Donald Share is Assistant Professor of Politics and Government at the University of Puget Sound. He is finishing a book on the transition to democracy in Spain, 1975-1982. Scott Mainwaring is Assistant Professor of Government and Member of the Kellogg Institute of the University of Notre Dame. His book, The Catholic Church and Politics in Brazil, 1916-1985, will be published by Stanford University Press in 1985. The authors wish to thank Gabriel Almond, Karen Bernstein, Caroline Domingo, Peter McDonough, Guillermo O'Donnell, Wayne Selcher, and Eduardo Viola for helpful suggestions.
ABSTRACT

This paper discusses transitions from authoritarian to democratic rule initiated by the elites of the authoritarian regime, focusing on Brazil and Spain. The first section of the paper describes some basic characteristics of "transitions from above." In the second section we address the seemingly paradoxical issue of why an authoritarian regime would decide to alter the rules of the game which had sustained its own existence. We argue that liberalization and democratization afford some advantages to the authoritarian elites, while at the same time minimizing the risks which are always present in political transitions. Yet while transition from above is often an appealing alternative, it is very difficult to effect. A third section of the paper discusses conditions which facilitate such transitions. Then in Section 4, we discuss salient differences between the Spanish and Brazilian differences. In the concluding section, we analyze costs and benefits of transitions from above.

Este trabajo analiza aquellas transiciones del autoritarismo a la democracia que son controladas por los elites del regimen autoritario, enfocando sobre todo los casos del Brasil (1973-85) y de la España (1975-82). La primera parte del trabajo describe algunas características basicas de estas "transiciones desde arriba." En la segunda parte discutimos por que un regimen autoritario decidiria cambiar las reglas del juego que lo habian sostenido. Afirmamos que la liberalizacion y la democratizacion pueden beneficiar los elites autoritarios, al mismo tiempo que el caracter controlado de la transicion minimiza los riesgos siempre presentes en todas transiciones politicas. Aunque puede ser una opcion atractiva para muchos regimenes autoritarios, es dificil realizar una transicion controlada. La tercera parte del trabajo analiza las condiciones que facilitan estas transiciones. En la cuarta parte, discutimos algunas diferencias sobresalientes entre los casos de Brasil y de España. Concluimos el trabajo con un analisis de los costos y beneficios de las transiciones controladas.
While in the 1970s scholarly interest was focused on authoritarianism and the breakdown of democracy, recently the question of transitions from authoritarianism to democracy has become a central theme in comparative politics. The emergence of democratic regimes in Spain, Portugal, Greece, Peru, Ecuador, Bolivia and Argentina, as well as the erosion of authoritarian regimes in Turkey, Brazil, Chile and Uruguay, have made the transition from authoritarianism to democracy one of the outstanding political issues of our time. Yet despite the evident importance of these transitions, only recently has much been written on the topic. Consequently, there is ample space for further historical, theoretical and comparative contributions. This paper is especially geared toward the comparative dimension of the task. We discuss a form of transition from authoritarian to democratic rule which we term "transitions from above" or "controlled transitions" and compare the two most significant cases, Spain and Brazil.

In Spain, after forty years of franquist authoritarianism, a full-fledged parliamentary democracy has emerged. Between Franco's death in November 1975 and the implementation of a democratic constitution in December 1978, members of the franquist regime initiated a democratic reform through the existing authoritarian political structures. Since 1975 the franquist regime has been largely dismantled, a democratic constitution has been written, a competitive party system has emerged, and there has been an alternation of political power and a consolidation of democracy at all levels of Spanish politics.

Around 1974 Brazil's military regime began to promote a slow
and gradual liberalization. The regime continues to oversee the liberalization and democratization process, but there has been a move towards democratic rule. The use of repression has declined considerably, and most civil liberties are fully re-established. In 1982, the country had direct elections for state governors, and elections for the presidency, the last step in restoring a constitutional democracy, are scheduled for 1985.

Although Brazil's transition is still incomplete and Spain has undergone a full transition, the two transitions share significant similarities. The Brazilian transition has been much slower and the authoritarian elites have retained more power than in Spain, but in both cases the elites controlled important aspects of political change. While many authoritarian regimes attempt to oversee transitions from above, the Spanish and Brazilian regimes stand out for their ability to do so. These cases are among the few contemporary transitions from above, and they also stand out because of the relatively low level of violence and high degree of stability. These two cases may suggest a desirable alternative for authoritarian elites who wish to minimize the risk, uncertainty, and costs of democratization while still moving away from authoritarian rule. At the same time, it is our contention that transitions from above, while seemingly more stable, are difficult to achieve and can only be effected under certain conditions. Furthermore, we argue that this form of transition is likely to entail some political, economic, and social costs.

By comparing these two important and potentially influential
examples we hope to shed some light on aspects of the logic of controlled transitions. We begin by addressing the paradoxical question of why authoritarian elites undertake democratic transition. We then examine the question of the conditions which make possible this type of transition. Finally, we discuss some of the costs and benefits associated with transition from above. In addressing all of these questions we analyze some of the major similarities and differences between the two cases.
DEMOCRATIZATION AND TRANSITION FROM ABOVE

Before discussing the Brazilian and Spanish transitions to democracy, it is necessary to briefly define some basic terms. By democracy, we mean a political regime with free competitive elections, without major proscriptions and with universal adult suffrage. Democratic regimes afford freedom of speech and the press, freedom of political association, and individual rights. There are competing definitions of democracy which focus on outcomes rather than procedures, but we believe that there are good reasons for focusing on these institutional arrangements. While these institutions neither ensure full governmental responsibility nor socio-economic justice, they do ensure the basic rights and political competition which are essential to democracy as we understand it. Although this definition suffices to characterize a liberal democracy, democracy can always be expanded, both in competitiveness and participation.[5]

Democracy implies the possibility of an alternation in power. In this sense, a transition to democracy involves more than a liberalization of an authoritarian regime. Liberalization refers to a decline in repression and the re-establishment of most basic civil and political rights, but without permitting competitive elections which would allow for an alternation in power. Democratization refers to the establishment of institutional arrangements which make possible such an alternation. Transitions to democracy involve both liberalization and democratization.

These definitions are important because they point to a major difference between Brazil and Spain. Although franquism
was unquestionably an authoritarian regime until the dictator's
death, inchoate liberalization in Spain began in the late 1950s.
Democratization began only with the accession of King Juan Carlos
in November 1975. The transition was complete, though democracy
was not consolidated, with the popular approval of a democratic
constitution in December 1978. In comparison with the Brazilian
case, Spain's transition was relatively rapid and had a clearer
beginning and end point. In Brazil, liberalization began around
1974 with the presidency of General Ernesto Geisel and continues
to the present. Democratization could be said to have begun in
1980 with the promise of open, competitive elections for state
governors. However, the regime continues to retain some clearly
authoritarian characteristics, so democratization is by no means
complete. In comparative perspective, Brazil's transition has
been singularly slow and protracted.

In order to better understand the specific qualities of
transitions from above, it is useful to locate them within the
universe of non-revolutionary transitions to democracy. In the
classical cases of democratization (England, the United States,
Scandinavia and other Northern European countries), an oligarchic
regime gradually extended participation and contestation over a
long period of time, often involving centuries of incremental
change. Some South American countries (Chile, Uruguay, and
Argentina) followed this evolutionary path in the late nineteenth
and early twentieth centuries, but this classical route is
probably historically closed. Democratization in the classical
cases occurred in a context of limited popular mobilization,
limited or non-existent cultural legitimacy of democratic institutions, and limited global interdependence and external influence in domestic politics. This context facilitated a gradual elite-controlled democratization that seems highly unlikely in today's world. It is worth noting, however, that contemporary transitions from above share a major similarity with these classical cases—entrenched elites control much of the democratization process. Like the classical cases, transitions from above involve considerable continuity of political structures, elites and practices.

Transitions from above are neither the only nor the most common form of democratic transition. According to the amount of control authoritarian elites exercise, we can analytically distinguish between three ideal types of transitions to democracy. These ideal types are deductive constructs and no case will completely conform to them. The most common type is a transition after regime breakdown or collapse, in which the authoritarian elites exercise almost no control. Whether through military defeat at the hands of an external force or profound internal crisis, these regimes become thoroughly discredited and delegitimized. This type of transition to democracy involves significant institutional changes and a rupture in patterns of political authority. Examples include Germany, Italy and Japan after World War II, Greece and Portugal in 1974, and Argentina in 1982-1983. In a second ideal type, transition through extrication, the authoritarian elites set limits regarding the form and timing of political change, but are less capable of controlling the transition beyond the moment of the first
elections. These authoritarian regimes withdraw from power because of their low level of legitimacy and internal cohesion, but still manage to retain some control of the transition. While it is appropriate to speak of the erosion of these regimes, they manage to avoid a breakdown or collapse. For a variety of reasons, including a lack of popular support, the authoritarian leadership decides to extricate itself from power. Examples would include Peru (1980), Bolivia (1979-80), and probably Uruguay (1984-85).

The third ideal type, and the one with which we are concerned, is transition from above. Elites from the authoritarian regime control most aspects of the transition. In contrast to situations of regime collapse, they initiate the process of liberalization. Liberalization and democratization come about as choices made fundamentally by the regime. Popular mobilization, foreign pressures and domestic opposition may be important, but at least in the initial phase, they are secondary factors in shaping the process.

One important element of control in transitions from above is the timing of political change. By regulating the pace of implementing reforms, authoritarian elites attempt to guard against losing control. Even though they may be committed to re-establishing democracy, they believe it is necessary to effect reforms in a gradual way. In dealing with the authoritarian coalition, incremental change elicits less resistance and prevents disaffected interests from unifying in opposition to democratization. The gradual character of the transition fosters
the perception that order and stability are intact.

Although the Spanish transition transpired in a relatively short time period, President Suárez avoided cumulative political reform when possible. Despite the uncertainty and improvisation inherent in all regime change, democratization involved a well paced set of reforms whose timing was, for the most part, determined by the regime. These changes began with the initial limited amnesties in the summer of 1976, continued through the constitutional reform and popular referendum of late 1976, the legalization of the PCE, the dismantling of franquist institutions in May 1977, and the parliamentary elections in June of that year. By staggering the reforms, Suárez avoided antagonizing too many sectors of the franquist regime simultaneously. The last set of democratic reforms provoked open hostility from the military and other franquist hardliners, but the president had already gained considerable momentum and popular support.

While the timing of liberalization has changed in response to opposition demands, Brazil's leaders established a timetable for reform that spanned over a decade. Major highlights of this process have included the relaxation of repression in 1974, the political amnesty and reestablishment of major civil liberties in 1979, the direct gubernatorial elections in 1982 and the scheduling of direct presidential elections for 1988. There have been some reverses in democratization and some unplanned advances, but the regime's ability to control the timing of change has been remarkable.

In addition to controlling the timing of democratization,
these regimes are likely to insist upon excluding some actors from the transition. Where authoritarian regimes come to power with the purpose of defeating a perceived leftist threat, for a protracted period of time the leaders are likely to view the left as an enemy with whom no negotiation is possible. Even though time may erode the sense of threat, most of the regime still views the left's reincorporation with hostility. The possibility of negotiating with the left depends on the timing and intensity of previous leftist mobilization. The insistence upon prohibiting the left from politics tends to be greatest where the perceived threat was strongest and where the memories of those threats are most vivid.

In both Spain and Brazil the decision to democratize was contingent on guarantees of the left's exclusion. In the initial phases of Spain's democratization there was a consensus among regime reformers and the moderate democratic opposition that the Communist left would be excluded. Suárez's decision to legalize the Spanish Communist Party six weeks before the June 1977 elections shocked and disappointed virtually the entire franquist elite, which had supported democratization under the condition that the extreme left be permanently proscribed. In Brazil, the circumscription of the left has lasted longer and has been more extensive. All of the Marxist parties remain illegal, and there is no sign that they will accepted in the near future. Furthermore, there continues to be sporadic repression against the Marxist left, the Catholic left, and popular leaders.

A third area of control concerns policy outputs. Some vital
questions concerning economic, social and political life are proscribed from the agenda. In transitions controlled by conservative authoritarian regimes, we can expect regime leaders to rule out structural socio-economic change. In Spain, for example, the 1978 constitution explicitly guaranteed the preservation of a capitalist economy. In both countries, agrarian reform was excluded from the agenda. Neither transition was accompanied by any attempt to radically improve income distribution or to significantly change the model of development.

These transitions also rule out punitive measures directed against leaders from the authoritarian period, regardless of their involvement in repressive activities. Authoritarian leaders will not initiate democratization unless they are assured that they will not be prosecuted. In Spain and Brazil there have been almost no cases of punishment or forced exile of authoritarian leaders. This contrasts markedly from many cases of regime collapse (Germany, 1945; Greece and Portugal, 1974; Argentina, 1983) where some leaders from the previous regime have been brought to trial or forced to leave the country.

One of the features of transitions from above is that the authoritarian leadership continues to enjoy significant popular support. As a result, elections offer the possibility of retaining power. Even if they do not win open competitive elections, the authoritarian regime's elites will be a serious electoral force. This ability to compete in open elections is the primary factor distinguishing these transitions from transitions through extrication. The authoritarian leadership's confidence in its ability to fare well in democratic elections
explains its concern about the minutiae of electoral laws. The franquist elite bargained energetically to achieve an electoral law which would favor conservative, rural Spain and which would benefit large parties and widely recognized politicians. In Brazil, the manipulation of electoral laws to favor the regime has gone to extremes. The government altered the electoral laws in 1977, 1978 and 1981, attempting to enhance its own situation. In 1980 the regime felt that it would fare better against a divided opposition, so it imposed a party reform that split the opposition. By late 1981, it realized that the opposition parties would unite against the regime, so it issued another decree preventing electoral alliances. The electoral laws have enabled the regime to retain a large majority in the Senate despite the opposition's majority of the popular vote.

The fact that these regimes feel they can compete in elections minimizes their fears about democratization and maximizes their sense of control. This provides some security and reduces the risks of democratization for the entire authoritarian coalition. Eventually, the authoritarian elites with the best electoral prospects begin to have an active stake in the holding of elections. Consequently, these elites stand to lose a great deal in the event of an authoritarian involution. Under these circumstances, while the hardliners may continue to threaten a coup, the prospects for a long term reversal diminish. The authoritarian leadership committed to elections now shares a significant interest with the moderate democratic opposition, creating a potential schism in the authoritarian coalition.
These leaders are likely to attempt to isolate the authoritarian hardliners, both to diminish the prospects of an involution and to further their own electoral goals by distancing themselves from the far right. President Geisel's firing of General D'Avila Melo, Commander of the Second Army, in 1977, because of the latter's involvement in torture, was one case of marginalizing the far right in Brazil. In Spain, President Suarez's decision to form a center-right electoral coalition in the spring of 1977, displacing the rightist Popular Alliance, also exemplifies this marginalization.

One of the consequences of the high level of control over the transition is the continuity in many areas between the authoritarian and democratic periods. While there is likely to be some elite turnover, especially the marginalization of the hardliners, many high level elites from the authoritarian period retain positions of prestige and power. In the democratic period, Spain's chief of state and first two heads of government were strongly identified with the franquist regime. Eight years after the first democratic elections, Spain's second largest political party is headed by Manuel Fraga Iribarne, a cabinet minister under Franco. In Brazil the continuity of elites has been even more pronounced, and there has not been a generational change as was the case in Spain. The current leaders helped engineer the coup in 1964 and have occupied important positions during most of the regime. President Figueiredo, the major symbol of Brazil's liberalization, was head of the National Information Service (SNI), the secret service apparatus which was the core of the most repressive side of the regime. The current
Minister of Economics, Minister of the Interior, and Chief of the Cabinet all held the same positions during parts of the 1960s and 1970s. Former presidents continue to be venerated and consulted about major decisions.

Continuity can also be witnessed in major social institutions. In transitions controlled by conservative authoritarian regimes, democratization requires at least tacit consent from the armed forces. This situation may constitute a serious obstacle since militaries are generally a key component of the authoritarian coalition and frequently oppose democratic change. Their monopoly over the means of coercion gives them a special ability to impede the transition. As a result, transition from above requires a modus vivendi between the armed forces and the government, usually guaranteeing the continuation of military autonomy. Unlike cases of regime collapse, where the military is discredited, transitions from above do not significantly alter the military's position of power.

The role of the military has posed difficult problems in both Brazil and Spain. Both armed forces have constituted the outstanding threat to democratization; military hardliners have repeatedly threatened to reverse the process. In Spain, the 1981 coup attempt came close to undermining the democracy. Were it not for the intervention of King Juan Carlos, Spain's highest ranking military official, the plot might have succeeded. Brazil's armed forces have presented a more constant if less dramatic threat to democratization.

We can also expect transitions from above to exhibit
considerable continuity in political structures and institutions. Legislatures, constitutions, and judiciaries may all remain essentially unchanged. For example, there was a continuity in the office of head of state between franquism and democracy since Franco designated his own successor in 1969. Brazil's democratization has not included the writing of a new constitution, and in both countries the bureaucracy has changed only slightly.

Continuity is also manifested in the fact that the legitimacy of the authoritarian period is not attacked retrospectively. Unlike situations of collapse, where the democratic leaders assail the policies, symbols and leaders of the authoritarian regime, in transitions from above there is almost no such attempt. The transition leaders may actively draw upon their linkages to the authoritarian regime as a means of winning "backward legitimacy," even while attempting to obtain support based on their newly found democratic ideals. In both Spain and Brazil the transition did not challenge the substantial reservoir of positive memories regarding the previous regime. In fact, in both countries a large percentage of the population continues to view that period favorably.

Thus far we have emphasized the authoritarian regime's control over the transition and continuity between the democratic and authoritarian period, but there are limits to this control and continuity. Even though transitions from above afford more stability and security, all transitions involve significant risks and uncertainties. Furthermore, no government completely controls major political changes. Democratization can take on a
dynamic of its own; it can be reversed, stalled, or accelerated. Unforeseen events can alter the democratization process in unpredictable ways, and there are predictable ways in which the regime's control will erode as democratization proceeds. Liberalization inherently involves marginalizing the hardliners and constructing a dialogue with the moderate opposition. This process gives the opposition some influence over subsequent political events. With the first democratic elections, the populace enters the political picture in a new way, with uncertain consequences. After these elections are convoked, any involution runs a greater risk of contravening the expressed wishes of the population. Once elections become the mechanism for selecting leaders, elites must take into consideration popular demands and public opinion. Even if the authoritarian regime initiates the transition with considerable popular support, it will have to adapt its style and policies to the new political environment.

Leaders of the transition may also develop autonomy and direct the process in a different direction than the original democratizing coalition had foreseen. Authoritarian regimes afford considerable leeway to top elites who subsequently may employ this power as they choose, within some limits. President Suárez's behavior during the Spanish transition clearly illustrates this point. Suárez pushed the transition much further than almost anybody—opposition and regime alike—would have expected. His surprise appointment in July 1976 was met with widespread skepticism on the part of democratic opposition
leaders. The regime right supported his appointment precisely because of his impeccable franquist credentials and felt deceived when Suarez took democratization further than expected.

Even in a transition as meticulously controlled as the Brazilian, democratization has sometimes surpassed the limits authoritarian leaders hoped to establish. The regime was stunned by the results of the 1974 elections, when the opposition did much better than expected. Between 1977 and 1980, the resurgence of popular mobilization caught the leadership by surprise. In devising the 1980 party reform, the government expected the emergence of a centrist opposition party with which it could ally. The centrist party (the Popular Party) did emerge, but it quickly developed an opposition stance not foreseen by the government. This development scuttled the government's electoral plans, forcing it to elaborate a new strategy. The vast mobilization for direct elections in 1984 also surprised the regime and threatened to seriously erode it.

Just as there are limits to the authoritarian regime's ability to control the transition, so too are there limits in the continuity between the authoritarian and democratic periods. Most important, the very existence of democratic elections means that there are new mechanisms for legitimizing the exercise of political power. Blatantly authoritarian practices are no longer permissible, and leaders are subject to a greater accountability. Some of the most characteristic aspects of authoritarian rule, like institutionalized repression, torture, and censorship, greatly decline. Even though the transition to democracy does not necessarily lead to changes in economic policy, significant
alterations may occur.

While the military may remain an important actor, we can expect some demilitarization of politics. Sectors of Spain's armed forces have continued to threaten democracy, but under Prime Ministers Calvo Sotelo and González, the military has been gradually brought under civilian control. In Brazil, Presidents Geisel and Figueiredo initiated a pattern of disengaging the armed forces from the government. The Figueiredo administration developed a public image which was closer to that of a civilian government than that of a military government and insisted that the armed forces return to the barracks. However, while the military no longer controls the presidential succession process, it continues to be a powerful and autonomous political force, much more so than in Spain.

In both countries, no area more clearly reflects the positive aspects of democratization than culture and education. In Brazil, after years of censorship and repression against institutions of higher education, Figueiredo appointed a young liberal university professor as Minister of Education, ended censorship, allowed university professors who had been dismissed for political reasons to reapply to their old jobs, terminated the open presence of the security apparatus in the universities, permitted increasing university autonomy, and tolerated unionization and even strikes among teachers and professors. In Spain, democratization gave rise to a cultural renaissance, including a rediscovery of the regional languages and literature, and a revitalization of the media. Spain has become an international center for literature, film, music and the arts.
REASONS FOR INITIATING TRANSITIONS FROM ABOVE

Figure 1 outlines our scheme of reasons why an authoritarian regime might democratize. As Figure 1 indicates, the move toward democracy may be a necessity or a choice. Here we focus on democratization by choice since, by definition, transitions from above result from a choice by regime elites, even if declining internal cohesion or limited legitimacy are factors in that choice. This means that factors such as mass mobilization, international pressures, and economic success or failure are secondary.

There is a striking paradox here: why would an authoritarian regime decide to alter the very rules of the game which have sustained it? A first possibility is that some members of the authoritarian coalition had the intention of diffusing a threat and restoring democracy after a short interregnum. The Brazilian situation illustrates this point; many high ranking officers hoped for a quick return to democracy. The two decades of authoritarian rule have been marked by constant tension between those generals who perceived the regime as long term and wanted a rupture from the democratic past and those who wanted to restore order and return to the barracks. Although the former pushed the military into staying in power for more than two decades, they could never effect a full break from democratic institutions. Consequently, the history of the regime was one of compromise between hardliners and the moderate authoritarians over the issue of democratic institutions. Unlike the Spanish case, the Brazilian regime always retained some institutional continuity from the democratic period. Former
FIGURE 1

REASONS WHY AUTHORITARIAN REGIMES DEMOCRATIZE

I. BY NECESSITY
   (Democratization through Collapse or Extrication)

II. BY CHOICE
    (Democratization from above)

A. The initial idea was to correct unacceptable aspects of the previous regime and then re-establish democracy.

B. The advantages of staying in power and the costs of democratizing diminish.

1. The costs of staying in power increase because of:
   a. A succession crisis.
   b. Declining military cohesion.
   c. Declining legitimacy:
      (i) "Negative legitimacy" declines in value.
      (ii) Limited legitimacy of authoritarianism since World War II.

2. The costs of democratizing decline because of:
   (i) Elimination of perceived threat.
   (ii) Establishment of socio-economic order.

19
political parties were abolished, but in 1965 the government created a regime and an opposition party which continued to function until the 1979 party reform. Even though the opposition party suffered significant repression, it was always a source of channelling some demands. The Constitution was rendered less democratic but was never abolished. Congress functioned throughout almost the entire authoritarian period. Even at the aegis of authoritarianism, military leaders employed a democratic discourse. Between 1969 and 1974, military hardliners considered institutionalizing the regime in a more authoritarian direction, but they met excessive internal military opposition. This continuity in democratic institutions later facilitated the transition to democracy.

In Spain the break from the past was more complete than in Brazil. After the Civil War, Franco destroyed all aspects of the previous democratic regime. The republic was replaced by a monarchy and a federal system by a centralized one. The Nationalists eliminated elections and parties, abolished the republican constitution, and introduced a new flag and national anthem. The entire franquist coalition shared a rejection of parliamentary democracy, although there was less consensus regarding the regime's ultimate political direction. The regime's long term intentions were evident in the constitutional provision that made Franco dictator for life. Only in the 1960s did the regime attempt to construct a democratic facade and introduce a democratic discourse.

The second major possibility is that the costs of staying in
power increase and the costs of democratization decline. Over the course of time, contemporary authoritarian regimes in the Western world face a number of challenges which alter the costs and benefits of staying in power. Three of the most common and important challenges are leadership succession, erosion in elite cohesion, and declining legitimacy.

Leadership succession has differing consequences from authoritarian regime to authoritarian regime, but in all cases it presents a serious problem. Whereas democratic regimes have defined procedures for selecting new leaders, this process is more uncertain and often creates political infighting in authoritarian regimes, precisely because they lack institutionalized forms of decision making. At best, top leaders make policy in consultation with the major partners of the authoritarian coalition, and the decision making process is more closed and arbitrary than in democratic regimes. The executive tends to have more power in authoritarian regimes. These systems are generally so top heavy that any change at the apex has major reverberations and easily constitutes a regime crisis. Authoritarian regimes are based on carefully balanced coalitions of interests. Frequently a single leader is responsible for maintaining this equilibrium, so the death or demise of the leader may provoke a struggle among disparate factions.

The intensity of the crisis resulting from leadership succession depends on a number of factors. Succession is more traumatic in personalized regimes, especially where power has been exercised by a single charismatic leader. The crisis is also more severe where the leader held power for an extended
period and/or was responsible for founding the regime. For a regime facing a succession, democratization may be a desirable alternative because of the impossibility of reaching a consensus over a new leader.

Military authoritarian regimes almost invariably face tensions which can easily cause an erosion of elite cohesion. There is generally a conflict between the military as institution and the military as government. The military as institution requires autonomy and depends on a professionalization that is above politics. Being in government prevents such autonomy and almost always politicizes the armed forces. It entails serious risks because political setbacks and mismanagement may compromise the autonomy and image of the entire military. While a military government may safeguard some interests of the armed forces, over time it may damage others, especially the internal cohesion so essential for a professionalized military. Few military regimes in the contemporary Western world have successfully resolved this tension. In this context, democratization often appears to be the best way to avoid further erosion of military cohesion. It offers the benefits of returning to the barracks while affording the possibility of exercising considerable control over the transition, thereby guaranteeing the military's institutional interests.

A long term decline in legitimacy may also induce democratization from above. Authoritarian regimes generally derive part of their initial legitimacy from their ability to
counteract a perceived threat. Their capacity to guarantee order, restore faith in the economy, or eliminate a "subversive" threat accounts for much of their support. Much of the authoritarian coalition supports the regime principally out of a dislike of the previous regime. Thus a primary source of legitimacy is based on opposition to the democratic system. Over time these negative forms of legitimacy tend to weaken as memories of democratic "evils" dissipate. Order and stability, once highly valued, may become taken for granted. The defeat or disappearance of the "subversives," which initially helped legitimate authoritarianism, has declining importance as time passes. The negative legitimating factors, which allowed disparate forces to support authoritarianism, do not provide a basis for agreement about a positive direction.

As time passes, even well established authoritarian regimes usually begin to lose their active support. Authoritarian regimes discourage mobilization but in doing so also deprive themselves of a reservoir of active support. While democratic regimes enjoy procedural legitimacy, authoritarian regimes rely exclusively on performance or charisma after the negative sources lose their appeal. But performance is a fickle basis of legitimacy; poor performance can shatter it and good performance may eventually be taken for granted.

Authoritarian regimes initially enjoy the support of some relatively uncommitted "semi-democratic" political forces. These forces are willing to adhere to authoritarianism when their interests are threatened, but once the threat is overcome they no longer support authoritarian rule. Some even join the democratic
opposition, and the others feel no compelling interest in the 
continuation of authoritarianism. The decline of legitimacy is 
compounded by the emergence of a new generation of young citizens 
who do not have the same fear of democracy.

Finally, it is difficult to cultivate legitimacy for 
authoritarian rule in the contemporary Western world. 
Authoritarian rule was delegitimated after the defeat of the Axis 
powers in World War II. Conversely, democratic institutions and 
practices have become widely accepted. While this has not 
precluded authoritarian rule, it has made it more difficult to 
legitimate. As a consequence, most contemporary authoritarian 
regimes do not completely reject democratic values. They may act 
undemocratically, but they often retain aspects of democratic 
institutions and discourse. This situation generates 
contradictions and creates problems for long term 
institutionalization of authoritarian rule.

Just as the benefits of authoritarian rule tend to decline 
over time, the costs of democratization may also decrease. Once 
stability is restored and once the perceived threat is contained, 
a return to democracy may be more acceptable. Conversely, if the 
regime fails to contain political challenges and establish socio-
economic order, the perceived costs of democratization increase. 
Paradoxically, then, it may be easier for a successful 
authoritarian regime to promote democratization than for an 
unsuccessful one, even though the unsuccessful one has a more 
urgent need to expand the channels of communication with civil 
society.
Authoritarian regimes may initiate transitions to democracy in response to any combination of the challenges mentioned above. The Brazilian and Spanish regimes demonstrate some similarities and some differences in the kinds and intensity of challenges faced, and in the reasons they ultimately democratized. In both cases all four reasons for democratization were present, although to varying degrees.

In twenty years of military rule in Brazil, five presidents have governed and have willingly agreed to relinquish power after a single term. This regularized succession is exceptional for an authoritarian regime. Nevertheless, even in the Brazilian regime, which has so successfully and regularly handled the issue, all four successions have generated significant internal military conflicts. In 1969, a severe conflict took place over the succession question, pitting the hardliners against the moderates. In 1974, this scenario reproduced itself, but this time the moderates won out. In 1978, the opposition party's presidential candidate was a general, so the electoral campaign threatened to split the armed forces. In 1983-84, three government party leaders competed for the presidential nomination, again dividing the regime. Even though these succession problems were not the major reason for initiating the transition, the conflicts resulting from leadership change contributed to the military's decision to return to the barracks.

In Spain, the succession problem was more crucial. Franco governed for almost forty years without any intention of relinquishing power. In fact, the dictator purposely avoided the question of succession for decades so as not to antagonize some
members of the authoritarian coalition. In 1947, Franco made Spain a monarchy, but he retained the role of chief of state for life and reserved the right to appoint his successor at an unspecified date. Only in 1969 did Franco name Juan Carlos as heir to the throne, and even then the fact that the prince was young, inexperienced and a political unknown cast continuing doubt over the succession. Until 1973, the positions of head of state and head of government were held by Franco. The appointment of Admiral Carrero Blanco to the presidency in 1973 was Franco's first real delegation of power. Previously, Franco had systematically prevented the emergence of any autonomous leader who might have filled his shoes. The fact that Franco waited so long to address the issue deprived this regime of a well established leader at the time of his death and made succession a more traumatic problem. Had Carrero Blanco not been assassinated shortly after his appointment, he might have been able to assert himself as the principle guardian of Spanish authoritarianism. As it was, the regime lacked a leader capable of maintaining an equilibrium in the authoritarian coalition.

A significant part of the legitimacy of Spanish authoritarianism derived from Franco's leadership. Not only had Franco governed for forty years, his victory in the Civil War and his sheer perseverance endowed him with an almost mythical quality. While hardly a flamboyant leader, Franco commanded respect from and intimidated all the coalition partners of the regime. For all of these reasons, Franco was an irreplaceable leader whose death created a serious crisis, even though
succession was not the only factor behind the decision to democratize.

The potential for erosion of military cohesion was more important in the Brazilian regime's decision to democratize than in the Spanish case. The military directly governed the country, even though there were more high ranking civilian leaders than in the recent Argentine (1976-83) or Chilean regimes. Although the Brazilian military has maintained significant cohesion, high ranking military leaders feared that continuing control of government would damage the institution. They responded in part by reducing direct military involvement in politics. The Figueiredo administration has made efforts to civilianize the regime, and the military does not plan to control the next presidential succession. The armed forces also responded by creating autonomous military institutions which continue to be responsible for national security. The most important example is the National Information Service (SNI), a state apparatus autonomous from the rest of the military, yet controlled by military leaders who have made their career in the SNI. Its existence facilitated the separation between the military government and the armed forces as an institution, thereby enabling the military to maintain a high profile in the upper echelon of the state without politicizing the armed forces as a whole. As a result, it helped avoid the delegitimation of the armed forces which is characteristic of so many transitions from military rule. Although fears about military unity provided one motive for initiating a return to the barracks, the most significant opposition to liberalization also came from within the armed
forces.

The fear of declining internal cohesion in the Spanish military was not a factor in the transition to democracy. While the armed forces played an important role, franquism was not a military regime, so the conflict between military as institution and military as government did not exist. For a number of reasons, the Spanish military enjoyed a high degree of internal cohesion throughout the regime. All the loyalists and most moderates were eliminated from the military after the Civil War. As opposition emerged from within the military, Franco was quick to smash it. The dictator maintained strict respect for the military's autonomy and avoided policies which could endanger military unity. In the twilight of franquism, the military remained solidly united behind the dictator and was the major bulwark of authoritarianism. Rather than supporting a return to democracy, the military was--and is--the chief obstacle to democratization.

Both authoritarian regimes experienced a long term decline in legitimacy, even though both continued to enjoy considerable support. In Brazil, this long term decline was manifested in electoral returns and the defection of some partners in the original authoritarian coalition. The 1974 elections made apparent widespread opposition to authoritarianism. The regime was badly defeated in the major metropolitan areas which had been the primary beneficiaries of rapid, uneven growth. Both the regime and the opposition alike read the electoral results as a partial repudiation of military rule. Around the same time,
the industrial bourgeoisie of São Paulo began to criticize the government and call for a return to democracy. After having initially supported the 1964 coup, the Catholic Church, which enjoys unparalleled moral legitimacy in the society, became the leading source of opposition. Important voices of middle class Brazil like the Order of Brazilian Lawyers and the Brazilian Press Association criticized human rights abuses and demanded a restoration of democracy. President Carter's human rights policies and Western European support for democracy reinforced the opposition to authoritarianism. None of these factors directly led to the democratization process, but all of them contributed to an erosion of support for the regime which partially shaped the decision to liberalize. At the same time however, it should be emphasized that the Brazilian government still enjoys unusual support for an authoritarian regime. Indeed, in comparative perspective, its capacity to command support and do well in competitive elections stands out more than the decline in legitimacy. Even the Figueiredo administration's deterioration did not dramatically shatter the regime's image or support level.

Since the 1950s, Spanish authoritarianism also suffered from a decline in legitimacy. Initial opposition to franquism was centered in the universities and intellectual circles. Gradually, however, the desire for liberalization extended to important members of the franquist coalition, such as the Catholic Church. As the first generation of authoritarian leaders were replaced by younger Spaniards in the 1950s and 1960s, the need to liberalize the regime became widely accepted.
by much of the franquist elite. The liberal Press Law of 1966, the direct election of some legislators in 1967, and measures designed to allow limited political competition were some responses to this desire for liberalization. In the late 1960s and early 1970s, a number of periodicals associated with the moderate democratic opposition, such as the Catholic *Cuadernos Para el Diálogo* and the liberal *Cambio 16*, enjoyed widespread circulation, even among the franquist elite. Workers and employers alike bypassed the inefficient vertical syndical structures, and the Communist-led Workers Commissions made important gains. Attempts to institutionalize authoritarianism and sell it as an "organic democracy" reflected the generalized acceptance of a democratic discourse. During most of the Franco period, democracy was the exception to the rule in Southern Europe, but by 1975 Spain had the only remaining authoritarian regime. *Europeismo* became a euphemism for the acceptance of democracy and the delegitimation of authoritarian rule.

Finally, in both countries the perceived costs of democratization had declined. Many Brazilian civilian and military leaders had always viewed the regime as transitory, leading back to democracy. The most important condition for initiating the transition was political stability, though for many people, economic stability was also a condition. By 1973, both conditions were satisfied. The regime had annihilated the guerrilla left, crushed the popular movements, and domesticated the rest of the opposition. Between 1967 and 1974, the economy grew at one of the fastest rates in the world, and inflation
slowed to twenty percent per year, from almost 100 percent in 1963-64. In this favorable context, the authoritarian leaders were confident that they could initiate political liberalization with minimal risks. In doing so, they could also resolve the problems accruing from declining legitimacy and concerns about military cohesion.

The Spanish regime also enjoyed considerable political and economic stability in 1975. The regime had survived the domestic and foreign challenges of the post-War period and was well entrenched. Franco had overseen the economic "miracle", a period of unprecedented economic growth between 1960 and 1970. A new and relatively wealthy middle class, the direct beneficiary of this growth, augured well for the creation of a political center. Opposition to authoritarianism existed but never exceeded the regime's ability to control it. Yet while the perceived costs of democratization had declined, there continued to be risks. The international economic crisis adversely affected the Spanish economy, bringing the "miracle" to an end. The Communist Party, the _bête noire_ of the hardline franquists, was the strongest and best organized force within the opposition. After years of franquist suppression of regional autonomy, the movement for Basque and Catalan separatism had grown stronger. Terrorism, the scourge of the Spanish military, was well rooted in the Basque provinces.
CONDITIONS FOR DEMOCRATIZATION FROM ABOVE

For many reasons, democratization from above may be a desirable alternative for authoritarian regimes. It can resolve the tensions created by succession problems, declining internal cohesion and eroding legitimacy. At the same time, a controlled transition affords authoritarian elites a means of continuing to establish limits and shape the outcome in the new democracy. These elites must make some concessions, but they can also benefit from the controlled transition.

While transition from above is often an appealing alternative, it is very difficult to effect. Many authoritarian regimes attempt to democratize from above, but few succeed. Most cases of transition through extrication and some cases of transition after collapse initially began as attempts to control transitions from above. However, the elites lacked the conditions and/or skill to exercise this level of control. For example, the Argentine transition of 1971-73 started out as an attempted transition from above. When President Lanusse realized that the regime lacked the support necessary for this type of transition, he attempted to negotiate a transition through extrication. Serious schisms within the armed forces, dramatic mass mobilization, the eruption of guerrilla warfare, and Peron's determination to discredit the military government ultimately led to a collapse of the regime, which was unable to enforce even the most basic limits to the transition.

Transitions from above require a delicate balance between regime and opposition forces. Convincing the moderate authoritarian elites to support a transition to democracy
requires assuring them that their paramount interests will be safeguarded. Transition leaders must marginalize regime hardliners, who generally control the coercive apparatus and consequently have the capacity to undermine democratization. A first major tension in the transition revolves around this need to convince the moderate authoritarians while marginalizing their hardline colleagues. Second, transitions from above must obtain the support of the opposition even though it stands to gain little in the short term. The need to appease significant elements of the authoritarian coalition may undermine the confidence of opposition leaders, who then become less willing to accept the limits imposed by the regime. Opposition leaders must walk a tightrope between demands for a more rapid and thorough transition, and the limits inherent in transitions. A third major tension arises in the need to make some concessions to the opposition while continuing to control the most important aspects of the transition. The concessions must be limited enough in the short run that the hardliners and authoritarian moderates do not torpedo the transition, yet significant enough that they move the country in a democratic direction. In summary, governments overseeing transitions from above must know how to use both the accelerator and the brake of reform. If the transition from above is carried out with excessive haste or delay, democratization is imperiled.

This discussion raises the question of the conditions necessary for democratization from above. In the remainder of this section, we discuss five such conditions.
I. Transition from above requires that the authoritarian regime be well established and widely supported. As is evident from our discussion, democratization from above is unlikely to emerge from weak authoritarian regimes. Authoritarian regimes which lack significant support are unable to control a transition. They may be able to remain in power through maintaining authoritarian rule, but if they hope to relinquish power, the best they can do is to negotiate an extrication. In situations of weakness, it is hard to convince regime forces that their interests will be safeguarded and that the transition will be limited. Likewise, it is difficult to persuade the opposition to accept a transition dictated from above when it believes it can topple the regime.

One manifestation of the level of support an authoritarian regime enjoys is its capacity to create a competitive political party during the transition. The creation of a party shows regime confidence in its popular support. Frequently, however, authoritarian regimes significantly overestimate their following. The absence of visible protest, a result of the suppression of institutionalized means of resolving conflict, leads them to equate silence with consent. The fact that there have been no competitive elections enables them to overestimate their electoral strength. This kind of miscalculation has occurred in many transitions, including those in Argentina (1971-73) and Bolivia (1978-80).

Both the Spanish and Brazilian regimes were well established and widely supported. Both regimes had been in power for decades and had uncontested control of the government, and neither regime
ever came close to collapsing. The demise of Portuguese authoritarianism in 1974 shows that longevity does not ensure the capacity to control a transition to democracy, but only a well established regime has the authority to do so.

The Spanish and Brazilian regimes are among the few authoritarian regimes to create parties which have fared well in democratic elections. The Brazilian regime party, ARENA, created in 1965, was the majority party in the lower house until the party reform in 1979, and its successor, the PDS, has sustained this majority. In the 1982 elections, the PDS won a majority of the states and earned enough electoral college votes to virtually assure victory in the 1985 presidential elections. Aided by electoral engineering and occasional fraud, the PDS has taken advantage of the deeply rooted populist traditions throughout much of the country. Authoritarian elites in Spain took much longer to create a party and were unable to agree on a single electoral vehicle. While a number of franquist political associations were formed after 1974, a full scale political party, the Popular Alliance (AP) was not established until early 1977. This party included much of the prominent franquist elite, including a number of top cabinet ministers. However, many reformist leaders of the regime, including President Suárez, refrained from participating in AP and later founded a competing electoral coalition, the Union of the Democratic Center (UCD), with members of the moderate opposition. The major question in the June 1977 elections revolved around which regime party would win control of the government. UCD's victory in the first two
democratic elections was followed by a spectacular demise, but AP has replaced it as the major party of the right. As the second largest party in Spain, it continues to be the heir of the franquist past.

II. Transitions from above require that the authoritarian regime be capable of controlling "subversive" threats. Containing some opposition forces, especially those committed to overthrowing the system, is a major goal of most authoritarian regimes. Democratization only becomes an attractive alternative if these perceived "subversive" forces have been vanquished. No significant partners in the authoritarian coalition will support democratization so long as there are prospects for the reemergence of such forces in the democratic regime.

The crushing of the guerrilla left was an indispensable condition for political liberalization in Brazil. The regime came to power largely to defeat a perceived leftist threat. However, significant parts of the left radicalized in response to the initial repression. This radicalization provoked a further increase in repression, and by 1973 the government had decimated the left. By as early as 1968, it completely contained the popular movements which it also perceived as a threat. Thus, by 1973, the military felt it could liberalize without facing any significant leftist opposition. Throughout the ten years of liberalization, the government has continued to repress the left, making clear the limits of democratization. For the most part, the left which has emerged from this repression has become more committed to democratic values and has abandoned the hope of overthrowing the regime. This transformation of the left has
also facilitated the transition.

Leftist opposition to the franquist regime was extinguished by the late 1940s and only in the late 1950s did significant anti-franquist movements reemerge within Spain. The major leftist party, the Spanish Socialist Workers Party (PSOE), virtually ceased to exist. Most democratic leaders were in exile awaiting the overthrow of Franco by the allied powers. The security forces periodically decimated the ranks of the opposition, limiting its cohesiveness and mass appeal. In the 1960s the Communist Party made inroads among workers and students and became the best organized and most effective opposition force, but it never constituted a serious threat to Franco. The repression was especially directed at PCE leaders and was successful in keeping the party underground. Beginning with the PCE's adoption of a National Reconciliation policy in 1960 major leftist parties abandoned strategies based on the overthrow of franquism. Despite the increase of anti-franquist demonstrations in the 1970s, no opposition activity ever exceeded the ability of the franquist repressive apparatus to respond. On the eve of Franco's death, the left was weak and divided. The specter of terrorism was the major security problem facing the regime, but it was largely confined to the Basque Country.

III. In transitions from above, the democratic opposition must accept some limits and rules set by the regime. The opposition may be able to challenge the regime but is not strong enough to topple it. Consequently, it is more prone to avoid confrontational strategies. If the opposition actively pursues
radical change it runs the risk of provoking an authoritarian involution. Having suffered through periods of repression, opposition leaders may prefer to accept the limits and rules of a transition from above.

While radical opposition demands threaten transition from above, any democratic opposition must challenge some aspects of authoritarianism. Thus, there are limits to the opposition's willingness to accept the regimes' rules, even in transitions from above. The opposition must push essentially conservative regimes toward democratic change but do so as a loyal opposition. Opposition leaders must operate as if they were in a democratic system, but without enjoying any of the guarantees afforded by a democracy. Simultaneously, they must contend with sectors of their own constituency who demand more rapid change and who oppose negotiation with the authoritarian regime.

The Brazilian opposition was so weak and the regime so strong that there was no question of rejecting a controlled democratization in favor of a more ambitious strategy. It has continuously faced the dilemma of pushing for change while avoiding an involution. When the abertura began, the opposition party (MDB) had been seriously weakened by years of repression. Most of the remaining MDB leaders represented conservative positions within the opposition. The decimation of the left and control over popular movements reinforced the opposition's weakness and its tendency to accept limits established by the regime.

After the 1974 elections, the MDB gradually acquired a more progressive profile and became more willing to confront the
regime. Nevertheless, it continued to accept the basic parameters of the transition from above, even while challenging some blatantly authoritarian measures. This cautious tendency was reinforced by selective repression against more confrontational leaders, which had the effect of dampening opposition demands as a whole. Only after the 1979 party reform did a significantly more aggressive opposition emerge. The Workers Party (PT) promoted radical change and rejected the government's slow pace of reform, and the largest opposition party, the PMDB, demanded substantial change. Yet after the 1982 elections, the PMDB moved in a more cautious direction in response to the severe economic crisis, the absence of vigorous popular movements, and the effects of being in power in several important states. Thus the opposition has generally—but not always—conformed to the established Brazilian pattern of cautious elite accommodation. The 1984 mobilization for direct elections and the military regime's crisis may alter this tendency.

The Spanish opposition abandoned attempts to overthrow the regime in the 1960s, but it continued to harbor illusions of a regime collapse, followed by a ruptura democrática (a democratic break) in which all democratic forces would form a provisional government. After Franco's death, the democratic opposition remained stubbornly attached to this strategy. President Arias' failure to enact a genuine democratic reform and his inability to convince the opposition of his sincerity contributed to this intransigence. After July 1976, President Suárez's capacity to
implement reform and success in initiating a dialogue between the regime and opposition began to weaken the opposition's hostility to a controlled transition. Between July 1976 and January 1977, most of the opposition dropped the demand for a provisional government and spoke instead of a *ruptura pactada* (a negotiated democratic break). This change of position was motivated by Suárez's success in building a consensus within the franquist regime in support of a controlled transition. The most important sign of this consensus was the overwhelming passage of the Political Reform Law by the franquist legislature in November 1976. In a referendum held one month later, the Reform Law won a massive popular endorsement. While the major opposition officially advocated abstention in the referendum, it did not campaign actively against the Law for Political Reform. Opposition leaders consistently called for greater civil liberties, legalization of all parties, the dismantling of the franquist state apparatus, and more rapid reform. Yet by participating in the June elections and by agreeing to avoid all attacks against the monarchy or the franquist past, the opposition implicitly accepted Suárez's transition from above. Finally, throughout the entire transition period, opposition leaders repeatedly called for calm and moderation, a factor which contributed to the success of the Suárez reform.

IV. Transitions from above require limited levels of mass mobilization. A high level of mobilization makes a negotiated transition extremely unlikely, both because the regimes fear the consequences of a more open system and because the oppositions are unwilling to accept the regimes' conditions. Where levels of
mass mobilization are low, authoritarian leaders are less likely to fear democratization. High levels of mobilization may raise fear of disorder reminiscent of that which preceded the authoritarian takeover. They also favor the unacceptable prospect of a leftist victory in elections.

In highly mobilized societies, it is more difficult for opposition leaders to accept the regime's rules for the transition (Condition III). High mobilization suggests that the authoritarian regime is weak, so the opposition is more likely to attempt to topple the regime. Furthermore, under these conditions opposition leaders frequently have difficulty containing grass roots demands for rapid change. They are less insulated from their constituency and more constrained in their negotiations with regime leaders.

Brazil's political history has been characterized by low levels of popular mobilization; the popular sectors have been consistently marginalized from participation in major political decisions. This pattern eroded in the years immediately preceding the 1964 coup, but the increasing popular mobilization was a significant factor behind the military intervention. Popular leaders were a primary object of repression during the early phases of the regime, and by late 1968 the popular movements were well under control. Between 1968 and 1978, the labor movement did not organize a single major strike, and peasant organizations were even more silent. When the abertura began, there had been no major popular protests for several years, a fact which gave the military confidence it could ease
the repression. During the subsequent course of the abertura, the government continued to repress the strongest movements.

Historically, Spain has had higher levels of mass mobilization. The Second Republic was one of the most highly mobilized regimes in history, a fact which partially explains the intensity of the authoritarian reaction. Franco discouraged political mobilization and was successful in demobilizing and depoliticizing the masses. While opposition labor activity steadily increased in the 1960s and 1970s, at no time did a strike paralyze a major sector of the economy. Political demonstrations, especially in the Basque Country and Catalonia, were on the rise in the years surrounding the transition, but the opposition remained weak and fragmented. Franco's death evoked no mass mobilization, a fact which astounded most observers. Opposition leaders felt little mass pressure to wage their political struggle in the streets, a strategy which they feared would only provoke an authoritarian involution.

V. Transitions from above require gifted leadership.

Transitions from above can occur only under certain conditions, but even where all of these conditions obtain, they do not ensure that a controlled transition will result. Since this kind of transition does not automatically derive from any set of preconditions, it requires a willful choice even if favorable conditions are present. Poor leadership, in either the regime or opposition, can bungle the most propitious opportunities.

The leadership qualities which facilitate transitions from above include a willingness to promote democratization, a capacity to negotiate and persuade, and an ability to sustain the
momentum and regulate the timing of the reform. Given the difficulty in balancing the competing demands of different regime and opposition forces, skillful leadership is crucial. Leaders of controlled transitions must be able to sell the transition as the optimal solution for most of the regime and opposition. This involves persuading authoritarian forces to accept democratization and convincing the opposition to accept limits. The momentum of the transition must be sustained despite the many obstacles that emerge. Leaders must regulate the timing of reforms to avoid excessive hostility.

President Arias' failure to effect a controlled transition between December 1975 and June 1976 and Suárez's subsequent success illustrate the crucial role of leadership in the Spanish transition. Arias proved unable to convince either the regime hardliners or the democratic opposition to support the transition. His poor oratorical skills and lack of tact made him a poor choice to lead the transition, and his lack of conviction about the desirability of democracy was manifested in constant vacillations. Arias failed to initiate a dialogue with the democratic opposition, which he distrusted and despised. Because the president proved unable and unwilling to confront the right wing "bunker" with which he sympathized, he never dispelled his image as a hardline franquist.

Under essentially similar conditions, Suarez's superior leadership skills and his greater desire for democracy made the transition possible. His youth appealed to an entire generation of Spaniards who had not experienced the Civil War.
His franquist credentials won him initial confidence from regime hardliners. His charisma gave him undeniable popular support and facilitated the victory of the center-right in 1977. Suárez's political style was markedly different from that of his predecessor. He felt comfortable negotiating with the democratic opposition, even the PCE, and did not share Arias' anti-communism. He convinced the military and many doubtful franquists that a controlled transition offered the best solution to the regime crisis, and that strict limits would be respected. He employed a combination of persuasion, negotiation and coercion to convince the franquist Cortes to support the transition. His ability to sustain a steady, rapid pace for the transition kept both the hardliners and the democratic opposition off guard. Finally, Suárez's willingness to break past promises and exceed the established limits of the reform was instrumental in success.

The importance of leadership is also underscored by the role of King Juan Carlos. Initially considered awkward and inept, the King proved to be a prudent leader. When it became apparent that Arias could not effect a controlled transition, the monarch fired him and appointed Suárez. Both the King and Suárez cultivated dual images throughout the transition. On the one hand, they were always careful to express their respect for franquist traditions and procedure. On the other hand, both leaders were unequivocal in their public support for democratization. This balancing act required careful behavior, ambiguous public statements, and occasional duplicity.

While the Brazilian transition does not have any leaders of the stature of Juan Carlos or Suárez, Presidents Geisel and
Figueiredo and former Chief of the Cabinet Golbery de Couto e Silva, the regime's outstanding ideologue since 1964, all contributed toward striking a balance between introducing some reforms and maintaining significant control. They marginalized the far right, won considerable popular support despite authoritarian measures, and sometimes anticipated opposition demands in promoting change.

**Concluding Remarks:** The five conditions discussed above are interrelated. For example, well established authoritarian regimes (Condition I) are more likely to control "subversive" threats (Condition II). The democratic opposition will more likely accept limits (Condition III) where Conditions I and II obtain. The presence of skilled leaders (Condition V) facilitates the opposition's acceptance of limits (Condition III). Other conditions beyond those we have discussed may facilitate the transition, but they are not necessary. For example, the greater longevity of an authoritarian regime may make controlled transitions easier by dampening past fears and by creating a generational turnover.

In contrast to many scholars, we have intentionally omitted discussion of economic and international factors as necessary conditions for a transition from above. There is no predictable relationship between the economic environment and the ability to effect controlled transitions. A favorable economic situation may give authoritarian elites the confidence necessary to begin a transition, but it may also provide a justification for remaining in power. An economic crisis often creates
problems for a transition to democracy, but it can also contribute towards the erosion of authoritarianism. Appositely, the Spanish transition began in a period of economic crisis, while the Brazilian transition began in a period of prosperity.

An international environment that actively encourages democracy facilitates democratization, but it is not a necessary or sufficient condition. Democratization can occur in an unfavorable international climate just as authoritarian regimes can survive a hostile environment. Authoritarian regimes can be well insulated and can even use foreign pressure to enhance their legitimacy. International ostracism can make the elites more insecure and less willing to democratize. For example, the franquist regime survived the international isolation of the 1940s and early 1950s. Throughout the regime's history, Franco was successful in converting foreign condemnation into political capital.
DIFFERENCES IN TRANSITIONS FROM ABOVE: SPAIN AND BRAZIL

One of the fundamental postulates of this chapter has been that there are significant similarities between the Spanish and Brazilian transitions. Nevertheless, we have also emphasized differences between democratization in Brazil and Spain. Figure 2 summarizes some outstanding differences mentioned in previous sections.

FIGURE 2

DIFFERENCES BETWEEN DEMOCRATIZATION IN BRAZIL AND SPAIN

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Aspects from the authoritarian regime affecting democratization:</th>
<th>Brazil</th>
<th>Spain</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Type of previous regime</td>
<td>Military</td>
<td>Personal dictatorship</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Continuity between previous democratic regime and authoritarian regime</td>
<td>Moderate</td>
<td>Almost none</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Longevity of authoritarian regime</td>
<td>21 years</td>
<td>39 years</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Aspects of the transition:</th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Pace of democratization</td>
<td>Slower</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Completeness of transition</td>
<td>Incomplete</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Leaders of transition</td>
<td>Founders of regime</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Orientation of leaders</td>
<td>More authoritarian</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Party options for ex-authoritarians</td>
<td>Rightist regime party (PDS)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
In this section we analyze reasons for the greater rapidity and completeness of the Spanish transition. The question of how the transition evolved is analytically distinct from the issue of conditions for democratization from above. As we argued above, both Spain and Brazil enjoyed favorable conditions for a transition from above. However, three main factors in Spain were conducive to a more rapid and complete transition.

Although both transitions have had skilled leaders, these leaders have had different orientations. Spanish leaders were more genuinely reform oriented than their counterparts in Brazil. The transition to democracy was led by a generation of younger leaders, notably King Juan Carlos and President Adolfo Suárez, who implemented a controlled transition that exceeded the wishes of the moderate authoritarians. By contrast, in Brazil the same people who led the authoritarian period have overseen the transition, controlling it for a much longer time than their Spanish counterparts. The military carefully controlled the selection of presidents so as to perpetuate a gradual, conservative transition. The leaders of the transition were fundamentally concerned with devising ways to limit change even while introducing some reforms. Even had a genuinely democratic general been selected as president, he would have lacked the autonomy to carry the reform further than the limits imposed by the armed forces. This difference in orientation was also reflected in the newly created parties. The Brazilian leaders formed a strictly regime party, whereas the UCD combined elements of the moderate opposition and regime reformists. Given the importance of leadership in controlled transitions, this
difference between Spain and Brazil was crucial.

Earlier we argued that there is no necessary relationship between the economic environment and democratization. Nevertheless, while economic development is not a necessary condition for the establishment of a stable democracy, widespread poverty hinders the consolidation of a democratic regime. Almost all stable democracies have highly developed economies. In a developed nation there is a large middle class which has a stake in the system, and the government has resources to distribute, helping it to diffuse sources of instability.

Spain's higher level of development and greater equity facilitated the consolidation of parliamentary democracy after 1975. The economic "miracle" created a large middle class and a consumer society uninterested in radical change. No Western capitalist nation with a comparable level of development had an authoritarian regime.

Brazil is less developed than Spain and has worse income distribution. In 1981, Spain's per capita GNP was $5,640 compared to $2,220 in Brazil. The wealthiest ten percent of the Brazilian population accounted for 50.6 percent of total income compared to 26.7 percent in Spain. Brazil has eight times as much illiteracy and its infant mortality rate is 7.5 times greater. The extreme poverty found in many regions bolsters authoritarianism since the poorest sectors of the population tend to passively accept their fate. Large sectors of the elite who have formed the basis for authoritarian rule completely reject a democratic ethos. The extreme income inequality fosters the
continuation of rigid elitism and a well defined social hierarchy.

A favorable international environment is not a necessary condition for democratization, but it helps. Here again, there were differences between the Spanish and Brazilian cases. Spain's Western European neighbors provided consistent support for democratization, and many Spaniards associated democratization with a much desired entry into the European Economic Community. Brazil's international environment was less favorable than Spain's. Spain's fundamental cultural reference point was democratic Europe, while Brazil's was the southern cone of Latin America and the United States. During much of the liberalization process, most of Brazil's neighbors had extremely repressive governments. The level of repression in neighboring Argentina, Uruguay, Paraguay, and Bolivia far exceeded that of Brazil, and Peru and Ecuador also had military governments. With the exception of the Carter Administration, there has been little or no pressure for democratization from the United States.
COSTS AND BENEFITS OF TRANSITIONS FROM ABOVE

The way in which a democracy is inaugurated does not wholly determine its subsequent development, but it is important. The early phases of a new regime establish rules of the game, modes of political interaction, and limits to political behavior and change. Subsequent political struggles can alter these precedents, but generally speaking no period of a democracy's life is more important than its inauguration. The transition period also offers the best opportunity to change past traditions, even though these traditions continue to shape the new regime.

All forms of transition to democracy have costs and benefits relative to each other. In this section we discuss some of the the costs and benefits likely to be associated with controlled transitions. On the positive side, transitions from above offer a relatively peaceful means of establishing democracy since both the regime and opposition accept the basic rules of the game. Because the regime controls the basic aspects of the transition, it can intimidate most violent opposition. In addition, the population remains demobilized, depriving political extremes of mass support. Transitions from above are also more likely to establish a stable democracy, an objective which few countries have achieved since 1950. This kind of transition facilitates the institutionalization of the politics of compromise, thereby initiating democratic means of resolving conflict. Because controlled transitions include all major political actors, anti-democratic coalitions are less likely to develop. The moderation necessary during the transition may carry over to the democratic
period, decreasing the likelihood of polarization.

On the negative side, transitions from above afford less opportunity for a sharp break from the authoritarian past. The actors responsible for authoritarian rule, including abusers of human rights, continue to be present on the political scene. Authoritarian forces may be weakened and some ex-authoritarians may become conservative democrats, but others pose an ongoing threat to the democratic system. The immunity granted them during the transition may encourage them to act against the democratic system. The bitterness of the hardliners, caused by their marginalization from politics, may exacerbate this tendency.

While transitions from above seem more likely to produce stable democratic regimes, the initial phases of democracy are likely to be fragile and conservative. Until the democratic system has taken root, the military will remain a threat. Because of low levels of mobilization and weak political structures, there is little effective opposition to an authoritarian involution. The demobilization of society also gives the democracy an elitist character. The absence of major socio-economic change makes it impossible to resolve some fundamental questions like agrarian reform and inequitable income distribution. These initial costs of controlled transitions may decline over time; the critical question is the extent to which the democracy can break from its conservative, elitist origins.

Both Spain and Brazil have demonstrated some of these costs and benefits, but Spain has been more successful in moving away from its authoritarian past. The outstanding benefit of the
Spanish transition has been the development of a stable parliamentary democracy. Electoral competition has resulted in the alternation of power between parties of the center-right and center-left. The parliamentary monarchy has attained a new democratic legitimacy. Elites have learned to reach compromises over contentious issues and have been able to avoid politicizing potentially divisive issues.

The transition from above has ended the historical—and often violent—confrontation between the "two Spains"—one which was conservative, authoritarian, clerical, rural, and the other which was liberal, republican, anticlerical and urban. The new Constitution, often referred to as the "constitution of consensus," represents one example of how elites compromised on the most important issues that have traditionally divided Spaniards. The menacing church-state conflict was resolved by Article 17, which guarantees freedom of religion and explicitly rejects a confessional state but nevertheless recognizes the special role of the Catholic Church. The equally contentious question of regionalism was largely resolved by officially recognizing the right to regional autonomy while stopping short of establishing a federal system. The Constitution establishes a market economy but allows for significant state intervention in the "direction, coordination and exploitation of enterprises when the general interest demands it." It calls for civilian control over the armed forces but acknowledges the military's duty to "guarantee the sovereignty and independence of Spain, and to defend its territorial integrity and the functioning of the Constitution." All parties and organizations were dissatisfied
All parties and organizations were dissatisfied with some aspects of the Constitution, but almost all Spaniards have accepted it as a reasonable compromise.

The ability of elites to compromise on the rules of the game has carried over to the socio-economic sphere. The transition took place during a severe international economic recession. The uncertainty surrounding the regime change had exacerbated an already critical economic situation. Suárez had paid almost exclusive attention to political problems and had neglected the economy, fearing that attempts to implement economic reforms would imperil the reform. After the first elections, however, it was no longer possible to delay taking action. The inflation rate in 1977 (26.4%) was almost double that in other OECD countries. By late 1977 almost one million Spaniards were unemployed and the balance of payments deficit reached an alarming five billion dollars.

Suárez was caught between the opposition of the right, including much of his own party, to any economic reforms, and the demands of the leftist opposition for a progressive economic program. Faced with the prospect of a "hot autumn" that might trigger a military coup, government and leftist opposition reached a broad social accord known as the Moncloa Pacts. These negotiations earned Suárez the left's support for an austerity program in exchange for his promise of a substantial reform of the fiscal system, an increase in certain social expenditures, and a more rapid devolution of power to the regions. By reaching an accord between the center right and center left and by marginalizing both extremes, the Moncloa Pacts eliminated the
prospects for an authoritarian involution and established a precedent for elite negotiation and compromise. The logic of transition from above in Spain contributed to the moderation of the party system and consequently to the prospects for alternation in power. On the one hand, the controlled transition required that the democratic opposition moderate its demands and accept the regime's limits. This helps explain why the PSOE underwent a dramatic metamorphosis, transforming itself from one of Western Europe's most radical socialist parties in 1977, to one of its most cautious leftist parties. On the other hand, the regime right had to prove its democratic credentials to the Spanish electorate and could not afford to appear too rightist. From June 1977 to February 1981, Suárez's UCD acted in a manner befitting a social democratic party rather than a conservative one. In fact, Suarez's centrism eventually alienated him from the UCD right and led to the disintegration of the coalition. The more conservative Popular Alliance (AP) has since replaced UCD in Spain's party system, but it has also come to avoid political extremism out of electoral necessity. AP has become a conservative loyal opposition party and has distanced itself from its franquist origins.

While the benefits of Spain's controlled transition to democracy stand out, two important costs are evident. The regime has had difficulty harnessing the military, which has been the staunchest opponent to democratization. The legalization of the Communist Party, the granting of autonomy to Catalonia and the Basque country, and the dismantling of the National Movement were all viewed as broken promises by the armed forces. After the
first democratic elections, military hostility to democracy steadily grew. In early September 1977, plans for an authoritarian involution were initiated within the armed forces. In the fall of 1978, a major coup plot was uncovered, but military courts handed down light sentences to the conspirators. Attempts by hardline sectors of the military to undermine democracy culminated in the coup attempt of February 23, 1981. Since the discovery of another military conspiracy on the eve of the 1982 elections, the armed forces have maintained a lower profile. Nevertheless, the specter of military intervention has contributed to what has been described as Spain's "conditional democracy."

A second cost associated with transition from above has been a continuity in the low levels of mobilization and participation. Transition from above has done little to encourage mobilization. In contrast to revolutionary Portugal, which experienced a surge of mobilization, in Spain democratization was initially controlled by authoritarian elites and did not involve the masses. The Constitution was written behind closed doors by party representatives, and the Moncloa Pacts were negotiated without participation by trade unions or entrepreneurial groups. Spain continues to have the lowest rate of voter turnout in Europe, and recent survey data demonstrate that comparatively low levels of political participation have accompanied the democratization process.

The long term impact of low levels of mobilization is difficult to assess. Spaniards may not actively participate in
the democratic system in large percentages, but they overwhelmingly express their support for the new regime. While it is possible to view the absence of an immediate popular response to the coup attempt of 1981 as a sign of weakness of the new regime, the ability of elites to contain the crisis compensated for the popular passivity. As long as elites are able to rally to the defense of the regime, low levels of mobilization may not present a serious danger for democracy. Nevertheless, low levels of participation may adversely affect the quality of a democracy. Participation helps encourage governmental responsiveness to the citizenry and facilitates the development of a democratic political culture.

Any discussion of costs and benefits of controlled democratization in Brazil is necessarily tenuous because the transition is still incomplete. Nevertheless, there are reasons to believe that the Brazilian case will exemplify many of the negative features of transitions from above. Where Spain shows the potential for a deepening of democracy after a controlled transition, Brazil underscores the capacity of conservative elites to perpetuate important components of authoritarian rule under a more democratic regime.

More than a decade after the beginning of the abertura, Brazil has still not reached a full democracy. The transition's very length and incompleteness point to a major negative feature of the democratization process. Some key elements of the most repressive period, including the National Information Service and the Law of National Security, are intact. The regime embellished the Constitution with some authoritarian provisions——sometimes
promulgated in unconstitutional ways—designed to enhance the conservatives' role in the new system. The armed forces retain significant autonomy and power in politics, and there is no sign that this will change in the foreseeable future.

Probably the most deleterious effect of the controlled transition has been the exacerbation of Brazil's traditional pattern of elitist politics. Especially in rural areas, the regime has intentionally excluded the popular sectors from meaningful participation in politics. While encouraging change which satisfied some demands of middle class urban Brazil, it has continued to exercise considerable repression against the popular classes. In vast areas of the country, especially the Amazon and the Northeast, political liberalization has had little or no effect. Landowners continue to exercise virtually unchecked authority, and the state generally reinforces rather than challenges these patterns of private repression and control. In practice, the popular sectors still lack most of the basic rights of citizenship. Popular participation in politics is very limited, and there is widespread apathy about politics, even the establishment of democracy. Most of the popular sectors believe—and historically have reason to—that politics does not affect them.

The economic consequences of this elitist system are as striking as the political. Despite Brazil's level of development, millions of people live in abject poverty. Income distribution ranks among the worst in the world; in 1976, the bottom 50 percent of the population received only 11.8 percent of
total domestic income. Regional inequalities are also extreme. The states of São Paulo, Santa Catarina, and Rio Grande do Sul are among the wealthiest parts of Latin America, while the Northeast is among the poorest. Per capita income in São Paulo is approximately eight times that of the poorest state. Political liberalization has done little to alter the egregious inequalities which characterize the society, and the anti-popular effects of the economic model were reinforced by the severe crisis which began in 1982.

None of this means that political liberalization has been without positive consequences. The re-establishment of formal civil liberties, the more competitive character of political life, the sharp reduction in torture and elimination of political killings, and the revitalization of cultural life are among the positive changes of the last decade. Furthermore, a break from the authoritarian past may still come, enabling a new cadre of leaders to challenge the elitist political traditions and economic inequities. The magnitude of the 1984 mobilization for direct elections and the regime's current crisis could prove the beginning point for such a change.

Yet it is difficult to be overly optimistic about the direction of Brazil's political change. Not only did the authoritarian regime succeed in controlling many aspects of the liberalization process, it also reinforced elitist patterns well entrenched in the country's political traditions. Only favorable conditions and exceptional democratic leadership could challenge the elitism and inegalitarianism which have been at the root of Brazil's authoritarianism. While there is good reason to
be confident that the transition will continue, these factors suggest that the cautious and elitist pattern of political interactions, so well established during the transition, may continue to plague a democratic regime.
NOTES


4. Parts of this paper, especially the first pages of this section, draw upon Eduardo Viola and Scott Mainwaring, "Transitions to Democracy: Brazil and Argentina in the 1980s," Journal of International Affairs, forthcoming.


7. On the continuation of repression against peasants, see José de Souza Martins, Expropriação e Violência: A Questão Política no Campo (São Paulo: Hucitec, 1980); José de Souza Martins, Os Campesinos e a Política no Brasil (Petrópolis: Vozes, 1981); and Octávio Ianni, A Luta pela Terra (Petropolis: Vozes, 1978). On repression against the progressive Church, see Scott Mainwaring, The Catholic Church and Politics in Brazil, 1916-1983, (Stanford: Stanford University Press, forthcoming). Documentation of repression against peasants and the progressive Church is available through the Comissão Pastoral da Terra; see, for example, the two volume publication, Denúncia: Caso Araguaia-Tocantins (Goiânia, 1981).


10. Although not specifically focused on transitions from above, a good discussion of the dilemmas of controlling the military in transitions from authoritarian rule is Alain Rouqué, "Demilitarization and the Institutionalization of Military-Dominated Politics in Latin America," Latin American Program, Wilson Center, Working Paper 110 (circa 1981).


13. For example, a 1979 survey showed that about twenty five percent of the respondents evaluated Franco's rule favorably, and a similar percentage felt 'neutral' about the dictator. See Juan J. Linz (et. al.), Informe sociológico sobre el cambio político en España, 1975-1981 (Madrid: Euramerica, 1981), p. 588.

14. Much of this discussion draws on Share's "Transition Through Transaction."


17. Here we are only concerned with regimes which attempt to establish themselves in power. We do not include what Alfred Stepan has called "moderator regimes," where the sole purpose is to contain a threat and quickly restore democracy. On this point, see Alfred Stepan, The Military in Politics: Changing Patterns in Brazil (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1971). For example, before 1964 the Brazilian military often acted as a short term "moderator." This pattern differs markedly from the Latin American military interventions inspired by the National Security Doctrine in the 1960s and 1970s. In these latter cases the military intervened with the intention of remaining in power for a protracted period of time.


Franquista (1939-1975) (Barcelona: Labor, 1980).


27. On this period in Argentina, see Guillermo O'Donnell, El estado autoritario-burocratico, 1966-1973: Triunfos, derrotas y crisis (Buenos Aires: Editorial del Belgrano, 1982); Eduardo


29. On the UCD see "La Unión de Centro Democrático, Un Partido Consociacional" in Revista de Política Comparada 3 (Winter 1980-81); Luis García San Miguel, "The Ideology of the Union de Centro Democrático" in European Journal of Political Research 9 (1981); José Amoia, "The Union of the Democratic Centre" in Bell, Democratic Politics. On AP, see Jorge de Esteban and Luis López Guerra, Los partidos políticos en la España actual (Barcelona: Planeta, 1982), chapters 4 and 5.


31. This point is illustrated in much of contemporary Central America (Nicaragua until 1979, El Salvador and Guatemala). Given the high levels of mobilization, and the mutual distrust between regimes and oppositions, transition from above is extremely unlikely.

32. On the labor movement under the military regime, see Kenneth Paul Erickson, Sindicalismo no Processo Político no Brasil (São Paulo: Brasiliense, 1979); and Kenneth Mericle, "Conflict Regulation in the Brazilian Industrial Relations System." (Ph.D. dissertation, University of Wisconsin, 1974).


35. On Suárez's role in the transition, see Gregorio Morán, Adolfo Suárez, historia de una ambición (Barcelona: Planeta, 1979).

36. On Juan Carlos' role in the transition see Joaquin Bardavío, Los silencios del Rey (Madrid: Strips, 1979).


40. On the relationship between levels of economic development and democracy, see Seymour Martin Lipset, Political Man: The Social Bases of Politics (Garden City: Anchor Books, 1963) and Dahl, Polyarchy, 62-80.


42. See Linz, Informe sociológico, 616-618.

44. For a good treatment of the political economy of this period, see Pedro Schwartz "Politics First: The Economy After Franco" in Government and Opposition 11 (Winter 1976).


46. This argument is developed in Donald Share, "Two Transitions: Democratization and the Evolution of the Spanish Socialist Left" in West European Politics (Winter 1985).


48. This term is used in the preface and title of Abel and Torrent's recent work, Spain: Conditional Democracy.


50. Indeed, some scholars argue that high levels of participation may endanger democracy. See the controversial work by Michel Crozier, Samuel Huntington, and Joji Watanuki, The Crisis of Democracy (New York: New York University Press, 1975). 

51. The role of participation in invigorating democracy is a leading theme in democratic theory. See, for example, C.B. MacPherson, The Life and Times of Liberal Democracy (New York: Oxford University Press, 1977); Carole Pateman, Participation and Democratic Theory (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1970); Claus Offe, "New Social Movements as a Meta-Political Challenge," forthcoming. A work questioning the quality of Spanish democracy is Juan Luis Cebrian, La España que bosteza (Madrid: Taurus, 1980).


54. These regional inequalities are discussed by Clovis Cavalcanti, "Tristes Processos Econômicos: O Padrão Recent de Desenvolvimento do Nordeste," (mimeo, 1979), and Roberto Cavalcanti de Albuquerque and Clovis Cavalcanti, Desenvolvimento Regional no Brasil (Brasília: IPEA, 1976).

55. These traditional aspects of Brazilian political culture are analyzed in Raimundo Faoro, Os Donos do Poder (Porto Alegre: Globo, 1958); Wanderley Guilherme Dos Santos, Ordem Burguesa e Liberalismo Político (São Paulo: Duas Cidades, 1978); and Simón Schwartzman, Bases do Autoritarismo no Brasil (Rio de Janeiro: Campus, 1982).