THE IMPACT OF ELECTION ADMINISTRATION
ON THE LEGITIMACY OF EMERGING DEMOCRACIES:
A NEW RESEARCH AGENDA

Jørgen Elklit and Andrew Reynolds

THE IMPACT OF ELECTION ADMINISTRATION
ON THE LEGITIMACY OF EMERGING DEMOCRACIES:
A NEW RESEARCH AGENDA

Jørgen Elklit and Andrew Reynolds


Jørgen Elklit is a professor and former chair of the Department of Political Science at the University of Aarhus, Denmark. He was a Visiting Fellow at the Kellogg Institute during the fall term of 1999. Professor Elklit specializes in electoral systems, electoral politics and management, political parties, and political behavior. He has worked with election and democratization support consultancies and observation missions to more than 15 countries in Africa, Asia, and Europe since 1990. He was an international member of the South African Independent Electoral Commission in 1990 and is now, inter alia, an international expert advisor to the Independent Electoral Commission in Lesotho. Recent books include Electoral Systems for Emerging Democracies (Copenhagen: Danida, 1997) and Hvem stemmer—og hvem stemmer ikke? (Who Votes—and Who Doesn't?) (Aarhus: Magtudredningen, 2000, with Birgit Møller, Palle Svensson, and Lise Togeby).

Andrew Reynolds is an assistant professor in the Department of Government and International Studies at the University of Notre Dame. He has written extensively on democratization and constitutional design and consulted on issues of electoral system design in South Africa, Indonesia, Zimbabwe, Guyana, Liberia, Sierra Leone, Jordan, and Fiji. His books include Electoral Systems and Democratization in Southern Africa (Oxford, 1999), Elections and Conflict Management in Africa (coeditor, USIP, 1998), Election ’94 South Africa (editor, St. Martin’s, 1994), and Election ’99 South Africa (editor, St. Martin’s, 1999).

The paper has benefited from comments from Bob Pastor, Rafael López-Pintor, Andreas Schedler, and two anonymous referees.
ABSTRACT

In this paper we attempt to push the development of a new subfield of research in the field of democratization and institutional design, which is the relationship between the institutionalization of electoral politics (and in particular the administration of elections) and the emergence of democracy in the developing world. This new avenue of research represents an important advance in the study of causal relationships, which so far has either been completely neglected in the democratization canon or has only been given dramatically insufficient attention.

The paper suggests a framework for the analysis of election management bodies that builds on a close scrutiny of the electoral management system’s performance during the twelve steps of the electoral process. This approach obviously leads to discussion of how the formation of policies in the electoral field can benefit from insights gained within the field of policy analysis, in particular within the field of implementation theory.

A pilot study of recent elections in eight Sub-Saharan countries (Botswana, Burkina Faso, Ghana, Mozambique, Sierra Leone, South Africa, Tanzania, and Zambia) allows us to conclude that the framework—even though it yet has to be fully utilized—is helpful in coming to grips with the electoral processes in these cases. However, a full test requires more cases and more in-depth data collection than has been possible here.

RESUMEN

En este artículo intentamos impulsar el desarrollo de un nuevo subcampo de investigación en los estudios de democratización y diseño institucional: la relación entre la institucionalización de la política electoral (en particular la administración de las elecciones) y la emergencia de la democracia en el mundo en desarrollo. Este nuevo camino de investigación representa un importante avance en el estudio de las relaciones causales, que hasta el momento ha sido o bien completamente ignorado en el canon de la democratización o bien ha recibido extraordinariamente insuficiente atención.

El artículo sugiere un marco para el análisis de los cuerpos de administración electoral que se apoya en un cuidadoso examen del rendimiento del sistema de administración en los doce pasos del proceso electoral. Este abordaje obviamente lleva a la discusión de cómo la formación de las políticas en el campo electoral pueden beneficiarse de enseñanzas del campo de análisis de políticas, en particular en el campo de la teoría de la implementación.

Un estudio piloto de elecciones recientes en ocho países del África Subsahariana (Botswana, Burkina Faso, Mozambique, Sierra Leona, Sudáfrica, Tanzania y Zambia) nos permite concluir que el marco—aunque todavía tienen que ser utilizado por completo—ayuda para aprehender los procesos electorales en estos casos. Sin embargo, una prueba completa del marco requiere más casos y información en profundidad de lo que aquí ha sido posible.
This paper seeks to push the development of a new subfield of research in the field of democratization and institutional design, namely the relationship between the institutionalization of electoral politics—in particular the administration of elections—and the emergence of democracy in the developing world. The quality of an election in this regard is conceptualized as the extent to which the entire electoral process is seen as legitimate and binding by political actors.

This new avenue of research represents an important advance in the study of causal relationships that to date have either been completely neglected in the democratization canon or have been given dramatically insufficient attention. There is general agreement among electoral scholars that the study of electoral systems and their importance to the democratic evolution of any state appears to have reached a point where far-reaching and new insights are few and far between. In 1984 the doyen of electoral system comparativists, Arend Lijphart, reviewed the state of the field, making a clarion call for scholars to trumpet the molding effects electoral systems have upon party systems, the importance of electoral institutions to constitutional design, and accumulate knowledge through the development of systematic cross-national comparative research projects (Lijphart 1984). He noted that after “several decades of apparent moribundity” real vigor was being restored to the discipline engendered by the works of, for example, Gudgin and Taylor (1979), Katz (1980), Mackie and Rose (1982), and Nohlen (1978).

Over the past more than fifteen years Lijphart’s call has been answered, and perhaps answered more strongly than what has been seen in any other subfield within comparative politics, so that, for all intents and purposes, the narrow study of the mathematical consequences of electoral laws has been exhausted. Ground breaking political science published by Cox, Gallagher, Grofman, Lijphart, Shugart and Taagepera, among others, has demonstrated psephological truths that make Duverger’s conjectures look more like ‘guestimates’ than ‘laws’. We now have a whole library of evidence to draw upon when analyzing the impact of the specific type of proportional representation formula on seat allocation, the effective threshold of votes needed to win seats in multimember and single-member district systems of all varieties, and the incestuous relationship among districting, registration, communal voting, and discrimination. In many respects the book can be closed, or at least set aside for a time, on the mathematical-technical consequences of electoral laws.

After a decade or so of global diffusion of multiparty competitive politics it has been recognized more explicitly than previously (see, however, for an early work in this area, Jaramillo, Léon-Roesch, and Nohlen 1989) that the quality of electoral administration has a
direct impact on the way in which elections in the developing world and their outcomes are regarded not merely by international observers, but also—and more importantly—by domestic actors such as voters, parties, media, and local observers (e.g., Lopéz-Pintor 1999, 139–40). These groups do not necessarily see things the same way; indeed their differential perceptions are useful as they allow us to gauge—at least partly—the reasons why different groups come out with variant judgements about the electoral exercise.

It may be somewhat puzzling that studies of electoral administration and its impact on democratization have not been systematically undertaken before. One of several explanations suggested by Pastor (1999b) is that those who previously have worked with elections and democratization predominantly originate from countries where administrative issues are not at all problematic, and they have therefore not thought that it was necessary to include this variable (or these variables) in the analysis. However, a more powerful explanation revolves around the nature of the electoral administration issues themselves. These issues are purportedly less fascinating research topics than the development of democratization theory, the study of individual transition processes, the effects of various seat allocation systems, or surveying voters’ attitudes towards new regimes. Indeed, despite their salience to democratic stability in emerging polyarchies, election administration issues are probably more tedious to study and to document.

While the canon of literature is tiny, the importance of the quality of election administration both as a theoretical issue and at the more management-oriented and policy-relevant level has not merely been addressed as a general issue (López-Pintor 1999; Pastor 1999a, 1999b; Elklit 1999; also some of the chapters in Nohlen, Picado, and Zovatto, comps. 1998). The importance of these issues have been illustrated by scholars working on recent development in, for example, Mexico (Schedler 1999; Trejo and Rivera 1999; Magnussen 1999; Eisenstadt 1999), and Ghana where a dramatic improvement in election administration quality in 1996 has been noted (Ayee 1999; Gyimah-Boadi 1998).

Mexico and Ghana are two examples that strongly support our claim that a conscious positive and professional approach to election administration is crucial for the outcome of the electoral process and the way it is perceived by political actors at all levels. While few would dispute such a claim, institutional factors in the realm of election administration and management have rarely been studied systematically and almost never comparatively.

Our main focus here is on the way in which institutional factors and institutional choices, and the ensuing administrative and political behavior, contribute both to the transition and to the consolidation of new democracies. This approach inevitably leaves aside a whole array of other issues that will also influence the way in which the first democratic election is perceived and—later—the democratic regime is accepted as ‘the only game in town’. We are convinced
that elections play a crucial role in this development, as they are a necessary condition for having some kind of democratic regime. We therefore focus specifically on the way in which elections are conducted and formulate our research questions so that they will enable us to gauge the effectiveness and positive contribution of institutional choices related to election management and the impact of various stages of the implementation processes.

Democratization is brought about, if at all, by a complicated interplay of a number of factors that all impact both directly and indirectly on the unfolding of the transition and consolidation processes. This cocktail, while not our main concern here, values both structural, agency, and international factors as well as an interwoven set of factors conditioning the consolidation process (civil society, political society, rule of law, functioning state bureaucracy, and economic society; see Linz and Stepan 1996). Here, however, we will focus on the importance of the institutional choices. One complicating fact is that the institutional choice variable (itself already a composite variable) is both dependent and independent variable in the underlying causation model. However, we will primarily approach it as an independent variable, looking into its possible impact on the legitimation of democratic regimes.

In his most recent book, Developing Democracy: Toward Consolidation, Larry Diamond defines—in the tradition of scholars like Linz, Lipset, and Dahl—consolidation as the process of achieving broad and deep legitimation, such that all significant political actors, both at the elite and mass levels, believe that the democratic regime is the most right and appropriate for their society, better than any other realistic alternative they can imagine (Diamond 1999, 65).

This definition is compelling, but it is difficult to obtain reliable and valid evidence of the degree to which ‘broad and deep legitimation’ has been achieved. It appears that the inclusion of the requirement that the legitimation should be ‘deep’ makes it impossible to arrive—at least within a reasonable time-limit—at the level of consolidation that Diamond apparently has in mind. It should also be realized—and this is perhaps more important—that legitimation is not only an element in achieving consolidation. It is also an inherent element in the transition phase, especially as a main objective of the transition phase is to arrive at a legitimate regime, for example, by reshaping a regime that is considered illegitimate.

Diamond further notes how political competitors at the elite level must come to see democracy—the laws, the procedures, and the institutions that democracy specifies—as the ‘only game in town’, that is, the only viable framework for governing the society and for advancing their own interests. But political actors—especially in nascent democracies—might conceive of democracy as the only game in town (under current circumstances) without
actually believing that “… it is the most right and appropriate for their society, better than any other realistic alternative they can imagine.”

The same is obviously the case at the mass level: The definitional requirement is that there must be a broad normative and behavioral consensus—cutting across class, ethnic, and other cleavages—on the legitimacy of this constitutional system, no matter how poor and how unsatisfactory its political and/or economic performance may be (Diamond 1999, 65). Put differently, but in a similar vein: “The legitimacy of an institution stems from the support which individuals belonging to the group in question give to it” (Blondel, Sinnott, and Svensson 1998, 6). The analysis and interpretation of different measures of broad or specific support is not easy, and the distinction between different objects of support might lead to the conclusion that the concept in itself is too fuzzy and should be avoided.

This is obviously not Diamond’s approach, and we will in any case accept his claim that a behavioral component of legitimation (support, commitment) is to be included in its study. A normative commitment is not enough, as it must also be evident and routinized in behavior. The commitment must be a habituation, it must be internalized, so that even intense conflicts do not make competitors forget it. A routinized commitment to democracy also reduces uncertainty—not the uncertainty of the outcome of the democratic process, which is a constituent characteristic of that process, but uncertainty regarding the rules and procedures of the political and electoral competition. The development of this process over time can but influence the simultaneous development of the political culture, as it will itself be influenced by the political culture and the changes therein (Diamond 1999, 162). It also has to be noted that a process of change in the political culture will have been under way from much earlier in the transition process, increasing, inter alia, the level of legitimacy of the political regime.

Diamond offers a complex causation model (1999, 205) where he crafts a complex web of causal systemic and individual level factors. However, absent from Diamond’s model is the character of the first transition. The institutional choices made as part of the transition are only indirectly integrated, for example, through the development and change of elements (variables) such as ‘trust in political institutions’ or ‘party system institutionalization’. But the choices of the institutions themselves, leading, inter alia, also to the developing party system in question, might usefully have been incorporated as well.

In this context it is appropriate to introduce the feeling of political efficacy that individual citizens might experience and attribute, at least in part, to the democratic transition and to the institutional choices connected with the transition. Such feelings are nourished when citizens believe that the new regime functions better than the previous one, that is, it is more responsive, considerate, effective, and fair and provides increased channels of influence (however modest).
In sum, our claim is 1) that individual experiences in a number of fields related to the conduct of elections have a direct bearing on how the sense of political efficacy develops in individual citizens, and 2) that this is an important factor behind the eventual development of legitimacy and a principled commitment to democracy, that is, progression towards democratic consolidation (even if during the transition phase).

Therefore, it is unfortunate when causation models of democratic transition and consolidation fail to include all relevant institutional choices. This is especially the case as, in the fledgling stages of any new democracy, specific experiences with new institutions contribute directly to forming the feeling of individual efficacy, which again is an important element in the nourishing of broad legitimacy and principled commitment to the new system, thereby furthering over-time consolidation.

Two institutional choice variables of particular relevance are the balance between the executive and the legislative, that is, a more presidential or a more parliamentarian system, and the choice of electoral system, understood as the seat allocation system. Sometimes a third element, the federal issue (or some other variation of the centralization/decentralization issue) is also taken up.

It is important, however, to remember that elections do not just happen, and legislatures are not like manna falling from heaven. Elections are complicated processes, particularly when it comes to administration. Because it is not a given that they will run smoothly, we argue that the quality of election administration be included among the factors that must be studied and analyzed carefully before any serious explanation of the level of sense of individual efficacy or its relation to the level of legitimacy in a postauthoritarian or emerging democratic system be ventured.

Since our main concern is the contribution of the quality of electoral administration to the outcome of the electoral process, we are less concerned with definitions and categorizations of the various types and subtypes of democracy (see on this Collier and Levitsky 1997; Diamond 1999, 24–63; Zakaria 1997; Karatnycky 1999; Elklit 1999). However, we find it useful to adhere to the ‘procedural minimal’ definition and its three main components of contested elections, full suffrage, and effective guarantees of civil liberties, which have gradually developed through the work of Schumpeter (1947/1975; for an interesting rehabilitation of a central element in Schumpeter’s work, see O’Donnell 1999, 7–9; Dahl 1971; and Diamond, Linz, and Lipset 1989, xvi).

Lastly, election administration, the forgotten variable in the explanation of democratic legitimacy, is not only theoretically interesting but is also of considerable interest from a policy perspective. A number of countries—the United States and Denmark are two of the frontrunners in this field—and a number of international and nongovernmental organizations—such
as the OSCE, NDI, IRI, or IFES—use a considerable amount of the taxpayers’ money in their (all too often less than fully co-ordinated) effort to influence the democratic development in a number of postauthoritarian emerging and improving democracies. This is done in many different ways, and with rather different degrees of success (see Carothers 1999).

How to Analyze Election Administration?

How can electoral management (or administration) bodies—EMBs—be analyzed and what are the constituent elements of such agencies? Further, how might one approach the concept of election administration quality? In this section we will present our methodology and introduce the variables we will rely on. Some authors make a distinction between different EMB models (Harris 1998; Pastor 1999a and 1999b; López-Pintor 1999), while others (Choe 1997; Choe and Darnolf 1999) have restricted themselves to distinguishing between governmental and independent bodies. For our purpose, the trichotomy also suggested by López-Pintor (1999, 13) appears to be the best way of categorizing EMBs for analytical purposes. The three categories suggested by López-Pintor are:

1. An office or agency within the Civil Service or government structure, most often in the Ministry of Home Affairs (or its equivalent). This model is primarily found in older democracies in Western, industrialized countries (according to López-Pintor, this is the least numerous category).

2. A model similar to 1) but under some supervisory authority (the second most numerous category), and

3. A more or less independent and self-contained electoral management body (often termed Electoral Commission). This form of EMB is usually established under a board of directors with an implementing secretariat under a Chief Electoral Officer. This construction is found most often in new democracies but also in countries like Australia, Canada, and India. (The variations of this form of EMB are several; the category covers a little more than half of all cases).

One should be particularly concerned about the inclusion of the following five factors in the analysis of election administration:

- EMB Organizational Structure

   The organizational characteristics of the EMB have a considerable bearing both on the electoral process and on the results of that process. How is the relationship between
commission and head of staff regulated—what is the day-to-day reality? Who is the stronger personality—the Commission Chair or the CEO? Are commissioners on good terms among themselves so that they can work as a group—or do internal tensions surface from time to time? Such questions are particularly pertinent if the commission is composed of representatives of the political parties running for office but also in situations where commissioners may feel some kind of commitment towards some of the political actors—or are seen by others as having such attachment. A similar problem exists when commission members are appointed as representatives of ethnic groups.

- The EMB’s level of independence from the political forces.
  A perceived lack of independence, oftentimes raised by losing electoral contestants in need of a scapegoat, is sometimes so serious that it taints the legitimacy of the entire electoral process (Tekle 1997, 116). Elections in Kenya are a particularly evident case in point (Barkan 1993; Macrory, Elklit, and Mendez 1992; Geisler 1993; Throup 1993; Throup and Hornsby 1998; Svensson 1997; Barkan and Ng’ethe 1998). Evidently, ‘level of independence’ is a difficult variable to measure, as the necessary evidence is only rarely available for public scrutiny, but perceptions about EMB independence are in any case almost as important as the actual, but indiscernible, level of independence as perceptions might be the basis for actions and counteractions of political actors at all levels. Examples of how difficult it can be for opposition parties to substantiate claims about EMB dependency are Lesotho 1998 and Tanzania 1995.

- Internal EMB Motivations
  Narrow organizational interests can also play a role, that is, the interest among commissioners and staff at all levels in seeing their organization prosper and grow, with more staff, more resources, better facilities, more successes—even at the cost of other organizations. This leads to an organizational interest in taking over functions that could just as well be handled by other state agencies, such as registration and issuance of identity cards, education of voters, delimitation and mapping of constituencies, publication of electoral statistics, etc.

- EMB Staff Motivations
  Individual interests also play a role. Fights over salaries, per diems, various allowances, working hours, etc. are in abundance. The pursuit of such interests can compromise the organization’s ability to perform its management and delivery functions within restricted budgets and narrow timelines.
• **EMB Transparency**

The level of transparency in the work of the EMB is another important but often overlooked factor. When parties and voters are given some insights into what goes on and the basis for decision-making, they tend to accept EMB decisions more willingly. In Ghana (1996) and South Africa (1994 and 1999) an open policy of information did contribute substantially to the acceptance of the results—and therefore also to the high level of legitimacy (Ayee 1998; IEC 1994). Conversely the policy of nontransparency of the Kenyan Electoral Commission in 1992 contributed markedly to the low level of acceptance of that commission’s work.

Following Kimberling (1991), we find it useful to subdivide the electoral process into twelve basic steps, which are at the same time systematic and largely chronological. In our model each step consists of between two and six constituent elements (others might wish to work with a different set of components). To systematically analyze an electoral process it is important that each element is precisely operationalized and the election management system’s performance measured. As a minimum, one should at least be able to say if the performance in relation to a particular element is satisfactory or not. Table 1 below presents our framework for the systematic evaluation of the electoral process and the electoral administration. The framework is intended to be general, so it can be used as a basis for scrutinizing the work of election management bodies in all kinds of elections and all kinds of postauthoritarian, more or less democratic regimes.

The first two columns of Table 1 give the twelve basic steps in the electoral-administrative process as well as the 47 elements into which we subdivide these steps. The fourth column attempts to identify the specific outputs of each step, that is, it identifies the immediate, identifiable objective of the particular activities. The next column, the fifth, lists the various indicators of performance we propose to study, while the sixth and final column identifies indicators to gauge the effectiveness—or the success—the formulations and terminology of the table—as well as its specific content—will continue to be a matter of discussion and challenge, but we believe we have at least identified the crucial elements.

One striking feature of Table 1 is that what many see as the quintessential act of electing—polling itself—is only Step 8. This illustrates well that the outcome of the polling process depends on the way in which all seven preceding steps in the electoral management process have actually been conducted. This fact has only recently begun to be understood by the majority of democratization support policymakers and election advisors, and the same holds true for election monitoring. Indeed, a level playing field in place well in advance of polling is
a decisive element in approaching something that might look like a free and fair election (Elklit and Svensson 1997; Boneo 2000).

Implementation of Electoral Management Decisions

The implementation of the institutional choices that were decided on during the transition phase is crucial for the understanding of the outputs and the outcomes of the entire process. Students of policy processes might therefore find a rich study field. Implementation has often been disregarded in policy studies (Winter 1990, 1994, 1999; see also López-Pintor 1999 and Soudriette 1999, 4–5), but we expect that the implementation model suggested by Winter (1990, 20; 1994, 59) might be a useful tool in coming to grips with processes and factors that interact to produce the implementation results of election administrative systems, that is, outputs and outcomes.

Winter sees the implementation process as an interplay among three related sets of behavior: 1) intraorganizational behavior of the implementing organization (the EMB) and interorganizational behavior where other organizations interact with the implementing organization; 2) street-level bureaucratic behavior, and 3) target-group behavior. This interplay—as well as each of the three individual sets of behavior—is both conditioned and influenced by the previous policy formation process, the policy design decisions, and the entire set of contextual factors. All previous elements have an impact on the results of the implementation process, and the immediate outputs have a direct bearing on outcomes, as has target-group behavior.

The model provides the framework and some necessary tools for such an exercise but does not in itself explain individual cases of implementation. Individual cases must be analyzed in more depth and specificity than the model as such allows, drawing on case-specific causal explanations. It is a framework that identifies the elements and factors one has to look at, which is no small achievement for such a model. More specifically:

- An important point of departure for Winter is that one cannot insulate policy implementation from policy formation and design, that is, from policy objectives and specific means as they were established during the political decision-making process. It goes without saying that this factor might be particularly important during processes of political transformation from one form of regime to another.

- Some political and administrative actors participate both in policy formation and implementation processes, which is one way in which linkage takes place. In the electoral management field this is not uncommon: 1) The development of the Chinese village
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Steps in electoral process</th>
<th>Important elements in step</th>
<th>Provisions in case country</th>
<th>Outputs of process</th>
<th>Indicators of performance</th>
<th>Elements to look at to gauge effectiveness/success of step</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1. Legal framework</td>
<td>• Constitutional/legal basis</td>
<td>• Written rules in constitu-</td>
<td>• Elections held and on time</td>
<td>• Is legislation easily available and understand-</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• Rules and regulations</td>
<td>tion, statutory law,</td>
<td>• Wasted votes</td>
<td>• Perceived legitimacy of electoral system?</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• Seat allocation system</td>
<td>and regulatory law</td>
<td>• LSQ Ids</td>
<td>• Adequacy of resources allocated</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>• ENEP/ENPP</td>
<td>• Accessibility/ transparency</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2. Elections management</td>
<td>• EC appointment and independ-</td>
<td>• Functioning EC</td>
<td>• EC activities</td>
<td>• Are the boundaries accepted?</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>• Commission/administration relationship</td>
<td>• Consumption of resources</td>
<td>• Are they temporally sensitive?</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• Allocation of resources</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>• Scope/extent/penetration into marginalized communities</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>• Adequacy of resources allocated</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>• Are voter education efforts by various groups complementary or overlapping?</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3. Constituency and polling</td>
<td>• Relevant body identified and active</td>
<td>• Identifiable constituencies (in accordance with the electoral system chosen) and registration and polling districts</td>
<td>• Accessibility of information about constituencies and lower level districts</td>
<td>• Level of registration</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>district demarcation</td>
<td>• Principles for delimitation identified</td>
<td></td>
<td>• Malapportionment</td>
<td>• Equality of registration across the country</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• Rules about automatic periodical revision</td>
<td></td>
<td>• Compactness</td>
<td>• Complaints procedures</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• Adequate resources available</td>
<td></td>
<td>• Geographical sensitivity</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• Rules for handling complaints in place</td>
<td></td>
<td>• Communities of interest</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4. Voter education</td>
<td>• Timing</td>
<td>• Voter education sessions conducted</td>
<td>• % of ballots spoilt or invalid</td>
<td>• Is access to the ballot inclusive of the diversity of political opinions?</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• Quality</td>
<td>• % voters exposed to voter education (related to literacy rates and previous voting experience)</td>
<td>• Resources per capita spent (related to literacy rates and previous voting experience)</td>
<td>• Were parties and candidates rejected for no obvious, legal reason?</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• Outreach</td>
<td>• % of registered voters</td>
<td>• Registration/VAP</td>
<td>• Acceptance of ballot paper design</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• Adequate resources available</td>
<td>• Registered voters</td>
<td>• Pattern of registration/VAP across regions, ethnicity, gender, age, etc.</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• Relationship between EC efforts and efforts by parties and NGOs</td>
<td>• Co-ordination of voter register with polling districts</td>
<td>• # of complaints filed</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>• % of complaints processed prior to issuance of final voters’ register</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5. Voter registration</td>
<td>• Automatic or voluntary registration</td>
<td>• Registered voters</td>
<td>• Registration/VAP</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• Appointment and training of registration personnel</td>
<td>• Co-ordination of voter register with polling districts</td>
<td>• Pattern of registration/VAP across regions, ethnicity, gender, age, etc.</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• Adequate time for registration and access to registration stations</td>
<td>• % of parties registered of those who in good faith sought registration</td>
<td>• # of complaints filed</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• Rules for public scrutiny of voters’ register</td>
<td>• % of candidates nominated of those who in good faith sought nomination</td>
<td>• % of complaints processed prior to issuance of final voters’ register</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• Complaints procedures</td>
<td>• Parties and candidates registered and nominated for participation in the election</td>
<td>• Registration/VAP</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>• Pattern of registration/VAP across regions, ethnicity, gender, age, etc.</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6. Access to, and design of, the ballot: Nomination and registration of parties and candidates</td>
<td>• Registration of parties/candidates</td>
<td>• Parties and candidates registered and nominated for participation in the election</td>
<td>• % of parties registered of those who in good faith sought registration</td>
<td>• Is access to the ballot inclusive of the diversity of political opinions?</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• Rules about independent candidates</td>
<td>• % of candidates nominated of those who in good faith sought nomination</td>
<td>• % of parties registered of those who in good faith sought registration</td>
<td>• Were parties and candidates rejected for no obvious, legal reason?</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• Mechanisms for ballot paper access</td>
<td>• Disputes over ballot paper design/spoil ballots</td>
<td>• % of candidates nominated of those who in good faith sought nomination</td>
<td>• Acceptance of ballot paper design?</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• Ballot paper design</td>
<td>• % of parties registered of those who in good faith sought registration</td>
<td>• Pattern of registration/VAP across regions, ethnicity, gender, age, etc.</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
| 7. Campaign regulation | • Spending rules  
• Public funding of party expenditures/campaign costs  
• Access to public media  
• Rules for meetings/rallies  
• Codes of conduct  
• Rules for handling of violations of code of conduct and campaign regulations | • Political parties and candidates having media access to the electorate  
• Air time allocated to and used by the political parties and the independent candidates  
• # of substantiated complaints about violations of campaign regulations, spending rules etc. | • Acceptable distribution of public campaign funding, if any?  
• Do funding laws facilitate a level playing field?  
• Reasonable equal access to public media? |
|---|---|---|---|
| 8. Polling | • Plan for distribution and location of polling places  
• Appointment and training of polling station personnel  
• Procurement of polling material  
• Polling observation by representatives of political parties and candidates as well as by local and international organisations  
• Security and integrity of polling  
• Clear rules for assistance to incapacitated voters | • Unhindered and reasonable access to voting for all voters  
• Turnout as vote/registration  
• Turnout as vote/VAP  
• % of polling stations operating  
• % of polling stations that lack integrity  
• % of constituencies (wards/polling stations) where polling was invalidated  
• % of rerun elections  
• % of first-time voters who turned out to vote | • Are polling places in place?  
• Do they function in accordance with their expected role?  
• Do they function adequately?  
• Are polling station personnel able to fulfill their role?  
• Are polling places secure?  
• Are procedures for observation functioning? |
| 9. Counting and tabulating the vote | • Counting procedures established (including whether to count at polling station level or at counting centers)  
• Availability of counting results to party agents and others at the lowest level of counting immediately after completing the count  
• Access for interested parties to observe the count and request a recount | • A complete count of the vote, aggregated according to relevant rules and needs  
• A complete list of persons elected  
• # of complaints  
• # of individual recounts undertaken  
• time elapsed before the conclusion of the count and announcement of results  
• incidence of incorrectly allocated seats | • Are papers counted in accordance with the law (including regulations about what constitutes an invalid ballot)?  
• Are special ballots assessed on their merits?  
• Is the count conducted without undue delay?  
• Are observation rules followed?  
• Are interested parties provided with a copy of the counting tallies? |
| 10. Resolving election related disputes and complaints. Verification of final results. Certification | • Provisions for a special electoral court and/or adjudication system  
• Time limits for handling election disputes and complaints  
• Verification of the final results verified  
• Certification of the election  
• Settlement of all election related complaints and disputes not handled by the EC and the electoral administration  
• Verification of the election  
• A certification decision  
• # and nature of complaints  
• % accepted  
• time elapsed before the last complaint or electoral court case is settled  
• elected body having its first meeting at the time foreseen in legislation (if any) | | • Is an adjudication system available?  
• Are electoral court cases and complaints handled efficiently and without undue delay?  
• Does verification follow the guiding law? |
| 11. Election result implementation | • Procedures for taking office  
• Seats filled in accordance with results  
• % of seats not taken by those properly elected | | • Why do elected candidates not take office? |
| 12. Postelection procedures | • Provisions for publication of election results at all levels of election administration  
• Election management body subject to ordinary accounting  
• Easily accessible and well-documented election statistics  
• Accounting reports  
• Time before electoral statistics are publicly available  
• Statement by accountants | | • Are election results (at all levels) made available to all interested parties and persons without delay? |
committee electoral system primarily by middle-level bureaucrats (Elklit 1997; Shi 1999) was partly due to ‘street-level’ behavior of some village election committees or party secretaries; 2) in Bosnia-Herzegovina since the signing of the Dayton-agreement in December 1995 the OSCE has been both policy formulating and implementing; and 3) most EMBs contribute to the preparation of new legislation—or at least provide recommendations to the legislative process.

- The importance of contextual factors should not be overlooked. This includes domestic socioeconomic and political-cultural factors as well as international factors. International factors primarily take two forms: The diffusion of basic democratic principles and standards and the dissemination of information about ‘best practices’ (ACE Project 1999) or experiences with high-quality elections, and the advisory and managerial assistance provided by numerous organizations, countries, and individuals to first and second generation elections in the developing world and elsewhere.

- The dependent variable in traditional policy analysis has been the immediate output, but that is often a too narrow approach, as the broader outcomes—the general effects in society of the policy and its implementation—should also be included (Winter 1990, 21ff). This is especially so in the field of electoral administration, where the one important analytical interest is the long-term effect of the entire electoral and political process on democratic legitimation and consolidation.

- The initial policy formation process in most countries rarely formulates specific objectives apart from 1) stating that there will be elections and 2) defining the rules. In educational policy-making, for instance, one often sees specific objectives formulated, which can then be used to measure the degree to which the objectives have eventually been reached. But what should the specific objectives be in relation to election and election administration? A certain turnout? Such a standard only appears to be relevant to one-party states or systems with compulsory voting. A certain registration level? Yes, but why aim for less than 100 per cent? A certain level of relevant knowledge about procedures among the least educated segments of the electorate? Yes, but how is that to be defined and how is it to be measured? When policy objectives are difficult to formulate precisely—or have not been formulated at all—it becomes difficult to tell if and when they have been achieved.

Clearly a considerable number of factors influence the development and formation of policies in the electoral field. Therefore, we need to look more closely at the policy formation process in order to know what to expect regarding its influence on subsequent policy phases. Winter’s
four hypotheses are useful here, as they are rooted in established models of policy-making.

1. Successful implementation is likely to be negatively related to the level of conflict during the policy-formation phase. Pursuit of individual or collective interests dominates and agreement over goals is rare. Consequently, actors engage in a bargaining process and the resulting decisions are a product of interests, intensity of interests, unequal distribution of resources, and coalition formation ability. In transitions to multiparty competitive elections the conflicts during the first transition phase will often have been dealt with during a very complicated bargaining process.

2. Successful implementation is more likely if based on a valid causal theory, that is, a correct understanding of causes and effects within the field. Here we particularly have in mind issues related to voter education and voter behavior.

3. Implementation success is unlikely if the particular policy was primarily adopted for symbolic reasons, where the demonstration of willingness to act is more important than actually solving problems. This is maybe a truism, but it is made salient by many cases of sham elections.

4. The level of attention given to the process by policy proponents has a bearing on the results. The low level of interest which politicians—sometimes even election commissioners—often give to trivial administrative issues is a clear barrier to successful implementation. If attention becomes diverted from a certain policy—for example, because problems in other areas require immediate attention—then the policy process tends to become less instrumental and goal-oriented. The connection among participants, values, problems, choice opportunities, and solutions then tends to become more accidental, resembling the classic garbage-can model.

We now turn to the implementation process and its three major behavioral elements, which are intra- and interorganizational behavior, street-level bureaucracy behavior, and target group behavior.

Some of the features of intraorganizational behavior have already been touched upon. Organizational theory gives a number of clues to factors that might be important, such as the organizational structure, the level of relevant qualifications available among staff members and commissioners, the character of the ordinary decision-making structure, the number of veto-points, the openness of the organization, etc.
The interplay between the EMB and other organizations with election-related functions, that is, the interorganizational behavior, is similarly of paramount importance for the outcome of the election management process. If some organization other than the EMB is in charge of, for instance, issuance of ordinary ID cards (not voter registration cards issued as a proof of valid registration) and these ID cards play an important role in the registration exercise, then the relationship between the two organizations will unavoidably influence the situation in the registration field (as in Zambia in 1991 and 1996 and in South Africa 1998–99). It might also influence the perception of how well registration actually went, with severe consequences for the perceived legitimacy of the entire electoral process.

Other such agencies might be the constituency and polling district delimitation agency, the media, the government printer, the school administration, and the government computer center. It goes without saying that the relationship between the EMB and the police/military is a particularly sensitive one (Tekle 1997, 117–18). Police interference in the electoral process has often come at the point of the issuance of rally and march permits, where the concern for ‘public order’ has often been the official excuse for not allowing opposition parties the right to organize such events in time (Zimbabwe 2000 is, of course, only one case in point).

Similarly, there is a complex relationship between EMBs and civil society. Often in new democracies a plethora of NGOs—domestic as well as foreign—participate in voter education, election monitoring, etc. If the relationship between civil society and the EMB is smooth and constructive, then NGOs can contribute considerably and positively to the outcome of the electoral process. If the relationship is more tense, the contribution of NGOs becomes more troublesome.

The relationship between the EMB and foreign providers of election- and democracy-related support is a particularly delicate one, especially if the EMB feels that its performance capacity is being underestimated by the foreigners, who often come from other kinds of management culture and with a different grasp of available management facilities. These external NGOs are also in a strong bargaining position because they command much-needed funds and sometimes also have direct government access. The external pressures can complicate decision-making processes considerably, especially if the EMB tries to establish itself and is seen as an independent body (Ottoway and Chung 1999).

Second, in the context of election administration, ‘street-level bureaucracy’ is primarily the registration station, the nomination office, and the polling station personnel. In relation to street-level behavior election management staff vary considerably in their formal and informal qualifications as well as in their professional dedication. Differences in norms, interests, attitudes, and behavior within these groups—which in some countries count hundreds of
thousands of men and women (in India even millions)—cannot but influence outputs and outcomes.

A key element when studying street-level bureaucracy is ‘coping behavior’, which relates to the ability to cope with the pressure of the tasks at hand, especially in face-to-face contact with clients. In this context ‘clients’ are 1) citizens who want to register or complain about registration related problems; 2) voters who want nomination as candidates; or 3) registered voters at voter education events or—in particular—who have turned out to vote on polling day. Good coping behavior is instrumental in handling such situations, which, for example, could be repeated instances where voters come in good faith to vote but must be turned away because they are not on the voters’ roll for that particular polling station. The ability to handle such situations in an orderly and respectful way depends on training and motivation, which partly is a function of the culture of the organization.

Target-group behavior is the third and last kind of implementation-related behavior to consider. In this context the primary target group is the voters, but other target groups that should also be considered are the political parties and their candidates. Target group behavior is a function of a number of factors, including individual as well as collective motivation, interest, and information about rules and regulations, policy options, party and candidate choices.

The least privileged groups in society are the groups least likely to be reached by various kinds of information—here information about elections, registration rules, different party agendas, etc. In a pilot study of gender differences in registering for voting in six byelections in Tanzania conducted during 1999, in some constituencies only approximately one third of those registered were women (Ulriksen 2000). One might expect to find gender differences pointing in the same direction in other societies where women still suffer from strong cultural and social suppression.

In conclusion, we expect implementation factors to have considerable explanatory value when it comes to understanding how electoral management policy decisions relate to the outputs we see towards the end of the electoral processes. This will have a strong bearing on the outcome of the process, the eventual effects on democratization, legitimacy, and consolidation, and it may well turn out to be an area where personal agency factors are particularly important. The behavior of individuals—and of collective and organizational actors as well—is in any case a central factor in explaining and understanding how the electoral management policy is implemented.
A Pilot Study of Eight Sub-Saharan Countries and Their Elections

The remains of this article engage in a pilot study in order to develop and specify a methodology that can be subsequently applied in a more comprehensive research project.

We conduct a number of paired comparisons and in order to control—at least partially—for contextual factors, our focus is on countries from only one geographic region. The reason for this strategic choice is that we envisage some differences between the functioning of electoral management bodies and electoral systems in different parts of the world as already demonstrated by López-Pintor (1999) and in more general works (Reynolds, Reilly, et al. 1997; Nohlen, Picado, and Zovatto comps. 1998). For similar reasons, we also concentrate on countries with comparable seat allocation systems. We compare countries with majoritarian seat allocation systems with other countries with majoritarian systems and likewise for countries using proportional representation systems.

The eight Sub-Saharan African countries we are looking at have a considerable number of socioeconomic, cultural, and historical factors in common. Our approach thus provides us with a control—at least partially—for the influence of such factors. Furthermore, we pair countries by selecting in essence on whether their electoral management processes were either relatively good or relatively poor—according to our own, as well as other observers’ judgements. This kind of strategic choice is necessary for the pilot study to ensure that there is some variation to explain, remembering that our central variable (i.e., election management) is simultaneously dependent (to be explained by the causal factors behind the institutional choices) and independent (itself explaining, at least in part, the development of individual political efficacy and, at the societal level, a certain level of political legitimacy).

The methodological challenge is then to establish a causal link between 1) the election management quality variable in all its dynamic complexity; 2) the perceptions thereof, both at the level of the political elite and among the electorate at large; and 3) the eventual impact of such perceptions on the legitimacy of the transition and consolidation processes. Political developments in Ghana are illustrative: Observers and commentators on Ghanaian electoral politics agree on the constructive and positive development from 1992 to 1996 and point to a number of specific measures that are seen as having contributed to that development (see, in particular, Ayee 1998; McCarty 1997).

In relation to each of our four categories (a) PR + high performance of election administration; b) PR + low performance; c) FPTP + high performance; d) FPTP + low performance) we look at two countries to decrease the risk of falling victim to the unintended consequences of choosing countries with abnormal values. The choice of pilot countries (together with their electoral systems and the overall rating of their election management
quality) is given in Table 2. Ghana represents a special case as the 1992 elections were characterized by poor election management, while 1996 was a case of considerable and intended improvement. These two elections are therefore treated as separate cases, each occupying its own cell in the table. We have, similarly, concluded that the two Zambian cases as well as the two Mozambican cases are also better treated separately, as they were perceived differently by political actors.

So far, we have only included two output and outcome variables in Table 2. We have, however, taken care to include one of the central performance indicators (from Step 8 polling) in Table 1. The reason for including this variable (average voter turnout compared to estimated voting age population, VAP) is that it not only measures voter turnout but also includes voter registration, probably the best indicator of election management quality. In this regard the picture is quite clear, as the average turnout/VAP under both electoral systems tend to be higher for countries with good electoral administration systems than for other countries. While being aware of the risk of circularity in our argument, it should be remembered that we are looking at indicators of election management quality as an independent variable, of which average voter turnout/VAP is but one indicator, while the dependent variables are the perceptions discussed below. It is in any case satisfying that differences in the combination of election management quality and turnout/VAP are as expected in almost all cases under scrutiny.

It contributes to our confidence in the results that differences between the electoral systems do not explain the differences in turnout/VAP, the differences are related to levels of management quality. This interpretation is based on expectations developed from studies of differences in turnout between electoral systems, even though these studies have primarily focused on industrialized countries (Blais and Carty 1990; Jackman and Miller 1995; Elklit and

Table 2. Eight Country Cases and Their Performance on Selected Variables

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Seating allocation system</th>
<th>Overall evaluation of election administration quality</th>
<th>Country and election years</th>
<th>Voter turnout/VAP</th>
<th>Perceived legitimacy of the electoral process among relevant political actors</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>First past the post</td>
<td>Higher</td>
<td>Ghana 1996</td>
<td>0.78</td>
<td>High</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Botswana 1965-99 (8 elections)</td>
<td>0.46</td>
<td>High</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lower</td>
<td></td>
<td>Ghana 1992</td>
<td>0.30</td>
<td>Low</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Tanzania 1995</td>
<td>0.52</td>
<td>Middle</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Zambia 1991</td>
<td>0.39</td>
<td>Middle</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Zambia 1996</td>
<td>0.29</td>
<td>Low</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Proportional representation</td>
<td>Higher</td>
<td>South Africa 1994, 1999</td>
<td>0.77</td>
<td>High</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Mozambique 1994</td>
<td>0.66</td>
<td>High</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lower</td>
<td></td>
<td>Sierra Leone 1996</td>
<td>0.37</td>
<td>Low</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Burkina Faso 1998</td>
<td>0.41</td>
<td>Low</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Mozambique 1999</td>
<td>0.50</td>
<td>Low</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Roberts 1996, 229–30). The only case that differs from the general pattern is Botswana, but it should be remembered that we here are looking at a much longer time period. Participation in Botswana was low in the 1960s, which explains the country’s low over-time average. For more recent elections Botswana fits the general pattern. Another case to mention is Burkina Faso, where Table 3 below reveals that the effective number of parties in parliament (ENPP) is as low as 1.8 and 1.2, that is, at the same level as in countries using FPTP. The explanation is that elections in Burkina Faso are primarily being conducted in constituencies of small magnitude, with 31 of 45 constituencies returning only one or two MPs and only six constituencies return more than three MPs (Grotz 1999). Such a system will tend to perform like a FPTP system—and that is exactly what we see.

The second variable (in the last column of Table 2) is the central outcome variable of the study, namely the perceived legitimacy of the electoral process. The intention is to present what in our judgement is the general, over-all conclusion among relevant political actors—the electorate at large, the political parties, and the candidates—as to the legitimacy of the entire electoral process. This variable therefore represents the input from the process of electoral management and institutionalization to the general transition and consolidation processes of the new democratic regime.

Some indicators of the performance of the eight electoral systems are given in Table 3. The table, although as yet incomplete, is nevertheless relatively clear in the differences among the four categories.

The percentage of spoilt ballots is not in itself a defining measure, but it is nevertheless an indicator of the combined quality of voter education, ballot paper design, and counting instructions (including rules for acceptance of cast votes). The lowest level of spoilt ballot papers was found in South Africa in 1994 which was partly a result of a conscious effort by the IEC to avoid disenfranchising new and/or illiterate voters by being overly strict when scrutinizing ballot papers during counting. In sum our more legitimate FPTP elections gave rise to a spoilt percentage of 3.6 on average, while the equivalent PR elections had a 4.6 per cent rate. Less legitimate FPTP elections had a spoilt paper rate of 4.6 per cent, while low performing PR elections averaged 7.2 per cent.

Table 3 also illustrates a pattern of increased disproportionality between votes and seats in the more highly contested and disputed elections. The Gallagher index of disproportionality was on average 12.3 in the high quality FPTP cases but 16.2 in the low. We would expect much lower levels in all PR elections, but here we found a marked difference: 2.8 in the high performing cases, 15.2 in the low (this value is influenced by the two Burkina Faso cases). Last, the degree of parliamentary party fragmentation (or concentration) does not relate to the
election management quality: In high FPTP cases the ENPP averages out at 1.4, in low cases at 1.3. In high PR cases the ENPP is 2.1, in low 2.2.

Table 3. Proportionality, Party Fragmentation, Spoilt Ballots, and Participation

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Year</th>
<th>LSQ-ID</th>
<th>ENPP</th>
<th>% valid and invalid</th>
<th>% of VAP registered</th>
<th>Vote registered</th>
<th>Vote/VAP</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>FPTP-High</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ghana</td>
<td>1996</td>
<td>10.3</td>
<td>1.9</td>
<td>1.5</td>
<td>78.2%</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Botswana</td>
<td>1965</td>
<td>8.3</td>
<td>1.2</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>68%</td>
<td>54.7%</td>
<td>37%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1969</td>
<td>7.4</td>
<td>1.6</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>84%</td>
<td>55.2%</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1974</td>
<td>6.7</td>
<td>1.4</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>84%</td>
<td>55.2%</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1979</td>
<td>12.6</td>
<td>1.2</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>84%</td>
<td>55.2%</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1984</td>
<td>11.5</td>
<td>1.4</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>70%</td>
<td>77.6%</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1989</td>
<td>22.9</td>
<td>1.2</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>70%</td>
<td>77.6%</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1994</td>
<td>10.2</td>
<td>1.8</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>58%</td>
<td>76.6%</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1999</td>
<td>20.9</td>
<td>1.14</td>
<td>5.7</td>
<td>59%</td>
<td>77.5%</td>
<td></td>
<td>46%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>FPTP-Lower</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ghana</td>
<td>1992</td>
<td>16.1</td>
<td>1.1</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>76.1%</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tanzania</td>
<td>1995</td>
<td>19.0</td>
<td>1.5</td>
<td>5.5</td>
<td>68%</td>
<td>76.7%</td>
<td>52%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Zambia</td>
<td>1991</td>
<td>8.5</td>
<td>1.4</td>
<td>3.4</td>
<td>87%</td>
<td>44.4%</td>
<td>34%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1996</td>
<td>21.2</td>
<td>1.3</td>
<td>4.8</td>
<td>49%</td>
<td>59.7%</td>
<td></td>
<td>30%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>PR-High</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>South Africa</td>
<td>1994</td>
<td>0.4</td>
<td>2.2</td>
<td>0.8</td>
<td>NA</td>
<td>89.3%</td>
<td>68%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1999</td>
<td>0.2</td>
<td>2.1</td>
<td>1.5</td>
<td>76%</td>
<td>NA</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mozambique</td>
<td>1994</td>
<td>7.7</td>
<td>2.1</td>
<td>11.7</td>
<td>75%</td>
<td>87.9%</td>
<td>66%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>PR-Lower</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sierra Leone</td>
<td>1996</td>
<td>4.0</td>
<td>3.2</td>
<td>NA</td>
<td>74%</td>
<td>30.1%</td>
<td>37%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Burkina Faso</td>
<td>1992</td>
<td>25.7</td>
<td>1.8</td>
<td>3.3</td>
<td>33.8%</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1997</td>
<td>24.2</td>
<td>1.2</td>
<td>3.8</td>
<td>44.1%</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mozambique</td>
<td>1999</td>
<td>6.6</td>
<td>1.9</td>
<td>14.5</td>
<td>74%</td>
<td>68.1%</td>
<td>50%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*NB: LSQ-ID = Least Squares Index of disproportionality, ENPP = Effective Number of Political Parties, VAP = Voting Age Population*

Summary of Cases

1. Ghana

After the ban on political parties had been lifted in mid-1992, in compliance with the Constitution accepted in the April 1992 referendum, presidential elections were held in November. The opposition parties claimed that the election was rigged, even though international observers primarily noted ‘the usual technical problems’ so often seen in early African elections. The opposition, however, felt strongly about the issue and decided to boycott the parliamentary elections in December, which were therefore easily won by President Rawling’s party, the National Democratic Congress, NDC. The distrust between the
government and the opposition after the 1992 elections was widespread, even though the factual basis for the opposition’s claims is difficult to establish.

Nevertheless, the situation before the elections of 7 December 1996 demonstrates convincingly that African electoral commissions, and their management styles, can have a major impact on the legitimacy of the outcome of elections (Ayee 1998, 53). Two major preconditions for the shift from 1992 to 1996 were the determination of the Electoral Commission to do better in 1996 than in 1992 and the availability of funding, partly from donors, which allowed the commission to provide the better solutions.

The electoral system and the stipulations about the appointment of the EC by the President (in consultation with the Council of State) were not changed and there were also after December 1996 those who had misgivings about the EC (Ayee 1998, 58) (Steps 1 and 2). But the much more important feature of the management process before the 1996 elections was the willingness of the EC to engage actively in confidence-building, inter alia, through the establishment of the ‘Inter-Party Advisory Committee’, which became a major vehicle for the development of a transparent management style, where party grievances were addressed before they became serious allegations against the EC.

Another major contribution to the creation of a high level of general acceptance of the election was that the opposition’s 1992 complaints were taken into consideration when the 1996 elections were being prepared. A new electoral roll was put together and considerable effort and skill was used to make it as inclusive and comprehensive as possible—and enough time was left to check the provisional version of the roll. Registration stations were staffed by both government and opposition party agents who were given the same training as EC registration personnel (Ayee 1998, 60) (Step 5).

In other areas that the opposition had complained about in 1992 there was improvement. Better and more dedicated voter education (leading, inter alia, to easier conduct of the poll itself and fewer spoilt ballots), counting at the polling station level (which makes fraudulent behavior more difficult if all party agents are given a copy of the result tally, which they were), the huge number of party agents present at most polling stations, the provision of transparent ballot boxes as well as small cardboard screens, which provided for secrecy without letting the voter out of sight (e.g., in a private room), which could give support to rumors about inappropriate voting behavior behind the closed doors (Steps 8 and 9).

There was broad and substantial agreement among all observers on the commendable work of the Ghanaian EC before and during the 1996 elections (Ayee 1997 and 1998; Gyimah-Boadi 1998 and 1999; Lyons 1997/99). The opposition could not reasonably question the result
of the election and the two defeated presidential candidates even congratulated the winner publicly, a dramatic shift from 1992.

In sum, the Ghanaian 1996 elections were a demonstration of the impact that good election management can have on the legitimacy of the election result and the development towards a more consolidated democracy, by contributing to the ordinary voters’ perceptions of the quality of the election (Ayee 1998, 72; McCarty 1997).

2. Botswana

There is widespread agreement, at least in the scholarly literature, that Botswana’s eight general elections since 1965 have been among the most free and fair elections on the continent (Wiseman and Charlton 1995; Molomo 1991; Good 1996; Danevad 1995; Darnoff 1997; López-Pintor 1999, 171–81). The voter participation of those registered to vote has maintained at a fairly high level (see Table 3) although registration rates have declined markedly since the 1970s and 1980s, which Wiseman and Charlton put down to apathy rather than to administrative inefficiency (1995, 324).

If there have been criticisms of a flawed process they have come in the following areas: The electoral system Legal Framework (Step 1) over-represents the governing Botswana Democratic Party (BDP), under-represents the fragmented opposition, and fails to provide the space needed for new parties to insert themselves into the political discourse. Nevertheless, unease with the electoral system has not been translated into dissatisfaction with the administration of elections themselves. When there have been questions of administrative legitimacy they have come in the areas of voter registration (Step 8), campaign regulation (Step 7), district delimitation (Step 3), ballot design (Step 6), and the area of election management (Step 2).

Registration in Botswana has been criticized on two levels, first the declining percentage of voters actually enrolled and the ability to register without proof of age (at least before 1994) and, second, the lack of an absentee vote which excludes a large number of Botswanas from voting as they work in neighboring countries, especially South Africa. There are also claims that the uneven financial playing field which leaves the ruling BDP with a monopoly of the campaign resources has been compounded by the BDP illegally accepting foreign campaign contributions (Molomo 1991, 20–21). In the area of districting, up till 1994, urban areas were seriously under-represented and this was where the opposition drew most of its strength. In 1999 there was some question about ballot design as the country for the first time moved from a ‘disc in envelope’ system to a printed ballot paper. The 5.7 percent spoilt ballot paper rate in 1999 was high, but as records had not been kept in previous elections it is difficult to ascertain
whether the change in the vote-casting method had increased the spoilt rate. Lastly, in 1994 over 70 percent of voters were in favor of establishing an independent, all-party commission to supervise elections, as opposed to the existing practice of government run elections (Good 1996, 66).

However, despite these criticisms, the legitimacy of Botswana’s electoral process is perceived to be high both domestically and externally. Voter education has been strong and the elections office produces at each election a substantial voter guidebook, which describes the purposes of elections, how to register, and how to practically vote, as well as the details of parties, candidates, and leaders (Wiseman and Charlton 1995, 324). Finally, Botswana is notable for actually putting into practice and accepting judicial review of election disputes. This happened most notably in 1984 when the High Court ordered the Gaborone South race to be re-run after a ballot box went missing.

3. Tanzania

The 1995 first multiparty elections in Tanzania (including Zanzibar) in more than three decades suffered from a number of logistical problems.

One problem was that the political discourse after the Nyalili report did not entail a broad, inclusive discussion and decision-making about constitutional or electoral law issues. The incumbent party, CCM, did not appear very interested in addressing the issues brought to the fore, such as the requirements for party registration, the different Mainland and Zanzibar residence requirements for registration, the different constituency sizes, the fact that independents could not stand for election, the appointment rules for the National Election Commission (NEC), the vagueness and inconsistencies of electoral legislation, etc. (Mukandala 1997; Mushi and Mukandala, eds. 1997). Some confusion over appointment of presiding officers and lower level electoral staff was probably unavoidable, but it contributed to the picture of a less than perfect situation. A major point of contention during the preparation phase was the insufficient and delayed allocation of funds from the Treasury for the conduct of the allocation, which made NEC planning difficult and made the NEC dependent on donor support for the conduct of the elections (Steps 1 and 2).

The NEC is responsible for delimitation, and a number of constituencies were subject to changes prior to the 1995 election. Accusations over the delimitation are difficult to substantiate (Liviga 1997, 67–68) but this contributed to the opposition parties’ perception of the NEC as being biased (Mukandala 1997, 127) (Steps 2 and 3).

Voter education, both by the NEC and civil society, was less than adequate (Step 4), so it was no surprise that registration was slow and the registration period had to be prolonged by
ten days (NEC 1997). While the NEC claimed that some 80 percent of the voting age population registered, the figure was only about 68 percent.

Polling was marred by logistical problems in the Dar es Salaam region, where elections had to be rerun in all seven constituencies, while the picture around the rest of the country differed. However, counting of the votes for the Zanzibar presidential election was evidently flawed and suspicion remains that this particular election was rigged during counting. Unfortunately once the result of a presidential election (Union or Zanzibar) has been officially declared, no complaint can be filed, in itself a dubious rule (Steps 8 and 9).

Complaints can, however, be filed in parliamentary races, and such complaints have flooded the legal system until the end of 1999, where the last reruns finally took place to settle disputes after the election four years ago (Step 10).

The general verdict about the quality of the election administration and the freeness and fairness of the 1995 elections is still being debated, as the experiences from 1995 might be instrumental in improving the elections scheduled for October 2000. However, the CCM government was slow in responding to suggestions intended to improve NEC capacity to deliver a better election than in 1995, and the opposition parties appear weaker and more divided than ever. The problems of election process administration and management experienced before, during, and after the 1995 election still colors the perceptions of many opposition party representatives—and consequently the legitimacy of the incumbent government.

4. Zambia

The perceived level of legitimacy associated with the 1991 Zambian elections was relatively high despite a low registration rate and subsequent low turnout. There were logistical failures on polling day, incidents of violence and intimidation during the campaign, and misuse of state apparatus by United National Independence Party government but, on the whole, the elections went smoothly, which led independent observers to say that the electoral authorities had conducted successful and credible elections (Bjornlund, Garber, and Gibson 1992, 4; Baylies and Szeftel 1999).

The chief flaws in the process originated from the legal framework (Step 1), campaign regulation (Step 7), and polling operations (Step 8), but none of these mishaps was serious enough to call into question the general validity of the elections. Indeed, the transfer of power from the old one-party regime of Kenneth Kaunda to the new ‘Multiparty Democracy’ movement of Frederick Chiluba was enough to legitimize the process in itself. Specifically in 1991 the chief obstacle to free campaigning was the state of emergency which remained in place throughout the election period and precluded opposition campaign meetings and evening
canvassing sessions. The opposition was also hindered by a lack of access to the national media, thanks to UNIP’s control over radio, television, and the only two national newspapers. The situation only improved late in the campaign when a number of small independent MMD-supporting newssheets began to appear and High Court rulings overturned Kaunda’s edict that newspapers not publicize the activities of the opposition.

On election day the electoral authorities “transported the ballot boxes, conducted the count, and transmitted the results with relatively few serious problems” (Bjornlund, Bratton, and Gibson 1992, 422). However, the polling itself was characterized by a number of logistical failures. Some polling stations did not open on time, some ran out of supplies, and many had invalid equipment and were unable to follow the electoral code in full. Nevertheless, it was believed that the overall results did in fact reflect the general will of the Zambian people.

However, by 1996 there had been electoral administrative collapse and sufficient manipulation of the legal framework (Step 1) that elections were held during a time of intense fragility. In May of 1996 Chiluba’s government passed into law a highly controversial constitutional amendment which, among other things, barred Kenneth Kaunda and his UNIP deputy from standing for the Presidency and changed the presidential electoral system from a majority to a plurality system. These clauses precipitated the UNIP’s eventual boycott of the November 1996 parliamentary and presidential elections.

Overall, the general environment in the lead-up to the 1996 polls was far from being conducive to a ‘free and fair election’ (Baylies and Szeftel 1999, 107). The Electoral Commission remained under the firm control of the government in the office of the Vice-President, and there was a severe misallocation of media space among political parties (Steps 2 and 7). In 1996 there were serious flaws in almost all the steps of the electoral process. There was government restriction on freedom of expression and assembly (Step 7), duplication of national registration cards (Step 5), and partisan politicization of voter education (Step 4). Equally disturbing was the widespread failure of a scheme to increase voter registration from the low levels of 1991 (Step 5). In 1995 the government contracted an Israeli firm, NIKUV, to conduct a registration exercise at the cost of US $18 million. The registration process was complex and required two trips to a registration center, which led to the exclusion of millions of voters in rural and inaccessible areas. Activities were also concentrated in the rainy season which doubled the difficulties, and eventually, after two extensions of the registration period, the voters roll consisted of 2.3 million names, 600,000 less than in 1991 and only half of the estimated 4.6 million Zambians of voting age. When registration cards were issued in August 1996 there were so many reports of irregularities that UNIP took the issue to court and were only defeated by the judges’ ruling that too much money had already been spent on the NIKUV operation to abandon the scheme.
As a result of the UNIP boycott and general alienation from the political system by the electorate, on the day only just over a million Zambians voted in the presidential and parliamentary elections, less than 30 percent of the eligible electorate. However, even the validity of these low figures was brought into doubt with allegations of widespread multiple voting. Local observer groups claimed that the elections had been fraudulent. Alfred Zulu, President of the Zambia Independent Monitoring Team (ZIMT), argued that the pattern of voting had shown the results to be fixed and that the elections had failed to meet international standards as set by human rights law associations. Ngande Mwanajiti, Chair of the Committee for a Clean Campaign (CCC), concurred that the elections were not free and fair. Both were detained by the police for their pronouncements.

5. South Africa

The 1994 and 1999 South African post-Apartheid national elections are interesting cases to study, as they both had various technical flaws (1994 more so than 1999), but the results were nevertheless generally accepted by all—voters, parties, international observers—as reflecting well the political attitudes of the South African electorate (Evans and Bruce 1999; Uys 1999). The explicit trust in the electoral process expressed by participating voters in 1999 is also remarkable (Lodge and Ntuli 1999, 17ff).

It should also be noted that South African voters on both occasions turned out in high numbers, which contributes to the picture of a political climate conducive to acceptance of the outcome. Two factors contributed strongly to this picture: 1) the Multiparty Negotiations at Kempton Park resulted in the acceptance of a fully proportional electoral system, which ensured that all parties would have a share of the seats reflecting as precisely as mathematically possible its share of the votes, whether in the provinces or in the National Assembly; and 2) the power-sharing element of ensuring all parties with more than five percent of the national vote in 1994 a proportional share of the seats in the first national government was a step in the same consensual direction (Step 1). Despite many of the rules and regulations being developed very late in the day, they were accepted by all parties as something necessitated by the extraordinary political situation.

The selection and appointment processes of the electoral commissions of 1994 and 1999 were generally accepted as having produced a good blend of personalities, with different political and cultural backgrounds, reflecting the diversity of the new South Africa. It is interesting to note, however, that even though both IECs did not have politically high-profile members, most members of both commissions had well-known political leanings, which, however, did not seem to trouble the political parties. Resources were not a concern in 1994, but they became a major concern in 1998–99, when they contributed to Johann Kriegler’s
decision to step down as IEC chairperson. This apparently helped convince the government to allocate more funds to the commission and to actively solve most of the problems related to the bar-coded IDs, a technically as well as politically complicated issue. The relationship between the IEC and its administrative branch gives an important contribution to the understanding of the electoral processes in 1994 and 1999.

In 1994 the time available for voter registration was too short and it was decided to conduct polling without a voters’ roll. This contributed to more inclusive elections than would otherwise have been the case—and it was a strong argument in many Commission deliberations that decisions should not disenfranchise voters at these particular elections. This and the ensuing decision—that voters could vote where they liked—eased some of the preparations, even though complicating the distribution of election material (such as ballot papers and spray ink) as it was impossible to know how many voters would turn up at polling stations A and B, respectively. In this regard, the situation improved in 1999, as the GIS based demarcation system allowed both the IEC and local election officials to know the number of voters expected at a particular polling station (Steps 3, 5, and 8).

Step 9 (counting) was a particularly contentious issue in 1994, because the political parties had opted for counting in counting centers, some of which were catering for substantial amounts of votes (Johannesburg, Pretoria, Cape Town, and Durban, in particular) but not allowing enough time for developing and training in the procedures for collecting and delivering ballot papers and for counting and reporting. The result was a certain amount of chaos, which was embarrassing for the IEC but which was definitely uncoordinated and therefore could not be favorable to any political party. Complications created by the last-minute, but still timely, discovery that a computer hacker had accessed the counting and tallying system contributed to the myth that the entire counting operation was a mess, which was actually not true. The overall acceptance of the final election result by all contestants demonstrates the importance of the IEC efforts to develop a good general relationship and a policy of transparency between itself and the parties (Southall and Szefiel 1999, 217–19; see also Evans and Bruce 1999 and Uys 1999).

The broad acceptance of election results both in 1994 and 1999 is remarkable. Different explanations are available, but a particularly plausible one appears to be the combination of the very proportional electoral system (Elklit and Roberts 1996) and two commissions, which were seen as reflecting the broad political spectrum of post-Apartheid South Africa and were therefore broadly accepted.
6. Mozambique

In 1994 Mozambique held multiparty elections within a sociohistorical environment that had all the elements for democratic disaster and breakdown—à la Angola two years earlier (see Turner, Nelson, and Mahling-Clark 1998). The country had been virtually destroyed by a long running civil war, the rule of law was virtually nonexistent, and the two major players in the war had antagonistically positioned themselves as the only two serious parties within the new multiparty competitive dispensation. However, quite remarkably, the 1994 elections went off relatively smoothly and were acclaimed to be administratively free and fair by both the domestic actors and the international observation community.

The logistical success of these first elections was greatly facilitated by massive international support. The UN deployed a team of 4,000 peacekeepers and 2,000 administrative personnel, and over $1 billion dollars was spent on the transition process. Three-quarters of the eligible voting age population were registered to vote (of which an incredibly high 88 percent actually turned out to vote) and an independent National Elections Commission was constituted. The closed-list PR electoral system (where seats were allocated within eleven districts with a five percent national threshold) proved to be inclusive of all the main parties—even though FRELIMO won an absolute majority of the seats on 44 percent of the popular vote. Thus the crucial elements of the legal framework (Step 1), the elections management body (Step 2), voter education (Step 4), and voter registration (Step 5) were all accepted and in place by the time of the October elections.

Many transition cases demonstrate serious flaws in the arena of campaign regulation (Step 7), especially when it comes to the financing of campaigning and facilitating a level playing field, but in Mozambique these issues were effectively massaged by the international community providing large amounts of campaign finance to both major parties. The FRELIMO governing party was relatively wealthy with its corporate interests to begin with, but Italy, the United States, South Africa, Namibia, and the UN together contributed $16 million to RENAMO in the run up to the elections (Haynes and Wood 1995, 365). In the first parliament that practice of ‘state funding’ continued with all three parliamentary parties being allocated monies from the $17 million UN Trust Fund to promote Mozambican democracy (Wood and Haynes 1998, 109).

In some of the media FRELIMO was able to protect its domination of the press, but the electronic media were scrutinized by international monitors to ensure neutrality (Wood and Haynes 1998, 108). On the voting days themselves there were some logistical failures, the allegation that Zimbabweans were voting on the border, and reported cases of journalists being harressed in the RENAMO stronghold of Zambezia, but the high turnout and lack of incidents paid testament to the smoothness and legitimacy of the process. There were no serious
objections or repercussions to FRELIMO’s subsequent victory in both the presidential and parliamentary elections.

By the elections of 1999 voter registration had actually gone up (to a reported 85 percent) and the social environment had been largely peaceful for the preceding five years of democratic government. But ironically the perceived legitimacy of the second multiparty elections of December 1999 was somewhat more in question than the first elections in 1994. RENAMO claimed four months before the election that thousands of foreigners had registered and the Carter Center subsequently argued that such opposition complaints had not been effectively dealt with by the electoral commission. On the two days of polling FRELIMO accused RENAMO of stuffing ballot boxes in their strongholds and RENAMO in turn argued that the extension to a third day of voting (as in 1994) was a ruse to rig the final outcome of what was expected to be a close race. Voting was in fact extended because of serious delays due to flooding in the Zambezi, which was a RENAMO area. In face of these cited irregularities the election was declared free and fair by international observers, but in a close-run race for both the presidency and the legislature RENAMO ultimately rejected the results when they lost by relatively small percentages at both levels and took their objections to the Supreme Court.

7. Sierra Leone

Riley’s statement that the conditions under which the 1996 Sierra Leone elections were held were “far from perfect” is perhaps the greatest understatement in the history of election analysis (Riley 1997, 540). The February–March presidential and parliamentary elections were conducted in one of the poorest countries in the world, which had been devastated by years of colonial exploitation, one-party mis-rule, six military coups, and in the 1990s a horrific civil war, which had not been resolved at the time of the elections. All this meant that many of the elements of free and fair elections were impossible to adequately arrange. The freeness of the election management (Step 2) was severely constrained by the fact that the independent Interim National Electoral Commission (INEC) sat underneath the existing military regime. The legal framework (Step 1), while altered to allow multiparty competition and a PR electoral system, still retained one-party state anomalies such as the 55 percent threshold needed by a candidate to win the presidency on the first round. Last, large numbers of rural dwellers had fled from the front lines to the few urban areas, especially Freetown, or abroad to Guinea and Liberia. In March 1996 the UN estimated that over 50 percent of all Sierra Leoneans were displaced persons (Riley 1997, 539).

However, the main administrative obstacle was registering voters (Step 5) in such a hostile environment. Registration efforts may have reached between 60 and 70 percent of eligible voters, but over a quarter of a million refugees over the border in Guinea were blocked
from registering by the military junta and most Sierra Leoneans left in the war torn countryside were untouched by voter registration teams. This meant that turnout in the first round of elections in February was little more than one-third of the voting age population.

Because of the conflict between the government and the Revolutionary United Front rebels, no real campaigning took place in the rural areas and very little campaigning took place at all outside of Freetown (Step 7). Nevertheless, access to media (the radio) was relatively balanced as each party could make appeals and the voter education conducted by the INEC, consisting of briefing booklets, radio adverts, and road-shows in different local languages, were successful in reaching those voters near to Freetown (Step 4). It is also true to say that those who were able to vote had few difficulties with the switch from the old marble voting system to party list PR legislative and presidential ballot papers.

However, the Commonwealth Observer Team’s announcement that the “elections were transparent and honestly conducted and generally free from fear and intimidation” (Riley 1997, 538) was clearly a political statement made to facilitate the implementation of an elected government and not a view rooted in the reality of the vote itself. Indeed, this stance was mirrored by the leading opposition party’s (UNPP) statement that “in spite of the glaring irregularities and flagrant violations of the electoral law…in the interests of fostering peace, security, and democracy, [they] would overlook these violations and allow the transition process to move forward” (Kandeh 1998, 105).

In the first round of voting (for the assembly and first-round presidential elections) there were: complete logistical failures in all provinces apart from the West; the looting of ballot boxes; attacks on polling stations and threats of reprisals made by soldiers in Freetown and elsewhere; the disappearance of ballot boxes in the city of Bo; attacks on the houses of the eventual presidential election winner, Ahmad Tejan Kabbah, and the former dictator, Valentine Strasser. In Bo youths danced through the streets with the severed heads and limbs of rebels who had attempted to stop people from voting, and in two of the country’s twelve districts there was almost no voting (see Riley 1997 and Kandeh 1998 for a summary of these incidents). Because of these problems voting was extended into February 27th but the overall turnout remained just half of those who had been able to register.

As no single presidential candidate had won over 55 percent on the first round, a run-off election between Ahmad Tejan Kabbah (SLPP) and John Karefa-Smart (UNPP) was held two weeks later. By this time rebel attacks had diminished and an extra 300,000 votes were cast. However, in a number of districts the legitimacy of this ballot was called into question as voter turnout ranged between 90 and 345 percent of the electoral roll. Indeed, the election commission arbitrarily reduced Kabbah’s vote by 70,000, although this still gave him election with over 55 percent of the vote (Kandeh 1998, 105).
8. Burkina Faso

The Burkinabe ‘regulated democracy’ started to develop in 1989–90, with the establishment of the Constitutional Commission in early 1990. From 1991 onwards a multiparty system was introduced and free, though highly controversial, elections were held. The latest parliamentary election took place in May 1997, and the result was—again—a sweeping victory for the incumbent party, the CDP, which is the successor to the ODP-MT, the party of long-term president Blaise Compaoré. The transition process in Burkina Faso actually unfolded—as in other African states also—in relative stability, which is—at least partly—to be explained by the strongly connected factors of the dominance of one party, the well-established symbiosis between state and party, and the limited role of the opposition.

Burkina Faso has a tradition of opposition parties either boycotting elections or issuing threats to that effect, which obviously testifies to the profound lack of confidence between the ruling party and the opposition. Before the 1997 elections a new EMB was established—*La Commission Nationale d’Organisation des Élections, CNOE*—but only after long and bitter debates over whether it should be ‘independent’ (the opposition’s claim) or ‘autonomous’ (the government position), a debate that also reflects the influence of French bureaucratic culture in Francophone Africa (see also Lopéz-Pintor 1999, 12–17). Eventually, the government’s proposal was adopted, including the appointment of the CNOE chair by the President but on the recommendation of the President of the Supreme Court. The appointment in early 1997 of a somewhat controversial magistrate as the CNOE chair did not contribute to the development of a good climate for the upcoming elections (Step 2).

The electoral system is proportional and the administrative units are used as constituencies (Grotz 1999). The residence pattern in Burkina Faso is such that many constituencies end up having only one or two seats, and the consequence is that the system becomes more majoritarian than proportional, as referred to earlier (Steps 1 and 3).

The Burkinabe electorate is among the most illiterate in the world, which makes voter education an extremely daunting task. The continuous need for such voter education is illustrated by the fact that more than five percent of the ballots in 1997 were blank or spoilt. Registration appears to be automatic (i.e., on the basis of the census lists), which explains why a relatively high percentage of the voting age population (21+) are registered to vote. However, participation has traditionally been low, which means that considerably less than half of the voting age population normally has participated in elections. However, participation increased to 56 percent of voting age population in the November 1998 presidential elections. But there appear to be a strong need for increased voter education in the run-up to elections (Step 4).

It has been claimed that the 1997 and 1998 electoral campaigns were heavily marked by state patronage, resources, and media to bolster the incumbent’s campaign and that the elections
were marred by fraud (Karatnycky, ed. 1999, 113–14) (Steps 7 and 8). That is probably true, but it should nevertheless be remembered that the divided opposition and the majoritarian features of the seat allocation system also contributed substantially to the eventual seat distribution (Step 1).

Summary of case study findings

1. An initial analysis of the most salient variables in the four cases with low perceived legitimacy of the electoral process illustrates that while there were flaws in many of the steps of Table 1, the common themes running through all cases are i) a perception that the basic legal framework was flawed and unfair (Step 1), ii) the belief that the EMB was either partisan or incompetent (or both) (Step 2), and iii) that polling was logistically flawed to such an extent that the results could not be a true reflection of the will of the people (Step 8). In some cases there was also substantial unease with registration, delimitation, and campaign regulation, but most of these issues were subsumed under the broader rubric of an inherently illegitimate legal and administrative base for the elections. That is, minority parties felt that the playing field was dramatically unequal and uneven and that the rules of the electoral game were stacked against them, preventing them from living up to their expected potential. Obviously, losing opposition and minority parties will rarely be the most trustworthy witnesses about factual matters. However, reports from international observers and nonpartisan domestic observers and commentators generally point in the same direction, so there appears to be some substance behind many of the reported perceptions. Thus it appears substantiated that these were indeed low-quality elections.

2. If we look at the areas that gave cause for concern in our more ‘successful’ cases but did not injure the legitimacy of the process to the same degree as in the previous cases, we note that issues of registration (Step 5), polling operations (Step 8), and counting (Step 9) did arise in Botswana, South Africa, and Mozambique, but the fact that the basic legal framework and professional approach of the election administration (Steps 1 and 2) was accepted by all significant parties appears to have stopped complaints in these areas from blossoming into a broader delegitimization of the entire process.

3. It thus appears that the EMBs’ willingness to include, reassure, and be responsive to all parties—even when the latter appear to be unfair in their judgment or unable to substantiate their complaints—has a considerable potential for defusing potential problems and misgivings among political contestants, as demonstrated in Ghana 1996 but also in other countries (e.g., South Africa). And where there have been problems—such
as in Zambia and Burkina Faso—the unhappiness has evidently been exacerbated by poor
relations between those administering the elections and those looking for answers or
redress. It also appears that a climate of acceptance and openness in the party-EMB
relationship will impact on the general campaigning climate, which tends to be less
unpleasant when the EMB has been able to establish a general acceptance of its good will
and professional approach.

4. The registration level does matter but only where low registration is perceived to be a
product of partisan bias or where disenfranchising a certain number of people is expected
to hurt one party more than another. For example, registration was poor in Zambia in 1996
but it was uniformly poor across all parts of the country. Thus, it appears that most parties
do not consider registration a matter of principle (i.e., that it is important to ensure
inclusiveness) but more as something that has an inherent instrumental value for
improving one’s own prospects for winning. The more principled approach—that a high
level of inclusion, inter alia, in relation to registration, is a sine qua non if an election is
to be considered free and fair—is then primarily found in civil society, among the more
dedicated EMB commissioners and staff, and among foreigners coming from political
cultures nurturing inclusiveness themselves.

5. The seat allocation system matters as yet another a facilitator of inclusiveness, as seen in
South Africa, Mozambique, and Sierra Leone. Sometimes even a PR system can rather be
exclusionary and cause unhappiness as in Burkina Faso, but it is interesting to note the
scant attention that the use of the FPTP electoral system has attracted in countries
applying this system. It is of course well known that this system discriminates against
representation of minorities, but most complaints are not directed against the electoral
system per se. However, the issue of the electoral system appears to be slightly more in
the forefront in Botswana and Tanzania than in Zambia and Ghana.

Some Provisional Conclusions

Theoretical reflections convinced us that a study of the implementation of institutional
choices with a direct bearing on election management and administration—and the ensuing
legislation and regulation—could contribute substantially towards understanding how election
management quality impacts on the processes of legitimation—and through that on the
processes of transition and consolidation in new and emerging democracies.
The framework established in Table 1 is yet to be fully utilized, but it has nevertheless been helpful in coming to grips with the electoral processes in the eight country cases included in our pilot study. The real test, however, will be how well the framework performs when more cases are included and when the analysis of individual cases can build on more in-depth data collection than has been possible here.

1. Policy formulation and design as well as implementation behavior are not only of paramount importance for the actual conduct of elections and the election management quality achieved but also for the perceptions evolving around the electoral process—and through that process also for the broad legitimacy of election processes. This means that the policy analysis approach offers a methodology that has not been included in the study of first and second elections in new democracies.

2. Implementation carried out by individuals and by organizations is often dedicated to the pursuit of high-quality democratic elections. But they might also—and simultaneously—be acting to promote bureaucratic, political, and personal materialistic interests within the confines established during the transition and especially during the legislative process, which itself impacts directly on the implementation process. This means that we will only see a democratic development if the political and bureaucratic actors find it in their interest to pursue such a development. We cannot make the horse drink if it doesn’t want to, as has been formulated elsewhere (Elklit 1999). The implication is that the suggestion by Mainwaring (1992) that structure is more important in explaining the second transition (toward consolidation) than the first should be revisited.

3. The organizational structure of EMBs—and the real (as well as perceived) independence of the electoral commission—matters a great deal.

4. Election management is a complex cluster of variables that need to be integrated into future studies of democratization. This means that in-depth studies and analyses of individual electoral processes and their administration are needed to validate and enrich the broader comparative studies and analyses that are also needed to get beyond the conclusions based on the present pilot study and scattered evidence from other countries.

5. This new explanatory variable should not in any way be seen as negating the importance of other variables that have so far been important for the understanding of transition and consolidation of new and emerging democracies. Our intention has only been to provide a much needed supplement to previous explanations.
Bibliography


Jaramillo, Juan Camilo; Marta León-Roesch; and Dieter Nohlen. 1989. *Poder electoral y consolidación democrática: Estudios sobre la organización electoral en América Latina.* San José, Costa Rica: CAPEL.


