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ABSTRACT

The author aims at uncovering points of convergence and divergence in the relationship between the Catholic Church and society. He begins by analyzing the challenges facing the Church in modern times, using the case of the United States and the traditional political relationship between Church and State in Latin America until the rise of the social-Christian options in the 1960s. He then describes Vatican II, which opened the Church to the influences of modern times. Subsequently, the author explains what he calls the “glorious period” of the Latin American Church, from the conference of bishops in Medellin (1968) to the meeting in Puebla (1979), with the Church’s critique of “social sin,” its option for the poor, and liberation theology. Concurrently, the author shows the contradictory effects of the military regimes in the region. Looking at the relationship between Christians and politics, he analyzes in particular the case of Brazil, later expanding his analysis to Latin America and the world. The author then addresses social participation and politics in ecclesiastical practices and the slow building of democracy in the region, offering methodological criticisms of some static and nonhistorical analyses. He delineates how democracy has challenged the Church and, looking ahead, explores the present dynamism of society, especially the virtuosity of social movements and ecclesiastical communities when facing future transformation. The author ends by describing the current situation in Latin America, highlighting the pressing need for the Church to face issues that are presently frozen (such as sexuality, celibacy, and women as priests), in the hopes of a possible Council process in the future.

RESUMEN

El autor apunta a develar los puntos de convergencia y divergencia en la relación entre la Iglesia Católica y la sociedad. Comienza analizando los desafíos que enfrenta la Iglesia en los tiempos modernos, usando el caso de los Estados Unidos y la tradicional relación política entre la Iglesia y el Estado en América Latina hasta el surgimiento de las opciones social-cristianas en los 1960s. Luego describe el Concilio Vaticano II, el cual abrió la Iglesia a las influencias de los tiempos modernos. A continuación, explica lo que llama el “período glorioso” de la Iglesia Latinoamericana, desde la conferencia de obispos en Medellín (1968) hasta el encuentro de Puebla (1979), con la crítica de la Iglesia acerca del “pecado social”, su opción por los pobres y la teología de la liberación. Al mismo tiempo, el autor muestra los efectos contradictorios de los regímenes militares en la región. Observando la relación entre los cristianos y la política, analiza en particular el caso de Brasil, expandiendo más tarde su análisis a América Latina y el mundo. Se ocupa luego de la participación social y la política en las prácticas eclesiásticas y la lenta construcción de la democracia en la región, ofreciendo críticas metodológicas de algunos análisis estáticos y no históricos. Delinea cómo la democracia ha desafiado a la Iglesia y, mirando hacia adelante, explora el dinamismo presente de la sociedad, especialmente la virtud de los movimientos sociales y las comunidades eclesiásticas cuando enfrentan la transformación futura. El autor culmina describiendo la situación actual de la Iglesia en América Latina, resaltando la necesidad apremiante de que la Iglesia enfrente cuestiones que actualmente están congeladas (tales como la sexualidad, el celibato y las mujeres como sacerdotes) con la esperanza de un posible proceso conciliar conciliatorio en el futuro.
SUMÁRIO

O autor procura descobrir encontros e desencontros nas relações entre a Igreja Católica e a sociedade. Começa analisando as dificuldades da Igreja diante da modernidade, o caso particular dos Estados Unidos e as articulações políticas no passado na região, até as experiências social-cristãs e as opções de sua geração nos anos sessenta. Vai então descrever o momento do Vaticano II, que abriu a Igreja aos tempos modernos. Logo depois chega o que chama de “período glorioso” da Igreja latino-americana, que vai da reunião dos bispos em Medellín (1968) ao encontro de Puebla (1979), com sua crítica ao “pecado social”, suas opções pelo pobre e pela libertação. Em contraponto, indica os efeitos contraditórios dos regimes militares na região. Na relação entre cristãos e política, estuda o caso particular do Brasil, ampliado depois à América Latina e ao mundo. Trata a seguir da participação social e política nas práticas eclesiais e da lenta construção da democracia na região. A esse respeito faz uma crítica metodológica a algumas análises estáticas e a-históricas. Procura ver como a democracia tem desafiado a Igreja e, olhando para adiante, tenta descobrir o atual dinamismo da sociedade, principalmente através dos movimentos sociais, das pastorais sociais e das CEBs, com suas virtualidades diante de futuras transformações. Termina descrevendo a situação atual da América Latina, indicando a urgência, na Igreja, de enfrentar temas no momento congelados (sexualidade, celibato, mulher nos ministérios...), na preparação de um possível processo conciliador futuro.
HISTORICAL BACKGROUND

Society, political powers, and religions do not always have coincident time frames. The British writer Hilaire Belloc, considering the great deal of adjustment between medieval European society and the Roman Catholic Church—the latter present in the evolution of the former—simplified it as “Europe is Faith and Faith is Europe,” a denial of all claims of universality for the Christian religion (or, more specifically, Catholicism). However, it was very difficult for the Catholic Church to assimilate modernity, unlike the evangelical churches that thrived in it.

The profound integration of the Roman Catholic Church with the medieval world—despite tensions and conflicts, struggles between popes and emperors, and theocratic tendencies—hindered the Church’s coexistence with the political spaces that arose with modernity, distinct from the Protestant churches that were established in the new context, and, in part, were influenced by it (the Lutheran Church in Germany, the Calvinist Church in Geneva, the Anglican Church in England). Later, there were problems between the papacy and the new absolute governments (Gallicanism in France, Josephinism in Austria), but, little by little, there was a compromise with the monarchical ancien régime.

As the freedoms of opinion, the press, and the pluralism of political parties emerged, there was resistance, expressed in the Syllabus of Pius IX and in the earlier attitudes of Pius VI to Gregory XVI. Pius IX, elected pope quite young, was received in Rome (1846) amid cheers as a “liberal Pope.” But the process of the unification of Italy, his flight to Gaeta (1848), and the loss of the Papal States led him to an ultramontane attitude.

It befell to the following Pope, Leo XIII, despite also judging himself to be a prisoner in the Vatican, to bring about an opening. A few weeks after publishing his encyclical on the social question, Rerum Novarum, in 1891, he wrote a harsh letter to the monarchist French cardinals urging the episcopate to accept the Third Republic, installed in 1871 in the so-called ralliement. But the following pontificate, of Pius X, was intransigent in the face of modernity and democracy, with the conservative Spanish secretary of state, Merry del Val, and an intolerant extremist group encrusted within the
Holy See leading to what was called the “modernist crisis.” The pontificates of Benedict XV and Pius IX reopened a timid dialogue with the modern industrial world that arose after 1914, and, in 1927, Rome condemned the French monarchist group, Action Française.

I entitled a text I once wrote about Catholicism and democracy “An oblique (enviesado) encounter in history,” an encounter subject to advances and setbacks. The attempts by Father Luigi Sturzo to create a Popular Party in Italy, or those of the French democratic thinker, Marc Sagnier, suffered such vicissitudes. Earlier, Lamennais, Lacordaire, and Rosmini had already had difficulties in this regard. In 1848, a year of intense conflict in Europe and the year Marx published the Communist Manifesto, the position of Frédéric Ozanam was prophetic and anticipatory, in saying that it was time for Rome to repeat what it had done centuries before, when it had abandoned the vermolue (termite-ridden) throne of Byzantium and gone on to make an encounter with the new peoples who had come from the east. Ozanam coined the famous phrase: “Let’s go over to the barbarians” (Passons aux barbares). For him, the working class and the Republic, with historical force behind them, were the new barbarians.

A turning point took place during the Spanish Civil War. Thinkers such as Mauriac, Bernanos and, principally, Jacques Maritain, criticized the “crusade” of General Franco and later, General Pétain’s government in occupied France. Maritain, who at first had been close to the Action Française, faithfully followed Pius XI and wrote important texts such as Rome a parlé (with various authors, 1927), Primauté du Spirituel (1927) and, above all, Humanisme Intégral (True Humanism, 1936). But his going to the United States and, years later, his stay in Princeton, was fundamental. In contact with American thinking, of which I shall speak below, he published two small but illuminating books, Christianity and Democracy (1944) and The Rights of Man and Natural Law (1944). Therein lie the origins of the Christian-Democrat orientation in the post-1945 period.

The irony of these delayed dialogues between the Catholic Church and modernity is that they were held when the situation had already been surpassed. Thus, in 1968, three years after the end of the Second Vatican Council, youth rebellions around the world hinted at the possibility of a vanishing modernity. Fernand Braudel, in France, and Immanuel Wallerstein, in the United States, predicted the exhaustion of a period of long
duration, the 500 years of modern times, and the beginning of a secular transition to a new era. The “Age of Aquarius” claimed youth in 1968. Theodore Roszak analyzed the emergence of a counterculture and the “creative disintegration of industrial society.”

“CATHOLICISM IN AN AGE OF DEMOCRACY”

But it is necessary to go back a little and situate the special and emblematic case of Catholicism in the United States and its relation with modern ideas such as freedom. These themes were the very basis of the founding texts of the new nation and civil and religious freedom. The First Amendment solemnly declared that the legislators should “make no law respecting an establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof.” And in a well-known letter (January 1, 1802), Thomas Jefferson stressed that this declaration was “building a wall of separation between Church & State.” We know that Pope Gregory XVI condemned this separation in the document Mirari Vos (1832). But in the United States there arose a climate of pluralism, of a certain tolerance, and of democratic experimentation.

However, for a long time American thinkers (Dewey, for example) were suspicious of the Catholic Church. Would such a dogmatic institution, as they considered it, be reliable in democratic practice? Catholic claims of affinity with the American founders emphasize the medieval roots of such notions as rule by the people and human rights. The democratic experience had influenced American Catholicism since the birth of the republic. Since the days of the first American bishop, John Carroll—elected bishop of Baltimore by the clergy in 1789—members of the clergy and laity had sought to democratize the government of the local church.

The thinking of the Jesuit John Courtney Murray (1904–1967) about religious freedom and the separation between Church and State would be decisive. It was no easy task. In 1955 his Jesuit superiors, under pressure from Rome, prohibited him from writing about Church-State relations. A little earlier, in France, the theologians Yves Congar and Henri de Lubac were also silenced, and in the same year, the French Jesuit Pierre Teilhard de Chardin died in the United States, without having been able to have his writings published while he was alive. However, soon after, in the Second Vatican Council (1962–1965), Murray, Congar, and de Lubac would be key figures as
consultants, and the text about religious freedom of the Council had as one of its principal
ghostwriters John Murray.\textsuperscript{14} In addition to Maritain, there was also the presence in the
American debate of other Europeans exiled during World War II.\textsuperscript{15}

**DEMOCRACY IN THE GLORIOUS THIRTY YEARS**

At the international level, a thaw had already begun. Two “Christmas Messages”
from Pius XII during the Second World War approved democracy as an acceptable
political practice. Many asked themselves if there was not a certain political opportunism
in these messages, when the western democracies—of course with Soviet support—were
defeating the Fascists and Nazi totalitarianism.

It is worth noting the presence of Catholic politicians (Alcides de Gasperi,
Amintori Fanfani, and Aldo Moro in Italy and Konrad Adenauer in Germany) on the
political scene and in the very construction of Europe during this period starting in 1945.
In France, George Bidault, in his first phase, was a Christian Democratic leader
(Mouvement Républicain Populaire, or MRP) and de Gaulle, always unclassifiable, was a
strong political leader of Catholic affiliation.

The Vatican II document *Gaudium et Spes* marks an encounter of the Church with
the modern world and its freedoms and democracy with its reading of the new “signs of
the times.” It states, “Praise is deserved for the conduct of those nations in which the
greater part of the citizens participate in public life with true freedom.”\textsuperscript{16}

**A LATIN AMERICA OF CONSERVATIVE ROOTS**

In Latin America, the position of the Church vis-à-vis the democratic process is
quite different from that in the United States and even from that in some European
countries; it may have some affinities with the Spanish and Portuguese cases in parts of
the 20th century. As established in the colonies of the New World, the Church was linked
to the state by the Portuguese *padroado*\textsuperscript{17} or by the Spanish throne-altar alliance.

With Latin American independence, the conservative and liberal party labels were
imported under English influence and did not necessarily express Latin America’s real
ideological differences. Catholics were normally inclined towards the conservatives. But,
to be precise, even the liberal movements were more oligarchic than democratic. The conservative position was particularly extreme in Ecuador, with Gabriel García Moreno, its Catholic president, and in Colombia, shaken by decades of violence. In Mexico, Catholics supported the Emperor Maximilian and were penalized by the reforms of Benito Juárez; in the 20th century, there came the revolt of the cristeros (Catholic peasant rebels) and the anti-Catholic legislation of the Elias Plutarco Calles government. In Argentina, an intransigent Catholicism developed, which gained power with the coup d’état of General Uriburu in 1930 (General Ongania’s 1966 coup had some similarities). In Brazil in 1932, part of the episcopate, clerics, and laity sympathized with the Ação Integralista Brasileira (Brazilian Integralist Action), created by the Catholic writer Plínio Salgado, who sympathized with Portuguese Salazarism and was a critic of the democratic process and of what he called Protestant “Americanism,” opting instead for an authoritarian “integral state.” The young Fr. Hélder Câmara was the leader of the movement in the Northeast. The national president of Catholic Action, Alceu Amoroso Lima, the most eminent layman in the country, reached the point of suggesting that Catholics join the integralism movement. However, like Hélder Câmara and thanks to the influence of Jacques Maritain, he soon regretted it, and in his following books, he adopted democratic proposals.

The democratic experience being related to the Anglo-Saxon countries of Protestant origin aroused suspicions in a part of the Catholic world sympathetic to Catholic politicians such as the stiff Portuguese Salazar, the violent and intolerant Spanish caudillos, or, later, the senile Maréchal Pétain. The Lateran Treaty between the Holy See and Mussolini, in 1927, brought sympathy for fascism. But, as in the case of Amoroso Lima in Brazil, there was also a gradual evolution in other countries. Thus, in Argentina, Msgr. Franceschi, editor of the magazine Criterio, distanced himself little by little from Francoism.

**SOCIAL-CHRISTIAN EXPERIENCES**

In Chile, the evolution took place in conservative youth, such as Bernardo Leighton and Eduardo Frei Montalva, who created their own party, the Falange. The name, however, indicated a certain ambiguity of origin. One of the founders, Manuel
Garretón, had manifested sympathies with the Spanish Falange. But soon their leaders would distance themselves from the Spanish party and it was the custom to refer to the “Falange, pero...” (Falange, but not in the Spanish sense). Later, it would be transformed into the Partido Demócrata Cristiano (Christian Democratic Party, or PDC).

Indeed, in Montevideo after World War II, leaders from various countries—Argentina, Uruguay, Brazil, and Venezuela—met to think about the structuring of a continental Christian-Democrat movement resembling those which arose in Europe. The strongest experiences were those in Chile and in Venezuela, where COPEI was formed. In Mexico, the Catholics would concentrate principally on the Partido de Acción Nacional (National Action Party, or PAN). In countries like Brazil and Argentina, the Christian presence would be observed in various parties, even if Christian Democratic parties (PDCs) existed at certain times. In Argentina, the relation of the Catholics to Peronism was extremely complex and mutable. In Brazil, a PDC of lesser significance was created, founded by a priest, Arruda Câmara, and transformed later by laymen who had come from Catholic Action: André Franco Montoro, Paulo de Tarso dos Santos, and Plínio de Arruda Sampaio.

Members of my generation, who came from Catholic University Youth (Juventude Universitária Católica, or JUC), had another influence distinct from that of Maritain and the Christian Democrats in the proposal of the Jesuit philosopher Henrique C. de Lima Vaz and the French thinker Emmanuel Mounier for a communitarian personalism and a democratic socialism as a political option. In 1962, a movement was created for this current, Ação Popular (Popular Action, or AP), which in its founding document (documento base) criticized single-party socialist regimes. After the 1964 coup d’état this movement started, in clandestinity during the military regime, to rid itself of some of its Christian founders, including the author of this paper; and unfortunately it was transformed into an unoriginal, authoritarian Maoist movement.

The important point to note is that the most significant Catholic activists headed gradually towards an explicit acceptance of democratic principles. This had repercussions on the episcopates, even if they maintained traditionalist and integralist pockets, such as the Tacuara group in Argentina or the Brazilian Tradição, Família e Propriedade (Tradition, Family and Property, or TFP), with two bishops, some laymen, and activity in
other countries. Today there are new groups such as the Legionarios de Cristo (Legionnaires of Christ).

**LATIN AMERICA AND VATICAN II: FROM MEDELLÍN TO PUEBLA**

After the end of the Second Vatican Council, Latin American bishops Msgr. Hélder Câmara, from Brazil, and Msgr. Manuel Larraín, from Chile, envisaged the application of the Vatican II results to their region, starting the preparations for the Medellín meeting of bishops. One year before (1967) in Buga, Colombia, two meetings of the Latin American Episcopal Council (CELAM) on the university and education criticized the hegemonic system and, in the footsteps of Paulo Freire’s first book, *Educação como prática da liberdade*, proposed an education for liberation. In the same tone, Medellín (1968) denounced the structures of domination—the “social sin”—introduced the poor as the protagonist, and insisted on the idea of liberation. It is worth noting how meaningful the year of the meeting, 1968, is: the year of youth rebellion, of the counterculture, and of social critique. Throughout the next decade and in the meeting of the Latin American bishops in Puebla (1979) those ideas were confirmed and the Assembly approved the “preferred option for the poor” and their “evangelizing dynamism.” It was no longer an attempt at dialoguing with a questionable modernity, but rather a critical position originating on the periphery. Latin America was witnessing an adjustment between the social and ecclesial analyses with regard to social justice issues.

But if 1968 was the year of accord in the criticism of society, the university, and the Church, it was also the year the encyclical *Humanae Vitae* on reproductive rights was published. In it, Pope Paul VI, adopting the minority position of the working group formed to study the issue, froze the debate and declared a traditional position against the use of contraceptives and other matters of sexuality in general. This had serious consequences in the life of the national Churches in countries like the Netherlands and the United States and even in Latin America, where open-minded positions on social issues had to co-exist with strict prescriptions regarding interpersonal ethics. An Italian author pointed out the appearance of a worrisome “*scisma sommerso*” (underground
rupture). A true schizophrenia was established between doctrinal precepts and a concrete, more flexible behavior in practice.

From 1968 to 1979 the Latin American Church lived through what we could call a “glorious decade,” enjoying creative ecclesial practices in several countries. There were, however, some cases of traditional positions. In 1972 CELAM elected the Colombian bishop Alfonso López Trujillo as Secretary General and became a forum of conservative tendencies. The situation also changed in the following decade at the international level. John Paul II’s papacy started just before the Puebla meeting and would soon be characterized by the strong direct intervention of the Pope into international political life through a growing centralization and doctrinal conservatism—despite the fact that he was opposed to the political participation of the clergy in Nicaragua. The next meeting of the Latin American episcopate, in Santo Domingo in 1992, was tightly controlled by the Curia Romana. While at Puebla it had been possible to confront the pressure from the top and from CELAM’s leaders, at this last meeting freedom of speech was largely limited. The final document lacked the impact of the two previous ones, even if it included interesting declarations dealing with enculturation, and an expressive chapter on “human promotion.” This was the fruit of persistent work by Msgr. Luciano Mendes de Almeida, one of the editors who had participated in the drafting of the Puebla document.

The often vague and generic interventions of the bishops at the Synod of the Americas, held in Rome in 1997, should be analyzed in comparison with some of the more expressive manifestations of the European Synod (Cardinal Martini, Cardinal Daneels, and the Superior of the Dominicans), or with those of the Asian and Oceanian Synods. John Paul II’s post-synod document Ecclesia in America, although having suggestive paragraphs, has not matched the impact of Puebla or of some Medellín documents. Thus, the political presence of the Church on the Latin American scene has lost significance in recent years. A new meeting of Latin American bishops is to be held in 2007 at Aparecida do Norte, Brazil. Will it come back to the spirit and creativity of Medellín and Puebla or be only another meeting, controlled and prudent?
CONTRADICTORY EFFECTS OF THE MILITARY REGIMES

The military regimes in Brazil (1964–1985) and Chile (1973–1988) and the successive coups d'état in Argentina, starting in 1966, and even in the traditionally liberal Uruguay, were a challenge testing the relationship of the Catholic Church to democratic processes; they contributed, without realizing it, to the affirmation of a democratic trend in the Church.

At the time of the military takeover in Brazil on April 1, 1964, numbers of Catholic laity committed to the processes of popular culture and rural syndicalization were imprisoned, went into exile, or remained in semi-hiding, including the leaders of Catholic Action and the Movimento de Educação de Base (Basic Education Movement, or MEB). However, other Catholics participated in the first military government (in the Ministry of Justice and Agrarian Policy Institute) and even in the organs of repression. The episcopate, which one year before had made a strong pronouncement for social reforms (“Our order is still rife with the heavy burden of capitalist tradition”), days after the coup d'état, actually greeted it ambiguously. In the words of one author, the Church was “on a slack rope” (na corda bamba).

But, soon afterwards, the military went after laymen and laywomen, priests and other religious men, nuns, and bishops in Recife, Crateús, Volta Redonda, São Félix do Araguaia, Uberaba, and Goiás. The Justice and Peace Commissions, especially the one in São Paulo, began to denounce the repression, torture, and disappearance of prisoners, with the brave attitude of Cardinal Paulo Evaristo Arns and bishops such as Waldyr Calheiros, Antonio Fragoso, Tomás Balduíno, and Pedro Casaldáliga. In this last case, sectors of the government attempted to obtain Casaldáliga’s expulsion from the country for being Spanish. Militants such as Santos Dias or Margarida Alves and priests such as Henrique Neto and Josimo and João Bosco Bournier were murdered. The Italian priest Vito Miracapillo was expelled from the country. A bishop known for his acute analysis, the Benedictine Msgr. Cândido Padim, wrote a criticism of the military doctrine of national security, denouncing its anti-evangelical and anti-democratic roots.

The Conference of Brazilian Bishops (CNBB) issued two important declarations during the military regime stressing the importance of democracy: Christian demands of a political order (1978) and Christian reflection on the political situation (1981). In the
re-democratization period, the Conference returned to the theme: *For a new constitutional order* (1985), *Ethical demands in a democratic order* (1989), *Ethics, person and the society* (1993). The Brazilian Church was practically the only space of liberty during the military regime, “the voice of the voiceless,” as Msgr. Hélder Câmara put it.

The National Conference of Bishops also denounced the practice of torture in one of its meetings and acted strongly against the repression through its Commissions for Justice and Peace. At the same time, the CNBB strived to establish a dialogue with the military, by means of a “bipartite commission.” In those years the Grassroots Ecclesial Communities (CEBs) developed, together with several social pastorals (the Pastoral Commission on Land, the Worker’s Pastoral, the Indianist Missionary Council).

In Chile, the episcopate was also hesitant at first to react to the military takeover, perhaps as a result of the suspicion of the Salvador Allende government by many of their members. However, soon after, principally by means of the Vicaria de la Solidaridad, its refuges (sanctuaries), its declarations, and the valiant and ecumenic presence of priests, pastors, laity, or even bishops like Msgr. Ariztía, there was a strong testimony of resistance to the anti-democratic and repressive processes. A subsequent book, *Iglesia y dictadura*, illustrates the taking of this position.

However, in neighboring Argentina, another book with the same title, *Iglesia y dictadura*, published in the same year, showed the complicity of a good part of the episcopate (and of the nuncio) with the regime and denounced their terrible silence. It is true that there were bishops who confronted the government, such as Jerónimo Podestá (Avellaneda), Miguel Hesayne (Viedma), Jorge Novak (Quilmes), Jaime de Nevares (Neuquéñ) and one of them, Msgr. Angelelli, possibly was killed by the forces of repression. Years later, in 2000, the Argentine episcopate issued opinions on the return to democracy, citizen participation, and human rights and formulated an appeal for pardon.

**CHRISTIANS AND POLITICS: THE BRAZILIAN CASE**

Up to the middle of the 1940s, when delving into the world of politics, the main interest of the Church centered on the institution’s corporate interests: fighting divorce,
defending the Catholic schools and religious teaching in public schools, keeping chaplains in the army, even maintaining the name of God in the preamble to the Constitution (a demand in Brazil in 1934). Candidates to electoral positions were judged, supported, or rejected in accordance with their stances vis-à-vis these issues.

Starting in the 1950s, after declarations by Brazilian bishops from the northeast and the Amazon region, the main concern focused on the country’s social problems. The creation of the Agency for the Development of the Northeast (SUDENE) by President Kubitschek followed a suggestion made by the bishops, as he himself said. In 1962 and 1963 (exactly one year before the coup) statements by the Central Commission of the CNBB denounced the state of social injustice and demanded political reforms.50 This issue was revisited in 2002 through the document *Evangelical and ethical demands for the elimination of misery and hunger. Food—a gift of God and everyone’s right* (CNBB doc. no. 69). Later in the same year, the *National joint effort (“mutirão”) for the elimination of misery and hunger* was launched. It is important to mention that the launching of this program by the CNBB in 2002 preceded by one year the “Zero hunger” program created in 2003 by Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva’s administration.

During the post-authoritarian period the Brazilian Church consistently criticized the economic policies of the different administrations. The February 1996 declaration urged: “stop sacrificing lives in order to save the economic plans.”51 Recently, during President Lula’s administration, the conjunctural review prepared by specialists at the CNBB’s meetings insisted on the need for a change in the economic policies. A document issued on August 26, 2003 by sociologist Pedro Ribeiro de Oliveira stated: “The macroeconomic indicators are healthy, while the social indicators suffer from chronic anemia. Unemployment is up and the workers daily income is down.” The president of the CNBB, Msgr. Geraldo Majella Agnelo, declared at a press conference on August 29 that the review was not an official document of the CNBB, but the work of experts that advised the institution, and added: “The evidence is so clear that we are all in agreement.”52

A certain oscillation is noted in Church circles with regard to Lula’s administration. On the one hand, there is a flowing dialogue between the Church and the state. For the first time a president of the Republic was present at the Bishops General
Assembly (May 1, 2003) and his candid and straightforward speech was received with approval. Some sectors of the social pastorals and some bishops, however, are restless about the administration’s continuance of an economic policy still considered “neoliberal.” They call also for a more aggressive social policy, especially with regard to land reform. During the CNBB General Assembly in 2003, the author of this text made a presentation titled *The Christian Churches and Politics* and, at the end of the debates, indicated that, in his opinion, two things must be overcome: the fear of change that some have and the impatience of others who want fast and drastic changes in issues that involve ponderous pressures and previous commitments. Ecclesial circles may swing undecided between the frightened prudence of some and a certain voluntarism or abstract moralism of others.

**THE PROBLEM IN LATIN AMERICA AND IN THE WORLD**

The Argentine episcopate, which remained silent during the military regime, as indicated above, has now issued opinions on the return to democracy, citizen participation, and human rights and formulated an appeal for pardon. The Chilean episcopate, which was more active during the authoritarian period, insists on reconciliation and affirms the need to investigate violations of human rights that occurred in the past.

In the last several years, the Latin American Episcopal Conference (CELAM) has organized a discussion on globalization. The final document had different versions, after traveling through several working groups, and was published on March 5, 2003. It points to a deep, epochal change, advances in some sectors (e.g., technology and women’s participation), but also to a worsening in the area of social exclusion. There is an important mention of the “world of the impoverished, those considered as non-persons, those that the system sees as non-viable.” The document is much more cautious when dealing with marriage, the family, and interpersonal ethics. As a matter of fact, this contradiction between the social analysis and individual behavior permeates declarations by the Latin American Church and the Catholic Church in general.

Some Catholic Church documents, such as the encyclical *Centesimus Annus* (1991), already show an opening on the issue of ecology, which is much easier to deal
with than the issue of sexuality. Such discussion of ecology is present in the CELAM paper on globalization. But the most vigorous discussion on this topic is found in the theological analysis of Leonardo Boff and in the poetic work of Ernesto Cardenal. As a matter of fact, it is probably through concrete practices and theological work that the new direction of the Latin American Church will be plotted, in spite of a certain repressive official attitude towards a more liberated and daring way of thinking.

There is a misconstrued idea that, after its high point in the 1970s, liberation theology would experience a decline. This is the same trend of thought that sees the past in a simplified way and cannot untangle the complexity of a contradictory present. Not only are classic authors such as Gustavo Gutiérrez and Leonardo Boff constantly being re-read, but there is also a broad array of new theologians coming to life—many women and some laypersons—producing abundant literature. The area of biblical studies is extremely rich in the Catholic, Lutheran, and Methodist Churches, among others. In Brazil, the Center for Biblical Studies (CEBI) has groups disseminated all over the country, counting on young experts and a vast production of studies and didactic materials.

SOCIAL AND POLITICAL PARTICIPATION IN ECCLESIAL PRACTICE

It is necessary to make a distinction between formal declarations about a democratic process and concrete positions towards it. An analysis about religion and politics at the world level by Pippa Norris and Ronald Inglehart also makes a distinction between support for the ideals of democracy and evaluations of the actual performance of democracy. Applying factorial analysis to 74 countries, the authors conclude that Brazilians (close behind Poles and Tanzanians), “proved extremely critical of the way that democracy worked in practice, although showing greater support for democratic ideals.”

But in order to see the Catholic Church’s relationship with democracy in the context of each country, it is also necessary to make a distinction between the Church as an institution, with its governing instruments (the ecclesiastic world, declarations by bishops) and, to use the terms of the Second Vatican Council, the Church as “people of
God,” the community of faithful, or believers (the broader ecclesial world, including all the baptized). In this case, we have to shift from formal declarations to the world of concrete practices. \(^{60}\)

It is at this last level that we may more exactly assess the Catholic Church and its experience of freedom and democracy. For a number of decades, as a researcher and as an advisor, I have accompanied the process of the Catholic Church in Brazil, through its social pastoral and its grassroots ecclesial base communities (CEBs). One of the national meetings of the latter, the VII Interecclesial of Trindade (Goiânia), in 1986, dealt with the theme of religion and politics. The paper that I published in this regard was titled “The slow and painful learning of democratic practice.” My aim was to see how the CEBs viewed the democratic process and how they participated in it. \(^{61}\)

Democratic practice is not confined to affiliation with a political party, to voting in elections, or to accompanying the performance of elected representatives. In addition to representative democracy, there is a participative democracy, which implies everyday action and intervention in public life by civil society. This participation in society is also an educative process for more direct actions in political society and in the state apparatus. In fact, an author from the United States says quite clearly: “… the very existence of elections does not of itself testify to the vibrancy of democratic life. To test for democracy, it makes much more sense to ask about the health of the mediating structures in society that encourage citizens to participate in the formation of public opinion, to examine the quality of public discourse, and to scrutinize the accountability of leadership to the collective voice of those they serve.” \(^{62}\)

Actions showing the presence of Christians in public life keep on appearing in Brazil, through the demands and pressures of social movements, in municipal health or infancy and youth councils, in the processes of participative budgeting launched in various municipalities. There is, therefore, a democratic practice in progress and under development. A significant part of the leadership of the Movimento dos Trabalhadores Rurais sem Terra (Movement of Landless Rural Workers, or MST) has stemmed from the youth pastoral of the Catholic Church. \(^{63}\)

It has always been easier for the Catholic Church to plan policies for the traditional rural sector, since the modern problems of the urban sector are more difficult
to address. The Center for Religious Statistics and Social Concern (CERIS) reviewed the issue in its survey *Challenges to Catholicism in the City*.64 The evangelical churches operate in the cities while Pentecostal groups feel more at ease and have been more active and aggressive on the peripheries of the popular sectors of the big cities. Richard Shaull, a brilliant and insightful analyst who died some years ago, knew Brazil well. His desire was to put together the findings of liberation theology and new Pentecostal trends of a religion of the Spirit to constitute what could become the route for a new spirituality in the 21st century.65

The Catholic Church has lost the privileged position of exclusive actor it enjoyed in the past. Now it has to live in a secularized world, together with a growing number of other religions, mainly Pentecostal and neo-Pentecostal.

And here we have a contradiction: while in the last several decades the Catholic Church and the historic evangelical churches have made an effort to avoid using politics as a tool for their corporate institutional endeavors, some Pentecostal churches use religion in politics and politics as a tool for religion. During the 2002 elections in Brazil, presidential candidate Anthony Garotinho openly used his condition as a member of an evangelical group to seek votes. His wife, elected governor of the State of Rio de Janeiro, displayed the same utilitarian attitude. But another candidate for state governor in Rio—Benedita da Silva, of the Workers Party (Partido dos Trabalhadores, or PT)—although belonging to the same Presbyterian Church as the two other candidates, behaved differently, separating her religious beliefs from her political affiliation. In Guatemala and in other countries in the region there were also demonstrations of the use of personal beliefs in politics. In spite of some hasty analyses of secularization, we cannot confirm that the religious factor has exited the political arena. It is still present and relevant, even if no longer the most important actor.66

Some years ago Leonardo Boff wrote an intriguing book, *Church, Charisma and Power*,67 which was amply criticized in the official circles of the Church and won him legal proceedings at the Congregation for the Doctrine of the Faith, in Rome. For this author, there is a pendular ambivalence between freedom of speech and criticism and a propensity to the exertion of power—either in internal authority or the exercise of power in society. Msgr. Hélder Câmara, who was influential on the political scene in the fifties
and beginning of the sixties, criticized the power in the mid-sixties and throughout the next decades. He was the personification of this contradiction. His best biography has the subtitle: “Between the Power and the Prophecy.”

With regard to the visibility of the Church by the public and in circles of political power, a strengthening of the episcopate occurred in recent years. In the past, Catholic Action in some countries as well as prominent laymen such as Alceu Amoroso Lima of Brazil were responsible for expressing the political position of the Church. In the last several decades this became more centralized in CELAM, at the continental level, and in the National Conference of Bishops. There was also some friction between the bishops’ organization and its religious counterpart, the Latin American Conference of Religious (CLAR). Thus, when, beginning in 1972 with the election of Lopez Trujillo, CELAM adopted a conservative posture, CLAR started to welcome more advanced counselors and theologians, until it was censored and suffered Rome’s intervention.

The national conferences, themselves, have endured strained relations with the Holy See and the Apostolic Nuncios, who ambiguously accumulated diplomatic and ecclesiastic functions. The most conspicuous case was the Mexican nuncio Prigione, who had a strong influence in PRI administrations and frequently clashed with sectors of the local episcopate.

A variety of situations are found in the Latin American countries. In Nicaragua, the progressive sectors clustered in the “popular church,” making it easy for the more conservative official sectors to isolate them and denounce them as a parallel church. In Brazil, the reform sectors avoided this separatist attitude and, during the CNBB elections, made a broad alliance with the moderate wing and left the conservatives alone. This alliance repeatedly won the body’s elections as a whole, with just one exception. During the last several decades, this allowed approval of collective guidelines that superseded the individual attitudes of more traditional sectors of the episcopate.

In the sixties and seventies Latin America was endowed with a generation of bishops of topmost influence in social and ecclesial fields: Hélder Câmara and Cardinal Paulo Evaristo Arns in Brazil, Manuel Larraín and Cardinal Raúl Silva Henríquez in Chile, Leonidas Proaño in Ecuador, Sergio Mendes Arceo and Samuel Ruiz in Mexico, and others. Several of them became “bishops emeritus” and thus gained positions of more
freedom to better manifest a critical attitude. In Brazil, this can be felt in declarations and texts by bishops Cardinal Arns, Antonio Fragoso, Waldyr Calheiros, José Maria Pires, and Tomás Balduíno—the last one currently president of the Pastoral Land Commission (CPT) and very prominent because of his aggressive political attitude with regard to land reform and against the Free Trade Agreement of the Americas. In Chile, Msgr. Carlos González, the former bishop of Talca who succeeded Manuel Larraín, wrote a candid analysis of the Church. Repeated reports indicate that conservative priests have been the preferred choice in recent nominations to the episcopate. But we must not forget that many of the innovative bishops were conservative in the beginning, the most outstanding example being Msgr. Oscar Romero, in San Salvador. There is now a new generation of bishops who are markedly active in the pastoral renewal.

There was also criticism about the fact that the Church publicly insists on participation in society and democracy but internally maintains an authoritarian stance. In consonance with society’s cultural and sociopolitical trends, many Church issues have been depoliticized in recent years, with a simultaneous, growing assertion of inner spirituality and more individual pastoral action. Charismatic movements are growing and in the Catholic Church and in some episcopates in particular, such as the Peruvian one, the presence of Opus Dei, of Sodalitium, and of the Focolari is strongly felt. It would be incorrect, however, to consider that we are witnessing a decline of the CEBs and of the more active social pastorals. I have reiterated that we are not in a zero-sum game, where some grow in detriment of the others. Even with less intense growth and a less conspicuous media presence, the CEBs and the social pastorals stay present and relevant. In the Brazilian case, the Pastoral Land Commission, the Indianist Missionary Council (CIMI), the youth pastorals, and a reinvigorated and dynamic Caritas are good examples of this.

**THE SLOW CONSTRUCTION OF LATIN AMERICAN DEMOCRACY**

In Brazil, as indicated, we had a fragile process, “slow and painful,” with advances between 1930 and 1934, an interruption from 1937 to 1945, resurgence from 1946 to 1963, a new abrupt interruption from 1964 to 1983, a “slow, gradual” reopening, in the words of a leader of the last military regime, from 1984 to 2002, and from 2003
until today, a new climate, still undefined, rated somewhere between promising and timid. How may one follow it with acuity and perspicacity without needing to fall into classifications that freeze and immobilize?

We have the presence, not only of the institutional Church with its declarations or taking of heterogeneous positions, in accordance with different tendencies in the episcopate, but actions principally taken within the ecclesial community, so as to return to the distinction between the ecclesiastic (the space of the clerics) and the ecclesial (the people of god). But, even among the faithful, there is a diversity of practices. The social pastorals (the Pastoral Land Commission, the Indigenous Missionary Council, those pertaining to youth, students, workers, children, health, fishermen, “street-dwellers” [homeless] or “outcast women” [prostitutes]) are present in many areas of decision-making processes in society and have directly influenced public policy. Take the cases of the Statute of the Child and the Adolescent, and that of the indigenous communities, in the elaboration of the Constitution of 1988, where there was strong pressure from the pastoral movements. Also, the Justice and Peace Commission, linked to the CNBB, gathered one million signatures for a popular initiative, transformed into Law 9840/99, to penalize electoral corruption. From the pastorals, as indicated above, there emerged the leadership of social movements (of women, the young, landless, homeless) and of political parties. One of the various sectors that created the Workers Party comes from the social pastoral movement and the CEBs. In view of analyses that “announced the death” of the latter, in 2000 I wrote a paper based on my observations in the field: “The CEBs are doing just fine, thanks” (As CEBs vão indo bem, obrigado).

There are, of course, small integrist and authoritarian groups such as TFP (Tradition, Family and Property), but they are marginal. In the last few years, other Church practices from new movements supported from Rome—and which are actually those that have grown most—generally give little attention to the social and political processes, frequently being restricted to a spirituality and an action more individual and intimist. But we need to be careful about simplifications and generalizations. The growing Catholic Charismatic Movement, for example, when it gives responsibility and initiative to its lay members in the Church (and frequently in society too), could be a space for socialization of a certain kind of participation and for learning to take
responsibility. And this may be a beginning that will lead eventually to the practice of citizenship.  

**A METHODOLOGICAL DIGRESSION**

At this point, I wish to draw aside for a rapid theoretical consideration. I referred earlier to “the slow and painful learning of democratic practice.” Democracy is not a fact given once and for all, simply absent or present, but a continuous creation, conquered and, at times, in regression. I have some difficulty with political science analyses that often seem to be static and unchanging, where countries are classified as democratic and nondemocratic, including at times intermediate categories of restricted democracy or semi-democracy. These categories are generally constructed by the choice of some variables (at times, arbitrary, at others implicitly or explicitly ideological and frequently tautological, where the selection leads compellingly to the desired or expected result). I have the impression that it is heuristically more advantageous—and less banal or predictable—to use a historical analysis that takes into account processes under development, always ambiguous and contradictory, with advances, retreats, and partial outcomes.

In this sense, the stimulating analyses of democratic transition processes conducted by Robert Fishman in relation to Portugal and Spain are extremely useful and elucidative for the Latin American cases. Democracy is not a fact that is given or concluded, but a construction that is never completed. Therefore, there are relevant studies in Latin America on transition processes, historical and comparative perspectives, and on “advances and setbacks.”

Indeed, merely classifying some western countries as democratic, without an analysis of their contradictions and deadlocks, could lead to suspicion that they are being held up as possible models and/or goals for the others. Besides this, superficial treatment is given to the incomplete nature of their democracies: the persistence of nondemocratic practices in their interiors, or even processes of regression. Recent electoral processes in the United States have raised some question marks. For many years, since his *American Power and the New Mandarins* (1971), Noam Chomsky has been criticizing a number of soi-disant democracies. He stresses the limits of democracy in the US and denounces
attempts to reduce it even further. In 1975, at the request of Brzezinski, authors such as Huntington, Crozier, and Watanuki prepared a study for the Trilateral Commission that affirms that there was excessive participation of the population in the United States and that “some problems in governing arise from excess of democracy…. Greater moderation in democracy is necessary.” Then they proposed a “new” democracy, “viable,” “restricted,” or “governable.” Thus, there are many degrees of democracy and several suggestions to achieve it or to constrain it, even in the countries that are classified as so-called “post-industrial” and only apparently free of authoritarian temptations. In fact, it was the cultured and sophisticated Germany of Weimar that gave rise to the insanity of Nazism. Therefore, we cannot forget that a democratic process is not neutral but value-oriented, with ethical choices.

DEMOCRACY CHALLENGING THE CHURCH

This latter reflection leads to a final point on this relationship between the Catholic Church and citizen participation. The Catholic Church over the last few years, in its documents and by the action of its faithful, has encouraged citizenship and democracy in society. At the same time, it is maintained as a hierarchical institution with limited participation of the laity and especially of women (included here are nuns and members of secular institutes). The Catholics who act in politics and society to build democracy, upon returning to the Church, are naturally compelled to begin to demand a more active presence in the decision-making instruments of the Church itself. I have studied this type of crisis in Catholic Action youth movements in France and in Canada (in the 1950s and 1960s) and in Brazil (between 1964 and 1968). The most emblematic case was the crisis and extinction of the Brazilian JUC (made up of college students), which took place, paradoxically, in 1968, on the eve of youth rebellions around the world. Geneviève Hervieu-Léger, analyzing the crisis of the French JEC (Jeunesses Étudiantes Catholiques, or Catholic Student Youth—high school and college age), indicated that the criticism of society (e.g., the war in Algeria, de Gaulle's centralism) led to criticism of the Church itself and its centralized structures.

Recently, a book about the profound crisis in the Catholic Church in the United States, by David Gibson, indicated that the way out of the same is greater internal
democracy and participation of the faithful. One of the chapters is titled “Revolution from Below: We the People of God.” The book’s subtitle is expressive, too: How the Faithful Are Shaping a New American Catholicism. Another book in the same year, by Peter Steinfels—who is rather severe about the Church in his country, where he sees “a people adrift”—also sees the solution in a more participatory Church, where lay people practice citizenship and share responsibility. Paul Lakeland says the same in his book, The Liberation of the Laity: “While the church is not quite a secular democracy, many of the signs of health are common to both communities. To be specific, we should test the health of the ecclesial community in ways analogous to those we use to examine the health of the body politic. A healthy church will possess lively mediating structures, a strong public forum of ideas...”

The need for citizenship, participation, and democracy is not raised with impunity without bringing it into other ambits of life (the gender dimension, the family, school, religion). Democracy, in the contemporary historical conscience, goes on being consolidated as a universal value. The five World Social Forums (four in Porto Alegre and one in Mumbai) were exercises of participation, citizenship, and democracy at the planetary level. At the last one, in January 2005, around 110,000 participants, gathered from the whole world to debate in hundreds of workshops, seminars, and laboratories, indicating that other worlds, more democratic and participative, are already becoming possible, despite the violence, wars, and fundamentalism in the opposite direction. And one of the spaces at the Forum was that of religion and spirituality, where the Catholic world made itself present. In fact, one of the three creators of the World Social Forum, Francisco Whitaker Ferreira, was Executive Secretary of the National Commission for Justice and Peace, set up by the CNBB.

LOOKING AHEAD

In my writings in the last several years I have stressed the great dynamism of society in Latin America, not always perceived by the media and by the studies of social scientists. There is a fixation on the past as an ideal without contradictions and the inability to discover the potentiality and complexity of something new or emergent. We can see a recurrent affirmation throughout the decades of the dynamism of social
movements in the past and a reflux in the present. This is also what is happening within the Church. There is a multiplicity of dynamic experiences at the ecclesial base, with or without the support of the authorities, experiences which might generate future institutional change.

Let me draw a hypothetical parallel with the Church of the fifties, half a century ago, the era of the centralizing pontificate of Pius XII and the cult of the papal personality. Political positions had been immobilized in 1948, when voting for communist candidates in Italy was prohibited. Soon after that came the end of the worker-priest experience in France and the encyclical *Humani Generis* (1950) sent many theologians into an “obliging silence” (de Lubac, Congar, Chenu). But the specialized Catholic Action movements in France, Canada, and Brazil, the liturgical renewal, and the experiences of “progressive Catholics” were emerging. Following that came what was considered a time of transition, with an elderly, good-natured, and charming pope. Suddenly all were amazed when John XXIII criticized the prophets of pessimism and summoned a Council as an “unexpected spring blossom.”

Today there are many restricted issues in the area of sexuality and reproductive behavior, celibacy of the clergy, and access of women to the various ecclesiastic ministries. In spite of some overtures, such as that of John Paul II at Assisi, the ecumenical and interreligious exchanges are frustrated by manifestations like the Eucharistic document of the same pope. Some voices have been heard suggesting a new Council, but at the moment it seems premature in view of the prevailing ecclesiastic conditions. However, a conciliar process must be prepared. The most important thing is the continuance of an ecclesial and pastoral practice, which is experimental and renewing, silent, subversive, and patient, steadily staying ahead of today’s institutional politics, and perhaps preparing, underground, surprises for tomorrow.

In the Church today, there is therefore a growing demand to reopen a debate on themes noted above that had remained frozen, from sexuality, participation of women in the religious ministries, imposed celibacy of the clergy, ecumenism, interreligious dialogue, and, especially, shared participation, which is nothing other than democratic ecclesial practice. Who knows, this may form part of a long conciliar process in a future pontificate, while probably not in that of Benedict XVI. If the Church of the second
millennium was a Church with power concentrated in the clergy, in this the third, little by little, a Church may arise with the active and decisory presence of all the faithful.

New social and political practices are taking place in Latin America. Recent elections signal different patterns from the seventies and even from the nineties. The arrival to power of Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva in Brazil, Nestor Kirchner in Argentina, Tabaré Vázquez in Uruguay, Hugo Chávez in Venezuela, Evo Morales in Bolivia, Michelle Bachelet in Chile, and Rafael Correa in Ecuador indicates emerging new popular and nonconservative leaders on the region’s political scene—with significant differences among them, however. Chávez is the most ambiguous, with populist and authoritarian tendencies. Social movements, such as the Movement of Landless Rural Workers (MST) in Brazil, or the *piqueteros* (organized unemployed workers) in Argentina continue to be active and others grow, like the *cocaleros* (coca growers) and Aymara and Quechua Indian movements in Bolivia (and also in Ecuador). It seems that little by little the poor are becoming more present. Catholic social pastorals and CEBs are the origin of a number of grassroots leaders. The new president of Ecuador, Rafael Correa, has indicated in an interview the influence he received from liberation theology and Paulo Freire. Of course, to the contrary, some conservative sectors of the Church are on the defensive, like some bishops and middle-class laymen in Venezuela, or are reticent, because of moral biases, vis-à-vis the private life of Bachelet in Chile. The Christian churches do not speak with one voice. Besides, a certain number of conservative or populist Pentecostal leaders appear in the political arena to muddy the waters between religion and politics.

Of course, we have an open future ahead of us, full of possibilities but also great risks. In Brazil, for instance, we find a pulsating vitality in the local grassroots base of society and of the Catholic Church. It is true that, because of the enormous size of the country, these experiences are frequently isolated from each other. Hence the importance of intercommunication: if networks and horizontal connections are established, they may nurture each other, promoting the exchange of knowledge and providing mutual support. Today, information technology has the material means to make such an interchange possible. The idea of networking has become essential for the combined efforts of society and religion to bear fruit, making instantaneous and intense contact among local realities.
The flow of information is unceasing and only grows as popular and pastoral organizations become increasingly computerized.

The CEBs, for instance, without a national bureaucracy, have periodical assemblies called Inter-Ecclesial Meetings. The last one, the eleventh at the national level, took place at Ipatinga, Minas Gerais, in 2005, with more than 2,000 delegates. This type of joint effort at the national and regional level is a major factor in democratization; while allowing diversity and differences to flourish, it enables communications among experiences that do not have to be channeled through central organizations, which tend to control and direct. Our mental habits are more accustomed to stereotyped models and similarities, and do not always see the wealth of diversity that flows from intercommunication. Having gotten used to routines and repetition, we tend to be wary of what is new and different—which may be much more fecund and challenging.

It seems evident that, at any moment now, these local social or ecclesial processes will find political or pastoral resonance on the national level. They can also change the structures of power, the role of the State, the trade unions, and the political parties. Therefore one must have a keen eye to sense the virtualities of the profound social and pastoral movements that are patiently being prepared before irrupting into unquestionable visibility and with direct impact in the political arena. If we learn to understand this process and cooperate to make it successful, it will be possible, at the onset of this new millennium, to redeem the hopes that our generation of Christians and social analysts anticipated half a century ago. And once again, the Catholic Church and Latin American society may manage to establish new, creative connections.
6 Aubert, Le pontificat de Pie IX, 42–44.
13 Dolan, In Search of an American Catholicism, 14, 164.
15 Among them, F. A. Hermens, Waldemar Gurian, and Yves Simon took posts at the University of Notre Dame (McGreevy, Catholicism and American Freedom, 197).
16 “Gaudium et Spes” (No. 31), Documentos del Vaticano II, Madrid, Biblioteca de Autores Cristianos, 1967, 225.
17 Padroado refers to the system of official relations between the Church and the State which gave certain privileges to the State—the nomination of bishops and other rights.
18 A unique semi-theocratic dictatorship in Ecuador between 1861 and 1871 placed education in the hands of the Roman Catholic Church. Under the Constitution of 1869 only practicing Catholics qualified for citizenship. Garcia Moreno was assassinated by young liberals. His followers asked Rome for canonization.
19 See German Guzmán, Orlando Fals-Borda, Eduardo Umana Luna, La violencia en Colombia (Bogotá, Univ. Nacional, 1962).
23 See Alceu Amoroso Lima, Problemas da burguesia (Rio de Janeiro, José Olympio, 1936), Problema do Trabalho (Rio de Janeiro, Agir, 1946), and written after a stay in the United States, Uma experiência americana (Rio de Janeiro, Agir, 1954).
26 There are letters on this matter from Msgr. Câmara to Msgr. Larraín—D. Manuelito, as he was affectionately called—soon after the Council. For that period, see Fr. José Oscar Beozzo, “A recepção do Vaticano II na Igreja do Brasil” in Instituto Nacional de Pastoral (INP), *Presença pública da Igreja no Brasil*, São Paulo, Paulinas, 2003, 425–457.
30 Economic Commission for Latin America (ECLA) documents from the sixties reiterated the polarity from center to periphery, mainly in texts prepared by Raúl Prebitch and Aníbal Pinto Santa Cruz. See Aníbal Pinto, *Tres ensayos sobre Chile y América Latina*, Buenos Aires, Ediciones Solar, 1971.
42 Published in *Documentos da CNBB*, São Paulo, Paulinas, Nos. 10, 22, 36, 42, 50.


L. A. Gómez de Souza, *Igrejas cristãs e política*, CNBB, 41ª Assembleia Geral, Itaici, April 30/Mai 9, doc. 31/41ª AG (sub).


Data collected by the author in various MST meetings.


new twist on the old ‘pay, pray and obey’ command, exhorting the American laity to ‘stay, pray and inveigh’” (p. 344).
90 Gómez de Souza, A JUC.
92 “Blueprint for Vatican III (Cover Story), National Catholic Reporter, May 3, 2002; Prini, Lo scisma sommerso.
93 Gómez de Souza, Do Vaticano II a um novo concílio?, 233–278; Jon Sobrino, “Novo Concílio Ecumênico, grito de esperança universal,” Adital [Fortaleza, Brazil], August 16, 2002.