GRASS ROOTS POPULAR MOVEMENTS AND
THE STRUGGLE FOR DEMOCRACY:
NOVA IGUAÇU, 1974-1985

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Abstract

Most analyses of the transition to democracy in Brazil have focused on the role of elites. This paper addresses what might be called the underside of the transition. Focusing on the case of Nova Iguacu, this paper analyzes the role of grass roots popular movements in the struggle for democracy in Brazil, 1974-1985. The author addresses at length the extent to which grass roots movements contributed to the democratization process, and the dilemmas they faced as a result of this process. He also discusses the issue of change and continuity in the popular process, especially relative to the pre-'64 period. The paper concludes with an analysis of the likely prospects of grass roots movements in the near future.

Resumen

La mayoría de los análisis acerca de la transición a la democracia en Brasil se centran en el papel de las elites. Este trabajo trata sobre el papel de los movimientos urbanos populares en la transición. Concentrándose en el caso de Nova Iguacu, este ensayo señala la importancia y los límites de los movimientos populares de base en la lucha por la democracia en Brasil, 1974-1985. El autor analiza el aporte de estos movimientos al proceso de democratización como también los dilemas que ellos enfrentaron en el curso de la apertura. Luego discute el problema de cambio y continuidad en el proceso popular, especialmente en relación al período previo a 1964. El ensayo concluye con un análisis de las perspectivas probables de los movimientos de base en un futuro cercano, bajo el nuevo régimen democrático.
Most analyses of the *abertura* in Brazil have focused on the role of elites in the struggle for democracy. This paper analyzes what might be called the "underside" of the *abertura*, the role of grass roots popular movements in this process. The subject is important for several reasons. First, although I agree with the other analyses that the *abertura* was largely an elite process, I also argue that grass roots movements did have an impact on the political situation, especially after 1978. Second, grass roots movements awakened great hopes and expectations in Brazil, particularly between 1978 and 1982, when many people saw them as the answer for a true democratizing process.\(^1\) Third, even though the *abertura* was initiated from within the military regime and the transition to democracy was completed through elite interactions,\(^2\) it is the popular movements which most directly express the material needs of the majority of the Brazilian population in the political sphere. Finally, the quality of any democratic regime will be closely connected to the dynamism of grass roots movements and their relationship to the state.

For methodological reasons, I chose to focus on a case study, that of the Movement of the Friends of the Neighborhood (MAB) of Nova Iguaçu, which I followed closely between December 1980 and June 1982, and again between January and April 1985.\(^3\) Nova Iguaçu is a poor city located some 20 miles to the north of Rio de Janeiro. With a population of approximately 1.5 million, it has become the seventh largest city in Brazil, having grown at a rapid rate since 1950.

By most standards — ability to mobilize the local population; local, state, and even national projection; recognition by the public authorities — MAB is an exceptionally well organized movement, probably the most successful in the state of Rio de Janeiro, which in turn has the strongest statewide neighborhood federation (FAMERJ) in the country. Thus it presents an interesting case for analysis, although not a "typical" one. Indeed, the reason I chose a case study was precisely the impossibility of generalizing about important aspects of grass roots movements in contemporary Brazil. When they emerged, how they developed, when they faced periods of demobilization, what linkages they constructed to political parties and the state, how the state responded — all of these issues vary so much from case to case that it is virtually impossible to
establish meaningful generalizations. Nevertheless, it is possible to
detect general trends and dilemmas, as well as to reflect upon the
general impact of grass roots movements. While focusing on the case of
Nova Iguaçu, the paper also reflects upon these general issues.

The Socio-Economic and Political Context in Nova Iguaçu

Although today Nova Iguaçu is a large city, in the recent past it was
known primarily for its agricultural production. Located in the Baixada
Fluminense, large lowlands which have a hot climate, Nova Iguaçu became
one of the most important orange producing regions in the country around
the turn of this century. The orange cycle entered a decline in 1926 when
diseases started to kill the trees in parts of the Baixada. The municipality's
population grew from 33,396 in 1920 to 105,809 in 1940, but the population
was still predominantly rural. By the end of World War II, orange
production had dropped off dramatically.

After 1945, Nova Iguaçu began a new phase characterized by being a
distant periphery of Greater Rio. As Greater Rio grew, real estate prices
pushed the popular classes into favelas or the outlying periphery areas like
Nova Iguaçu. From 145,649 inhabitants in 1950, the population increased to
359,364 in 1960 and 727,140 in 1970, making Nova Iguaçu the fastest
growing major city in the country. In 1950 46.60% of the municipality's
population still resided in rural areas, but by 1980 this figure had dropped
to 0.29%. This growth slowed during the 1970s, but the population still
increased to 1,094,805.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Population</th>
<th>% of population in rural areas</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1920</td>
<td>33,396</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1940</td>
<td>105,809</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1950</td>
<td>145,649</td>
<td>46.60</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1960</td>
<td>359,364</td>
<td>28.34</td>
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<tr>
<td>1970</td>
<td>727,140</td>
<td>0.39</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1980</td>
<td>1,094,805</td>
<td>0.29</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
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Source: Instituto Brasileiro de Geografia e Estatística, Censo, various years.
It is predominantly a working class (generally unskilled labor) city with a high percentage of migrants. The expansion of social services lagged far behind the city's growth. In 1980, only 37.7% of the municipality's population had running water, and 27.2% were without electricity. Only 30.3% had sewers; sewage is disposed through open canals and rivers, which is severely damaging to the local ecology and helps account for the bad health conditions. The city had only 265 doctors, 27 dentists, and 961 hospital beds, in all cases approximately one-eighth of Rio's per capita level. Between 1968 and 1972, the mortality rate for children in their first four years of life was 39%. Partially because of a shortage of schools, in 1978, according to the mayor's estimate, 150,000 school aged children were not enrolled, and most schools were in poor condition and seriously deficient in supplies. The illiteracy rate for people over 10 years old was 17% in 1980. As of 1978, only about 15% of the municipality's garbage was collected, leaving some 500 tons of garbage per day in open sewers and unoccupied land. Inadequate police facilities have led to one of the highest crime rates in the country, and transportation facilities are equally deficient.

The population of Nova Iguaçu has a tradition of battling to obtain better social services. As early as 1945, there were isolated attempts to organize the population for this purpose. In 1950, the first neighborhood associations (associações de bairro) were formed. As the national and local climate of the late populist years (1958-64) stimulated a rich political debate throughout the society, the neighborhood movement expanded. In 1960, the leaders organized the First Congress of the Commissions for Urban Improvements of the Neighborhoods of Nova Iguaçu. The congress mobilized many neighborhood associations and obtained some concessions from the city administration. The pre-coup years saw other experiences of popular mobilization in the Balxada Fluminense, including an important labor movement and movements of peasants and rural workers. The post-'74 neighborhood movement would draw upon this history of popular mobilization; several leaders in the post-'74 movement had actively participated in these earlier struggles.
The coup wiped out the most important popular movements. Key leaders of the neighborhood movement were imprisoned, and the repression prevented efforts to coordinate the movement between different neighborhoods. The associations and commissions which survived articulated their demands individually, and there was little public sensitivity to them. The repression and the weakness of local opposition forces made any popular organizing outside the Church almost impossible.

The years following the coup were difficult for much of the local population. The city continued to grow at a rapid pace, creating new social tensions. Because the limited local resources were not always well used, the city administration was incapable of providing urban services which kept pace with the population increase.\textsuperscript{12} Politically, too, things were difficult. In addition to the official repressive apparatus, the infamous Death Squad was very active in the Baixada. By 1979, the Death Squad had executed some 2,000 people in Nova Iguacu, and another paramilitary organization executed 764 in the first semester of 1980 alone.\textsuperscript{13} The progressive local leaders of the official opposition party, the MDB (Brazilian Democratic Movement), were imprisoned, and by 1970, the party entered a crisis. Statewide, the MDB fell into the hands of a conservative group closely linked to the military regime and became noted for being corrupt.\textsuperscript{14} The local government party, ARENA, was conservative even in comparison to its counterparts in other major cities. It was notorious for corruption and was largely uninterested in resolving the urban problems confronting the population. Despite the local MDB's problems, ARENA was defeated in 1974 and subsequent elections.\textsuperscript{15}

Meanwhile, the Catholic Church was undergoing the changes that would make it the bulwark of popular movements. The diocese of Nova Iguacu was created in 1960, and until 1966 it followed a relatively conservative orientation. That year, D. Adriano Hypolito was named bishop and began to encourage the changes that led the Church to become closely identified with the popular sectors. At the first Diocesan Assembly, held in 1968, the diocese voted to establish base communities as one of its principal priorities.\textsuperscript{16} Coinciding with the constriction of civil society, the Church began to create community groups — Bible circles, mothers’ clubs, youth groups, catechesis clubs — which reflected on faith and social
reality. During the most repressive years, the base communities, which started to flourish during the early 1970s, were virtually the only popular organizations which promoted critical political perspectives. Although these communities were involved only in rudimentary political actions such as signing petitions for urban services, their prior existence would facilitate more extensive organization and mobilization when the repression relaxed. Many leaders and participants in the neighborhood movement were motivated by their experiences in the CEBs.

Political liberalization followed the same general contours in Nova Iguaçu as nationally, with a gradual easing of repression, especially after 1978. The abertura helped make possible the re-emergence of popular movements by reducing the fear of participating, enabling the Left to engage in popular organizing, and enabling the movements to construct linkages to other institutions, like the opposition party, the press, and human rights groups.

Nevertheless, some caution is necessary in discussing the relationship between MAB and the abertura. Although the abertura began in 1974, both in general terms and in the specific case of Nova Iguaçu, the repression against popular movements did not ease up significantly until 1978. In Nova Iguaçu, although the systematic repression of the Médici years disappeared, the far Right continued to engage in terrorist practices. The most spectacular incidents involved the kidnapping and torturing of D. Adriano Hypolito in 1976 and the bombing of the cathedral in 1979. The specter of repression, therefore, continued to condition the development of the neighborhood movement until 1983.

More generally, the liberalization process did not noticeably affect politics in Nova Iguaçu until the late 1970s, given the weakness of the local opposition, the authoritarian nature of the city administration, and the presence of the Death Squad. The city administration and local PDS were particularly discredited. The administration remained unresponsive to popular demands, and the MDB's (and later PMDB's) problems continued through Tancredo Neves's election in 1985. In contrast to other cities, where some MDB politicians supported the popular movements, in Nova Iguaçu the neighborhood movement remained relatively isolated, with the Church as its most significant ally. Furthermore, it would be erroneous
to posit a linear relationship between liberalization or democratization and the expansion of social movements. In Nova Iguaçu, as elsewhere, democratization created new dilemmas and problems for popular movements, even as it allowed new spaces for popular organization.

The Neighborhood Movement, 1974–1985

The seeds of the Nova Iguaçu neighborhood movement were planted in 1974, when two young doctors committed to working with the poor started to work in one of Nova Iguaçu's outlying neighborhoods. Initially, they attended the population without charge and offered health courses but they gradually became aware of the limitations of this kind of work. Medical treatment had only palliative effects in a region with widespread malnutrition, open sewers, no garbage collection, and other health problems, so they began to think about organizing the population to help change those living conditions.

In 1975, the diocese's branch of Caritas, an international organ of the Catholic Church for serving the poor, hired these doctors and two others to start a health program. These four doctors played a leading role in transforming the previously isolated neighborhood efforts into a coherent popular movement. In November 1975, the diocese began to hold health discussions led by the four doctors. The group's orientation was expressed in a March 1976 document:

The solution of health problems depends more on the population's unity and action than on the presence of a doctor. Having a health post is important, but it does not resolve health problems. Therefore, all the forms the population has of uniting to reflect on its problems and develop its consciousness and unity are important. Actions which are purely palliative, which are not concerned with the population's conscientization, discourage true learning and do not resolve health problems.

In this early phase, the majority of people attending the courses worked at health posts. The doctors were satisfied with these courses, but they were also interested in reaching a different public, the poor themselves. In 1976, they held health courses in six neighborhoods throughout the municipality. The immersion in the neighborhoods
represented an important step for the young movement. The kind of participants began to change. Fewer people who worked in health care but more people from a working class background started to come. The discussions started to include all problems faced by the population rather than just health issues. Simultaneously, the population began to organize neighborhood associations which would address these needs. From the beginning, these efforts emphasized the concrete needs of the local population rather than the more theoretical discussions characteristic of the Church's conscientization work.

In May 1977, the movement began to call itself Amigos do Bairro (Friends of the Neighborhood) and assumed responsibility for putting out the newspaper which disseminated information. At the eleventh health encounter, in November 1977, the movement explicitly stated its objectives: "Friends of the Neighborhood is a movement concerned with the good of all people, with a better and more dignified existence." At this same meeting, the movement expressed its concern that "Friends of the Neighborhood cannot be closed, it must communicate with all people and encourage all to participate." This was a call to grow beyond Church horizons and become a mass movement.

The movement continued to expand, involving a growing number of neighborhoods, throughout 1976 and 1977. This expansion dictated the need for more formal leadership structures, and at the thirteenth meeting, in March 1978, the movement voted to create a Coordinating Commission. This kind of leadership structure was an important step in expanding beyond isolated material needs to developing a mass movement with broad political horizons. Other important steps in the same direction occurred around the same time, including turning the health newspaper into a newspaper for the movement. MAB was starting a period of consolidation and rapid expansion.

By May 1978, the bi-monthly meetings involved people from 18 different neighborhoods of Nova Iguaçu. At that time, the movement adopted its definitive name, Movimento de Amigos do Bairro, MAB (Friends of the Neighborhood Movement). The local associations continued to be the primary instrument for organizing the neighborhood, and MAB became the
means of coordinating the efforts of different associations and turning these efforts into a cohesive project, capable of pressuring the state into becoming more responsive to local needs.

In May 1978, two issues had a major impact in the movement's development. One of the most active associations took a petition with 1,500 signatures to the city administration, but the administration refused to receive it, stating that it would accept demands only from people who had paid their property tax. The residents wrote to several council people (vereadores) protesting this policy, and the movement got the local press involved in the issue. The pressures from different segments of the society forced the mayor to partially retract his initial statement. On July 25, he stated his willingness to receive all petitions, but still declared that in allocating public resources, he would give priority to people whose taxes were paid. This was MAB's first major victory in pressuring the city administration to re-evaluate its policies towards the popular sectors. Equally important, it was the first time MAB received considerable press attention and won allies among local politicians.

Around the same time, another serious conflict between MAB and the city administration occurred. The mayor agreed to attend a meeting with residents from one neighborhood, but he failed to show up and sent a representative instead. In protest against the initial decision to refuse to receive petitions and the mayor's failure to listen to the demands of the local population, MAB decided to hold an assembly to discuss the administration's irresponsibility and what the residents could do about it. The assembly was held on October 14, 1978, with 700 participants representing 38 neighborhoods. The assembly began a new period in MAB's development, marked by stronger linkages to local politicians and the press, and with more extensive participation. The development of local allies would give the movement greater impact than it previously had.21

During its early years, even though MAB had moved towards becoming a mass movement, it was still almost exclusively concerned with the immediate material needs of the local population. This began to change in late 1978 and early 1979 as the leadership opened out more towards local national politics. MAB participated in the solidarity movement with the 1979 ABC strike and with a teachers' strike in Rio and started to send
representatives to local demonstrations. The leaders began to support issues related to the democratization of the society, such as party reform, political amnesty, and reform of local government.

Organizational and political changes accompanied the movement's expansion and the parallel changes in the national political situation. In January 1979, MAB elected its first formal Coordinating Council, which started to meet every week rather than every two months. The movement divided into five regional groups to attempt to ensure better sensitivity to grassroots needs.

MAB's dynamism created a new problem for the city administration, accustomed to ignoring popular demands. MAB used the administration's unresponsiveness as a means of further delegitimizing the city government. The movement publicized the government's repeated failures to meet promises, the disrespect it had shown for MAB participants, the financial scandals which surrounded the administration, and its failures to attend to the needs of the local population. Largely in response to the administration's repeated failures to meet promises and provide certain urban services, MAB decided to hold a second major assembly on July 15, 1979. The assembly had 3,000 participants, representing 60 neighborhoods of Nova Iguacu. The importance the movement had acquired was seen in the publicity the assembly received and in the presence of important political figures, including a federal senator. The meeting was successful in forcing the administration to agree to weekly meetings with representatives from different neighborhoods of Nova Iguacu. MAB, by now the most important popular movement in Nova Iguacu, was in a new, more mature phase.

The party reform initiated in 1979 was one of the most important steps in the abertura. It deeply affected the subsequent political struggle, including the popular movements and in this specific case, MAB. MAB's leaders had always experienced some internal divisions, but these divisions were accentuated with the party reform. Some MAB leaders opted for the PMDB while others joined the PT; among the members of the original Coordinating Council, 11 opted for the former and eight for the latter. The party issue would have been less significant if it had not paralleled other differences in basic philosophy about what should be done at the current
political conjuncture and how popular movements should be led. Some people (mostly PT) were more concerned about grass roots discussions and about making sure the common people led the process, while others (mostly PMDB) emphasized the importance of creating a mass movement which would participate in the redemocratization process. Ironically, then, the abertura, which facilitated the growth of the movement, also created conditions for internal competition and division.

Until December 1981, although there were some tensions between PT and PMDB leaders, the existence of competing conceptions about how to run the movement probably helped MAB to articulate a careful balance between grass roots work and broader political issues that made it one of the more successful neighborhood movements in the country. By late 1981, about 90 neighborhood associations were participating.

In December 1981, the movement began a period of greater internal conflict at the leadership level and some demobilization of the grass roots. The most important problem was accentuation of internal tensions in the movement, principally stemming from partisan disputes. In December 1981, MAB held the Second Congress of Neighborhood Associations of Nova Iguaçu (the first had been held in 1960), became a federation, and held elections for a new Coordinating Council. The elections for the Coordinating Council led to sharp disputes. Many of the original leaders, including the four doctors, lost out. Twelve of the nineteen original members remained, but the overall composition of the Coordinating Council changed. There were tensions between the new leaders and some of those who left, and charges of manipulation were made on both sides. Never before had MAB experienced such deep internal disputes.

The 1982 elections for governor, federal and state congress, and local government stimulated further serious conflicts within the movement. Officially, MAB adopted a position of autonomy vis-à-vis political parties. This meant that as a movement, MAB did not opt for any particular party and was open to all individuals, regardless of party affiliation. At the same time, however, many MAB leaders recognized the
importance of electing individuals more sympathetic to the movement, so over a dozen MAB leaders ran for office, generally in the PMDB or the PT. The election results proved a major disappointment to the movement's leaders, most of whom had worked for the PMDB or PT. None of the popular candidates from the PT or PMDB of Nova Iguaçu were elected. Only one individual (Ivan Lemos, a PDT Vereador) who had participated in MAB won, and his participation was more limited than that of other popular candidates. Leonel Brizola won by a large plurality in Nova Iguaçu, and the PDT easily won the municipal elections. In the dispute for mayor, the election yielded the following results:22

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Party</th>
<th>Votes</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>PDT</td>
<td>129,789</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PDS</td>
<td>67,484</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PMDB</td>
<td>66,252</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PTB</td>
<td>20,084</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PT</td>
<td>7,262</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

In Nova Iguaçu, a relatively conservative faction of the PDT came to power. Although less repressive and more open than past local governments, it also faced problems of corruption and lack of responsiveness. Statewide, Brizola implemented populist practices aimed at developing popular support. Faced with the severe economic crisis, the federal government's strategy of reducing its allocation of resources to opposition governors, and a PDT minority in the state Parliament, Brizola had difficulties in effecting major changes. At both the municipal and state levels, the fact that the opposition had won free, competitive elections, but could not introduce substantial improvements in popular living conditions created new problems for MAB.

Despite these new challenges and a temporary demobilization of the grass roots, MAB continued to be one of the most important popular movements in the state. In December 1983, the movement held new elections for the Coordinating Council, and the different factions improved their relations, leading to another phase of growth. The new Coordinating Council had 11 representations from the PMDB, 7 from the PT, and 1 from
the PDT. In early 1984, the movement participated in the campaign for
direct elections. In November 1984, along with the other two neighborhood
federations of the Baixada Fluminense, MAB held one of its largest
demonstrations ever, with about 4,000 people, around issues of public
health. By January 1985, when Tancredo Neves was elected President, MAB
represented 120 neighborhood associations in the Baixada Fluminense.

**MAB and the State, 1974–1985**

The grass roots movements which emerged in the post-'74 period
generally espoused an ideology of autonomy vis-à-vis the state.
Nevertheless, MAB and other movements constantly interacted with state
organs in attempting to obtain urban services. The state's response to
grass roots movements is one of the most important factors conditioning
their development. Furthermore, even though part of the innovative
character of some social movements stemmed from their questioning the
traditional state oriented politics, the capacity of social movements to
promote change depends largely on their ability to influence the state.23

A brief preliminary discussion of some aspects of the relationship
between popular movements and the state at an abstract level will help
clarify the analysis of Nova Iguaçu. It is important to distinguish between
the state's response to popular movements and its orientation towards the
popular sectors. Neighborhood movements generally present themselves
as movements which represent the entire population of a given geographic
area, but even in well organized movements, participation is limited
relative to the overall population. MAB represented 120 associations by
1985. By a rough calculation, an average of 50 people participate per
association, and perhaps five times that number have been involved at one
time or another. This means that the number of current participants is
perhaps 6,000, and perhaps 30,000 have participated at some point. While
these numbers are impressive, the fact remains that only a small
percentage (at most 3%) of the population has participated in the movement.
As a result, it is possible for the state to develop a strategy of responding
to some demands raised by the popular movements, while at the same time
essentially ignoring or even being hostile to popular movements, which can be seen as a threat because of their autonomy.

In Nova Iguazu, the state has employed three main approaches to MAB. Between 1974 and 1978, the predominant approach combined repression and malign neglect of popular movements with basic neglect of popular demands. From 1978 until 1982, the state introduced some elements of conservative clientelism. It employed similar policies toward popular movements, but with more emphasis on malign neglect than repression. Some state organs were more responsive to popular demands and attempted to win popular support. From March 1983 on until March 1985, with the PDT in power, the predominant state approach to MAB was progressive populism. While seeing autonomous popular movements as a threat, the state was willing to support movements which could be more easily controlled. It was significantly more responsive to popular needs.

During the first four years of MAB's existence, the state's primary response to the movement was generally authoritarian. The leaders of Nova Iguazu saw no reason to respond to the demands formulated by the nascent popular movement. The city administration perceived the popular movement as an enemy which was still weak enough that the government did not need to make concessions. At best, the attitude towards MAB was one of neglect, and on occasion the movement suffered repression. Several MAB leaders were threatened, and at least two were assaulted and warned to curtail their participation. MAB leaders described the administration's personal treatment of movement people as one of "flagrant rudeness" during this period.

The period between June and October 1978 marked the beginning of a second phase in the relationship between MAB and the city administration. The city government began to change from a blatantly authoritarian approach to one which included some elements of conservative clientelism. This period, which lasted until 1982, was characterized by occasional minor concessions to the movement. Intermittently, the administration was less overtly hostile to the movement, even though it provided few concrete improvements in urban services. In October 1978, the mayor finally agreed to attend a MAB meeting, indicating greater concern with his public
image in the popular sectors. In front of 700 people, the mayor recognized
the fairness of MAB’s demands and agreed to begin holding weekly meetings
with the movement to discuss the population’s most pressing demands. In
early 1979 the administration announced a new community development
program, the Community Operation of Social Integration of Nova Iguaçu,
which would supposedly involve popular participation. In practice, the
project was barely implemented except for the program of polio
vaccinations, but its existence indicated concern with responding to popular
demands.

Despite the minor improvements in the city’s response to popular
demands, the movement still faced a series of frustrations in this regard.
For example, in 1981, in response to demands to extend electricity to
different parts of Nova Iguaçu, the city finally got the light company to do
this — but then had the residents pay for the installation of services, in
violation of practices elsewhere. In response, in July 1981, MAB held a
demonstration in front of the town hall, but to no effect.

Partially in response to the frustration of years of popular
organizing which had little impact on local government, in 1980 MAB leaders
decided to attempt to negotiate directly with the state government. The
demonstration at the Government Palace in Rio, June 13, 1980, with 700
participants, was the first time MAB had gone to the state government as
opposed to Nova Iguaçu’s government to demand urban improvements. This
move towards the state government marked an important step in MAB’s
visibility and capacity to negotiate. It meant dealing with a higher level of
the state, and initiated a strategy of forcing the government party, the PDS,
and the now extinct Popular Party (PP) to compete in providing services.
While Nova Iguaçu was governed by the PDS, the state governor of Rio,
Chagas Freitas of the PP, was the only opposition governor in the country.
Chagas Freitas was a conservative figure within the most conservative
opposition party and had strong links to the federal government, but his
strategy for dealing with the popular movements was less confrontive and
repressive than that of the PDS of Nova Iguaçu. Chagas Freitas, known for
his clientelistic practices with the popular classes, was more tuned into
the exigencies of the process of political liberalization than the PDS. By
1978, his dominant response to the popular sectors was conservative
clientelism. Typical in this regard was his successful attempt to create a
more conservative movement of favela associations in Rio de Janeiro. In
doing so, Chagas divided the favela movement, took the steam out of the
more autonomous movement which already existed, and implemented
clientelistic policies in a number of favelas throughout the city. The
repressive removal policies of the 1964-73 period gave rise to a policy of
"urbanizing" the favelas.24

MAB hoped to encourage competition between the PP and the PDS at a
time when the parties were scrambling to develop strategies for the 1982
elections. Movement leaders feel, however, that this endeavor met with
limited success. Although Chagas Freitas used some state resources for
urban improvements in Nova Iguaçu, he did so to a limited extent. MAB
rarely won access to the state government. Rather than responding to an
autonomous popular movement, Chagas attempted -- unsuccessfully -- to
reproduce, in Nova Iguaçu, the strategy of creating neighborhood
associations from above.

The decision of 12 movement leaders to run for office in 1982 must
be understood within this context of eight years of frustration with the
state's response to popular demands. MAB leaders felt that the only way
to effect significant changes in local government was by electing someone
to represent popular demands within the administration. The defeat of the
popular candidates and the PDT victory added one more chapter to the
history of frustrations besetting MAB. At the time, none of the 19
members of the Coordinating Council belonged to the PDT. While a large
number of grass roots participants had voted for the PDT, the PDT victory
meant a continuation of the lack of any organic relationship between the
movement and the state.

The period beginning January 31, 1983, when Paulo Leone (PDT)
became mayor of Nova Iguaçu, and March 15, 1983, when Leonel Brizola
became governor, marked the beginning of a third phase in the
relationship between the state and MAB. During this period, MAB directed
more of its demands towards the state government, which was more
concerned about popular needs and had more resources. Brizola's predominant approach to popular movements has been one of progressive populism, though marked by more conservative policies than most people expected. In his discourse, Brizola emphasized participation and social justice. Despite his evident concern for ameliorating the most pressing popular needs, in practice Brizola has been somewhat hostile towards autonomous popular movements.

Typical of the relationship between MAB and Brizola was an incident in late 1984. In October 1984, MAB and the two other federations of neighborhood associations of the Baixada Fluminense held an assembly and encouraged Brizola to attend. The Governor did not even send a representative, so the three federations decided to hold a demonstration in front of the Government palace in Rio, November 18, 1984. Brizola took the demonstration as a personal affront, accusing MAB of attempting to delegitimize his government. He stated that in the future, he would refuse to work with neighborhood associations, thereby provoking considerable confusion in the movement about how to respond. At the same time, notwithstanding the effects of the economic crisis, Brizola initiated programs which responded to popular needs in the areas of health, education and transportation.

Equally interesting in this sense was the PDT's attempt to create new neighborhood associations in Nova Iguaçu, thereby reproducing the PP's earlier attempts to do so from above. Again, however, the endeavor met little success; most of the associations which survived eventually joined MAB. Brizola's cooptation of a significant part of the favela movement in Rio de Janeiro indicates that other incursions into the popular sectors were more successful.

The relationship between the city administration and MAB was similar, though the Nova Iguaçu PDT was more conservative and less sophisticated. Mayor Paulo Leone announced his intention to work closely with the popular sectors, and in June 1983 held a large assembly with 4,000 people present, to discuss the city's needs and projects. In October 1984, the city administration sponsored the First Congress for the Development of the Municipalities of the Baixada Fluminense, again
welcoming popular participation. The administration's discourse has been favorable to popular participation and to MAB. For example, a publication on the administration's accomplishments in its first two years (January 31, 1983 to January 31, 1985) mentioned the "support the administration gives the neighborhood associations of Nova Iguaçu, represented by the Federation of MAB. In previous years, access to the Executive Power was difficult to obtain. Today, thanks to the philosophy implemented by Mayor Paulo Leone, everyone is listened to. Demands and suggestions are noted and directed to the pertinent authorities."^25

From the viewpoint of MAB leaders, however, the relationship was not as smooth. MAB leaders criticize the gap between the administration's discourse and its practice. The current President of MAB stated in an interview: "When the PDS was in power, everyone knew that the government was against the people. With Brizola, with the PDT, it is harder. Brizola says he is your friend, but in practice he is not much better than the PDS. But most people don't see this."^26

In material terms, Nova Iguaçu has, if anything, become poorer since Brizola and Paulo Leone took office, as much of the local population has suffered from what is perhaps the worst economic crisis in Brazil's modern history. Yet even if MAB's direct impact in obtaining material demands has been limited, the movement has played a decisive role in legitimating popular demands. This role is manifested most clearly in the profound change politicians have evinced towards the movement. During the early years of MAB's existence, not only did the mayor continually show disrespect for the movement, but local PDS politicians, including some town council representatives, denounced the movement as a nexus of communist infiltration. By contrast, the Leone administration explicitly recognized MAB as the most important and legitimate expression of popular demands in Nova Iguaçu. Furthermore, it recognized the legitimacy of the demands of the popular sectors, even though MAB leaders perceived its record in meeting those demands as unsatisfactory. For the first time, the Leone administration created institutionalized means of receiving popular demands in the form of a permanent planning commission which includes MAB representatives.
Dilemmas and Problems

When grassroots popular movements proliferated in major urban areas in the second half of the 1970s, the first analyses about their political impact were highly optimistic. Many early works assumed or posited a secular increase in mobilization and efficacy of these movements. In fact, the movements have been subject to ebbs and tides, confirming the expectations of some theoretical works on the subject.27 Without pretending to be exhaustive, the following pages analyze some of the outstanding dilemmas MAB has faced.

1) Popular consciousness and popular participation. The success of a movement like MAB depends largely on the leadership’s ability to encourage popular participation. In the absence of such participation, the movement cannot claim the representativeness it needs to effectively bargain with the state, nor does the population accumulate political experience. Yet encouraging popular participation is difficult given the local living conditions and popular consciousness.

As can be surmised from data on local living conditions, the vast majority of the population of the Baixada Fluminense faces significant material difficulties. When they can get jobs, men work long hours for low pay, and frequently travel as many as four hours per day to and from work. Women take care of the home and the children, and generally work at least part time as well. The exhausting nature of daily life by itself represents an obstacle to popular participation; people do not find the time or energy to add one more commitment to their already difficult lives. In addition, going to meetings usually entails round trip bus fares, which further burdens the already tight family budget.

More important than these practical and material problems is the question of popular consciousness. Despite the great heterogeneity in popular consciousness, most studies on the subject point to several common findings. As a rule, the popular sectors are somewhat skeptical about the possibility of effecting political change. Politics is seen as an elite struggle, and the state is perceived as a realm beyond the popular sectors.28 These characterizations do not apply to the individuals who
actively participate in MAB, yet the active participants perceive the difficulty in getting people to believe in the efficacy of popular organizations as one of the movement's most significant obstacles. In this sense, the lengthy history of popular exclusion from the most important political decisions, partially excluding the 1955–64 period, has played a major role in shaping popular consciousness. Popular movements have begun to affect Brazil's elitist political culture, yet the lengthy heritage of elitism still weighs significantly. 29

2) Frustration through continuous defeats. Even though MAB stands out as an unusually successful movement, its concrete victories have always been limited and partial, especially in relation to the tremendous effort spent in mobilizing the local population. The number of defeats and the amount of energy spent in winning minor material benefits have led many movement participants to drop out or reduce their participation. Many associations have had cyclical histories, with periods of growth followed by others of demobilization. Since 1974, at least thirty associations in Nova Iguaçu have collapsed or dropped out of MAB, underscoring the fragility these movements are subject to.

In response to this problem, MAB always paid some attention to cultural questions. Many associations saw their work as community building, which emphasized personal relations, as well as presenting material demands. In 1984 MAB began a popular theater, which performed for local neighborhood associations, attracting an many as 300 people. The individuals who created the theater group saw their efforts as a means of extending the movement in a cultural direction, thereby hoping to avoid the cyclical effects of movements which focus exclusively on material demands.

3) Frustration because of the difficulty of capitalizing on victories. Continuous defeats are almost certain to have a demobilizing effect, but even when a movement wins some victories, it can be hard to capitalize on them. Since 1978, this has been a major problem for MAB.

This difficulty was evident, for example in MAB's efforts in 1981–82 to get an already completed public hospital open for public use. The state responded to the movement. Finally, on November 12, 1982, three days
before the elections, President Figueiredo, hoping to swing enough votes so that the PDS would win the state of Rio, inaugurated the hospital. MAB had worked for over a year to get the hospital opened, yet the local and federal government were ultimately in the best position to capitalize.

This difficulty was compounded when Brizola and Paulo Leone took office. Both PDT politicians have a discourse favorable to popular demands, and both have implemented some programs favorable to the popular sectors. Yet neither has been directly responsive to popular demands, preferring to present their programs as state initiatives. When the government was openly anti-popular, it was easier for the movement to project an image which combatted this view.

The generalized disappointment with the Brizola government generated frustration within MAB, especially at the grass roots level. Many people had placed high hopes in Brizola. The subsequent results -- the austerity program, the centralized decision making style, the governor's notorious neglect of the state in order to promote himself for president, and the willingness to construct alliances with the most conservative political forces -- turned Brizola into one of the major disappointments of the post-'82 period. On Brizola's behalf, it is important to recognize that governing an opposition state during the crisis was difficult. This difficulty was compounded by the need to construct alliances in view of the minority the PDT had in the parliament. Nevertheless, the disappointment experienced by social movements often had a demobilizing effect, further complicated by the economic crisis. While MAB was able to resume a favorable path during the December 1983 to March 1985 period, leaders noted the difficulty of dealing with the generalized disenchantment with the political world.

This disenchantment was not unique to Rio de Janeiro. In São Paulo, too, many movements experienced demobilization as a result of disappointment with the Montoro government and the economic crisis. As organized social movements declined and the economic crisis accelerated, a number of spontaneous violent movements (supermarket invasions, etc) occurred. While such movements were far from unprecedented, their magnitude was a new and disturbing phenomenon. Under both the Brizola
and Montoro governments, the tenuous alliance which had existed between liberal democrats and progressive social movements under ARENA and PDS governors broke down. The most progressive bishop in Greater São Paulo, D. Angélico Sândalo, stated in early 1984 that, "It is time for Governor Montoro to listen to the population and cease fearing it; to quit making excuses for a repressive government, which treated popular demands with clubs and arms; and to follow through on his campaign promise to promote revolutionary changes in the countryside... Today, in its rhythm, its discourse, and its behavior, the Montoro government is like all the rest." 33 Meanwhile, both the Brizola and Montoro governments attributed their difficulties to the economic crisis and the federal government's attempts to delegitimize the opposition governments by cutting off resources. And both complained about the unrealistic expectations of social movements and the progressive Church. Senador Fernando Henrique Cardoso of São Paulo stated, "At times, the Church demands moral solutions for a structural crisis, leading to a certain lack of communication." 34

4) Internal Tensions. Internal tensions and conflicts inhere in virtually any movement or organization which attempts to follow democratic principles. They need not adversely affect the movement or organization, but there is always the possibility that they can do so. In popular movements, this kind of enervation occurs when the leaders are so embroiled in internal disputes that the primary objective becomes defeating opposing positions within the movement rather than mobilizing the population for urban services.

Ever since MAB emerged, there have been conflicts, even though, excepting the period between December 1981 and mid-1983, the movement did not experience significant adverse effects. The conflicts at the leadership level revolve around both substantive issues (how to lead the movement), questions of power (usually a party dispute, rather than an issue of individual power), or a combination of the two (since party differences are reflected in substantive questions and vice versa). The party reform of 1979 accentuated divisions within the movement at the
leadership level. After 1979, the leadership of MAB could be divided into three main groups, each of which is subdivided as follows:

1) a Catholic left, which is subdivided into PT X PMDB;

2) an independent left, which is also subdivided into PT X PMDB;

3) an "organized" left, with linkages to clandestine (illegal) political organizations. Here, in addition to the PT X PMDB divisions, are additional cleavages. Among others, the MR-8, Brazilian Community Party (PCB), Communist Party of Brazil (PC do B), Libelu, and Socialist Convergence were represented by at least one leader. Some of the clandestine groups (MR-8, PCB, and most of the PC do B) supported the PMDB, while others (Socialist Convergence, Libelu, and a split off of the PC do B) supported the PT.

The cleavages were complex, cutting across many different issues and reference points. On some issues, there were divisions between the secular and the Catholic left. On others, differences arose between the PT and PMDB leaders, or between MR-8 and PC do B positions. And on other questions, the cleavages did not correspond to any clear party alignments.

The period when the popular movement most clearly suffered from internal disputes was between December 1981 and mid-1983. The bitter disputes which accompanied the elections for MAB's Coordinating Council in December 1981 were originated by the parallel disputes taking place over the 1982 elections. Power considerations (enhancing the position of one of the clandestine groups) rather than substantive issues were primarily at stake. The Congress disputes were so bitter that some leaders considered creating a parallel movement. Eventually, both sides overcame the animosity, recognizing that the movement had suffered as a consequence. The defeat of all the popular candidates in 1982 also contributed to the awareness of the fragility of the popular movement and the importance of unifying forces.

5) Cooption. MAB has not faced significant problems caused by cooption by the state, but this fact is noteworthy, both because other popular movements have\textsuperscript{35} and because the state clearly attempted to
co-opt the neighborhood movement in at least two moments. The possibility of cooptation implies an exchange between the state and a popular movement. The state can co-opt only if it provides some resources in return. In this sense, until 1979 at the state level and January 1983 at the local level, there were limited possibilities of cooptation since government leaders preferred to ignore popular movements. Chagas Freitas and his political machine made clear initiatives to co-opt popular movements in Nova Iguaçu and elsewhere, including the ill-fated attempts to create neighborhood associations linked to the Popular Party in the Baixada Fluminense. However, these efforts failed, largely because MAB already effectively occupied this political space.

In Nova Iguaçu, Brizola’s attempts to create associations linked to the PDT were equally unsuccessful, as the associations which survived joined MAB. In his own state, Brizola’s popularity declined, suggesting that his efforts to win popular sympathies via centralized actions were also at best partially successful. Nevertheless, judging from interviews with popular leaders, his attempts to abort popular movements by providing some resources to the popular sectors while circumventing MAB and similar movements were often successful.

MAB’s consolidation as a well organized, relatively autonomous popular movement undoubtedly contributed to avoiding cooptation. Yet it would be misleading to suggest that cooptation is a historically closed option. Especially if the PMDB wins the 1986 elections for governor, the movement will face new dilemmas in this sense. Some MAB leaders would probably be elected to office and others nominated for local positions if the PMDB wins. The movement as a whole would have to decide how to play the negotiating game with the PMDB in power: when to protest against a government elected with the support of MAB leaders, and when to accept policies which seem to go against the interests of the popular sectors.

**Change and Continuity in the Popular Process**

One of the most important questions regarding popular movements in the post-’74 period is their relative novelty. What has changed and what
has remained the same? As noted earlier, neighborhood associations are not new in Nova Iguaçu, and other studies have convincingly showed that this is also true elsewhere. Furthermore, at least as regards neighborhood associations, the changes are not as dramatic as some people suggested. Nevertheless, the character of the post-'74 movement in Nova Iguaçu has changed in relation to the pre-'64 movement in several important ways.

1) The relationship between the movement and political parties.

The post-'74 movement had greater autonomy vis-à-vis the parties than the 1950-64 movement. In the earlier period, the Brazilian Labor Party, the most progressive of the three major parties, played a major role in supporting neighborhood associations in Nova Iguaçu. The outstanding leader of the movement, for example, was the head of Nova Iguaçu's chapter of the PTB. One neighborhood leader of the period stated that the PTB helped finance cultural events, organized the local association and obtained legal recognition. He also indicated that the party encouraged politicians to be responsive to popular organizations. All of the pre-'64 leaders who were interviewed noted that the PTB helped organize the 1960 neighborhood Congress. As was characteristic of the late populist period, the linkages between the PTB and the popular movements of Nova Iguaçu were informal. Leaders of popular movements requested PTB politicians to take care of specific requests. Although its role was not as pronounced as the PTB's, the Communist Party also helped support the neighborhood movement. Although officially illegal, the Communist Party was active in supporting many popular movements of the period.

In the post-'74 period, most of the key leaders first participated in MAB and later joined political parties. Neither the official opposition party, the MDB, which was dominated by conservative leaders without any linkages to the popular movement, nor the clandestine leftist parties, which were decimated, were important actors in the beginning of MAB. Some leaders of the movement later joined clandestine parties, and by 1982, the party dispute was sharp. Yet over time, despite the complexities and difficulties of the relationship, MAB has retained greater autonomy vis-à-vis parties than the pre-'64 movement. Indeed, one of the greatest challenges the
movement has faced has been reconciling diverse party positions within the movement.

2) Relationship between the movement and the state. MAB has had greater autonomy vis-à-vis the state than the pre-'64 movement. Especially between 1961 and 1964, the state played a major role in creating neighborhood and favela associations in Rio de Janeiro. Although the state did not actively create associations in Nova Iguacu, the associations were closely linked to the state. This was seen, for example, in the fact that the state helped sponsor the Congress of Neighborhood Associations in May 1960. Leaders of the period emphasize that the relationship between the movement and the state was essentially harmonious. To some extent, the harmony between the popular movement and the state reflected the presence of a progressive governor, Roberto Silveira (1958-1962) and relatively progressive mayor, Alósio de Barros, both PTB politicians.

By contrast, MAB emerged as a movement opposed to, and with no linkages to the authoritarian state, and over time it has remained autonomous with respect to the state. In this sense, MAB has thus far escaped the fate of some neighborhood movements which were co-opted by the state. At the opposite end of the spectrum, MAB has also generally avoided the radical anti-statist positions which have paralyzed some grass roots movements. The movement has insisted on preserving its autonomy, but it has also seen negotiation with the state as essential to its development. Even though the movement has generally opposed many policies of the local and state governments, it has actively sought dialogue with the authorities. This autonomy vis-à-vis the state, without falling into a naive anti-state attitude, is one of the characteristics which has distinguished MAB as an unusually successful neighborhood movement. However, as noted previously, the possibility of reconstructing some forms of cooptation, clientelism, or populism is by no means historically closed.

3) The role of the Left. In Nova Iguacu, the post-'74 movement involved a Catholic left for the first time. In addition, parts of the traditional left underwent a significant transformation and also played an important role in the neighborhood movement.
After the dismal results of the guerrilla experience (1968–73), parts of the left began to rethink their politics. Among the significant changes was a new attitude towards liberal democracy, previously dismissed as a bourgeois façade. Having experienced the consequences of the absence of traditional democratic freedoms, much of the left began to criticize its past conceptions and to actively participate in the effort to construct a democratic regime.40 A parallel and equally important change was the attempt to construct stronger linkages to the popular sectors. During the 1968–73 period, a “vanguardist” conception of politics permeated the left, and there were almost no linkages between the clandestine organizations and the masses. By 1973, the naïveté and tragic consequences of this approach were all too apparent, and the left began to seek new linkages to the masses.

Finally, during the 1960s, the left gave primacy to the conflict between labor and capital, and neighborhood associations were seen as secondary. Since 1974, other forms of popular movements have gained greater attention. In the state of Rio de Janeiro this change was reinforced by the relative decline of the labor movement. Before 1964, the state had some of the most powerful unions in the country. In the Baixada Fluminense, the labor movement played a visible role in local political struggles, while the neighborhood movement was secondary. In the post-’74 period, the region’s labor movement never reconquered the vitality it had before the coup,41 and the neighborhood movement acquired an unprecedented importance.

Some of the outstanding leaders of MAB followed this trajectory from clandestine revolutionary organizations to working with the neighborhood movement. Although limited in numbers, the left’s involvement in MAB dates back to the origins of the movement and has been critical in its entire development. The four doctors who began the movement were all individuals with a history of participation in the left. As the movement expanded, other individuals with linkages (past or present) to leftist organizations also participated.

The impact of the non-Catholic Left has been considerable, largely because of the dedication, political experience, and broader political
vision of these people. People from the non-Catholic Left participate in perhaps 20 of the 120 associations represented by MAB, and between five and ten members of the Coordinating Council have been younger educated people from the non-Catholic Left.

The population of Nova Iguáçu has a history of different forms of popular resistance and organization, but it was the non-Catholic Left which helped the movement transcend immediate material perspectives. Individuals from the Left helped raise broader political issues and also actively worked to coordinate efforts between neighborhoods. The step from a movement solely concerned with the population's immediate needs to one where the leaders attempted to relate these needs to broader political issues was important. Popular movements can create pressures which cause authoritarian regimes to open up, but to do so, they must work beyond immediate material benefits towards issues related to democratization. Excessive focus on the broader issues easily leads to gaps between the leaders, who in a movement like MAB are politically sophisticated, and the rank and file, which is generally not very aware of the linkages between broader political issues and immediate material needs. Yet exclusive concern with immediate material needs prevents a movement from contributing to broader social change and makes the movement susceptible to internal crisis once it has obtained the benefits it initially sought or, conversely, once it becomes frustrated from repeated failure.

The efforts to coordinate work between neighborhoods also gave a new character to the movement. From a relatively early time, the movement was concerned about articulation between the participating neighborhoods. This was a marked contrast to previous neighborhood movements in Nova Iguáçu since only during the brief period before and after the 1960 Congress had there been serious efforts to coordinate work between neighborhoods. It is also one of the characteristics which made MAB an unusually well articulated movement. Coordinating work between neighborhoods created the possibility of a mass movement, with greater chances of pressuring the state.
The role the Left played in helping organize the local populations is common to most movements in Brazil. The popular classes have always created some expressions of resisting domination, but without the input of leadership generally drawn from outside circles, these expressions have not led to political movements which could change the society. Even the post-’74 movements, which have been more autonomous with respect to political parties and intellectuals, have generally relied on outside support, especially in the early phases.

However, many people who participate in the neighborhood movement are critical of the participation of the non-Catholic Left. One individual who has participated in the popular struggles of the Baixada Fluminense since the late 1950s stated, "The ideological proposals are generating some problems. The lack of credibility among politicians, and the constant attacks by the movement against the politicians, have impeded the growth of the popular movement. The popular movement has grown in terms of protest and radicalized a lot. This radicalization has prevented its progress." 42

Recognition of the Left's role in MAB does not imply that the Left's involvement in a popular movement is a panacea. The Federation of Favela Associations of Rio de Janeiro (FAFERJ) provides an example in which extensive involvement by the Left has, by the most favorable evaluation, produced mixed results. A frequent complaint in such cases is that the organized Left manipulates the movement for its own ends.

4) Grass roots participation. Most popular movements in the pre-’64 period were hierarchically organized, and only in exceptional periods did the grass roots participate. 43 The available evidence suggests that at least the latter part of this generalization was true of Nova Iguaçu’s neighborhood movement of the pre-’64 period. Only at one point, the 1960 Congress of Neighborhood Associations, did the movement mobilize a large number of people. After the Congress, participation once again declined. One participant of the period stated that the associations were formed on the basis of a small group of friends getting together and using their personal contacts to attempt to have problems resolved. While this method was successful in obtaining some short term
benefits, the movement did not mobilize large numbers of people or create solid associations.

In the post-'74 movement, there continues to persist a gap between rank and file and leaders in terms of political consciousness and involvement. Nevertheless, the efforts to promote grass roots participation and democracy have led to encouraging results in many associations. Some associations have as many as 500 members, and as many as 150 people participate in the weekly meeting. An individual who actively participated in the region’s popular struggles in both the pre-'64 and the post-'74 periods commented, “The big difference between the popular movements today and the movements of the pre-'64 period is that today more people enter the struggle. Before 1964, a small group of people got together to try to resolve things. Today we try to conscientize everyone about the importance of participating. The number of people who participate increased a lot.” Without entering into details here, it is important to emphasize the fundamental role the Catholic Church played in encouraging this roots participation.

The limits of change. The neighborhood movement which surfaced after 1974 had greater popular participation than ever before, and it was also more autonomous vis-à-vis the state and political parties than the pre-'64 movement. These changes suggest that the popular classes have emerged as a more conscious, active political force than in the past. Especially in light of the traditional relative exclusion of the popular classes, these changes assume considerable political importance. If popular movements continue to expand and are able to establish effective linkages to dominant political parties and to the state, they will contribute significantly to democratizing both the state and social relations.

Nevertheless, the changes which have occurred are generally subtle and fragile. In this sense, many analyses of grass roots movements have erred on the side of exaggerating the novelty, strength, and autonomy of grass roots popular movements.

A first important point in this regard is that the popular process is always subject to reversals and impasses. Any literature which assumes a linear growth of popular movements must be dismissed as a chimera.
Regardless of what happens in terms of political regime, the social movements will face new dilemmas. If there is an authoritarian involution, grass roots movements will probably be among the first to suffer. Conversely, if an elitist liberal democracy consolidates itself, grass roots movements will face problems of disillusionment.

While there has been some change in the level of popular participation, the contrast to the pre-'64 movement is not as sharp as some analysts have suggested. On the one hand, during some moments, there was significant participation in the pre-'64 movements. This is especially true of the labor and peasant movements, but was also occasionally true of some neighborhood movements. On the other hand, as the discussion of MAB's dilemmas indicated, it remains difficult to mobilize the local population. Furthermore, the gap between the political consciousness of the leaders and that of grass roots participants remains profound.

In order to avoid idealization of the popular process, it is important to emphasize that in Nova Iguaçu, the neighborhood movement was far from autonomous in relation to political forces outside the popular classes. In particular, the Catholic Church and the non-Catholic Left played a fundamental role in the movement. Without support from the Church or other institutions and from the Left, neighborhood movements have experienced considerable difficulty in developing, except in the face of a concrete threat from the outside, as in the case of favela removals or land expulsions. While the popular sectors may organize on their own, this organization still tends to be ephemeral, to focus exclusively on immediate material demands, and to fail to construct linkages to other neighborhoods or local institutions.

Despite the strengthening of popular movements, the state remains the dominant sphere of Brazilian politics. Political parties are still more effective than social movements in promoting political change, not because the parties themselves are strong, but rather because they are the primary instrument for gaining access to power in a democratic system. The relative fragility of popular movements and the need to effect change through the state was seen clearly in Nova Iguaçu in 1982.
when over a dozen candidates from MAB decided to run for office because of the limits of the social movements. Despite the fact that grass roots movements of the post-'74 period were heralded by some as the answer to strengthening civil society, by 1982 many leaders of one of the country's most successful grass roots movements felt that change would be most effectively realized through the state. Equally noteworthy is the fact that all of the main political currents represented within MAB had candidates for office, notwithstanding the significant differences and conflicts between them. There can be no doubt that grass roots movements have strengthened civil society -- but it is also clear that Brazilian civil society remains relatively subordinate to the state.

The 1982 election results further underscored the weakness of popular movements; with one exception, the popular candidates were defeated. Judging from the number of candidates from MAB, the movement appears to have overestimated its electoral strength. Significantly, the candidate who won had a more traditional approach which favored constructing clientelistic linkages to the state. Thus it was a clientelistic approach which proved most successful in electoral terms. The unique party situation in the state of Rio de Janeiro contributed to the defeat of popular candidates, it seems likely that under even the most propitious conditions, MAB's electoral impact will be limited.46

Despite the important changes Brazilian society underwent during the two decades of military rule, the state and political parties remain as central as ever in any attempts to democratize the political order.47 The tradition of a strong state and weak civil society has undergone some alterations,48 but the experience of MAB and other social movements suggest that this transformation has been limited. The case of São Paulo, where popular movements have elected a meaningful number of candidates, both in the PT and the PMDB, indicates that placing representatives within the state does not ensure greater public responsiveness to popular demands.

Despite the evident intentions of movements like MAB to challenge them, traditional populist, clientelistic mechanisms are alive and well in Brazilian society. The emergence of more autonomous, stronger popular
movements in the second half of the 1970s did contribute to forcing political elites to change their discourse. The technocratic, authoritarian discourse of the most repressive period gave rise to a more participatory discourse. This change in itself is significant, but it should not camouflage the continuation of traditional populist practices. Nowhere is this continuation so clear as in the state of Rio de Janeiro, with Governor Leonel Brizola.

Finally, despite the strengthening of popular movements, Brazilian politics remains fundamentally a struggle among different elite groups. This was clear in the period after April 1984, when the Amendment which proposed establishing direct elections for president was defeated. Vast segments of the society, including many organized social movements, mobilized on behalf of direct elections. However, it was only through traditional elite negotiations behind closed doors that the transition to democracy was secured. Appositely, the master of elite negotiation and conciliation, Tancredo Neves, was the winner of the negotiations. Tancredo's victory represented the triumph of traditional Brazilian ways of doing politics -- ways which largely excluded the popular sectors.

None of this is to deny the impact grass roots movements had in the struggle for democracy in Brazil, the role they may have in the future, or the changes Brazilian politics have undergone as a result of the grass roots movements. But any adequate assessment of these movements must take into consideration the unusual resiliency of relatively traditional approaches to politics, even though, if the argument here is correct, the traditional style has had to change to accommodate grass roots movements.

**Grass Roots Movements and Democratization, 1974–1985**

At this point, it is time to leave a reflection centered on Nova Iguaçu and analyze, more generally, the contributions of grass roots movements in the struggle for democracy. While the Nova Iguaçu case illustrates many of the most important contributions, limits, and dilemmas faced by grass roots movements, it must also be analyzed
within the context of an amalgam of heterogeneous grass roots movements.

As Bolivar Lamounier has argued, the Brazilian regime reached the point where the most important decision arenas were open for dispute only in 1982. In this sense, the regime was successful in controlling the broadest contours of the *abertura* over a protracted period of time. Nevertheless, from 1974 on, the opposition was successful in forcing the regime to redefine important issues, even if these issues did not imply relinquishing the most important positions in the decision arena. Many changes were not foreseen by the originators of the *abertura*; they rather reflected an ongoing process of opposition initiatives, followed by subsequent regime responses and initiatives, with occasional negotiating between the two sides. Indeed, I would argue that it was in part because the regime responded with relative sagacity to a wide array of opposition demands that it was able to move in a more liberal direction while still controlling the most important decision arenas.

Without having responded to civil society, the regime would not have been able to compete in elections as well as it did. It was precisely this competitive character (aided, admittedly, by frequent manipulation of electoral laws, as well as by occasional intimidation and repression of the opposition) which enabled it to liberalize without being marginalized from the political process. In this sense, the Brazilian regime stands out with the Spanish one (1975–77) as one of the few authoritarian regimes which was able to promote liberalization while remaining a competitive political force.

It is within this overall context of the dynamic between the regime and the opposition that the impact of the grass roots movements is best comprehended. It would be misleading to attribute significant weight to popular movements at the beginning of the *abertura*. Indeed, elsewhere I have argued that the weakness of popular movements, rather than their strength, was an important factor in creating confidence within the regime that it could liberalize without adverse effects. And especially in rural areas, the regime's approach to popular movements remained repressive until 1978.
Over a period of time, however, the *abertura* allowed more space for popular movements, and these movements used this space to put new items on the political agenda. Depending on the movements in question, these items ranged from the right to strike, better work conditions, the right to land, or urban services. While the regime continued to resort to repression against popular movements, the relationship between popular movements and the state reproduced many aspects of the relationship between the opposition as a whole and the state. The regime resisted change and attempted to control it, but for its own survival it was forced to make some concessions to the popular sectors. Otherwise, in a period of increasing liberalization of the electoral process, it would not have been able to compete for the popular vote. While refusing to deal with grass roots movements, the regime attempted to meet some of the demands formulated by these movements. In doing so, it hoped to strengthen its own forces and weaken those of the popular movements.

Even when they appear to be inefficient political actors, social movements can play an important role by sensitizing other forces, especially political parties and the state, to the need to redefine the political arena. The movements themselves may die out, but they can promote lasting change by placing new questions on the agenda — questions which are ultimately adopted by political parties and acted upon by the state. In Nova Iguacu, this indirect political role was seen through the way MAB has helped encourage a transformation of political discourse, through the state's increased responsiveness to material needs of the population, and through the institutionalization of mechanisms of dialogue with the popular movements. In the country as a whole, the indirect role of social movements was manifested in the authoritarian regime's decision to formulate, for the first time, a strategy for dealing with popular demands, in the late 1970s. After years of neglecting popular demands and repressing popular movements, the regime began to initiate some clientelistic, populist programs. The various housing programs for the poor, the reformulation of wage policy to favor the poorest workers (1979), and Figueiredo's ill fated attempts to cultivate a populist style and discourse (1979-81) were among the most
important measures in this regard. Repression against popular movements continued, but the change in policies towards the popular sectors was clear. While it is impossible to "measure" the role of popular movements in promoting these changes, the government's vocalized concern about these movements is a strong indication that they had some impact.

If this argument is correct, it calls attention to the importance of studying social movements in relation to political parties, the state, and other institutions. It would also suggest that by themselves, social movements did not and will not have a great direct political impact. However, they are likely to continue acting as the "conscience" of the society, placing issues of socio-economic justice, rights for the popular classes and minority groups, and popular participation on the agenda. Furthermore, even if the movements are ineffective in their political action, they can help redefine political culture. Particularly important in this regard is their role in legitimating popular demands and participation, and their role as mechanism of popular political socialization.

Towards the Future:
Prospects for Grass Roots Popular Movements

During the 11 years between the beginning of the abertura and the transition to democracy, many grass roots movements engaged in the efforts to redemocratize the society. According to the preceding argument, they were partially successful in these efforts. Paradoxically, however, every step along the way brought new and unexpected dilemmas. In MAB's case, for example, as the repression began to decline, the party dispute became more significant. In this sense, the very conditions which made possible an expansion of the movement also increased possibilities for internal dispute and division. When the democratically elected mayor and governor took office, the movement faced new challenges stemming from the difficulties of mobilizing the population in a period of popular apathy.
This past history in itself suggests that the transition to democracy at the federal level will create new problems for the grass roots movements. Not that the movements will necessarily fare worse under the democratic regime; that remains to be seen. But the advent of a democratic regime will not necessarily ameliorate the dilemmas of grass roots movements.

This consideration is especially relevant because of the nature of the transition. Social movements participated in the campaign for direct elections in 1984, which was one of the most important factors which made the transition possible. Yet after actively contributing to the campaign which resulted in Tancredo Neves's election, the social movements once again found themselves marginalized from the centers of power.

Although Tancredo's election marked the demise of the military regime, the opposition effected this victory only with the active support of the large segment of regime defectors which formed the Liberal Front. The style and content of the new government, at least in the early going, clearly recognized this "compromise" character. The new regime included, in the upper echelon of the decision making sphere, several leaders from the deposed regime. Furthermore, with the possible exception of the Minister of Social Welfare, there were no cabinet members with a history of active support for grass roots movements.

After having struggled for more than a decade to effect political change, the conservative nature of the transition was a deep disappointment to many movement leaders and participants. The progressive sectors of the PMDB were generally marginalized from the transition, and simultaneously the PT was undergoing the deepest crisis of its history. The exclusion from Tancredo's government, coupled with the marginalization of the progressive sectors within the PMDB and the crisis of the PT, left many movement leaders skeptical about the possibilities of a deeper democratization.

However difficult the prospects for the grass roots movements may be, two points seem clear. First, despite adversity, these movements contributed to the struggle for democracy between 1974 and 1985. There is no a priori reason to suppose that they will necessarily decline under the
democratic regime, even if the regime continues to develop in a conservative way and even if the economic crisis continues. Second, although the survival of the democratic regime does not depend on its responsiveness to social movements, the quality of democracy in Brazil almost certainly will. For the social movements continue to raise the banners of socio-economic justice, rights for the popular classes, and popular participation. Given the country's lengthy history of elitism, as well as the profound socio-economic inequalities, no one can doubt the importance of these banners.
Notes

1. The Brazilian literature on these movements is vast; here I will refer to those works which seem most important. Although I disagree with a great deal of what they have to say, the works of Manuel Castells, Jean Lojkine, and Jordi Borja were highly influential in Brazil. By Castells, see Movimentos sociais urbanos (Mexico, 1974), and Cidade, Democracia e Socialismo (Rio de Janeiro, 1980). Borja's most influential work is Movimentos sociais urbanos (Buenos Aires, 1975). By Lojkine, see O Estado Capitalista e a Questão Urbana (São Paulo, 1981).

2. It is important to note that for some leaders of the Workers Party PT, the transition to democracy was not effected in March 1985. For them, the absence of direct elections for president implied a fundamental continuity in the authoritarian regime. Without dismissing the validity of some of the points PT intellectuals have raised regarding the limited character of the transition, I would argue that the alternance in power means that there has been a transition. My views of this subject are developed in a forthcoming article, "The Transition to Democracy in Brazil." Eduardo Viola and I also emphasize the continuity in the regime in "Transitions to Democracy: Brazil and Argentina in the 1980s," Journal of International Affairs 38 (Winter 1985), pp. 193-219.

3. Chapter VIII of my book, The Catholic Church and Politics in Brazil, 1916-1985 (Stanford, forthcoming) relates other aspects of this past work, focusing on the relationship between neighborhood movement and the Catholic Church. Some paragraphs of this paper are taken from my book and are reproduced here with the permission of Stanford University Press.

4. Data is from the official census.


6. For a socio-economic profile of the Baixada Fluminense's population, see Cristina Saliby, et. al., "A Política de Habitação


8 Queiroz, "Movimentos Sociais Urbanos," p. 79.

9 Movimento de Amigos de Bairro, "Primeiro Ciclo de Debates Populares,"


11 See Queiroz, "Movimentos Sociais Urbanos," Chapter II, on the pre-'74 mobilizations. In addition, I interviewed several popular leaders from that period.

12 While these socio-economic changes contributed to shaping the profile of the popular movements in Nova Iguaçu, they do not adequately explain the emergence or vicissitudes of the movements. In this sense, much of the Marxian literature overstates the causal relationship between urban contradictions and the emergence of social movements. Castells, Lojkine, and many Brazilian authors are prone to this problem. Ana Maria Doimo, *Movimentos Sociais Urbanos, Participação Popular e Igreja* (Petrópolis, 1984) provides a more satisfactory discussion of this problem. As Barrington Moore has argued in *Injustice: The Social Bases of Revolt* (New York, 1978), a structural contradiction can generate a wide variety of responses. What actually occurs depends on the political identities of the social sectors involved, in relation to an expected reaction by the state or other political actors. Depending on the political conditions and the political identity of the concerned population, the exacerbation of urban contradictions could encourage the emergence of social movements, or it could have the opposite effect.


In 1974, the top MDB candidate for federal deputy had 47,929 votes compared to 22,862 for the top ARENA candidate. The top MDB candidate for state deputy had 19,917 votes, compared to 9,974 for the top ARENA candidate; and the MDB candidate for federal senator outpolled the ARENA candidate 99,628 to 43,352. Election coverage and date is found in *Correio da Lavoura* 2299 (November 16-17, 1974). In 1978, the MDB won 118,774 votes for federal senator while ARENA got 72,942. *Jornal do Brasil*, May 16, 1982.

Information on the diocese's development came from interviews and from diocesan publications.

Although my interpretation of the movement differs significantly from hers, the history of MAB presented in this section draws on Queiroz, "Movimentos Sociais Urbanos." Other information comes from extensive interviews with movement and Church leaders; participation in popular assemblies; interviews with Nova Iguaçu politicians; the movement's newspaper, *Encontro*; MAB's archive; and Adão Bernardes, *Espaço e Movimentos Reivindicatórios*.


*Encontro* 2 (March 1976).


On the assembly, see *Encontro* 16 (October 1978).


This point is also forcefully argued by Renato Raul Boschi in "Movimentos Sociais e a Institutionalização de uma Ordem," (Rio de Janeiro: IUPERJ, 1983)

Lúcia do Prado Valladares discusses the changes in housing policy in "A Propósito da Urbanização de Favelas," *Espaço e Debates* 2 (May 1981), pp. 5-18. On this subject, also see Ephim Shluger,


On the demobilization of social movements, see Pedro Jacobi,


35 The possibility of cooptation is discussed by Pedro Jacobi in “Exclusão Urbana e Lutas pelo Direito à Moradia,” Espaço e Debates 7 (n.d.), pp. 53-70.

36 Various surveys make this point apparent.


39 For an interesting study on the question of movement autonomy vis-à-vis parties and the state, see Eva Alterman Blay, “Movimentos Sociais: Autonomia e Estado,” VII ANPOCS, 1983.

40 Among the most important works by leading intellectuals on the


42 Interview, March 27, 1985.

43 Most of the literature has emphasized the strength of corporatist mechanisms and the relative weakness of the popular classes as political actors. See, for example, Heloísa Helena Teixeira de Souza Martins, *O Estado e a Burocratização do Sindicato no Brasil* (São Paulo, 1979). Although they do not radically disagree with this perspective, other authors have emphasized the occasional capacity of the popular classes to enter the main political stage. See, for example, Francisco Weffort, "Sindicatos e Política," Ph.D. dissertation, University of São Paulo, 1970; Moisés, "Classes Populares e Protesto Urbano," Luiz Alberto Gómez de Souza, *Classes Populares e Igreja nos Caminhos da História* (Petrópolis, 1982).

44 Interview, June 2, 1981.

45 For details, see Chapter VIII of *The Catholic Church and Politics in Brazil*.

46 Other authors have also suggested that the electoral impact of social movements was limited. See Teresa Pires do Rio Caldeira, "A Luta pelo Voto em um Bairro de Periferia," VII ANPOCS, 1983; Nisia Verônica Trindade Lima, "As Eleições de 1982 em Favelas do Rio de Janeiro," VII ANPOCS, 1983. Pedro Ribeiro de Oliveira notes that "In general, the electoral of CEBs proved to be less than expected." See his "Comunidade X Massa: Dilema da Pastoral Popular," VII ANPOCS, 1983.


See his contribution to Stepan, ed., *Democratizing Brazil*.

See (with Donald Share) "Transitions through Transaction: Democratization in Brazil and Spain," in Selcher, ed., *Political Liberalization in Brazil*.