THE TRADITIONAL POLITICAL ELITE AND THE TRANSITION 
TO DEMOCRACY IN BRAZIL 

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ABSTRACT

This paper examines the participation of traditional political elites in the transition to democracy in Brazil through an in-depth study of the political elite of the state of Minas Gerais. The first part of the analysis focuses on the political negotiations, crucial for the construction of the civilian regime, which allowed the traditional elite to recapture the political bases of its dominance: control of state office and political parties through which the elite organized channels of state clientelism. The second part of the paper discusses how the participation of this group in the governing coalition may undermine efforts to achieve democratic politics in Brazil. It concludes that open political competition among representative political parties holds the best prospects for consolidating democratic gains.

RESUMO

Este trabalho examina o papel das elites políticas tradicionais, sobretudo da elite política do estado de Minas Gerais, na transição democrática no Brasil. A primeira parte do estudo aponta as transações políticas que, enquanto críticas para a consolação de uma regime civil, entregaram à elite tradicional os instrumentos principais da dominação política tradicional: o comando do aparato estatal e dos partidos políticos pelo qual o clientelismo estatal é canalizado. A segunda parte da análise chama atenção à maneira em que a participação deste grupo na coalização governante pode prejudicar os esforços para construir uma democracia no Brasil. Conclui que a competição política aberta entre partidos políticos representativos oferece a melhor chance para a consolidação da democracia.
The long transition to democracy in Brazil launched in 1974 from "above" by then President Geisel is widely believed to have culminated in 1985 with the electoral college victory of Tancredo Neves, the civilian opposition candidate for president. Following a year of mass popular mobilization and elite bargaining, two decades of military rule came to a close--not even the death of the president-elect on the eve of his inauguration impeded the orderly transition from military to civilian rule.¹ In the years prior to 1985 when the military frequently retreated from its promised liberalization, how far the military governors would allow the regime to open, and whether they would renege on their promise to concede power to a civilian regime, were intensely debated issues. With the future of a new political regime in doubt, relatively less attention was paid to its emerging form. Now that civilians appear to be securely entrenched in office and the "New Republic"² is two years old, it seems appropriate to shift the focus of our discussion about democratization to the political institutions and processes of the new civilian regime.

The New Republic had an authoritarian birth. The old regime's leaders agreed to a political opening before it was demanded from below. Important social actors such as industrialists, labor, and the Catholic Church did protest regime policies and hasten the military's departure from politics, but the pace and scope of the transition to civilian rule were dictated by incumbent elites, up to and including the indirect election of the civilian president.³ The realization of democracy in Brazil would appear to depend at least in part, therefore, on the new regime's ability to discard the old regime's elites, rules, and practices--in effect to free itself from its authoritarian legacy.

This paper examines the degree of continuity and change between the authoritarian regime and the New Republic in Brazil by investigating the role played by old regime elites in the transition, assessing the extent to which they were able to influence the reconstruction of politics after two decades of military rule, and mapping out the implications of their participation in the new regime for democratization. This approach
has been endorsed by many observers. O'Donnell (1985a: 11-13) has recognized the
capacity of an incumbent elite of an authoritarian regime to control a transition to
democracy as a critical variable in explaining the success and direction of democratization.
Similarly, Viola and Mainwaring (1984) have pointed out in general terms that the ability of
the elite to control the "transition from above" in Brazil kept significant features of the
authoritarian regime alive during the transition. Werneck Vianna (1985: 31-33) has
argued that the power retained by the forces of the old regime will, to a large extent,
determine the outcome of the most important issues facing Brazil in its transition to
democracy--agrarian reform and strike laws--and also define the center in the party and
political systems.

But while many works have stressed the elite origins of the democratization in
Brazil, differing only in the degree of control they credit regime elites with being able to
maintain throughout the process of democratization, few have systematically examined
the participation of the elite in the latter stages of the transition. Those which have
studied this group, moreover, have invoked "regime elite" broadly and loosely,
distinguishing within it, if at all, only "state elites"--the "technobureaucracy"--and "societal
elites"--the bourgeoisie. Moreover, they often equate "regime elites" with military elites.
Missing from these works is an explicit treatment of the traditional political elites who
embraced the 1964 "Revolution," participated in the authoritarian regime and, once
democratization gained momentum, advocated a controlled liberalization. This omission
is significant in that recent events have shown that while the ruling military elites exited,
many political elites remained to preside over the birth of the new regime.

This study focuses on a class of elite political actors whose role and power in the
authoritarian regime was considerable, if largely unacknowledged: the traditional political
elite of Minas Gerais. Political elites in Brazil, traditionally organized on a state basis, have
long dominated politics, shaping political institutions and arrangements for their self-
aggrandizement. Firmly anchored in the states, in control of state executives, political parties, and state patronage, their power eroded less during the bureaucratic-authoritarian regime than was believed by many observers. The Mineiro elite was one of Brazil’s first regional elites to plot its escape from the sinking authoritarian coalition; it proposed the realignment of forces which made the transition possible and, at the same time, placed it under traditional political elite control. Tancredo Neves, the victor in the 1985 presidential elections, was a native son.

This paper argues that old regime political elites figure prominently in the new order, and that their participation in it has resulted in important continuities in the political regime. Invited to help construct a new civilian regime by prominent opponents of the authoritarian order seeking to accelerate the demise of the military regime, these elites used their importance to the democratic camp as a bargaining lever with which to recapture state executive positions that carried with them control over state patronage. In migrating from the decaying Democratic Social Party (PDS) to the Party of the Brazilian Democratic Movement (PMDB), they appropriated and transformed the new party of government. Their persistent influence over primary political institutions, we argue, limits the representation of popular interests, an essential ingredient in a democracy.

**Background**

In Minas Gerais, the state’s “traditional families” dominated state politics from the time regional elites overthrew the emperor until toward the close of the last century. At least three pillars of oligarchical domination buttressed the rule of this political elite: the exercise of political clientelism; the oligarchical control of a dominant political party closely linked to a centralized state executive; and restrictions on political competition. Whether in a nominally authoritarian or democratic regime, the distribution of state resources
according to political criteria allowed traditional elites to enforce loyalty to themselves and
to the regime, and control of a dominant party allowed the traditional elite to control elite
recruitment, enforce unity and discipline in policy and succession questions, and marshall
popular electoral support for the candidacies of its members, however restricted the
franchise. With the exception of the decade leading up to the coup of 1964, limited
political competition engendered a monopoly of power which preserved traditional
political elite tenure in the state and the patterns of political organization it orchestrated.

The bureaucratic-authoritarian regime, despite military ambitions to the contrary,
ultimately could not reverse these trends. Because only the traditional political elite could
secure the electoral victories needed to legitimize military rule and prevent the
radicalization of the polity and the development of class/interest based politics, the military
could not govern indefinitely without the active complicity of the regional oligarchies and
the toleration of traditional political practices. Traditional regional elites throughout the
course of the military regime continued to use political parties, although these were
extremely weak in relation to the powerful national executive, as oligarchical vehicles to
uphold their power. They dispensed state patronage and channeled regime support
through ARENA, the "semi-official" political party. Even during an authoritarian regime
that excluded the vast majority of the population from participation in political life and
economic gain, administering state patronage allowed the regional oligarchies to remain
electorally competitive. They achieved electoral victories not only in small cities and rural
areas where they might be expected to poll well, but also in many mid-sized cities where
they might not because of the tendency of voters in urban, industrial centers in Brazil to
support the opposition. Bureaucratic-authoritarianism, and the political centralization and
monopoly of power which were its defining features, moreover, established an immutable
political alignment from national executive to local city councillor which effectively
rendered political opposition futile.
The New Republic initially attacked these three sources of traditional dominance—patronage, oligarchical party, and restricted political competition—creating the potential for new forms of political organization in Brazil. The new regime lifted the ban on real political competition, removing the obstacles to political participation and autonomous local politics and laying a new basis for competitive interest representation to supplant state clientelism. In 1945, a previous transition from authoritarian rule had broadened participation and political competition, and the political system for the next two decades permitted at times a frenzied scramble for individual and group votes. Nonetheless, this failed to produce lasting democratic institutions. Popular access to the state in the post-war period was restricted by populist, clientelist, and corporatist networks, and the dominant parties of the postwar era—two organized by Vargas and one in opposition to him—did not become vehicles for popular interest representation but served to keep the traditional elite in place. The current transition began differently in two important respects. Unlike the first post-war contest, state elections in 1982 evicted traditional political elites from office, depriving them, at least momentarily, of an important power base in the state. And second, the success of the opposition party organized by regime foes, the PMDB, opened the party system to democracy’s adherents. These developments auspicious for democratization, however, were soon reversed by negotiation and compromise with the traditional political elite.

**Surviving the Transition: Traditional Elites in Minas and the Opposition Coalition, 1982-1985**

The outcome of the November 1982 elections did not bode well for the traditional political elite. In these elections in which state governors were elected directly for the first time in 17 years, the PMDB won nine governorships (of a possible 22) and legislative
majorities in the most developed states including São Paulo, Rio de Janeiro, Paraná, and Minas Gerais. The PDS failed to achieve an outright majority in the federal Chamber of Deputies, and the government was forced to enter into coalition with the Brazilian Labor Party (PTB) of Ivete Vargas. In Minas, Tancredo Neves was elected governor as the PMDB’s standard bearer with 45.8 percent of the vote. Itamar Franco was reelected senator; the party elected 27 federal deputies to the 26 of its rival, the PDS; and it captured a slim majority in the state Legislative Assembly—40 to 37, with a single representative to both houses elected by the Workers’ Party (PT) (Table 1). While the PDS won control of many more city halls and city councils than the PMDB—the PDS elected 461 mayors to 247 for the PMDB, and 4662 city councillors to 2788 for the PMDB (Table 2)—the PMDB won the local elections in the most important and largest cities in the state, including many into which the government had pumped considerable sums of money precisely in order to preserve victory in the 1982 elections. In Barbacena, a bastion of the traditional Minas oligarchy (Murilo de Carvalho, 1966), voters for the first time elected candidates from outside the oligarchical machines of both the Bias Fortes and Bonifácio de Andrada families. In that city, the PMDB won the races for mayor and vice-mayor, a majority of city council seats (8 to 7 for the PDS), and most significantly of all, 41.6 percent of the vote in the state deputy election went to a PMDB candidate whose vote total surpassed that of the candidates of the two families combined.

Most observers interpreted the 1982 PMDB vote as a rejection of the authoritarian regime, a logical inference given the party’s predecessor, the MDB’s, place in the political system as the party of protest (Cardoso and Lamounier, 1978). In its 1982 victory, however, the PMDB in Minas Gerais had only partially and temporarily defeated the traditional political elite. Tancredo Neves’ victory was produced by a sporadic coalition of opposition and traditional elite forces. His candidacy attracted the first wave of
Table 1
Minas Gerais: 1982 State Elections

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Race</th>
<th>Votes Cast</th>
<th>% of Turnout</th>
<th>% of Party Vote</th>
<th>Seats Won</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Gubernatorial:</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Blank</td>
<td>459,479</td>
<td>7.9</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Void</td>
<td>147,160</td>
<td>2.5</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>*Tancredo Neves (PMDB)</td>
<td>2,667,595</td>
<td>45.8</td>
<td>51.1</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Eliseu Resende (PDS)</td>
<td>2,424,197</td>
<td>41.6</td>
<td>46.5</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sandra Starling</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>de Azevedo (PT)</td>
<td>113,950</td>
<td>2.0</td>
<td>2.2</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Theotonio dos Santos Jr. (PDT)</td>
<td>11,160</td>
<td>2.00</td>
<td>2.0</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Senatorial:</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Blank</td>
<td>658,409</td>
<td>11.3</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Void</td>
<td>176,050</td>
<td>3.0</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>*Itamar Franco (PMDB)</td>
<td>2,398,361</td>
<td>41.2</td>
<td>48.1</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Simão Viana da Cunha Pereira (PMDB)</td>
<td>164,100</td>
<td>2.80</td>
<td>(51.4)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>João Marques de Vasconcelos (PDS)</td>
<td>1,174,027</td>
<td>20.2</td>
<td>23.5</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fernando Jorge</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>(39.7)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fagundes Neto (PDS)</td>
<td>1,135,095</td>
<td>19.5</td>
<td>(46.3)</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Joaquim José de Oliveira (PT)</td>
<td>107,099</td>
<td>1.8</td>
<td>2.1</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Wilson Carneiro Vigidal (PDT)</td>
<td>10,400</td>
<td>2.00</td>
<td>2.0</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Federal Deputy:</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Blank</td>
<td>704,776</td>
<td>12.1</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Void</td>
<td>234,984</td>
<td>4.0</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PMDB slate</td>
<td>2,456,638</td>
<td>42.2</td>
<td>50.3</td>
<td>27</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PDS slate</td>
<td>2,312,248</td>
<td>39.7</td>
<td>47.3</td>
<td>26</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PT slate</td>
<td>104,594</td>
<td>1.8</td>
<td>2.2</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PDT slate</td>
<td>10,201</td>
<td>2.0</td>
<td>2.2</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>State Deputy:</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Blank</td>
<td>774,154</td>
<td>13.3</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Void</td>
<td>269,833</td>
<td>4.7</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PMDB slate</td>
<td>2,406,106</td>
<td>41.3</td>
<td>50.4</td>
<td>40</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PDS slate</td>
<td>2,261,267</td>
<td>38.7</td>
<td>47.3</td>
<td>37</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PT slate</td>
<td>102,125</td>
<td>1.8</td>
<td>2.1</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PDT slate</td>
<td>10,056</td>
<td>23.0</td>
<td>2.2</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total Turnout:</strong></td>
<td>6,738,879</td>
<td>(86% of the electorate)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Elected
Table 2

Minas Gerais: 1982 Municipal Elections

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Party</th>
<th>Mayors</th>
<th>City Councillors</th>
<th>Total Elected</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Candidates</td>
<td>Elected</td>
<td>Candidates</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PDS</td>
<td>1382</td>
<td>461</td>
<td>15,904</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PDT</td>
<td>90</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>396</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PT</td>
<td>138</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>1,441</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PTB</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>--</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PMDB</td>
<td>1151</td>
<td>247</td>
<td>11,515</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TOTAL</td>
<td>2761</td>
<td>708*</td>
<td>29,256</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*The remaining 14 mayors from the capital and 13 "estâncias hidrominerais" were named by the state governor. The hidrostâncias, or spas, are resort or tourist cities with fountains and natural mineral water springs which possess alleged healing properties. The mayors of state capitals, hidrostâncias, and other "national security areas" were appointed rather than directly elected.

Source: TRE-MG.

defections in what was to be a progressive detachment on the part of the oligarchy from the government coalition.

The traditional political elite in Minas Gerais was initially divided over how to approach the 1982 gubernatorial elections, the most important political contest since the coup. While most preferred to side with the apparently safe option, the eventual PDS nominee, some staked their hopes for maintaining power in a liberalizing political
environment on the new "Popular Party" (PP). The PP, a primarily Minas and Rio-based party (its leading officers--Tancredo Neves and former Minas governor Magalhães Pinto--were Mineiros) was formed soon after the party reform of 1979 opened the door to a multi-party system. For those abandoning the government party who had been staunch regime allies, such as Magalhães Pinto, the PP provided an opportunity to jump from a sinking ship and land on secure ground. For those moving from the MDB, such as Tancredo Neves, the PP offered the possibility of putting together a winning coalition which strict reliance on traditional MDB constituencies might not have afforded. The PP in Minas Gerais was extremely successful at attracting traditional oligarchs anxious to shed the baggage of the government's economic failures (Brazil was in a deep recession in 1981-82) and an agricultural policy unpopular with rural elites, without what for many in 1980 was anathema--sharing a party slate with the PMDB. Their adherence gave the PP an impressive state-wide network of local organizations.

This segment of the traditional political elite was soon forced to rethink its course of action after a sequence of events rendered its strategy for controlling the transition no longer viable. In response to a Congressional vote to abolish the sublegenda or party "sub-ticket"--the electoral device permitting up to three candidates of the same party to contest plurality elections--the government decreed a change in electoral laws prohibiting electoral coalitions and ticket splitting, thereby dooming Neves' gubernatorial ambitions as a PP candidate. Correctly reasoning that he could not win the governorship as the candidate of the PP under the new electoral rules, Neves dissolved the party and instructed its members to join or rejoin the PMDB. The merger of the two parties in Minas Gerais and nationally was presided over by men loyal to Neves who placed his many supporters in strong positions in the new party. From this organizational base Neves plucked the party's gubernatorial nomination from Itamar Franco, the PMDB's other
senator, in large part because he was accurately perceived as the most electable candidate of the opposition.

Within the government party, intra-elite rivalries which had been artificially contained for 18 years were rekindled by the defeat of the sublegenda and Neves' candidacy. Had the sublegenda been utilized, competing oligarchical factions could have been accommodated: one sublegenda would have been occupied by an ex-PSDer; one by an ex-UDNer; and one by either a technocrat or an ex-PRe. When the sublegenda was abandoned, however, the government could nominate only one candidate. The choice, if left as by custom to the incumbent governor, most likely would have been an ex-UDNer. The nomination of an ex-UDNer, however, would surely have precipitated a reaction from the embittered ex-PSD wing of the PDS who felt it was "their turn." Every governor of the post-coup period had been an ex-UDN member with the single exception of Ozanam Coelho who, as Aureliano Chaves' lieutenant governor, became the state's chief executive for eight months when Chaves had to resign to "run" for vice-president.

The manner in which the government countered Neves' nomination set in motion the Mineiro oligarchs' disengagement from the regime. In an effort to stop UDN-PSD feuding, the Planalto intervened in the gubernatorial succession in Minas, nominating Eliseu Resende, an engineer-technocrat, as the PDS's candidate for governor. The government's attempted compromise failed. Many ex-PSD oligarchs not satisfied with President João Figueiredo's gesture flocked to Neves' camp; in Tancredo Neves they now had an alternative to the UDN and the MDB--one of their own. In the North of Minas, the sons and grandsons of regional cattle barons threw their support behind Neves, partly to manifest their discontent with the PDS's candidate, and partly to protest recent agricultural policies which they guessed would not change under a technocrat. The support the traditional political bosses delivered to the PMDB in the cities and towns of
the interior, when combined with that mobilized by the left among a genuinely
discontented populace, accounted for the narrow opposition victory.¹⁰

Those elements of the traditional political elite who were instrumental in Neves' victory, who had a place in his designs for governing and who could further his political ambitions, profited from his victory. His state cabinet did not differ radically from those of his predecessors. While it did include five secretaries who rose in politics through the ranks of the MDB,¹¹ others traced their political origins, and power, to pre-1964 elite parties. Pre-1964 partisan attachments may be more indicative of a person's age than the residual power of the traditional political elite, but the latter interpretation cannot be discounted in light of a pattern of reliance on the support of traditional clienteles. Neves' appointee as secretary of Agriculture, Arnaldo Rosa Prata, is suggestive of such a pattern: he was elected mayor of the important Triângulo city of Uberaba in 1970 on the ARENA ticket, and he served as the president of such powerful agrarian societies as the Brazilian Association of "Zebu" Cattle Raisers, the Rural Society of the Minas Triângulo, and so forth. Moreover, Neves left much of the economic decision-making machinery to the secretaries and undersecretaries of economic departments in previous state governments who for all intents and purposes had masterminded economic policy in Minas during the authoritarian era.¹²

If some traditional elites exercised sound political judgement in supporting Neves, the leading political representatives of the oligarchy, including many federal deputies, did not. Although the new administration did not threaten elite interests in the policy realm, those who had stayed with the PDS, like kingmakers Bias Fortes and Bonifácio de Andrade, lost something important in the 1982 elections: the control over state patronage in the cities and towns that gave them their greatest vote totals. In Minas Gerais for at least four governors' administrations, the "political command" (comando político) of a municipality, which entailed the right to make virtually every public decision,
including the appointment of all public officeholders, had been awarded openly to the
deputy from the state's majority party who had received the most votes in that municipio.
When the PDS lost its majority, the "political command" in many cities passed to PMDB
deputies, even where old elites polled better. This blow to the personal patronage
machines of old elites was compounded by their loss as a class of the power to make high-
level federal and state appointments in Minas. Such losses, if not recuperated, would
cost future votes and spell certain doom for the medium- and long-term survival of the
traditional political elite.

The opportunity to recover the machinery of state patronage and secure its state-
wide dominance presented itself when the old elite had something to trade: its support
for the governor in the presidential electoral college. Tancredo Neves became the
opposition's candidate for president once it became clear an electoral college would
choose Figueiredo's successor. Indeed, the opposition's decision to participate in the
electoral college was swayed by the opportunity Neves' candidacy presented for a
partisan realignment. Since PDS electors were the clear majority in the electoral college,
any opposition candidate needed the traditional political elite to win. Of all PMDB
politicians, Neves, rooted in the oligarchy, stood the best chance of attracting votes from
the government forces. His task was facilitated by the politically suicidal decision on the
part of President Figueiredo to permit the government party to nominate Paulo Maluf—the
governor of São Paulo who had more than a few enemies in high places—as the party's
standard-bearer. Disgruntled with Maluf for personal reasons and genuinely
apprehensive about the consequences for their own political futures of electing a
president so unpopular within the electorate, many PDS deputies defected.
Understanding the stakes and recognizing the opportunity that uniting with the PMDB
offered for preserving their positions in the state, many political elites scrambled to line up
behind Neves to secure a place in the new order. A motley coalition of PMDB "radicals,"

PDS deserters later to become the Liberal Front (Frente Liberal, FL), and dissident PDS governors of the northeast states coalesced rapidly in the months of June-September 1985 to ensure Tancredo Neves' victory.

To secure the support of the old regime's elite, Tancredo Neves and his supporters were prepared to pay a high price. In exchange for the agreement to back the candidate of the PMDB in the electoral college--certain to be Neves--they assured the Liberal Front of the PDS that their candidate would neither run as a representative of the "opposition" nor criticize the "Revolution" or the [incumbent] Figueiredo government; the vice-presidential nominee would come from the ranks of the Liberal Front or, if this were to be prohibited by electoral law, the nominee would at least be someone who supported the "movement of April, 1964" [the coup]; and there would be an equitable distribution of administrative posts (Istoé, 1984: 24). For vice-president and fellow Mineiro Aureliano Chaves, Neves even put in writing that all those who backed him would be repaid with posts in his government (Veja, 1985a: 36). This promise was extracted as a condition not only for the vice-president's support (and with it the votes of the hedging members of the Minas PDS delegation) but also for that of ex-president General Geisel. Since Geisel wielded considerable influence within the military, his backing was critical if a pre-emptive coup were to be avoided. 15

While a political settlement of this magnitude could be sealed in principle relatively easily on the national level--it was a fairly simple matter to promise federal cabinet posts to a handful of influential figures--in order to secure the votes of the deputies and other delegates in the electoral college, agreements had to be hammered out and implemented in the states. Careful, detailed, and explicit bargaining was conducted on a state by state basis between the two parties wherever such an accord was struck. The success of these state-level negotiations hinged on the mutually satisfactory division of state patronage between two uneasy allies. At stake was the distribution of 15,000
federal jobs. In many states, regional presidents of the PMDB and the FL drew up agreements stipulating explicitly which federal and state posts would be assigned to each party’s pork barrel (these posts were of varying political worth) (Veja, 1985b: 20).

According to Federal Deputy Oscar Alves of Paraná, Neves promised the Liberal Front in Paraná, if elected, a number of federal posts in equal proportion to the number of “frentista” votes in the electoral college. Since Front members had cast 25 percent of Neves’ votes in the Paraná delegation, Alves calculated they were owed one-fourth of these posts in the state (Veja, 1985b: 26-27). Israel Pinheiro, one of the FL’s founders and foremost proponents, used the same rationale as a basis for proposing that the FL in Minas Gerais merited a one-third participation in state government (Estado de Minas, 1984b: 3).

In Minas Gerais, dissident PDS deputies held out longer and drove a harder bargain—the "Acordo de Minas" or the "Minas Agreement." The embryonic core of the new Liberal Front in the state agreed to support Neves, to “put a Mineiro in the presidency,” in exchange for the return of the power of patronage they lost in the 1982 elections. According to the terms of the accord, the new governor, Hélio Garcia, agreed to accept at least two members of the Liberal Front into the cabinet; the "political command" of a municipality would be handed back to the deputy who won a majority of the votes in that municipality, irrespective of party; and Liberal Front federal deputies would regain another prime source of state patronage—the right to make appointments to 72 second and third echelon federal posts in the state (e.g. regional directors of the National Housing Bank and the Brazilian Coffee Institute). The terms of the agreement represented a unilateral victory for the traditional political elite. Local resistance to the state-imposed agreement was offered in vain.

The "Acordo de Minas" had the immediate effect of guaranteeing Tancredo Neves’ election as president in January 1985 in an electoral college composed mostly of
old elites from the authoritarian regime. Its major consequences were more enduring. Members of the traditional political elite who endorsed the "Acordo" retook the leading positions in Minas politics. The agreement compromised the foundations of democratic politics in Brazil.

The Residual Power of Traditional Political Elites,

Political Parties, and "Trasformismo"

The political transactions which accompanied the transition from authoritarian rule in Brazil allowed the protagonists of the ancien régime to assume a commanding position at the helm of the central institutions of political life in the new. In Minas Gerais, members of the traditional political elite were returned their primary political resources—their positions in the state and power of political patronage. They also entered the "democratic" era in the leadership of the two most important parties, the PFL and, more significantly, the PMDB. The faction loyal to the governor emerged from the PMDB's 1983 elections in the state in undisputed control of top party commissions. The so-called "Constituente" slate won all seats on the diretório but 16 (of 71), and all but 16 delegates and 16 alternates to the national convention (of 58 for each). Long-time members of the party in the "radical" group, "Direct Elections" (Eleições Diretas) not only had to content themselves with only slightly more than one-fifth of the seats on these key decision-making bodies of the party, but also had to defer to the governor in the selection of Executive Commission members. Neves chose for these pivotal posts, including that of president, recent party converts whom many in the party found distasteful. The Estado de Minas (1983) wrote of the new Executive Commission: "The moderate wing [of the party], derived from the PP, prevails in the party command." A PMDB deputy commented, "If Governor Tancredo Neves is not thinking of creating a new party, as he
declared in a press conference, at least he has succeeded in making the PMDB closer to the party of his dreams" (Estado de Minas, 1983). A few months later, national PMDB president Ulysses Guimarães was brought to the bargaining table to negotiate the terms of the surrender of the national party as well to Tancredo Neves' traditional forces. ¹⁹

Of what consequence is it for democratization in Brazil if traditional political elites are found in these positions of power, provided that they are subject to ratification under democratic rules? If "democratization" is understood as the road to a political system in which, in the Schumpeterian tradition, "its most powerful collective decision-makers are selected through periodic elections in which candidates freely compete for votes and in which virtually all the adult population is eligible to vote" (Huntington, 1985: 149), then perhaps it makes little or no difference if traditional political elites retain office. ²⁰ But if democracy is conceived in a broader sense, the residual power of the traditional elite can be very consequential indeed.

One conceptually useful view of democratization advanced by O'Donnell (1985b) distinguishes between stages which he labels the "consolidation" and the "extension" of political democracy. Political democracy is considered consolidated when civilian rule has been established and the procedural minima for democracy identified by Dahl (1971) are present. These minima are: the freedom to form and join organizations, the freedom of expression, the right to vote, eligibility for public office, the right of political leaders to compete for support, access to alternative sources of information, and free and fair elections. They embody those institutional guarantees required for the opportunity to formulate preferences, to engage in individual and collective action to bring those preferences to the attention of fellow citizens and government, and to have preferences weighted equally in the conduct of government (Dahl, 1971: 3). A "consolidated" democracy largely resembles the Schumpeterian model. The extension of political democracy in O'Donnell's scheme refers to "increased transparency in policy deliberation
and in interest representation." O'Donnell sees the consolidation of the procedural minima as a precondition for the extension of political democracy. But he also acknowledges that consolidation does not necessarily enhance the prospects for democracy's extension (1985b: 52).

What seem to be required to make the passage from a consolidated civilian regime to a full democracy are institutions capable of "formulating" and "signifying" (to use Dahl's language) citizen preferences.\(^21\) Without the opportunity for citizen preferences to be expressed effectively--without interest representation for all classes and strata--there can be no polyarchy. In democratic societies, the institutions most capable of representing non-elite interests are political parties. Parties normally frame political issues, provide a forum for public debate, and afford citizens the opportunity to "express their preferences" by voting for a platform which details party positions and future government action on a range of issues. Not all democracies of course have parties which can qualify as programmatic down to their local branches. But no country can claim to have a vibrant democracy, not even a "polyarchy," where party positions on issues are sacrificed systematically to the particularistic calculations of a closed elite--an oligarchy.

For a democracy which meets the Dahl-O'Donnell criteria to function in Brazil, political parties arguably would have to be transformed. In Brazil, political parties have long been prevented from representing non-elite interests--from "formulating and signifying citizen preferences"--by the traditional political elite. They were used for decades as patronage machines, private weapons in intra-oligarchical disputes. Even the exceptions to this rule, parties which had non-elite constituents in the post-war era--the populist PTB for example--built vertical channels of interest representation which restricted mass access to the state. In the 1970s, the PMDB raised hopes that it might articulate the interests of classes previously excluded from politics. But in the birth and rebirth of political parties accompanying the transition when the traditional political elite created the
PFL and gained control of the PMDB, the parties with the best chances of achieving executive offices and legislative majorities, it became unlikely that either major Brazilian party could become an effective agent of democratization.

In democratic societies in which political parties realign, however infrequently, over salient, cross-cutting issues, the process of realignment broadens the possibilities for democratic representation by providing electors with the opportunity to express their preferences along a new axis of conflict in society. In Brazil, where realignment was precipitated instead by particularism and oligarchical factionalism—the PFL differed initially from its parent, the PDS, only in its preference for Tancredo Neves over Paulo Maluf—the new party system failed to allow for the expression of a wider range of interests. When the oligarchy opted for realignment, its old rivalries were fitted into the current party system and the PMDB, which had formerly sheltered opponents of authoritarianism and those who had suffered from it, now opened its ranks to those who had supported and profited from the military regime. Partisan conversions were neither impeded by nor did they create ideological or programmatic divides. To the contrary, the infusion of traditional elites into the PMDB inevitably diluted the party's already weak programmatic message, diminishing even further the potential for the PMDB in government to signify citizen preferences and represent popular interests. Traditional political elites were now placed within the party to veto undesirable platforms or to bar action on policies not in their interests such as agrarian reform. The most appropriate political strategy to consolidate civilian rule—building the broadest possible coalition for keeping the military in its barracks—thus conflicted with that best suited to achieve the transition from a consolidated to an extended democracy.22 The extension of political democracy was, in short, compromised by its consolidation.

Similar political transactions, negotiations for the state, and takeovers of political parties were repeated elsewhere in Brazil during the transition from authoritarian rule.
What makes Minas politics significant in national terms is that its oligarchy is not one among equals. This state's elite has been able consistently to impose its preferences nationally; its actions sparked every major regime change in Brazil in this century. It helped launch the 1930 "Revolution"; its 1943 Manifesto dos Mineiros hastened the end of the Estado Novo; it led the movement to depose President Goulart in 1964; and once again in 1984 Minas politicians accelerated the regime change.

The strength of the Minas oligarchy has always been even greater when combined with that of its old partner, São Paulo. Today, Brazil is witnessing a return to the politics of "café com leite." 23 As in the heyday of the oligarchs, the decisions reached by the governors of Brazil's two largest states have a decisive impact on the course of national politics. In 1984, Tancredo Neves convinced the governor of São Paulo, Franco Montoro, to agree to a Mineiro in the presidency, a plan frustrated only by Neves' death. The Paulista Ulysses Guimarães, national PMDB president, and Hélio Garcia, governor of Minas Gerais, have already agreed in writing that both will be candidates for the next presidential election in 1988. (Guimarães, who sacrificed his own presidential ambitions to elect Tancredo Neves, acknowledges that Minas lost "its turn" with Neves' death, but does not wish to concede outright yet another term before he can occupy the presidency.) Whoever wins the party nomination will be supported by the other, who will become the vice-presidential candidate on the PMDB ticket (Istoé, 1986a: 16).

The ability of the traditional political elite to control the transition from authoritarian rule in Brazil may profoundly affect the long-term prospects for democracy. Patterns of politics established now may become semi-permanent features of the political landscape. In appropriating parties that have direct access to the state, for instance, the oligarchy can perpetuate state clientelism as the principle which orders politics itself. Once the PMDB had attracted much of the state oligarchy and established itself as more than a transient
Table 3

Minas Gerais: Party Membership, 1982-1985

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>PDS</th>
<th>PDT</th>
<th>PT</th>
<th>PTB</th>
<th>PMDB</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1982</td>
<td>163,501</td>
<td>11,796</td>
<td>22,641</td>
<td>12,256</td>
<td>91,530</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1983</td>
<td>163,007</td>
<td>13,656</td>
<td>23,872</td>
<td>12,390</td>
<td>105,125</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1984 (June)</td>
<td>189,710</td>
<td>17,259</td>
<td>30,298</td>
<td>16,724</td>
<td>51,882</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1984 (Sept.)</td>
<td>206,150</td>
<td>19,388</td>
<td>33,275</td>
<td>19,530</td>
<td>173,884</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1984 (Dec.)</td>
<td>221,298</td>
<td>22,692</td>
<td>34,883</td>
<td>21,406</td>
<td>190,939</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1985 (March)</td>
<td>235,272</td>
<td>27,103</td>
<td>36,348</td>
<td>24,276</td>
<td>199,097</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: TRE-MG.

party of government, local elites and party bosses flocked to its ranks. In Minas Gerais, a PMDB governor in the state house swelled the party with new recruits. Party membership more than doubled between 1982 and the end of 1984, while that of its old rival, the PDS rose by only 44 percent (Table 3). Anxious to join the “ins” and not be excluded from state resources, at least 200 mayors and local party directories changed partisan affiliation virtually overnight in mid-1985 from the PDS to the PMDB.24 These mayors and party leaders of the interior, necessarily from small towns that previously had no local PMDB branch, for the most part shared little or nothing ideologically with the party’s veteran national leaders. The mayors belonged to a cohort elected in 1982 that carried on Minas Gerais’ political tradition. In a survey of 387 mayors elected in 1982 (over half the total universe of 722) conducted by the state Secretariat of Planning (SEPLAN, 1983), 58.9 percent of the mayors sampled attributed their victories to “personal attributes”; 28.9 percent to “political tradition”; and only 8.3 percent to party program (3.9 percent not
available) (SEPLAN, 1983: 43). Approximately 30 percent identified themselves as fazendeiros by profession; nearly 60 percent were from families of fazendeiros. Nearly 60 percent also had "political tradition in the family", meaning that fathers, grandfathers, uncles and/or brothers had participated in politics in an elected capacity. Thirty percent had been active in politics for more than 20 years, and other 25 percent from 12 to 20 years. Only one-fifth had entered politics within the preceding four years. Two-thirds had previously occupied political posts. These mayors and local bosses will serve the oligarchy well as cogs in the traditional patronage machines. From within the governing party, they are taking their place in reconstructed clientelistic networks.

In moments of transition and convulsion there arise unique opportunities to discard the constraints of the organizational forms inherited from previous regimes, but missed opportunities are seldom regained. Political arrangements, once in place, condition future political behavior and possibilities. Political institutions are molded to suit the regime which they uphold, and state elites and societal organizations build bridges to one another appropriate for the immediate political environment. Individuals rise who are adept at the political game as it is played and they use their positions to perpetuate modes of political interaction that favor them. Political systems, in short, carry with them the seeds of their own reproduction.

Evidence from other countries provides many examples of political institutions and practices that long outlive the political pacts that spawned them. At a moment of transition in Italy in 1876, Agostino De Pretis, the newly elected prime minister, invited opposition deputies from the Destra party to shift their votes to the government majority in exchange for personal benefits, access to state patronage, and the right to rule locally. The deputies, finding themselves newly marginalized from power and state spoils (the Destra had controlled the Parliament since Italian unification 16 years earlier), agreed. Unfettered in their conversion by ideological or programmatic constraints--the parties
represented only loosely knit coalitions of elite factions—they "transformed" themselves from the opposition into a stable part of the governing majority. For decades, southern deputies voted with any government, regardless of program or ideology, which supported the practice of clientelism. As Chubb (1982: 21) explains the consequences of trasformismo:

Trasformismo successfully eliminated any effective opposition from the Italian Parliament....The organization of politics around personality and patronage rather than ideas and practical programs not only absorbed and neutralized the opposition but ultimately emptied the very concept of "party" of any meaning beyond that of loose congeries of personal clienteles.

More than 100 years later, Tancredo Neves like De Pretis pursued a strategy of trasformismo with much the same effects: immediate success for the government majority, the elimination of opposition, and a long-term blow to political parties as vehicles of non-elite interest representation at precisely the moment they held their greatest potential to advance democratization. Political competition had given opponents of the oligarchy in the PMDB the opening to attack the foundations of elite power. The opposition was able to overcome the advantage with which their adversaries had begun—the spoils of the pork barrel—due to the coincidence, at least in Minas Gerais, of the unpopularity of the military regime and the winning coalition constructed by Tancredo Neves. With a PMDB governor in the Palácio da Liberdade, politics might in principle have been reorganized. Clientelism could have been weakened, or more modestly perhaps, redirected to support a new alignment of political forces. However genuine the possibilities were for democratization in Minas Gerais, they were forfeited almost before the euphoria over the electoral results had subsided. The governor made plain his intent to govern with, not against, the Minas oligarchy.25 The transformation of the PMDB from a party poised to represent popular classes into an oligarchical vehicle, the revitalization of traditional clientelistic networks, and the barter of public policy for personal political gain
confirm that traditional politics survived at least the initial stages of civilian government in Brazil.

The major continuities between the "New Republic" in Brazil and its predecessor seem to outweigh their significant differences. Arbitrary military abuses of human rights have been curbed, political rights restored to political "undesirables," censorship lifted, illiterates enfranchised, and direct elections are proceeding on schedule for posts of considerable importance—state governors and the presidency. But the new order carries over from the old more than its personnel; many of traditional Brazilian political procedures and practices appear to have survived the regime change. National cabinet posts are still awarded to satisfy politically determined state quotas and to bolster adherents in the states. State governors are as formidable as ever and, in most places, are forging new political machines on the unshaken foundations of the old. Public posts are still filled by top bosses to maximize political returns. Party candidates are still approached by convention and general electors who solicit home roof repairs and lunches for their families as payment for their votes. Even traditional elites would agree that much is as it was before. Minas governor Hélio Garcia was asked what the country's political and administrative picture would have looked like had Eliseu Resende defeated Tancredo Neves for governor of Minas, and Mario Andreazza wrested the PDS presidential nomination from Paulo Maluf in 1984 and been elected president in the electoral college—in other words, if the "democratization" had not proceeded at the pace that it did. He replied: "It would look very much as it does now" (Istoé, 1986b: 20).
Conclusions

In controlling the transition from the authoritarian regime, traditional elites have won a decisive round in the struggle for the political future of Brazil. They have regained control over state patronage and the majority political party. The significant traditional elite presence in the PMDB belies any interpretation of the party's electoral victories after 1982 as a popular rejection of the old order, the future replacement of its elite, or the overhaul of its institutions and political practices.27 In Brazil today, political parties, local governments, the executive-legislative relationship, electoral codes, and interest association and representation, even if not formally "authoritarian," are unlike corresponding institutions and arrangements in a democratic polity. They are well suited to restricting mass political participation and the arena of decision-making.

Does this mean, then, that Brazil cannot become genuinely democratic in the near future? Will democratic government and free elections prove to be a mere legal fiction? The central problem underlying these questions is how much relative significance formal political rules, the most obvious distinguishing features of political regimes, should be accorded vis-à-vis political practice. Examples from both democratic and authoritarian periods in Brazilian history suggest that the effectiveness of political rules varies according to external circumstances. During the Old Republic (1889-1930), the Brazilian Constitution framed a democracy and guaranteed liberal political rights, yet political elites routinely engaged in electoral fraud, physical intimidation, and subversion of the judicial process (Reis, 1980). Democratic political rules, in this case easily bent or outright flouted by extra-political sources of domination—land dependence and private armies—could not ensure democracy for all citizens. In Brazil's recent experience, on the other hand, political rules appear to have assumed greater importance. When economic change and the professionalization of the military and police forces in most parts of the country
removed the stick of private power with which local elites once enforced loyalty to regional oligarchies, these traditional political elites became subjected to political rules to a far greater degree than they had been at any time in the recent past. In order to defend their positions local elites and their oligarchical patrons were obliged to rely almost exclusively on sources of domination available to them through the political system. Under a military regime their power was not thereby diminished but actually enhanced, since the political rules to which they were subjected were intentionally authoritarian. The enactment of democratic rules, in contrast, may expose traditional political elites to new challenges and prove conducive to genuinely democratic political practice.

It is in this context that open political competition may yet allow challengers to unseat incumbent groups in the states, and even in the federal government. The possibility that the “outs” might one day become the “ins” creates choice and encourages local opposition to form in the cities and the countryside. As long as the formal rules of open political competition are secure, there is reason to hope that, in the long-term, politics can be transformed. What changes are possible in agrarian reform, union laws, and other pressing policy problems in contemporary Brazil, as elsewhere, are determined by the outcome of the contest in the primary arena of political conflict, the constitution of the political system itself.
Notes

1. José Sarney, the newly elected vice-president, was sworn in as president. For an account of the events of 1984, see Veja (1985a).

2. The "New Republic" (A República Nova), a phrase coined by Tancredo Neves in his presidential campaign, has been widely used to describe the post-1985 civilian regime.

3. Diniz (1985) has disputed that regime elites were entirely successful in implementing their project for democratization. She argues that the process of democratization departed from elite plans due to popular protest and pressure. She also rejects, however, the view that attributes too much strength to popular forces.

4. Tancredo Neves changed his partisan affiliation three times in his political career. He started out in the old PSD ("Social Democratic" Party). As a cabinet minister in Goulart's government, he was part of a minority in the PSD that did not accept the military incursion into politics and thus, in 1965, when the military offered politicians an exclusive choice of membership in either a pro- or an anti-government party (both of their creation), he opted for the opposition MDB. He remained with the MDB until its dissolution by the party reform law in 1979, when he co-founded the new "moderate" PP (Popular Party). In 1982, after changes in electoral laws crippled all but the largest opposition party, he dissolved the PP and joined the PMDB. Virtually overnight, he became the party's candidate for governor.

5. Leaders of the newly created PP were selected to submerge pre-1964 party divisions. With Tancredo Neves (national president) from the old PSD and Hélio Garcia (state president) and Magalhães Pinto (honorary national president) representing the old UDN, PP ranks would not be restricted to members of only one of the extinct parties. A refuge for the traditional political elite, the PP was a welcome development to the architect of party reform, retired General Golbery de Couto e Silva, who understood well the value of dividing the opposition. As a last resort, if the military had to accept defeat, better to concede to members of the traditional political elite than to the popular classes.

6. Congress voted to abolish the sublegenda over the wishes of the government. Party discipline among the government majority could not be maintained because PDS politicians had cross-cutting interests in the sublegenda. PDS congressmen from the Northeast wished to retain it, while PDS representatives from the South, where this system benefited the PMDB, did not. These PDS defectors, together with the opposition, defeated the sublegenda.

Military intelligence in the fall of 1981 discovered that under standing electoral arrangements without the sublegenda, the government was in danger of losing the governors' races in more states than the military cared to tolerate. Accordingly, that November, the government "reformed" electoral rules by decree, without input from PDS politicians, and over Tancredo Neves' personal protest. The "November package" made successful opposition by new parties more difficult. Had electoral coalitions not been banned, Neves might have expected to receive the gubernatorial nomination of more than one party. Without the possibility of jointly nominating candidates, however, each party was forced instead to nominate its own candidates for every office, including that of governor. The prohibition of ticket splitting was equally damaging to Neves' candidacy. Because the PP was relatively new and not well established in every electoral district, Neves' hopes for winning the gubernatorial contest rested on capturing the votes of PMDB and PDS constituents who, in other races, planned to support their own party candidates. The new legislation, by forcing electors to vote for a single party slate from governor to city councillor, meant that they could only vote for Neves at the cost of abandoning their own party candidates altogether.
7. Hélio Garcia, who oversaw the state merger, had been a member of ARENA until 1969 when, as a federal deputy, he became disgusted with the closing of Congress. He did not run again in 1971. "Out of politics," he was appointed by Aureliano Chaves, then governor, as president of the state savings institution, the Caixa Econômica, in Minas Gerais, a post which he held from 1975 to 1976. In 1979, he returned to politics under the PP banner. He was elected lieutenant governor in 1982, and jointly served as mayor of Belo Horizonte. Thus, the governor in 1984 had never been a member of the MDB. Affonso Camargo, the "bionic" senator from Paraná who presided over the national merger, was also from the PP via ARENA.

8. Indeed, Francelino Pereira openly favored Maurício Campos, a member of the former UDN faction who at the time was mayor of Belo Horizonte.

9. The Planalto is literally the presidential palace. In common parlance in Brazil, it is used to signify the president and his advisors.

10. The left's role in the campaign was important if largely unrecognized at the time. Neves accepted the support of the left, but made no deliberate effort to mobilize it. In fact, he preferred that its potential lie dormant. Taking for granted a PMDB victory in Belo Horizonte, he had no campaign planned for the state capital. Soon it became clear, however, that the campaign in the interior would be difficult: the PMDB had diretórios in only 303 cities (Estado de Minas, 1983). To win, the party needed to carry Belo Horizonte and the 50 largest cities by a wide margin. The burden for delivering the urban vote fell to the left.

11. Luiz Otávio Valadares, Sílvio de Abreu Junior, Maurício de Pádua Souza, Ronan Tito, and Carlos Cotta were appointed to head the Departments of Administration, Interior and Justice, Public Works, Labor and Social Action, and Tourism and Sports (later Government and Political Coordination after the death of Renato Azeredo) (Minas Gerais, 1983). Only Cotta detoured through the PP before rejoining the PMDB. At least once in Neves' short term in office two were threatened with dismissal (Diário de Comércio, 1983: 3).

12. The three economic secretaries were Luis Rogério de Castro Leite (secretary of Finance); Ronaldo Costa Couto (secretary of Planning); and Márcio Garcia Vilela (president of the BEMGE). All three had links with the PDS.

13. The opposition for some time debated how to approach the "indirect" election for president. With a government victory a foregone conclusion, many advocated boycotting the electoral college due to be convened the following January to ratify the government party nominee (and presumably hand-picked presidential successor) rather than legitimize an electoral farce. These people galvanized public opinion in favor of direct popular elections. A campaign for direct elections--"the most significant popular campaign in Brazilian history" (Veja, 1985a: 22)--took place in early 1984. It was highlighted by massive street demonstrations demanding congressional passage of an amendment providing for direct popular elections for president later that year. The campaign won the support of even the vice-president. While the amendment was doomed to fail from the beginning, the awakening of public opinion accelerated the regime change.

Although privately convinced that Congress was not in fact going to approve the amendment for direct elections and that the military would not in any case permit them (he called the demonstrations "lyric"), Neves lent nominal support to the campaign while never losing sight of his candidacy within the electoral college. Minas Gerais was the virtually last state, and Belo Horizonte the last major city, to organize public demonstrations for direct elections. According to one member of the Executive Commission of the state PMDB, the idea of the campaign was discussed only once: a
sub-committee of three was appointed to study the idea, and two members, upon being named, departed immediately for personal vacations (Interview, Belo Horizonte, August 16, 1985).

14. Why Figueiredo behaved so passively has been the subject of much speculation. One theory is that he himself wished to stay on as president for another four-year term (Veja, 1985a: 24-27).

15. The fear of a coup attempt was not irrational. Security forces had attempted in 1981 to sabotage the political opening by planting a bomb (which exploded prematurely in the lap of a saboteur) at the Riocentro complex in Rio de Janeiro during a public gathering on May Day. Between August and November, 1984, once it became apparent Neves had the votes to triumph in the electoral college, the PMDB steeled itself for a coup. Expecting a coup to originate in Brasilia under the command of General Newton Cruz, it even drew up a detailed plan of resistance. Veja (1985a: 40-45) provides a full account of the events of these months.

16. Tancredo Neves, according to Brazilian law, had to resign his post as governor in order to run for president. Thus Helio Garcia became governor in July 1984. Much of the negotiations for the “Acordo”, with Aureliano Chaves representing the FL, fell to Garcia.

17. The way in which the prerogatives to make these appointments were parcelled out to the dissident deputies illustrates the persistence of traditional politics. Reportedly, when deputies could not agree amongst themselves on how to divide the spoils (different posts, of course, had different real and relative values), Israel Pinheiro proposed that the names of each post be put on separate pieces of paper, and the deputies pull these scraps of paper from a hat. Later, deputies could trade the rights to appoint particular posts to strengthen their positions in different parts of the state (Veja, 1985b: 26-27). Pinheiro acknowledged having learned this method for resolving such disputes from Benedito Valadares (Vargas' interventor and later governor of Minas Gerais), who employed it during the Estado Novo.

18. On each count, the traditional elite was able to impose its preferences. At first, when pressured to reintegrate the PDS defectors into the state, Helio Garcia avowed publicly that he would not name any FL members to his cabinet. He agreed only to review the cases of those primary school directors, regional school administrators, and police chiefs who worked in the interior for current FL politicians and who, as PDS ward bosses (cabinete eleitoral), had been fired (Estado de Minas, 1984a). Shortly thereafter, succumbing to FL demands, he did in fact name two members of the Liberal Front to his cabinet. Secondly, the manner in which the issue of the comando politico was resolved was an outright victory for the ex-PDS elite: the PMDB had wanted “proportionality” to save at least some patronage resources. Finally, the agreement called for direct elections for mayor to be held in the state's 13 estancias hidrominerais in November 1985, at the same time as the mayor of Belo Horizonte was to be elected directly for the first time since 1965. As long as these posts were appointed by the governor and approved in the state legislature, the majority party was assured control over them. By having the schedule moved up, the PDS-FL dissidents hoped to recover by direct elections at least some of what they had lost for the first time in 1982.

19. The command of the national PMDB was negotiated in November, 1983, prior to its ratification in the party's national convention that December. The Unidade (Unity) group loyal to Tancredo Neves emerged from the negotiations ahead of the Travessia group led by party president Ulysses Guimaraes. Guimaraes ceded half the posts on the Executive Commission and 43 percent of those on the national directory to the Unidade group. His own Travessia received 35 percent (the remaining 17 percent were allocated to a third Pro-parte faction composed of independents and first-time
congressmen). The complexion of the Executive Commission, too, changed. "Radical" Francisco ("Chico") Pinto was pushed out of his position of first vice-president by "moderate" senator Pedro Simon. In return for retaining the presidency, Guimarães allowed Neves to name the party's secretary-general, the post which controls the party's organization. Neves' choice, Alfonso Camargo, the "bionic" senator (appointed by the president) from Paraná who had only recently joined the PMDB via the PP and ARENA, precipitated strong reaction from party regulars, including threats from the Travessia rank and file to organize a resistance, to cancel the convention, and to resign from the party. The threats were to no avail. By all accounts, Neves by this time was in extra-official command of the party.

20. Huntington (1985: 149) points out the inherent difficulty in arriving at a concept of democracy both acceptable as a normative ideal and useful for comparative political analysis. Leaning toward the latter, he adopts Schumpeter's definition because, among other reasons, it can incorporate the two dimensions--contestation and participation--that Dahl sees as critical to his "realistic democracy" or "polyarchy."

Such an approach does offer the advantage of a clear yardstick by which to measure whether a regime can meet established criteria of democracy. This definition, however, is so broad as to encompass many regimes which in the eyes of even an untrained observer are questionable democracies. For instance, does a regime such as the Brazilian, with universal suffrage and regular elections for president and congress in which the military nonetheless exercises "behind the scenes" veto power, qualify as a democracy?

21. Dahl (1971: 3) acknowledges that institutions are needed to respond to citizen votes or "other expressions of preference" only in his third "opportunity"--to have preferences weighted equally in the conduct of government. In a functioning mass democracy, however, institutions, more broadly defined, are essential before the government is poised to take decisions.

22. Guimarães (1985: 38-39) has similarly pointed out that a coalition formed to hasten the dissolution of the old regime aims to be as broad as possible, and thus encumbers itself as a governing coalition.

23. The "café com leite," or "café au lait," alliance, refers broadly to an alliance between the coffee-producing state of São Paulo and the dairy-producing state of Minas Gerais during the Old Republic and, specifically, to the collaboration of the two states' delegations in the national Congress.

24. Senhor (1986: 43) reports: "The number of mayors who have sought refuge in the PMDB is about four or five per month. Two hundred mayors have submitted to [Governor Hélio] Garcia's charisma." A PMDB vice-president suggested that the rate at which these 200 mayors converted to the PMDB during the Brazilian winter (June-August) months of 1985 was even faster, and furthermore that they were accompanied by entire PDS diretorios (Interview, Belo Horizonte, August 16, 1985).

25. Instead of supporting PMDB politicians in the interior, Neves used the spoils of the governor's office to coopt PDS deputies. He deliberately courted PDS politicians and even used them to isolate the left of his own party who opposed his projects.

There was one occasion, in November 1983, on which the Legislative Assembly approved the creation of four new Secretariats (Transportation; Sports, Recreation, and Tourism; Culture; and Special Affairs) by a margin of 39-38: the PDS delegation and the lone PT representative voted against the measure. Other than this, there is little indication of traditional political elite opposition to the governor, and less as time went on. Indeed, the more significant opposition came from the "Bloco da Virada" within the PMDB.
26. Silvia Raw has pointed out that the enfranchisement of illiterates, while a positive step toward democratization, creates the danger that clientelistic practices might be reinforced. Traditionally, landowners manipulated the votes of their illiterate rural workers; the disenfranchisement of illiterates was an urban, liberal demand after 1930.

27. Guimarães (1985: 41) aptly argued that PMDB victories in the 1985 mayoral races did not signal an advance of progressive and leftist forces in Brazil. He saw two (or more) PMDBs in places, and "in the majority of cities, the more conservative PMDB won."
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