



**CIVIL WARS, REVOLUTIONS AND COUNTERREVOLUTIONS IN
FINLAND, SPAIN, AND GREECE (1918–1949):
A COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS.**

Julián Casanova

Working Paper #266 – March 1999

Julián Casanova, a Kellogg Institute Visiting Fellow during the fall 1998 semester, is Professor of Contemporary History at the University of Zaragoza, Spain. He is the author of *Anarquismo y revolución en la sociedad rural aragonesa, 1936–1938* (Madrid: Siglo XXI, 1985), *La historia social y los historiadores* (Crítica, Barcelona, 1991), and *De la calle al frente. El anarcosindicalismo en España, 1931–1939* (Crítica, Barcelona, 1997); the editor of *El sueño igualitario: Campesinado y colectivizaciones en la España republicana, 1936–1939* (Institución Fernando el Católico, Zaragoza, 1988); the coauthor of *El pasado oculto. Fascismo y violencia en Aragón, 1936–1939* (Siglo XXI, Madrid, 1992); and he has written some fifty journal articles and

book chapters. He just finished a collective book on violence and repression during the Spanish Civil War and Franco's Spain. Professor Casanova has been a Research Fellow at Queen Mary College, University of London (1985–86), Visiting Scholar at the Center for European Studies, Harvard University (1991–1992), and Visiting Professor at the Facultad Latinoamericana de Ciencias Sociales (FLACSO), Quito, Ecuador (1994) and at the Universidad Industrial de Santander, Bucaramanga, Colombia (1997). He is Director of the Social Sciences section of Prensas Universitarias de Zaragoza and a member of the Editorial Committee of the journal *Historia Social* and the Advisory Board of *The International Journal of Iberian Studies* (Bradford, England).

Much has been written on the different civil wars of the interwar period in Europe—there is a veritable flood of books about the Spanish Civil War and fewer, but still numerous, books about the Finnish, Russian, Irish, and Greek Civil Wars. Surprisingly, and there are no comparative analyses of these events. For students of comparative macro-sociology, Finland, Spain, and Greece were small countries with little or no influence on the political and economic world system. For most historians, history is singular by nature, and this focus does not lend itself to comparisons.

The research I am presenting here reflects my interests in theoretical and comparative work and my view that there is a need to explore the connection between history and social theory. Such a perspective ought to be grounded always in rigorous empirical analysis and be accompanied by an awareness of the pitfalls and methodological difficulties entailed in any comparison. This research is also closely related to ongoing debates concerning breakdowns of democracy, revolutionary alternatives, and fascism.

From a symbolic and cultural point of view, the Finnish Civil War was the first national war of the period, with red and white sides. For the socialists, the Civil War was a battle for the preservation of democracy and, at the same time, a revolutionary war. For ‘the Whites,’ on the other hand, it was a war of liberation, a fight to rid the country of the evil influences of Bolshevism, in order to establish Finland’s independence.¹ The Spanish Civil War was not only a battle among Spaniards or between revolution and counterrevolution but also a battlefield between forces of democracy on one side and reactionary and fascist forces on the other. The Greek Civil War, finally, has been considered as one of the first major battles of the Cold War.

Red and white; fascism and democracy; capitalism and communism: these are big words that can define the character of those civil wars, revolutions and counterrevolutions. But beyond any emotive labels one can use, those civil wars were not simply the outcome of a political-military rivalry between two contending factions. In each of the three cases there was a conflicting vision with respect to the fundamental arrangements of social order in troubled years. It was, above all, a social crisis with manifest features of class conflict, national integration and, in the Spanish case, strong religious divisions.

¹ D.G. Kirby, *Finland in the Twentieth Century* (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1979), 50. For general and specific history of the period, see the annotated bibliography at the end.

There is so much material available that is necessary to attempt a preliminary synthesis. What I can do at present is to outline the similarities and differences among the cases and to reach some tentative conclusions. I will pay special attention to the origins, the revolutionary and counterrevolutionary processes, and the outcomes. And although I will not go into details on their historical backgrounds, I would like to introduce the subject to those who may be unfamiliar with Finland's, Spain's, and Greece's history. Let me, therefore, give you a brief description of the three very different settings in which these civil wars occurred.

The Settings

First I look at Finland. Finland is situated on the northern periphery of Europe; it seldom appears in the world press and still less in history books. The Grand Duchy of Finland was ruled by Russia in 1809, after having been a part of Sweden since the Middle Ages. In the twentieth century Finland was transformed from an agrarian country into a modern state whose citizens enjoy one of the highest standards of living in Europe. But in en route to this relative prosperity Finland first suffered oppression by Russia, a bloody civil war, and an 'eclipse' of democracy in the thirties as fascism emerged.

The demise of the Russian autocracy in March 1917 led to the collapse of imperial authority in Finland and introduced a period of confusion and debate as to the nation's future. As a result of the March revolution Finland was in chaos. As Risto Alapuro writes: "the only armed forces the state could rely on in a possible crisis were, in the last analysis, the imperial troops stationed in the country—and the Russian revolution largely paralyzed this force."² The restoration of law and order was a major issue during the last months of 1917. Social unrest grew. The Social Democratic Party, which in 1916 had become the world's first Marxist party to obtain an absolute majority in a parliamentary election, created the 'workers' guard.' The workers' guard, which became known as the Red Guards, was created in response to the growing strength of the civil guards (or White Guards), composed of antilabor and antisocialist groups.

A new revolution in Russia, in November, introduced again the problem of who must exercise sovereign authority. On 25 January 1918, the day on which the White Guards were officially proclaimed the troops of the Finnish—Svinhufvud—government, a committee set up by

² Risto Alapuro, *State and Revolution in Finland* (Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of California Press, 1988), 152.

the Social Democratic Party council took the decision to seize power. The civil war began on the night of 27–28 January. The Red Guards formally took control of Helsinki and established a revolutionary government. White forces, commanded by General Mannerheim, a former imperial Russian officer, disarmed the Russian troops in Ostrobothnia and set up a government in Vaasa. At the beginning of February the country was divided between the area in the south controlled by the Red government in Helsinki and the area in the north where the Svinhufvud government, backed by Mannerheim's White Guards, held sway. The Reds were in control of much of the industry and most of the major towns in the country. The Whites, although their numbers were inferior, were better equipped, better organized, and more united than the Reds.

The Finnish Civil War lasted some three months. Helsinki fell to the German expeditionary force under General Rüdiger von der Goltz on 13 April. Two weeks later the leaders of the Red Guards and several members of the revolutionary government fled to Russia. The end of the Civil War was celebrated on 16 May when Mannerheim rode at the head of a victory parade in Helsinki.

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We turn now to Spain. In Spain the fall of dictator Primo de Rivera in January 1930 opened up a hegemony crisis that led to the proclamation of the Second Republic in April 1931. At the time traditional agrarian structures were still common in Spanish society. Yet one could no longer ignore the results of the slow development of industrial capitalism which led in some cities to an 'urban explosion.' In the 1910s and 1920s the trade union—the classic working-class organization—emerged and become consolidated. As in other western European countries, trade unionism in Spain strove to improve the economic conditions of workers and to defend them from capitalist aggression. On this point there were no significant differences between socialists and anarchosyndicalists. What was different, however, from the rest of western Europe was the fact that in Spain all workers (whether affiliated with unions or not), like the mass of rural wage laborers and the entire female population, were excluded from a corrupt pseudo-parliamentarian political system.

An inefficient and oligarchic state was unable to channel the diverse interests of these social classes through parliament. In the absence of more appropriate channels, repression had been the traditional way of addressing social problems in Spain. The state always emerged victorious in those conflicts, but such a confrontational attitude towards the working classes

contributed significantly to the consolidation of a form of syndicalism that was antipolitical and radically hostile to the state.

With the overthrow of the monarchy all these issues, which had never been entirely repressed, came out into the open. Their resolution would not depend solely on the good will of the actors; but certainly success or failure in this matter was going to determine the course of the Republic.

The Second Republic, therefore, opened up the possibility of solving the old obdurate problems. Nevertheless, the project of reform was blocked by the adverse circumstances that surrounded the life of the Republic: an economic crisis, an inefficient and repressive state incapable of carrying out the project of reform, a rivalry between two syndicalist practices irreconcilably opposed to one another, and a hostile reaction on the part of numerous landowners.

Reform, social protest, conflict, and also some failed insurrections—led by anarchists in January and December 1933 and by socialists in October 1934—served to unify the ‘reactionary coalition’ against the Republic. That wide class coalition embraced the landowning aristocracy and hundreds of thousands of small and ‘very poor’ proprietors. Their objective was to destroy the Republic and to eradicate the socialist and anarchist threat.

The Spanish military had proven on numerous occasions that it had the capacity to protect by force the interests of those classes. It was not necessary, therefore, to invent a new solution. The *coup d'état*, begun on the evening of 17 July 1936 by forces of the Spanish Moroccan army, failed because the rebel military could not take the main cities. Civil war ensued from the failed attempt. The republican state maintained its legality. But the collapse of the mechanisms of coercion, caused by the splits within the military and the security forces, destroyed the state’s cohesiveness. Ultimately, the state itself collapsed.

Spain was divided into two zones with different forms of political and socioeconomic organization, depending on the local success or failure of the military coup. The areas of greatest population density and the most important towns were to be controlled by the republicans. The first year of the war saw, on both sides of the front, the growing centralization and consolidation of power. General Franco gradually emerged as the dominant figure on the rebel (‘Nationalist’) side. On the Republican side the previously small Communist Party, acting mainly under orders from Moscow, set about eliminating its rivals, notable the socialists, anarchists, and the Marxist POUM.

The Spanish Civil War ended on the first of April 1939 with the total victory of Franco’s forces. The end of the war was also celebrated with a victory parade.

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I now turn to the Greek experience. After more than four hundred years of Ottoman rule, Greece gained her independence in 1832. A century later Greece was a country divided. The high hopes raised by Greek successes in the Balkan wars (1912–3) were to be shattered by the profound rift that split the country into two rivals camps during the First World War and by the disastrous failure of Greece's postwar adventure in Asia Minor. According to Richard Clogg, the consequences of that National Schism, as it was known, "were to distort the country's political life throughout the interwar period."³ The fundamental cause of this cleavage was the differences that developed between King Constantine and his prime minister, Eleutherios Venizelos, over Greece's involvement in the First World War. After the defeat in Asia Minor in 1922 these tensions culminated in a military coup and in a plebiscite on the monarchy in 1923. The plebiscite resulted in a two-to-one vote in favor of a republic.

The political situation remained turbulent from then on. The military acted as an arbiter of political life through its political clients. Political clientelism, the factionalism of political life, and the chronic tendency of the military to intervene in the political process were distinctive features of Greek society before the Civil War.

In 1935, following a 'manifestly rigged' plebiscite, King George II, Constantine' son, returned to Greece after a twelve-year exile. Several months later General Metaxas was in power. In August 1936 he declared the suspension of the articles of the constitution and imitated the example of Greece's Balkan neighbors in substituting dictatorial for parliamentary government. Metaxas died in January 1941. Three months later Greece suffered a tripartite German, Italian, and Bulgarian occupation.

From the very beginning of the occupation there was a violent upsurge in antimonarchical sentiment. This was because King George was regarded as responsible both for the Metaxas dictatorship and the horrors of the subsequent occupation which was associated with a terrible famine. As Hagen Fleischer puts it very clearly: "there were at the time two large categories of people capable of inspiring and activating the paralyzed majority and transforming the existing potential for action into a coherent resistance movement. The first group was composed of the nation's traditional leaders, the politicians and the military caste; the other consisted of

revolutionary and subversive elements of diverse ideological orientation. It would prove tragic for Greece that only those in the second category would undertake to fulfill their patriotic obligations.”⁴

The Communists took the lead in the resistance movement. A National Liberation Front (EAM), with its military arm (ELAS), was created, as well as a number of smaller, republican, resistance groups, such as EDES. EAM, as the largest group, sought to monopolize the resistance struggle, and in the winter of 1943–4 civil strife broke out in the mountains between EAM and the much smaller EDES, in what has been called ‘the first round’ of the Civil War.⁵ Thanks to British intervention a uneasy peace was restored. None of the resistance groups could achieve total political and military control of the country, and it was clear that when the liberation came, the power struggle between the Communist-controlled EAM/ELAS and their opponents, republicans and loyalists, would be inevitable.

Nevertheless, as Richard Clogg says: “the course of events in Greece was to be shaped...not so much by the internal balance of power as by the complex pattern of Great Power relations.”⁶ Churchill was obsessed by the danger of a communist takeover in a country that was traditionally vital to British security. Under British auspices a government of national unity,

³ Richard Clogg, *Modern Greece* (London: The Historical Association, 1981), 23, and more extensive in his *A Short History of Modern Greece* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1986).

⁴ “The National Liberation Front (EAM), 1941–1947: A Reassessment” in John O. Iatrides and Linda Wrigley ed., *Greece at the Crossroads: The Civil War and Its Legacy* (University Park: The Pennsylvania State University Press, 1995), 49.

⁵ Ole L. Smith, “‘The First Round’—Civil War during the Occupation” in David H. Close ed., *The Greek Civil War, 1943–1950: Studies of Polarization* (London and New York: Routledge, 1993), 58–71.

⁶ Clogg, *Modern Greece*, op. cit. n. 3, 29.

headed by George Papandreu, was formed in exile with six ministers representing EAM. At the same time, in September 1944, the German forces began the retreat and evacuated Athens on 12 October. A British advance force reached the city two days later. On 18 October Papandreu landed in Piraeus.

For the next few days Athens was one huge liberation party. But, as Lars Baerentzen and David H. Close state: “it was soon apparent that Papandreu’s government faced at least three outstanding problems: the need to satisfy the demand from the Left for power and revenge in a manner acceptable to the Right; the economic problem of creating a stable currency, and finding supplies to prevent deprivation and get production going; and finally the problem of disarming the guerrilla forces and creating a new national army.”⁷ The country was partitioned between what were in effect two systems of government, each with its own police and armed forces.

That division, the chaotic economic situation, and the lack of agreement over the demobilization of the guerrilla forces led to the battle for Athens, or *Dekemvriana*, the ‘second round’ of the Civil War. This second round was characterized by fierce fighting between Communist guerrillas and the British and Greek forces that were at the disposal of the national government. The outcome of the battle was eventually determined by the immense superiority in men and *matériel* of the British.

On 15 February 1945, in negotiations in the seaside village of Varkiza, the EAM representatives were forced to demobilize ELAS, to abandon their hope of participation in the government, and to accept responsibility for those individuals found guilty of common crimes. The Right, the immediate beneficiaries from the victory of the British forces in the *Dekemvriana*, engaged in a campaign of terror against the Left, which boycotted the elections of March 1946, the first to be held since 1936. This abstention resulted in a massive victory for the right-wing Populists. Six months later a referendum, “which could not be regarded as a fair reflection of public opinion,” led to the return of king George II, who had left Greece with the German invasion in 1941.⁸

In Clogg’s words: “the elections exacerbated rather than resolved the continuing political crisis, and in the summer of 1946 Greece gradually drifted towards civil war” (the third, and decisive, round). With the support of Greece’s communist neighbors, Yugoslavia, Bulgaria, and Albania, the Democratic Army, founded in the autumn of that year, was able to maintain an

⁷ “The British Defeat of EAM, 1944–5” in Close, *The Greek Civil War*, op. cit. n. 5, 81.

⁸ Clogg, *Modern Greece*, op. cit. n. 3, 30.

effective campaign of guerrilla warfare. The Provisional Democratic Government of Greece, set up in the mountains in December 1947, was not recognized by any of the Eastern countries.

The British authorities, which had been dominating Greece since 1944, abandoned their long-standing protectorate over Greece in March 1947 (after securing their main aim of keeping the Russians away from the Mediterranean). President Truman took up the challenge and proclaimed the Truman Doctrine under which the United States guaranteed support for governments threatened with armed (or communist) subversion.

The massive flow of American military and economic aid began to turn the tide slowly against the Democratic Army. Internal dissension in the communist camp and disputes about Russia's role in Eastern Europe also undermined the Greek Communist Party (KKE). The Party sided with the Kremlin in its quarrel with Tito in 1948. Because of this the Yugoslav frontier was closed in 1949, and the Democratic Army was cut off from its main source of logistical support. In October 1949 Nikos Zakhariadis, the secretary general of the KKE, announced that large-scale military operations had ended, and tens of thousands of people fled into exile in Eastern Europe.

THE ORIGINS OF CIVIL WARS: INTERNAL PROBLEMS, INTERNATIONAL PRESSURES

We know now that the three civil wars were both the result of the accumulation of unsolved problems and the outcome of long- and short-term factors. But in terms of its origins the Spanish Civil War can be distinguished from the Finnish and Greek revolutionary-counterrevolutionary civil wars by virtue of the fact that these civil wars were inextricably related to international pressures.

The Finnish Civil War and revolution was, in Risto Alapuro's words: "an encounter on the one hand, of the class relations institutionalized in the state and, on the other, of the domestic consequences of Russia's collapse."⁹ In the end, however, the decisive factor was "the mode and timing of the final collapse of the metropolitan power." The abrupt end of the Russian Empire and the sudden disappearance of state control created favorable conditions for war and revolution. Therefore, the loss of unified control over the instruments of violence proved to be decisive; indeed it was seen as a key factor in the social analyses of war and revolution in the work of Barrington Moore, Theda Skocpol, Eric Wolf, and Charles Tilly.

This theoretical perspective helps us to see how the specific features of internal revolutionary developments resulted from Finland's external dependence. As Alapuro puts it:

⁹ *State and Revolution in Finland*, op. cit. n. 2, 185 and 150–196 for the quotations that follow.

“the process was genuinely internal in that it took place within the Finnish polity and the main contenders were Finnish groups; it was initiated, however, by the collapse of imperial authority, on which the maintenance of internal order ultimately depended.”

In Greece a ‘crisis of national integration,’ resulting from major internal cleavages (along territorial, ethnic, and class lines), developed in the period between the two world wars. This crisis exacerbated the conflicting visions regarding social and political order that were present since the National Schism of 1915 and the Asia Minor disaster of 1922.¹⁰ But external intervention played a key role as well and was more important even in Greece than in Finland during the so-called three ‘rounds’ of the Greek Civil War.

In fact, as John L. Hondros reminds us: “since the founding of the modern Greek state in the nineteenth century, foreign penetration of its affairs has been common and has had a decisive effect on the course of modern Greek politics.” And although a history of external interference can lead to an exaggerated focus that sees the hand of foreigners behind all major Greek political developments, almost all historians stress the influence of foreign powers in the Greek domestic disputes of the forties (a critical turning point in the history of the nation). It could hardly be any other way: there was a German invasion and occupation from 1941–4, a British intervention from 1944–7, and an American one from 1947–9. The history of the 1940s in Greece was determined externally, although each intervening power also served local interests and found collaborators within Greece’s ‘political world.’ By using Hondro’s words again: “in each intervention each foreign power sought to extend its power from the urban centers over the countryside, and in each instance the intervention provoked armed opposition rooted in the countryside.”¹¹

The German invasion and the resultant triple Axis occupation of Greece, created a political situation that to some extent, in Ole L. Smith’s opinion, paralleled that of Yugoslavia and Albania. He states that “the struggle against the occupation forces became at the same time a struggle for national liberation and for democratization of political, social, and economic life.” The German invasion and occupation discredited completely the traditional political forces and “helped to cause the total breakdown of the established order in 1941.” Thus, the seeds of civil war were contained in the resistance from the start “given the abnormal situation created by the

¹⁰ George Th. Mavrogordatos, “The 1940s between Past and Future” in Iatrides and Wrigley, *Greece at the Crossroads*, op. cit. n. 4, 40–2.

¹¹ “Greece and the German Occupation” in Close, *The Greek Civil War*, op. cit. n. 5, 32.

Metaxas dictatorship, the old politician's fear of the Communists, and the political vacuum left by the weak or nonexistent central authority."¹²

The British intervention on the anti-Communist side during 1944 determined the place of Greece in the postwar world. "Without British intervention, political power in Greece would almost certainly have passed into the hands of EAM/ELAS either at liberation or a few months later. Without British intervention, ELAS would certainly have won the battle for Athens."¹³ The British intervention in Athens in December 1944 was the first time during the Second World War that one of the Allied powers openly used military force to determine the postwar politics of a liberated country. The implications of those events extended beyond Greece. For Stalin, they provided a precedent for Soviet intervention in Eastern Europe. For western Communist Parties, especially that of Italy, they meant a warning as to what could happen if Communists chose the road of revolution.

Under the turbulent conditions that followed liberation, the ELAS was disarmed, the Communists were persecuted, and the Monarchy returned. KKE could not hope to succeed unless through the overthrow of the established political order. "The days of possible compromise, peaceful reform, and broad coalition government were long gone."¹⁴ The clash would ultimately be resolved by military means.

Parliamentary channels also proved useless in Spain for resolving political problems and social conflicts. But unlike the wars in Finland and Greece, the Spanish Civil War itself was the immediate result of a military coup which failed from the start to achieve its fundamental objectives of assuming central power and overthrowing the republican regime. In trying to answer the question of why a military insurrection took place (a rare event at the time in neighboring countries) and why it failed to achieve its objectives, one begins to discern some salient aspects of the situation.

On the one hand, there is the interventionist tradition of the Spanish military, the nature of that armed bureaucracy, and the privileged place it occupied within state and society. On the other hand, the failure of the coup forces us to explore the roots of the organized resistance against it within the armed forces as well as within Spanish society. What one encounters is the Second Republic, a regime that by introducing the possibility of solving old intractable problems had to face an array of factors causing instability. The regime was unable to put in place

¹² Smith "The First Round," op. cit. n. 5, 58–61.

¹³ Baerentzen and Close, "The British Defeat of EAM," op. cit. n. 7, 91 and 92 for what follows.

¹⁴ Introduction of John O. Iatrides to *Greece at the Crossroads*, op. cit. n. 4, 10.

adequate political responses to control these factors and was wracked in the end by logical doubts, tensions, and conflicts. These types of problems are characteristic of all reformist regimes trying to achieve a lot in a very short period (something shared by all the republics and democratic projects that succumbed to fascism and other reactionary movements of the period).¹⁵

Given the level of extensive political and social mobilization in the Spanish Republic in 1931, the military coup could not end, as had been the case so often in Spanish history, in a mere *pronunciamento*. The working classes, their organizations, collective actions, and mobilizations emerged on the public stage, on the street, in parliament, and in other political institutions as powerful contenders that could no longer be excluded from the system. Due to the presence that such collective subjects assumed in the conflict and because of the extensive popular support that was attained on both sides through broad interest coalitions, the Civil War of the 1930s cannot be viewed simply as the last in a continuum of civil wars experienced by modern Spain (the nineteenth-century Carlist wars).

The Spanish Civil War derived primarily from internal problems, but once it started the conflict became internationalized and each side began to rely upon foreign aid. When the war broke out, three Western democracies—Italy, Germany, and Austria—had already surrendered to fascism. Under those circumstances, the Spanish Civil War became a new link in the chain which led from Manchuria and Abyssinia to Czechoslovakia and to the outbreak of the Second World War. In such conditions Spain became the battlefield between the forces of democracy, on the one side, and reactionary and fascist forces, on the other. And this was an uneven fight, because the intervention of fascist powers and the lack of support from Western democracies tilted the balance toward Franco's army.

As pointed out by Juan Linz, the Spanish Civil War was the last of the great conflicts of interwar Europe (in fact, it ended a few months before the beginning of World War II). Being the last of such conflicts meant that it had some noticeable peculiarities. The two alternatives to democracy, communism and fascism, had already been invented and consolidated in some

¹⁵ For Germany, see Richard Bessel's very suggestive analysis, "Why did the Weimar Republic Collapse?" in Ian Kershaw, ed., *Weimar: Why Did German Democracy Fail?* (New York: St. Martin Press, 1990), 148–9. David Abraham had already tried to answer that key and persistent question in his work, *The Collapse of the Weimar Republic: Political Economy and Crisis* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1981). The best synthetic work on the troubled years in Germany is that of Eberhard Kolb, *The Weimar Republic*, (London: Unwin Hyman, 1988). Although military insurrections were not a rarity in Greece at that time, military coups never led to civil war. This was, among other reasons, because in Greece there was neither a reformist nor a democratic regime as in the Second Republic in Spain.

countries. Thus, other possible political outcomes—namely, conservative, liberal, social-democratic—appeared unavailable at the time.

By 1936 international conditions had become very unfavorable to the Spanish Republic. Additionally, internal factors played a role in influencing the final result. These internal factors were discord on the republican side and union on the Francoist side. International conditions, however, ultimately determined the fate of the Republic. It should be noted that external intervention also played similar roles in Greece later and in Finland two decades earlier.¹⁶ In the three cases external intervention tilted the balance toward the victors and the victors in these three cases were the forces of counterrevolution.

Egalitarian Dreams, Revolutions Defeated

That external intervention contributed to or determined the triumph of counterrevolution is a good indication of the extent to which the civil wars and revolutions under consideration here were closely related to international change during the interwar period. Having lost their monopoly on the means of violence, the Finnish, Spanish, and Greek states could not impede the emergence of a sudden, violent revolutionary process directed against the privileged groups. In these three cases multiple sovereignty emerged: there were two governments and hence two different polities, each composed of and supported by various groups and classes. And in the three cases, although revolutionary challenge meant an intense break with the past, social revolution did not lead to the takeover of centralized power (which, for many analysts, is a necessary condition for a 'real' revolution).¹⁷

¹⁶ Germany contributed decisively to the Whites' victory, not only delivering arms and sending home the *Jägers* who had been trained in Germany but also in intervening in the war. See Anthony F. Upton, *The Finnish Revolution 1917–18* (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1980), 336–42.

¹⁷ The break with the past also experienced different levels of intensity. The break was much more profound and violent in Spain and less so in Finland and Greece. According to Risto Alapuro, the "abortive revolution" in Finland had from the beginning a "defensive character" with the Socialist Party and the working-class movement trying basically "to *maintain* the power and advantages it had gained in 1917, not to seize power" (*State and Revolution in Finland*, op. cit. n. 2, 174–96). In Greece, as several analysts demonstrate, the EAM did not advocate revolution during the resistance against the Axis (trying to include in the movement liberal bourgeois parties and personalities, even royalists) and "took care not to scare off potential recruits, in what was fundamentally a conservative and traditional society, with wild talk of land collectivization or nationalization" (Clogg, *A Short History of Modern Greece*, op. cit. n. 3, 140, and Smith, "The First Round," op. cit. n. 5, 159). Efforts not to scare off potential recruits with talk of

A civil war accompanied by a social revolution as intense as the Spanish one did not take place anywhere else during the interwar years. Only the Chinese (1946–9) Civil War, which falls outside the spatial frame of this research, would be comparable. There were of course more civil wars than those considered in my analysis, e.g., the Irish Civil War of 1919–23. There were also bloody, abortive insurrections and rebellions, primarily in countries that suffered defeat in World War I. (Hungary is case in point. It had a Communist revolution and associated leadership in power for a few months, namely March through August 1919. The Communists were defeated by a counterrevolution with external support). The Russian revolution, then considered the paradigm of revolutions, was also followed by a civil-international war.

Yet the Spanish Civil War did not emerge immediately following World War I. Nor was it a war within another war, as was frequently the case during World War II when many movements of resistance against fascism soon turned into internal conflicts (e.g., France, Italy, and, above all, Yugoslavia and Greece). Let us focus, therefore, on the peculiarities of Spanish history that are highly relevant to comparative analyses of social movements in Europe and of the breakdown of democracy, social revolutions, and fascism.

The military uprising of July 1936 caused a break in the direction taken by the anarcosindicalist and socialist movements. The power vacuum following the defeat of the uprising called for an organized response in the streets, in factories, at the front, and in the institutions. But so many paths and alternatives were opened up that few anarcosindicalists—just to mention the main actors of the revolutionary process—seemed to realize the seriousness of what was around the corner.

As it was, in the summer of 1936 the revolution seemed to be all but reality. Revolution for the anarchists meant the radical elimination of the symbols of power, be it military, economic, cultural, or ecclesiastical power. Revolution meant the overturning of the existing order, of a State that no longer had a master to serve, with the bourgeoisie cornered and forced to don workers' clothes if they wanted to save their lives. Revolution meant sweeping clean, setting the surgeon's knife on sick organs. Revolution, in short, consisted of a widespread dissemination of aggressive rhetoric that spoke of a society with no class structure, no political parties, and no State.

collectivization, and to suppress it violently if necessary, was also the position adopted by Communists in Spain in their struggle for political and military power on the republican side. (See the discussion of these matters in my book *De la calle al frente. El anarcosindicalismo en España, 1931–1939*, Barcelona: Crítica, 1997.)

For George Orwell, who had just arrived in Barcelona, this outward aspect of the city, even though it was by now December of 1936, was “startling and overwhelming. It was the first time that I had ever been in a town where the working class was in the saddle.” Buildings draped with red and black flags; gutted churches; collectivized shops and cafés. Waiters and shop-walkers looked you in the face and treated you as an equal. Servile and even ceremonial forms of speech had...disappeared. ‘Tu’ was used instead of ‘usted’ and ‘salud’ instead of ‘adios.’ Loudspeakers “were bellowing revolutionary songs... In outward appearance...the wealthy classes had ceased to exist”: There was no evidence of ‘well-dressed’ people. Overalls, or ‘rough working-class clothes’ had taken the place of bourgeois dress.¹⁸

It was nearly all appearances, as Orwell himself admitted, images and rhetoric in which women were also involved. The revolution and the war against the fascists gave rise to a new perception and different image of the woman, plainly to be seen in war propaganda and slogans. Her traditional image as the ‘perfect wife’ and ‘domestic guardian angel’ was to be transformed, in the revolutionary fervor of the first few weeks, into that of the militiawoman, graphically portrayed on countless posters as the attractive young woman in blue overalls, rifle on her shoulder, and marching with firm step to the front to face the enemy.

During the early stages the image of the militiawoman, the active and warlike heroine, strong and brave, became the symbol of Spanish mobilization against fascism. If for men the casting off of ‘bourgeois dress’ was a sign of political identification, “for women, wearing trousers or overalls took on a deeper significance, since women had never before adopted this masculine dress,” and this challenged the traditional feminine appearance. But the militiawomen who dressed like men, thus demonstrating their claim for equality, were a small minority who were members of the *Confederación Nacional del Trabajo* (CNT), sisters or wives of militants, and were not representative of the female population. The majority of working women rejected this style of dress, and it goes without saying that not many men were in favor of it. For example, the 3 October 1936 edition of the Badalona *Diari Oficial del Comité Antifeixista i de Salut Pública* said that war was a serious business and should not be confused with a carnival.

¹⁸ George Orwell, *Homage to Catalonia* (London: Secker and Warburg, 1938). It seems that the aim of making ‘well-dressed’ people disappear was a recurrent cultural ingredient of social revolution and not just a trivial thing, as many could think. For example, at Tornio, Finland, after the Russian revolution of March 1917 a workers’ meeting resolved that the upper classes must give up wearing starched collars and cuffs “so that they could get to look like other people” (quoted by Jay C. Smith Jr., *Finland and the Russian Revolution, 1917–1992*, Athens: University of Georgia Press, 1958, 14).

In fact, this aggressive image of women had been part of the spirit of revolutionary adventure in the summer of 1936, but it soon disappeared, to be replaced by the slogan 'the men at the front line, the women in the rearguard,' more in line with the different roles assigned to the two sexes in the war effort: the former occupying themselves with combat in the trenches and the latter with support services and first aid in behind the line. Following the revolutionary upheaval, the exaltation of motherhood and a mother's right to defend her children from the brutality of fascism was to represent a much more powerful form of feminine militancy. September 1936, with Largo Caballero as President of the Government, saw the implantation of a policy to oblige women to leave the front. By the end of that year posters and propaganda featuring militia women had disappeared. In early 1937 these heroines in blue overalls had passed into history. As far as we know, not one of these female organizations, not even 'Mujeres Libres' (Free Women), publicly defied the decision, taken by men, forcing them to give up the armed struggle. All these organizations, concludes Mary Nash in the best work available on this theme, viewed the integration of the female work-force in production behind the lines "as an essential ingredient for winning the war."¹⁹

The revolution, with its militias, its collectives and its committees, was to extend its cleansing fire to deal with industrialists, rural landowners, members of the most conservative political organizations and, with particular zeal, the clergy. In republican Spain 6,852 members of the clergy, secular or regular, were murdered during the war. There were places like Catalonia, the stronghold of anarchist revolution, where more than a quarter of the people killed belonged to the clergy.

Many anarchosyndicalists believed that with the smashing of the legal system in force and the changes in ownership that took place, the revolution had become a reality. The events of July 1936 had, in fact, brought about a staggering rise in membership of the CNT. In Catalonia and the eastern half of Aragón this organization's long-term militants believed themselves to be the absolute masters of the situation. No longer were they 'the disinherited' or criminals or a sitting target for reactionaries and the governors. The people were now armed and nothing and no one could stop them. Everyone wanted to be a card-carrying member of the CNT. The broadsheet *Solidaridad Obrera* (Workers' Solidarity), which was distributed at no cost in the

¹⁹ *Defying Male Civilization: Women in the Spanish Civil War* (Denver, CO: Arden Press, 1995), 101–2. Unfortunately I could not find studies on women's participation referring to the Finnish revolution and, if Hagen Fleischer is correct, "not a single scholarly study exists on this subject" in the historiography on civil war and revolution in Greece ("The National Liberation Front," op. cit. n. 4, 66–7).

streets of Barcelona during the first few days, was soon to reach its height of circulation with so many people eager for the latest news of the war and the revolution.

But for all its destructive and radical aspects, in that summer of 1936 the revolution had only just begun. Events soon showed that the horizon was not so clear. The breach opened by few weeks in which all the political organizations seemed to condone these ways of exercising the revolutionaries with their victory in Barcelona did not even manage to reach Saragossa. After a popular power, overturning the old order, it very soon became clear that the revolutionary process—or what others described as a struggle against fascism in a civil war—was first and foremost a struggle for political and military power. It was a battle for the control of arms and the changes that could be brought about by them. It was a battle for the reconstruction of a State that had been debilitated by the uprising and by popular action.

The anarchosyndicalists' inability to synthesize their widespread revolutionary powers into a comprehensive policy condemned them to becoming mere supporting actors from the autumn of 1936 onwards. When they joined the government, the best posts had already been taken. The revolution, with its air of improvisation, with no clear direction in mind and threatened by countless enemies, had reached an impasse. The militias, poorly organized, even more poorly equipped, and with hardly any discipline, languished until their final incorporation into the new Republican army. By the summer of 1937 there was no trace of the glorious times of July 1936. In less than a year the great anarchosyndicalist project was to expose its brittleness. This had been its—albeit brief—golden age.

The Outcomes: Varieties of Counterrevolution

These civil wars and revolutions were to leave long-term scars on the Finnish, Spanish, and Greek societies.

In Finland, as was the case later on in Spain and Greece, the attempt at revolution was followed by counterrevolution. The White terror was unleashed on the whole working class in the wake of White victory. According to Anthony F. Upton, the White terror had three components:

the extralegal reprisals taken against the defeated, the legal repression carried out under forms of law, and the incidental suffering and mortality experienced by the imprisoned Reds.”²⁰

During the war the terror had been a regular feature of both White and Red behavior. About two thousand people were killed on each side, apart from the battles. When the war’s end was approaching and the Reds were in a chaotic retreat, a large-scale reign of White terror broke out. From 28 April to 1 June the number of illegal killings was 4,745, just over half of all such killings. During the first week after the war the Whites executed on average 200 people per day. In total the illegal killings of captured Reds, or those taken to be such, reached at least 8,380.

The method of killing was a combination of simple shooting out of hand, usually in the immediate aftermath of a battle, and the use of self-appointed tribunals. The process, as in the aftermath of many wars and revolutions, was quite arbitrary and the victims were not necessarily either the most activist socialists or among those accused of perpetrating the Red terror. In Upton’s words: “The basis of the purge seems to be as much social as political; the bourgeois leaders, in their local communities, took the opportunity to get rid of known troublemakers and bad characters, and inevitably many personal vendettas were settled in the process.”

There was also the ‘unintended’ mortality of about 12,000 prisoners—from about 82,000 who were incarcerated by the victors—who died in prison camps, mostly of malnutrition and diseases associated with it.

The White terror, therefore, was vast in its effects. In a country with a population of 3.1 million the executions and camp deaths resulted in the deaths of about 20,000 people. In addition to these deaths, tens of thousands of workers were imprisoned, lost their rights, and were discriminated against by hostile employers and the security forces of the state. The Social Democratic Party was prevented from participating in the political system, and the Communist Party of Finland, founded by emigrants in Moscow, was declared illegal.

In Finland the terror continued and it continues to be a highly emotional subject. The counterrevolution, however, did not last. The ‘legal’ agencies of repression were set up very soon and ‘illegal’ repression was brought to an end. A law was passed on 29 May 1918 that set up special courts. After the end of May the murders fell dramatically, and in fact only 5% of those brought before the courts were killed after the law had passed.

²⁰ Upton, *The Finnish Revolution*, op. cit. n. 16, 519, from whom I am taking also the numbers of the repression.

On the other hand, and this is very important for the comparative framework I am presenting here, “just as the international power constellation had decisively contributed to the revolutionary situation, so too did it influence the postwar political system in Finland.”²¹ After Germany’s defeat, democratic general elections—one of the Entente’s conditions for the recognition of Finnish independence—were held in 1919, with ‘reasonable’ Social Democratic success. In the same year a republican constitution was confirmed and a Liberal was elected president (with the support of the Socialist Party). From then on the Social Democratic Party was tolerated; in fact, as early as 1926 the Socialists formed a minority government.²²

Nor was democracy the first and main inclination of the Right who were the victors in the Greek Civil War. During the final stages of the war over 140,000 people fled into exile. About 20,000 people were killed on the leftist side during the fighting of 1946–50, although there are no exact figures on murders as the result of rightist terror. At the end of 1949 the government admitted that 50,000 people were imprisoned in camps and gaols.

The executions ordered by court martial ceased very soon and the number of political prisoners declined steadily, falling from 17,089 in January 1952 to 5,396 in November 1955, according to official figures. A general election in which even socialists could participate (to some extent) occurred in March 1952 immediately following the end of hostilities and the lifting of martial law. Postwar Greece was based on a strong monarchy, a respected national church, an archaic educational system, and a systemic denial of communism. In fact, the defeated Communist Party was outlawed and its followers and sympathizers were systematically harassed and persecuted. However, the existence in Greece of a ‘restricted’ parliamentary system or a ‘quasiparliamentary’ regime, as termed by Nicos P. Mouzelis, allowed the Greek Communist Party in exile “to guide the activities of a revived EAM, under the name of the United Democratic

²¹ Alapuro, *State and Revolution in Finland*, op. cit. n. 2, 178.

²² There is, of course, another line of interpretation that would stress the recurrent repression of workers until the mid-forties and the persecution of Communists. There was a worrying emergence of the Lapua movement at the end of the twenties and the beginning of the thirties, cleavages around the language question, and conflicts between monarchists and republicans and in the ranks of the Finnish army (see, for example, Kirby, *Finland in the Twentieth Century*, op. cit. n. 1, 64–105). But still, as Alapuro argues, the counterrevolutionary forces “had no deep roots in the social structure.” They were forced to surrender many of their gains, “leaving a significant potential for discontent within the dominant groups” (*State and Revolution in Finland*, op. cit. n. 2, 178); potential for discontent, it should be added, that put to the test the ‘hard-won’ independence during the following two decades.

Left (EDA). Under police harassment the EDA participated in parliamentary elections from 1951 onwards and secured the election of some deputies.”²³

International intervention played a key role again in the internal events of Greece. Some authors such as David H. Close think that “the relative mildness” of the war’s aftermath was due mainly to the fact that the Right’s inclination toward violence and authoritarianism “was restrained by a realization that the British and the Americans opposed the establishment of a dictatorship.”²⁴

In Spain there was no mildness at all and the Civil War was followed by a long uncivil peace. This may possibly be the most relevant difference among the Finnish, the Greek, and the Spanish cases. Following Franco’s conquest of all the territory that had been loyal to the Republic, social order was reestablished with the same speed with which it had been overturned. The cultural and social structures of *caciquismo*, the Church, and employer/employee relations were restored after the nightmare of the revolutionary experiment. The memory of war and bloody repression and the spirit of revenge on the defeated were exploited by the regime as useful tools for maintaining unity in the victorious coalition and for intensifying the misery of all the ‘undisciplined masses’ who had dared to denounce the social order. The churches were filled with commemorative plaques for those ‘fallen in the service of God and Fatherland,’ and the February 1939 Political Responsibilities Act gave *carte blanche* for continuing the physical elimination of any opposition. For a long time, in the official language of the day, there were only ‘the victors and the vanquished,’ ‘patriotic and traitors,’ or ‘nationalists and reds.’ Imprisonment, execution, and exile drove republicans, leftists, and workers’ organizations into a tunnel from which there was no exit. Until June 1977, almost two years after the death of Franco, there were no free elections.

The ‘vanquished’ who managed to survive were forced to adapt to new methods of ‘coexistence.’ The bosses returned to their factories and their lands, determined to purge them of all those who had played an active part in the collectives. Many lost their jobs; others, especially in the rural areas, were forced to move to other cities or villages. The trade union militants received the worst treatment—hounded and denounced by informers. Those who had not been

²³ David H. Close, *The Origins of the Greek Civil War* (London: Longman, 1995), 219–21, from whom I am borrowing also the figures of repression. The definition of the regime used here is from Mouzelis in his *Modern Greece: Facets of Underdevelopment* (New York: Holmes and Meier Publishers, 1978), 111.

²⁴ “The Reconstruction of a Right-Wing State” in Close, *The Greek Civil War*, op. cit. n. 5, 156–7, and “The Changing Structure of the Right, 1945–1950” in Iatrides and Wrigley, *Greece at the Crossroads*, op. cit. n. 4, 122–5.

so committed, many of them illiterate, suffered in silence in order to survive, forced to 'swallow' their very identity.²⁵

Franco's dictatorship was the only one in Europe that emerged from a civil war and established a repressive state, persecuted its opponents, attempted to eliminate the memory of war, and constantly administered bitter punishment to the losers to the very end. Irrespective of the characterization of the dictatorship (fascist, authoritarian, reactionary), a civil war that begins with a *coup d'état* and ends with the triumph of violent, definitive, and lasting forces of counterrevolution calls for comparison not only because of the process (i.e., the historical event itself) but also because of its outcomes. Thus, it is necessary to insert the Spanish Second Republic, the Civil War, the revolution and the dictatorial regime that followed within the framework of research and debates over the breakdowns of democracy and fascism.

The unfavorable international situation during the thirties determined the final outcome of the Spanish Republic. Once defeated in 1939, the unfavorable international situation helped to maintain the dictatorship. There are, however, some peculiarities of Spain's social structure and Spanish history that are also highly relevant to more comprehensive explanation.

On the one hand, the existence of a powerful landowner class—in political and not only quantitative terms—blocked the needed agrarian reform, had an important effect on middle-class and peasant politics, and foreclosed options for the working class. The agrarian reform undertaken by the first republican-socialist government in Spanish history (1931–3) was radical in appearance although very mild in practice. That reform menaced the family peasantry, small and very small holders, and because of its mildness alienated the support for the Republic of rural workers and urban working-class groups that were very committed to radical-revolutionary agrarian change. The reactionary coalition that came together with the military uprising in July 1936 was strongly marked by antisocialist resentment, which had been fed by its opposition to the reformers' project for the Republic. That was certainly one of the lines of confrontation that led to the military *coup d'état* and then to the civil war.²⁶

²⁵ Mercedes Vilanova, *Les majories invisibles. Explotació fabril, revolució i repressió. 26 entrevistes* (Barcelona: Icaria, 1995).

²⁶ As is very well known, Barrington Moore was the first to stress in comparative perspective the relevance of the formation of a reactionary coalition among landowners, the state, and a weak and dependent bourgeoisie as a decisive condition for the success of a fascist solution (*Social Origins of Dictatorship and Democracy: Lord and Peasant in the Making of the Modern World*, Boston: Beacon Press, 1966). John D. Stephens extended the same argument by including more countries, Spain and Finland among them, in "Democratic Transition and Breakdown in Western Europe, 1870–1939: A Test of the Moore Thesis," *American Journal of Sociology* 94 (5, 1989):

Moreover, in a conjuncture of economic crisis and radical change, such as the one the Second Republic had to face, the social policies of republicans and socialists could not do much to benefit the dispossessed. There opened up an abyss between the state and a large sector of the population that was not necessarily affiliated to the anarchosyndicalist CNT. Under those circumstances the democratic state, which according to the Republicans was going to be the instrument of social change, found itself unable to integrate 'the laboring classes' into the system at all. The abyss became even wider among the large rural sectors of poor and 'very poor' proprietors. All of these cleavages also help to explain the destructive and radical ingredients of revolution in the summer of 1936, after the military uprising, when armed means were the only ones left for the resolution of political problems and social conflicts.

From the first moment of the coup the military created a climate of terror that left behind almost 100,000 people murdered during the Civil War and more than 30,000 killed in the uncivil peace that followed (mainly between the end of the war and 1946). The uprising and the 'reactionary' terror met resistance as the response of all those who defended either the republican legitimacy or the revolution. And in places where the military was defeated the blood of 'fascists,' bourgeoisie, military, and clergy watered the fields and the city streets. Over 70,000 people were murdered, most of them, as on the other side, without any 'legal' guarantees.

Religion increased the violence, instead of mitigating it. On the one hand, the united defense of religion and the social order blessed the killings of 'reds,' 'atheists,' and 'undesirable' people. On the other hand, the role of the Church in sanctioning violence fed to a extreme extent the popular anger against the clergy which had exploded in the same instant as the defeat of the military uprising. Thus, the long conflict between the Church or Spanish Catholicism—as the classical pattern of 'status quo religion'—and anticlericalism—which impregnated every movement of social protest and dissidence in contemporary Spain—was also solved by armed means.

By combining these lines of confrontation we understand much better the nature of the violent solution that was initiated in July 1936 and triumphed from April 1939. It rescued the

1019–77. The "pivotal role" of the "family peasantry" and its antisocialism for the fascist solution in Italy, Germany, and Spain was stressed by Gregory M. Luebbert, *Liberalism, Fascism or Social Democracy: Social Classes and the Political Origins of the Regimes in Interwar Europe* (NY: Oxford University Press, 1991), 277–85. Neither Finland nor Greece had a powerful landowner class. In Greece, for example, the Asia Minor defeat and the arrival of more than one million Greek refugees accelerated the land reform program already initiated by Venizelos. The benefits and social consequences of the break-up of the large landed estates have been emphasized by many analysts (see, among them, Clogg, *A Short History of Modern Greece*, op. cit. n. 3, 121–2; and Mouzelis, *Modern Greece*, op. cit. n. 23, 22–3).

political and social system from the crisis of domination, cleared the way for capitalism, destroyed the political culture of republicanism and the labor movement, abolished the nationalist separatist alternatives and their languages, and freed the Church from anticlericalism.²⁷

In all three countries the Right was determined to crush the Left. But in Spain, given the greater level of political and social mobilization that was closer to the Western European countries and given the nature of old insoluble problems, success required major surgery of the sort that was put in motion by fascism elsewhere in Europe. The 'solution' ended the crisis and suppressed all of the cleavages either opened or enlarged by the experience of the Republic, Civil War, and revolution. The development over time from a 'fascist' dictatorship into a bureaucratic and less violent one does not change its bloody origins or the political, social, economic, and cultural costs of the benefits that the victors obtained.

In Finland civil war and revolution occurred without strong threats to social order because it was the metropolitan—Russian—collapse that opened the way to independence and armed conflict. In Greece the discrediting of the traditional political forces caused by the German invasion in 1941 helped to break down the established order and opened the way for the Communist Party to mobilize the peasantry, the urban working classes, and large sections of slavophones against the German invaders and the 'traitor' collaborationists. In both these cases international democratic intervention blocked the road to postwar counterrevolution. A great benefit which, due to internal and external factors, as I have argued, Spain never enjoyed.

²⁷ According to David Close, the Greek Right, like its counterparts in Italy and Spain, "was keen to associate the national church with the power structure." In that sense, "defense of the church gave the Right a sense of purpose and was associated both with patriotism and with traditional moral values, such as patriarchal authority in the family." But the church, unlike its counterparts in Italy and Spain, "was at first unsure whether it wanted to be bound to the Right." Religion had little impact on the 1946 elections and the Communist Party "did not appear to present an out-and-out threat to the church." (See "The Changing Structure of the Right" in *Iatrides and Wrigley*, op. cit. n. 24, 127.)

Annotated Bibliography

The reader interested in the kind of comparative analysis proposed here will find suggestive clues and suitable reflections in the opening and concluding articles by Edward Malefakis to *La guerra de España, 1936–1939*, first published in *El País* in 1986 and now published with the same title and some slight changes by Taurus, Madrid, 1996. A more solid base is provided by a research that places the Spanish Civil War within the context of the investigations and debates concerning the breakdowns of democracy, revolutionary alternatives, and fascism. Juan J. Linz is the outstanding figure in this tradition. The four-volume work he coedited with Alfred Stepan, *The Breakdown of Democratic Regimes* (Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 1978), serves as a prominent model (only the extensive introduction by Linz has appeared in Spanish, published as *La quiebra de las democracias* by Alianza, Madrid, 1987). Linz reexamined the topic, updating his well-known reflections, in “La crisis de las democracias” in Mercedes Cabrera, Santos Juliá y Pablo Martín Aceña, eds., *Europa en crisis, 1919–1939* (Madrid: Editorial Pablo Iglesias, 1991).

Gregory M. Luebbert is the first author to have included Spain in a broad comparative study of this crucial period: *Liberalism, Fascism or Social Democracy: Social Classes and the Political Origins of Regimes in Interwar Europe* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1991). I have reviewed the validity of his arguments in light of existing investigations in “Liberalismo, fascismo y clase obrera: Algunas contribuciones recientes a la historia comparada de la Europa de entreguerras,” *Studia Historica-Historia Contemporánea X–XI* (1992–3): 101–24.

North American historical sociology is well versed in this comparative terrain, thanks to the pioneering work of Barrington Moore, Jr., *Social Origins of Dictatorship and Democracy: Lord and Peasant in the Making of the Modern World* (Boston: Beacon Press, 1966). John D. Stephens tested the validity of Moore’s thesis in an extensive article dealing comparatively with most of the Western European countries that experienced democratic governments between the end of the Franco-Prussian War and the beginning of World War II: “Democratic Transition and Breakdown in Western Europe, 1870–1939: A Test of the Moore Thesis,” *American Journal of Sociology* 94 (5, 1989): 1019–77.

Much has been written as well about the social revolution that accompanied the Spanish Civil War, although comparative analysis is very rare. Franz Borkeu offered pioneering research in his suggestive but now forgotten essay, “State and Revolution in the Paris Commune, the Russian Revolution, and the Spanish Civil War,” *Sociological Review* XXIX (1, 1937).

Notwithstanding the fact that they rarely deal with the Spanish case, almost all the comparative historical analyses of revolutions offer abundant paths for exploring. Theda Skocpol's *States and Social Revolutions: A Comparative Analysis of France, Russia and China* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1979) stands out in this field. I reviewed its strengths and shortcomings in "Revoluciones sin revolucionarios: Theda Skocpol y su análisis histórico comparativo," *Zona Abierta* 41–42 (octubre de 1986–marzo de 1987): 81–101. I have offered a recent account of the social revolution that accompanied the Spanish Civil War in *De la calle al frente. El anarcosindicalismo en España (1931–1939)* (Barcelona: Crítica, 1997).

Finally, concerning the debates around the character of Francoism, a regime that emerged out of the Civil War and was built with its uncivil peace upon the ashes of the conflict, there is the recent account by Manuel Perez Ledesma, "Una dictadura 'por la gracia de Dios'," *Historia Social* 20 (1993): 173–93. Paul Preston, Stanley G. Payne, and Juan Linz are the best English writer on this issue.

General histories of modern Finland include: L.A. Puntilla, *The Political History of Finland, 1809–1966* (London: Heineman, 1975); Fred Singleton, *A Short History of Finland* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1989); and more informative on the Civil War, D.G. Kirby, *Finland in the Twentieth Century* (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1979).

The statemaking and class structure in Finland are studied in depth by Risto Alapuro in *State and Revolution in Finland* (Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of California Press, 1988). The revolution that accompanied the Finnish Civil War is described in minute detail by Anthony F. Upton, *The Finnish Revolution 1917–1918* (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1980).

The implications of dependency for Greece, along with provocative theoretical points, are discussed by Nikos. P. Mouzelis in *Modern Greece: Facets of Underdevelopment* (New York: Holmes & Meier Publishers, 1978) and *Politics in the Semi-Periphery: Early Parliamentarism and Late Industrialization in the Balkans and Latin America* (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1986).

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The works that I found most useful for my research include David H. Close, *The Origins of the Greek Civil War* (London: Longman, 1995); David H. Close, ed., *The Greek Civil War, 1943–1950: Studies of Polarization* (London and New York: Routledge, 1993); and John O. Latrides and Linda Wrigley, eds., *Greece at the Crossroads: The Civil War and Its Legacy* (University Park: The Pennsylvania State University Press, 1995). The last two books contain a good and up-to-date discussion of the most relevant issues concerning Greek society in the

forties. For the years before, fundamental reading is George Th. Mavrogordatos, *Stillborn Republic: Social Coalitions and Party Strategies in Greece, 1922–1936* (Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of California Press, 1983).