Brutal Perfectionism and Collapse of Justice: A Case Study of Early Chinese Empires

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Liang Cai
Ruth and Paul Idzik Associate Professor in Digital Scholarship
Kellogg Institute Faculty Fellow

Shang Yang and Han Feizi eloquently articulated the effectiveness of performance-based law and severe punishments (重刑). By evaluating performance against objectives established by law and imposing intolerable suffering for transgressions, they believed, none would dare deceive the lord or violate the law. They asserted that heavy punishments aim to eliminate the need for further punishment, thereby creating a crime-free utopia. However, by examining both the archeologically excavated legal statutes and cases and the transmitted sources, I demonstrate that when brutal instrumentalism and idealism were applied to real politics, they generated a monstrous legal system that distorted justice. I argue that the Qin-Han legal system excessively punished administrative errors as crimes. Aiming to promote efficiency, performance-oriented legislation prescribed rigid, detailed, and high-standard job objectives for officials. A large number of officials, including those industriously devoted to their jobs, easily violated the law. Excessive punishments made officials guilty of administrative errors suffer the same bodily pain and economic loss as those who caused serious harm to society with intentional violence. When the punishment was neither deserved nor just, resentment arose against the law, and sympathy developed for the condemned. This prominent and unjust problem triggered continuous and heated discussions and criticism among scholars, officials, and sometimes the emperors themselves, but no efficient legal reforms ever occurred. This study aims to provide a historical case to provoke thought about the dangerous application of perfectionism in real world and to explain some historical roots of the Confucian long-standing tradition against the rule by laws.