ISSUES ON DEMOCRACY AND DEMOCRATIZATION:
NORTH AND SOUTH
-A Rapporteurs' Report-

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The conference was organized by Guillermo O'Donnell, Academic Director of the Kellogg Institute, and Fabio Wanderley Reis, Visiting Kellogg Fellow, both members of an international study group on democracy. Visiting Junior Kellogg Fellow Andrés Fontana acted as the conference coordinator.

The following participants presented papers: Philippe Schmitter, European University Institute (Italy) and University of Chicago; Fabio Wanderley Reis, Federal University of Minas Gerais; Alessandro Pizzorno, Harvard University; Sergio Abrances, IUPERJ (Brazil) and Kellogg Institute; Renato Boschi, IUPERJ (Brazil); Guillermo O'Donnell, Kellogg Institute and University of Notre Dame; Andrew Arato, New School for Social Research; Douglas Bennett, Temple University; Claus Offe and Hans-Jurgen Puhle, University Bielefeld (Federal German Republic); Adam Przeworski, University of Chicago; Fred Dallmayr, University of Notre Dame and Kellogg Institute; and, Robert Dahl and James Fishkin, Yale University.

Other participants included Alfred Stepan, Columbia University; Terry Karl, Harvard University; Fernando Daniel Janet, Universidad Autónoma de México; Ernest Bartell, C.S.C., Michael Francis, James Holston, Scott Mainwaring, Eduardo Viola and Alexander Wilde of the Kellogg Institute and the University of Notre Dame; and Edward Goerner and John Roos of the University of Notre Dame. Carlos Acuña and Robert Barros, University of Chicago, acted as rapporteurs.
The following papers were presented at the conference *Issues on Democracy and Democratization: North and South*, The Hellen Kellogg Institute for International Studies, November 1983:

"Neither Citizens nor Free Men," Sergio Henrique Abranches

"The Democratic Theory of the Polish Opposition: Normative Intentions and Strategic Ambiguities," Andrew Arato

"Democracy and Public Policy Analysis," Douglas C. Bennett

"On Social Movements and Democracy," Renato R. Boschi

"Equality versus Liberty," Robert A. Dahl

"Democracy and Post-Modernism," Fred R. Dallmayr

"Liberal Theory and the Problem of Justification," James S. Fishkin

"More Democracy?," James S. Fishkin

"Why Democracy (again...)?," Guillermo O'Donnell

"Societal Preconditions of Corporatism and some Current Dilemmas of Democratic Theory," Claus Offe

"A Few Proposals for the Notre Dame Conference," Alessandro Pizzorno

"Outline for a Discussion on Political and Social Control (Repression and Representation)," Alessandro Pizzorno

"Democracy as a Contingent Outcome of Conflicts," Adam Przeworski

"Varieties of Democratization," Hans-Jurgen Puhle

"Democracy, Democratization and Political Theory," Fabio Wanderley Reis

"Democracy, Market and Strategy," Fabio Wanderley Reis

"Democratic Theory and Neo-Corporatist Practice," Philippe C. Schmitter

"Private Interest Government: Order Beyond or Between Community, Market and State?," Wolfgang Streeck & Philippe C. Schmitter
ABSTRACT

This paper is a rapporteurs' report from the conference "Issues on Democracy and Democratization: North and South," sponsored by the Kellogg Institute of the University of Notre Dame in November 1983. The conference focused on issues in democratic theory in light of recent and differing problems confronted by both democratic and non-democratic regimes in the United States, Europe and Latin America. This report summarizes and assesses the proceedings of the conference in terms of three broad issues. (1) The problem of justifying democracy: Why are "imperfect" democracies preferable to other political regimes? (2) The need to develop criteria to evaluate the varying degrees to which democracy exists in political institutions and social practices. (3) The problem of conceptualizing the process of democratization.

RESUMEN

Este trabajo es un informe de la conferencia "Temas sobre la democracia y la democratización: Norte y Sur," auspiciada por el Instituto Kellogg de la Universidad de Notre Dame en noviembre de 1983. La conferencia enfocó temas relacionados con la democracia a la luz de recientes y variados problemas que confrontan los régimenes tanto democráticos en los Estados Unidos, Europa y América Latina. Este informe sintetiza y evalúa los trabajos y discusiones de la conferencia en base a tres grandes temas: (1) El problema de la justificación de la democracia: ¿por qué son preferibles las democracias "imperfectas" a otros régimenes políticos? (2) La necesidad teórica de desarrollar criterios para evaluar diferentes niveles de democracia en instituciones políticas y prácticas sociales. (3) El problema de cómo conceptualizar el proceso de democratización.
INTRODUCTION

Not long ago, the democratic regimes of the industrialized capitalist societies were diagnosed as suffering a crisis of demand overload. If the body politic were to be governable, popular mobilization, political participation, freedom of the press and public intervention by intellectuals had to be reduced. In other words, the treatment was "less democracy to save democracy."

Approximately in the same period Latin America was suffering a new wave of breakdown of democratic regimes that included some newcomers, such as Chile and Uruguay. Again, social tensions and economic crisis had prompted the treatment, though this time a bit more severe: "suspend democracy to save democracy."

Europe and the US have experienced since then a reduction of individual freedom, while South America is slowly emerging from the repressive barbarism initiated in the mid-seventies. Democracy, from the point of view of the northern scholars, has become an increasing issue of concern: can democracy meet the needs of advanced capitalism, while maintaining its basic features? Are equality and freedom, participation and governability, categories that are at odds with each other? Can parliamentary forms of territorial representation be improved by the institutionalization of functional representation? Is democracy an
enduring form of government or just an exceptional phenomenon that faces its historical demise? Should, then, the expectations of justice, freedom, equality and participation be reduced to the political sphere (narrowly defined) or is it still possible to envision an advance of the democratic realm to social spheres without jeopardizing the existence of democratic rule at the national governmental level as such?

For southern scholars and politicians, democracy has regained its status as a hopeful symbol, and warrants a commitment that is not conditioned by criticisms that were common ground only a decade ago. Industrialization, development, independence, social and national liberation, and socialism are goals still present in Latin America. But the experience of defeat and the horrors of terrorist state repression have highlighted the specificity and value of political democracy in itself. Thus, the attention of the "southerners" is also focused on democracy, though their revaluation is not a naive one and does not preclude the inquiry into the same issues that concern their northern counterparts.

Within this historical context, and aiming at advancing the elaboration and analysis of the democratic problem, scholars from Latin America, Europe and the US were invited to participate in the seminar "Issues on Democracy and Democratization: North and South," organized by the Kellogg Institute at the University of Notre Dame. The reader should be warned, or reminded, that the seminar sought to achieve a style that would display not so much formal purity as an atmosphere of reflection and creativity, even though incurring a cost in precision and consistency. Our purpose in this report has not been to synthesize the contents of the papers or summarize the dynamics of the discussions, but
to reconstruct the logic underlying the different analyses of the most significant topics that emerged. While the participants referred explicitly or implicitly to most of the topics that constitute the core of democratic theory, we chose to "order" the information in three sections: justification of democracy, evaluation of contemporary democratic practices and perspectives on democratization as the guiding issues.

Justifying Democracy

Why are "imperfect" democracies preferable to other political regimes? In an historical context of changing political practices and breakdown of long-standing socio-political projects, the old problem of justification for democracy has gained a renewed significance among political scholars. During the conference the topic was one of the cornerstones of the discussions and played a major role in the analyses carried out by James Fishkin, Adam Przeworski, and Guillermo O'Donnell.

In broad terms, James Fishkin, basing his arguments in an attempt to connect ethics and metaethics with political philosophy, posed a series of limitations that liberal theory faces when defining ethical foundations for democracy and liberalism itself. O'Donnell's and Przeworski's presentations reflected concerns and hypotheses drawn from the historical experience of authoritarianism. On the one hand, Przeworski sought to justify democracy from a "minimalistic" framework that emphasized the advantage that democratic regimes have over authoritarian ones in assuring basic human rights. On the other hand, O'Donnell, while framing his discussion of justification as a necessary part of a broader
theory of democracy and democratization, followed a psycho-sociological line of argument articulating micro and macro dimensions of identity formation under authoritarian and democratic rule.

Let us turn our attention to James Fishkin's approach to the problem. By classifying and analyzing all ethical stands, Fishkin first concluded that only one ethical position, "minimal objectivism", was able to justify liberalism and liberal democracy, without contradicting any of its basic principles. This position relies on objective grounds for its validation, thus avoiding subjective arbitrariness. But it does not claim that moral judgments to be valid have to hold without exception or be beyond reasonable question, thus avoiding the need to rely for its legitimation on universal and unquestionable assumptions. Such assumptions violate the neutrality among coexisting alternative religious and metaphysical beliefs that is necessary in liberal pluralist polities. Nevertheless, the "generalized absolutist expectations" existent in our societies, that tend to perceive any non-universal and/or questionable moral judgment as subjective, i.e., arbitrary, leave no space for the only ethical stand that can consistently validate liberalism. In this sense Fishkin sees these generalized expectations as creating conditions for a legitimacy crisis that could end up in the destruction of liberalism as a "coherent moral ideology." Fishkin finally concluded, "The solution is a revision of moral culture, a revision in our common expectations about what would constitute an adequate basis for a moral position. Only if we learn to expect less can liberalism maintain its viability and coherence."
Two major objections were raised during the discussion of James Fishkin's presentation. Alessandro Pizzorno pointed out that a relevant issue missing in the analysis was the reasons for the existence of generalized absolutist expectations. Pizzorno suggested that the moral principles and claims on which democracy is founded have to be absolute for democracy to be capable of answering to the threats of its enemies. He thus concluded that the paradox of democratic pluralism being non-pluralist at the level of its constituting principles was unsolvable in formal terms. A second objection, left as an open question, dealt with the unclear relationship between Fishkin's elaboration on the limits of liberal ideology and democracy itself.

With the intention of avoiding transforming democracy into a "Christmas tree" to which can be attributed whatever positive values one might wish, Adam Przeworski aimed at justifying democracy by stressing its advantages in remedying abuses of power. His analysis was framed by a series of assumptions about the problem of transition from authoritarian to democratic regimes,¹ the strategic logic of the main social actors who participate in stable democratic processes,² and the histor-

¹Recalling the line of argument in his paper "Democracy as a Contingent Outcome of Conflicts," Przeworski assumed that democracy can be established only if there exist possible institutional outcomes that would make it unlikely that the competitive political process would result in outcomes highly adverse to any of the actors' interests given the distribution of economic, ideological, organizational and other relevant resources. It follows that social and economic conservatism may be the necessary price for democracy if the transition from authoritarianism is to be successful, because the political institutions that result from the democratic compromise must be designed in such a way as to protect the interests of the forces associated with the authoritarian regime, thus minimizing the extent of eventual transformations.

²Referring to the dynamics that reproduce stability once the process of transition to democracy is completed, Przeworski asserted that democ-
ical experience from which democracy is presently being argued for.

Przeworski defined democracy primarily as a series of procedural means to assure basic human rights. A democratic regime, then, is one in which the actors are protected and defended from arbitrary aggression, therefore implying a fundamentally institutional problem rather than a socio-economic one. The historical root for the increased revalorization and justification of democracy on these grounds lies at the core of what Przeworski identified as "the breakdown of the two democratic socialist projects," i.e., social democracy and ideas that stressed the function of workers' councils and/or the nationalization of the means of production. The assumption that socialism, as the full realization of democracy, implied the fulfillment of two stages (one political and one economic, whatever their order) pointed attention away from the real problem of democracy: the protection of civil and political liberties as values in themselves, independent of socio-economic outcomes.

In this sense the justification of democratic capitalism should be based on the fact that its institutional procedures manage to assure the defense of basic human rights. This is not to deny the need to elaborate and pursue strategies to further democratize all possible social
racy implies a compromise that from the workers' and capitalists' perspectives entails a second best choice. Capitalists accept the cost of broadening political rights by being assured that they are not going to be dispossessed of the means of production. Workers accept the institution of private ownership of the means of production by being assured that they will have the possibility of struggling to improve their living conditions under capitalism. A key factor underlying the stability of the democratic political process is the risk averse behavior that characterizes the actors' strategies. Thus, from the workers standpoint, they give up their optimal choice, socialism, due to the economic and political risks entailed in the process of transition.
spheres, even within capitalism. It is rather to avoid the analysis and
evaluation of existing democracies from a "maximalist" framework, that
instead of clarifying the nature of democracy and the possible strat-
egies to improve its present character, would not even be able to iden-
tify those basic features that justify democracy as a preferable politi-
cal regime to any form of authoritarian rule.

Finally, Przeworski suggested the need to aim at the construction
of a more complex theory of democratization, capable of understanding
and supporting these processes without falling into the rather simplis-
tic position of assuming the party-parliamentary system as the central
or unique institutional form for assuring civil liberties and further
democratization.

Most of the remarks during the discussion of Przeworski's presenta-
tion did not focus specifically on his justification of democracy, but
on his use of the rational choice framework to understand the dynamics
that underly a democratic process. The problem, as it was posed, cen-
tered on the limits of a theory that assumes narrow economic interests
as the main motivation for the social actors' behavior, when seeking to
explain political processes where the symbolic dimension plays a major
role. In this line of analysis, Claus Offe argued that risk averse
behavior by the working class was not present in a number of historical
processes and linked Przeworski's "rather skeptical" conclusions to the
use of such a rational choice framework. Guillermo O'Donnell pointed
out that economic interest, risk averse behavior and negotiation were not
sufficient conditions for democracy because they could lead to non-
democratic outcomes. For O'Donnell the turning point was that in some
cases the
actors believed that democracy was worth trying, an explanatory variable that was not included in Przeworski's presentation. Last, but not least, both O'Donnell and Philippe Schmitter stressed that the second socialist project, the movement from political democracy towards other more encompassing forms of democracy, could still be considered valid and worth trying to deepen.

Guillermo O'Donnell's approach to the problem of justification, while rooted in the need to "raregue" for a theory of democracy, pointed out that such a theory cannot but be normative and stem from certain assumptions about "basic" or "central" characteristics of humanness. His presentation stressed that the formation of individual and collective identities entails a symbolic process that results from a complex set of interactions with those relevant "others" that tell us who we are and who we should become. More specifically, the constitution and transformation of identities implies a dialectical process where we are appealed ("interpeller", from Althusser-Lucan) in our condition qua members of a multiplicity of associations, in ways that amount to ratification of the we-ness entailed by the very fact of being appealed. The communicative pattern of an association's symbolic space can be characterized by a monologal or a dialogal-translogal structure of appeals. In the former only the center is entitled to discourse, while in the latter the appealed actors are also entitled to appeal to the center expecting from it some degree of responsiveness. (The fact that the actor's right to discourse can be exercised by appealing to the center and/or to the other members of the association turns the dialogal structure into a translogal one.)
The translogical structure of appeals creates the possibility for the actor to recognize him/herself as a co-constructor of the social order and its meanings. As such, this re-cognition is a demystifying reappropriation of political power that, on the one hand, allows the human being to "mature" as a social actor and, on the other hand, constitutes a pre-condition for his/her participation in a democratic process.

O'Donnell, therefore, sees the existence of the translogical space as a pre-condition for democracy and understands a democratic regime as the institutionalization of the entitlement to the space for translogical communication. In this sense, the notion of citizenship is defined as the human right to share the necessary conditions for the exercise of translogical communication.

O'Donnell's analysis was rooted in the general experience of authoritarian rule, with his hypotheses drawn specifically from the Argentine case (1976-1983). His description showed how the repressive apparatuses of an authoritarian regime impose a degree of fear that affects basic textures of sociability. The violent removal of the symbolic space for multiple recognitions makes impossible the social verification of identities. Actors become isolated in the sense that the possibility of recognition of themselves through "others" disappears or is relegated to the imaginary. The individual is subjected to the monological discourse of the "superior" authority and finds him/herself in a "world without mirrors" to confirm his/her identity because everyone's rational attitude is to survive by concealing his/her "non-madness." Therefore, the actor, not only divorced from the sources of power but also deprived of any right and subjected to the threat of these powers.
perceives social power as something alien to him/herself. This alienation is at the core of the process of de-socialization and identity regression, i.e., infantilization. Isolated, frightened, "powerless", and with no recognizable rights, the individual is deprived of the attributes of "mature" social beings.

O'Donnell's evaluation of democracy is fundamentally determined by the search for a political regime that would constitute an alternative to the personal and collective dynamics characteristic of authoritarian rule. Thus, his central argument on the problem of justification is that "democracy is desirable and further democratization is also desirable, because democratic authority is the best arrangement for promoting, potentially among all members of a society, the re-cognition that they are the source, as well as the sufficient and necessary condition, of the powers . . . that coordinate, organize, facilitate and quite often oppress their lives."

O'Donnell's last argument was that the translogal space is never complete or, in other words, that democracy is not an end state where the individual is fully autonomous and free of all possible constraints and controls. For example, citizenship still has not been incorporated into social realms other than the nation state. The development of the translogal structure of appeals would entail a permanent dynamic where new social arenas would be incorporated. Moreover, those arenas that have already been included within democratic institutions would be constantly redefined in an iterated process of re-appropriation and re-alienation. Therefore, democracy cannot but be democratization and, as such, a permanently subversive issue.
In relation to O'Donnell's presentation, Fabio Reis and Adam Przeworski pointed out that the bottom line of O'Donnell's analysis did not differ from classical political analysis in identifying the key role played by the pattern of communication flows a) in constituting individual and collective identities, and b) in turning democracy into a feasible and legitimate political enterprise. Philippe Schmitter posed a two-fold objection: on the one hand, the presentation and paper did not clearly establish if the translogal space was either necessary or sufficient as a pre-condition for democracy. On the other hand, Schmitter pointed out a possible implicit confusion between terrorist and bureaucratic authoritarian regimes, because although both are non-democratic, the former do not allow the existence of translogal spaces while the latter might tolerate some arenas of translogal communication, even if within limits.

**Judging Contemporary Regimes and Practices**

As a number of conference participants agreed, a theory of democracy cannot stop at providing justifications for the preferability of democracy over other regime types. Democracy, as Alessandro Pizzorno noted in his opening remarks, is not a "yes" or "no" situation. Even in contexts where political institutions designated as democratic prevail, democracy exists in varying degrees along certain dimensions of social and political life but not in others. This suggests the need for democratic theory to include criteria by which both to measure degrees of democracy and to evaluate institutions.
Do "classical" and contemporary theories provide standards adequate for this task? Or is it possible that these criteria—due either to contemporary transformations in the relations between state and civil society, or to the recognition of previously occluded dimensions of political and social life—have been rendered inapplicable and devoid of critical thrust? A number of presentations and papers examined these questions. Pizzorno raised as a neglected problem in democratic theory the coexistence and growth of forms of social control with democracy, while Claus Offe and Philippe Schmitter each examined the implications of "neo-corporatist" modes of interest intermediation for the practice of democracy. Douglas Bennett's paper represented an effort to evaluate a significant component of public policy-making—the use that is made of rational choice models in policy evaluation.

Pizzorno's opening remarks consisted of an exhortation to rethink the terms of political discourse on democracy by going beyond a narrow focus on political institutions. He stressed the need to situate the problem of democratic institutions in the broader context of their relationship with coexisting forms of administrative, civil and familial authority. The central thrust of Pizzorno's presentation concerned the need to examine the extent to which the emergence and subsequent transformation of representative institutions was dependent on the development of certain forms of control, or discipline, in social relations.

As a research agenda, this would entail assimilating to political analysis the findings of the literature on various types of administrative and social control.
Pizzorno maintained that this body of literature, without itself raising such concerns, suggests the inadequacy of a number of classical concepts of democratic theory. For example, can distinctions such as those between persuasion and coercion, or the subjection to legal as against personal authority continue to mark off boundaries of freedom in contexts in which state institutions play a large role in socialization and law itself has ceased to provide an easily knowable and therefore predictable framework of interaction?

Such an inquiry would also simultaneously provide the elements to evaluate the extent to which existing democratic mechanisms actually realize those values for which they are often appreciated, for example, freedom and the satisfaction of the demands of citizens. Such an evaluation, Pizzorno noted, is not merely an intellectual concern; it responds to issues presented by contemporary social movements, which in their diversity practically raise the problem of the "relative worth of political liberty" in contrast to liberty in other realms. [Pizzorno's categorizations of these movements into four types according to the nature of power sought (either to exercise or to prevent others from exercising power) and the realms in which freedom is to be achieved (either the public or the private spheres) will be returned to below.] No definitive answers were posed to these problems. Rather the possible implications of the coexistence of forms of administrative and social control with representative institutions were presented as a problem which can no longer be neglected by theories of democracy.

One example of the type of practices that may be inimical to democracy, understood as a set of rules providing for the direct and indirect
participation of all citizens in political decisions, but which nonetheless are found within formally democratic institutions, was illustrated by Douglas Bennett. He argued that despite its self-understanding as neutral, the use that is made of rational choice models to prepare and evaluate policy alternatives tends to have negative consequences for the practice of democracy. Practitioners of this approach, in their pretensions to aggregate existing interests and weigh off the "costs" and "benefits" of different policies, tend to either displace or demean democracy. Democracy is displaced when policy-makers judge its rationality according to whether or not policies they have determined to be pareto optimal are adopted. In those contexts where no such "best solution" can be arrived at, democracy is demeaned by being relegated to a second best form of decision making.

A number of participants objected to Bennett's claim to be evaluating rational choice theory. They argued that his example represented the least sophisticated version of this theory and could not stand as a judgment of the approach itself. These objections were less concerned with Bennett's presentation of the technocratic use made of more vulgar versions of this theory than with a desire to defend the rational choice approach as an adequate action theory for understanding democracy, a subject we will return to.

Another type of institutional practice which demands critical scrutiny is the appearance in the post-war period of "societal" or "neo" corporatism as an emergent characteristic of interest representation and economic policy making in Western Europe. Despite the plethora of studies examining the characteristics, workings, and relative performance of
corporatist arrangements, the serious questions and challenges which neo-corporatism raises for democratic theory have largely gone unaddressed. Can societal corporatism be considered a form of democratization? Does it involve an extension of citizen sovereignty into a realm formerly excluded from democratic control? Or must we conclude that corporatism represents an institutional mode of insulating organized functional interests from responsiveness and accountability to elections and legislative choices, and, hence, is antithetical to democracy?

Claus Offe and Philippe Schmitter raised these questions in their respective papers and presentations. Rather than reconstruct their arguments, we proceed by briefly outlining the substantive conclusions which Offe and Schmitter share to a certain extent. We then develop the differences in their respective evaluative criteria, which, when contrasted with each other, raise the problem of specifying the appropriate scope and parameters of a theory of democracy.

Both concur, though Schmitter more tentatively than Offe, that societal corporatism fails to meet democratic standards. These failings occur primarily in the areas of citizen participation and access to institutions. Although neo-corporatism has contributed to reducing differences both in levels of organization and policy influence among organized collectivities—particularly those of capital and labor—it restricts equal access and participation by excluding other citizens and associations, who despite their lesser functional relevance, are certainly affected by the outcomes of corporatist decisions. Within organizations, corporatism strengthens the dimension of control over that of representation. Representational monopolies and state contribution of
resources provide organizational staffs and directors both with greater leeway to define the interests of their constituents and with resources to assure their compliance. "Private governance" by associations rather than internal democracy appears to characterize the internal workings of incorporated associations.

While, certainly with different emphases and qualifications, Offe and Schmitter arrive at roughly similar conclusions, the manner by which each arrives at them is significantly different. Schmitter's normative criteria of evaluation are exclusively democratic, whereas Offe is more demanding in specifying what he calls criteria of "legitimation and justification." As mentioned, this difference has significant implications and hence will be developed further.

Schmitter's abstract, meta-institutional definition of democracy in terms of the underlying principle of citizenship opens up the possibility of conceiving of and evaluating democracy in institutions and settings not usually associated with political democracy. This principle forms the basis for his derivation—through a matrix which combines units of evaluation (citizens and authorities) and forms of governance ("by" and "for" the people)—of the normative democratic standards which he applies to corporatism: participation, accessibility, accountability, and responsiveness, all of which are held together by the competitive character of democracy.

Offe's evaluative strategy, which is broader, departs from the dual character of institutions as both protective constraints against the arbitrary use of power by others and resources for purposive action. He then applies this perspective to social power relations and political
relations of domination. Once the critique of representation is introduced, Offe's criteria of legitimacy turn into an uneasy synthesis of liberal and democratic standards. When combined, these criteria lead to an evaluation of corporatism which goes beyond merely assessing its democratic or non-democratic character. In other words, Offe evaluates neo-corporatism not only in regards to its ability to meet democratic requirements, such as the right to equal participation and responsiveness to socially posited goals. He also judges neo-corporatism as a possible form of autonomous societal regulation capable of "by-passing" the state, while simultaneously assuring social peace, as well as liberty from subjection.

Societal corporatism, as one might expect, fails to satisfy Offe's standards. But could any single institution meet all four of Schmitter's criteria? This is not the point. Rather whether or not these normative criteria are appropriate yardsticks with which to judge the implications of neo-corporatism for democratic practices should be examined. Offe's problematic points to a tension, also raised by Pizzorno's work, which democratic theory should recognize--that of the contradictory relationship between liberalism and democracy.

Both as currents of thought and as movements, liberalism and democracy have distinctive origins and historically have often stood in an antagonistic relationship to one another. Put very schematically, the liberal movements of the 17th and 18th centuries had as their end the constitution and defense of a civil realm free both from hierarchical status differentiations and from the arbitrary regimentations of the absolutist state. This entailed the subordination of the state to the
rule of law, the legitimacy of which derived from its accordance to—or, in those cases where the Rechtsstaat was supplemented by representative legislatures, genesis from—societal norms arrived at consensually, through a process of dialogue and reason within the institutions of the bourgeois public sphere—cafes, clubs, salons, and secret societies. Law, by being general, public and positive, was understood to establish the formal equality of citizens and protect them from the arbitrary actions of government. Despite this emphasis on representation, the universal norms of liberalism—freedom, equality, private property and individuality—were conceived as having their locus of realization in civil society, not the state. In the classical liberal conception, positive private freedom, to use Pizzorno's terminology, was the central value, whereas the positive public freedoms corresponding to representative government were a subordinate moment, necessary to ensure society's protection from arbitrary political interference.

Modern democratic movements, on the other hand, emerged as a response and challenge to liberalism and its conception of freedom. For the working classes, whose emergence paralleled the development of a capitalist economy, positive private freedom assured subjection to social power relations, new forms of social stratification, and continued exposure to the destructive consequences of the market mechanism, rather than individuation in a context of freedom, equality and private property. These actors, therefore, had no qualms about challenging the liberal sanctity of the private sphere. Political rights and the democratization of the liberal constitutional state were sought in order to translate economic antagonisms into political conflicts. Democracy was
to provide a vehicle by which to achieve political redress and protection from the inequalities of the market.

The point of this digression has been to try to regain a sense of the historical tension that has existed between the liberal and democratic conceptions of power and freedom, a tension which Offe demands that a theory of democracy overcome. But if we turn to history, as Hans Jurgen Puhle did in his presentation, and examine the extent to which liberalism and democracy have only been partially realized and therefore remain ideals, the scope of Offe's demand for reconciliation becomes apparent.

Puhle surveyed the variety of developmental paths to democracy, examining the experiences of England, France and Prussia. Despite rather different points of departure and processes of democratization, Puhle noted a convergence in all three countries that began in the last quarter of the nineteenth century, in the relations between state and civil society. In all cases, the instrumental utilization of democratic institutions has stood in opposition to the liberal ethical ideal of an autonomous civil realm free of power. The extension of political rights to formerly excluded groups has been accompanied by increased demands on the state, and as a result the expansion of the bureaucratic apparatus of the state and its penetration into civil society. Bureaucratization and the blurring of the boundaries between state and society have also been accelerated by the emergence of organized interest politics and demands for state regulation of the economy on the part of business groups have also greatly contributed to this trend.

Two points should be noted about the consequences for democracy of the intrusion of class conflict and organized pressure politics into the
political arena. First, as Schmitter points out, whereas votes are counted, interests are weighed, and secondly, even when demands for social compensation and economic regulation have originated within representative bodies, their implementation, through a logic which Offe cogently describes, has not only contributed to the administrative expansion of the state, but has also further empowered those organized collectivities whose collaboration successful policy implementation requires.

What we hope is apparent from this discussion is the extent to which criteria used to evaluate the present situation of democracy are intrinsically linked to the reasons and values for which democracy is preferred over other regimes. Offe's broad evaluative strategy, for example, raises the central "design problems" confronting any social theory with emancipatory intentions. But whether this should be the domain of a theory of democracy is an open question, on which conference participants were less than unanimous.

Nonetheless, even if one rejects dimensions of Offe's argument as some conference participants did, it seems that the tensions that we have attempted to draw out of Offe's work—and which are more directly raised by Pizzorno—must necessarily inform any theory of democracy. Adam Przeworski, for example, objected to Pizzorno's discussion of the relationship of different types of freedom in favor of an examination of the institutional requirements necessary for the protection of basic human and civil liberties. This suggestion, which was largely left unheeded, certainly would involve a consideration of the relationship between civil and political freedoms. Similarly, a perspective which
values democratic rule for creating the possibility of a non-authoritarian, pluralistic process of identity formation cannot abstract from considering the administrative and social constraints inhibiting such a process, even within institutionally democratic contexts.

We wish to emphasize that the point of contention does not concern the need to bring theoretical considerations to bear on the analysis of democracy. Rather the question is one of delimiting the appropriate boundaries and promises of a minimal democratic standard. From this follow criteria of evaluation, which particularly when defined exclusively in terms of the principle of citizenship, reveal the distance which separates the ideal from reality. This suggests a widely agreed upon point: democracy defines a specific character of relationship between rulers and ruled. Hence, when understood abstractly it is open to realization in a number of social and institutional settings, despite its usual association with specifically political institutions. In this sense, democracy is not an end state but a process open to improvement (and regression) where it formally exists, and potentially extendable to other realms. Lest anyone interpret this as suggesting that contemporary "bad" democracies may be traded off for any of their "true" idealizations, we stress a point made by Andrew Arato. He noted that while all forms of democracy have their exclusion rules, the suppression of any type of democracy has authoritarian potential.

**Perspectives on Democratization**

The question of democratization was raised repeatedly throughout the conference. As has just been hinted at, the notion of democratiza-
tion can be understood along a number of dimensions. At the levels of political institutions democratization can refer to: the introduction of democratic institutions of decision-making into polities previously subject to oligarchical or authoritarian rule; the extension of mechanisms of democratic control to cover a broader array of state functions and institutions; increasing the representative character of political organizations and legislatures; as well as the extension of citizenship to formerly excluded subjects. At the level of society, democratization would involve extending the right of equal individual participation in collective decision-making to the governance of economic and social institutions.

Although each of these various meanings of the term was touched upon during the conference, here we focus only on those presentations and discussions which most directly addressed aspects of this problem. Hence, this focuses primarily on Sergio Abranches' return to participatory traditions of political thought, Fabio Wanderley Reis' presentation of an ideal typical, normative model of a democratic polity, Andrew Arato's discussion of the democratic theory of the Polish opposition, and Renato Boschi's discussion of social movements and their relationship to democratization.

Sergio Abranches, in his presentation argued for the recovery of the notion of "collective citizenship." This he presented as opening the way beyond the contradiction between individual citizenship and the collective nature of the means for its implementation, a contradiction which he claims besets liberalism and is today manifest in the "regulated, organized, and controlled" nature of citizenship. Such a
retrieval involves the reappropriation of the tradition of collective, participatory politics, whose origins Abranches locates in the Greek polis and whose continuation he traces through Rousseau and certain anarchist and socialist thinkers.

From this perspective Abranches criticized liberalism and pluralism and counterposed to their shortcomings the promise of participatory politics. Liberalism is viewed negatively primarily due to its positive valuation of individual private action; its goal of restricting the scope of state power; and, as a corollary to these, its protective, defensive conception of political action. This argument concerning the limitations of individual citizenship precludes neither political association nor group organization. Rather, Abranches is critical of the manner in which pluralist pressure group politics and neo-corporatism, via the mediation of private associations, link the individual citizen to the state and not the whole. In contrast to this privatistic view, the collective citizenship approach conceives of politics as a collective endeavour by which the citizen is integrated into the political community. Historically two threads of continuity have traversed this intellectual tradition: on the one hand, the condemnation and exclusion of particularistic interests, and, on the other, a commitment to direct forms of political participation. In most cases, but not all, this latter point has been coupled with a rejection of representation.

While Abranches' survey of this collectivist tradition forcefully raises the question of political participation, it remains unclear what dimensions of this tradition ought to be integrated into a theory of democracy. Abranches does suggest certain modifications, particularly
the introduction of forms of representation and guarantees for the protection of individual rights. But whether these additions actually overcome or are rather indicative of the shortcomings of this approach should be asked.

First, is it at all desirable to overcome the schizophrenia between the citizen and the individual, if the very separation of state and society that gives rise to this distinction creates the freedom of private life? If this is valued positively, then the image of a unified collective subject must be discarded in favor of a conception which posits the normative validity of the existence of a plurality of different interests and identities. In this case the central problem for a theory of democracy is how to ensure that all individuals are able to articulate and assert their own interests while taking into account the interests of other individuals.

Fabio Wanderley Reis addressed this issue and developed an abstract normative model of the requirements entailed by such a concept of democracy. The chief aim of his presentation was to solve the traditional divorce between organizational aspects of society, such as the state, and individual freedom to pursue interests (as in the market), by articulating social, political, economic, and socio-psychological factors into a model to analyze political change.

Reis' point of departure was to stress that the conception of democracy that one adopts is a function of the definition of politics and political science that sustain the individual's analysis.

Using Hannah Arendt's and Carl Schmitt's conflicting notions of politics, Reis illustrated the traditional tension between, on the one
hand, an "egalitarian" conception that understands politics as the realm of communication among equals (with its characteristic medium being free speech) and, on the other hand, a "realistic" approach that emphasizes power, domination, and interest struggle as the essence of politics (having open or potential violence as its characteristic tool). The antinomy underlying these two approaches, he argued, represents the basic analytical problem of the social sciences and can be rephrased as "solidarity versus interest." This antinomy's structure is reproduced, under different labels, by a series of theoretical frameworks. In Parsons, as Reis pointed out, it appears as the contradiction between utilitarianism and the cohesive role of values. Similarly, Marxist thought has reproduced the antinomy in the definition of the dialectic between the particular and the universal in the process of class formation and in the problematic analytical balance between historical conflict of interests among classes and the normative stress on a rational and harmonious society to be built after the revolution.

Against other conceivable outcomes of the interest-solidarity antinomy (such as war, "organic society" and "pure speech"—each of which involves the dominance of one pole and the suppression of the other), Reis suggested the notion of "market" as a synthesis of both terms.

The aspects of the market that Reis wanted to recover and transpose to the level of political life were two-fold. On the one hand, its non-discriminatory, status and domination free, egalitarian and non-oligopolistic nature—which, he maintained, would have to be preserved through structural and institutional measures—and, on the other, its character
as an arena of interest pursuit which nonetheless is "distinguished by
the fact that this search is undertaken under conditions which presup-
pose the underlying operation of a principle of solidarity and the
adherence to effective rules which mitigate the search for interests."
Moreover from Reis' point of view, it is meaningful to speak of a
"political market" not as a metaphor, but as a way of conceptualizing
the relationships between different spheres of social reality, while
avoiding a reduction of the notion of market to its purely "economic"
character.

Reis' model hinges on the use of the concepts of "interest" and
"solidarity". Interest is defined --following Pizzorno-- as "oneself's
own aims and objectives" (with "oneself referring either to individual or
collective actors), while solidarity is understood as the "sharing of
objectives or interests." Both of these concepts are intertwined with
Reis' notion of rationality. His approach to the concept of rationality
follows from his criticism of the distinction between work and interac-
tion, which is Habermas' foundation for his differentiation between
technical (purposive) and practical (communicative) reason. Reis main-
tained that Habermas does not adequately thematize the category of
strategic action. Since strategic action plays an intermediate role
between work and interaction, the category creates an unavoidable ambi-
guity that jeopardizes the original distinction between technical and
practical rationality. Drawing from Piaget's work, Reis argued for the
existence of "unbreakable links between 'work' and 'interaction'," which
led him to conclude that there is only one concept of rationality, that
being the relationship between means and ends. Politics, then is funda-
mentally a problem of strategic action.
The importance of developing the normative notion of a "political market" was suggested by Reis' comments on autonomy. For democracy to actually be a form of self-rule, processes of identity formation must occur in contexts that allow for a maximum of autonomy. But as research on socialization and social control has shown, identity formation is critically bound up with existing social institutions. "Autonomy, therefore, supposes certain elements of 'social coercion' as given and necessary in the process of identity formation at the level of the individual." As a consequence of this deep linkage between institutional mechanisms and the constitution of collective identities, and if autonomy is indispensable for democracy, then "organizational pluralism is important precisely to the extent that the former (autonomy) will not be systematically blocked or hindered."

There were three main criticisms to Reis' model. Andrew Arato suggested that Reis' notion of rationality is at odds with the requirements of his model and vitiate his attempt to synthesize communicative and purposive approaches to politics. Following Durkheim, he pointed out the non-strategic presuppositions of the market and further argued that the overarching solidarity concerning institutions and the need to maintain their egalitarian character in Reis' model likewise would have to rest on non-strategic assumptions. Otherwise, if democratic institutions and their validity are left to strategic calculi they are always negotiable, subject to changing correlations of force.

Philippe Schmitter pointed out two relevant aspects of the notion of the market that the model of political market does not address: the principle that choices are supposed to be independent from each other
and the assumption that the actions of no single participant can influence the market's outcomes. Schmitter concluded that these two general premises of the notion of market affect the possibility of its use for the understanding of politics.

Finally, Adam Przeworski criticized a misleading ambiguity in Reis' key notion of solidarity. Przeworski listed a number of alternative possible meanings that fall within Reis' definition of solidarity, but, nevertheless, suggest contradictory meanings of the concept. These included, among others, 'x' and 'y' wanting 'a' (a possible case of rivalry in consumption, despite a shared objective), 'x' wanting 'a' and 'y' wanting 'x' to have 'a' (suggesting the problem of the manipulation of the actor's preferences), the possibility of neither 'x' nor 'y' wanting 'a' though it would be best for them to bring it about (as in the case of the Prisoner's Dilemma), and "ideological" solidarity (referring to preferences about the state of the collectivity). Beyond all of these alternatives, solidarity may be one of action and not of interests, a possibility left aside in Reis' definition.

Andrew Arato, in his presentation on the democratic theory of the Polish opposition revealed the extent to which some of the most concrete ideas and experiments with democratization have emerged not in the West, but in post-World War II Eastern Europe. Confronted with a dual context of imperial oppression and extreme centralism, reform movements from Hungary in 1956, Czechoslovakia in 1968, and Poland in 1980-1981 each have sought a combination of forms of democracy both to restore national sovereignty and to devolve authority from the state. The theoretical innovations of the Polish democratic opposition, particularly those of
Jacek Kuron and Adam Michnik, were the subject of Arato’s paper and presentation. He examined, in turn, the normative project of the "plurality of democracies"; the ambiguities underlying Michnik and Kuron’s respective strategies of self-delimiting democratization; and how the idea of "society against the state" with its dependence on a theory of totalitarianism—despite its great mobilizational value—ultimately not only contradicted the strategy of self-limitation, but also hindered an adequate assessment of the political situations facing the democratic movement in Poland. It is worth briefly outlining the ideas of "plurality of democracies" and the strategic conception of self-limitation, as both concepts are of interest for thinking about democratization, both in the East and the West.

The normative project of a plurality of democracies—which is Arato’s term, Kuron refers to a "radical pluralism"—seeks to avoid the monolithic implications of an exclusive reliance on either parliamentary or council forms of democracy through a combination of both. Kuron’s argument is that workers’ councils, though necessary to articulate and represent workers’ interests, cannot integrate the multiplicity of associations, interests, and values that a freely organized society would involve. Therefore, parliamentary structures of representation are a necessary complement to councils. But as a corrective to parliamentary democracy’s tendency to represent consumer interests, Kuron is also committed to national organs of functional representation to provide a voice for producers’ interests.

The strategic conception of self-limitation—which Arato noted involves normative as well as strategic dimensions—illustrates the
extent to which in the Polish context of state socialism the vision of a plurality of democracies could at best constitute a long term goal. The idea of "self-limitation" followed from the recognition of the probable negative consequences of any direct challenge to the Polish Communist Party's rule. To avoid such an outcome it was maintained that the reform movement should "limit" itself by directing its energies to the expansion and defense of autonomous spheres of social and public life.

This emphasis on plurality and the rejection of an orientation toward state power in favor of concentrating on developing and strengthening autonomous forms of social organization finds significant parallels within the theory and practices of contemporary social movements in the West. The question of the democratizing potential of these movements was raised numerous times at the conference and specifically addressed by Renato Boschi. His paper examined claims often made about social movements by raising a number of critical questions concerning their actual spontaneity, internal democracy, novelty, and relations with party systems and states.

The limitations of Boschi's discussion have to be pointed out. The applicability of his conclusions is limited by his approach, which tended to counterpose the claims of an undifferentiated literature with those aspects of the practice of Brazilian social movements which provide counter-examples. As an alternative Offe argued for a contextual approach to focusing on the reality of specific movements in order to handle the diversity of movements and maintain the complexity of the issue of their relationship to democratization. An initial distinction this would suggest is the difference between social movements in author-
itarian and formally democratic contexts; a distinction which may par-

tially explain the emphasis—uncharacteristic of most Western European 

social movements—on elections which Boschi finds in Brazil.

Certainly, the controversy over social movements does not hinge on 
an adequate empirical description of them—which, of course, is neces-
sary—but rather on clarifying the theoretical questions they raise. As 
as suggested by both Offe's and Przeworski's interventions, once sta-
tist versions of reformism—particularly their social democratic vari-
ants, which have too often translated into depoliticizing forms of cri-
sis management and welfare administration—are rejected or questioned, 
independent societal forms of association present themselves as one 
direction through which to rethink an alternative oppositional politics. 
This is suggested by Przeworski's call to reexamine both the degree of 
functional interdependence among different issues of conflict, and the 
extent to which they may be resolved through state intervention, as well 
as by Fred Dallmayr's survey of contemporary theoretical trends emphasizing the defense of cultural/social heterogeneity and decentralized asso-
ciation. In this vein, Dallmayr turned to the thought of Heidegger, 
Foucault, and Deleuze as sources of a new "post-modern" type of plural-

ism.

It is outside the scope of this report to attempt to examine the 
many issues one could raise concerning social movements and their rela-
tionship to democratization. Therefore we close this section by merely 
mentioning some points and questions suggested at the conference which 
deserve more focused attention. To avoid mythologizing social movements 
it seems necessary both to specify what conditions encourage action in
the form of social movements and to critically evaluate their claims. Further, the extent and manner by which social movements constitute publics which redefine and broaden the political agenda by raising "neglected" issues, such as peace, the environment, and the defense of civil and political liberties, is a significant topic. Associated with this is the question of the relationship between the image of social democratization in the form of a multiplication of arenas and forms of independent social activity and organization, and reform at the political institutional level.

We wish to close our account of the presentations with a reference to Robert Dahl's analysis of the possible tension between social equality and political liberty, and its potential consequences for democracy. The discussion was based on de Tocqueville's hypothesis that social equality over time would produce a privatization of individual life that would affect social cohesion. The danger of social atomization would bring about a mass reaction against insecurity, by which the majority would finally support an authoritarian regime destined to restore social cohesion and security. Dahl's analysis showed de Tocqueville's presumption wrong by demonstrating that in all historical cases of democratic breakdowns with mass support, the causes for the rise of authoritarian rule were independent of social equality. He concluded by pointing out that, in turn, it was economic liberty that proved to have grave effects on democracy and political equality, by causing destabilizing socio-economic inequalities.
Conclusion

During the seminar there was, to be sure, a major point of agreement on the way democracy was reevaluated. This revaluation was carried out on the basis of historical experience rather than by the use of socio-economic attributes attached aprioristically to the notion of democracy. Illustrative of this emphasis was the consensus on the misleading role that the distinction between "formal" and "real" (or "substantive") democracy had played in the analysis and evaluation of democratic regimes. As Fabio Wanderley Reis put it, "there is nothing formal about formality when it implies the difference between life and death." Furthermore, the group's positive appraisal of existing democratic rule avoided falling into conservative positions that might foreclose the movement towards radical improvements within democratic societies.

The pattern of presentations and discussion was a repeated acknowledgment of new spaces of inquiry. Most of the presentations not only highlighted new trends of research but also laid the theoretical grounds from which analysis should proceed. Though obviously this did not imply agreement on the relevance of every issue or on the usefulness of any given framework. In this sense, we might say that the outcome was not so much a research agenda but a series of agendas that displayed diverse degrees, first, of present development and second, of potential synthesis. An example of the dynamics that we are describing is the attempt to incorporate the literature on social and self-control, production of meaning, discipline and constitution of individual and collective identities into the study of democratic rule. While by the end of the semi-
...n this line of argument had revealed more questions than answers, it clearly constitutes the potentially most profound break with "classical" theories of democracy. The pursuit of this study demands a redefinition of categories such as autonomy, self-determination, freedom, participation, citizenship, representation, and democracy itself, if we take into account that the problem of political institutions has to be situated in the context of coexisting forms of authority. Moreover, to be consistent this theoretical trend could not do without a discussion on the general meaning of politics.

A summary of other key questions posed during the meeting, though surely not all-inclusive, can illustrate the seminar's significance for further development of democratic theory. What institutional forms guarantee procedural protection of the social actors? How does the changing state-civil society relationship affect the characteristics and conditions for democracy? How and why might alternative forms of representation, such as neo-corporatist arrangements, increase or diminish the democratic quality of a regime? Does the use of "rational choice" models constitute an obstacle for a deeper understanding of democracy and does its use by public policy makers undermine democratic rule? How and why might or might not social movements materialize forms of democratization independent from central authority or political institutions? How can the state change social life and what are the empirical limitations for democratization of state activities? What is and what is not functionally dependent in our societies (how to understand when and why the solution for the demands of one social movement or group is or is not the solution for another)? What kind of political articulations among
social and political actors are feasible to carry out democratizing strategies? Which criteria can be used to measure and evaluate diverse degrees of democracy among different social and economic institutions? How can individual and collective interests be articulated within democratic regimes while not reducing individual freedom and rights? And, how do political-administrative institutions help to create socially democratic forms of life?