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CONSERVATIVE PARTIES, DEMOCRACY, AND ECONOMIC REFORM IN CONTEMPORARY BRAZIL

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ABSTRACT

In this paper we analyze conservative parties in Brazil, focusing on the post-1985 democracy but with some attention to earlier periods as well. We develop four main themes. First, conservative parties in Brazil have been successful at maintaining political power. Our second major theme is that compared to the center and left, Brazil's conservative parties have several distinctive features. Third, there are significant differences among the conservative parties. Our final major theme is that the conservative pole in the party system is changing.

RESUMEN

En este artículo analizamos a los partidos conservadores en Brasil, concentrándonos en el período democrático posterior a 1985, pero prestando también alguna atención a períodos anteriores. Desarrollamos cuatro tesis principales. En primer lugar, que los partidos coservadores en Brasil han tenido éxito en mantener poder político. Nuestra segunda tesis es que los partidos conservadores de Brasil tienen varias características que los distinguen tanto del centro como de la izquierda. Tercero, que hay significativas diferencias entre los partidos conservadores. Nuestra cuarta tesis principal es que el polo conservador en este sistema de partidos está cambiando.

In this paper we analyze conservative parties in Brazil, focusing on the post-1985 democracy but with some attention to earlier periods as well. We develop four main themes. First, conservative parties in Brazil have been successful at maintaining political power. Conservative parties were pillars of the oligarchic order from their creation in the 1830s until 1930. With the introduction of basically fair competitive elections and mass suffrage in 1945, they established themselves as the hegemonic electoral force in congressional elections until 1962. They helped engineer the 1964 military coup, then became a powerful junior partner in the military regime of 1964–85.

Since 1985, in Brazil's second 'experiment with democracy,'[1] conservative parties have consistently been part of the governing coalition at the national level, and they have fared well electorally. Remarkably in view of the discredit of the military regime by 1985, in the mid to late 1990s conservatives have succeeded in revitalizing their programmatic image. Once viewed as retrograde by large sectors of the society, today, under the aegis of a somewhat successful centrist president (Fernando Henrique Cardoso, 1995–present) who has embraced much of the conservative economic agenda, conservatives are again able to publicly articulate what they stand for without fear of ridicule.

While emphasizing conservative dominance throughout Brazilian history, we do not intend to imply that there have been no serious challenges to conservative hegemony. Getúlio Vargas, president from 1930 to 1945, dismayed some conservatives by beginning to incorporate the urban popular classes into the political system. The second time Vargas was president (1951–4) he implemented measures that conservatives disdained; so did President Juscelino Kubitschek (1956–60). The populist reformist government of President João Goulart (1961–4) represented a particularly stiff challenge—one that conservatives could not tolerate, so they fostered and supported a military coup and the ensuing dictatorship. Throughout the 1946–61 period, conservative politicians shared power at the national level and had to make concessions, some of which they regarded as significant. Similarly, they have shared power in the post-1985 democracy, during which time they have again experienced some defeats. But in broad historical and comparative perspective, conservative politicians in Brazil have done well electorally and politically. With the exception of 1963–4, they have been part of the governing coalition at the national level since Brazil's independence in 1822.

Our second major theme is that compared to the center and left, Brazil's conservative parties have several distinctive features. Rightist parties are more likely to favor neoliberal

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[1] The allusion here is to Thomas E. Skidmore's classic *Politics in Brazil, 1930–1964: An Experiment in Democracy* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1967).

economic policies and are more conservative on issues such as law and order, abortion, and family morality. Most conservative parties fare best electorally among relatively poor, less educated, and older voters. They also do best in small counties (*municípios*) and in the poor regions, especially the Northeast. Organizationally, conservative parties are marked by significant cross-state differences, low discipline and loyalty, reliance on clientelism, and personalistic campaign styles.

Third, there are significant differences among the conservative parties. Some have an articulate and coherent conservative discourse and do best among well-educated and better-off voters and in the more developed regions of the country. Others are less ideological and more clientelistic or personalistic; they generally fare best among less educated voters in smaller counties.

Our final major theme is that the conservative pole in the party system is changing. We highlight three changes. First, since the late 1980s the conservative parties appear to have ended and perhaps even reversed the long-term downward electoral trend they experienced between 1945 and 1964 and again, after an upward spike promoted by the military regime, between 1970 and 1982. Second, in the post-1985 period the conservative parties have accepted democracy more than ever before. Third, conservative parties are less dependent electorally on the poor regions than was the case in the past. The poor regions are still conservative strongholds, but the gap between conservatives' electoral fate in the wealthy and poor regions appears to be narrowing.

Rethinking the Notion of Conservative Parties

In his excellent book[2] Edward Gibson proposes this definition: "[C]onservative parties are parties that draw their core constituencies from the upper strata of society… A party's core constituencies are those sectors of society that are most important to its political agenda and resources. Notwithstanding the many valuable contributions of Gibson's book, this definition is problematic, and the Brazilian case illustrates the flaws.

Gibson provides four criteria for assessing whether conservative parties' core constituency is the upper strata. First, a conservative party draws disproportionately on the upper classes for its electoral support. This criterion has insuperable empirical problems. In Brazil, as we show later, the main conservative parties have disproportionately drawn their support from less educated and lower income respondents. By 'disproportionately' we indicate that supporters of conservative parties are slightly poorer and less educated than the mean for the Brazilian

electorate. Several important conservative populists have overwhelmingly drawn their electoral support from the lower classes. One example was Fernando Collor de Mello, who won the 1989 presidential election. His electoral base was the poor and uneducated; he fared poorly among the wealthy and educated. Conversely, respondents from the highest income category sampled in surveys (with a family income of 50 or more minimum salaries) are more likely to identify with a leftist than a rightist party.

Gibson's second criterion is that conservative parties can be identified by distinctive patterns of financial support. Whether it is actually the case that programmatically conservative parties can be identified in this manner, however, is an untested and uncertain proposition. In Brazil, for example, it is not ex-ante obvious that conservative parties have different bases of financial support from the centrist parties. Third, Gibson suggests examining programmatic positions—a move we fully endorse. But the relationship between programmatic positions and the other criteria Gibson uses is opaque. Finally, Gibson advocates looking at "the social interests most consistently advanced by the party" (14). But, as he recognizes, determining what interests a party advances is problematic. The analyst would ultimately need to decide, on uncertain empirical grounds, which groups a party intends to favor or which ones it actually does favor. He/she would probably make the decision about whether a party primarily benefits the upper strata on programmatic grounds. It is also not clear whether a party would be conservative if it met some of these four criteria but not others. In sum, notwithstanding Gibson's many important contributions, identifying conservative parties by their core constituencies is problematic.

In our view, conservative parties should be defined according to programmatic positions. Using programmatic positions to identify conservative parties is neither difficult nor in most Latin American cases controversial, because parties can be consistently differentiated from others in terms of their preferred policies and their left-right location. Although conservative parties in Brazil do not loudly trumpet themselves as such, political elites clearly differentiate conservative parties from the rest in surveys of the national congress.[3] Moreover, conservative parties can be readily identified through analysis of legislative voting.[4] We cannot identify conservatives by an

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[2] Edward Gibson, *Class and Conservative Parties: Argentina in Comparative Perspective* (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1996), 7.

[3] Timothy J. Power, *Elites, Institutions, and Democratization: The Political Right in Postauthoritarian Brazil* (College Station, PA: Pennsylvania State University Press, forthcoming); Leôncio Martins Rodrigues, *Quem é Quem na Constituinte: Uma Análise Sócio-Política dos Partidos e Deputados* (São Paulo: Oesp-Maltese, 1987).

[4] Maria D'Alva Gil Kinzo, "O Quadro Constituinte Partidário e a Constituinte" in Bolívar Lamounier, ed., *De Geisel a Collor: O Balanço da Transição* (São Paulo: IDESP/Sumaré, 1990), 105–34; Fernando Limongi and Argelina Cheibub Figueiredo, "Partidos Políticos na Câmara dos Deputados: 1989–1994," *Dados* 38 (3): 497–525.

unchanging set of ideological or policy preferences; conservatism is relational and evolves over time. But we can and should identify them by their policy positions as expressed above all in voting in the national congress. Later we identify the conservative parties in Brazil and note some issues on which they have held distinctive positions in the post-1985 period.

Conservative Parties under Oligarchic Rule: 1830s–1930

Until Getúlio Vargas became president in 1930, Brazil's political order was pervasively elitist and oligarchic. During this lengthy period conservative parties helped bolster the fundamentally conservative political order. During the empire (1822–89) the two main parties, the Liberals and Conservatives, were organizationally extremely weak, and power was fundamentally personal rather than organizational in nature. However, after their formation in the late 1830s, the Liberal and Conservative Parties were moderately important actors in the struggle for political power.[5] They were conduits to public office, which was a key pillar in the patrimonial political order.

As Middlebrook notes,[6] in many Latin American countries nineteenth-century conservatives and liberals were divided on important policy questions, often related to Church rights and privileges. In contrast, in Brazil the Conservatives and Liberals shared a similar outlook on most issues. Although Church/state conflict erupted on occasion, it was more episodic and usually less virulent than in most of Spanish America, and it did not form the basis for the conservative/liberal cleavage as it did in several other Latin American countries, including Chile and Colombia. Most of the political elite of both parties shared a secular viewpoint and thus did not conflict over religious questions.[7] The shared perspectives of Liberals and Conservatives fostered greater political stability than existed in most Latin American countries in the nineteenth century. The divide between them was more personal than policy driven.

Conservative parties created in the nineteenth century survived well into the twentieth in Chile, Colombia, Honduras, Paraguay, and Uruguay. In most of Latin America, however, the

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[5] See José Murilo de Carvalho, *A Construção da Ordem* (Rio de Janeiro: Campus, 1980); and Richard Graham, *Patronage and Politics in Nineteenth Century Brazil* (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1990). For an overview of Brazil's party systems beginning with the Empire, see Bolívar Lamounier and Rachel Meneguello, *Partidos Políticos e Consolidação Democrática: O Caso Brasileiro* (São Paulo: Brasiliense, 1986).

[6] Introduction to Kevin Middlebrook, ed., *Conservative Parties, the Right, and Democracy in Latin America* (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, forthcoming). The present paper will also appear as a chapter in this volume.

[7] See Thomas Bruneau, *The Political Transformation of the Brazilian Catholic Church* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1974), 11–37; and Scott Mainwaring, *The Catholic Church and Politics in Brazil, 1916–1985* (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1986), 25–42.

nineteenth-century parties did not survive. In Brazil the leaders of the 1889 military coup dissolved the two traditional parties, which never again reemerged.

The Old Republic (1889–1930) marked the demise of the monarchy, in name instituted a republic, and radically decentralized power to the states, but in most respects it provided continuity rather than change. The political order remained thoroughly elitist, conservative, and patrimonial; once again, political parties helped form and sustain it. There was no national party organization; instead, each state had its own Republican Party. These state-level Republican Parties were patrimonial, clientelistic machines that helped oil access to public office, public goods, and policies favorable to the elite who ran the party and the state. In most of the ascendant powerful states—São Paulo, Minas Gerais, Rio Grande do Sul—the Republican machines were a key pillar of the patrimonial order; in other states they were less central.

The coup that brought Getúlio Vargas to power in 1930 marked the end of the Old Republic. During Vargas's fifteen-year presidency conservative parties lost their sway, notwithstanding continuities in the political system. From 1930 until 1937 Vargas governed in supraparty fashion, and in 1937 he imposed a corporatist dictatorship and banned all parties. The Vargas years sparked national debate about issues of popular participation and redistribution, and his person and policies combined to introduce a new cleavage (for or against *getulismo*) within the national elite. Vargas initiated a long period, lasting until the 1980s, during which the state was a central agent in promoting economic development.

We conclude our brief analysis of the pre-1930 period with a comparative observation on the different paths followed by conservative party development in Latin America.[8] In comparing conservative party development, it is useful to initially distinguish between those countries where political competition and participation expanded earlier and those where it expanded later. In the former cases conservatives needed to organize mass parties (as opposed to parties of notables) and win popular sympathies or lose power.[9] In the latter cases they had little incentive to organize mass parties and cultivate popular electoral support. The need to win popular support did not ensure success in doing so, but it was a necessary condition for attempting to build mass parties.

These differences in historical patterns shaped early possibilities for the development of conservative parties. In Chile, Colombia, and Argentina fairly open political competition emerged at an early date. In Chile and Colombia significant and durable conservative parties formed on the right or center-right as political participation expanded in the nineteenth and early twentieth

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[8] Argentina, Brazil, Chile, Colombia, El Salvador, Peru, and Venezuela are the countries analyzed in *Conservative Parties, the Right, and Democracy in Latin America*, op. cit. n. 6.

centuries. In Argentina, conversely, no nationally competitive rightist party emerged following the collapse of the Conservative Party after 1912.

In El Salvador, Peru, Venezuela, and Brazil open electoral competition with a broadened franchise was a later development, so traditional elites had little opportunity and need to build conservative parties with a mass following. Political domination in all four countries remained personalistic and the regimes were authoritarian, albeit with differences from case to case. In Brazil the conservative parties—the Conservatives and Liberals in the Empire and the Republicans in the Old Republic—were more important than their counterparts in El Salvador and Venezuela, where political rule was openly authoritarian. In Brazil conservatives retained their dominant position through civilian governments that did not regularly rely on massive repression (though personalistic domination often was repressive, especially in the hinterlands). There were regular elections for office, including president, and a legislature functioned during most of the Empire and from 1894 to 1930. Clientelism and personalistic domination were more important than outright state repression in guaranteeing the conservative order.

Conservative Parties under Democracy, 1946–64

In 1945 Vargas was deposed by a military coup, paving the way to Brazil's first democratic government. The 1946 Republic permitted free elections and the expansion of suffrage, mobilizing huge numbers of new voters into the system and opening up spaces for new and diverse political appeals. For the first time, conservatives needed to win mass electoral support in free and fair elections, and they proved equal to the task. In few Latin American democracies has the electoral right consistently fared better than in Brazil. center-right and conservative parties were electorally successful in Brazil from the first elections in 1945 on. They dominated congressional elections in the 1940s and 1950s, and conservative candidates won the presidency in 1945 and 1960.

Among the seven countries just mentioned the challenge of building mass parties faced by conservatives in Brazil was closest to that confronting conservatives in Venezuela. Both countries' first experience with mass democracy emerged concurrently (1945–6 in Brazil, 1945 in Venezuela), so conservatives had to organize mass parties for the first time. Both political systems were oligarchic and authoritarian until 1945. In both cases the establishment of democracy in 1945–6 encouraged conservatives' efforts to build organizations with strong mass bases. But while the challenge facing conservatives was similar in the two countries, the

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[9] On the contrast between mass parties and parties of notables, see Giovanni Sartori, *Parties and Party Systems: A Framework for Analysis* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1976), 3–24.

outcome was different. Whereas Brazil has had some electorally powerful parties that are indisputably conservative, Venezuela has not, as Coppedge argues persuasively.[10] Moreover, in Brazil conservatives faced no serious threat until 1963–4; conservative and center parties were electorally dominant until then. In contrast, in Venezuela conservative forces felt imperiled by the left-leaning government of 1945–8 and almost immediately began conspiring against it.

The post-Vargas pluralization of elite politics did not signify the outright defeat of traditional conservative forces. Though conservatism suffered a steady electoral decline between 1945 and 1962, only in the period between 1961 and the 1964 military coup did the traditional elite lose the upper hand. Even though it experienced a steady erosion in its support, the *Partido Social Democrático*, or PSD, the conservative vehicle of *getulismo,* remained the largest party of this period. It was the largest party in the Chamber of Deputies until 1963. Despite its name, it bore little resemblance to European social democracy. Its dominant orientation was center-right. In her authoritative study of the PSD, Hippólito labels it a centrist party, but other scholars consider it a conservative party.[11] The PSD was one of two parties that were created by Getúlio Vargas in 1945 in order to preserve the extensive political machine he had built during his *Estado Novo* dictatorship (1937–45). The PSD was interwoven with long-established networks of rural domination in the less-developed regions. Born of the *Estado Novo* bureaucracy—most of the early leaders of the PSD had been Vargas-appointed executives, *interventores*, in state governments and capital cities—the party always had a close relationship to the state apparatus. The party was pragmatic, with a reputation for moderation and conciliation. While the PSD lost ground to other parties over time, its electoral record remained impressive, especially in the poor regions.

There were six indisputably conservative parties in the 1946–64 period. The *União Democrática Nacional* (UDN, National Democratic Union), the major unequivocally conservative party, was the second strongest electoral force for most of the 1946–64 period. The UDN was an umbrella party for sectors of the national oligarchy that opposed Getúlio Vargas and his populist policies. At the outset of the democratic regime the UDN's social base was similar to that of the PSD, being concentrated in rural areas and small towns. Over time, however, the UDN did better in urban areas and captured middle-class voters, especially in what is today the state of Rio de

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[10] "Venezuela: Conservative Representation without Conservative Parties" in *Conservative Parties, the Right, and Democracy in Latin America*, op. cit. n. 6.

[11] Lúcia Hippólito, *PSD: De Raposas e Refomistas* (Rio de Janeiro: Paz e Terra, 1985). Among those who regard the PSD as conservative are Glaucio Ary Dillon Soares, *Colégio Eleitoral, Convenções Partidárias e Eleições Diretas* (Petrópolis: Vozes, 1984), 44–55, and *Sociedade e Política no Brasil* (São Paulo: DIFEL, 1973); and Maria D'Alva Gil Kinzo, *Legal Opposition Politics under Authoritarian Rule in Brazil: The Case of the MDB, 1966–1979* (New York: St. Martin's, 1988).

Janeiro.[12] The UDN's discourse was vaguely liberal and antistatist, though plagued by

[12] See Soares, *Sociedade e Política no Brasil*, op. cit. n 11, 217–8. The classic work on the UDN is Maria Victória de Mesquita Benevides, *A UDN e o Udenismo: Ambiguidades do Liberalismo Brasileiro* (Rio de Janeiro: Paz e Terra, 1981).

contradictions. Its proclaimed support for democratic freedoms did not prevent it from twice supporting military intervention in presidential successions, and it endorsed the 1964 military coup. The smaller conservative parties included the *Partido Republicano* (PR), which was based mainly in Minas Gerais; the *Partido Libertador* (PL), based mainly in Rio Grande do Sul; the far right *Partido de Representação Popular* (PRP); the center-right Christian Democratic Party (PDC); and the PSP (Social Progressive Party).

While the PSD and UDN dominated in the early years of the 1946–64 regime, they lost ground steadily to the third major party, the PTB, a pro-Vargas populist party with a predominantly center-left orientation and strong urban base. By the time of the 1964 coup, the three parties' delegations to the Chamber of Deputies were roughly equal in size.

Conservative parties fared well electorally between 1945 and 1962. Nevertheless, a general tendency in Brazilian politics between 1946 and 1964 was the decline of the electoral right.[13] Despite some minor exceptions—for example, the late surge of the Christian Democrats—the trend was secular. In the federal Chamber of Deputies the share of seats held by the PSD and the six conservative parties declined from 86.4% in 1945 to 59.4% by 1962 (Table 1).

Table 1

Conservative Parties' Electoral Results, Chamber of Deputies, 1945–62
% Seats

	1945	1950	1954	1958	1962
PSD	52.8	36.8	35.0	35.3	28.9
UDN	26.9	26.6	22.7	21.5	22.2
PR	2.4	3.6	5.8	5.2	0.9
PPS	1.4	—	—	—	—
PL	0.3	1.7	2.5	0.9	1.2
PDC	0.7	0.7	0.6	2.1	4.9
UDN/PR	2.1	—	—	—	—
PRP		0.7	0.9	0.9	1.2
Conservative Total	86.4	70.0	67.5	66.0	59.4

Source: Hippólito, *PSD*, op. cit. n. 10, 276–85.

The decline of conservatism as an electoral force was only one element of a major transformation of the Brazilian political system between 1946 and 1964. Political changes took place against a backdrop of accelerated social change and economic growth. These changes

[13] This theme has been developed by Soares, *Sociedade e Política no Brasil*.

were reflected in the political system in the form of a dramatic rise in support for populist and progressive parties and candidates. This secular trend was evident within the dominant pro-Vargas coalition (PSD-PTB). While in 1945 the conservative PSD's congressional delegation was roughly seven times the size of that of the labor-based PTB, by 1963 the PTB was the senior partner. The PTB's success in the 1962 elections, combined with defections from other parties, made it the largest party in the Chamber of Deputies, and it was already the second largest in the Senate. More importantly, an unexpected historical twist—the resignation of President Jânio Quadros in August 1961—gave the presidency to Vice President João Goulart, the populist former Labor Minister and a protégé of Vargas. Goulart was widely distrusted by the right, which conspired with the armed forces to install a parliamentary system and reduce his presidential powers. When these powers were restored via a plebiscite in January 1963, Goulart's immediate opening to the left wing of his party fueled conservatives' fears.

By early 1964 the Brazilian political right had visibly lost the hegemony that it had enjoyed from 1945 until Quadros's resignation in 1961. The political initiative belonged to the populist and progressive forces identified with President Goulart. In this context, the armed forces intervened on 31 March 1964 to oust Goulart and reestablish a conservative governing coalition. The UDN and much of the PSD conspired against Goulart and supported the coup.

Conservative Parties and Military Rule, 1964–1985

The military coup that ended democracy in 1964 differed from previous interventions in that the armed forces did not return power to civilians in the short term. The presidency was occupied by army generals from 1964 to 1985, and the ultimate decision-making authority in Brazil rested with the army. Nevertheless, compared to the military dictatorships in Argentina, Chile, and Uruguay, one distinctive feature of military rule in Brazil was that the generals allowed elections for Congress, state assemblies, and mayors of most cities. Whereas the Argentine, Chilean, and Uruguayan dictatorships suppressed conservative parties, the Brazilian generals worked with and relied upon them.

The military coup was welcomed by the conservative parties. The first military president, Gen. Humberto Castello Branco, had little difficulty in securing many politicians' endorsements of the military government. In his first two years in office Castello Branco governed with the support of a majority faction in Congress, the *Bloco Parlamentar da Revolução*, still based on the old political parties of the 1945–64 period. Castello Branco's Second Institutional Act (AI–2) in October 1965 abolished all existing parties and imposed a two-party system. AI–2 marked the beginning of a political cleavage that would characterize Brazilian politics for a generation: authoritarians versus democrats.

In the wake of AI–2, nearly two-thirds of federal legislators and all 22 state governors (that is, those who survived the early political purges) joined the progovernment *Aliança Renovadora Nacional* (National Renovating Alliance, or ARENA) rather than the opposition *Movimento Democrático Brasileiro* (Brazilian Democratic Movement, or MDB).[14] ARENA was built largely on the foundations of the disbanded conservative parties. Given the partisan ancestry of its founders, it was clear that ARENA would be the new vehicle of political conservatism after AI–2. However, the nature of rightist politics had changed. Rather than belonging to several parties that competed with each other under democratic rules, the electoral right was now organized in *one* party in support of a military dictatorship.

The new conservative party had several tasks in the military regime. As part of a larger strategy to maintain the trappings of a democratic system—which involved an opposition party, regularly held elections, and the retention of the National Congress—ARENA was expected to generate legitimacy for the new regime. But ARENA was also expected to assist in the work of governing Brazil, thus permitting the military to enact its policies and programs within the states. From its creation ARENA did what the PSD and UDN had done so well earlier, which was to build political networks and clienteles within the vast, underdeveloped interior of the country. The first national elections under military rule, held in late 1966, established voting patterns that endured until the return of political democracy in 1985. ARENA dominated in the less-developed areas of Brazil, especially in the impoverished Northeast, whereas the opposition MDB had its best showings in the South and Southeast, the most developed regions of the country. Throughout the authoritarian period support for ARENA also varied inversely with urbanization.

Why did ARENA dominate in rural and small-town Brazil? These are areas where levels of political information are low and dependence on government resources is high, thus favoring the practice of patronage politics and the establishment of rural clienteles. Wherever indices of development were higher—and this includes the capital cities of poor states—ARENA performed poorly in elections. These patterns were so clearly defined that by the early 1980s, when the opposition vote was surging rapidly, ARENA's strength had become geographically restricted: the PDS, successor to ARENA, was dubbed by the press the 'party of the Northeast.'

During its first decade of existence ARENA was a servile junior partner in the ruling coalition. Under military rule ARENA-controlled state assemblies 'elected' ARENA state governors, though in fact these were usually selected by military presidents. These ARENA governors appointed ARENA mayors in most of the important cities in the state. Direct elections for governors were not restored until 1982, and mayors of state capitals and many other cities were not directly elected until November 1985 (after the military had withdrawn from power).

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[14] Margaret Jenks, "Political Parties in Authoritarian Brazil" (PhD dissertation, Duke University,

Among civilians meaningful executive power was therefore reserved for ARENA/PDS politicians until 1982. Only in what is today the state of Rio de Janeiro did the opposition MDB ever control a state government, and even then the incumbent governor was seen as a client of the military government.

ARENA won landslide legislative victories in 1966 and 1970. The opposition MDB's startling comeback in the November 1974 elections, in which the party won 16 of the 22 Senate seats at stake, marked the beginning of the plebiscitarian phase of electoral politics. After 1974 the MDB's vote total rose while the number of blank and spoiled ballots declined (Table 2), as did support for ARENA. The military government's shock at the 1974 results prompted it to launch a strategy aimed at preventing MDB advances in subsequent contests. Basically, this consisted in manipulating electoral laws in order to maintain ARENA majorities.

Table 2

Results of Legislative Elections, 1966–1982
(in percentages)

Year	Senate			Chamber of Deputies			State Assemblies		
	ARENA	MDB	Blank & Null Votes	ARENA	MDB	Blank & Null Votes	ARENA	MDB	Blank & Null Votes
1966	44.7	34.2	21.2	50.5	28.4	21.0	52.2	29.2	18.6
1970	43.7	28.6	27.7	48.4	21.3	30.3	51.0	22.0	26.8
1974	34.7	50.0	15.1	40.9	37.8	21.3	42.1	38.8	18.9
1978	35.0	46.4	18.6	40.0	39.3	20.7	41.1	39.6	19.3
1982[a]	36.5	50.0	13.5	36.7	48.2	15.1	36.0	47.2	16.8

Results for 1982 show PDS votes in the ARENA column and votes for all four opposition parties (PMDB, PDT, PTB, and PT) in the MDB column.

Source: Bolívar Lamounier, "*Authoritarian Brazil* Revisited: The Impact of Elections on the *Abertura*," in Alfred Stepan, ed., *Democratizing Brazil: Problems of Transition and Consolidation* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1989), Table 3, 58.

President Geisel's (1974–9) process of political liberalization devolved more power back to civilian politicians and to state and local governments. Gradually ARENA became a more important partner in the governing coalition, though the military continued to control the presidency.

1979), 106–26.

In the 1976 municipal elections the MDB penetrated more counties than previously, and in 1978 the opposition party made another strong showing in national and state legislative elections. In 1978 the MDB did slightly better than in 1974, but ARENA maintained majorities in both houses of Congress thanks to manipulations of electoral laws. The strengthening of the opposition party in combination with the growth of opposition groups in civil society put the regime's party and electoral strategy at the forefront of the political agenda. Military strategists decided that the two-party system—imposed by AI–2 in 1965—was no longer working to their advantage. President Geisel opted to 'divide and conquer' the opposition by imposing a return to a multiparty system. He expected that the progovernment coalition would remain intact while the MDB would splinter into various factions.

Geisel's expectations were mostly correct. The MDB (reorganized in 1979 as the PMDB) diminished in size, while four new, smaller opposition parties emerged. These were the *Partido dos Trabalhadores* (PT), a leftist party; the *Partido Popular* (PP), a short-lived center-right party which merged with the PMDB in 1982; and two parties disputing Vargas's mantle, the *Partido Democrático Trabalhista* (PDT) of Leonel Brizola and the *Partido Trabalhista Brasileiro* (PTB) of Ivete Vargas. While the PDT carved out a space as a social democratic party, the rival PTB bore little resemblance to its namesake in the Third Republic. By 1983 it was in a tacit alliance with the progovernment PDS, and today it is considered a conservative party. ARENA, suffering fewer defections, changed its name to the *Partido Democrático Social* (PDS).

The political system became increasingly competitive in the early 1980s. In a major step toward democracy, direct elections for state governors were scheduled for 1982. In the 1982 elections the opposition parties took 56.8% of the valid votes for the Chamber of Deputies, 57.9% of those for the Senate, and 58.5% of those cast for governors. The PMDB won nine governorships and the PDT one. The PDS won twelve governorships, but these were mostly the poorer states; the ten states won by the opposition were responsible for 75% of Brazil's total economic output.[15] Also important was the failure of PDS to win an absolute majority in the Chamber of Deputies—the first time since 1964 that the progovernment party had lost control of a house of Congress. Combined with the loss of most of the prestigious state governments, this was a powerful blow to the PDS. Despite the elaborate manipulation of electoral laws and the built-in advantages that come with controlling state resources in Brazil, a real redistribution of political power had taken place, and the last elections under military rule had confirmed the declining strength of the political right.

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[15] Maria Helena Moreira Alves, *State and Opposition in Military Brazil* (Austin: University of Texas Press, 1985), 228–9.

The Transition to Democracy and the Division of the PDS

From 1966 until 1984 the Brazilian electoral right was relatively cohesive, working within the ARENA/PDS party structure. But in the wake of the political realignment brought about by the 1982 elections, strains became visible within the PDS. The fading legitimacy of the authoritarian regime, the reduced electoral potency of the progovernment party, and the fact that the political system increasingly resembled democracy—with its emphasis on competition and the posing of political alternatives—produced a situation in which continued support of the military government was an increasingly costly option for individual politicians. In 1984–5 a large group within the PDS defected and created a second major conservative party, the PFL (Party of the Liberal Front). The immediate impulse for the defection was opposition to PDS presidential candidate Paulo Maluf, who had recently secured the party's nomination. In January 1985 the PFL joined forces with the PMDB to defeat Maluf and elect Tancredo Neves, a leading PMDB politician, president, and José Sarney, previously of the PDS, vice-president. In early 1985 with Neves's inauguration approaching, the PDS was drastically reduced in size as the PFL drew away many of its members. In the first year of the new democracy the PDS shrank to less than a third of its size in 1983.

Twenty-one years of military rule ended on 15 March 1985, but the occasion was marred by the illness and subsequent death of President-Elect Tancredo Neves. His running mate, José Sarney, was sworn in as president instead. Ironically, only nine months earlier Sarney had been the president of the promilitary PDS. So in a sense the old PDS *did* win the presidency of Brazil yet again, and the historic opposition to authoritarian rule could not savor Tancredo's victory.

Several authors have commented on how this lack of a sharp break between the 1964–85 authoritarian regime and the New Republic encouraged the perpetuation of conservative political elites.[16] Sarney's unforeseen accession to power was perhaps the most obvious indicator of the continuity between the 1964–85 military regime and the New Republic, but it was hardly the only one. The negotiations that built the Democratic Alliance had led Tancredo Neves to include several former PDS luminaries in his cabinet. Sarney governed with Tancredo's cabinet for several months but then began replacing the original members with old allies, many of

[16] Frances Hagopian, "The Compromised Consolidation: The Political Class in the Brazilian Transition" in Scott Mainwaring et al., eds., *Issues in Democratic Consolidation: The New South American Democracies in Comparative Perspective*, 243–93, and *Traditional Politics and Regime Change in Brazil* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996); Maria do Carmo Campello de Souza, "The Brazilian 'New Republic': Under the 'Sword of Damocles'" in Alfred Stepan, ed., *Democratizing Brazil: Problems of Transition and Consolidation* (New York: Oxford University

whom were fellow veterans of ARENA/PDS. Also, the PFL attracted so many new 'converts' from the PDS that the 'Democratic Alliance' was hardly worthy of the name. Nevertheless, the events of 1985, if not defining Brazil as having a completely democratic regime, identified Sarney's as a democratic government.

The circumstances of the military regime's collapse, while dealing a crippling blow to the PDS, paradoxically were favorable to some conservative politicians. The division of PDS and the founding of the PFL gave former supporters of military rule an opportunity to break publicly with the increasingly unpopular authoritarian regime. The events of 1984 permitted the Liberal Front dissidents to renew their political viability through two successive infusions of democratic legitimacy: the first from their endorsement of direct elections and their opposition to Maluf, and the second from Tancredo Neves, an opposition politician of solid democratic credentials who welcomed the PFL into his fold. The unusual circumstances of the regime transition allowed them to obfuscate their political past and to associate themselves with what the Brazil of 1984 viewed as desirable: civilian rule instead of military rule, democracy instead of authoritarianism. Moreover, the indirect nature of the presidential election and the splintering of one party into two allowed the PDS to escape the crushing verdict that might have been delivered in a popular vote. Considering the declining legitimacy and the spiraling economic collapse of the military regime in the early 1980s, the outcome of the 1985 transition could hardly have been more favorable to the right.

The Conservative Parties in Post-1985 Brazil

The post-1985 conservative pole at the national level has comprised two major parties (the PFL and PDS/PPR/PPB), a medium one (the PTB), and many minor ones. Throughout the 1985–99 period the PFL has been the largest conservative party in Congress, and the PDS/PPR/PPB has been the second largest. A gaggle of smaller conservative parties has proliferated since May 1985, when the Congress approved sweeping changes in electoral legislation, making it easier for new parties to form, obtain legal recognition, and win representation. Among parties that have elected a member of the National Congress or a governor or have fielded a presidential candidate who won at least 2% of the vote, we regard the following as conservative:

Press, 1989), 351–94; Guillermo O'Donnell, "Transitions, Continuities, and Paradoxes" in Mainwaring et al., eds., *Issues in Democratic Consolidation*, 17–56.

Center-Right

Party	Year Created	
PDC	1985	Christian Democratic Party (Partido Demócrata Cristão). More conservative than its counterpart Christian Democratic parties in many countries. Merged with the PDS in 1993 to form the PPR.
PMB	1985	Brazilian Municipalist Party (Partido Municipalista Brasileiro).
PMN	1985	Party of National Mobilization (Partido da Mobilização Nacional).
PP	1993	Progressive Party (Partido Progressista). Created through a merger of the PST and PTR. Merged with the PPR to form the PPB in 1995.
PSC	1985	Social Christian Party (Partido Social Cristão).
PSL	?	Social Liberal Party (Partido Social Liberal).
PST	1989	Social Labor Party (Partido Social Trabalhista).
PTB	1979	Brazilian Labor Party (Partido Trabalhista Brasileiro). In contrast to the PTB of the 1945–65 period, a predominantly center-right party.
PTR	1985	Renovative Labor Party (Partido Trabalhista Renovador).

Right

PDS	1979	Democratic Social Party (Partido Democrático Social). Despite its name, a conservative party. The PDS and its predecessor, ARENA (1966–79) provided the partisan support for the military regime. Merged with the PDC in 1993 to form the PPR.
PFL	1985	Party of the Liberal Front (Partido da Frente Liberal). A conservative party created by dissidents of the PDS. Has been in every cabinet since 1985.
PL	1985	Liberal Party (Partido Liberal). A conservative party known for its antistatist discourse and for its linkage to business interests in the most developed parts of Brazil, especially Rio and São Paulo.
PPB	1995	Brazilian Progressive Party (Partido Progressista Brasileiro). Created by the merger of the PPR and PP. Successor of ARENA/PDS.
PPR	1993	Reformist Progressive Party (Partido Progressista Reformador). Successor of ARENA/PDS. Created by the merger of the PDS and the PDC. Merged with the PP to form the PPB in 1995.
PRN	1989	Party of National Reconstruction (Partido da Reconstrução Nacional). Created by Fernando Collor de Mello as a vehicle for running for president. Virtually disappeared after Collor's impeachment in 1992. Previously (and briefly) known as the PJ, Youth Party (Partido da Juventude).
PRONA	1989	Party for the Reconstruction of National Order (Partido da Reedificação da Ordem Nacional). Far rightist party led by a personalistic leader, Enéas Carneiro.
PRP	1988	Party of Popular Representation (Partido de Representação Popular).
PSD	1987	Social Democratic Party (Partido Social Democrático). The PSD created in 1987 is not the same party as the one that existed between 1944 and 1965. A small party concentrated in the Center-West region. In 1989 its presidential candidate and most prominent figure was Ronaldo Caiado, leader of the right-wing Democratic Rural Union (UDR), a landowners' interest group.[17]

[17] Data on the year of foundation of these parties come from Jairo Marconi Nicolau, *Multipartidarismo e Democracia* (Rio de Janeiro: Fundação Getúlio Vargas, 1996), 15–16.

Although the PMDB and PSDB have acquired a more conservative profile over the year, we do not see them as conservative parties. A significant faction of the post-1985 PMDB is conservative, but to call the PMDB a conservative party provides too much elasticity to this concept. Studies of legislative behavior and surveys of the national congress have consistently shown that the PMDB is to the left of the major conservative parties. Moreover, some PMDB leaders who opposed the military dictatorship have remained in the party.

Programmatic Positions: Democracy and Authoritarianism

Our criteria for identifying conservative parties are programmatic. Both in legislative voting and in surveys of the National Congress, they have distinctive positions on political, economic, social, and moral issues.

From 1964 until 1985 the left-to-right divide was expressed above all in attitudes toward military rule and democracy; the right supported military rule while the center and center-left were democratic. This cleavage persisted in weakened form in the first few years after the end of military rule. Table 3 illustrates how conservative parties voted on some key issues related to democratic practice and authoritarian enclaves in the constitutional congress of 1987–8. Conservative parties were more likely than others to support some authoritarian positions. In this period conservative parties defended controversial military policies such as unpublished decrees, unlimited classification of secret government documents, and a blanket refusal to acknowledge human rights abuses after 1964. Efforts to overturn these policies won majority support in the Constitutional Congress but were strongly opposed by the main conservative parties. Thus, in the immediate aftermath of the transition conservative parties won a reputation as diehard defenders of military prerogatives even when these prerogatives seemed to contradict democratic principles.

The salience of differences among parties on questions related to authoritarianism and democracy has diminished since 1985 as conservative parties have become less wedded to authoritarianism. However, differences related to democratic practice still persist between conservatives and most of the center and left; conservatives are more likely to favor truncated forms of democracy. For example, they are less likely to try to ensure that the poor enjoy equal rights of citizenship such as equal access to the legal system.[18]

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[18] On the problems of equal access to the legal system and its relationship to citizenship and democracy, see James Holston and Teresa Caldeira, “Democracy, Law, and Violence: Disjunctions of Brazilian Citizenship” in Felipe Agüero and Jeffrey Stark, eds., *Fault Lines of Democracy in Post-Transition Latin America* (Miami: North-South Center, 1998), 263–96; Guillermo O’Donnell, “Polyarchies and the (Un)Rule of Law in Latin America” in Juan Méndez, Guillermo O’Donnell, and Paulo Sérgio Pinheiro, eds., *The (Un)Rule of Law and the*

Table 3

Authoritarian Debris Issues in the Constitutional Congress, 1988
(Percentages of Members Taking Positions Described)

Issue/Position/Roll Call Vote Number	Conservative Parties	Nonconservative Parties	ANC[a]
Favoring revocation of all secret decrees upon promulgation of new Constitution (vote 650)	16.1***	71.0	51.3
Favoring a maximum 30–year limit on classification of secret documents (vote 82)	32.4***	71.7	58.3
Favoring pensions for members of military dismissed under authoritarian regime (vote 636)	8.7***	91.3	30.3
Favoring allowing citizens to request official recognition of rights violated in the 1964–78 period covered by the 1979 general amnesty (vote 639)	23.2***	70.7	53.7

Pearson's chi-square test on conservative versus nonconservative groups. Significance levels.
*** $p < .01$ ** $p < .05$ * $p < .10$

[a] Percentages refer to members present and voting at the time of each rollcall. Simple majority votes were not sufficient to approve proposals. Amendments required an absolute majority (280 votes) of the 559–member ANC.

Source: Barry Ames and Timothy J. Power's data set on the Constitutional Congress. See their "Research Guide to Roll-Call Voting in Brazil's Constituent Assembly, 1987–1988," December 1990.

Programmatic Positions: Market-Oriented Policies and Moral Agenda

In the 1990s the most important policy area defining the conservative agenda has been the role of states and markets. Conservatives generally hold promarket economic positions, are more open to foreign capital, and are more favorable to state shrinking. They opposed many statist measures in the 1988 constitution, supported the neoliberal policy agenda of President Fernando Collor (1990–2), and provided the most consistent support for President Fernando

Underprivileged in Latin America (Notre Dame: Kellogg Series with the University of Notre Dame Press, forthcoming 1999); and several works by Paulo Sérgio Pinheiro, for example,

Henrique Cardoso's (1995–present) economic reforms. Although economic differences between conservatives and other parties have narrowed in the 1990s, conservatives are more likely than centrists and leftists to favor economic growth over distribution. They support state reform and state shrinking, a reduction of state spending, and privatization.

For the most part conservatives voted for market-oriented positions in the Constitutional Congress. Table 4 illustrates some of the key economic positions defended by conservative parties in the Constitutional Congress. On all four issues members of conservative parties were more likely than others to support market-oriented positions.

Table 4

Economic Liberalism Issues in the Constitutional Congress, 1988 (Percentages of Members Taking Positions Described)

Issue/Position/Roll-Call Vote Number	Conservative Parties	Nonconser-vative Parties	ANC[a]
Favoring making right to private property subordinated to its 'social function' (vote 48)	15.7***	68.7	49.1
Favoring removal of 12% annual cap on real interest rates (vote 980)	78.2***	33.8	49.9
Favoring nationalization of subsoil rights (vote 502)	44.3***	84.3	70.5
Favoring union pluralism (vote 136)	48.2***	7.0	21.3

Pearson's chi-square test on conservative versus nonconservative groups. Significance levels. *** $p < .01$

[a] Percentages refer to members present and voting at the time of each rollcall. Simple majority votes were not sufficient to approve proposals. Amendments required an absolute majority (280 votes) of the 559-member constitutional congress.

Source: Barry Ames and Timothy J. Power's data set on the Constitutional Congress. See their "Research Guide to Roll-Call Voting in Brazil's Constituent Assembly, 1987–1988," December 1990.

Members of conservative parties have consistently been more likely to report favoring market-oriented economic policies (Table 5). During the 1990s economic neoliberalism became a unifying feature of the conservative political agenda. Economic liberalism became respec-

"Democracies without Citizenship," *Report on the Americas* 30 (2, September/Octctober 1996):

table—indeed, almost fashionable. The growing acceptance of economic liberalism is evident in surveys of the National Congress. At the beginning of the Constitutional Congress in 1987

17–23.

Table 5

Self-Reported Economic Liberalism in the Major Parties, 1987 and 1997[a]

Party	Rodrigues 1987 Survey % Liberals N Resp.	Power 1997 Survey % Liberals N Resp.
PFL	62.4 (101)	70.0 (40)
PDS/PPB[b]	77.4 (31)	94.7 (19)
Small Right[c]	61.5 (26)	75.0 (08)
PMDB	29.2 (233)	43.8 (32)
Proto-PSDB/PSDB[d]	30.6 (36)	62.5 (32)
Left Parties[e]	4.5 (44)	11.1 (27)
Totals for Conservative Parties	65.2 (158)	77.6 (67)***
Totals for Noncon-servative Parties	25.3 (277)	40.2 (92)
Totals	39.8 (435)	56.0 (159)

Pearson's chi-square test on conservative versus nonconservative groups. Significance levels. *** p < .01 ** p < .05 * p < .10

[a] The Rodrigues question wording, replicated by Power, was: "In your opinion, what type of economic system would be best suited for Brazil?" The possible responses were (1) "A predominantly market economy with the least possible participation by the state;" (2) "An economic system in which there would be an equitable distribution of responsibilities between state enterprises and private firms;" (3) "An economy in which public enterprises and the state would comprise the main sector, but without eliminating the market economy;" and (4) "An economy in which private capital would be completely excluded from the main economic sectors, with all large firms coming under state control." Percentages in the table refer to respondents choosing option 1.

[b] In 1987 the PDS party, and in 1997 the successor PPB party.

[c] In 1987 includes the PTB, PL, and PDC; in 1997 the PTB and PL.

[d] The PSDB did not exist in 1987. A proto-PSDB was created retrospectively by compiling the survey responses of legislators who later signed the founding charter of the party in June and July 1988, about 18 months after the Rodrigues survey was conducted. The Rodrigues numbers do not total to 435 because the 36 proto-PSDB members are counted twice.

[e] In 1987 the left parties were the PT, PCB, PC do B, PDT, and PSB; in 1997, the same five, except that the PCB is now known as the PPS. Within this group, both in 1987 and 1997 the only proliberalism responses came from PDT members.

Sources: Leôncio Martins Rodrigues, *Quem É Quem na Constituinte: Uma Análise Sócio-Política dos Partidos e Deputados* (São Paulo: Oesp-Maltese, 1987), 109; Timothy J. Power's 1997 survey of the Brazilian National Congress.

Rodrigues found that 40% of federal deputies classified themselves as pure economic liberals.[19] Replicating Rodrigues' question in 1997 in a survey of both houses of Congress, Power found that the proportion of self-identified liberals had increased to 56%.[20] The increasing acceptance of neoliberal ideas was visible in all the important parties except the PT.

Conservatives also have identifiable views on some important social issues. They generally see expansive social spending, tough environmental laws and enforcement, and expanded labor rights as undesirable fetters to more rapid growth. They trenchantly oppose agrarian reform, which has emerged as one of the most polemical issues of the post-1985 period, just as it was in the early 1960s. During the Cardoso administration (1995–8), the most salient distinguishing national issues have been conservative support for liberal economic reforms (social security reform, administrative reform, public sector privatizations) and conservative opposition to agrarian reform and the mobilized peasant movement known as the Movement of the Landless (Movimento dos Sem Terra), which has sponsored many land occupations.

In addition to these distinguishing characteristics on political and economic questions, conservatives often hold distinctive views on some cultural/moral issues. They are more likely to adopt tough stances on crime and less likely to criticize human rights violations of suspected criminals. They are more likely to oppose abortion and equal rights for homosexuals.

Programmatic Positions: Democratic Institutions and Representation

Some of the major debates in the post-1985 democracy have revolved around issues of institutional design because Brazil's political institutions have widely been seen as problematic. The issues under debate include the system of government (presidential, parliamentary, or mixed) and the nature of political representation, particularly as expressed in the party system and the legislative arena. Conservative parties have held distinctive positions in these debates.

Table 6 reports roll-call voting concerning institutional issues in the Constitutional Congress of 1987–8. Conservatives were more likely to support the maintenance of a presidential as opposed to a semipresidential system (Vote #315). They were significantly more

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[19] Rodrigues, *Quem é Quem na Constituinte*, op. cit. n. 3, 106–10.

[20] Power conducted mail surveys of the Brazilian National Congress in March–April 1990, May–June 1993, and March–May 1997. The survey instrument was distributed to all members of both the Federal Senate and Chamber of Deputies. The 1990 questionnaire received 249 responses (43.7% of 570 members of Congress), the 1993 replication received 185 responses (31.7% of 584 members), and the 1997 replication received 162 responses (27.3% of 594 members). For more information, see Power, *Elites, Institutions, and Democratization*, op. cit. n. 3.

inclined to vote for a five-year rather than a four-year term for President Sarney (Vote #624). These were two of the most polemical issues in the Constitutional Congress.

Table 6

Institutional Design Issues in the Constitutional Congress, 1988
(Percentages of Members Taking Positions Described)

Issue/Position/Roll-Call Vote Number	Conservative Parties	Nonconserv-ative Parties	ANC[a]
Favoring presidentialism (vote 315)	76.6***	53.1	61.6
Favoring five-year term for Pres. Sarney (vote 624)	77.3***	49.6	59.5
Favoring US-style electoral college for presidential elections (vote 316)	70.9***	38.9	50.8
Favoring recall elections for majoritarian positions (vote 161)	11.4***	46.8	35.1

Pearson's chi-square test on conservative versus nonconservative groups. Significance levels.
*** $p < .01$

[a] Percentages refer to members present and voting at the time of each rollcall. Simple majority votes were not sufficient to approve proposals. Amendments required an absolute majority (280 votes) of the 559–member constitutional congress.

Source: Calculated from Barry Ames and Timothy J. Power's data set on the Constitutional Congress. See their "Research Guide to Roll-Call Voting in Brazil's Constituent Assembly, 1987–1988," December 1990.

In a little-known but revealing episode the Constitutional Congress nearly approved the *voto federativo ponderado* ('weighted federall vote'), a method of presidential election copied from the US Electoral College. Presidential elections are now conducted by popular vote in a single national district, but the adoption of the *voto federativo ponderado* would have redistributed electoral power away from the Southeast and South toward the less-developed states. Not surprisingly, PFL members voted overwhelmingly for this failed proposal, which would have magnified the importance of their political machines in the more backward states and allowed them to hike the already significant 'prices' that they charge for delivering these machines to national candidates. Conservative parties were also more likely to oppose recall elections (Vote #161).

Surveys of the National Congress provide further evidence that members of conservative parties hold distinctive issues on institutional and representational issues. The relatively greater localistic bent of conservative parties is suggested by the data in Table 7.

Table 8 reports attitudes toward a variety of other institutional questions. Members of conservative parties are somewhat more likely to favor presidentialism. Brazilian legislators overwhelmingly feel that they do not owe their electoral mandates to their parties but rather to themselves. Politicians from conservative parties are particularly likely to have this perception.

The last three rows of Table 8 show that the conservative parties as a bloc consistently took more antiparty positions than the Congress as a whole. More disaggregated data (not shown) reveal that the PFL and small conservative parties were more antiparty than the entire Congress, while the PDS/PPR/PPB generally took positions more in favor of party discipline than Congress as a whole. The reason for this cleavage within the conservative camp is probably that in 1984–85 the PDS lost its position as the dominant party in Brazil by virtue of the relaxation and subsequent abolition of party discipline statutes. Of all Brazilian parties, the PDS suffered the most from the permissive electoral and party legislation approved in the New Republic. As a rule, the more individualistic conservative politicians left the PDS early on (the PFL, PL, and PDC were all founded in 1984–5), and the remaining PDS/PPR/PPB members preferred stronger mechanisms of party discipline.

The Left/Right Dimension

Consistent with our claim that conservative parties can be differentiated on the basis of their programmatic positions, they have a clear location on the left-to-right scale. Table 9 underscores the sharp differences among the Brazilian parties along the left-to-right scale. The once prevalent image of nonprogrammatic parties with marginal differences among them is misleading. Brazil's conservative parties are not highly ideological in the sense of vigorously espousing and defending a coherent set of policies, but the programmatic distances among the parties are large at the elite level.

Table 9 supports our earlier classification of conservative parties. This is no accident because our classification was constructed on the basis of attitudinal surveys of Congress and legislative voting. In Table 9 there are no borderline cases between the right and the center if one uses the overall mean placement of the party by all respondents (column 1 for each year). The two center parties are always a large distance from the least conservative of the conservative parties. The parties' positions on the left-to-right scale have been remarkably consistent. If we take the first column for each year in Table 9 (overall placement), the correlation between parties' 1990 score and their 1993 score is a remarkable .983. The correlation between 1993 and 1997 is .975, and between 1990 and 1997 it is .970. The extraordinarily high correlations mean that there was virtually no change in relative positions on the left-to-right scale.

this is table 9

Evaluations of parties' positions on the left-to-right scale have been consensual among authors.[21] There is also broad agreement about which parties should be regarded as conservative. This consensus supports our earlier claim that it is possible to identify the conservative parties on the basis of their programmatic positions.

Although conservative parties are best identified by these distinctive programmatic positions, they do not present themselves to the public in a highly ideological way. To the contrary, their discourse downplays their location on the right. Throughout the democratic period, researchers have consistently found that politicians in left parties happily classify themselves ideologically but that members of conservative parties either downplay the importance of ideology, refuse to answer, or classify themselves in a manner that stretches credulity. In 1987, for example, when Rodrigues asked 428 federal deputies to classify themselves ideologically on a five-point scale, not a single deputy accepted the label 'radical right' and only 6% called themselves moderate or center-right. The rest of the deputies claimed to be of the center (37%), center-left (52%), and radical left (5%). Rodrigues sardonically concluded that "judging by the political self-definition of the deputies, Brazil is a country without a right."[22]

The legislative surveys conducted by Power confirm the reluctance of politicians to identify themselves as right of center (Table 9). The mean self-placement of politicians from conservative parties has consistently been lower than 6.0 on a 10–point scale where 1 is the far left and 10 is the far right. In many cases it has been under 5.5, the median point on a scale from 1 to 10. But note the profound discrepancy between how conservative politicians locate themselves (the fourth column for each year) and how their nonconservative counterparts perceive these parties. Whereas the members of the leftist and centrist parties locate themselves close to where these same members locate their own party (compare the third and fourth columns for each year), members of conservative parties consistently locate themselves to the left of where they place their parties. Thus, the prevailing attitude among members of conservative parties is "My party may be conservative, but I am not."

The overall congressional mean and the mean of the two largest conservative parties have drifted slightly rightward throughout the 1990s. It is possible that this rightward shift is due to real ideological change in Congress, but it is also likely that the obfuscatory tendencies of conservative politicians have receded as the connotations of 'right' have gradually changed over

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[21] See the sources cited in notes 3 and 4 above.

[22] Rodrigues, *Quem é Quem na Constituinte*, op. cit. n. 3, 97. Because of conservatives' aversion to identifying themselves as such, Maria do Carmo Campello de Souza speaks of an 'embarrassed' right. See her "The Contemporary Faces of the Brazilian Right: An Interpretation of Style and Substance" in Douglas A. Chalmers, Maria do Carmo Campello de Souza, and Atilio A. Borón, eds., *The Right and Democracy in Latin America* (New York: Praeger, 1992), 99–127.

time—from association with military authoritarianism in the 1980s to a more respectable association with economic neoliberalism in the 1990s. This would explain the changing self-classification of the PFL. It would be difficult to argue that the party has moved significantly rightward in the 1990s, as Table 9 might seem to suggest; rather, PFL politicians have become more willing to locate themselves and their party more accurately.

The Electoral Results of Conservative Parties, 1982–98

Both Gibson and Middlebrook argue that conservative parties tend to fare best in the contemporary period when they build on long-existing organizations and loyalties. Between 1946 and 1964 the Brazilian experience ran counter to this argument; conservative parties were highly competitive electorally despite the fact that they were new parties. In some states they built on the conservative legacy and networks of the Republican organizations, but in others the Republican machines were smashed during the Vargas period. Conservative parties have again fared well since 1982 with the reintroduction of elections that were largely fair and free. Conservatives successfully made the adjustment from an oligarchic political order of unfettered conservative rule to two periods of polyarchy in which they have almost always been part of the governing coalition at the national level and have been a major electoral contender.

It did not initially appear that conservatives would fare so well in the new democracy. As Soares has argued, the long-term trend prior to 1985 was inauspicious; conservative parties had experienced a linear electoral decline between 1945 and 1964 and between 1970 and 1982. Moreover, conservative parties did not do well in the 1985 municipal elections, the first elections held under the new democracy, or in the 1986 elections for Congress, governors, and state assemblies. After 1986, however, conservative parties enjoyed a revival.

Tables 10, 11, and 12 show conservative parties' electoral performance for the Chamber of Deputies, Senate, and governors from 1982 to 1998. These tables show both the high degree of dispersion within the conservative pole and the generally strong performance of conservative parties as a bloc. In the Chamber of Deputies conservative parties won 36.3% of the seats in 1986, 51.2% in 1990, 45.3% in 1994, and 42.3% in 1998. The PFL was the largest conservative party in the lower chamber and the Senate throughout this period. Senate results have oscillated more sharply, at least in part because these elections are based on plurality. Conservative parties won 20.4% of the seats in 1986, 59.2% in 1990, 38.9% in 1994, and 25.9% in 1998. The Senate that took office in 1999 had the lowest share of conservative party members in Brazilian history. Conservative parties also captured 4.3%, 51.9%, 22.2%, and 25.9% of the state houses, respectively. After helping to elect Cardoso in 1994 (and supplying his running mate, Marco

Maciel), by the end of Cardoso's first term the PFL had vaulted past the PMDB to become the largest party in Congress.

Table 10

Lower Chamber Seats Won by Conservative Parties, 1982–1998 (percentages)

	1982	1986	1990	1994	1998
PDS/PPR/PPB[a,b]	49.1	6.6	8.3	10.1	11.7
PTB[b]	2.7	3.5	7.6	6.0	6.0
PFL	—	23.8	16.7	17.3	20.5
PL	—	1.2	3.0	2.5	2.3
PDC[a]	—	1.2	4.4	—	—
PRN	—	—	8.0	0.2	—
PSC	—	—	1.2	0.6	0.4
PRS	—	—	0.8	—	—
PST/PP[b,c]/PST	—	—	0.4	7.0	0.2
PTR[c]	—	—	0.4	—	—
PSD	—	—	0.2	0.6	0.4
PMN	—	—	0.2	0.8	0.4
PRP	—	—	—	0.2	—
PSL	—	—	—	—	0.2
PRONA	—	—	—	—	0.2
Conservative Total	51.8	36.3	51.2	45.3	42.3
Number Seats	479	487	503	513	513

[a] The PDS and PDC merged to form the PPR in 1993.
[b] The PPR, PTB, and PP merged to form the PPB in 1995.
[c] The PST and PTR merged to form the PP in 1993.

Sources: Lamounier, *De Geisel a Collor,* op. cit. n. 4, 186–9; Robert Wesson and David V. Fleischer, *Brazil in Transition* (New York: Praeger, 1983), 119; *Folha de São Paulo*, 29 October 1990, 16 November 1994, and 21 November 1994; *Jornal do Brasil*, 2 February 1999.

Table 12

Governorships Won by Conservative Parties, 1982–1998
(percentages)

Party	1982[a]	1986[b]	1990	1994	1998
PDS/PPR/PPB[cd]	54.5	—	3.7	11.1	7.4
PFL	—	4.3	33.3	7.4	18.5
PTB	—	—	7.4	3.7	—
PTR[e]	—	—	7.4	—	—
PRS	—	—	3.7	—	—
PDC[c]	—	—	3.7	—	—
PSL	—	—	3.7	—	—
Conservative total	54.5	4.3	63.0	22.2	25.9
Number Governors	22	23	27	27	27

[a] In 1982, in addition to the twelve PDS governors elected by popular vote, the newly created state of Rondônia had an appointed PDS governor.
[b] Does not include Tocantins. In 1988 the PDC candidate won the gubernatorial election in the newly created state of Tocantins.
[c] The PDS and PDC merged to form the PPR in 1993.
[d] The PPR, PTB, and PP merged to form the PPB in 1995.
[e] The PST and PTR merged to form the PP in 1993.

Sources: Lamounier, *De Geisel a Collor*, op. cit. n. 4, 187–9; *Folha de São Paulo*, 29 Oct. 1990; Timothy J. Power, "Politicized Democracy: Competition, Institutions, and 'Civic Fatigue' in Brazil," *Journal of Interamerican Studies and World Affairs* 33 no. 3 (Fall 1991): 86. For 1994, *Folha de São Paulo*, 16 Nov. 1994, and *Jornal do Brasil*, 17 Nov. 1994. Tribunal Superior Eleitoral for 1998.

Since 1988, conservatives have done very well in municipal elections, if we simply count the number of counties in which they govern. In all three municipal elections (1988, 1992, 1996), conservatives won over 40% of the counties (Table 13). Conservative parties fare best in the small counties, which constitute the majority.

Because presidential elections in Brazil are personalized, they are not the best gauge of the electoral strength of conservative *parties*. Nevertheless, the presidency is powerful, so the capacity to compete in and win presidential elections is crucial for political power. Table 14 shows how conservative parties fared in the presidential elections of 1989, 1994, and 1998. In the first round in 1989 three of the top four finishers were progressive candidates and long-time

opponents of the authoritarian regime. Nevertheless, candidates of conservative parties obtained 47.7% of the first-round vote. In the runoff conservatives closed ranks around Collor, who was their only hope to head off the leftist candidate, Luis Inácio Lula da Silva (Lula) of the Workers' Party (*Partido dos Trabalhadores*, or PT). The right funded Collor heavily and mobilized its social and political networks throughout the country, but he still barely won. After Collor's victory many conservatives settled in for another five comfortable years in government, which Collor was unable to deliver (he was impeached in September 1992 and ultimately removed from office). The narrow margin of Collor's victory in 1989 can hardly have been comforting to conservatives. This helps explain why in 1993–4 many conservative elites, determined to block Lula's path to the presidency, cast their lot with a moderate social democrat, Fernando Henrique Cardoso, who easily defeated Lula and brought several leading ARENA/PDS veterans into his government.

Table 13

Percentage of Mayors Elected by Conservative Parties, 1982–96

	1982	**1988**	**1992**	**1996**
PDS/PPR/PPB	64.3	10.4	7.6	11.7
PFL	—	24.7	20.3	17.3
PTB	0.2	7.8	6.4	7.1
PDC	–	5.4	4.4	—
PL	—	5.6	3.5	4.1
PSC	—	0.6	1.1	0.9
PTR	—	0.2	1.0	—
PJ/PRN	—	0.1	2.1	0.0
PSD	—	0.0	0.7	2.2
PMB	—	1.4	—	_
PST	—	—	2.6	0.2
PMN	—	—	—	0.6
PRP	—	—	—	0.6
Conservative Total	64.5	56.2	48.6	43.7
Unknown	—	—	—	0.6
Total N	3941	4291	4964	5351

Source: Tribunal Superior Eleitoral

Table 14

Results of Conservative Parties' Presidential Candidates, 1989–1998

	1989, First Round		1994[b]		1998[d]	
Party		**% Valid Vote**		**% Valid Vote**		**% Valid Vote**
PRN	F. Collor de Mello[a]	30.5	C. Gomes	0.6		—
PDS/ PPR	P. Maluf	8.9	E. Amin	2.8		
PL	G. Afif Domingos	4.8		—		
PFL	A. Chaves	0.9				
PSD	R. Caiado	0.8				
PTB	A. Camargo	0.6				
PRONA	Enéas Carneiro	0.5	Enéas Carneiro	7.4	Enéas Carneiro	2.1
	Others[c]	1.9	Others[c]	0.4	Others[c]	1.7
	Conservative Total	47.7	Conservative Total	11.2	Conservative Total	3.8

[a] The PST and PTR officially supported Collor.
[b] The PFL and PTB officially supported Cardoso (PSDB) in 1994. The PSD officially supported Quércia (PMDB).
[c] 9 other candidates in 1989, 1 in 1994, 6 in 1998.
[d] The PFL, PPB, PTB, PSD, and PSL officially supported Cardoso (PSDB) in 1998.

Source: Tribunal Superior Eleitoral.

Candidates of conservative parties obtained only 11.2% of the presidential vote in 1994 and 3.8% in 1998, but it would be a mistake to interpret these elections as defeats for conservatives. Fearing defeat to a leftist candidate who enjoyed a large lead in the polls until three months before the 1994 election, conservatives rallied behind Fernando Henrique Cardoso. Although Cardoso's party, the PSDB, was in the center of the political spectrum, he was formally supported by the PFL. His running mate and vice president, Marco Maciel, was a PFL politician who had been a key ARENA/PDS leader under military rule. His platform, cabinet, and policies reflected the coalition with conservatives, and his economic policies in particular resembled those of Collor in promoting privatization and state shrinking. Thus, although conservative candidates

fared poorly, conservatives retained a large share of power in the national executive. This fact coupled with the reality that conservatives could not field a candidate capable of competing with Cardoso explains why most conservatives supported his reelection effort in 1998. Supported by five conservative parties and his own PSDB, Cardoso won 53.1% of the vote in 1998.

The electoral results of conservative *parties* underestimate the performance of conservative *politicians*. None of the conservative parties has a significant centrist or center-left faction, but since 1985 the PMDB has had a large conservative wing that includes many politicians of ARENA/PDS lineage. As a result of this asymmetry, there are more conservatives in the National Congress than there are members of Congress who belong to conservative parties.

The electoral success of conservative parties and politicians is a key to understanding Brazilian politics in the post-1985 period. By virtue of their electoral success, conservatives have always been part of the governing coalition at the national level. They have used this power to shape many policy outcomes. Conservative political elites—the vast majority of whom supported the move against democracy in 1964—have navigated recent political transitions with success and have not been dislodged en masse from positions of effective power.

Fragmentation, Diversity, and Unity among Conservative Parties

In Latin America Brazil presents the greatest fragmentation of conservative parties. Indeed, at a world level it is a case of extreme fragmentation of the conservative pole of the party system. Eighteen conservative parties have elected a member of the National Congress since 1985. The center and left are less fragmented.

This fragmentation on the right does not follow clear ideological or policy differences. What policy differences exist among conservative parties are relatively minor. Studies of roll-call voting in the constitutional congress and of the post-1988 period highlight the coherence of the conservative bloc across different issue arenas.[23] Power's surveys of congress also show only minor differences among conservative parties on most issues.[24] The mergers of conservative parties and the frequent party switching among conservative politicians further underscore the common bonds among the rightist parties.

Conservative politicians do not hold uniform positions on all important issues, but the differences among them are not clearly organized along party lines. For example, one cleavage is that between a minority faction of Evangelical Protestants and conservative Catholics, who are

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[23] Kinzo, "O Quadro Constituinte Partidário e a Constituinte," op. cit. n. 3; Limongi and Figueiredo, "Partidos Políticos na Câmara dos Deputados," op. cit. n. 3.

[24] For details on Power's surveys, see his *Elites, Institutions, and Democratization*, op. cit. n. 3.

active on abortion, traditional family morality, pornography, and some other religious issues, and

the majority of conservatives, who are more secular and are less involved in these issues. But this cleavage is not clearly reflected in party affiliations within the conservative bloc; the religious conservatives are dispersed throughout many parties. [25]

Similarly, there are differences between more assertive, ideological economic neoliberals and other conservatives, who are more clientelistic and less ideological about neoliberalism. But on this dimension, too, the differences among the conservative parties seem minor. Conservative politicians join a party more based on the state and local network of allies and foes than on the party's national position on economic liberalism. When it was created in 1985, the Liberal Party (PL) represented the more ideologically assertive brand of conservatism, but over time its identity was diluted. Meanwhile, the other conservative parties became more wedded to economic liberalism when it became a popular bandwagon. Thus, the differences among conservatives are more individual and idiosyncratic rather than organized along coherent party lines.

Why are conservatives dispersed throughout so many parties whose programmatic positions are similar? Brazil's electoral system and federalism have been cited elsewhere as reasons for the fragmentation of the party system as a whole.[26] These institutional factors are important but they do not explain why the conservative pole of the political spectrum is more fragmented than the center and left. One explanation is that, especially compared to politicians on the left, conservative political elites are more personalistic and focused on networks and less committed to formal organizations. Conservatives prize their own autonomy more and do not place a premium on banding together in large national organizations. The same institutional rules thus result in greater fragmentation on the right.

Social Bases of Conservative Parties

Notwithstanding the proliferation of literature on parties and party systems in Latin America, the analysis of social bases of political parties remains underdeveloped.[27] Yet it is

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[25] Antônio Flávio Pierucci, "Representantes de Deus em Brasília: A Bancada Evangélica na Constituinte" in *Ciências Sociais Hoje, 1989* (São Paulo: Vértice/ANPOCS, 1989), 130–1.

[26] On the electoral system, see Nicolau, *Multipartidarismo e Democracia*, op. cit. n. 17. On federalism, see David J. Samuels, "Careerism and its Consequences: Federalism, Elections, and Policy-Making in Brazil" (PhD dissertation, University of California, San Diego, 1998).

[27] On social bases of parties in the 1945–64 period, see Soares, *Sociedade e Política*, op. cit. n. 11. On the 1974–85 period, see Bolívar Lamounier and Fernando Henrique Cardoso, eds., *Os Partidos e as Eleições no Brasil* (Rio de Janeiro: Paz e Terra, 1975); Bolívar Lamounier, ed., *Voto de Desconfiança: Eleições e Mudança Política no Brasil, 1970–1979* (Petrópolis: Vozes, 1980); Kurt von Mettenheim, *The Brazilian Voter: Mass Politics in Democratic Transition, 1974–1986* (Pittsburgh: University of Pittsburgh Press, 1995); Fábio Wanderley Reis, ed., *Os Partidos e o Regime: A Lógica do Processo Eleitoral Brasileiro* (São Paulo: Símbolo, 1978).

impossible to fully understand conservative parties without some analysis of social bases. Our insistence on conceptualizing conservative parties along programmatic lines and our view that they should not be defined by core constituencies is shaped by the fact that the main conservative parties in Brazil fare best among the poor. Moreover, a conservative party that disproportionately draws its strength from the popular sectors is likely to differ in meaningful regards from a conservative party that fares best among the upper strata.

Our discussion focuses on the national level. But more so than is the case in most countries, Brazilian parties differ significantly from one state to the next; this is also true for the parties' social bases. Thus our aggregate national portrait conceals interstate variance within parties.

Regional Bases of Conservative Parties: Electoral Data

Brazil has long had among the most pronounced regional inequalities of any country in the world. The North, Northeast, and Center-West are much poorer than the South and Southeast. Despite some reduction in regional income inequalities in the past two decades, the wealthiest state (São Paulo) still has a per capita income six times higher than the poorest (Piauí). These economic disparities underpin important cross-regional political differences, including differences in the social bases of parties.

From 1945 until 1994 the conservative bloc disproportionately won its electoral support in the less developed regions.[28] In the 1987–91 and 1991–95 legislatures a much higher percentage of the national legislators from conservative parties came from the poor regions (Table 15). The 1994 and 1998 results indicate that this pattern may be changing. The conservative bloc recruited a lower share of its members of Congress from the less-developed regions than in the past, and the percentage of members of Congress from centrist and leftist parties who came from the poor regions increased. The difference in regional recruitment patterns narrowed to the point of statistical insignificance (p=.689) in 1998. In light of the decades-long superior conservative electoral performance in the poor regions, this finding is notable. This suggests that a new, more modern—at least in terms of social bases—conservatism may be springing up alongside the traditional conservatism that thrived in the poor regions. Some of the reduction in

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Since 1985, despite the overall increase in production on parties and the party system in Brazil, less has been done on this subject.

[28] On the regional cleavage in Brazilian politics, see Simon Schwartzman, *Bases do Autoritarismo Brasileiro* (Rio de Janeiro: Campus, 1979), and Fábio Wanderley Reis and Mônica Mata Machado de Castro, "Regiões, Classe e Ideologia no Processo Eleitoral Brasileiro," *Lua Nova* 26 (1992): 81–131.

the gap between the regional bases of the conservative and nonconservative parties is a product of the growth of the latter (especially the PT and PSDB) in the poor regions.

A majority of the PFL's congressional delegation came from the Northeast in the first three legislatures after the end of military rule. Fifty-two percent of its congressional delegation came from the Northeast following the 1986 elections, 59% after 1990, 53% after 1994, and 49% after 1998. Despite being the largest conservative party at the national level throughout the entire post-1985 period, the PFL was not a major party outside the Northeast until 1998. This concentration in the Northeast reflects the PFL's genesis. Most of the PFL leaders responsible for the schism in 1984 were then PDS governors from the Northeast who opposed the PDS presidential candidacy of Paulo Maluf, a politician from São Paulo (in the Southeastern region) who ultimately won the nomination. In 1998 the party attenuated its dependence on the Northeast for its electoral support.

The PPB and PTB are more regionally diversified than the PFL. Under military rule the PDS did better in the poor regions, but this is no longer the case. Between 1984 and 1990 the party's regional base shifted toward the South and away from the Northeast. This was not because the party expanded in the South and Southeast; rather, the shift occurred because many ex-PDS politicians from the Northeast joined the PFL, leaving a smaller PDS contingent in that region and greater balance across regions. By 1998, completely reversing the Arena/PDS pattern under military rule, the PPB recruited 63.5% of its members of Congress from the wealthy regions. In 1986 the PTB was concentrated in the Southeast, but in subsequent legislatures it became a regionally diversified party. The PL has marched in the opposite direction from the PPB and PFL: from a party concentrated in the Southeast (mainly Rio and São Paulo) to one with a more 'normal' geographic spread.

Conservative parties have always benefited from the fact that the less populous and more economically backward states of the North and Center-West regions are overrepresented in Congress. In the first four legislatures under democracy more than 50% of the legislative seats were held by the less-developed states even though these states contain only 41% of the national population and 38% of the electorate.

Who Are the Party Identifiers?

Most of the research on social bases of parties in post-1985 Brazil has focused on voting preferences (how individuals say they vote) rather than party identification (what party they say they prefer). [29] Our primary focus here is the social bases of party identifiers. Analysis of voting

[29] There is a rich bibliography on social bases of the vote in São Paulo. On the 1985 election, with some comparisons to the 1974–85 period, see Bolivar Lamounier and Maria Judith Brito Muszynski, "A Eleição de Jânio Quadros," and Rachel Meneguello and Ricardo Márcio Martins

preferences is important, but voting patterns have been less stable, more personalized, and more election specific than party identification (although party identification has been less stable in Brazil than in almost all of the advanced industrial democracies.) Moreover, party identifiers presumably vote in a more stable way for the same party than other voters.[30]

In the post-1985 period, party identifiers have generally constituted slightly less than half of the electorate. In a June 1996 national survey (n=2791),[31] only 42.4% of respondents expressed a party preference. This figure is substantially lower than that in most of the advanced industrial democracies.

Party identifiers are not randomly distributed across ideological blocs; conservative voters are less likely to identify with a party than leftist voters. Conservative parties are a powerful force at the ballot box, yet in the 1996 national survey only 18.7% of party identifiers preferred a conservative party. The conservative vote tends to be more personalistic and less party based than the vote in the center and especially on the left.[32]

Why are conservative voters less likely to express a party preference than voters of the center and especially the left? We cannot provide a definitive answer, but we hypothesize that

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Alves, "Tendências Eleitorais em São Paulo (1974–1985," both in Bolivar Lamounier, ed., *1985: O Voto em São Paulo* (São Paulo: IDESP, 1986). On Paulo Maluf's social bases, see Antônio Flávio Pierucci and Marcelo Coutinho de Lima, "A Direita que Flutua: O Voto Conservador na Eleição de 1990 em São Paulo," *Novos Estudos CEBRAP* 29 (March 1991): 10–27. On the social bases of Jânio Quadros in 1985 and Paulo Maluf in 1986, see Antônio Flávio Pierucci, "A Direita Mora do Outro Lado da Cidade," *Revista Brasileira de Ciências Sociais* No. 10 (4 June 1989): 44–64. On the 1986 elections, see Judith Musysnski, "Os Eleitores Paulistas em 1986: A Marca do Oposicionismo" in Maria Teresa Sadek, ed., *Eleições 1986* (São Paulo: IDESP/Vértice, 1989). On Fernando Collor's electoral base in 1989, see André Singer, "Collor na Periferia: A Volta por Cima do Populismo" in Lamounier, ed., *De Geisel a Collor*, op. cit. n. 4, 135–52.

[30] This is a core claim of the party identification school of analysis. See, for example, Bruce E. Cain and John Ferejohn, "Party Identification in the United States and Great Britain," *Comparative Political Studies* 14 (1 April 1981): 31–47; Philip Converse, "The Nature of Belief Systems in Mass Publics" in David Apter, ed., *Ideology and Discontent* (New York: The Free Press, 1964), 206–61; Anthony Heath and Sarah-K. McDonald, "The Demise of Party Identification Theory?" *Electoral Studies* 7 (2 August 1988): 95–107; Eric Schickler and Donald Philip Green, "The Stability of Party Identification in western Democracies: Results from Eight Panel Surveys," *Comparative Political Studies* 30 (4 August 1997): 450–83. An interesting examination of party identification and its significance in Brazil in the 1980s is Elizabeth Balbachevsky, "Identidade Partidária e Instituições Políticas no Brasil," *Lua Nova* 26 (1992): 133–65.

[31] This data set can be consulted in the National Survey Data Bank of CESOP, University of Campinas. The CESOP archive number is Dat/BR96–jun.00541. Methodologically, we drew inspiration from Pradeep Chhibber and Mariano Torcal, "Elite Strategy, Social Cleavages, and Party Systems in a New Democracy: Spain," *Comparative Political Studies* 30 (1 February 1997): 27–54.

[32] See David J. Samuels, "Determinantes do Voto Partidário em Sistemas Centrados no Candidato: Evidências sobre o Brasil," *Dados* 40 (3): 493–536.

the political elites' behavior fosters this antiparty predilection among conservative voters, who take their cues from the party elite, more than vice versa. Conservative politicians are much more likely to switch parties than politicians of leftist and centrist parties. On the right of the political spectrum loyalty is often to individuals rather than parties, whereas the left—especially the PT, PPS, and PC do B—has a strong party tradition.

Our reason for believing that the direction of causality runs mainly from political elites to citizens is that parties of the right have always been created and organized from the top down. Under these circumstances voters take their cues from politicians more than vice versa. Because party switching is more prevalent on the right, voters are compelled to follow their politicians in and out of parties. Conservative voters have never created a major party from the bottom up in Brazil, nor have conservative parties been predicated upon a mobilized, activist base.

Region

We begin with simple bivariate analysis. Although bivariate crosstabs are not very meaningful in any causal analysis because they do not control for other factors, they provide a useful first approximation to understanding parties' social bases.

Consistent with the electoral results presented earlier, the conservative bloc has a disproportionate share of party identifiers in the Northeast and a particularly low share in the Southeast (Table 16). This concentration in the Northeast stems mostly from the PFL, which recruited a remarkable 64.8% of its identifiers from this region. This regional cleavage between the poor regions and the wealthier ones has endured over generations. [33]

There are important differences among the conservative parties. Just as the PPB and PTB have a more nationalized pattern of electoral support, so do they have a more nationalized pattern of party identifiers.

Size of County

Brazilian politics continues to be structured by a powerful cleavage between small counties, where conservative politicians and parties tend to prevail, and large urban areas, where they do not fare as well. Conservative party identifiers come disproportionately from small counties. This is especially true of PFL and PPB identifiers (Table 17). The profile of party identifiers on the left is strikingly different from that of the PPB and PFL; most PDT and PT identifiers come from medium and large counties.

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[33] In addition to the parties identified in Table 10, the conservative total includes 8 PL identifiers and 2 PRN identifiers; the leftist total includes 12 PSB identifiers. The column for all party identifiers includes 37 respondents who named various unspecified parties.

The profile of PTB sympathizers in 1996 was different from that of the PPB and PFL identifiers. Whereas PPB and PFL identifiers came overwhelmingly from small counties, a slim majority of PTB party identifiers resided in medium and large counties. The profile of PTB identifiers by size of county was similar to that of PSDB, PDT, and PT identifiers.

Slicing the data in a different way further highlights the low number of conservative party identifiers in the medium and large cities. In the small counties 24.2% of party identifiers preferred a conservative party. In the medium and large counties a mere 7.9% and 11.6% of party identifiers, respectively, preferred a conservative party. The weak penetration of conservative parties in the large cities is also reflected in surveys conducted in state capitals in 1988, 1991, and 1996.[34] A small minority of party identifiers in the capitals favored conservative parties. This percentage, moreover, declined from 19.4% in 1988 to 11.0% in 1996 while the left's share of party identifiers grew considerably**.**

This is an old cleavage in Brazilian politics. Glaúcio Soares demonstrated that conservative parties fared best in small counties in the 1945–64 period, and several scholars showed that ARENA/PDS maintained this profile between 1966 and 1982.[35] Since Brazil's first democratic elections in 1945, conservative parties have fared better in small counties and in the less-developed regions. In the small counties and in the less developed regions traditional clientelistic mechanisms are more influential. Conservatives rely more on clientelism than the left, thus it is not surprising that they fare best in small counties and in the poor regions. In addition, small counties tend to have less dense organizational networks among the popular classes. Organizations such as unions and neighborhood associations are key factors in cultivating popular political interest and in forging popular political identities. The weaker organizational network in small counties and in the poor regions means weaker penetration of leftist parties and greater opportunities for conservatives.

Not coincidentally, democracy in the regions where conservative parties fare best has been shallower. The poor regions and the small counties have been characterized by more pervasive clientelism and patrimonialism and by weaker rule of law.

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[34] These surveys were conducted in July 1988 (n=4561), November 1991 (n=11,180), and July 1996 (n=16,680). The July 1988 survey's CESOP catalogue number is Dat/cap88.jul–00100. The November 1991's number is Dat/cap91.nov–00296, and the July 1996 survey's number is Dat/cap96.jul–00622.

[35] Kinzo, *Legal Opposition Politics under Authoritarian Rule*, op. cit. n. 11, 66–70; Bolívar Lamounier, "O Voto em São Paulo, 1970–1978" in Lamounier, ed., *Voto de Desconfiança*, op. cit. n. 37, esp. 17–22. For a classic examination of mechanisms of domination in small counties, see Víctor Nunes Leal, *Coronelismo, Enxada e Voto* (São Paulo: Alfa-Omega, 1978).

Age

Age is the third factor that distinguishes conservative party identifiers, who tend to be older. Table 18 shows the age distribution of party identifiers in the 1996 national survey. Sympathizers of all three of the main conservative parties have consistently been older than the sympathizers of the leftist and centrist parties.

There are two possible interpretations of why older identifiers are more likely to prefer conservative parties. One possibility is a cohort effect, i.e., the younger cohort is less likely to identify with a conservative party and will remain so as it ages. The other is a life cycle effect, i.e., younger respondents are less likely to identify with a conservative party when they are young, but as they grow older become more likely to identify with a conservative party.

We expect that further research would show that the cohort effect is significant in Brazil. Because they were born before the phenomenal social changes of recent decades, older generations were socialized in a Brazil that was still traditional and poor. Probably this factor was important in shaping the political preferences of these older party identifiers.

Education

In most of the advanced industrial democracies education is a significant determinant of party preference. In Brazil the conservative bloc as a whole, mostly because of PFL identifiers, has consistently been less educated than other party identifiers (see Table 19 for 1996 data). The educational profile of conservative party identifiers does not differ sharply from that of center party identifiers because the conservative sympathizers differ from the PMDB, on the one hand, and the PSDB, on the other, in diverging directions. PMDB sympathizers are less educated than conservative party identifiers, while PSDB identifiers are better educated.

The educational profile of party identifiers cuts across the ideological blocs in surprising ways. Three parties, one from the right (PL), one from the center (PSDB), and one from the left (PT) fare best among well-educated voters. The three main conservative parties have an educational profile between that of the PMDB and that of the PT.

For the three largest conservative parties, the percentage of less-educated party identifiers increased in the state capitals from 1988 to 1996. The same trend toward less-educated party sympathizers occurred in the centrist and leftist parties. One plausible explanation for this trend is that across the ideological spectrum, the better educated voters got fed up with parties. This increase in the percentage of poorly educated party identifiers is all the more notable because during the period in question the mean education level in Brazil increased slightly.

Household Income

In his seminal book, *Political Man*, Seymour Martin Lipset wrote that "(I)n virtually every economically developed country the lower-income groups vote mainly for parties of the left, while the higher-income groups vote mainly for parties of the right."[36] The Brazilian case in the post-1985 period runs contrary to the Western European experience upon which Lipset based this claim. The conservative bloc has a lower income level than leftist party identifiers and a similar profile to the centrist identifiers. Few PPB and PFL identifiers are in the upper income categories, and a disproportionate share of PFL identifiers are poor (Table 20). Counterintuitively, the wealthiest respondents (household incomes of at least 50 minimum salaries) were much more likely to identify with a leftist party (13 identifiers) than with the right (only 1 identifier) or center (3 identifiers).

Why have conservative parties in Brazil fared comparatively well in winning the support of lower income groups? Why do they not conform to the pattern Lipset and others identified for the advanced industrial democracies?

In Brazil large groups of the poor are politically unorganized and work in the informal sector. As several studies on Latin America have shown, the less organized urban poor are more inclined to vote conservatively than the organized.[37] In small counties, clientelism and personalistic domination enable conservative politicians to retain popular support. These traditional means of political domination remain important in contemporary Brazil. The pattern Lipset and others identified existed because leftist parties succeeded in creating strong organizations that captured most popular class sympathies. In Brazil, because of the structural and political fragmentation of the popular classes,[38] this political project of the left has been more difficult, enabling conservative parties to compete more successfully for popular loyalties.

Gender and Race

Gender is a significant determinant of party identification and voting preferences in many democracies. In Brazil, however, the only consistent gender pattern that emerges among party identifiers is that the PT has a slightly higher percentage of women than other parties (Table 21). Among the conservative parties no consistent gender patterns distinguish one party's identifiers from the others. Nor is there a pellucid tendency over time.

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[36] *Political Man: The Social Bases of Politics* (Garden City, NY: Anchor Books, 1963), 234.
[37] Kenneth Roberts and Moisés Arce, "Neoliberalism and Lower Class Voting Behavior in Peru," *Comparative Political Studies* 31 (2 April 1998) : 217–46.
[38] Kurt Weyland, *Democracy without Equity: Failures of Reform in Brazil* (Pittsburgh: University of Pittsburgh Press, 1996).

In many countries—for example, the United States—race is an important cleavage in the party system. This is not true in Brazil. Notwithstanding profound racial inequalities in the society,[39] the racial composition of the various parties' identifiers does not differ much from one party to the next. This reflects the limited politicization of racial questions. The limited politicization of race even surfaces in the survey questions; the 1988 and 1991 surveys of state capitals did not ask respondents to identify their race.

Why are Brazil's profound racial inequalities not clearly reflected in party divisions? Race has historically been weakly politicized in Brazil. Until the mid–twentieth century, the idea that Brazil was not a racist society prevailed. One of Brazil's great twentieth-century intellectuals, Gilberto Freyre, even argued that Brazil was a racial democracy. In the scholarly community this viewpoint was shattered decades ago, and it is clear that race is one of the most important features of the social authoritarianism that is widespread in Brazilian society.[40] Nevertheless, racial questions are still not widely politicized. An Afro-Brazilian movement now exists, but it is a less powerful political actor than its counterpart in the United States. Although individual politicians seek the support of specific racial and ethnic groups, parties per se have eschewed such efforts. Thus, parties have not politicized racial questions, and the social movements that have politicized race and ethnic issues have failed to attract broad support.

Religion

In many party systems in the advanced industrial democracies and in several Latin American countries religion has been a powerful predictor of party preferences.[41] In this light, the paucity of research on the relationship between religion and party preference in Brazil seems surprising. Perhaps even more notable is that most surveys in Brazil have not asked questions about respondents' religious practice. This omission shows that religion is not commonly

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[39] Carlos Hasenbalg and Nelson do Valle Silva, *Estrutura Social, Mobilidade e Raça* (São Paulo: Vértice, 1988).

[40] On social authoritarianism, see Robert DaMatta's classic essay, "Do You Know Who You're Talking to?! The Distinction between Individual and Person in Brazil" in his *Carnivals, Rogues, and Heroes: An Interpretation of the Brazilian Dilemma* (Notre Dame, IN: Kellogg Institute Series with the University of Notre Dame Press, 1991), 137–97; and Evelina Dagnino, "Uma Nova Noção de Cidadania" in Evelina Dagnino, ed., *Anos 90: Política e Sociedade no Brasil* (São Paulo: Brasiliense, 1994), 103–15.

[41] Arend Lijphart, "Religious vs. Linguistic vs. Class Voting: The 'Crucial Experiment' of Comparing Belgium, Canada, South Africa, and Switzerland," *American Political Science Review* 73 (2 June 1979): 442–58; Richard Rose and Derek W. Urwin, "Social Cohesion, Political Parties and Strains in Regimes," *Comparative Political Studies* 2 (1969): 7–67. Timothy R. Scully argues that religion has been an important cleavage in the Chilean party system in his *Rethinking the Center: Cleavages, Critical Junctures, and Party Evolution in Chile* (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1992).

perceived as a major cleavage in the Brazilian party system. Nevertheless, religion was a moderately important cleavage in the presidential vote in 1994, and this effect holds up controlling for gender, race, and education.[42] Because religion seems to have some influence on Brazilians' political predilections, it merits more attention in future research.

Multivariate Analysis

For the 1996 national survey we ran a multivariate logistic regression analysis to analyze the social bases of conservative party identifiers.[43] Logistic regression enables us to ascertain which independent variables have the greatest impact on party identification and which have little impact once others are controlled for.

We ran fifteen models for the logistic regressions, each one with a different dependent variable. Model 1 compares party identifiers and nonidentifiers. The other fourteen models compare some group of conservative party sympathizers with other party identifiers. The specific samples for each model are shown in the top two rows of Table 22. A positive coefficient means that a higher range on an independent variable is favorable to the dependent variable in the '1' row.[44]

In the multivariate analysis, gender, age, and region were the only significant variables differentiating party identifiers from nonidentifiers. Controlling for the other variables, women, younger respondents, and residents of the Northeast were less likely to identify with a party.

The greater involvement of men in party politics is hardly surprising. Even with the dramatic transformations in the role of Brazilian women in recent decades, powerful vestiges

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[42] Antônio Flávio Pierucci and Reginaldo Prandi, "Religiões e Voto: A Eleição Presidencial de 1994," *Opinião Pública* 3 (1 May 1995): 20–44.

[43] We also worked with a 1994 national survey, DAT/BR96–00347 (n=13,024). Results were very consistent with those for 1996. The main difference is that in 1994, controlling for the other independent variables, higher-income identifiers were more likely to prefer a conservative party. This is because conservative party identifiers came disproportionately from small counties and the less developed regions. In a bivariate analysis income was not a significant predictor of conservative party identification.

[44] The coding for family income ranges from 1 (0 to 2 minimum salaries) to 6 (50 minimum salaries). Education ranges from 1 (illiterate or incomplete primary education) to 8 (post-graduate). For the four ethnic/racial dummy variables a value of 1 signifies that a respondent declared her/himself part of that racial or ethnic group. The largest group, respondents who identified themselves as white, are the reference group. For gender women are coded as a 1 and men as a 0. Age is an individual's chronological age. Region is a dummy variable; a value of 1 means that a respondent lives in a certain region. The North and Center-West regions combined are used as the reference group. Finally, county is coded from 1 (small counties with up to 19,600 voters) to 3 (160,000 or more voters). Except in the first model, we excluded respondents who did not provide information about family income.

remain of a traditional society in which party politics was thoroughly male dominated. The greater likelihood of men to express a party preference holds up across all parties.

Further research is needed on why younger voters have been less inclined to express a party preference. It could be that young voters are less inclined to identify with parties because the post–Cold War period, during which they have been socialized into politics, is characterized by less political polarization and less passion about politics. Another possibility is that the serious economic problems Brazil confronted between 1981 and 1994 generated political cynicism or diverted young voters' attention from political issues toward the private sphere. In addition, television may have an effect; individuals socialized politically in the post-1985 period, when television has been an important campaign vehicle, may be more accustomed to more personalistic appeals and less attuned to parties.

Predicting Conservative Party Identifiers

Among the party identifiers two facts stand out: the impressive significance of region, size of county, and age, and the weak predictive capability of the other variables.[45] Identifiers from small counties and older respondents are more likely to prefer conservative parties. Respondents from the most populous and developed region, the Southeast, are less likely to prefer a conservative party (Model 2). In the multivariate analysis, education and household income usually drop out as significant predictors of conservative party identification because conservative identifiers tend to come from three categories that on average have lower educational levels and lower household incomes: residents of small counties and poor regions, and older respondents.[46]

It is interesting in light of the significance age acquired in the multivariate analysis that little work has been done on the relationship between age and generational cohort and party preferences in Brazil. This is due to various factors, above all the short lifespan of the parties and of the diverse party systems that marked Brazil's history until 1985, and also to the long period

[45] To check for multicollinearity among the independent variables, we analyzed the correlations among education, income, and country size. Education and income had the highest correlation, but at .503 it was not high enough to cause multicollinearity. The correlation between education and county size was .254, and between income and county size it was .237.

[46] Model 3 compares conservative identifiers to a sample of nonconservative identifiers, with a very similar result. The sample group was randomly selected by SPSS. The reason for this procedure was the skewed distribution of the dependent variable: conservative identifiers constituted only 18.7% of all party identifiers. Results with logistic regression are more reliable with a more even distribution on the dependent variable. The random sample group enabled us to compare conservative party identifiers with a smaller group of nonconservative identifiers, thus creating a more balanced distribution of roughly 2/3 nonconservative identifiers to 1/3 conservative identifiers.

(1965–79) in which voters had to choose from among the two parties imposed by the military regime. It is also partly a consequence of limited survey research before the military dictatorship.

The sociological differences between leftist and rightist identifiers are greater than those between the centrist and rightist identifiers (Models 4 and 5). The chi square significance is greater in Model 5, and five variables are significant at .10.

We also ran specific groups of conservative party identifiers against all other identifiers and against sample groups of all other identifiers (Models 6 through 11). The PFL identifiers have the profile that is most distinctive vis-à-vis the nationwide pattern. Residents of small counties and of the Northeast and older identifiers were more likely to be PFL identifiers (Models 8 and 9). Identifiers from the South and Southeast are unlikely to prefer the PFL. The regional pattern of identification, then, is consistent with the voting data that we examined in the previous subsection: the PFL is a party of the Northeast.

Whereas the PFL and PPB have distinctive profiles vis-à-vis all other identifiers, the PTB identifiers are close to a random sample of all party identifiers (Model 10). None of the variables reaches the high levels of significance that county, age, and some regions had for the PFL and PPB. These results show that the PTB's bases differ markedly from those of the PFL and to a lesser degree the PPB.

Models 12 through 14 further demonstrate significant differences among the three main conservative parties in 1996. PFL identifiers differ markedly from PTB and PPB identifiers (Models 12 and 13). PPB and PTB identifiers do not differ as markedly (Model 14); only one variable—county—is significant, and the chi square is lower. To the limited extent that region predicts PPB or PTB identification, it is in an opposite direction from that of PFL identification; southern identifiers are more likely to prefer the PPB, and northeastern identifiers are less likely to prefer the PTB.

Model 15 compares conservative identifiers to all other identifiers, but we dropped the regions and size of county as independent variables. Income becomes statistically significant and has the expected negative coefficient, indicating that lower-income identifiers were more likely to prefer a conservative party. Controlling for region and county size, however, income becomes utterly insignificant. This explains the difference in results between the bivariate analysis above, in which conservative identifiers had somewhat lower household incomes than the mean, and the lack of statistical significance in Model 2 above.

Social Bases of Presidential Voting in 1989

The advantage of post- or pre- election surveys is that whereas party identifiers constitute only half of the electorate, the vast majority of respondents express a preference for president.[47] Thus, the data on presidential preferences comprehend a fuller band of the electorate. Moreover, presidential voting is very important in Brazil because the president is so powerful. Nevertheless, one must be careful in drawing inferences about *party* preferences from responses about the preferred presidential candidate in Brazil because the vote for executive positions is highly personalized and because strategic voting can be widespread. As a result, it can be misleading to make assertions about the social base of a given party on the basis of who voted for a particular presidential candidate. He/she may win far more or far less support, and with a different demographic composition, than the party's other candidates.

The problem of using a presidential election to judge parties' social bases was more acute in 1994 and 1998 than in 1989 because most conservative voters supported Fernando Henrique Cardoso of the PSDB. The conservative parties' candidates won small vote shares, and their supporters were in some cases dramatically nonrepresentative of their parties' normal social bases. For example, in 1994 PPB presidential candidate Espiridião Amin did best among well-educated and better-off Brazilians, but the PPB generally does best among the voters who are slightly less educated and poorer than the average. As a result of these problems, we limited our analysis to the 1989 presidential election.

We ran a logistic regression with the same independent variables as in Table 22 above, except for race/ethnicity, which was not included in the 1989 survey.[48] In any case, race/ethnicity was an irrelevant factor in social bases of party identification in 1996.

If we take the conservative vote as a whole (Model 1), most of the results are consistent with those for party identifiers in Table 22. Older voters and voters from smaller counties were more likely to cast their ballot for a conservative candidate, and voters from the Southeast were less likely to do so. Voters from the poor regions are more likely to prefer the conservative pole.

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[47] Most respondents also express a preference for governor, but working with the data on gubernatorial elections (and elections for Congress) was difficult because of coding problems in the surveys.

[48] The 1989 survey was conducted by IBOPE in November, after the first round of voting and before the second. There were 3,650 respondents. The IBOPE National Voter Survey Wave 19 can be obtained from the Roper Center Archive, University of Connecticut, BRIOPE89–OPP602. County size ranges from 1 (under 10,000 voters) to 6 (more than 500,000 registered voters). For gender, 0 is male and 1 female. For age, there are 6 categories ranging from 16–17 to 51 and older. For family income, there are six categories ranging from under 1 minimum salary to over 20. For education, there are ten categories from illiterate (1) to finished higher education (10).

Table 24

Vote Patterns in the 1989 Presidential Election, Conservative Candidates

	Collor	Maluf	Afif	Others	None[a]	Total	N	Pct. of Sample
By household income[b]								
>20	13.3	19.3	8.9	52.6	5.9	100.0	135	3.7
10–20	18.6	12.4	7.4	58.5	3.1	100.0	258	7.1
5–10	24.5	13.5	4.7	52.6	4.7	100.0	510	14.0
2–5	32.9	6.6	3.1	52.4	5.0	100.0	940	25.8
1–2	38.8	5.6	3.0	47.7	4.9	100.0	892	24.4
0–1	49.0	3.1	1.0	39.8	7.1	100.0	714	19.6
No answer	35.3	8.5	2.0	46.7	7.5	100.0	201	5.5
TOTAL	34.7	7.6	3.3	49.0	5.4	100.0	3650	100.0
By education								
Illiterate	54.9	2.7	0.5	32.3	9.6	100.0	366	10.0
Through 3rd grade	44.7	6.0	1.3	42.5	5.5	100.0	687	18.8
4th–8th grade	34.8	8.1	3.4	48.7	5.0	100.0	1692	46.4
9th–11th grade	22.0	8.8	6.2	58.3	4.7	100.0	645	17.7
Some university	11.2	12.7	5.4	67.2	3.5	100.0	260	7.2
TOTAL	34.7	7.6	3.3	49.0	5.4	100.0	3650	100.0
By size of municipality								
<19,999	49.2	6.2	1.8	36.9	5.9	100.0	1313	35.9
20,000-99,999	34.2	8.0	4.5	48.3	5.0	100.0	892	24.4
100,000–499,000	26.7	8.8	4.9	54.7	4.9	100.0	636	17.4
500,000+	18.0	8.1	3.5	65.1	5.3	100.0	809	22.2
TOTAL	34.7	7.6	3.3	49.0	5.4	100.0	3650	100.0

Source: National Voter Survey Wave 19, IBOPE, November 1989. Roper Center Archive Number BRIOPE89–OPP602.

[a] Combined total for blank vote, null ballot, no answer, and doesn't know.

[b] Household income is represented by the number of minimum salaries earned by the household. One minimum salary at that time was equivalent to US $43.60 per month: *Anuário Estatístico do Brasil*, 51 (Rio de Janeiro, Ministério da Economia, Fazenda e Planejamento & Fundação Instituto Brasileiro de Geografía e Estatística, 1991), 883–4; and *Conjuntura Econômica* 43, 12 (30 December 1989), 89.

There are some differences between the 1989 presidential voting pattern and the 1996 party identification pattern. In 1989, once other factors are controlled for, higher-income but worse-educated voters were more likely to choose a conservative candidate. In 1996 neither variable was significant. The 1989 income result will surprise those who know much about that election. Income is positive only because other variables are controlled for; in a simple bivariate analysis, lower-income voters were more likely to vote conservative.

As was the case for party identification, Models 5 and 6 indicate remarkable contrasts within the conservative bloc. Table 24 further underscores this diversity within the conservative bloc with crosstabs for three important independent variables: income, education, and county size. Collor fared much better in small counties. By contrast, Paulo Maluf's pattern of support was even across different county sizes, and Guilherme Afif Domingos did best in large cities.

In 1989 the conservative bloc did best among less-educated voters, but with remarkable intrabloc variance. Collor's first-round support increased dramatically in linear fashion as education level decreased. In the November 1989 survey he enjoyed the support of 54.9% of the illiterate and only 11.2% of those who had attended university. Maluf, the second most-voted conservative candidate and fifth overall, completely reversed this pattern. Maluf's support increased sharply in linear fashion as education level increased; he won 2.7% among the illiterate and 12.7% among the university educated, respectively. Among the illiterate Collor won 20 times as much support as Maluf; among those with some university education Maluf slightly outdistanced Collor. Collor did much better among the poorest voters. As with education, Maluf and Afif completely reversed this pattern. Among the wealthiest voters Maluf won 45% more support than Collor; among the poorest Collor won 16 times more than Maluf.

Conclusion

Our analysis of the social bases of conservative parties suggests four conclusions. First, conservative party identifiers differ from other identifiers in statistically and substantively very important ways. Size of county, region, and age are important predictors of conservative political sympathizers.

Second, other independent variables including those that tap class (measured indirectly here, through education and household income), ethnicity, and gender have weak capacity to predict conservative loyalties. Parties have not politicized gender and racial questions, and the social movements that have politicized these questions have not had much impact on party politics, partly because they have deliberately sought autonomy vis-à-vis parties. The left has politicized class and distributional questions, but intraclass fragmentation makes it difficult for the left to galvanize support across the very heterogeneous groups within the popular sectors. The

right continues to win ample support from the unorganized poor, especially in rural Brazil and in the poor regions.

Third, the data show impressive differences among the conservative parties. At one pole is the PL, whose sympathizers are disproportionately educated, well off, from large cities, and from Southern Brazil. At the other pole was the short-lived PRN, whose identifiers were mostly poorly educated, poor, from small counties, and from the Northeast. The PFL comes closer to this latter pole. Corresponding to these differences are notable contrasts in political discourse (the PL's more coherent and intellectualized discourse versus Collor's popular, often demagogic tone) and political style (the PL's more refined style versus Collor's populism). These differences among the conservative parties flatten out the differences between the conservative bloc and the center and left. In terms of social bases the PL bears greater resemblance to the PSDB and PT than to the largest two conservative parties. Even among the three largest conservative parties there are notable contrasts in social bases, as is witnessed in the high levels of statistical significance of Models 12 through 14 in Table 22 and in Models 5 and 6 of Table 23. Despite these differences in social bases, political discourse, and political style, the programmatic differences in roll-call voting among the conservative parties are minor.

Contemporary Brazilian conservatism has two contrasting faces. One face is more popular and usually more clientelistic; it is also often populist and personalistic. Fernando Collor was the quintessential expression of this popular, populist, and personalistic conservatism, with a moralistic discourse oriented toward the lower-income, less-educated sectors. The other face is disproportionately elite and usually more programmatic.

The electoral dilemma for conservatives is that they need popular support, and the more elite-based parties such as the PL have limited electoral appeal. The gulf between elite-based and popular conservatism is not new. The UDN of the 1945–64 period was more elite-based, the PSD more popular. In the contemporary period, for the most part the divide between popular and elite-based conservatism is reflected in individual politicians rather than parties, though some minor parties are exceptions (e.g., the PL is a quintessential expression of elite-based conservatism). The PPB has some elite conservatives (e.g., economists Roberto Campos and Antônio Delfim Netto) and some popular conservatives.

Finally, the social bases of Brazil's conservative parties do not conform to Lipset and Rokkan's seminal social cleavage model (which was constructed for Western Europe) of party system formation.[49] In Western Europe most wealthy voters gravitated toward conservative

[49] Seymour Martin Lipset and Stein Rokkan, "Cleavage Structures, Party Systems, and Voter Alignments: An Introduction" in Lipset and Rokkan, eds., *Party Systems and Voter Alignments: Cross-National Perspectives* (New York: Free Press, 1967), 1–64.

parties. In Brazil higher-income voters have not had conservative political loyalties. Moreover, whereas Lipset and Rokkan's model implicitly assumed that parties of the same ideological bloc would compete for the same social bases, in Brazil conservative parties sometimes have diametrically opposed bases.

As Garretón[50] suggests, the profound differences in social bases of the conservative party bloc in Brazil compared to most of Western Europe and also to Chile indicate that we are dealing with two distinct variants of conservatism. In Brazil conservative parties' success has rested above all on their capacity to dominate small counties, especially in the less-developed regions of the country. The conservative agenda in Brazil disproportionately benefits elite groups and has always done so. But the social bases supporting the conservative agenda in Brazil are not primarily elite. The means of putting together this popular coalition has rested more on personalism and clientelism and less on ideological positions than in most of Western Europe and in post-1989 Chile.

Party Organization among Conservative Parties

Conservative parties in Brazil have several distinctive features compared to their conservative counterparts in most Latin American countries: a focus on state and local politics; lower party discipline than parties in most democracies; a low level of party loyalty; and reliance on clientelism. On the first dimension conservative parties are more or less similar to other Brazilian parties. On the second and fourth they are similar to the centrist organizations in Brazil but different from the leftist organizations, which are more disciplined. The conservative parties have exhibited distinctively low party loyalty since 1990; the contrast is especially sharp to the left.

During both of Brazil's democratic periods the party system has been highly federalized.[51] Since the withering of the PMDB in 1987–90, even the largest parties have not been fully national in scope. For example, in 1990 the PFL won as much as 41.6% of the lower chamber vote in one state (Pernambuco) but won under 6% in six states, with a low of 1.6% in Goiás. The PDS won more than 20% in four of the 27 states, but under 5% in 13 states, including one (Alagoas) where it did not even field candidates. Some of the small parties nationally are powerful contenders in a few states. For example, in 1990 the PSC was the plurality winner in the lower chamber election in Alagoas with 36.6% of the vote, but in 21 of the 27 states it won under 1%.

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[50] Manuel Antonio Garretón's chapter in *Conservative Parties, the Right, and Democracy in Latin America*, op. cit. n. 6.

A second feature of Brazil's conservative and centrist parties is their limited discipline. This has been empirically demonstrated by Figueiredo and Limongi, who analyzed roll-call voting in the Chamber of Deputies from 1989–94, and by Mainwaring and Pérez-Liñán, who examined roll-call voting during the Constitutional Congress of 1987–8.[52] The PT and the minor leftist parties demonstrated nearly perfect discipline, but the centrist and conservative organizations exhibit less discipline than parties in most democracies.

Politicians in most democracies are loyal to their parties. In Brazil, in contrast, since 1984 politicians of the conservative and centrist parties have frequently changed organizational loyalty. Between 1984 and 1987 most party switching involved defections from the PDS to the PFL or PMDB. Then from 1987 to 1990 it involved defecting from the PMDB. At least 82 members of Congress changed parties between February 1987 and September 1988, at least 57 between September 1988 and January 1990, and at least 58 more between January and October 1990. Even if we take only these four data points, there were at least 197 cases of party switching among the 559 members of the 1987–91 legislature. The PMDB hemorrhage was particularly strong; 152 of its 305 members of Congress had left the party by October 1990. The PFL had a net loss of 31 of 134 seats.

Party migration continued unabated during the 1991–4 legislature. There were 260 cases of party switches among the 503 deputies elected in 1990.[53] The conservative parties were especially prone to suffer defections. Among the 257 deputies elected in 1990 on conservative tickets, there were 201 cases of party switching between 1991 and 1995; among the 246 deputies of centrist and leftist parties, there were 59 cases. Party switching was particularly rampant among the members of small conservative parties, i.e., all but the PFL and PDS. The PFL elected 84 deputies, and the party experienced 37 defections. The PDS elected 42 deputies and it experienced 18 defections. The smaller conservative parties elected 131 deputies, and they suffered 146 defections, that is, more than one per initial deputy. Fully 174 of the 260 party switches involved movement from one center-right or rightist party to another. Although these figures demonstrate low loyalty to parties, even on the conservative pole, party labels are more important in Brazil than in Peru, as Conaghan has shown.[54]

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[51] On the 1945–64 period, see Olavo Brasil de Lima Júnior, *Os Partidos Políticos Brasileiros: A Experiência Federal e Regional* (Rio de Janeiro: Graal, 1983). On the post-1985 period, see Samuels, "Careerism and its Consequences," op. cit. n. 26.

[52] Limongi and Figueiredo, "Partidos Políticos na Câmara dos Deputados," op. cit. n. 4; Scott Mainwaring and Aníbal Pérez Liñan, "Party Discipline in the Brazilian Constitutional Congress," *Legislative Studies Quarterly* 22 (4 November 1997): 453–83.

[53] Samuels, "Determinantes do Voto Partidário," op. cit. n. 32.

[54] Catherine Conaghan's chapter in *Conservative Parties, the Right, and Democracy in Latin America*, op. cit., n. 6.

A final distinctive feature of conservative parties and politicians is their reliance on clientelism to sustain political careers. Deputies, especially of conservative and centrist parties, see one of their main functions as obtaining resources for their home state and region. Clientelism provides benefits that are key to their political careers. Most conservative and centrist members of Congress try to obtain resources in order to win the support of governors, mayors, state secretaries, and municipal councilors, all of whom can help bolster their electoral prospects. Politicians also use clientelism as a resource in intraparty competition. Finally, clientelism is widely used by presidents, governors, and mayors to secure support for their policies.[55]

Conservative Parties and Economic Liberalism

Between 1930 and 1990 Brazil pursued state-led economic development. Between 1945 and 1980 this development strategy was highly successful in terms of per capita growth. But as the developmentalist state collapsed in the 1980s, and in response to a changing international economic environment, market-oriented economic policies became a key part of the political debate.

In Western Europe, Eastern Europe, and the United States conservative parties led the wave of economic liberalism. In most of Latin America including Brazil this has not been true. In Brazil the first important neoliberal reformer, President Fernando Collor, was an antiparty populist who was a late convert to neoliberalism. Collor's party, the PRN, was peripheral in the neoliberal tide and virtually disappeared after he was impeached in 1992. The second key neoliberal reformer, President Fernando Henrique Cardoso, was a founding member of the previously center-left PSDB, which generally supported statist positions in the Constitutional Congress of 1987–8. The PSDB supported Cardoso's economic agenda, but the president, not the party, designed and implemented it; the party merely followed behind.

In most of the post-1945 period Brazil's conservative parties had an ambiguous attitude toward economic liberalism. In their discourse most have espoused antistatist, marked-oriented economic policies. In practice, however, most of the large conservative parties have fared best electorally in the poor regions where clientelism is particularly useful for building political careers. State shrinking and state reform potentially threaten to weaken clientelism and thereby could hurt conservative politicians. State shrinking reduces the pot of public sector resources on which

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[55] Barry Ames, "Electoral Rules, Constituency Pressures, and Pork Barrel: Bases of Voting in the Brazilian Congress," *The Journal of Politics* 57 (2 May 1995): 324–43; Hagopian, *Traditional Politics and Regime Change*, op. cit. n. 16; Scott Mainwaring, *Rethinking Party Systems in the Third Wave of Democratization: The Case of Brazil* (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1999), Chapter 6; Campello de Souza, "The Contemporary Faces of the Brazilian Right" in Weyland, *Democracy without Equity*, op. cit., n. 38.

politicians can draw in order to drum up electoral support. Many state reforms attempt to promote

more transparent, meritocratic processes within the public sector and thereby reduce opportunities for particularistic exchanges of favors. Conservative politicians, therefore, often support maintaining the public sector activities that benefit them and their constituents while espousing a market-oriented rhetoric. Thus, the practice of conservative politicians is not always consistent with their discourse.

From the time of its creation in 1965–6 ARENA was never a significant advocate of economic liberalism, notwithstanding the fact that some of its leaders preferred market-oriented economic policies. Most ARENA and PDS politicians lived off state patronage and never objected to the large expansion of the public sector that took place under military rule.

The tension between a liberal economic discourse and extensive recourse to clientelism helps explain why conservative parties were not at the forefront of the neoliberal economic tide in Brazil. This tension is particularly acute in the PFL, notorious for its clientelistic proclivities. In addition, the comparative weakness of the Brazilian Congress as a proactive actor and the dominance of the president make it easier for presidents rather than parties to lead an ambitious reform agenda. Finally, the temporary disrepute of conservative parties at the end of military rule and later the poor results of Sarney's administration delegitimated conservative positions, making it difficult for the right to push an ambitious new agenda.

The prolonged economic crisis of 1981–94 gradually led to renewed conservative emphasis on markets and economic liberalism. Nevertheless, as recently as 1995 Brazil lagged well behind most of Latin America in undertaking market-oriented reforms.[56] Even though conservatives supported market-oriented reforms, they did so with hesitation, often extracting substantial clientelistic benefits in exchange. Gradually, however, support for market-oriented policies increased in the 1990s. The collapse of the developmentalist state became apparent, leading to new opportunities for conservative parties. Even so, as neoliberalism advanced conservative parties were always followers, never leaders.

Three conservative parties—the PL, the PRN, and the PDS/PPR/PPB—helped turn the tide in favor of more market-oriented policies, though they were not at the forefront of this tide. Created in 1985, the PL became the main ideological herald of neoliberal policies. Its early leaders, Guilherme Afif Domingos and Alvaro Valle, loudly proclaimed the benefits of neoliberal economic policies at a time when doing so was unfashionable in Brazil. But as also occurred with

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[56] Maria Hermínia Tavares de Almeida, "Pragmatismo por Necessidade: Os Rumos da Reforma Econômica no Brasil," *Dados* 39 (2, 1996): 213–34; Sebastian Edwards, *Crisis and Reform in Latin America: From Despair to Hope* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1995); Robert Packenham, "The Politics of Economic Liberalization: Argentina and Brazil in Comparative Perspective," Kellogg Institute Working Paper #206 (April 1994), University of Notre Dame; Lourdes Sola, "The State, Structural Reform, and Democratization in Brazil" in William C. Smith et

the UceDe in Argentina, the party failed to expand its electoral base beyond fairly narrow, generally better-educated and more affluent sectors in developed urban areas—particularly the states of Rio de Janeiro and São Paulo. The PL got off to a decent start in 1986 when Domingos and Valle were among the country's most voted Federal Deputies. However, after Valle lost his bid to become mayor of Rio de Janeiro in 1988 and Domingos won only 4.7% in the 1989 presidential election, the party stagnated electorally.

The PRN per se was inconsequential in the debate about Brazil's economic policies; it was a mere organizational appendage of its 1989 presidential candidate, Fernando Collor. Because Collor was the most important figure in reinvigorating the debate about economic liberalism in Brazil, the PRN was for a time synonymous with the neoliberal tide. After Collor's impeachment in 1992, however, the PRN virtually disappeared. It elected only one federal deputy in 1994 compared to 40 in 1990.

When the most clientelistic sectors of the PDS defected to the PFL in 1984–5, what remained of the PDS was more identified with economic liberalism. PDS/PPR/PPB federal deputies (and former ministers) Roberto Campos and Antônio Delfim Netto have been among the country's most vociferous and articulate advocates of economic liberalism. However, Campos and Delfim Netto have few equivalents in the other main conservative parties, which have almost no intellectual luminaries.

Beginning with the Collor period, conservative party identities came to be determined less by an authoritarian/democratic dichotomy than by a statist/neoliberal cleavage. In the early months of the Collor administration conservative parties jumped on the neoliberal bandwagon as Collor introduced a panoply of reforms. As Collor's economic policies foundered, however, and as the president faced a mounting crisis because of corruption charges, the conservative parties again failed to trumpet neoliberalism. Although conservative parties per se were not the main actors responsible for introducing liberal economic policies in Brazil, they have largely supported Collor's and Cardoso's market-oriented agenda.

The agenda setters for neoliberalism in Brazil have been some business interests, some high-level state administrators, and Presidents Collor and Cardoso. Business has not uniformly supported neoliberalism, but business was the first to issue a clarion call for state shrinking (*desestatização*) in the mid–1970s. Many business sectors have supported neoliberal policies since then, though others have continued to benefit from state largesse and are neutral or even mildly opposed to state shrinking. In a 1989–90 survey business leaders (74% agreed) were far

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al., eds., *Democracy, Markets, and Structural Reform in Latin America* (New Brunswick, NJ: Transaction Publishers, 1994), 151–81.

more likely than other groups to completely or mostly agree that "Today the public sector should restrict itself to classic functions such as security, education, and justice."[57]

In the 1980s the left and center-left depicted themselves as 'progressive' and the conservative parties as the forces of 'reaction,' but by the late 1990s the statist/neoliberal cleavage allowed conservative parties to confidently portray themselves—with Cardoso's explicit backing—as the defenders of economic 'modernity' against the 'retrograde' left. This identification of the PFL with a popular (until 1999), reformist, 'modern' president has helped it to shed some of its earlier, negative image as authoritarian and patrimonial. The increasing importance of the statist/neoliberal cleavage in Brazilian politics—a trend reinforced by regional trends, effusive foreign praise for the Cardoso agenda, and the global *zeitgeist* itself—has contributed to the legitimation of conservative parties, particularly the PFL, for the simple reason that neoliberalism is prevailing. This same phenomenon is also linked to the transformation of Cardoso's own PSDB, founded as an avowedly social-democratic party only ten years ago, into a party of the liberal center.

Conservative Parties and Economic Elites

There is a diversity of linkages between economic elites and conservative parties in contemporary Latin America. In some cases such as Chile during its democratic periods, economic elites have tended to support conservative parties. By contrast, in contemporary Peru and Venezuela they have not relied significantly on conservative parties to further their interests.[58]

In this respect, Brazil is closer to Peru and Venezuela than to Chile. Research by Makler makes it clear that economic elites do not predominantly rely on one or two select conservative parties to defend their interests.[59] They prefer to put their eggs in several baskets, and they almost always support individual candidates and politicians rather than parties. The Liberal Party (PL), which has modest support in the states of Rio de Janeiro and São Paulo, is an attempt to create an ideological conservative party, and it has strong ties to the business community. But by no means has it become *the* party of business interests.

In a survey of 132 banking sector leaders Makler found that only 17 (12.9%) were members of parties. Among those 17 party preferences were divided: 3 PDS, 2 PMDB, 1 each

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[57] The survey included 76 business leaders, 108 political leaders, 34 media leaders, 68 military leaders, 34 labor leaders, 26 leaders of interest groups, 78 renowned intellectuals, and 26 high public officials. Amaury de Souza and Bolívar Lamounier, eds., *As Elites Brasileiras e a Modernização do Setor Público: Um Debate* (São Paulo: IDESP/Sumaré, 1992), 13.

[58] See Congahan, op. cit. n. 54, and Coppedge, op. cit. n. 10.

PFL, PDT, and PL, and 9 others. Even more revealing was the distribution of responses to the question, "What political party is best for Brazil's economic future?" Only 27 bankers (20.5%) specified any one party as best for the country's future, indicating that parties have not captured the sympathies of this important group. Those who voiced a preference for some party were inclined to see the PL most favorably (10 people), followed by the PSDB (5), PMDB (4), PDS (4), PFL (2), PDT (1), and PT (1).[60]

The practice of using parties to protect interests without making a strong commitment to specific parties is a sensible option in a context in which individual politicians, more than parties per se, are the primary mechanisms of representation. The national parties are weak in most respects; politicians, especially conservatives, have changed parties with considerable frequency; and except for the left, party discipline is less than ironclad. By supporting individual candidates financially or otherwise, business groups create connections to individual politicians, thereby gaining privileged access. In the post-1985 period organized elite interests have sought influence within Congress; it is not that Congress is an irrelevant actor. But they have gone through individual politicians rather than parties per se.

Conservative Parties' Electoral Performance and Democracy

Echoing Gibson's work on this subject, Middlebrook indicates the importance for democracy of an electorally viable conservative party (or parties).[61] On the other hand, Hagopian, O'Donnell, and Power have called attention to the ways in which strongly entrenched conservative politicians can truncate democracy.[62] These arguments are not intrinsically opposed to each other: Middlebrook's argument focuses on the desirability of an electorally viable

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[59] Harry M. Makler, "The Persistence of Corporatist Strategies: Brazilian Banks, Their Politics, and the State," Paper for the XIII World Congress of Sociology, Bielefeld, Germany, 18–23 July 1994.

[60] Harry Makler generously supplied this data from a survey he conducted in Brazil in 1990.

[61] Middlebrook, "Introduction," op. cit. n. 6. Guillermo O'Donnell and Philippe Schmitter made a related argument focusing specifically on transitions to democracy in "Tentative Conclusions about Uncertain Democracies," Part 4 of Guillermo O'Donnell, Philippe Schmitter, and Laurence Whitehead, eds., *Transitions from Authoritarian Rule: Prospects for Democracy* (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1986).

[62] Hagopian, "The Compromised Consolidation," op. cit. n. 16, and *Traditional Politics and Regime Change in Brazil*, op. cit. n. 16; O'Donnell, "Transitions, Continuities, and Paradoxes," op. cit. n. 16, "Polyarchies and the (Un)Rule of Law in Latin America," op. cit. n. 18, and "On the State, Democratization, and Some Conceptual Problems: A Latin American View with Glances at Some Postcommunist Countries," *World Development* 21 (8, 1993): 1355–69; Power, *Elites, Institutions, and Democratization*, op. cit. n. 3.

conservative party (or parties) for democratic survivability while Hagopian's focuses on the problems created by entrenched traditional elites for the deepening and quality of democracy.

The Brazilian case supports Hagopian's and O'Donnell's arguments more than Gibson's and Middlebrook's. This is not to say that Gibson and Middlebrook are *generally* wrong, but the Brazilian case does not conform to their arguments because democracy broke down *despite* the electoral viability of conservative parties. In both democratic periods Brazil has had electorally viable conservative parties. Middlebrook argues that conservative parties must win at least 20–30% of the vote if conservative forces are to play an influential role in policy coalitions and to exercise an effective veto over initiatives that threaten their interests. Even if one counts the 1945–64 PSD as a centrist rather than conservative party, Brazilian conservative parties have always managed above that threshold.

On four occasions between 1954 and 1964 democracy was seriously imperiled: in 1954 when conservative forces conspired against Getúlio Vargas; in 1955 when they considering blocking elected president Juscelino Kubitschek from taking power; in 1961 when President Jânio Quadros resigned; and in 1964 when the military coup toppled President João Goulart. In no case was this threat to democracy attributable to the absence of an electorally viable conservative party. Nevertheless, the fact that conservative parties had experienced an electoral decline between 1946 and 1964 contributed to their frustration with democracy and their willingness to support a coup. In this limited sense, the experience of 1946–64 was consistent with a modified version of Gibson's and Middlebrook's argument.

Consistent with the Gibson/Middlebrook argument, the electoral success of conservative parties since 1985 has probably contributed to conservative willingness to abide by democratic rules of the game. However, what has been decisive in this respect is not that conservative parties have fared better electorally since 1985 than they did between 1946 and 1964. Rather it is that they are more willing to accept electoral losses in the ideologically depolarized post–Cold War period and that the international sanctions for failing to abide by electoral rules of the game are far more costly today than was the case during Brazil's earlier experiment with democracy.

The Brazilian experience supports the arguments of Hagopian and O'Donnell regarding the disadvantages of large contingents of conservative politicians who favor truncated forms of democracy and support some undemocratic practices. Conservatives were especially likely to favor broad military prerogatives in the early years of the post-1985 democracy. They have been more tolerant of rampant police violence than other political sectors, and police violence has undermined Brazil's human rights record. In the vast interior conservatives are more likely to rule in personalistic, patrimonial fashion and to support legal, police, and political practices that limit popular sectors' exercise of citizenship.

Conservative Parties' Behavior and Attitudes Regarding Democracy

Conservative parties in Brazil are more supportive of democracy than ever before. Until 1985 some important conservative parties had a poor record of accepting democracy. Between 1946 and 1964 the UDN frequently acted in ways that undermined democracy. Even a large faction of the PSD turned against Goulart and supported the coup. The support of the conservative parties and the center-right PSD was probably a decisive factor in the 1964 coup; as Stepan has argued, successful coups usually enjoy considerable civilian backing.[63]

Between 1946 and 1964 even a minor threat sufficed to mobilize conservative forces against democracy. When the UDN conspired against democracy in 1950, 1954, and 1961, the 'leftist' threat was not significant. Although Vargas's populist proclivities alienated traditional conservative Brazilians, he hardly threatened property rights or even economic development. Nor did Juscelino Kubitschek threaten conservative interests, yet the UDN conspired to block him from taking office. Only in 1963–4, when Goulart flirted with the left, behaved erratically, and made equivocal statements about respecting the constitution, was the threat to conservative interests serious.

Between 1966 and 1984 ARENA and the PDS reaped the benefits of their junior partnership with the military dictatorship. They consistently supported military rule and until 1982 rarely questioned the generals' edicts. Only in 1984, when a faction defected to form the PFL, did a significant group within ARENA/PDS challenge military rule, and even this defection was occasioned more by personal and regional disagreements than by debate about the desirability of democracy.

Thus, the pre-1984 record of conservative parties was hardly auspicious for accepting democracy. Since 1985, however, conservative parties have engaged in no conspiratorial antidemocratic activities and appear to have accepted democracy, although if democracy were extremely threatening to conservative interests, coup mongering might resurface.

Skeptics might wonder whether this is because conservative parties have undergone a democratic metamorphosis or simply because they have been less threatened in the post-1985 democratic period.[64] Conservative acceptance of democracy has certainly been fostered by the consistent presence of rightist parties—especially the PFL—in the national cabinet during the

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[63] Alfred C. Stepan, *The Military in Politics: Changing Patterns in Brazil* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1971). On the UDN's conspiracies against democracy, see Benevides, *A UDN e o Udenismo*, op. cit. n. 12.

[64] The skeptics' point of view is expressed by Atilio Borón, "Becoming Democrats? Some Skeptical Considerations on the Right in Latin America" in Chalmers, Souza, and Borón, eds., *The Right and Democracy in Latin America*, op. cit. n. 22, 68–95.

entire post-1985 period.[65] We believe that conservatives have undergone a metamorphosis in accepting open political competition (though, especially in the poor regions, they often truncate democracy to protect their interests).

In 1989, when Lula appeared poised to win the presidency with a leftist platform, conservative parties appeared ready to live with the outcome, at least initially. Lula in 1989 represented far more of an objective threat to conservative interests than Vargas in the 1950s. Thus, a potentially serious threat to conservatives' interests in 1989 provoked less conspiratorial activity than a mild threat in the 1950s. Moreover, the economic decay of 1985–94 did not impel conservatives to mobilize against democracy, whereas in 1964 economic problems contributed to conservative dissatisfaction with democracy.

Surveys of Congress support the idea that conservative acceptance of democracy has increased since 1985. Table 25 shows responses to four survey questions related to authoritarianism and military prerogatives. In the years immediately following the transition to democracy in 1985 conservative politicians were more likely than others to express attitudes that reflected greater affinity for authoritarianism. The top two rows of Table 25 report orientations toward authoritarianism as a 'solution' for organizing the economy and polity. Conservative party members have consistently been more likely than other members of Congress to believe that social order is more easily achieved by authoritarianism.

The bottom two rows of Table 25 show growing convergence between members of conservative parties and other members of Congress regarding military prerogatives. One survey question asked whether respondents believed that the military should have the right to intervene to guarantee internal order. In Brazil this was a polemical issue because such a constitutional right had on past occasions legitimated military interventions. Members of conservative parties have consistently been more likely to agree with this statement, but the gap has narrowed over time.

Another important issue related to military prerogatives was whether there should be a single Ministry of Defense rather than various military ministers. As Stepan argued, the multiplicity of military ministers gave the armed forces significant power and autonomy in executive branch decision-making.[66] Thus, support for a single Minister of Defense was associated with more democratic positions. In the first legislature under democracy the PDS resisted this proposal strongly, and the remaining conservative parties were lukewarm about it. However, in 1993 and 1997 support for the Ministry of Defense was strong across the board, and

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[65] See Rachel Meneguello, *Partidos e Governos no Brasil Contemporâneo (1985–1997)* (São Paulo: Paz e Terra, forthcoming).

[66] Alfred Stepan, *Rethinking Military Politics: Brazil and the Southern Cone* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1988), 105–6.

conservative parties were no more likely than other parties to oppose the reform. On this particular idea conservative

parties have backed away from their earlier role as defenders of military prerogatives. In January 1999 President Cardoso created the Ministry of Defense and predictably entrusted this position to a conservative, naming as his minister the PFL Senator Elcio Alvares.[67]

This gradual conservative acceptance of democracy does not mean that conservative parties have democratic outlooks on all policy questions. Many conservative politicians tolerate human rights violations,[68] which are still widespread among criminal suspects. Although they have moved away from positions that could support democratic breakdowns, conservatives are still more likely to hold views that limit and erode democracy. The right fringe—which should not be confused with the mainstream conservative positions on which we have focused—continues to flagrantly undermine democratic practices and institutions. Perhaps the most important example is the right-wing landowners' association, the UDR (Democratic Rural Union), founded in 1985. Factions of the UDR have supported private landowners' militias. These militias have assassinated some peasant leaders and have attempted to intimidate the movement of landless peasants (Movimento Sem Terra). In the 1991–5 legislature eleven members of Congress, from the PTB, PDC, PPR, PFL, and PDT were linked to the UDR.[69] One of the points demarcating the boundary between the mainstream conservatives analyzed here and the extreme right is the latter's willingness to use armed violence to defend order and private property.

These are important qualifications to our argument that conservative political elites have generally accepted democracy. But whereas in the 1946–64 period these elites were quick to foster military coups, this is no longer the case.

We cannot analyze in detail the factors behind conservatives' willingness to accept democracy, but four seem particularly important. First, in the post–Cold War era the threat of radical social change is greatly diminished, making it easier for conservatives to accept democracy. This has especially been the case since Cardoso was elected president in 1994; the conservatives' economic agenda has become hegemonic. Second, the modern conservative establishment, which is more willing to accept democracy, has grown, and the traditional

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[67] For an analysis of increasing contestation of military prerogatives, see Wendy Hunter, *Eroding Military Influence in Brazil: Politicians against Soldiers* (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1997).

[68] In April 1998 a far rightist PPB federal deputy, Jair Bolsonaro, epitomized this attitude when he stated that some kidnappers "should be tortured so that they divulge the names of all their accomplices." *Veja* No. 1544 (29 April 1998), 17. Although an explicit public defense of torture has become the exception, few conservative politicians criticize the use of torture in interrogations.

[69] See Regina Bruno, "Revisitando a UDR: Ação Política, Ideologia e Representação," *Revista do Instituto de Estudos Brasileiros*, Universidade de São Paulo, No. 1 (1997); and Leigh Payne, *Uncivil Movements: The Armed Right and Democracy in Latin America* (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, forthcoming).

authoritarian right that ruled in personalistic fashion in the vast hinterland has receded in comparative power. Third, conservatives recognize that military rule was not a panacea, and the military is more reluctant to intervene in politics than it was in the past. The fact that three successive conservative presidents—Figueiredo (1979–85), Sarney (1985–90), and Collor (1990–2)—fared poorly destroyed conservatives' confidence that they had all the answers. Finally, international mechanisms for supporting democracy have strengthened in the past two decades, such that the cost of frontally opposing democracy has escalated. Conservative acceptance of democracy does not ensure its impregnability, but in a country in which conservatives historically were the main opponent of democracy, it is a major step.

The Resurgence of Conservative Parties?

Conservative parties have scored some meaningful electoral and political successes in post-1985 Brazil. In his seminal works on the Brazilian party system Gláucio Soares demonstrated that conservative parties experienced a secular demise between 1946 and 1962 and again between 1970 and 1982.[70] However, the post-1985 period has revealed a certain dynamism in conservative parties that may offset the trends that Soares detected for earlier periods. Instead of representing positions widely seen as retrograde, conservative parties now claim to represent the future by virtue of their promarket views. A more programmatic breed of conservatism is emerging alongside the more traditional clientelistic variant. It is possible that conservative electoral reliance on the traditional and poorer parts of the country is diminishing. The conservative parties are more accepting of democracy than in the past. If these changes are consolidated, they would bolster the future of conservative parties in Brazil.

On the political front conservative successes are even more striking. The three presidential elections held under democracy have been won by candidates who promoted the conservatives' economic agenda, and the centrist parties have migrated rapidly toward conservative economic positions over the last decade. Thus, even if conservatives do not revitalize their electoral standing, they have temporarily won the battle to define much of Brazil's future.

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[70] Soares, *Sociedade e Política*, op. cit. n. 11.

Table 7

Localistic Orientations in the Conservative Parties
(Percentage Ranking Local Loyalties Higher than Partisan Loyalties)

Group	1988		1997	
	%	(N)	%	(N)
Conservative Parties	74.2***	31	70.3***	64
Nonconservative Parties	46.9	64	46.3	95
Congress	55.2	96	56.0	159

Pearson's chi–square test on conservative versus nonconservative groups. Significance levels *** $p < .01$

Question: "When there is a conflict between the needs of your region and your party's positions, do you vote most often:
(1) with your party;
(2) according to the needs of your region; or
(3) do you split your votes evenly?"

Percentages in table refer to those selecting the second (regional) option.

Sources: Mainwaring 1988 survey of Brazilian National Congress; Power 1997 survey of Brazilian National Congress.

Table 8

Orientations toward Institutional and Representational Issues, from Legislative Surveys

Survey	1990			1993			1997		
Question	Cons. Parties	Noncons. Parties	Cong.	Cons. Parties	Noncons. Parties	Cong.	Cons. Parties	Noncons. Parties	Cong.
Support maintaining presidential system of government[a]	27.5**	14.7	19.5	41.3	37.0	38.9	43.1**	27.8	34.2
Attribute election victory to themselves rather than to party[b]	91.0***	74.8	81.6	88.0***	56.4	70.7	90.9***	69.1	78.1
Believe legislators should follow party line rather than personal beliefs[c]	46.6	53.2	50.7	46.2***	71.4	60.2	38.5***	64.1	53.5
Support concept of party fidelity[d]	48.9*	60.0	55.7	64.9***	84.0	75.7	60.0*	73.6	67.9
Favor punishing party switchers by depriving them of office[e]	50.0	55.6	53.6	—	—	—	60.9***	83.2	74.2

Pearson's chi–square test on conservative versus nonconservative groups. Significance levels *** p < .01 ** p < .05 * p < .10

[a] Question: "Do you favor or oppose instituting the parliamentary system of government?"

[b] Question: "Some legislators are elected because of their party—that is, the organizational strength of the party or its profile in public opinion. Others are elected due to their individual capacity for organization or their personal performance (*atuação*) in politics. In your case, which was more important, the party or your personal efforts?"

[c] Question: "Do you believe that in legislative activity, a legislator should generally vote as the party indicates or according to his/her personal beliefs?"

[d] Question: "Do you support the party closing debate on an issue and resorting to the institution of party fidelity?" (Loose translation of: "*O Sr. acha correto o partido fechar questão e usar o recurso da fidelidade partidária*?")

[e] Statement: "Legislators should lose their mandates if they change parties after the elections." Agreement percentages refer to sum of *concorda, plenamente* and *concorda, em termos*.

Source: Timothy J. Power surveys of Brazilian National Congress.

Table 9

Ideological Placement of Parties in National Congress, 1990–1997[a]

Party	1990 (1) Overall	1990 (2) Noncon.	1990 (3) Own Party	1990 (4) Selves	1993 (1) Overall	1993 (2) Noncon.	1993 (3) Own Party	1993 (4) Selves	1997 (1) Overall	1997 (2) Noncon.	1997 (3) Own Party	1997 (4) Selves
PDS/PPR/ PPB	8.47 (212)	8.96 (132)	6.93 (15)	5.60 (15)	7.75 (162)	8.48 (88)	6.17 (24)	5.82 (27)	8.38 (151)	8.84 (88)	7.39 (18)	5.65 (17)
PFL	7.74 (217)	8.35 (134)	6.05 (39)	5.27 (37)	7.51 (166)	8.23 (90)	6.12 (28)	5.43 (28)	8.10 (155)	8.60 (90)	6.92 (39)	6.03 (29)
PTB	6.92 (208)	7.54 (131)	5.17 (6)	4.86 (7)	6.75 (161)	7.39 (87)	6.00 (7)	5.14 (7)	7.28 (150)	7.69 (87)	6.75 (4)	5.33 (3)
PL	7.23 (209)	7.82 (130)	5.11 (9)	5.60 (5)	7.36 (163)	7.90 (87)	5.20 (5)	5.20 (5)	7.48 (145)	8.00 (85)	7.00 (3)	4.00 (1)
PDC	7.42 (204)	8.04 (127)	6.13 (8)	5.67 (6)	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—
PP	—	—	—	—	6.30 (157)	6.97 (87)	5.11 (9)	5.13 (8)	—	—	—	—
PRN	7.42 (205)	8.00 (129)	5.71 (7)	5.00 (6)	8.32 (158)	8.97 (88)	7.00 (4)	5.50 (6)	—	—	—	—
PMDB	4.88 (216)	4.95 (141)	4.42 (74)	4.62 (58)	5.03 (173)	5.13 (95)	4.38 (34)	4.71 (28)	5.48 (149)	5.39 (87)	4.57 (30)	4.25 (28)
PSDB	3.95 (207)	4.06 (130)	3.75 (32)	3.52 (29)	4.37 (165)	4.48 (89)	3.94 (17)	3.81 (16)	5.86 (153)	5.87 (89)	4.77 (30)	4.81 (27)
PDT	3.11 (209)	3.12 (130)	2.70 (17)	3.00 (14)	3.51 (166)	3.37 (90)	3.20 (15)	3.46 (13)	3.26 (152)	3.27 (89)	2.60 (5)	3.60 (5)
PT	1.50 (210)	1.62 (131)	1.00 (5)	1.60 (5)	2.03 (166)	2.09 (89)	2.06 (16)	2.57 (14)	1.93 (153)	2.02 (89)	1.94 (17)	2.21 (14)
Congress	—	—	—	4.42 (195)	—	—	—	4.49 (152)	—	—	—	4.61 (132)

(1) Mean overall placement of the party by all respondents (N respondents in parentheses).
(2) Mean placement of the party considering only respondents from nonconservative parties.
(3) Mean placement of the party considering only respondents from the party itself.
(4) Mean ideological self–placement of respondents from within a given party (individual–level).

[a] On a 10–point scale where 1 equals left and 10 equals right.

Source: Timothy J. Power surveys of Brazilian National Congress.

Table 11

Senate Seats by Party, 1982–1998 (percentages)

	1982		1986		1990		1994		1998	
Party	Seats won	Seats held	Seats won[a]	Seats held[a]	Seats won	Seats held	Seats won	Seats held	Seats won	Seats held
PDS/PPR[bc]/PPB	60.0	66.7	4.1	6.9	7.4	3.7	3.7	7.4	7.4	3.7
PTB[c]	—	1.5	—	1.4	14.8	9.9	5.6	6.2	—	1.2
PFL	—	—	14.3	20.8	29.6	18.5	20.4	22.2	18.5	24.7
PL	—	—	—	1.4	—	—	1.9	1.2	—	—
PDC[b]	—	—	—	1.4	—	4.9	—	—	—	—
PMB	—	—	2.0	1.4	—	—	—	—	—	—
PRN	—	—	—	—	7.4	3.7	—	—	—	—
PST/PP[d]	—	—	—	—	—	1.2	7.4	6.2	—	—
PMN	—	—	—	—	—	1.2	—	—	—	—
No party	—	—	—	—	—	2.5	—	—	—	—
Conservative Total	60.0	68.2	20.4	33.3	59.3	45.7	39.0	43.2	25.9	29.6
# Seats	25	69	49	72	27	81	54	81	27	81

Senate terms are eight years long. In alternate elections, two–thirds and one–third of the Senate seats are disputed. 'Seats held' columns refer to the composition of the Senate after the respective elections; they combine the seats of the newly elected senators with those who did not run that year. In 1982 one seat per state was contested, and the new state of Rondônia elected three senators. In 1986 two seats were disputed in 23 states, and the Federal District elected three senators. In 1990 and in 1998 one seat per state was disputed. In 1994 two seats per state were disputed.

[a] Omits the 1988 election of three senators from the newly created state of Tocantins, who served in 1989–90. Senate size increased from 72 to 75.

[b] The PDS and PDC merged to form the PPR in 1993.

[c] The PPR, PTB, and PP merged to form the PPB in 1995.

[d] The PST and PTR merged to form the PP in 1993.

Sources: Lamounier, *De Geisel a Collor*, op. cit. no. 4, 187–9; *Folha de São Paulo,* 29 October 1990; International Foundation for Electoral Systems, *Newsletter* 1, No. 4 (1990): 5; *Folha de São Paulo*, 16 November 1994 and 21 November 1994; Nicolau, *Multipartidarismo e Democracia*, op. cit. n. 17, Table 6, p. 39; *Jornal do Brasil*, 2 February 1999.

Table 15

Regional Origin of Members of Conservative Parties in Congress, 1986–1998

Year	1986		1990		1994		1998	
Party	Less-Developed Regions[a]	N	Less-Developed Regions	N	Less-Developed Regions	N	Less-Developed Regions	N
PDS/PPR/PPB	55.3	38	44.7	47	50.9	59	36.5	63
PFL	71.4	133	77.8	99	73.3	108	68.0	125
PTB	35.0	20	61.4	44	38.9	36	31.3	32
PL	0.0	6	13.3	15	28.6	14	58.3	12
PDC[b]	60.0	5	84.0	25	—	—	—	—
PP[c]	—	—	—	—	53.7	41	—	—
PRN	—	—	48.9	45	100.0	1	—	—
Other Conservative	0.0	2	68.8	16	66.7	12	66.7	9
Conservative Party Totals	61.8***	204	62.2***	291	58.3*	271	54.4	241
Nonconserva–tive Party Totals	46.8	355	46.4	293	48.9	323	52.5	353
Congress	52.2	559	54.3	584	53.4	594	53.4	594

There are minor inconsistencies with Tables 10 and 11 because different sources provide slightly different figures and because of party switching.

Pearson's chi–square test on conservative versus nonconservative groups. Significance levels *** p < .01 ** p < .05 * p < .10

[a] Percentage of party members drawn from the less economically developed regions, defined here as the states of the North, Northeast, and Center–West.

[b] The PDC fused with the PDS in 1993, forming the PPR.

[c] The PP and PPR fused in 1995, forming the PPB.

Sources: Tribunal Superior Eleitoral; *Folha de São Paulo*, 4 February 1991 and 31 January 1995; *Jornal do Brasil*, 2 February 1999.

Table 16

Distribution of Party Identifiers by Region, 1996

	Right				Center			Left					
	PPB	PFL	PTB	Right Total	PMDB	PSDB	Center Total	PDT	PT	Left Total	All Party Identifiers[a]	No Party Identi–fication	All Respondents
Southeast	22.2[a]	21.3	48.7	27.8	35.0	56.4	39.9	48.7	50.4	49.9	41.3	47.9	45.1
South	51.1	4.9	20.5	17.1	19.8	6.4	16.7	33.3	18.6	21.1	18.2	17.3	17.7
Northeast	15.6	64.8	15.4	44.4	32.4	27.3	31.2	12.8	22.3	20.7	29.9	22.2	25.4
North + Center–west	11.1	9.0	15.4	10.6	12.8	10.0	12.2	5.1	8.7	8.3	10.7	12.6	11.8
N	45	122	39	216	374	110	484	78	355	445	1182	1609	2791

[a] Includes 37 identifiers from nonidentified parties.

Source: June 1996 national survey. N=2791. CESOP archive Dat/BR 96–jun.00541.

Table 17

Distribution of Party Identifiers by Population of Counties, 1996

1996 National Survey

	Right				Center			Left					
	PPB	**PFL**	**PTB**	**Right Total**	**PMDB**	**PSDB**	**Center Total**	**PDT**	**PT**	**Left Total**	**All Party Identi–fiers**	**No Party Identifi–cation**	**TOTAL**
Small Counties (up to 19.600 voters)	80.0	86.9	46.1	76.4	72.5	52.7	68.0	44.9	40.0	42.0	59.6	57.4	58.3
Medium Counties (19.600–160.000 voters)	—	—	10.3	2.8	2.4	7.3	3.5	14.1	11.5	11.9	6.7	9.9	8.6
Large Counties (more than 160.000 voters)	20.0	13.1	43.6	20.8	25.1	40.0	28.5	41.0	48.5	46.1	33.7	32.7	33.1
N	45	122	39	216	374	110	484	78	355	445	1182	1609	2791

Source: June 1996 national survey. N=2791. CESOP archive Dat/BR 96–jun.00541.

Table 18

Distribution of Party Identifiers by Age, 1996

	Right				Center			Left			All Party Identifiers	No Party Identi–fication	TOTAL
Age	PPB	PFL	PTB	Right Total	PMDB	PSDB	Center Total	PDT	PT	Left Total			
16–17 years	11.1	4.1	15.4	7.9	4.3	10.9	5.8	7.7	9.9	9.4	8.0	6.9	7.3
18–24	20.0	26.2	20.5	22.7	27.8	28.2	27.9	23.1	30.7	29.0	27.2	21.3	23.8
25–34	24.4	26.2	15.4	23.6	29.4	25.5	28.5	32.1	32.7	32.1	29.0	24.9	26.6
35–44	17.8	18.0	20.5	19.4	17.4	10.9	15.9	19.2	16.1	16.9	16.8	18.5	17.7
45–59	17.8	16.4	20.5	18.1	14.7	19.1	15.7	12.8	7.9	8.8	13.3	18.2	16.1
60 and more	8.9	9.0	7.7	8.3	6.4	5.5	6.2	5.1	2.8	3.8	5.8	10.3	8.3
N	45	122	39	216	374	110	484	78	355	445	1182	1609	2791

Source: June 1996 National Survey. N=2791. CESOP archive Dat/BR 96–jun.00541

Table 19

Distribution of Party Identifiers by Level of Education, 1996

Education Level	Right				Center			Left			All Party Identi–fication	No Party Identi–fication	All Respon–dents
	PPB	PFL	PTB	Right Total	PMDB	PSDB	Center Total	PDT	PT	Left Total			
Illiterates and incomplete primary	15.6	31.1	17.9	25.9	21.7	5.5	18.0	10.3	7.0	8.1	15.7	24.2	20.6
Complete primary/ middle incomplete	28.9	32.0	30.8	30.6	37.4	23.6	34.3	26.9	24.2	24.9	29.8	28.1	28.8
Complete middle	8.9	3.3	2.6	5.1	11.5	11.8	11.6	19.2	11.3	13.0	10.7	9.0	9.7
Incomplete secondary	13.3	9.0	15.4	10.7	14.4	15.5	14.7	10.3	16.3	15.1	14.0	11.1	12.3
Complete secondary	22.2	18.0	28.2	20.4	12.3	24.6	15.1	25.6	24.5	24.0	19.6	17.7	18.5
Some College or more	11.1	6.6	5.1	7.4	2.7	19.1	6.4	7.7	16.6	14.8	10.1	9.9	10.0
N	45	122	39	216	374	110	484	78	355	445	1182	1609	2791

Source: June 1996 National Survey. N=2791. CESOP archive Dat/BR 96–jun.00541.

Table 20

Distribution of Party Identifiers by Household Income, 1996

	Right				Center			Left					
	PPB	PFL	PTB	Right Total	PMDB	PSDB	Center Total	PDT	PT	Left Total	All Party Identifiers	No Party Identi–fi cation	All Respon–dents
up to 2 mininum salaries[a]	31.1[b]	38.5	17.9	32.4	30.2	16.4	27.1	20.5	17.2	18.9	25.0	28.3	26.9
2–5	22.2	21.3	33.3	24.1	32.1	22.7	30.0	25.6	22.8	23.1	26.0	26.7	26.4
5–10	33.3	23.8	20.5	25.5	22.2	21.8	22.1	21.8	27.9	26.7	24.6	23.7	24.1
10–20	8.9	4.1	12.8	7.4	9.4	24.5	12.8	20.5	20.6	20.0	14.6	10.8	12.4
20–50	4.4	7.4	10.3	6.9	4.3	12.7	6.2	5.1	6.2	5.8	6.3	4.8	5.5
50 and more	–	–	2.6	0.5	0.5	0.9	0.6	1.3	3.4	2.9	1.5	2.2	1.9
N	45	122	39	216	374	110	484	78	355	445	1182	1609	2791

[a] In 1996 the national minimum salary was equivalent to US $112.

[b] Percentages do not necessarily add up to 100 because some respondents did not provide an income level.

Source: June 1996 National Survey. N=2791. CESOP archive Dat/BR 96–jun.00541.

Table 21

Distribution of Party Identifiers by Gender and by Race/Ethnicity, 1996

By gender	Right				Center			Left			All Party Identifiers[a]	No Party Indenti–fication	All Respon–dents
	PPB	PFL	PTB	Right Total	PMDB	PSDB	Center Total	PDT	PT	Left Total			
male	62.2	63.9	51.3	61.1	62.8	64.5	63.2	56.4	53.2	54.2	59.0	43.6	50.1
female	37.8	36.1	48.7	38.9	37.2	35.5	36.8	43.6	46.8	45.8	41.0	56.4	49.9
N	45	122	39	216	374	110	484	78	355	445	1182	1609	2791
By race/ ethnicity[a]													
white	77.8	53.3	79.5	62.5	61.5	66.4	62.6	71.8	62.5	63.8	63.4	63.4	63.5
black	—	8.2	—	5.6	4.5	6.4	5.0	7.7	6.2	6.3	6.6	6.8	6.3
Asian	—	2.5	2.6	1.9	1.3	0.9	1.2	—	2.5	2.0	1.6	1.4	1.5
mulato	17.8	35.2	17.9	28.7	31.6	26.4	30.4	20.5	27.9	27.2	28.7	27.2	27.9
Indian	4.4	0.8	—	1.4	0.5	—	0.4	—	0.6	0.4	0.6	0.9	0.8
N	45	122	39	216	374	110	484	78	355	445	1182	1609	2791

[a] Some columns do not total 100.0% because racial/ethnic information is missing for ten respondents.

Source: June 1996 National Survey. N=2791. CESOP archive Dat/BR 96–jun.00541

Table 22

Social Bases of Party Identifiers, 1996 (Multivariate Logistic Regression)

Model no.:	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	11	12	13	14	15
Dep. Var. – 1	no ident	All conser. identifiers	All conser. identifiers	all cons idr's	all cons idr's	PPBident	PPBident	PFLident	PFLident	PTBident	PTBident	**PPB**	**PFL**	**PPB**	All conser. identifiers
Dep. Var. – 0	all party id'rs	all other pty id'rs	smpl of all other pty id'rs	all center idr's	all left idr's	all other pty id'rs	smpl of all other pty id'rs	all other pty id'rs	smpl of all other pty id'rs	all other pty id'rs	smpl of all other pty id'rs	**PFL**	**PTB**	**PTB**	all other pty id'rs
N	2791	1158	627	687	643	1158	145	1158	348	1158	114	161	154	83	1158
CHI Sq. (sig)	111.051 (.0001)	66.517 (.0001)	45.118 (.0001)	24.945 (.0151)	128.377 (.0001)	46.815 (.0001)	27.578 (.0064)	116.460 (.0001)	95.743 (.0001)	17.532 (.1307)	12.782 (.3078)	63.721 (.0001)	61.895 (.0001)	26.229 (.0060)	20.284 (.0093)
Overall Prediction	58.51%	81.95%	68.10%	70.31%	74.96%	96.20%	70.37%	89.98%	75.57%	96.72%	68.42%	83.85%	84.42%	75.90%	81.87%
Income						–.2134 (.1880)	–.4135 (.0645)					–.3324 (.1455)			–.1360 (.0658)
Education					–.1201 (.0583)	.1852 (.0815)	.2385 (.0780)				–.1935 (.1485)			.2367 (.1516)	
Black															
Asian													–2.5835 (.0688)		
Mulatto					–.3261 (.1583)					–.8434 (.0740)	–.9695 (.1070)				
Indigenous						1.9978 (.0276)									
Sex (M =0; F=1)	.6072 (.0001)										5987 (.1877)		–1.6672 (.0072)	–.8556 (.1266)	
County Size		–.4332 (.0001)	–.4203 (.0001)	–.2116 (.0430)	–.6875 (.0001)	–.4503 (.0299)	–.4781 (.0711)	–.7621 (.0001)	–.9012 (.0001)	.2425 (.1858)	.3245 (.1907)	.5597 (.0886)	–1.5055 (.0001)	–.8355 (.0104)	**Not included**
Age	.0124 (.0001)	.0160 (.0041)	.0195 (.0021)	.0131 (.0284)	.0229 (.0011)			.0149 (.0443)	.0195 (.0418)	.0163 (.1456)					.0148 (.0065)
South	–.2328 (.1210)				–.8774 (.0182)	1.0303 (.0589)		–1.4672 (.0060)	–1.5496 (.0111)			2.5268 (.0021)		1.3324 (.1288)	**Not included**
Southeast	–.2099 (.1051)	–.5538 (.0473)	–.6746 (.0347)		–1.0644 (.0016)			–.6902 (.0752)					–1.1079 (.1617)		**Not included**
Northeast	–.6582 (.0001)	.4032 (.1398)		.4398 (.1319)				.8899 (.0128)	.9557 (.0321)	–.8734 (.1451)		–1.2847 (.0987)	1.4873 (.0669)		**Not included**

Source: June 1996 National Survey. N=2791. CESOP archive Dat/BR 96–jun.00541. Only coefficients significant at .20 or higher are reported.

Table 23

Voting Preferences in the 1989 Presidential Election (Logistic Regression)

Model no.:	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9
Dep. Var. = 1	Conserv	Conserv	Conserv	Collor (PRN)	Collor (PRN)	Collor (PRN)	Collor (PRN)	Collor (PRN)	Collor (PRN)
Dep. Var. = 0	All Others	Center	Left	All Others	Afif (PL)	Maluf (PDS)	Lula (PT)	Brizola (PDT)	Covas (PSDB)
N	3267	2088	2773	3267	1314	1457	1791	1737	1544
CHI Sq. (sig)	258.055 (.0001)	141.641 (.0001)	236.235 (.0001)	452.952 (.0001)	156.061 (.0001)	259.267 (.0001)	231.636 (.0001)	333.971 (.0001)	376.152 (.0001)
Overall Prediction	61.89%	77.30%	63.36%	67.52%	91.55%	82.98%	71.02%	74.21%	82.38%
Income	.1188 (.0012)		.1540 (.0001)		–.2589 (.0095)	–.2963 (.0001)		.1451 (.0137)	–.1738 (.0121)
Education	–.1177 (.0001)	–.1693 (.0001)	–.0906 (.0001)	–.1835 (.0001)	–.2658 (.0001)	–2.003 (.0001)	–.1073 (.0005)	–.1935 (.0001)	–.2957 (.0001)
Sex (M = 0; F = 1)			.1447 (.0737)		–.6463 (.0028)				–.3176 (.0253)
County Size	–.2373 (.0001)	–.1670 (.0001)	–.2695 (.0001)	–.2168 (.0001)	–.2265 (.0005)	–.0637 (.1502)	–.2858 (.0001)	–.2882 (.0001)	–.2764 (.0001)
Age	.0498 (.0549)		.1020 (.0004)		.1242 (.0852)	–.1832 (.0008)	.1834 (.0001)	–.0522 (.1987)	
South	–.1896 (.1064)	.3278 (.0985)	–.3676 (.0033)	–.5284 (.0001)	–1.4701 (.0001)	–1.2684 (.0012)	.8425 (.0001)	–1.6926 (.0001)	
Southeast		–.1991 (.1867)		–.3864 (.0002)	–.5847 (.0825)	–1.7881 (.0001)		–.5432 (.0008)	–.7475 (.0001)
North/ Center-West	.7170 (.0001)	.4333 (.0336)	.8323 (.0001)	.6411 (.0001)			.9401 (.0001)	.8193 (.0011)	.5764 (.0358)

Source: November 1989 national survey. N=3650. Roper Center archive BRIBOPE89-OPP602. Only coefficients significant at .20 or higher are reported.

Table 25

Attitudes toward Authoritarianism and Military Prerogatives[a]

Question[b]	1990 Cons. Parties	1990 Noncons. Parties	1990 Cong.	1993 Cons. Parties	1993 Noncons. Parties	1993 Cong.	1997 Cons. Parties	1997 Noncons. Parties	1997 Cong.
Economic development is easier to achieve under authoritarian regimes[c]	16.7	14.6	15.4	28.8***	9.1	17.9	22.7***	5.3	12.4
Social order is easier to achieve under authoritarian regimes[d]	52.3	44.3	47.3	63.0***	37.1	48.9	49.2***	26.1	35.7
Military should have the right to intervene to guarantee internal order[e]	80.5***	37.8	53.9	72.5***	39.2	54.2	57.6***	35.6	44.9
Create Ministry of Defense[f]	50.6***	76.2	66.7	72.8	78.0	75.7	76.6	86.2	82.3

Pearson's chi–square test on conservative versus nonconservative groups. Significance levels *** p < .01 ** p < .05 * p < .10

[a] In 1990 the total number of responses for Congress was N=249, in 1993 N=185, and in 1997 N=162.

[b] Percentages are the sum of those agreeing strongly (*concorda, plenamente*) or agreeing somewhat (*concorda, em termos*) with the questionnaire statements below. The exception is the military intervention question, posed as "favor" or "oppose."

[c] Statement: "Authoritarian regimes are better able to stimulate economic growth than democratic regimes."

[d] Statement: "In Latin America it has been more difficult for democratic governments than for authoritarian governments to maintain social order."

[e] Statement (favor or oppose): "The inclusion [in the Constitution of 1988] of the article that guarantees the Armed Forces' right to intervene to secure internal order."

[f] Statement: "Instead of having various military ministries, Brazil should have a single Ministry of Defense."

Source: Timothy J. Power surveys of Brazilian National Congress.