

# Regime Legacies and Levels of Democracy

Evidence from Latin America

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Every country in Latin America except Cuba either began 1978 as a democracy (Costa Rica, Colombia, and Venezuela) or experienced a transition to a competitive regime during the third wave of democratization that started in 1978 (sixteen countries). But by the early twenty-first century the outcomes of these transitions varied widely. At one pole, countries such as Nicaragua, Paraguay, and Guatemala established competitive regimes that remained fraught with limited accountability, weak judiciaries, frequent state abuses of power, and weak protection of political rights. At the other end of this spectrum, Chile after 1990 and Uruguay after 1985 joined Costa Rica as stable, robust democracies with solid mechanisms of intrastate accountability, effective rule of law, and solid respect for civil and political rights.

An even more dramatic dispersion of regime outcomes after an initial transition to competitive regimes has occurred in other parts of the world in the third and fourth waves of democratization. Many transitions to competitive regimes have failed, resulting in a burgeoning number of competitive authoritarian regimes that sponsor controlled elections. Other transitions (Poland, Hungary, the Czech Republic) have produced robust democracies. In light of the wide variation in regime outcomes after transitions, a new question has emerged on the political science agenda. Why have some countries blossomed into stable and robust democracies, while other regimes are best characterized as semidemocratic or even authoritarian? This question has assumed importance as a large number of hybrid regimes, semidemocracies, and competitive authoritarian regimes in Latin America, Africa, Asia, and the post-Soviet region have come into existence.<sup>1</sup>

We contribute to this literature by examining the level of democracy in post-1977 Latin America. We show that countries with stronger histories of democracy between 1900 and 1977 are more democratic today. The only countries that have attained a very high level of democracy in contemporary Latin America—Chile,

Costa Rica, and Uruguay—had the region’s strongest democratic legacies from 1900 until 1977. Most countries with highly authoritarian pasts have transitioned to competitive political regimes, but the level of democracy in these regimes is much lower.

This phenomenon can be explained by regime legacies that were partly reproduced over time through political parties and legal institutions. This finding apparently echoes recent work on path dependence in that it underscores the impact of long regime histories on the contemporary level of democracy. However, using the term “path dependence” to characterize our argument excessively stretches this concept. Latin American political regimes in many countries underwent a profound transformation in the post–1977 period. Because the notion of path dependence implies too much linearity, we instead develop the concept of regime legacies.

### **The Level of Democracy in Latin America Since 1978**

The level or quality of democracy (these terms are hereafter used interchangeably) is a complex and multidimensional concept.<sup>2</sup> This article focuses on the most conventional dimensions, civil liberties and political rights, and assesses the level of democracy achieved in the post-transition era using Freedom House scores.<sup>3</sup> Although not without problems, in recent years Freedom House has had some advantages over Polity IV, and provides more variance than dichotomous or trichotomous regime classifications. For present purposes, this variance is essential, and we also employ alternative measures of democracy to assess past experiences with democratization.

The post–1977 wave of democracy profoundly transformed Latin America. For the first time ever, almost all countries in the region have had competitive political regimes for a prolonged period. But the level of democracy has varied widely. Table 1 provides information on the level of democracy measured by Freedom House scores since the inauguration of competitive regimes after 1977 (and since 1978 for the three countries that were democratic at that time). Countries enter the sample in the year a competitive political regime was first established in the post–1977 period (Column 2). Because we focus on post-transition levels of democracy, we do not include Cuba, the only country that did not undergo a transition after 1977. Because data are missing for some variables, we also do not include Haiti.

In the third wave of democratization, Chile, Costa Rica, and Uruguay stand out as the Latin American countries with the highest levels of democracy. They are the only countries in Latin America that have ever registered the highest possible Freedom House score. Nicaragua and Guatemala anchor the other end of the spectrum with much lower mean Freedom House scores.

Table 1 also reports the average Polity scores prior to the third wave of democratization, in 1900–1977. The Polity index ranges from –10, indicating an institutionalized autocracy, to 10, indicating an institutionalized democracy.<sup>4</sup> Table 1

**Table 1** Freedom House Scores in the Post-1977 Period

Country	First year of competitive regime	Average FH score, 1978*–2010	Average Polity, 1900–77	Average Polity, 1900–44
Costa Rica	1949	11.7	10.0	10.0
Uruguay	1985	11.2	2.1	1.1
Chile	1990	10.8	2.0	1.6
Panama	1990	9.9	-2.1	-3.0
Argentina	1983	9.6	-2.1	0.1
Dominican Republic	1978	9.4	-5.4	-5.5
Ecuador	1979	8.9	-1.2	-2.1
Bolivia	1982	8.9	-1.6	0.6
Brazil	1985	8.8	-2.5	-4.2
Venezuela	1959	8.5	-2.1	-6.1
El Salvador	1984	8.3	-5.3	-6.6
Honduras	1982	8.2	0.9	2.9
Mexico	1988	7.9	-5.2	-4.8
Peru	1980	7.7	-1.0	-0.9
Colombia	1958	7.6	0.8	-1.2
Paraguay	1989	7.5	-5.3	-3.5
Nicaragua	1984	6.6	-6.0	-4.5
Guatemala	1986	6.6	-3.9	-6.2

\* Average scores computed since the transition from authoritarianism (or since 1978 in the cases of Colombia, Costa Rica, and Venezuela). Freedom House scores were re-scaled to range between 0 (most authoritarian) and 12 (most democratic). Polity scores range between -10 and 10.

suggests an intriguing relationship between early democratic experiences and the average level of democracy after the most recent democratic transitions initiated in 1978. Average Freedom House scores for 1978–2010 correlate at .69 ( $p < .01$ ) with Polity scores for 1900–1977 and at .64 ( $p < .01$ ) with earlier Polity scores for 1900–1944.


Although revealing, Table 1 does not provide conclusive evidence of long-term regime legacies for two reasons. First, average Freedom House scores mask within-country variation in levels of democracy during the post-1977 period. A few countries (Peru, Venezuela, and Nicaragua) exhibit pronounced shifts over time. Second and most important, apparent regime legacies may result from long-term forces driving latent continuities at the national level. It is possible that some stable conditions, such as enduring social cleavages or cultural traits, have affected the level of democratization in a consistent manner over the past century. Likewise, a consistently higher level of development, rather than legacies of the political regime, may explain why some countries have been on average more democratic than others both since 1977 and from 1900–1977. Focusing exclusively on Latin America rules out some likely candidates for this type of explanation (colonial legacies, religious worldviews) that show little variance within this region.

### Testing for Regime Legacies

To verify the legacy of past political regimes on the current level of democracy in Latin America, a time-series, cross-section model is employed. Each country in a given year is one observation. Because we focus on the third wave of democratization, Costa Rica, Colombia, and Venezuela enter the dataset in 1978 even though they inaugurated competitive political regimes well before that (1949, 1958, and 1959, respectively).

Figure 1 depicts the evolution of Freedom House scores for Latin American countries between the year of the transition from authoritarian rule (or 1978 for Costa Rica, Colombia, and Venezuela) and 2010. Stars represent the observed Freedom House scores, and horizontal lines indicate mean values for the period. Although some countries have shown considerable fluctuations, differences among countries are more important than change over time within countries for understanding the level of democracy in the region. Because democracy scores are stable for many countries, entrenched country characteristics may shape the overall level of democracy in the long run.

**Figure 1** Evolution of Competitive Regimes, 1978–2010



Note: Vertical axis reflects Freedom House scores, starting with the democratic transition. Cuba and Haiti included in the graphic for comparative purposes, but not in the analysis.

Figure 1 suggests two related questions. Why do some countries enjoy high levels of democracy, on average, while others are less democratic? And why do countries rise above or fall below those historical averages during particular periods? While the

latter question can be answered by looking at time-varying explanatory factors (for instance, a period of economic decline may trigger an erosion in the level of democracy), the former calls for the analysis of stable country characteristics that help explain variation across countries.

Invoking country characteristics as causal factors does not mean that some countries are culturally predetermined to be more or less democratic. Rather, it is important to identify stable conditions that affect the level of democracy in the long run. This approach precludes the use of a cross-sectional analysis or a standard fixed-effects model. A cross-sectional model would not properly capture the effect of the time-variant predictors, while a fixed-effects model would not capture the effect of stable-country characteristics. Therefore, the impact of our independent variables is estimated using a “hybrid” fixed-effects estimator developed by Paul Allison.<sup>5</sup> To estimate this model, we perform two tasks. First, the deviation of all time-varying predictors are computed from their country averages (that is, we group-center or de-mean the variables). Second, a random-effects model is estimated in which the centered variables are included in the equation along with their country-level averages and other time-invariant predictors.<sup>6</sup>

The model therefore includes cross-section as well as time-varying covariates. Every time-varying predictor is decomposed into two variables. The first represents the average value of the predictor for each country, and the second represents the difference between the observed value for any given country-year and the country average. While the first item captures the cross-sectional variance of the predictor, the second reflects variance within countries over time. Both components are included in the analysis. Coefficients for country-average variables are not relevant to assess the causal impact of the time-varying covariates, but they minimize omitted variable bias when purely cross-sectional predictors are included such as our measures of pre-1978 levels of democracy.<sup>7</sup> By contrast, the coefficient for the within-country component provides a reliable estimate of causal effects. Because the item is centered at the country level, the coefficient for this variable replicates the estimate of a fixed-effects model.<sup>8</sup>

The analysis includes a measure of regime legacies (computed according to three alternative sources) and several additional predictors, including rarely changing and time-varying covariates. Because information for some items was not available for recent years, the sample extends to 2004.

**Regime Legacies** To capture regime legacies, we created a variable for the average level of democracy for each country between 1900 and 1977. To avoid bias related to any particular index, we employ three alternative measures of democracy: the Polity index, the Mainwaring, Brinks, and Pérez-Liñán regime classification, and Smith’s regime classification.<sup>9</sup> Although widely used in political science, Polity scores are of questionable validity for many Latin American countries for the first decades of the twentieth century. For example, against the comparative historiography on the subject, average Polity scores suggest that Honduras and Cuba were more democratic

than Chile and Uruguay in the first half of the century, and Costa Rica has an untainted score of 10 throughout the twentieth century despite a military dictatorship from 1917 to 1919 and civil war in 1948.<sup>10</sup> Given these shortcomings, we rely more on the other two indicators than on Polity.

Scott Mainwaring, Daniel Brinks, and Aníbal Pérez-Liñán coded all Latin American countries as democratic, semi-democratic, or authoritarian.<sup>11</sup> Their scale is recoded here as democracy=1, semi-democracy=0.5, and authoritarian=0, so that the average value for each historical period can be roughly interpreted as the proportion of years that a country was democratic. Peter Smith classified Latin American regimes into four categories: democratic, semi-democratic, oligarchic, and authoritarian.<sup>12</sup> We again gave democracies a score of 1, dictatorships a score of 0, and semi-democracies or oligarchic regimes a score of 0.5.

**Structural Conditions** Four independent variables are included to capture the impact of structural forces. Following modernization theory, per capita GDP is included in our models because of the theoretical expectation that a higher level of development might be favorable to a higher level of democracy.<sup>13</sup> The natural logarithm (in constant 2000 dollars) accounts for nonlinearity in the effects of per capita GDP.

In their class approach to democratization, Dietrich Rueschemeyer, Evelyn Huber Stephens, and John D. Stephens argue that the working class is the pro-democratic actor par excellence, and that a large working class is favorable to democracy.<sup>14</sup> Accordingly, a variable that reflects the share of the economically active population in manufacturing, mining, construction, and transportation (from the World Bank's World Development Indicators) is included as a measure of the relative size of the industrial working class.

A third structural variable reflects the dependence of regimes on natural resources. Several scholars have argued that countries that depend on natural resources are likely to experience vicious cycles detrimental to democracy.<sup>15</sup> The average proportion of the gross national income represented by exports of fuel and minerals in any given year (obtained from the World Development Indicators) captures this effect.

The final structural covariate reflects ethnolinguistic fractionalization. Some scholars argue that ethnically divided countries are less likely to be democratic. Accordingly, an index is included that approaches a value of zero when a country is highly homogenous and a value of one when the country is highly fractionalized.<sup>16</sup> Because data are not available on a yearly basis, Anthony Annett and James Fearon and David Laitin computed this index as a time-invariant indicator.

**Economic Performance** Poor economic performance may undermine democracy,<sup>17</sup> so we include measures of per capita income growth (as a proportion of GDP) and inflation.<sup>18</sup> Because poor economic performance is unlikely to affect regime conditions in the short run but might in the medium or long run, both variables are measured as running averages beginning with the inception of the regime, for up to ten years.

**Political Conditions** Some scholars argue that presidential democracy is more problematic with multipartism.<sup>19</sup> Therefore, a dummy variable for multiparty systems is used, operationalized as an effective number of parties of three or greater. Presumably the number of parties has a nonlinear effect—the difference between two and three parties is more relevant for the argument than the difference between seven and eight parties. Thus, we prefer a dichotomous indicator to a continuous measure of party system fragmentation.

Several studies have shown neighborhood political effects on political regimes,<sup>20</sup> so we also control for this factor. To measure neighborhood effects, the average Freedom House score of a country's immediate neighbors during the previous year is used. In addition, because global international conditions varied over time, our models include year fixed-effects.

**Country-Level Variables** Two independent variables in this set (the average level of democracy from 1900 to 1977 and ethnic fractionalization) are time-invariant. All other independent variables change over time. To estimate hybrid fixed-effect models, we include the average value for each time-varying independent variable is used as a stable country-level control. Estimates for the mean variables are not the focus of interest, but they are necessary for proper model specification. The upper panel in Table 2 presents the estimates of fixed effects based on the centered, time-varying predictors, while the lower panel presents the estimates for stable country-level variables (including the country averages as controls).

### **Evidence of Regime Legacies**

Model 2.1 presents conventional fixed-effects estimates for reference. Models 2.2 to 2.4 present the coefficients for the hybrid estimator using three different measures of regime legacies based on the Polity, Mainwaring et al., and Smith indicators of democracy (shown at the bottom of the table). Even after controlling for a large number of alternative explanations, an early history of democracy has a powerful impact on levels of democracy among contemporary competitive regimes. The effect is powerful both statistically and substantively, and the results for these variables are consistent across models.

In model 2.2, an increase of 1 point in the 21-point Polity scale for 1900–1977 yields an increase of 0.21 points in the 13-point Freedom House scale for the post–1977 period. In model 2.3, a unit increase in the Mainwaring et al. classification for 1900–1977 (that is, a change in conditions from a country that was always authoritarian between 1900 and 1977 to one that was always democratic) predicts a substantial increase of 4.4 points on the inverted Freedom House scale for contemporary competitive regimes. In model 2.4, using Smith's historical classification of political regimes, a country that was consistently democratic from 1900 to 1977 would have a predicted Freedom House score 4.6 points higher for the post–1977 period than

**Table 2** Hybrid Models of Democratization (Dependent Variable is Freedom House Scores)

	2.1. Fixed-Effects		2.2. Polity		2.3. Mainwaring		2.4. Smith	
	Coef.	s.e.	Coef.	s.e.	Coef.	s.e.	Coef.	s.e.
<b>Fixed effects estimates</b>								
Per capita GDP, ln	2.05**	0.68	2.02**	0.68	2.01**	0.68	2.02**	0.68
Labor force in industry	0.08**	0.02	0.08**	0.02	0.08**	0.02	0.08**	0.02
Fuel and mineral exports	-4.18*	2.04	-4.16*	2.04	-4.15*	2.04	-4.17*	2.04
Growth, 10 years	17.51**	5.03	17.49**	5.03	17.44**	5.03	17.43**	5.03
Inflation, 10 years	-0.02	0.17	-0.02	0.17	-0.02	0.17	-0.02	0.17
Multipartism	-0.10	0.18	-0.11	0.17	-0.11	0.17	-0.11	0.17
Democracy neighbors	-0.15**	0.06	-0.15**	0.06	-0.15**	0.06	-0.15**	0.06
<b>Country-level variables</b>								
<i>Per capita GDP, ln</i>			0.92*	0.44	0.85*	0.40	0.86	0.51
<i>Labor force in industry</i>			-0.05	0.06	-0.03	0.05	-0.12	0.08
<i>Fuel and mineral exports</i>			0.16	4.34	-4.37	4.25	-0.77	5.14
<i>Growth, 10 years</i>			-19.29	25.41	-56.57*	26.57	-45.31	33.05
<i>Inflation, 10 years</i>			-0.14	0.60	-0.71	0.58	-0.89	0.76
<i>Multipartism</i>			2.17**	0.82	2.46**	0.77	2.16*	0.96
<i>Democracy neighbors</i>			-0.27*	0.12	-0.38**	0.12	-0.27	0.14
Ethnic fractionalization			-2.70	1.45	-2.26	1.36	-3.02	1.70
Democracy (1900–77)			0.21**	0.05	4.40**	1.01	4.57**	1.54
Intercept	-7.22	5.12	6.09*	2.89	6.06*	2.68	6.86*	3.42
Std. deviation of intercept			0.70*	0.19	0.65*	0.18	0.84*	0.22
N	390		390		390		390	
R <sup>2</sup> (within)	0.353							

Notes: Entries are coefficients for fixed-effects model in 2.1 and coefficients for Allison’s hybrid estimator in models 2.2–2.4 (standard errors on the right). Entries in the top panel represent fixed-effects (within) coefficients and entries in the bottom panel represent cross-sectional (between) coefficients for average country levels of democracy. Items in italics represent country-level averages for the time-varying covariates. Year dummies omitted to save space. \* Significant at  $p < .05$  \*\*  $p < .01$ .

a country that was consistently authoritarian. The impact of past democracy on the current level of democracy is similar to the result obtained by Michael Bratton and Nicolas van de Walle for forty-seven African countries; a past history of more elections and more electoral participation was favorable to a higher level of democracy in Africa in 1994.<sup>21</sup>

Other variables also have effects in the expected direction. The positive coefficients for the level of economic development in the top panel of Table 2 represent fixed-effects estimates of the impact of per capita GDP within countries. The positive coefficients for GDP in the bottom panel indicate that countries with a higher average per capita income also had higher average levels of democracy.<sup>22</sup> For Latin America over a longer time period, a higher level of development has not reduced the likelihood of democratic breakdowns or increased the likelihood of transitions,<sup>23</sup> but it has favored a higher level of democracy among competitive regimes in the post-1977 period.



The results in the upper panel of Table 2 indicate that an increase in the share of the labor force in manufacturing makes a moderate but statistically positive contribution to the level of democracy.<sup>24</sup> Reliance on fuel and mineral exports lowers the level of democracy, consistent with the idea of a natural resource curse. Ethnic fractionalization, a time-invariant predictor (listed in the lower panel of Table 2), has an insignificant effect on the level of democracy.

A higher rate of economic growth supports the expansion of democracy (the large coefficients reflect the fact that growth was measured as a proportion of GDP), while inflation fails to achieve statistical significance. The indicator for multipartism is also insignificant, but because this variable seldom changes within the same country over time, the positive and significant coefficient in the lower panel of Table 2 suggests that countries with multiparty systems were likely to establish higher levels of democracy.

The only variable presenting an unexpected effect is the influence of democratic neighbors. Increases in the democracy scores of neighbors seem to foster a decline in a given country's predicted level of democracy. Although democratic neighbors help promote transitions to democracy, countries follow independent and often contradictory trajectories after their transitions take place.

The estimates in Table 2 suggest that regime legacies are one of the main factors that explain the quality of democracy in the post-1977 period. An authoritarian past did not prevent Latin American countries from developing competitive political regimes in the post-1977 period, nor did it lead to full breakdowns of these competitive regimes. But an authoritarian past did tend to limit the quality of democracy. By contrast, countries with a past democratic heritage had a significant advantage in building a high-quality democracy in contemporary Latin America. This is true even when, as in Chile (1973-1990) and Uruguay (1973-1984), military dictatorships attempted to radically stamp out the democratic past.

### **Why Regime Legacies Have a Long-Term Impact**

In short, a high level of democracy in the past predicts a high post-transition level of democracy in the post-1977 period. The statistical results, however, do not explain the causal mechanism that lies behind the impact of regime heritage on the contemporary level of democracy. Our finding about the enduring impact of early democratization has some similarities to arguments about path dependence in social science.<sup>25</sup> Margaret Levi defines path dependence as meaning that "once a country or region has started down a track, the costs of reversal are very high." Events in one historical moment greatly alter the distribution of possible and probable outcomes into the medium- and/or long-term future.<sup>26</sup>

The statistical results here tell a similar story. The early history of political regimes affects the current level of democracy even controlling for a wide range of other variables. Two countries similar on all of the other independent variables

would have different predicted levels of democracy today if one had a past considerably more democratic than the other. However, a general claim about path dependence does not indicate how regime legacies are reproduced over time.

For Latin America, two problems undermine strong claims about path dependence. First, authoritarian disruptions in countries with long democratic traditions, such as the ones occurring in Chile (1973–1990) and Uruguay (1973–1984), defy any idea of “increasing returns” under democratic rule. Likewise, in the post–1977 period, several countries (Bolivia, the Dominican Republic, El Salvador, Guatemala, Mexico, Nicaragua, and Paraguay) shifted from almost uninterrupted histories of authoritarian rule to somewhat durable competitive regimes. Path dependence cannot explain so many radical departures from the past. Second, even if it is assumed that disruptions of long-established democratic regimes (again, Chile and Uruguay) were driven by exogenous causes (for example, the Cold War), fairly lengthy dictatorships should have depleted the pool of democratic leaders, not only because authoritarian rulers repressed them but also because aging individuals retired from politics or died over time.<sup>27</sup> Any explanation of regime legacies can be logically sound and historically credible only if we identify an intertemporal bridging mechanism that accounts for how legacies of an early but distant era carried their influence into the present despite an interlude of authoritarian rule. Without such a mechanism, the concept of path dependence is too vague to explain regime legacies.

### **Institutional Mechanisms**

In some cases, the intertemporal bridging mechanism is given by the survival of individual leaders. Patricio Aylwin and Julio María Sanguinetti were up-and-coming party leaders in Chile and Uruguay, respectively, before military coups imposed repressive dictatorships in 1973, and they returned as inaugural presidents after the transition took place in each country.<sup>28</sup> But the survival of individuals cannot fully explain the long-lasting legacies of the first wave of democratization depicted in Table 1.

Although different explanations are possible, some of which are addressed below, we hypothesize that an early history of democracy favored the building of formal institutions such as party systems, courts, and other agents of intrastate accountability that are favorable to a higher level of democracy in the contemporary period. Our empirical test of this proposition focuses on two institutions: political parties and the legal system. If our understanding of regime legacies is correct, well-established parties will favor a higher level of democracy only if these parties functioned under democratic regimes. A party that was institutionalized under democracy should be an asset for a higher level of democracy. Most parties created under democracy generate interests (among politicians, citizens, and organized groups) and identities connected to democracy; they socialize new generations in those interests and identities, and preserve them over time. In contrast, an institutionalized governing party that sustained an authoritarian regime (such as the PRI in Mexico or

the Colorados in Paraguay) will not. Parties are not the only mechanism for sustaining a high-quality democracy, but they are one of the main institutional carriers of democratic norms and practices.

A strong judicial system is important for protecting and promoting citizen rights, for generating accountability, and for bolstering the quality of democracy. Presumably, under democracy, a stable court system with long judicial careers fosters a stronger, more independent judiciary. If presidents tether the judicial system to their own preferences and often dismiss judges, the court system will not act as a mechanism of accountability, and it is less likely to be a staunch defender of citizen rights. Accordingly, a stable court system will be a pillar of democracy if judges are selected under democratically elected presidents and are allowed to serve for a long time. Even if those judges are severely constrained during authoritarian periods, their views of the law and their rulings will reemerge once democracy is established. To the extent that legal practices and procedures are reproduced over time, new judges will be socialized to uphold such democratic principles. However, the role of courts as bridging institutions of accountability can be undermined in two ways. If courts are reshuffled often and judges have short or unstable careers, they will not preserve long-term democratic legacies. In addition, if early judges were appointed under authoritarianism, stable courts will likely reproduce legal practices and procedures, but ones inimical to creating a high level of democracy.<sup>29</sup>

To capture the institutionalization of competitive parties during the twentieth century, we created a new indicator of democratic party system institutionalization. We collected data on a) the percentage of seats in the lower chamber by party, b) the year when each party was created, and c) the number of years each party had lived under a competitive political regime since 1900. This variable reflects the average age of the parties in Congress, weighted by their seat share and by their experience with democracy since 1900. We count only years that the party existed under a competitive (democratic or semidemocratic) regime. The formula for the index is

$$DPI_{it} = \sum_{j=1}^J S_{jt} \sqrt{a_{jt}}$$

where  $DPI_{it}$  is the democratic party institutionalization score for country  $i$  in year  $t$ ;  $s_j$  is the share of seats of the  $j$ -th party in the lower house; and  $a_{jt}$  is an age function that reflects the number of years that the  $j$ -th party has existed under a competitive regime between the time of its founding (or 1900 if the party was founded in the nineteenth century) and year  $t$ . For example, if party  $j$  has existed for a hundred years but the country experienced democracy or semidemocracy only for two decades during this period,  $a_{jt} = 20$ . Age is presumably a nonlinear indicator of party institutionalization; the gap between a hypothetical party system that is just one year old and another that is thirty years old is much greater than the gap between a party system that is seventy-one years old and another that is a hundred years old. Therefore, we took the square root of the regime-age function.<sup>30</sup> The resulting indicator can be

interpreted as weighted measure of the length of the democratic experience of the political parties in the lower chamber, given the composition of the chamber in any given year between 1978 and 2004.

We constructed a similar index to assess democratic institutionalization in the judiciary by focusing on each country's Supreme Court. We expanded the dataset from Anibal Pérez-Liñán and Andrea Castagnola to identify when different Supreme Court justices of eighteen Latin American countries served, and whether they were appointed under a competitive regime or a dictatorship.<sup>31</sup>

$$DCI_{it} = \sum_{j=1}^J \frac{1}{n_t} \sqrt{d_{jt}}$$

where  $DCI_{it}$  is the democratic court institutionalization score for country  $i$ ;  $n_t$  is the number of judges sitting in the supreme court in year  $t$ ; and  $d_{jt}$  is a duration function that reflects the number of years that a justice appointed by a competitive regime has been in office. If a justice  $j$  was appointed by an authoritarian regime, the duration term is treated as zero. This index displays greater values when the average justice in the supreme court was appointed by a democratic regime *and* served for a long period. The value of this index is particularly relevant after an episode of redemocratization because it shows whether justices appointed before the authoritarian takeover preserved their seats until democracy was restored.<sup>32</sup> Although this empirical indicator for democratic court institutionalization is limited to the supreme court, it probably serves as a proxy for a broader measure of the degree to which the justice system is appointed by democratic leaders and to which justices enjoy stability under democracy. We again take the square root of the duration term to preserve a common metric for both indices of democratic institutionalization.

## Empirical Evidence

We test the impact of these institutional mechanisms by adding our indicators of democratic party and court institutionalization to the empirical models of regime legacies presented in Table 2. If our hypothesis is correct and regime legacies are preserved by institutional carriers, the new predictors should be statistically significant in the hypothesized direction, and their inclusion should reduce the coefficients for measures of past democracy.

At least two alternative hypotheses may help explain why regime legacies from the first three-quarters of the twentieth century affect contemporary levels of democracy. First, in earlier periods of democracy, elites may have learned that democracy was not harmful to their interests, and hence they more readily tolerate a high level of democracy in the contemporary period. Many scholars have emphasized elite willingness to accept democracy as crucial to its viability.<sup>33</sup> However, several facts weaken the plausibility of this alternative hypothesis. In Chile, during the presidency of

Salvador Allende (1970–1973), the right and Christian Democrats learned that democracy could be harmful to their interests and supported a military coup. In a similar way, authoritarian attitudes among the political elite do not consistently endure. Leaders of the COPEI party in Venezuela supported a coup in 1948, but ten years later they embraced democracy.<sup>34</sup> The main conservative party in Brazil between 1946 and 1964, the UDN, frequently conspired against democracy, but by the end of the 1990s conservative parties and individuals had fully accepted democracy.<sup>35</sup>

A second alternative explanation is that a more democratic and tolerant mass political culture emerged in the early democratizing countries. In this perspective, a supportive democratic political culture fosters a higher level of democracy.<sup>36</sup> However, there are reasons to doubt that mass support for democracy was relatively steady in most countries during the twentieth century. Political polarization in the 1960s and the 1970s affected not only the elites, but also common citizens.

There is no definitive way to test these alternative hypotheses given the absence of comparative surveys for elites and mass publics going back to the early twentieth century. However, if a stronger democratic culture among elites (or masses) is the main mechanism through which regime legacies affect current levels of democracy, contemporary support for democracy among elites (masses) should be stronger in countries with past histories of democracy, and it should have a positive effect on democratization in the contemporary period.

We use information from similar questionnaire items employed by the Survey of Latin American Parliamentary Elites (PELA, its Spanish acronym) and by national public opinion surveys conducted by Latinobarómetro.<sup>37</sup> Both projects asked respondents whether they agreed with the statement, “Democracy is preferable to any other form of government” (as opposed to a statement indicating conditional support for authoritarian rule). The indicator of elite support for democracy is the average percentage of legislators who agreed with the statement in each country between 1995 and 2005. The indicator of mass attitudes is the average percentage of respondents who agreed with the statement in each country between 1995 and 2006. To address gaps in the data, as well as lack of information for 1978–1994, national averages for both variables are treated as country-level characteristics. Averaging at the country level is sensible because these control variables seek to capture a latent cultural trait developed before 1978, not the effect of specific fluctuations in the current era.

Table 3 includes the new covariates designed to capture specific causal mechanisms in addition to the general measure of regime legacies for 1900–1977. Model 3.1 reports the results of a conventional fixed effects model for reference, and thus omits the country-level variables. Models 3.2 through 3.4 present the result of Allison’s hybrid estimator using the three different measures of democracy for 1900–1977.

The indicators of democratic party and court institutionalization present positive and significant effects on current levels of democracy in all models. By contrast, the proxies for mass and elite political culture fail to achieve conventional levels of significance. Given the limited nature of these proxies, we do not infer much from the

**Table 3** Extended Models of Democratization, 1978–2004

	3.1. Fixed-Effects		3.2. Polity		3.3. Mainwaring		3.4. Smith	
	Coef.	s.e.	Coef.	s.e.	Coef.	s.e.	Coef.	s.e.
<b>Fixed effects estimates</b>								
Party institutionalization	0.39**	0.09	0.39**	0.09	0.39**	0.09	0.39**	0.09
Court institutionalization	0.44**	0.10	0.44**	0.10	0.44**	0.10	0.44**	0.10
Per capita GDP, ln	1.31*	0.64	1.30*	0.64	1.31*	0.64	1.31*	0.64
Labor force in industry	0.03	0.02	0.03	0.02	0.03	0.02	0.03	0.02
Fuel and mineral exports	-2.25	1.93	-2.25	1.93	-2.26	1.93	-2.26	1.93
Growth, 10 years	23.72**	4.73	23.67**	4.73	23.66**	4.73	23.64**	4.73
Inflation, 10 years	-0.00	0.16	-0.00	0.16	-0.00	0.16	-0.00	0.16
Multipartism	0.14	0.16	0.13	0.16	0.13	0.16	0.13	0.16
Democracy neighbors	-0.17**	0.05	-0.17**	0.05	-0.17**	0.05	-0.17**	0.05
<b>Country-level variables</b>								
<i>Party institutionalization</i>			-0.04	0.27	-0.25	0.30	-0.38	0.32
<i>Court institutionalization</i>			-0.11	0.96	0.37	1.13	0.56	1.15
<i>Per capita GDP, ln</i>			0.80	1.16	0.14	1.31	-0.07	1.33
<i>Labor force in industry</i>			0.00	0.07	0.01	0.09	-0.04	0.09
<i>Fuel and mineral exports</i>			-4.54	10.57	-0.53	12.97	2.82	12.38
<i>Growth, 10 years</i>			-17.86	56.18	-12.40	80.88	2.24	82.13
<i>Inflation, 10 years</i>			-0.07	0.54	-0.46	0.78	-0.62	0.96
<i>Multipartism</i>			2.26*	1.09	1.86	1.30	1.46	1.23
<i>Democracy neighbors</i>			-0.25	0.30	-0.16	0.38	-0.03	0.35
Ethnic fractionalization			-2.16	1.37	-1.99	1.67	-2.37	1.85
Mass support for democracy			0.05	0.03	0.04	0.04	0.06	0.03
Elite support for democracy			-0.10	0.16	0.02	0.16	0.03	0.17
Democracy (1900–77)			0.18*	0.09	3.14	2.57	3.55	3.54
Intercept	-2.41	4.80	12.61	10.02	5.31	10.43	5.60	11.70
Std. deviation of intercept			0.63*	0.24	0.78*	0.29	0.82*	0.31
N	390		390		390		390	
R <sup>2</sup> (within)	0.452							

Notes: Entries are coefficients for fixed-effects model in 4.1 and coefficients for Allison’s hybrid estimator in models 4.2–4.4 (standard errors on the right). Dependent variable is Freedom House Scores. Items in italics represent country-level averages for the time-varying covariates. Year dummies omitted to save space. \* Significant at  $p < .05$  \*\*  $p < .01$ .

results, but the evidence supports our hypothesis about institutional carriers irrespective of whether cultural mechanisms have a long term impact on democracy.

The coefficients for the measure of regime legacies decline by 12 percent in Model 3.2 (compared to 2.2), by 29 percent in Model 3.3 (compared to 2.3), and by 22 percent in Model 3.4 (compared to 2.4). Moreover, the coefficient for the previous history of democracy is not significant in the last two models. The reduction in the size of the effects hints that the indicators of democratic institutionalization may capture part of the process that creates regime legacies. The coefficient remains positive and significant in Model 3.2, so other unspecified mechanisms may operate as

well. After we control for the new variables, the coefficients for fuel and mineral exports and the size of the industrial labor force lose statistical significance, qualifying some of the results in Table 2.

### **Regime Legacies, Path Dependence, and Democratization**

Notwithstanding some important similarities between path dependence and regime legacy arguments, we distinguish between the two. Although the existing literature does not agree on how broadly or narrowly it defines path dependence, the concept should be bounded in such a way as to imply greater stability and linearity than is the case with Latin American political regimes. The stunning and unpredicted transformations of many political regimes in Latin America are inconsistent with the more bounded concept of path dependence advocated by Paul Pierson, Margaret Levi, and Douglass North. In the more bounded conception, path dependence means that switching courses is costly and relatively unlikely. In contrast to this emphasis on the low probability of dramatic shifts in course, many Latin American countries have radically broken from their past political regimes in the post-1977 period. Switching from authoritarianism to democracy and vice versa has been common in Latin America. Long-standing democracies fell in Uruguay and Chile in 1973, and several countries (for example, El Salvador, Guatemala, Nicaragua, and Paraguay) that had almost always had authoritarian regimes until the third wave have had durable competitive regimes in recent decades.

It is best to limit the notion of path dependence to contexts that create greater inertia and stability, and less radical departures from the past than many political regimes in Latin America have experienced. In post-1977 Latin America, regime legacies have significantly affected the level of democracy, but many countries have established and preserved competitive political regimes despite an authoritarian past. The history of political regimes in Latin America is inconsistent with the argument that path-dependent arguments are relatively deterministic. A regime legacy argument is a less-bounded, less-deterministic version of path dependence, with less emphasis on the improbability of profound shifts in path and greater emphasis on the probability of recovering an early democratic trajectory.

A regime heritage argument must explain why past legacies shape the current level of democracy. Moreover, it must explain how distant experiences with competitive politics have such effects even in countries where an extended period of authoritarianism separated two democratic eras. Our analysis suggests lasting effects through political parties and legal institutions.

In well-established democratic regimes, parties and heads of government who are usually recruited through parties are the most powerful actors. They often have a strong interest in restoring or preserving democracy, and they are often the most important actors pushing for an expansion of democracy. Parties socialize their members in particular values, policy preferences, and tactics that are preserved across

generations with a certain probability. Yet parties are not static; ideas may evolve over time, organizations may be converted to perform new functions, and extraordinary events may reconstitute the institutional landscape.<sup>38</sup>

The justice system also operates as an institutional carrier of regime legacies. Throughout the twentieth century, presidents were unlikely to reshuffle supreme courts in countries with strong democratic traditions, such as Chile, Costa Rica, and Uruguay. Today, according to the World Bank Governance Indicators, these three countries have by far the best perceptions for rule of law and control of corruption in the region, both of which are important to building high-quality democracy. Conversely, justice systems that historically were bulwarks of authoritarian regimes have been obstacles to creating high-level democracies in the third wave. Given a past of either unstable and shackled judiciaries or judiciaries appointed under authoritarian rule, it has been difficult to build a justice system that helps generate strong democratic rule of law, promotes and protects citizen rights, and serves as an effective mechanism of democratic accountability.

Dictatorships in Chile (1973–1990) and in Uruguay (1973–1984) crushed the capacity of the court system to stand up for democracy. Even so, new democratic regimes after 1990 and 1984, respectively, drew on the tradition of a solid court system. In part because many judges from the earlier democratic regimes remained in the court system, the current democratic regimes in both countries relatively quickly rebuilt a judicial system that could sustain a democratic rule of law.<sup>39</sup>

In sum, parties develop interests, norms, and preferences that typically favor some continuity in regime legacies. They have a reservoir of inherited interests, normative principles, policy preferences, and operational rules—an institutional “common sense”—that provides a historical underpinning to their strategic considerations. Likewise, the probability that courts will sustain higher levels of democracy is greater if justices were appointed under democratic presidents and are not highly vulnerable to dismissal. For both reasons, the cumulative experience of past generations affects the level of democracy in contemporary political regimes. The level of Latin American democracies after 1977 has offered a prime example of this causal mechanism.

## NOTES

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1. Keith Darden and Anna Grzymala-Busse, “The Great Divide: Literacy, Nationalism, and the Communist Collapse,” *World Politics*, 59 (October 2006), 83–115; Larry J. Diamond, “Thinking about Hybrid Regimes,” *Journal of Democracy*, 13 (April 2002), 21–35; David L. Epstein, Robert Bates, Jack Goldstone, Ida Kristensen, and Sharyn O’Halloran, “Democratic Transitions,” *American Journal of Political Science*, 50 (July 2006), 551–69; Jeffrey Kopstein and David Reilly, “Geographic Diffusion and the Transformation of the Post-Communist World,” *World Politics*, 53 (October 2000), 1–37; Steven Levitsky and Lucan A. Way, *Competitive Authoritarianism: Hybrid Regimes After the Cold War* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press,



2010); Kelly McMann, *Economic Autonomy and Democracy: Hybrid Regimes in Russia and Kyrgyzstan* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2006); Marina Ottaway, *Democracy Challenged: The Rise of Semi-Authoritarianism* (Washington, D.C.: The Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 2003).

2. Larry Diamond and Leonardo Morlino, *Assessing the Quality of Democracy* (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 2005); Daniel H. Levine and José Enrique Molina, eds., *The Quality of Democracy in Latin America* (Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner, 2011); Guillermo O'Donnell, Jorge Vargas Cullell, and Osvaldo M. Iazzetta, eds., *The Quality of Democracy: Theory and Applications* (Notre Dame: University of Notre Dame Press, 2004).

3. Every year since 1972, Freedom House has ranked countries on two scales, measuring civil liberties and political rights ([www.freedomhouse.org](http://www.freedomhouse.org)). Both scales range from 1 to 7, with 1 being the most democratic outcome. We created an aggregate score of democracy by adding the two measures and inverted the scale so that 0 indicates a fully authoritarian situation and 12 indicates the highest level of democracy.

4. Monty G. Marshall and Keith Jagers, *Polity IV Project: Political Regime Characteristics and Transitions, 1800–2010* (cited December 2011), available at <http://www.systemicpeace.org/polity/polity4.htm>.

5. A popular alternative to estimate the effect of country-level covariates is the fixed-effects vector decomposition estimator. Estimates for our models using this technique generated equivalent results. See Thomas Plümpner and Vera E. Troeger, "Efficient Estimation of Time-Invariant and Rarely Changing Variables in Finite Sample Panel Analyses with Unit Fixed Effects," *Political Analysis*, 15 (Spring 2007), 124–39; William Greene, "Fixed Effects Vector Decomposition: A Magical Solution to the Problem of Time-Invariant Variables in Fixed Effects Models?" *Political Analysis*, 19 (Spring 2011), 135–46.

6. Paul D. Allison, *Fixed Effects Regression Methods for Longitudinal Data Using SAS* (Cary, NC: SAS Publishing, 2005); Paul D. Allison, *Fixed Effects Regression Models* (Quantitative Application in the Social Sciences, no. 160, Los Angeles: SAGE, 2009), 23–26.

7. For time-varying predictors that exhibit considerable within-country variance (for example, GDP growth), a cross-sectional correlation between the country average and dependent variable has no clear causal interpretation because the fixed-effects estimates capture the short-term causal effect. By contrast, for predictors that are fairly stable and mostly display between-country variance (for example, the level of economic development, or all time-invariant covariates), a cross-sectional correlation may reflect a long-term causal effect.

8. In balanced panels, the estimates for the hybrid technique are identical to the fixed-effects model. In unbalanced panels such as our sample, the estimates may differ slightly, but they are substantively equivalent. Allison, *Fixed Effects Regression Models*, 27.

9. Marshall and Jagers, *Polity IV Project*; Scott Mainwaring, Daniel Brinks, and Aníbal Pérez-Liñán, "Classifying Political Regimes in Latin America, 1945–2004," in Gerardo Munck, ed., *Regimes and Democracy in Latin America: Theories and Methods* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2007), 121–60; Peter H. Smith, *Democracy in Latin America: Political Change in Comparative Perspective* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2005).

10. Kirk Bowman, Fabrice Lehoucq, and James Mahoney, "Measuring Political Democracy: Case Expertise, Data Adequacy, and Central America," *Comparative Political Studies*, 38 (October 2005), 939–70.

11. Mainwaring et al. classify Latin American countries in 1945–2007 based on whether (1) the president and congress are elected in free and fair elections; (2) the franchise is inclusive; (3) civil liberties are respected; and (4) elected officials actually control the government. If all four conditions are present, the country is coded as democratic. If one condition is fully absent, the country is coded as authoritarian. If any condition presents a "partial violation," the country is treated as semi-democratic. We extended the scale back to 1900.

12. Smith coded as democracies cases in which elections were free and fair, as semidemocracies cases in which elections were free but not fair, as oligarchic regimes cases in which elections were fair but not free (due to exclusions for candidates or voters), and as authoritarian regimes cases in which elections (if existed) were neither free nor fair.

13. Diego Abente Brun, "The Quality of Democracy in Small South American Countries: The Case of Paraguay," *Kellogg Institute Working Paper* No. 343 (November 2007), available at <http://kellogg.nd.edu/publications/workingpapers/index.shtml>; Ottaway, 161–89; Adam Przeworski, Michael E. Alvarez, José Antonio Cheibub, and Fernando Limongi, *Democracy and Development: Political Institutions and Well-Being in the World, 1950–1990* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2000).

14. Dietrich Rueschemeyer, Evelyn Huber Stephens, and John D. Stephens, *Capitalist Development and Democracy* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1992).

15. Michael L. Ross, "Does Oil Hinder Democracy?" *World Politics*, 53 (April 2001), 325–61; but see Stephen Haber and Victor Menaldo, "Do Natural Resources Fuel Authoritarianism? A Reappraisal of the Resource Curse," *American Political Science Review*, 105 (February 2011), 1–26.

16. The index is constructed as  $1 - \sum p^2$ , where  $p$  is the proportion of the population comprised by each group. Anthony Annett, "Social Fractionalization, Political Instability and the Size of Government," *IMF Staff Papers*, 48 (2001), 561–92; James D. Fearon and David D. Laitin, "Ethnicity, Insurgency and Civil War," *American Political Science Review*, 97 (February 2003), 75–90.

17. González showed that poor growth increased the likelihood of a major political crisis in Latin America. See Luis E. González, "Las crisis políticas de América Latina en los primeros años del siglo," in Diego Achard and Luis E. González, eds., *Política y desarrollo en Honduras, 2006–2009* (Tegucigalpa: UNDP-ASDI-AECI-DFID, 2006).

18. To avoid undue influence of extreme values, we took the natural logarithm of annual changes in the consumer price index (CPI), computing  $i = \ln(1 + \text{CPI}/100)$  for years of inflation and  $i = -1 * \ln(1 + |\text{CPI}/100|)$  for years of deflation.

19. Alfred Stepan and Cindy Skach, "Constitutional Frameworks and Democratic Consolidation? Parliamentarism Versus Presidentialism," *World Politics*, 46 (October 1993), 1–22.

20. Daniel Brinks and Michael Coppedge, "Diffusion is No Illusion: Neighbor Emulation in the Third Wave of Democracy," *Comparative Political Studies*, 39 (May 2006), 463–89; Kristian Skrede Gleditsch, *All International Politics is Local: The Diffusion of Conflict, Integration, and Democratization* (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 2002); Levitsky and Way; Kopstein and Reilly.

21. Michael Bratton and Nicolas van de Walle, *Democratic Experiments in Africa: Regime Transitions in Comparative Perspective* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1997), 223–25.

22. This result suggests that countries with higher levels of per capita GDP prior to their entry in the sample started their post-transition trajectories at higher levels of democracy, a finding that is consistent with modernization theory.

23. Scott Mainwaring and Aníbal Pérez-Liñán, "Latin American Democratization since 1978: Regime Transitions, Breakdowns, and Erosions," in Frances Hagopian and Scott Mainwaring, eds., *The Third Wave of Democratization in Latin America: Advances and Setbacks* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2005), 14–59.

24. We also ran model 2.2 including series on income inequality (the  $N$  declined to 371). The coefficient for regime legacies remained large and significant, but the fixed-effects coefficient for income inequality was not significant (results available upon request).

25. Ruth Berins Collier and David Collier, *Shaping the Political Arena: Critical Junctures, the Labor Movement, and Regime Dynamics in Latin America* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1991); Herbert Kitschelt, Peter Lange, Gary Marks, and John D. Stephens, eds., *Continuity and Change in Contemporary Capitalism* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1999); James Mahoney, "Path Dependence in Historical Sociology," *Theory and Society*, 29 (August 2000), 507–48; Douglass C. North, *Institutions, Institutional Change and Economic Performance* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1990), 92–100; Paul Pierson, *Politics in Time: History, Institutions, and Social Analysis* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2004), 17–78; Kathleen Thelen, "Historical Institutionalism in Comparative Politics," *Annual Review of Political Science*, 2 (1999), 369–404; Carlos H. Waisman, *Reversal of Development in Argentina* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1987).

26. Margaret Levi, "A Model, a Map, and a Method: Rational Choice in Comparative Politics," in Mark I. Lichbach and Alan S. Zuckerman, eds., *Comparative Politics: Rationality, Culture, and Structure* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1997), 28. See, also, Pierson, 20–22.

27. Stylized representations of path-dependence based on the Polya urn ignore generational replacement, because balls are never removed from the urn. Brian Arthur, *Increasing Returns and Path Dependence in the Economy* (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 1994); Scott E. Page, "Path Dependence," *Quarterly Journal of Political Science*, 1 (January 2006), 87–115.

28. J. Samuel Valenzuela, "Transición por Redemocratización: El Frente Nacional Colombiano en una Reflexión Teórica y Comparativa," *Kellogg Institute Working Paper #380* (November 2011), available at: <http://kellogg.nd.edu/publications/workingpapers/index.shtml>.

29. Our argument does not imply a deterministic mechanism. Established political parties do not guarantee unwavering support for democratic norms throughout society. In Colombia, for instance, longstanding parties have coexisted with a history of political violence. Similarly, judges appointed under democracy do not guarantee the protection of individual rights. See, for example, Lisa Hilbink, *Judges Beyond Politics in Democracy and Dictatorship: Lessons from Chile* (New York: Cambridge University

Press, 2007). However, parties and courts create an institutional environment for the reproduction of democratic norms that is absent in other contexts.

30. We calculated the years of competitive politics (democracy and semi-democracy) using the Mainwaring et al. classification of regimes.

31. Aníbal Pérez-Liñán and Andrea Castagnola, "Presidential Control of High Courts in Latin America: A Long-Term View (1904–2006)," *Journal of Politics in Latin America*, 1.2 (2009), 87–114.

32. Valenzuela, "Transición por Redemocratización."

33. For example, Daniel H. Levine, *Conflict and Political Change in Venezuela* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1973); Juan J. Linz and Alfred Stepan, eds., *The Breakdown of Democratic Regimes* (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1978).

34. Levine, *Conflict and Political Change in Venezuela*.

35. Maria Victória de Mesquita Benevides, *A UDN e o Udenismo: Ambigüidades do Liberalismo Brasileiro (1945–1965)* (Rio de Janeiro: Editora Paz e Terra, 1981); Timothy J. Power, *The Political Right in Postauthoritarian Brazil: Elites, Institutions, and Democratization* (University Park, PA: Penn State Press, 2000).

36. Gabriel A. Almond and Sidney Verba, *The Civic Culture: Political Attitudes and Democracy in Five Nations* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1963); Ronald Inglehart, *Modernization and Postmodernization: Cultural, Economic, and Political Change in 43 Societies* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1997), 160–215.

37. On PELA, see Manuel Alcántara Sáez, ed., *Politicians and Politics in Latin America* (Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 2008); Fátima García Díez and Araceli Mateos Díaz, "El Proyecto Elites Parlamentarias Latinoamericanas: Continuidades y Cambios (1994–2005)," in Manuel Alcántara, ed., *Políticos y política en América Latina* (Madrid: Siglo XXI, 2006), 3–29. Information is available at <http://americo.usal.es/oir/Elites/index.htm>. On Latinobarómetro, see *Informe Latinobarómetro 2006* (Santiago: Latinobarómetro Corporation, 2006), 72, available at <http://www.latinobarometro.org/latino/LATContenidos.jsp>.

38. James Mahoney and Kathleen Thelen, "A Theory of Gradual Institutional Change," in James Mahoney and Kathleen Thelen, *Explaining Institutional Change: Ambiguity, Agency, and Power* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2010), 1–37; Wolfgang Streeck and Kathleen Ann Thelen, eds., *Beyond Continuity: Institutional Change in Advanced Political Economies* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2005), 22–23; Stephen Krasner, "Approaches to the State: Alternative Conceptions and Historical Dynamics," *Comparative Politics*, 16 (January 1984), 223–46.

39. J. Samuel Valenzuela, "Los Derechos humanos y la redemocratización en Chile," in Manuel Alcántara Sáez and Leticia M. Rodríguez, eds., *Chile: Política y modernización democrática* (Barcelona: Edicions Bellaterra, 2006), 269–312.