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LATIN AMERICA

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IN LATIN AMERICA

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ABSTRACT

Polarization has been always identified as a problem for Latin American democracies. Yet its determinants remain largely undertheorized and without systematic evidence. This paper tackles this shortcoming with a new explanation where polarization is conceptualized as a mobilizational tool used by parties to deliver unequivocal signals to voters about their location in the policy space. The explanation holds that Parties’ strategies depend on the electoral context in which they compete, making volatility a crucial indicator of their behavior. Low-volatility contexts inhibit parties from seeking polarization due to potential electoral punishments by voters and the internal costs of programmatic change within the party organization. High volatility, however, increases the risk of electoral survival, decreasing the costs of seeking polarization. Here, volatility makes polarization more likely. Using time-series cross-sectional regression analysis for eighteen Latin American countries for 1995–2010, this paper provides robust statistical results to support the causal link between electoral volatility and polarization.

RESUMEN

La polarización ideológica es considerada como un problema para las democracias de América Latina. Sin embargo, la polarización no solo ha sido escasamente teorizada sino que además carecemos de evidencia empírica sistemática a nivel comparado. Este documento explora esta laguna en la literatura y provee una explicación de la polarización ideológica de las elites partidarias durante el periodo 1995–2010. La polarización es un herramienta mobilizacional que emplean los partidos, a los efectos de facilitarle a los votantes la localización inequívoca de los partidos en el espectro ideológico. En este documento, las estrategias de los partidos dependen del contexto electoral en el que compiten, donde la volatilidad electoral es un indicador determinante para el comportamiento de los agentes. Los contextos de baja volatilidad inhiben a los partidos de seguir una estrategia de polarización ideológica, debido al temor a ser castigado por los votantes y las dificultades de procesar cambios programáticos dentro de los partidos cuando no hay riesgos electorales de corto plazo. Alta volatilidad, sin embargo, aumenta el riesgo de supervivencia electoral de los partidos, haciendo decrecer los costos de seguir una estrategia de polarización. En este caso, alta volatilidad aumenta la probabilidad de polarizar. Un análisis de regresión con series de tiempo en sección cruzada provee evidencia solida sobre el vínculo causal entre la volatilidad electoral y la polarización ideológica.
INTRODUCTION

Polarization has been traditionally known as the driving force behind a large series of problems across Latin American democracies. It was the fundamental factor behind the breakdown of democracy during the sixties and seventies and a threatening factor for most transitions to democracy during the eighties (Huntington 1968; Linz 1978; O’Donnell and Schmitter 1986). During the nineties, it was responsible for limiting the chances to implement state and market reforms due to its constraining effects on potential coalition arrangements (Shugart and Carey 1992; Mainwaring and Shugart 1997; Cheibub 2007). More recently, as a part of a growing literature studying the emergence of leftist governments in Latin America, polarization has been considered a risk for regime stability in several cases across the region (Castañeda 2006; Schamis 2006; Weyland, Madrid, and Hunter 2010; Levitsky and Roberts 2011).

Although these three bodies of literature understand polarization as the cause of different kinds of political phenomena, they offer no systematic explanation for its origin. This is surprising given that there are important variations in ideological polarization across Latin American countries. From cases such as El Salvador, Nicaragua, or Bolivia, with high levels of ideological polarization, to cases such as Peru, Paraguay, and Costa Rica, with very low levels of polarization, the question addressed here is what accounts for this variation across Latin American democracies.

Extant theories on parties and party systems have suggested different accounts of polarization over the last half century. According to classic sociological accounts, party systems mirror the cleavage structure in society (Lipset and Rokkan 1967; Bartolini 2000), suggesting that the preferences of voters and their socioeconomic condition determine the party’s support for radical options in the policy space. From a different perspective, spatial models have offered two basic accounts: the classic proximity model in the Downsian tradition and the challenge posed by directional models (Downs 1957; Hinich and Munger 1994; Rabinowitz, Macdonald, and Listhaug 1991). Using the same heuristics, these two models make completely different predictions about the positioning of parties in the ideological spectrum. While proximity models predict centripetal competition, directional models predict centrifugal competition, assuming that voters care about ideology and feel attracted by clear policy stances. This important assumption in directional models implies that parties will locate in more extreme positions to provide clear
ideological cues to voters. In any case, both sociological and spatial models share the crucial tenet that the preferences of voters are exogenous to party competition.

Other prominent theories focus on elite strategies. For instance, one argument holds that party leaders can actually shape the preferences of voters by setting clear policy stances away from the center of the ideological spectrum (Przeworski and Sprague 1986). Instead of being led by the preferences of voters, parties seek centrifugal tendencies as their leaders choose to follow policy differentiation with other competing parties. This is largely due to the fact that some party leaders tend to privilege long-term objectives over short-term vote maximizing strategies. Here, if polarization exists, it comes from politicians (not from voters). Finally, institutions also count. In the institutionalist view, polarization is not driven by the preferences of voters and party leaders together with other contextual socioeconomic factors. Rather, institutionalists suggest that some types of electoral rules provide parties with incentives to follow either centripetal or centrifugal strategies (Sartori 1976; Cox 1990). Here, polarization naturally flows from rules that are seen as incentives for or constraints on political behavior.

While insightful, some of these explanations face important challenges when explaining ideological polarization at the comparative level. For instance, there is no systematic evidence supporting the classic Downsian or proximity model (Iversen 1994; Adams, Merrill, and Grofman 2005). Either way, there is little empirical evidence linking socioeconomic factors with ideological polarization (Dalton 2005, 2008; Knutsen 1998). Some of the most polarized countries across regions have low levels of poverty and inequality (e.g., Sweden and Chile). Further, institutional theories face a hard empirical test when we observe the US case and several Latin American countries where the main prediction around polarization works in the opposite direction. Bipartisan systems are not necessarily less polarized than multiparty systems. Thus far, the comparative evidence does not provide a clear back up for some of the most prominent theories. However, there is some evidence suggesting that parties are the main agents driving polarization (Iversen 1994; Adams, Merrill, and Grofman 2005; Adams, Green and Milazzo 2012; Adams 2012; Mainwaring and Torcal 2003; Abramowitz and Saunders 2008).

Following elite-driven explanations of political behavior, I argue that polarization is a mobilizational tool used by parties to send unequivocal signals to voters about their location in the policy space or on the ideological spectrum. Unlike other theories, my argument pays special attention to the electoral context in which parties compete for votes. Since polarization may
involves programmatic change, this path usually implies internal and external constraints between parties and voters and within the party organization. Yet, the parties’ perception of the costs imposed by these external and internal constraints to polarize largely depends on party-system stability, as this condition indicates the level of uncertainty about the party’s electoral prospects. Specifically, I suggest that electoral volatility determines the party’s perception of the relative costs and benefits of centripetal versus centrifugal strategies and thus the level of polarization observed in a party system.

The paper provides a new theory and original data and has two important implications. For theories of parties and party systems, it suggests that polarization is politically driven by elites who strategize according to the context in which they compete in elections. By stressing the role of political agency, my argument competes with other theories focused on the socioeconomic condition of voters and the electoral rules. The paper also has implications for the literature on democracy and democratization. Over the course of the last two decades, polarization has tended to increase over time, and yet democracy has never been at risk of severe democratic reversals. Contrary to the observation of an important portion of the comparative literature, democracy can survive with polarization in Latin America.

The paper proceeds as follows. The next section proposes the central argument, highlighting electoral volatility as the main factor behind the emergence of polarization but also causal mechanisms that identify the role of parties, the electorate, and the effect of time constraints in the strategies of parties. The third section develops the argument with a discussion of some examples across Latin America. The fourth section uses a cross-national time series analysis to test the main hypothesis. This section displays the scope of variation in polarization observed across and within Latin American countries and defines the dependent and independent variable, as well as other control variables representing different explanations offered by extant theories on parties and party systems. The fifth section displays the empirical tests and discusses the main results. The final section summarizes and concludes.
A THEORY OF POLARIZATION

Polarization is a widely used concept in the study of politics and institutions but rarely defined. In fact, some of the classics on parties and party systems do not provide a single definition of polarization (Downs 1957; Sartori 1976). This lacuna has not been filled out over the course of the last decades among different authors who have made important contributions to the study of political parties and democratization. For example, Juan Linz’s analysis (1978) of democratic breakdowns assumes that polarization involves different types of actions performed by diverse actors. In his work, polarization can be the radicalization of political discourse or riots and political violence in the streets but can also be policy differentiation among competing political parties in parliament. This is not the case for most scholars within the spatial modeling tradition (see Adams, Merrill, and Grofman 2005), where polarization is taken as the latter, not the former. Despite differences among theoretical traditions and authors, I share the common denominator in the literature by which polarization is considered as ideological or policy distances among parties.

In order to define terms, I make a distinction between a polarizing strategy and polarization. The latter is defined as a party-system trait that reveals the degree of policy differentiation among relevant competing parties. A polarizing strategy is the set of actions followed by one or more parties with the purpose of locating themselves away from the median of the electorate. These two levels of analysis are essentially different but closely intertwined. Given that polarization requires at least the strategic action of one or more parties, there is no polarization without polarizing parties. Similarly, polarization (at the system level) can induce non-polarized parties to play the only game in town (Adams and Somer-Topcu 2009).

What explains polarization? And more importantly: what is the causal mechanism linking party strategies and polarization? As mentioned before, explaining the causes of polarization has not been the main purpose of major theories of parties and party systems. Yet, these works have important implications from which we can draw a set of testable hypotheses. In what follows, I advance a novel theoretical argument that links electoral volatility with ideological polarization. To account for polarization, I develop my argument using a set of factors and causal mechanisms behind the strategies of parties to either stick to centrist policy agendas or use a polarizing strategy and concomitant extremist policies. In particular, I argue that parties face: (1) internal
constraints (within the party organization) and external constraints (among voters); and (2) contextual incentives to adopt a polarizing strategy.

**Internal and External Constraints**

For most political parties, a polarizing strategy faces internal and external constraints. Internal constraints apply to the organizational level and include the evaluation of the costs and benefits of elaborating and negotiating a programmatic change within the party (Przeworski and Sprague 1986; Panebianco 1988; Kitschelt 1989; Levitsky 2003). They tend to increase with the longevity of parties as well as the extent to which party organizations follow a set of formal procedures to implement a programmatic change. Older parties are less prone to ideological change because voters and grassroots have been persuaded and socialized within a stable ideological positioning and are usually mobilized on these grounds.

Similarly, party organizations that follow a set of formal procedures to perform programmatic changes are less likely to experience ideological shifts as these procedures are also seen as obstacles for a polarizing strategy. In general, the constraints within parties show that most programmatic changes involve actors with divergent policy preferences and, depending on the complexity of the organizational structure, change can be the product of a consensual agreement, the imposition by some majority coalition, or the advent of a new leadership.

Voters provide the external constraint for a polarizing strategy. Since one of the fundamental links between parties and voters is forged by ideology, the external constraint involves parties’ perception of the voters’ reaction to ideological change. If ideologies are stable over time they will help to develop a party identification, leading voters to more stable party preferences. This Downsian understanding of ideologies helps to explain why parties have incentives to have stable policy agendas over time if they want to survive. Consequently, the best way to build credibility and reputation among voters is by developing a brand name that is based on a set of policies tied together by an ideology (Lupu forthcoming; but see Stokes 2001 for an exception). If parties are ideologically consistent over time, voters will not easily change their preferences and move to other parties. Otherwise, inconsistency can lead voters to punish their parties for abrupt ideological changes for the sake of winning elections (Downs 1957, 103–13). Thus, a polarizing strategy can produce credibility problems among voters, who may judge a programmatic change as an act of electoral opportunism (Adams, Merrill, and Grofman 2005) or
may simply dislike the new ideological outlook of the party. A polarizing strategy can alienate voters, and this constitutes an external constraint for parties.

**Contextual Incentives**

Hitherto, internal and external constraints have not been linked to the environment in which parties compete. However, because they are usually part of a system, the scope of electoral stability (or instability) at the party-system level becomes a crucial contextual factor that affects not only a party’s electoral chances but also its members’ calculations about whether to stick to their policy preferences or shift towards a polarizing strategy. In the case of stable party systems that feature low levels of electoral volatility, both internal and external constraints tend to operate. The absence of unexpected electoral defeats with large voting losses make party leaders more risk averse to performing programmatic shifts with ostensible intraparty costs and uncertain electoral benefits. Therefore, party-system stability tends to activate both the internal and external constraints, making polarization less likely. Yet, parties can display a different behavior in unstable party systems.

First, volatility transforms the costs and benefits of seeking a polarizing strategy by decreasing the internal and external constraints that parties face when they consider changing their position in the policy space. In unstable (or volatile) party systems, parties may suffer important (if not determinant) electoral losses in a single election. Such losses may be irreversible. Thus, since the electoral risk is high in unstable settings, both the internal constraints (within the party organization) and the external constraints (coming from a possible punishment by voters) tend to decrease. This configuration fuels the strategy of polarization, as parties face fewer restrictions to move across the ideological spectrum for the sake of winning elections.

Second, electoral volatility often results in the emergence of new parties and individual challengers with new ideological stances. This is because volatility decreases the incentives to perform electoral coordination among politicians. If coordination works, this process must reduce the supply of candidates or parties in elections (Cox 1997). Yet, given that coordination is based on the scope of information around the electoral chances of different parties or candidates, volatility decreases the incentives to coordinate. If volatility is high, the lack of electoral coordination can lead to an oversupply of parties and candidates, increasing the chances that new
agents will overlap with the same policy position of established parties. This overlapping process creates the need to differentiate (under volatility contexts), inducing parties to polarize their location in the policy space. As Sartori argues (1976), new agents not only imply new party brands but also may bust polarization among them (Sani and Sartori 1984).

Third, volatility can turn polarization into an electorally efficient strategy when voters have no clear policy preferences. In low-volatility contexts, parties have information regarding the location of voters in the ideological space. Yet, this Downsian assumption faces important challenges when parties do not know the distribution of voters. In a world with perfect information, parties may seek a polarizing strategy if voters are located at the poles of the ideological space. In volatile contexts, however, parties do not have precise information about the location of voters in the policy space. That is, voters have vague policy preferences and can either vote for party A, B, or C (without a clear transitivity rule) and tend to be temporally inconsistent in their voting preferences. Polarization provides clear ideological cues to voters, helping them to choose among substantively different policy options.

Fourth, polarization makes parties more programmatic and stimulate “partisan motivated reasoning” (Levendusky 2010; Druckman, Peterson, and Slothuus 2013), and it also helps to stabilize the policy preferences of voters over time. Consequently, we should not expect an easy reversion of polarization in the short run, even after the peak of electoral volatility has passed. As a matter of fact, electoral volatility can decrease in the short run while polarization remains frozen. This claim is in line with Carmines and Stimson’s argument about “issue evolution” (1986, 903), according to which polarization begins at the elite level and turns into a mass issue alignment with long-term consequences in voting behavior.

Finally, the previous point brings to the fore the problem of reverse causation. In other words: does polarization drive electoral volatility? The answer is negative for two reasons. From a theoretical point of view, polarization stimulates voters to have consistent policy preferences across different sets of issues (Levendusky 2010; Druckman, Peterson, and Slothuus 2013), which is more likely to be observed in stable than in fluid party systems (with high volatility rates). This attitude consistency drives voters towards more partisan-oriented behavior based on stable ideological cues provided by parties. At the margin, if polarization produces any effect, it tends to reduce rather than increase volatility.
From an empirical point of view, some specific studies on electoral volatility in Latin America show that the impact of polarization on volatility is consistently negative across different specifications (Roberts and Wibbels 1999). Besides, I rule out the inverse line of causality in my own empirical analysis. Of course, some parties make strategic mistakes and get into ideological polarization (out of context). This kind of decision may lead them to decrease their vote share, affecting systemic volatility. More specifically, there are significant examples of parties whose unexpected programmatic changes (both in office and in opposition) can help to explain volatility rates across countries (Lupu forthcoming; Stokes 2001). Yet, these cases have to be considered as random errors, as systematic evidence in this paper shows that parties polarize when electoral contexts become volatile. More formally, the main hypothesis in this research holds that ideological polarization at the elite level increases as electoral volatility increases.

**SOME EXAMPLES**

Recent trends in Latin American politics illustrate how electoral volatility affects ideological polarization. In some cases, volatility boosts polarization, as happened in Venezuela, Ecuador, and Bolivia with presidents Chávez, Correa, and Morales, respectively. Each of these candidates succeeded by polarizing volatile party systems and, once elected, they were able to win more than one election at the national and subnational levels of government by deepening a polarized strategy (see Corrales 2005; López Maya 2011).

Venezuela was electorally dominated by AD (Acción Democrática or Democratic Action) and COPEI (Comité de Organización Política Electoral Independiente or Independent Electoral Political Organization Committee) between the late fifties and late nineties. The dominance of these two moderate catch-all parties yielded low levels of electoral volatility until the mid-nineties, when the whole party system and particularly AD and COPEI suffered major electoral loses (Molina and Pérez 1996). In this context, most scholars agree that a severe crisis at the party-system level preceded the rise of Hugo Chávez, who was elected during a peak of electoral volatility of 42.7 percent during the 1998 elections (Molina 2000). Electoral volatility has been observed as a threat by coalition forces surrounding Chávez. Yet electoral uncertainty

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1 This includes winning elections for the constitutional assemblies elected in these three countries.

2 Several students of Venezuelan politics have focused on social and economic polarization as the basis of
conflated with the radical actions of opposition forces until the military coup of 2001, reinforcing Chávez’s utility of polarizing to win elections and remain in power.

Chávez’s first victory in 1998 was surrounded by a heterogeneous coalition of leftist parties and the support of different social groups including parts of the business sector. Arguably, his first victory was less polarized than subsequent elections, which is largely explained by the progressive lack of internal opposition within his party and particularly within his coalition forces. Over his last two terms in office, Chávez lost the support of several coalition members, paving the way for a polarizing strategy without serious opposition within and outside his own party. In all cases, he systematically won using a polarizing strategy, including his last victory in October 2012.²

Ecuador is another example as their party system has shown increasing instability. Indeed, scholars have pointed out that there has been no single system but different party systems over the last decades (Mejía Acosta 2009; Freidenberg 2006).³ Several constitutional reforms have given incentives to avoid cooperation among partisan elites, regionalizing the whole party system and increasing the supply of parties and candidates in elections. These centrifugal incentives help to explain the combination of mass unrest and elite support behind three ousted presidents in 1990, 1998, and 2002. As in Venezuela, the climate of political instability in Ecuador can be observed through the lenses of electoral volatility, going from 38.3 percent in 1992 to 69.4 percent in 2006, when Correa won his first presidential election. Like Chávez, Correa progressively lost part of his political support within his own party and the heterogeneous coalition of parties behind his candidacy in 2006 and the constitutional reform held in 2007.

The Bolivian case is another example where volatility drives polarization. Like Venezuela, this country was characterized by a relatively stable party system after the democratic restoration in 1985 (Mayorga 2005). Yet, this party system quickly deteriorated since the early 1990s revealing the inability of partisan elites to cooperate. Like Ecuador, this country is also deeply marked by ethnic and regional cleavages that have come to the fore at the party-system level. Yet, as in the Venezuelan case, Bolivian parties were able to manage different social, economic, and ethnic cleavages until the early 2000s, when Evo Morales appeared for the first

² Several students of Venezuelan politics have focused on social and economic polarization as the basis of the emergence and survival of Chávez. The bulk of this debate is whether the vote for Chávez has come from a single- or multi-class basis over the last decade (see Lupu 2010).
³ The system exhibits the same instability at the local level.
time with the Movement for Socialism (Movimiento al Socialismo, MAS). Since the early period when the party system started to deteriorate, Bolivia went from 30.7 percent electoral volatility in 1989 to 69.7 percent in 2005, when Morales won his first presidential election. Over the course of his first and second term in office, volatility has been on the rise and so has polarization. Like Chávez and Correa, Morales faces harsh opposition not within his own party or coalition of parties but from opposition forces at the national and local levels of government, particularly from Social Democratic Power (Poder Democrático y Social, Podemos), the National Unity Front (Frente de Unidad Nacional, UN), and the Revolutionary Nationalist Movement (Movimiento Nacionalista Revolucionario, MNR).

Chile and Uruguay, in contrast, illustrate how low levels of electoral volatility affect ideological polarization. During the late sixties and early seventies, Chilean and Uruguayan parties went through periods of electoral volatility with increasing levels of ideological polarization. The old Uruguayan catch-all party system built by Blancos and Colorados during the nineteenth century was challenged by the leftist Broad Front (Frente Amplio), which captured more than 20 percent of the vote in its first election in 1971 (González 1991; Buquet, Chasquetti, and Moraes 1998; Luna 2007). The Frente Amplio emerged in a context of increasing electoral volatility among Blancos and Colorados and polarized the ideological spectrum until 2009. Although volatility had an irregular path right after the democratic restoration in 1985, an increase observed in 1999 and followed in 2004 left immediate and long-term increases in polarization that have not been reversed.

Similarly, the Chilean party system experienced high levels of electoral volatility during the sixties, along with increasing levels of ideological polarization (Scully 1995; Angell 2003; Montes, Mainwaring, and Ortega 2000). This period drove the Radical Party (Partido Radical) towards a more polarized position when the Christian Democrats (Partido Demócrata Cristiano, PDC) colonized the center with more than 40 percent of the electorate in 1965. During the following decade and particularly until 1973, high levels of electoral volatility paved the way for a polarized election won by the Socialist Party (Partido Socialista de Chile, PS) led by Salvador Allende. Like the Uruguayan restoration, Chile’s return to democracy came with a similar distribution of ideological blocks to that observed before the military coup (Siavelis 1997). The difference in Chile, however, was the alliance between center and left against the right, rather than the left against the rest, which was the situation before the breakdown (Scully 1995). In
general, the post-transitional party system in Chile has remained one of the most stable cases in Latin America, featuring low levels of electoral volatility (Jones 2005).

These examples allow us to understand not only the causal link between volatility and polarization but also the crucial role of time in the argument. Short-term changes in volatility can either have a positive or negative impact on polarization. On the other hand, the cumulative effect of these short-term impacts can contrast with the long-run effect of volatility on polarization. Indeed, a volatility shock at a single point in the past can explain a high but stable level of polarization across time, despite short-term reversals. Therefore, the original cause of a sharp increase in polarization may have disappeared and yet polarization remains relatively high in the long run. This particular role of time can help us to understand a possible freezing effect of polarization in several advanced democracies in Western Europe during the postwar period, where high levels of polarization persisted despite short-term decreases in electoral volatility (Knutsen 1998; Shively 1972). Similarly, Latin American countries such as Chile and Uruguay had volatility shocks during the mid-sixties that produced polarization levels that have not been seriously reversed overtime, even long after the democratic restoration.

EMPIRICAL TESTS

This section provides an empirical test for the main hypothesis using regression analysis with time-series cross-sectional data (TSCS). Because it is crucial to disentangle the dynamics of the impact of electoral volatility on polarization, I use an Error Correction Model (ECM) in which all the independent variables are measured in first-differences or annual changes to capture the short-term effects (Δ) and levels (with lagged values at t-1) to capture long-term effects. This simple ECM captures the way in which short-term variations affect the long-term equilibrium (De Boef and Keele 2008). Theoretically, the model takes the following specification:

\[ \Delta Y_t = \alpha_0 + \alpha^* Y_{t-1} + \beta_0 \Delta X_t + \beta_1 X_{t-1} + \varepsilon_t \]

where \( \Delta Y_t \) is the annual variation of polarization and \( Y_{t-1} \) is the lagged dependent variable that captures the long-term equilibrium through \( \alpha^* \).

The ECM sets that every time \( X_{t-1} \) impacts \( Y_t \), moving away from the long-term equilibrium path, error is corrected by \( \alpha^* \) at the yearly rate. Notice that the interpretation of the
coefficients is not evident in this model, because both $\beta_1 X_{t-1}$ and $\beta_0 \Delta X_t$ depend on $\alpha^* Y_{t-1}$. Knowing actual values of the dependent variable requires further calculations because they are not directly observable. In particular, $\beta_1 X_{t-1}/-\alpha^* Y_{t-1}$ yields the long-term equilibrium path, and $\beta_0 \Delta X_t \cdot (1+\alpha^* Y_{t-1})$ provides the measurement for the short-term impact for all variables in first differences (see De Boef and Keele 2008, 191; Segura-Ubiergo 2007, 172).

**Measuring the Dependent Variable**

Polarization is a systemic trait indicating the degree of programmatic or policy differentiation among parties (usually but not exclusively on the left-right axis). In order to measure polarization, the electoral size of parties is crucial, because two or more small extremist parties located at each end of the electoral spectrum are not a sufficient condition for a polarized party system. Polarization requires electorally successful parties and, for this reason, one or more parties may seek a polarizing strategy without succeeding at polarizing the system. Based on these criteria, this paper measures polarization with the most standardized index used in the literature on parties and party systems (Knutsen 1998; Jones 2005; Lachat 2008). 4

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4 Other measures include Huber’s index, which only takes the absolute values of the same formula used by Taylor and Herman. Yet, as extensively explained by Knutsen (1998, 20–29), this index is less sensitive to the electoral presence of small polarized parties, making it more suitable for two-party systems than multiparty systems. Michael Coppedge (1998) also provides a useful index and data, which has become an important source of information for students of Latin American politics. He not only provides a refined and rich classification of parties but also covers a time series from 1912 to 1996, which is more comprehensive than any other data based on mass and elite surveys. However, there are two important caveats about Coppedge’s index for the purposes of this paper. On the one hand, it does not cover the more recent decade, which is full of important changes in the patterns of party competition across Latin American countries in the context of high levels of ideological polarization. On the other hand, and because it seeks to cover a long time series (1912–1996) for eleven cases in the region, Coppedge’s data can only be based on expert judgments, rather than the elite opinions about their own location in the policy space.
The Taylor and Herman (1971) index of ideological polarization calculates the square sum of the deviations between the mean party position for party i ($x_i$) and the total mean for all parties ($\bar{x}$), multiplied by the share of votes of party i ($f_i$), such that:\textsuperscript{5}

$$P = \sum_{i=1}^{n} f_i (x_i - \bar{x})^2$$

where $f_i$ is the share of votes won by the $i^{th}$ party and $\bar{x}_i$ is the ideological mean for the $i^{th}$ party in the legislature, and $\bar{x}$ is the ideological mean all parties in the legislature.

Using this index and data from the Programa de Elites Parlamentarias de América Latina (PELA hereafter), I calculated ideological polarization for eighteen Latin American countries between 1993 and 2010 (n=70).\textsuperscript{6} These surveys are conducted among individual legislators from more than ninety political parties, including questions on democracy and political values, political institutions such as parties and interest groups, the state and market reforms, military issues and international relations. The questionnaires include the classical question capturing the legislator’s ideological positioning on the left-right scale. Using this information for eighteen countries on each available legislature and electoral data for each legislative period, Taylor and Herman’s index of ideological polarization shows a great level of variation across time and space in Latin America.

\textsuperscript{5} This index uses the numerator of the eta-coefficient, which is a covariance calculator used by Inglehart and Klingemann (1976) to measure ideological polarization in Europe. Only Mark Jones (2005) provides data on polarization for Latin America using Taylor and Herman’s index.

\textsuperscript{6} The specific wording for the survey question on ideological self-placement reads as follows: “When we talk about politics we generally use the expressions left and right. Regarding a scale where 1 is the left and 10 is the right, where would you place your own party?” (http://americo.usal.es/oir/Elites/bases_de_datos.htm).
Figure 1 reports elite polarization across countries for 1993–2010. There is a heterogeneous group of cases above the mean, from post-conflict societies such as El Salvador and Nicaragua, where government and opposition parties have been deeply divided since the early nineties, to cases such as Chile that feature robust democratic traditions, where government and opposition parties are able to share a set of common policy preferences and values. Below the mean, variation is even more important. That set ranges from countries such as Mexico, where the Institutional Revolutionary Party (Partido Revolucionario Institucional, PRI) and the National Action Party (Partido Acción Nacional, PAN) alternate in government with the systematic opposition of the Party of the Democratic Revolution (Partido de la Revolución Democrática, PRD), to countries such as Argentina with a predominant party represented by the heterogeneous Justicialist Party (Partido Justicialista, PJ) and a largely divided opposition. This cross-country variation, however, has to be analyzed in light of the standard deviations for each country. As reported, some cases have changed substantively while others did not, and the former tend to be those with the highest scores in ideological polarization. A correlation of .68 between the mean and the standard deviation (.46 without El Salvador), tells us that countries
with high polarization tend to be those more prone to change over time. Based on this data and due to the ECM model requirements, the dependent variable to be used is the annual variation in elite polarization ($\Delta E$-POLARIZATION).

**The Independent Variable and Control Variables**

The main hypothesis in this paper involves electoral volatility. I measure this variable using Pedersen’s (1979) classic index with a small correction for the sake of precision. While the original formula considers the percentage of votes won by party $j$ at election $t$ minus the percentage of votes won by party $j$ at election $t-1$, I set a 5 percent threshold in order to avoid the distortion caused by a myriad of very small parties. For instance, seventy parties corresponding to 57 percent of the electorate during the 2002 Colombian elections were dropped. Similarly, thirty-two parties corresponding to 43 percent of the electorate were dropped from the 2001 Argentine election. More importantly, the use of this threshold is coherent with Taylor and Herman’s index of polarization, where the electoral size of polarized parties is crucial for the index value. At any rate, the statistical results displayed in next section are robust with or without the 5 percent threshold.

Several independent variables capture classical arguments in the literature on parties and party systems. First, Downs (1957) argues that winning elections is the main objective of political parties. As a proximity model, parties will strategically locate their policy preferences close to the position of the median voter, no matter where this voter is on the left-right continuum. Directional models, on the contrary, have argued that most of the evidence gathered during the last decades suggests no congruence between the location of the median voter and the party’s location in the policy space. Yet, directional and proximity models share the view that parties may court voters if the distribution of voters is not normal (Adams, Merrill, and Grofman 2005; Iversen 1994; Rabinowitz, Macdonald, and Listhaug 1991). Formally speaking, ideological polarization at the elite level increases after an increase in ideological polarization at the mass level. Consequently, I capture the effect of mass polarization (on elite polarization)
with the Taylor and Herman index of ideological polarization M-POLARIZATION, using survey data coming from Latinobarometer for 1993–2010.7

Along with Downs (1957), few classics have been as influential among political scientists as Lipset and Rokkan’s (1967) work on the origin of parties and party systems in advanced democracies. In this case, party-system formation mirrors the structure of cleavages in society, marked by religious, cultural, class, and geographical divides. That is: social cleavages are given and become the basic source for party-system formation, which means that party systems reflect the structure of preferences observed in society. Put bluntly, a polarized society along one or more cleavages will generate a party system along the same polarized lines.8 If this is the case we can extend for this perspective what we stated for the Downsian model, where parties seek the position or preferences of median voter, whose socioeconomic condition determines his or her own policy preferences.

Second, the source of voters’ preferences is also important in spatial models. Downs, for instance, suggests that voters’ preferences are largely determined by their socioeconomic conditions. He argues that while working or lower classes will vote for leftist politicians, the upper classes will vote for rightist parties (see 1957, 120–21). Thus, if the median voter is indeed represented by the voter’s median income, skewed income distributions or harsh economic conditions (that shrink the middle class) will necessarily lead to polarized politics. Formally, polarization at the elite level increases after the socioeconomic condition of voters deteriorates. Likewise, polarization at the elite level increases after a country’s economic performance deteriorates. I capture the effect of socioeconomic factors on elite polarization with UNEMPLOYMENT and INFLATION rates, and the aggregate economic performance with the Gross Domestic Product Per Capita (GDPPC) for 1993–2010. In all cases I use data from the Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC) for 1993–2010.

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7 The question wording here reads as follows: “On a scale where 0 is left and 10 is right: where would you place yourself?”

8 Until recent years, these arguments were one of the fundamental topics of discussion among students of parties and party systems (Pedersen 1979; Ersson and Lane 1998; Chhibber and Torcal 1997; Mainwaring and Torcal 2003; Bartolini 2000; Mair 1997). With few exceptions, this research rejects Lipset and Rokkan’s freezing hypothesis on the basis of the scope of electoral volatility observed across advanced democracies since the postwar era. As Ersson and Lane (1998) argue, electoral volatility was far from being consistent between the early twenties and the mid eighties.
Third, electoral rules are another classic explanation for the origin and functioning of parties and party systems. On the one hand, in plurality systems (where the district size \( M = 1 \)) parties have incentives to compete under the umbrella of large coalitions. If (and only if) parties are able to perform strategic coordination, the smaller the district size the larger the effort to provide the smallest number of candidates (see Cox 1997). A successful strategic coordination decreases the supply of parties in the system. From this, we can infer that in plurality systems where only one candidate must be chosen, the equilibrium must be located close to \( M+1 \). Thus, if only two (or perhaps three) candidates compete in elections, the effect on the scope of polarization must be centripetal. Here, parties will compete close to the center and polarization will not take place. Inversely, as the district magnitude increases (such that \( M>1 \)) and particularly under a proportional representation-closed-list system (PRCL), agents will have fewer incentives to seek electoral coordination to reduce the supply of candidates. This explains why the systemic effect under PR will be towards multipartism. In this context, it is more likely that agents will not have to dilute their ideological preferences for the sake of winning elections. Thus, PR systems tend to have centrifugal effects depending on the number of competing parties (Sartori 1976). More formally, polarization will increase after an increase in the effective number of parties. I capture the impact of the effective number of parties on polarization with data from electoral results for each Latin American country during 1993–2010. Finally, the model is formalized in the following manner:

\[
Y_{t} = \beta_{0} + \beta_{E-POLARIZATION_{t-1}} + \beta_{VOLATILITY_{t-1}} + \\
\beta_{\Delta VOLATILITY} + \beta_{POLARIZATION-OP_{t-1}} + \beta_{\Delta POLARIZATION-OP} + \beta_{\Delta UNEMPLOY} + \beta_{UNEMPLOY_{t-1}} \\
+ \beta_{\Delta INFLATION} + \beta_{INFLATION_{t-1}} + \beta_{\Delta GDPPC} + \beta_{GDPPC_{t-1}} + \beta_{N-PARTIES_{t-1}} + \beta_{N-PARTIES} + \\
COUNTRY DUMMIES + \epsilon_{t}
\]

As is the case with most research based on time series-cross sectional data, two common estimation problems appear. First, after observing the presence of heteroskedasticity, I followed a standard procedure by using OLS regression analysis with panel corrected standard errors. This widely used method to handle with error distribution in panel data was applied to the statistical model. Second, a typical problem with time series data deals with autocorrelation, which was found after performing the Breush-Godgfrey test but solved by introducing a lagged dependent
variable (E-POLARIZATION_{t-1}). This independent variable usually causes endogeneity problems with the fixed effects represented by country dummies controlling for omitted variables. Yet, notice that an ECM corrects by default for endogeneity bias because all the independent variables are measured in levels (at t-1) and first differences (Δ). Thus the ECM not only corrects for endogeneity but also allows this research to fit the theoretical purpose with an appropriate estimation method that captures the effect of long- and short-term factors.

RESULTS AND DISCUSSION

Table 1 reports the results testing the main hypothesis and the control variables. The results are reported in two steps, where I find support for my hypothesis regarding how electoral volatility incentivizes party elites to adopt polarization, as well as support for some of the rival hypotheses derived from the literature on polarization. First and most importantly, the main hypothesis finds unambiguous evidence: polarization is driven by volatile electoral contexts. This is true in the short and long term, where the relation is positive and statistically significant. Moreover, the same sign of the coefficients indicates that there is a clear cumulative effect between the short and long run. As a matter of fact, short-run shocks in polarization tend to contribute to the positive long-term equilibrium. The main corollary from this point is that the positive relation between volatility and polarization is unlikely to be reversed by negative shocks in the short run. Again, this is because both signs move in the same direction.
## TABLE 1

**DETERMINANTS OF IDEOLOGICAL POLARIZATION**
*(DEPENDENT VARIABLE = Δ ELITE POLARIZATION)*

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Lagged Variables (t-1)</th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>E-POLARIZATION</td>
<td>-0.759**</td>
<td>(0.244)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>VOLATILITY</td>
<td>0.106***</td>
<td>(0.020)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>POLARIZATION P-OPINION</td>
<td>0.689*</td>
<td>(0.294)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UNEMPLOYMENT</td>
<td>0.827**</td>
<td>(0.289)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>INFLATION</td>
<td>-0.109**</td>
<td>(0.053)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GDPPC</td>
<td>0.000</td>
<td>(0.000)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EFFECTIVE # PARTIES</td>
<td>-1.552***</td>
<td>(0.488)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>First Difference Variables (Δ)</th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>VOLATILITY</td>
<td>0.072***</td>
<td>(0.011)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>POLARIZATION P-OPINION</td>
<td>0.046</td>
<td>(0.146)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UNEMPLOYMENT</td>
<td>0.827**</td>
<td>(0.289)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>INFLATION</td>
<td>-0.073*</td>
<td>(0.026)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GDPPC</td>
<td>0.000</td>
<td>(0.000)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EFFECTIVE # PARTIES</td>
<td>-0.827***</td>
<td>(0.122)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

| Constant                        | -1.900 | (-1.161) |
| Country dummies                 | Yes    |          |
| R²                              | 0.926  |          |
| Number of groups                | 15     |          |
| Number of cases                 | 33     |          |

*Note: (*) OLS regression with panel corrected standard errors; standard errors appear in parentheses. Significance levels = *p < .05, **p < .01, ***p < .001.*

More substantively, assuming a 10 percent increase in electoral volatility, it follows a short-run change of 0.727 points in ideological polarization. This estimated magnitude is similar to the changes in polarization in Honduras between 1995 and 1999 or Ecuador between 1996 and 1998.
There are also long-term effects. Although not directly observable in Table 1, the long-term multiplier should be calculated for a complete interpretation of the results. In the long run, a 10 percent increase in volatility renders 1.4 points in elite polarization. A substantial part of the overall long-term impact—precisely the 75.9 percent—takes place after the first election, and the remainder of the effect persists over the course of several subsequent electoral periods as shown in Figure 2.

Second, I follow with the control variables. As for the effect of mass polarization on elite polarization, the results show that elite polarization is positively affected by the preferences of voters, particularly in the long run. In the short run there is also a positive effect, but it is not statistically significant. This finding is important, because it does not allow us to reject the hypothesis that elite polarization is driven from below or, in causal terms, from voters to partisan elites.

Regarding the effect of structural factors such as the country’s socioeconomic performance, the effects are varied across the three variables considered. For instance,

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9 This can be done by dividing the coefficient in t-1 (0.106) by the lagged dependent variable (-0.759), which equals 1.396.
unemployment has a positive and strong effect on elite polarization, both in the short and long run. This means that there is a cumulative effect, as with electoral volatility. More substantively, unemployment affects polarization both in the long and short run, indicating that politicians may make constant use of this macroeconomic variable for political purposes.

The relation with inflation is different from that observed with unemployment, given that both signs are negative. This congruence regarding the direction of the signs (in the short and long run) shows that rather than pushing for an opportunistic elite behavior, inflation reduces polarization. This variable has been a crucial issue for Latin American politicians since the beginning of the structural adjustment that took place during the early nineties and continued over the course of the decade. During this period, inflation plummeted in most Latin American countries, becoming a public good for most parties and individual politicians. Progressively, inflation fell off the agenda of politicizing issues. Regarding economic wealth, measured by GDP per capita, no effect can be reported as neither variable is statistically significant.

Regarding the effective number of parties, the evidence also contradicts previous findings for industrialized democracies as well as more recent work on democratization for Latin America, where the effective number of parties has a positive influence on polarization. The correlation between these variables is negative and does not achieve statistically insignificance (-.018; .884, respectively). Moreover, a simple observation of Figure 1 (above) reveals that countries with a small and stable number of parties, such as El Salvador, have the highest level of polarization in the sample, not to mention cases such as Nicaragua, Chile, and Uruguay. Highly polarized countries tend to have a relatively small number of parties. Beyond Latin America, the United States is a good example of how polarized politics can emerge and become stable over time in a bipartisan environment (Layman, Carsey, and Horowitz 2006; Fiorina, Abrams, and Pope 2005; Abramowitz and Saunders 2008). Table 1 shows a clear negative and statistically significant relationship between the effective number of parties and polarization, both in the short and long run.
CONCLUDING REMARKS

Polarization is frequently identified as one of the main problems for democratic governance. From policy deadlock to democratic instability and breakdown, polarization has always been considered a negative indicator for Latin American countries. However, during the course of the third wave of democratization, most countries in the region have made ostensible democratic progress with increasing levels of ideological polarization among political parties. This discrepancy shows that our knowledge about the origin of polarization and motivations of parties to polarize still requires more systematic evidence. Thus far, there is no theory of polarization but theories of parties and party systems with implications for a theory of polarization. In this vein, this paper has sought to provide an account of the electoral conditions under which polarization is more likely to emerge.

The evidence in this paper holds that electoral volatility is a significant driving force behind the motivations of politicians and parties to seek polarization. Since parties strategize depending on the scope of electoral uncertainty, volatility becomes the main factor to predict the scope of ideological polarization in the party system. Under stable electoral conditions, parties are reluctant to perform programmatic changes because of the high costs of facing internal negotiations and the chances of being punished by core constituents. Yet, volatile contexts reduce the costs that parties impute to a programmatic change involving polarization. Because high volatility threatens party survival, some parties are induced to seek polarization at a low cost. The purpose for these parties seeking polarization under volatile conditions is to differentiate themselves from other parties, which drives them to adopt more radical positions in the policy space.

The implications of ideological polarization are diverse, mainly because most of the literature treats polarization as an independent variable with negative consequences for parties and democracy (Sartori 1976). However, polarization can have positive consequences too. In particular, it can help the process of programmatic structuring of parties and party systems, where these agents do not have clear programmatic differences (see APSA 1950). In many cases, the lack of substantive alternatives may obscure the selection of parties among citizens and complicate the process whereby voters have to evaluate parties’ performance. Thus, at the party-system level, polarization may tend to stabilize party systems by providing ideological cues to voters, especially in contexts with marked electoral volatility.
REFERENCES


