot{o} ng Tai Army (MTA) in a grandiose ceremony in 1996 (McCoy 1999; and Lintner 1999, 378–79). Khun Sa's "capture" allowed the Burmese military to bask in the praise of the US Drug Enforcement Administration. Yet Khun Sa was reportedly living happily under government protection in Rangoon with four new teenage wives. Moreover, Khun Sa's capture proved an economic boon to him. Not only did being captured free him from the significant expense of maintaining a large private army, it also opened new investment opportunities in the legal economy. Thus, soon after his arrest, Khun Sa made major investments in real estate, the hotel industry, and in a new motorway from Rangoon to Mandalay. Other narcotics kingpins reportedly saw Khun Sa's deal with the government as a model and sought to make "Khun Sa-style agreements" (Lintner 1999, 412–13).

As a result of the government's alliance with drug traffickers, profits from narcotics were increasingly invested in legitimate businesses in Burma, rather than being laundered abroad in Thailand or Hong Kong, as they had previously been. This stemming of "capital flight" resulted in a boom in construction, restaurants, and luxury cars in Mandalay and Rangoon, and during the 1990s the directory of the Myanmar Chamber of Commerce and Industry read like a "who's who in the drug trade." Thus a US State Department report concluded that the former leaders of insurgencies had benefited immensely from their good relationship with the regime: "Their businesses—legitimate and illegitimate—have prospered, [and] there has been no progress in reducing opium cultivation or in stopping the heroin-trafficking activities of ethnic armies now considered part of the 'legal fold'" (Lintner 1998, 178). And US Secretary of State

Madelaine Albright succinctly described an important aspect of joint extraction in Burma when she remarked, “Drug traffickers who once spent their days leading mule caravans down jungle tracks are now leading figures in [Burma’s] new political order” (Lintner 1999, 413).

By building institutions of joint extraction, the Burmese military transformed narcotics from a “honey pot” for hinterland rebels into the main pillar of the national economy. Thus lootable wealth helped an internationally ostracized and investment-starved military dictatorship keep its grip on power and impose political order.

SUMMARY AND CHALLENGES FOR FUTURE RESEARCH

Does lootable wealth breed disorder? Not always and never directly. The effects of lootable resources on political order are mediated by institutions of extraction. If rulers are able to build institutions of joint extraction, lootable resources can provide the revenue with which to govern and thus produce not disorder, but stability. Yet if joint extraction breaks down, or, alternatively, if rulers fail to achieve it in the first place, then lootable resources increase the risk of civil war by making it easier for insurgents to organize and get the income with which to rebel.

A focus on institutions of extraction gets beyond an important limitation of most existing research on civil war and collapsed states: the failure to explain why lootable wealth is associated with disorder in some instances and order in others. First, the *breakdown* of joint extraction helps account for the strong and positive correlation between lootable wealth and civil war observed in recent studies. Second, the *construction* of joint extraction helps explain the many cases where lootable wealth does not produce civil war: if institutions of joint extraction are built, then lootable resources can “breed” order. Thus the political economy of extraction framework provides a foundation for a more powerful theory of state collapse and civil war, one that accounts both for disorder *and* order in the face of lootable wealth.

To show how the framework explains the contrasting political consequences of lootable resources, I provide an empirical analysis of Sierra Leone and Burma. In Sierra Leone, income from alluvial diamonds sustained a stable patrimonial regime for nearly two decades. Similarly, revenue from opium helped a military regime in Burma

demobilize insurgent groups and keep power. By contrast, the decay of institutions of joint extraction in Sierra Leone caused a fiscal crisis that weakened the regime and helped rebels take control of the country's diamond fields. And the absence of institutions of joint extraction in Burma before 1990 left insurgent groups in undisputed control of opium revenue and thus contributed to Burma's protracted civil war.

This study poses several challenges for future research. One task involves further theorizing and empirical testing. This entails two steps: first, fine-tuning the theoretical framework by using it to formulate a set of more precise hypotheses and, second, collecting better data on lootable resources and also on institutions of extraction. A fruitful way to generate testable hypotheses is to get beyond the broad distinction between lootable and non-lootable wealth by focusing on different types of lootable resources.²⁸ For example, joint extraction and, hence, political order should be more likely in the face of detectable and, counter-intuitively, illegal resources, because such resources make it easier for rulers to deliver a credible threat of no extraction. Non-mobile and "point" resources—those that are spatially concentrated—should have a similar effect. Moreover, joint extraction should be easier to sustain in the face of lootable resources with a renewable and elastic supply, for example, illicit crops as opposed to precious gems, because the anticipated value of future returns may be greater in the case of renewable resources. In sum, a focus on *varieties* of lootable resources could help fine-tune the framework by generating testable hypotheses.

Carrying out further tests of the theory also requires better data. Some of the most widely read quantitative studies rely on invalid measures of lootable resources, using "primary commodity exports" as a proxy for lootable wealth.²⁹ In addition to lumping lootable resources, like alluvial diamonds and opium, with non-lootable resources, like petroleum and copper, this measure blurs important distinctions among lootable resources themselves, such as legality, detectability, mobility, and elasticity of supply. As noted, a focus on such distinctions can help generate testable hypotheses. Thus more nuanced and valid quantitative measures of lootable resources will make it easier to test the theoretical framework proposed in this article.

Better data are also needed on institutions of extraction, especially on the terms of joint extraction agreements, how rulers enforce these agreements, and how such

agreements break down. Because recent research has overlooked the important role played by institutions of extraction in producing order and disorder, few data have been systematically collected on these institutions.³⁰ Yet such data are indispensable if we wish to understand political order in contemporary developing countries.

In addition to further theorizing and empirical testing, another task for future research concerns how a political economy of extraction perspective can be integrated with and strengthen existing models of the initiation of civil war. Because institutions of extraction help determine how much income is available to rulers, a focus on such institutions could improve models of the onset of civil war that emphasize variation in government spending on counterinsurgency (see, for example, Grossman 1999). Moreover, a focus on institutions of extraction could strengthen “rebel-centered” models of the initiation of civil war that highlight the motives, strategies, and capabilities of insurgents (Gates 2002). Such models beg the crucial prior question of how and why the *ancien régime* was rendered vulnerable to insurgency in the first place.³¹ A focus on the decay of institutions of joint extraction helps fill this gap. At the same time, it bears emphasis that the breakdown of joint extraction, while important, is not a sufficient explanation for the onset of conflict: Insurgent groups still have to organize and seize the opportunities for rebellion afforded by this breakdown. Thus a dual focus on institutions of extraction and on the strengths and strategies of rebels could provide a more powerful theory of the initiation of civil war.

A related issue involves how a focus on the political economy of extraction could improve our understanding of the *termination* of civil war. Recent research has tended to focus on the *martial* and *juridical* aspects of peacebuilding—for example, how to achieve a professional military and police force as well as a competent judiciary. By contrast, this study highlights the *fiscal* side of peacebuilding, and it shows that lootable resources can be transformed from a source of conflict into a source of order.³² The case of Burma, where an opium boom helped the military regime demobilize insurgencies, raises the intriguing possibility that, rather than just being a “honey pot” that generates and prolongs conflict, lootable resources can also play an important role in conflict resolution. This insight challenges the widely-held view that lootable wealth, in addition to causing civil war, also poses an important barrier to ending it, because lucrative opportunities that

arise during wartime for profiting from lootable resources are often not available during peacetime.³³ To support this argument that peace is “bad for business” in places with lootable wealth, these studies point to cooperative plunder among enemy forces in cases such as Angola, Liberia, Cambodia, and Bosnia.³⁴ Yet in Burma peace actually proved *better* for business than war, because the returns from opium increased dramatically after cease-fire agreements were reached between the military and the insurgents. Indeed, battlefield cooperation among combatants in looting could even strengthen subsequent peacebuilding efforts by providing a foundation of “social capital” (that is, trust and interpersonal ties) on which to build post-conflict institutions of resource sharing and joint extraction. The challenge of converting lootable resources from a source of chaos into a source of order is at the top of the policy agenda for the world’s many resource-rich, yet conflict-ridden, countries.

A final question for future research concerns the relationship between lootable resources and democracy. This study has explained how and why lootable resources can provide the economic foundations for political order under different kinds of non-democratic regimes (for example, patrimonial and military dictatorships). Can lootable resources also provide an economic basis for stable *democratic* regimes? What kinds of institutions of extraction make lootable resources more or less compatible with democratic political systems? Cases like Bolivia, Botswana, and Peru, which have democratic regimes *and* abundant lootable wealth, could help us answer these questions. Such cases may also offer important insights about how to achieve democracy in the many other resource-rich countries that, like Sierra Leone and Burma, have historically lacked democratic regimes.

Studies that address issues such as these will provide a far better understanding of the wide range of political possibilities—from chaos, through dictatorship, to democracy—in countries with lootable wealth.

ENDNOTES

¹ See especially Collier and Hoeffler (1998; 2000) and De Soysa (2000), who find a strong and significant correlation between lootable resources and civil war. This finding has not been successfully replicated in all subsequent studies, leading some to argue that lootable resources affect the *duration* of civil wars, yet do not affect their initiation (see Fearon and Laitin 2003). One explanation for the contradictory and often inconclusive findings of recent quantitative research on resources and civil war concerns the lack of valid measures and data on lootable resources. For an overview of recent quantitative research on the civil war–resources relationship, see Ross (forthcoming).

² Burma is known today as Myanmar.

³ The concept of regime “reequilibrium” is from Linz (1978).

⁴ This, of course, is a core insight of the vast literature on state-building in Western Europe. I seek to adapt elements of this literature to the contemporary period and to developing countries. See Ardant (1975); Levi (1988); Schumpeter (1991); Tilly (1990); and Weber (1978).

⁵ Building the model around these two actors involves trade-offs. On the one hand, this focus has the virtue of parsimony, which makes the initial stages of theory-building more tractable. On the other hand, the influence of international actors, including foreign states, multinational companies, international organizations, and diaspora communities, is not incorporated directly into the model. Although the present analysis does situate rulers and private actors within the international context, the task of adding international actors to the model is left to future research.

⁶ State-owned petroleum companies are not necessarily fully owned by the government—they may be partnerships with private investors. Such partnerships should be regarded as instances of what I call *joint*, rather than public, extraction. On the varied strategies that rulers use to develop oil, gas, and other natural resources, see Jones Luong and Weintal (2001).

⁷ Yet rulers also wish to stay in power, and few rulers can survive if they plunder everything and completely “crowd out” private actors. This constraint on “total” public extraction is probably greater in weakly diversified economies, where there is just one lucrative economic activity. By contrast, in a diversified economy rulers can monopolize the most lucrative sectors and still leave enough income-generating opportunities for societal groups to survive. Thus the complexity and diversity of the economy, in particular the size of the lootable sector in relation to the overall economy, influence rulers’ preferences over the institutional outcomes I have defined. Because this study is only a first step toward building a theory of political order in the face of lootable wealth, I leave to future research the task of incorporating into the model variation in overall economic structure.

⁸ Depending on how the rulers actually *use* the income at their disposal, public extraction can enable them to provide collective goods, such as security and economic infrastructure. In the case of “benevolent” rulers who provide welfare-enhancing public goods, private actors could conceivably prefer public to no extraction. Regardless of the type of ruler, however, private actors prefer private and joint extraction over the alternatives.

⁹ On economic barriers to entry and state-building, see Shafer (1994).

¹⁰ On the important distinction between “diffuse source” and “point source” resources, see Auty (2001), and Le Billon (2001).

¹¹ In the 1980s, the Noriega regime in Panama and the Garcia Meza regime in Bolivia attempted to institutionalize a public monopoly over illegal drugs. The United States prevented these initiatives from succeeding.

¹² Another way of putting this is to say that public extraction is so costly to rulers that it becomes a second, or even third, best option after joint extraction.

¹³ According to Richards (1996, 50), “When state authorities step into [the diamond economy in Sierra Leone], it is not to ensure the state exchequer its fair share of revenue, but to take a ‘cut’ in

return for protection from political or bureaucratic harassment.” On the logic of protection, see Gambetta (1993).

¹⁴ During the early 1980s in Bolivia, large-scale cocaine traffickers paid off key members of the military government to drive smaller and medium-sized traffickers out of the market. This strategy “served two purposes: to convince the United States that the government was seriously combating drug traffickers, and to put the large [traffickers] on notice that the military government required a larger share of their profits” (Gamarra 1999, 179).

¹⁵ For example, in the 1990s, the military government of Burma relaxed regulations on foreign exchange, thus making it easier for drug lords to repatriate profits. In the 1980s, the democratic government of Colombia implemented a similar measure—the so-called “sinister window.”

¹⁶ Of course, the optimal strategy for a ruler may be to “double dip”—that is, crack down on enough illicit production to convince the US Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA) and the wider international community of a good faith effort to fight the war on drugs, while surreptitiously reaping the benefits of joint extraction with drug traffickers. The incentives and monitoring capacities of external drug enforcement agencies will determine the feasibility of such a strategy.

¹⁷ The argument that institutions produce political order is powerfully made in Huntington (1968). Huntington focuses on political institutions, especially parties, rather than economic institutions.

¹⁸ Indeed, the very protection provided by rulers may ironically enable private actors to accumulate the wealth they subsequently use to acquire their own forces and dispense with the rulers’ protection.

¹⁹ This effect should *not* occur in the case of lootable resources with an elastic, renewable supply—for example, illegal crops.

²⁰ This is especially true for illegal resources.

²¹ This is not to say that all was tranquil in Sierra Leone during Stevens’s tenure. Stevens survived an attempted coup in 1971 and later faced demonstrations by students in 1977 that forced him to call a general election. Yet Stevens kept power, and the country did not experience anything close to the near anarchy of the 1990s.

²² Locals morbidly referred to the ISU as “I Shoot You.” See Reno (1995, 107).

²³ The growing power of the Lebanese can be seen in the attack by the private army of one of the largest Lebanese dealers against the house of a popular Sierra Leonean politician after a dispute (Reno 1995, 151).

²⁴ According to Hirsch (2001, 30), Momoh’s “only claim on the nation’s top position was his sycophantic and fawning loyalty to his leader [that is, Stevens]. Momoh was notoriously inept.”

²⁵ The RUF received financial support and equipment from the Liberian warlord, Charles Taylor, who sought access to the diamond regions of Sierra Leone in order to fund his effort to take control of Liberia. See Hirsch (2001, ch. 1).

²⁶ Until 1990, with the exception of petty bribes extracted by front-line military officers, the government of Burma was essentially shut out of the opium trade. The bulk of the profits were made in Thailand, where raw opium was refined into heroin, and these profits were invested outside Burma (Boucaud and Boucaud 1992; and Yawngwe 1993).

²⁷ UMEH controlled the Myawaddy Bank, which advertised “prompt, accurate, secure and secret” service (Lintner 1998, 180).

²⁸ See Le Billon (2001) and Ross (2003) for efforts to build typologies of lootable resources.

²⁹ See, for example, Collier and Hoeffler (2000). On the invalidity of primary commodity exports as a measure of lootable wealth, see Fearon and Laitin (2003).

³⁰ The frequently informal nature of institutions of extraction, especially in the case of illegal resources, makes it difficult, and even dangerous, to get data. Still, many country studies contain rich information about institutions of extraction.

³¹ This point is made by Skocpol (1979) in her critique of “purposive” models of revolution.

³² Wood (forthcoming) focuses on the distributional aspects of peacebuilding.

³³ Collier (2000); Keen (1998); and Keen (2000).

³⁴ On Liberia, see Ellis (1999). On Bosnia, see Judah (1997).

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