TRANSITIONS TO DEMOCRACY:
BRAZIL AND ARGENTINA IN THE 1980s

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ABSTRACT

This paper discusses and compares the current transitions towards democracy in Brazil and Argentina. Its major purpose is to explore some of the major differences between these two transitions. It describes the Brazilian process as a "limited and unfinished transition initiated from above" and the Argentine process as a "transition after regime collapse." It compares the transitions on two main parameters: the extent to which the elites from the authoritarian regime control the transition, and the level of rupture or continuity of the democratic regime in relation to the authoritarian one. The authors argue that the authoritarian elites in Brazil have controlled many significant aspects of the transition, which has been characterized by significant continuity in relation to the authoritarian period, while the authoritarian elites in Argentina were incapable (despite attempts) of controlling the transition, which has been characterized by a rupture. The article also compares different aspects of the military regimes, the kinds of authoritarian political traditions, and the current prospects and dilemmas of democracy in the two countries.

RESUMEN

Este trabajo discute y compara las presentes transiciones hacia la democracia en Brasil y Argentina. Su principal propósito es explorar algunas de las mas relevantes diferencias entre estas dos transiciones. El proceso brasileño es descrito como una "limitada e inconclusa transición iniciada desde arriba" y el argentino como una "transición después del colapso del régimen". El papel compara las transiciones en dos parámetros fundamentales: la medida en que las elites del régimen autoritario controlan la transición y el nivel de ruptura o continuidad del régimen democrático en relación al autoritario. Los autores argumentan que las elites autoritarias en Brasil han controlado varios aspectos de la transición, que ha sido caracterizada por significativa continuidad en relación al periodo autoritario, mientras las elites autoritarias argentinas fueron incapaces (a pesar de los intentos) de controlar la transición, que ha sido caracterizada por la ruptura. El artículo también compara aspectos de los regímenes militares, los tipos de tradiciones políticas autoritarias y las presentes perspectivas para la democracia en los dos países.
This article discusses and compares the current transitions towards democracy in Brazil and Argentina. Its major purpose is to explore some of the major differences between the two transitions. We describe the Brazilian process as a "limited and unfinished transition initiated from above" and the Argentine process as a "transition after regime collapse." The article compares the transitions on two main dimensions: the extent to which the elites from the authoritarian regime control the transition, and the level of rupture or continuity of the democratic regime in relation to the authoritarian one. Our basic argument is that the authoritarian elites in Brazil have controlled many aspects of the transition, which has been characterized by significant continuity in relation to the authoritarian period, while the authoritarian elites in Argentina were incapable (despite attempts) of controlling the transition, which has been characterized by a rupture.

In the past few years, social scientists and historians have paid considerable attention to transitions to democracy. Nevertheless, this subject remains relatively new, and there is ample space for more empirical, comparative, and theoretical work. This article attempts to contribute to the discussion about transitions to democracy in two main ways. First, it establishes some comparisons between the two largest, most populous, and most influential South American nations. These comparisons must be read within the context of what are open ended, uncertain political processes, subject to continuous redefinition.
contradictions, and tensions. Second, it develops a heuristic model of major kinds of non-revolutionary transitions to democracy. This model is used to orient the discussion about Brazil and Argentina, but we believe it is also useful in thinking about other transitions.

Before turning to the corpus of the article, we must first briefly define some basic terms. By democracy, we mean a political regime with free competitive elections, without proscriptions and with universal adult suffrage. Democratic regimes afford freedom of speech and the press, freedom of political association, and individual civil rights. They have a division of powers, with autonomy of the executive, judiciary, and legislative branches. There are, of course, competing definitions of democracy which focus on socio-economic questions, but we believe that there are good reasons for definitionally focusing on these formal institutional arrangements. While this definition suffices to characterize a liberal democracy, democracy can always be expanded, both in competitiveness and participation.

Democracy implies the possibility of an alternance in power. In this sense, a transition to democracy involves more than a liberalization of an authoritarian regime. Liberalization refers to a decline in repression and the re-establishment of most basic civil and political rights, but without permitting competitive elections which would allow for an alternance in power. As used in this article, democratization refers to the establishment in
Institutional arrangements which make possible an alternance. And transitions to democracy involve both liberalization and democratization. These distinctions are important because of the differences between the Argentine and Brazilian cases. Whereas Argentina has already undergone a transition to democracy, the Brazilian regime has liberalized and appears to be moving towards a full transition, but the transition is still not finished. In Argentina, liberalization was not clearly separated from democratization, and from the outset it implied a transition to democracy. In Brazil, liberalization began around 1974, democratization began with the promise in 1980 of competitive elections which would allow an alternance in power at the state level, and a transition to democracy is yet to be realized.

**Kinds of Non-Revolutionary Transitions to Democracy**

This section discusses two kinds of non-revolutionary transitions to democracy, transitions initiated and controlled from above and transitions in the aftermath of the breakdown of an authoritarian regime. There are also intermediate cases of transitions through withdrawal, where the authoritarian regime has to promote democratization because of its low level of legitimacy and internal cohesion, but is still capable of negotiating the conditions under which it gave up power. We do not discuss transitions through withdrawal at length because they are less relevant for this article.

The distinction between transitions initiated from above, transitions by breakdown, and transitions through withdrawal is
an ideal type; any actual transition combines elements of the different types. This distinction is not intended to be theoretically rigorous, but rather to have heuristic value. Finally, it should be noted that the number of cases of successful transition to democracy is very limited.

The most important case of a relatively consolidated transition controlled from above is Spain. Brazil is the other outstanding example of an attempted transition from above, although the transition is still limited and unfinished. Because of their size and importance, the Spanish and Brazilian examples have been influential and may create a new model for twentieth century transition to democracy. Other authoritarian regimes are likely to attempt to emulate these two; the Panamanian case (1984) is an example.

Transitions initiated from above afford a significant level of continuity from the preceeding regime. While there is likely to be some turnover in the elite, especially a marginalization of the hardliners in the authoritarian regime, some of the more flexible leaders from the preceeding regime are likely to retain critical positions in the state apparatus. The regime will also ensure some continuity in policies. It must renounce the most authoritarian practices of the past, but it will also attempt to exclude radical and revolutionary elements from participation in the democratic political system. While it may need to make some concessions to popular demands, the new regime is likely to successfully avoid any attempts to significantly change socio-

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economic structures. The process of liberalization and democratization implies some change in the rules of the game, but this change is likely to be gradual, especially in the early phases.

The authoritarian regimes which control transitions to democracy can usually claim some meaningful accomplishments. These regimes frequently promoted modernization of the societies, even if this occurred at the expense of income concentration. They acquired political appeal partly on the basis of their efficiency and claims to developing the nation. Many of these regimes followed situations which key sectors of society perceived as revolutionary, and their ability to maintain social order attracted many of these sectors. Thus, while they could not necessarily win free competitive elections, these regimes can claim the support of numerous and powerful allies in civil society. Indeed, it is almost impossible for an authoritarian regime to control most aspects of the transition and build a mass party without having been successful in some key economic and political dimensions. The two main cases of authoritarian regimes which initiated and controlled many aspects of the transition (Spain, Brazil) had been politically stable and economically successful. This stability and success allowed the possibility of controlling the transition—although, as the Portuguese case shows, long term stability does not ensure that the regime will be able to control the transition to democracy. The decision to move towards a more liberal political system
enables the elites to promote a democratic discourse which becomes a further means of seeking legitimation.

Because of their ability to win legitimacy in civil society, these regimes attempt to organize a political party. In contrast to the parties linked to regimes which break down, those linked to regimes which initiate transitions can compete in open elections. A party with mass following is constructed upon the foundation of the authoritarian party and organizations. This capacity to create a mass party is one of the outstanding features which differentiates transitions controlled from above from the intermediate cases, where the authoritarian regime negotiates some aspects of how it withdraws from power, but is incapable of organizing the kind of mass party it needs to compete in elections. Because of the regime's ability to control key aspects of the transition, these regimes are almost certain to insist on protection for authoritarian leaders, regardless of their involvement in repression.

While the transition is initially begun and controlled by the regime, there are limits to this control. Liberalization inherently involves marginalizing the hardliners and constructing a dialogue with the moderate opposition. This process gives the opposition some influence over subsequent political events. As liberalization and democratization proceed, the regime's ability to control its rhythm and limits diminishes. Nevertheless, it retains more control than in transitions begun by regime collapse. Although all transitions involve a high level of
uncertainty, this uncertainty is lower in the cases of transitions initiated from above. The regime’s ability to control aspects of the transition establishes some basic parameters in the political struggle. Political actors from the right and left may attempt to destabilize the transition, but their ability to do so will be limited.

This contemporary pattern of transition from above differs from the traditional transitions controlled from above in European (England, Sweden, Denmark) in the eighteenth and nineteenth as well as some South American countries (Argentina, Chile, Uruguay) in the early twentieth century. In the classical European cases, an oligarchic regime gradually extended participation and contestation over a long period of time, in contrast to the relatively short term transition of the Spanish case. This classical democratization pattern is probably historically closed. Democratization occurred in a context of limited popular mobilization, limited or non-existent cultural legitimacy of democratic institutions, and less global interdependence and foreign impact upon domestic politics. This context made possible a gradual elite controlled democratization that seems impossible in today’s world.

Most transitions to democracy have followed a regime collapse or breakdown. Examples include Germany, Japan, Austria, and Italy (although revolutionary components were present) after World War II, Portugal and Greece in 1974, and Costa Rica in 1948 (although again, some revolutionary components
were present). Many of these cases involved defeat in a war and occupation by a foreign power. Contemporary Bolivia and Argentina represent attempts to institutionalize democratic regimes following the breakdown of authoritarianism.

In transitions to democracy after breakdown or collapse, the authoritarian regime has little or no capacity to control the transition. Whether through defeat in an external war or through its inability to govern effectively, it has lost its claims to legitimacy. The overwhelming part of the population wants a clear and decisive break from the regime, even if some small and powerful redoubts of the old system continue to exist. Consequently, none of the high level elites of the preceding regime are able to retain influential political positions in the democratic regime. The break with most policies of the preceding regime is also sharp. In some cases, the elites of the authoritarian regime become symbols of national disgrace and are actively prosecuted. In Greece (1974), Germany (1945), and Italy (1945), among other cases, some leaders particularly linked to repression were tried and imprisoned. Where transitions initiated from above usually provide assurances to the regime elite and exclude its enemies (usually the left), regime collapses produce sharper redefinitions of the acceptable political actors. In this kind of transition, civil society generally has a higher capacity to organize and penetrate the state.
Regime transition after breakdown involves a level of continuity somewhere between transition initiated from above and revolution. Transition initiated from above involves some continuity in elites, revolution destroys the previous elites, and transition after regime breakdown generally involves a displacement, but not destruction, of the former elites. Revolution radically changes power and property relations; transition to democracy after collapse significantly alters power relations, but generally does not greatly affect property; and transition initiated from above entails a more limited modification in power relations and usually protects extant property relations.

Many of the major social institutions, including the universities and educational system, are affected by the transition after collapse. This kind of transition is usually marked by a crisis in or a collapse of the armed forces. In some cases, the armed forces were responsible for a political regime which lost all legitimacy. As a result of the external defeat and/or internal illegitimacy, the power and autonomy of the armed forces decline. Creating democratic armed forces becomes crucial among some sectors committed to democracy, so civilian control of the armed forces is generally a significant issue for the new democratic regimes.

Transitions following regime collapse entail a marked, though unstable, redefinition of political rules. The modes of political interaction under the authoritarian regime are rejected, and during an initial period there is an intense
struggle to redefine the rules of the game. Political actors are likely to resort to some rules of the period preceding the authoritarian regime. However, these rules are often ill defined initially, leading some advocates of authoritarianism to become nostalgic about the period of law and order. Because these regimes are very delegitimized, they have difficulty organizing a mass political party. Former regime supporters are likely to become advocates of democracy in a party outside the regime or to hope for a return to authoritarian rule. Because the regime cannot organize mass support, its elites do not have democratic means of retaining power.

The dominant classes have an ambivalent attitude towards democratization after regime breakdown. They may accept or even encourage limited liberalization in non-breakdown situations; both the Spanish and Brazilian cases are examples. However, transitions after regime breakdown are marked by a high level of uncertainty. The dominant classes fear that they could lose some of their privileges and power in the redefinition of the political struggle. While they may avoid close identification with the fallen authoritarian regime for fear of being marginalized from the current political struggle, they also work towards limiting the democratization to avoid affecting their property, power, and profits. In the name of economic efficiency, they tend to demand political caution.

In addition to transitions controlled from above and transitions after regime breakdown, there is an intermediate category
of transition through withdrawal. Some authoritarian regimes withdraw from power because of their low level of legitimacy and internal cohesion, but still manage to retain some control of the transition. While it is appropriate to speak of the erosion of these regimes, they manage to avoid a breakdown or collapse. Their control over the coercive apparatus enables them to dictate aspects of the schedule and content of withdrawal. However, because they cannot organize a mass political party, they are less capable of controlling the transition beyond the moment of the first elections. Consequently, there is less continuity in regime elites and policies than in transitions controlled from above, though greater continuity than in transitions after regime breakdown. The recent transitions in Peru and Ecuador are examples of this third path of non-revolutionary transitions.

For some time the Argentine transition in the early 1970s had a similar profile, but the regime eventually lost the level of control implied by this scenario and deteriorated into a situation closer to the ideal type of transition after regime breakdown. There is a good chance that the future transitions in Chile and Uruguay will be close to this intermediate category.

The Authoritarian Political Traditions and the Military Regimes in Brazil and Argentina

A primary purpose of this article is to compare the way different impulses and starting points for political liberalization—a decision by the regime elites in Brazil, and a necessity because of the regime collapse in Argentina—affected
various aspects of the subsequent transition. Nevertheless, it would be a mistake to suggest that the whole character of the transition depends on whether it was initiated from above or resulted from a regime collapse. Several other factors also play a significant role, including the previous political traditions of the country and the nature of the preceding authoritarian regime. In this section we discuss these two questions with respect to Brazil and Argentina.

Democracy is a relatively uncommon form of political regime in the world, and both Argentina and Brazil have manifested the difficulty in creating stable, democratic regimes. Both countries have experienced only occasional and unstable periods of democratic rule in the twentieth century. Brazil has enjoyed only 18 years of democratic rule, 1946 to 1964. The most significant stable democratic period in Argentina was 1916-1930. Since 1930, Argentina has had an even higher propensity towards authoritarian regimes than Brazil. No president who was democratically elected in open elections finished his mandate except Juan Peron (1946-1952), who became one of the few examples of an authoritarian ruler who was elected in competitive democratic elections.

In both societies, important sectors of the population have manifested an indifference to institutional pluralism and have sought short term benefits (material or political) even at the expense of subverting a democratic order. As a result of the predominance of authoritarian regimes, the citizens of both
countries are largely unaccustomed to democratic political values. The authoritarian political culture in both societies has been reinforced by forms of social authoritarianism. Authoritarianism has not only been a characteristic of political life, but has also marked many elements of social relationships.

While both countries have an authoritarian tradition, they also have a history of some political pluralism and constitutionalism. They are more authoritarian than the established European and North American democracies, but they also have a more pluralistic political culture than most Third World societies. Alongside some political forces clearly committed to democracy and others with a markedly authoritarian bent, in both societies many political actors have had intermediate positions which could be termed semi-democratic. In Brazil, semi-democratic conservative forces have played a predominant political role, and in Argentina, semi-democratic populist leaders have played an outstanding role. Semi-democratic populists have also been important in Brazil, as have semi-democratic conservatives in Argentina. These semi-democratic forces support democratic or authoritarian regimes depending on their interests in a given political conjuncture. Given the strength of these semi-democratic actors, it is not surprising that both countries have a history of oscillations between democratic and authoritarian regimes. These forces continue to be important in the current transition in both societies.
Both countries are similar in their difficulty in establishing democratic political regimes, but there are differences in the way the political culture is authoritarian. Furthermore, the causes of the social and political authoritarianism differ markedly.

The pattern of social interactions throughout Brazilian history was marked by the slave experience. Even after legal abolition in 1888, the slave tradition continued to legitimate social asymmetries and social hierarchy. The prevailing norm rejected egalitarian, democratic ideals and favored the establishment of a stratified citizenship. The affirmation of social difference and hierarchy has led to a marginalization of the popular sectors from all major institutions—political, religious, social, economic. The dominant ideology legitimates and even demands this popular marginalization and subordination, as well as sharp socio-economic inequalities. The elitist, authoritarian, and hierarchical character of social life has cut across most relations. In the work place, peasants and workers have had limited rights. Relations outside the home have been so elitist and authoritarian that a leading Brazilian anthropologist has argued that the expression "Você sabe com que estou falando?" (Do you know whom you are speaking to?), widely used to establish social differentiation and hierarchy, captures the essence of Brazilian social life.

Argentina's history of social and political authoritarianism differs in significant regards. By 1930, Argentina had one of
the highest standards of living in the world, a lengthy tradition
of constitutionalism, and a significant degree of social egal-
tarianism. Despite some elite attempts to limit it, the
tradition towards equality has been reaffirmed in social
relations and, especially during the Peron period (1946-1955), in
political discourse. In contrast to Brazil, the belief in
equality of opportunity has been constant. In terms of the poli-
tical presence of the popular sectors--especially the working
class--Argentina is the opposite of Brazil. There is a much
stronger history of populist mobilization of the masses as part
of intra-elite struggles and of autonomous popular mobilization
and organization. Where Brazilian politics is marked by the
relative absence of the organized popular classes, in Argentina
they have been a constant in the political sphere. During the
first Peron period, the Argentine working class had along with
the English working class, one of the highest potentials to
affirm equality in the work place and restrict the owner's
authority. This pattern of equality has extended to other social
relations. Where the poor Brazilian accepts the social dif-
ferrertion implied by "Voce sabe com quem esta falando," the
Argentine is known for insolent rejections of similar attempts at
creating social hierarchy: "A mi que mierda me importa" (What the
hell do I care who you are). Because of the dominant ideology
established through the educational system and the legal frame-
work, Argentina formed a unified conception of citizenship, more
similar to the North American and Northern European pattern than to the Brazilian.

Corresponding to these differences in social relations and culture are equally marked differences in political patterns in the two countries. The Brazilian political system has always been elitist, and the elites have manifested an exceptional capacity to expand the system when necessary while maintaining its basically closed nature. Elites established basic rules of the game, limited attempts to change the society, and coopted new sectors as part of the system. The only moment when this pattern seemed threatened was 1963-1964, when the elites and military responded with a coup. This well established elitist pattern has allowed greater political stability.

In Argentina, the political struggle has been less elitist than in Brazil. Since 1930, the political system has been extremely unstable and has been characterized by a high level of factionalism, that is, the tendency to favor short term self-interest at the expense of long term societal concerns, including institutional questions like democracy. Both the intermittent attempts to create a more elitist system (1930-1943, 1966-1973, 1976-1983) and the endeavours to more fully include and incorporate the masses (1943-1955, 1963-1966, 1973-1976) have failed. The traditional sectors have destabilized the political system in their attempts to exclude, while those who have favored a more open political order have also failed, partially because
of sharp divisions (Peronists vs. Radicals) about rules for a democratic system.

One of the peculiarities of Argentine politics is the high level of polarization which occurred during the Peron presidency (1946-1955), and which continued to mark the political system during subsequent decades. This polarization exists in a society in which all sectors have accepted the capitalist order, and in which until the late 1960s there were no major demands for radical socio-economic change. Different parties, social classes, and interest groups formed alliances with sectors of the military and supported coups as a way of defending their immediate interests. The militarization of politics produced much more of political violence than in Brazil. The wave of leftist and rightist terror of the 1970s culminated in the 1976-1983 military regime, whose violence and repressive character surpassed any in Brazil's history. Whereas even the greatest rupture in recent Brazilian history, the 1964 coup, maintained some important continuities from the past, including the preservation of parties and elections (which later permitted another continuity in the liberalization of the military regime beginning the mid-1970s), Argentina's political history has been marked by attempts to radically change the previous rules of the game, thereby aborting institutional continuity.

These differences in political culture shape the dilemmas of the democratization process in Brazil and Argentina. In Brazil, the outstanding problem facing a full democratization is breaking
the oligarchic pattern of authoritarian politics. In Argentina, it is overcoming the authoritarian factionalism which has been responsible for such instability and violence.

Because the nature of the preceding regime strongly affects the possibility for and dilemmas of any transition to democracy, it is also necessary to analyze some of the outstanding features of these regimes. The Brazilian military regime came to power in April 1964 and is still overseeing the transition to democracy, while the Argentine military regime lasted from March 1976 to December 1983. Both "bureaucratic-authoritarian" regimes were clearly and most decisively anti-Communist and "anti-subversive," and they were opposed to the populist regimes which preceded military rule. Both were technocratic, favored social and political stability, and emphasized economic order. They were nationalistic and hoped to transform their respective societies into intermediate powers in the world system, partially by developing the military--industrial complex. Finally, both regimes attempted to transform and deepen the capitalist system. The Brazilian model was based on the expansion of modern, efficient, and competitive firms; the internationalization of the economy; the expansion of the state's role in the economy; and the growth of a consumer society. The Argentine model attempted to overcome political obstacles to capitalist transformation, especially by destroying the trade unions and sharply curtailing protectionism. Like the Brazilian model, it promoted
the internationalization of the economy, especially through the financial sector.

Despite some similarities, the differences between the two military regimes were notable. Although the Brazilian regime became internationally notorious for its use of torture, especially during the 1968-1974 period, compared to the Argentine regime it used selective repression. The repression was primarily aimed at the left and popular leaders, and it had a reactive character; in general terms, although the regime resorted to violence to destroy the left and limit the opposition, it did not exalt violence. Shortly after the regime had decimated the left, the use of torture declined. By best accounts, the number of political killings was limited to the hundreds. The difference in the level of violence employed by the Brazilian and Argentine military is linked to the nature of the "previous threat." The Brazilian military regime displaced a reformist populist regime, but it never faced a major revolutionary threat, notwithstanding the emergence of a guerrilla opposition in the late 1960s. By contrast, during the 1969-76 period Argentina had massive popular mobilization and even insurrection, one of the strongest urban guerrilla forces in recent world history, and social disintegration and economic chaos (1975-76).

The Brazilian regime allowed for some institutional continuity in relation to the populist regime which preceded it. There continued to be restricted competitive elections for most
state and local authorities. The old political parties were abolished in 1965, but the regime created two new parties, a government party (ARENA) and an opposition one (MDB). While the MDB had limited legitimacy for several years, beginning around 1973 it assumed a genuine opposition profile. Albeit with minimal power and semi-competitive elections, Congress functioned during almost the whole period. Although the military formed the cornerstone, the regime included many civilian technocrats in upper echelon positions.

A fundamental pillar of the Brazilian regime was its economic success. The regime initiated rapid industrialization and modernization of many rural areas. Based on an income concentrating model, the Brazilian economy expanded at one of the fastest rates in the world between 1967 and 1980. The economic success helped produce widespread support among the upper and middle strata of society which directly benefitted from the expansion. The regime also attracted the support of the popular classes in the country's poorest regions, largely through the use of clientelistic practices. This level of success and legitimation would have important implications for the regime transition.

The pervasive and arbitrary use of violence was the most salient characteristic of the Argentine regime. The military began with an attempt to exterminate the left and destroy the unions. The regime killed over 10,000 people between 1976 and 1978, and hundreds of thousands emigrated. In contrast to the
Brazilian regime, the Argentine military used violence for its own sake; the concentration camps took this violence to its utmost extreme. A primary objective of this terror was to destroy previous political and social identities. Seeking a profound rupture in political life, the regime developed an ideology of "purifying" and recreating the nation. It completely suppressed most of the previous institutional system (parties, unions, the electoral system, many professional associations), and severely attacked and altered other parts (the judiciary, universities). The military arrogated full powers, essentially dismissed the Constitution, and with few exceptions excluded civilians from high positions in the state. Coupled with an extreme nationalism and bellicose foreign policy. These characteristics brought the Argentine regime close to a form of totalitarianism. The combination of nationalism and militarism almost led to a war with Chile in 1978 and then did lead to the war with England in 1982.

The Argentine regime differed markedly from the Brazilian in its economic project. Inspired by orthodox "Chicago" monetarist policies, the regime attempted to create an economy thoroughly dominated by market logic and open to the international market. The regime promoted the development of the military and nuclear industries, but in all other respects its economic policies were a stunning failure. After temporarily lowering the inflation rate, it courted economic disaster. Industry declined, specu-
lation flourished, massive amounts of capital flowed the country, and the standard of living fell.

When it came to power, the Argentine military enjoyed considerable success because of the preceding vacuum of power and economic crisis. It won spectacular but ephemeral support with its foreign military adventures in 1978 and 1982, and the brief lived economic upsurge of 1977-1979 also elicited some support. After the economic crisis emerged in 1980, support declined sharply, leading to the regime's attempt to regain legitimation through the Malvinas-Falklands war.

**Limited Transition from Above: Brazil**

The next two sections discuss the capacity of the authoritarian elite to control the transition processes. The Brazilian liberalization process has been characterized by oscillations between regime and opposition initiatives. The regime began the process, but political liberalization implied concessions which at some moments the opposition successfully exploited so as to expand liberalization beyond the government's intents. Nevertheless, a notable feature about Brazilian liberalization has been the government's capacity to rebound after these moments of opposition initiative and reassert a significant level of control.

Liberalization began around 1974 at the initiative of the regime elites, who considered the moment favorable for a political opening. The military had decimated the guerrilla left, the popular movements were under control, the government did not face any radical opposition, and it had significant
support in civil society. The economic miracle not only bolstered regime support, it also led to a feeling of confidence that the economy was in good hands and could withstand some minor changes in the political system. These factors gave the regime confidence that it could open the system at a low risk. Furthermore, opening the system could release some tensions created by the years of tighter authoritarian control. In particular, it might help ameliorate tensions within the armed forces, tensions which were particularly acute during periods of presidential succession. Also important during this early phase was the partial erosion of support of leading sectors of the industrial bourgeoisie, as they began to favor a more open, less statist regime around 1974.

During their inaugural periods, authoritarian regimes can seek legitimacy primarily on the basis of restoring order and of their "anti" appeals: anti-communism, anti-subversive, anti-chaos. The Brazilian regime made these appeals quite successfully for some time, but by 1974 order had been restored for several years. The regime began to turn to symbols of national aggrandizement and economic prosperity for legitimation, but in the aftermath of the unequivocal establishment of order, it faced the question of long term institutionalization of power or, conversely, of beginning to liberalize. Since from the inception its primary thrust had been to return to democracy once it had accomplished certain key objectives, it lacked the bases for attempting to institutionalize an authoritarian order. In
this sense, the firm opposition of the institution which compels unparalleled moral authority in the society, the Catholic Church, was critical in limiting possibilities for authoritarian rule. While the Church's opposition to the regime was not directly responsible for policy changes, it helped set parameters which would have been difficult for the regime to break. Beginning around 1974, the regime began to decrease its use of repression, and censorship of the media also relaxed somewhat.

While the regime initiated the abertura, it has not controlled all moments of the process. An important step came in the 1974 elections, when the opposition did far better than expected, thereby deepening hopes of liberalization. The 1974 elections, a surprise to regime and opposition alike, showed more pervasive opposition than expected, especially in the country's most developed regions which had been the primary economic beneficiaries of development. But as it would do time and time again, the regime devised a response that would enable it to perpetuate important aspects of authoritarian rule, even while continuing the process of political liberalization. In 1976, the government passed a law which restricted the opposition's use of the media, thereby helping the regime's performance in the municipal elections. Then in April 1977, aware that its chances in the November 1978 elections were not very promising, it closed Congress to reform the constitution to change the electoral laws. The new system allowed for indirect election of one federal senator per state under conditions which almost guaranteed a
government party victory. Representation, which had previously been based on the size of the electorate, was now made dependent on the total population as a means of favoring the states (controlled by the government) where the electorate was small relative to the population. The April "package" also established a maximum number of representatives per state to limit the representatives from the state of Sao Paulo, where the opposition has had large majorities, and a minimum number to favor the least populous states. Finally, the package changed the electoral college for the election of president to include six representatives from the state assemblies, who were given equal weight regardless of the state's population, again, to discriminate against the populous states where the government had fared poorly. These changes enabled the government party to do better in 1978 than in 1974 and to strengthen it for the presidential elections scheduled for 1984.

The next unexpected challenge to the regime came from the increase in popular mobilization between 1977 and 1980. Initially, the popular sectors were largely excluded from the liberalization, but the process of popular organization and mobilization began to increase in 1977. Worker and peasant unions, neighborhood associations, and other popular organizations flourished after many years of repression. The series of auto workers' strikes in Greater Sao Paulo between 1978 and 1980 marked the high point of popular mobilization. These strikes caught the regime by surprise, for the 1978 strike was the first
one in a decade. The government faced a seemingly difficult situation: how to respond to what it perceived as a threat during a period when it was attempting to diminish the level of repression and to win popular support for elections. It responded with notable sagacity and success, using a pattern of cooptation where possible and repression where necessary. The strategy of cooptation involved traditional clientelistic concessions to the popular sectors. In other cases, especially the auto workers' strikes, the government resorted to repression as a means of making clear the limits of what was allowed. In response to the economic crisis which set in after 1980, the almost inevitable dampening of enthusiasm after an intense initial period of reactivation, the government's success in coopting some parts of the popular classes and isolating the most combative movements, after 1980 popular mobilization declined somewhat.

At the end of the Geisel and beginning of the Figueiredo administration, the regime again assumed the initiative in proposing a number of important reforms. Frequently it detected demands from civil society, beat the opposition to articulating these demands, and presented proposals which limited the nature of the changes. Institutionally, the government managed to maintain the initiative from 1977 until 1980. In 1978, Institutional Act V, which had given the executive extraordinary powers since December 1968 and had marked the beginning of the most repressive period, was abrogated in a measure which reestablished parliamentary immunities. That year and the following marked the
consolidation of reestablishment of important civil liberties and public freedoms. In 1979, amnesty was granted to former political exiles, and in December 1979 the regime reformed the party system.

The opposition parties began to reorganize in 1980, presenting a new challenge to the regime. The party reform went beyond the expectations of the regime for two main reasons. First, the government had not foreseen the creation of the Workers Party (PT), a leftist party which had considerable impact in the political debate. Second, it had expected the emergence of a centrist party with which the government party could form an alliance. The centrist Popular Party emerged, but it quickly developed an opposition profile that surprised the government, creating fears of massive losses in the November 1982 elections.

The regime responded to the new dilemma with the November 1981 "electoral package," which prohibited electoral alliances and imposed a straight party ticket to strengthen the PDS's possibilities. The opposition responded quickly to this measure; the two largest parties overcame numerous legal obstacles to merge into a single party, thereby creating new dilemmas for the government. The end result was to redefine the system in a biparty direction in most states. The regime accommodated itself to the new situation and competed in the 1982 elections, albeit aided by fraud in some states. The November 1982 elections marked a new period in the liberalization process. The opposition won most of the major states, and despite the severe
economic crisis, the elections created a sense of optimism about the continuation of liberalization. Yet the elections also underscored the government's continuing ability to preserve significant arenas of domination and control. The PDS won a majority of the states and also won a majority in the electoral college which would determine the January 1985 presidential elections, thereby virtually winning the 1985 elections 2 years before they occurred.

In late 1983, a new period of regime erosion and opposition ascension began. In October 1983, the PDS helped overturn a succession of wage adjustment proposals coming from the government, marking one of the first times large numbers of PDS leaders had voted against the regime. In October, several PDS governors announced their support for direct elections for president, again in opposition to the regime. In December, President Figueiredo decided against controlling the presidential succession process, deepening the crisis of authority within the regime. Subsequently, three regime candidates for president emerged, with marked differences between them, especially regarding the question of direct elections for president. The fact that the Vice President, Aureliano Chaves, supported direct elections in opposition to Figueiredo's predilection, underscored declining cohesion within the regime.

While the opposition was relatively acquiescent regarding socio-economic policies, beginning January 1984 it demonstrated a surprising capacity to mobilize in favor of direct elections for
president. The campaign for direct elections brought together all the opposition parties, which meant not only numerical strength, but also an alliance between the middle class and popular components of the opposition. The campaign strengthened the position of the more combative elements in the PMDB and succeeded in mobilizing millions of people. The only comparable period of political mobilization in Brazil occurred in favor of the 1964 coup, and even on that occasion the mobilization did not extend to so many cities. Argentine civil society failed to produce a similar mobilization for elections in the aftermath of the Malvinas/Falklands defeat, despite the history of higher levels of mobilization. Given the Brazilian regime's past history of alternative periods of erosion and successes, the events of October 1983 to April 1984 did not necessarily imply a definitive decline of the military regime, but they did mark the first time since 1968 that the regime simultaneously lost the initiative at both the elite and popular levels. The mobilization also strengthened the likelihood of the victory of the regime moderates over the more authoritarian tendencies concerning the scheduling of elections. The authoritarians wanted to postpone direct elections until 1990, and the moderates proposed negotiations for further democratization, including direct elections in 1986 or 1988.
In sum, then, the Brazilian regime has demonstrated a remarkable capacity to control key aspects of the transition to democracy. It is an exceptionally flexible and sagacious authoritarian regime, with a notable capacity to use the traditional Brazilian system of political accommodation—incorporating some new elements into the political system while controlling and excluding others which are perceived as a threat. There is no clearer indication of the regime's capacity for accommodation and political engineering than the fact that it has successfully organized one of the two major political parties. Almost all authoritarian regimes attempt to do so, but few succeed.

While the regime's political engineering has been one of the outstanding factors behind its capacity to control important aspects of the transition process, other factors have contributed to the limited character of democratization in Brazil. Two decades of authoritarian political rule have not changed Brazil's elitist social relations. The predominance of elitist social relations and an inegalitarian society have been a major obstacle to a fuller democratization.

Two factors related to the current conjuncture of the liberalization process also should be mentioned. First, the severe economic crisis has had a limiting effect on political democratization. While such an effect is not inevitable, the economic crisis has restricted the arena of political choice, especially in the case of a huge external debt, which has subjected the country to specific policies and objectives as a
condition for further loans to repay the debt. These policies have had an anti-popular and recessionary effect, thereby making difficult the extension of democratization to the popular classes. They have also demanded an increase in exports to pay for the debt, and in Brazil, export expansion has been linked to an inegalitarian model of development.

Finally, and related to the first point, since the November 1982 elections the opposition has moved in a more conservative, cautious direction on socio-economic questions. The old opposition party, the MDB, gradually developed the profile of an authentic opposition between 1974 and 1979, when party reorganization occurred. With party reorganization, during an initial period, the PMDB became more critical in its opposition stance. However, beginning with the merger between the PP and PMDB in March 1982, the opposition started becoming more cautious. In order to accommodate the PP and to respond to the government's November 1981 electoral package, the PMDB began to focus more on elections and less on economic development. This incipient tendency became clear after November 1982. The government's statement about the profundity of the debt crisis occurred shortly after the elections and had a dampening effect on the opposition's perspectives on economic policy. The PMDB generally accepted the view that the crisis required recessionary measures. In addition, in the states where the PMDB won the elections, coming to power had a conservative effect. The question tended to become how to keep power rather than how to implement signif-
significant socio-economic reform. The decline of popular movements, the regime's capacity to marginalize the popular sectors, and the inability of the parties to channel popular demands also contributed to the PMDB's move in a more cautious direction. When the popular movements declined, the PMDB felt less pressure and inclination to respond to questions about popular living standards and participation.

The vast mobilization for direct elections in the first months of 1984 gave some indications of changing dynamics of the opposition. This mobilization exceeded the expectations of the opposition parties. By bringing the popular sectors back into the political process and shattering—at least ephemerally—the traditional Brazilian pattern of elite style negotiation, the campaign for direct elections may have begun a new period of reinvigorating the opposition.

Unpredictable Transition after Collapse: Argentina

The general profile of the Argentina transition has been close to the ideal type of transition after the collapse of the authoritarian regime. The crisis of the Argentine military regime became apparent in 1981. The regime had always attempted to win legitimacy on the basis of its economic record, but by 1981 the economic situation deteriorated severely. The formation of a multi-party front in May 1981 marked a new point in the opposition, despite its limited and elite character. In November and December, military opposition to President Viola and his attempts at limited political liberalization led to the coup
which brought Galtieri to power. At this point, the labor movement became an important part of the opposition, leading a large demonstration against the government on March 30, 1982, on the eve of the Malvinas-Falklands invasion.

The Malvinas-Falklands war was a decisive turning point in the Argentine regime. After having lost its capacity to win support on economic grounds, the regime attempted to regain legitimation through nationalistic militarism. Indeed, it was successful at winning the support of the majority of the population until the very end of the war, which marked the high point in support for the regimes. Because of fear and because of the success of the nationalistic and militaristic appeals, there was a virtual absence of public criticism. The produced a dramatic collapse in the regime's legitimacy and an internal crisis in the armed forces.

The military attempted to control the Argentine transition, and during an initial period (June to December 1982) it was relatively successful. The period between June and December 1982 was generally characterized by a state of political passivity and social confusion which allowed the military to remain in power. Because of the absence of protest about the Malvinas/Falklands war, no major political parties emerged as capable of immediately assuming power despite the deep delegitimation of the armed forces. In this sense, the Argentine transition differs from the Greek case, where the transition was also initiated because of defeat in external war, but where the transfer to civilians was
immediate. Notwithstanding the deep internal crisis, the Argentine military stayed in power, even though the junta, which included all three branches of the armed forces, was dissolved. The demand for an immediate return to civilian rule was relatively weak.

The military also attempted to control the timing and duration of the transition. At the conclusion of the war, the regime stated that it would hold elections in approximately two years, whereas the democratic opposition wanted elections to be held in early 1983. The regime also refused to commit itself to a specific election date or schedule. Parties were allowed to reorganize, but the multiparty front continued to be cautious and did not encourage mobilization. The parties started to reorganize shortly after the end of the war, and the human rights efforts gradually expanded.

The period of relatively successful regime control over the transition ended in December 1982, when a new period of attempting to negotiate the future began. The change in the relationship between government and opposition reflected the military's lack of legitimacy and cohesion in conjunction with the growing mobilization against the regime. In September 1982, the first large public demonstration in support of the human rights groups and their demands occurred. In November 1982, individuals in Greater Buenos Aires formed a movement to cease paying taxes to what they perceived an illegitimate government. In December 1982, the opposition came alive with the first suc-
cessful general strike under the military regime (December 6) and then with a major demonstration for democracy (December 16). In response, in February 1983 President Bignone announced that elections would be held in October, and the winners would take office in January 1984. The schedule thus partially met the demands of the opposition and marked a first step in the regime's declining ability to impose its timing and rules of the game. Not only did the regime have to schedule elections earlier than it wanted to, it also was unable to negotiate with the parties before establishing the schedule.

The first semester of 1983 saw intense activity of the political parties, and the severe economic crisis further contributed to the regime's inability to control the transition. The electoral year was marked by other government attempts to dictate parts of the transition. The military endeavoured to establish some basic parameters for the transition, including guarantees for the armed forces themselves. The single most important feature in this regard was the Amnesty Law, which provided that no military leaders would be punished for their role in torture, killings, or corruption. One of the main instruments for attempting to ensure some basic parameters for the transition and some guarantees for the military institution was the threat of a coup, which marked the entire electoral campaign. The regime threatened that if the parties did not cooperate, it would not allow the elections. Yet it is striking how ineffective these threats were compared to the Brazilian case.
An important sign of the military's declining ability to control the transition was its manifest inability to create a party which would compete in the elections. Under presidents Viola and Galtieri, the regime had considered creating a party, but after the war it was too thoroughly discredited to do so. Whereas the Brazilian elections were marked by the competition between regime and opposition, in Argentina, once the election campaign started, the crucial competition was between Peronists and Radicals. The right, which had supported the regime, had difficulty in organizing a unified party despite distancing itself from the regime. As a result, the military was forced to attempt to negotiate with the traditional parties. It opted to negotiate principally with the Peronist Party, yet even this measure backfired. The Peronists probably lost votes because their negotiations suggested a more equivocal position on human rights issues, and the military lost by placing their bet in the wrong place.

The revival of the party system throughout 1983 helped limit the regime's attempt to control the process. The party system emerged as dynamic as ever, with a large number of affiliates, significant party mobilization, and internal elections during the first half of the year. This vital movement transferred the primary political dynamics to the party system, where the military was excluded. By the second half of 1983, as the campaign heated up, the opposition to the military regime had almost all the initiative. The regime's inability to control the
process was manifest in the fact that both major parties were very critical of the previous regime. Alfonsín and the Radicals (as well as the Intransigent Party) made clear in the campaign that they would attempt to restructure the armed forces. Far from being able to dictate the terms of the process, the military became one of the primary targets of the transition to democracy. The discrediting of the military was also reflected in a movement to abolish the draft.

The final phase of the military government was characterized by a decline in the state's capacity to regulate social life, as manifested in the loss of control of economic policy. However, it would be a mistake to exaggerate the regime's loss of control over the transition. In one crucial area, the use of violence, the military government maintained a monopoly. Although state terrorism sharply declined in relation to earlier periods in the military government, civil society did not produce any challenges to the state's monopoly over the use of repression. The government rarely resorted to violence during this period, despite frequent recourse to the threat of violence as a means of attempting to secure better conditions for the transition. The fact that the society did not use violence to overthrow the military, coupled with the fact that the military also refrained from violence, made the transition relatively peaceful compared to many other transitions. In Spain, for example, despite the fact that Franquist elites controlled the transition, there were more incidents of violence. Considering the level of violence
during the military government and the catastrophic economic situation, the Argentine transition could easily have disintegrated into a chaotic situation. The fact that it did not suggests that there may have been a tenuous learning process in Argentina in comparison to the transition of 1971-73, when many sides of the political spectrum resorted to violence.

The electoral campaign, which stepped up in August, was marked by a self-conscious awareness of the problems of authoritarian factionalism and of the importance of democracy. If the period from late 1982 to October 1983 saw a gradual decline in the regime's capacity to control the transition, the October elections signalled a sharp drop in this capacity. Largely because of its clearer emphasis on democracy and human rights and sharper criticisms of the military, the Radical Party won an unexpectedly easy victory over the Peronists, thereby breaking the tradition that the Peronists could always win elections. While both parties emphasized a commitment to democracy more than in the past, the Peronists were hurt by the presence of some leaders known for their authoritarian tendencies. The democratic character of the elections indicated a revitalization of civil society, and Alfonsin's wide margin of victory established a legitimacy that facilitated a sharp break from the military government. After the elections, the military opted for a quicker transfer of power than had originally been scheduled. In early December, Bignone decided to promulgate a new Law of Ministries, which established the legal framework for the
Executive Power, exactly in accordance with Alfonsin's preferences and in opposition to the leaders of the armed forces. This decision became another symbol of the regime's surrender to civilian power. President Alfonsin assumed office on December 10, 1983, beginning a new phase in the Argentine transition.
Elements of Continuity and Change: Brazil and Argentina

In this section we compare some elements of continuity and change in the two cases. In cases where the authoritarian elites initiate and control much of the transition, we can expect greater continuity and a more restricted democratization. In cases of transition after collapse, we can expect more marked changes in relation to the authoritarian regime, and in most cases an attempt to democratize more quickly and fully.

Elites. Even the elites who control the Brazilian regime show a remarkable continuity. The current leaders were leaders of the coup in 1964 and have occupied important positions during most of the regime. The only period of some discontinuity was between 1969 and 1974, the most repressive years, when the hard liners assumed control of the state. Yet some members of the current cabinet, including the economic minister and the head of the cabinet, were also part of the cabinet during the 1969-1974 period. President Figueiredo, who has become known for his attempt to liberalize the country, was head of the National Information Service (SNI), the secret service apparatus which was the core part of the most repressive side of the regime. One of the regime's three potential candidates for president, Mario Andreazza, was Minister of the Interior during the most repressive period and again during the Figueiredo administration. More examples could be given, but the point is the extraordinary continuity of leaders, remarkable even when compared to the Spanish transition. In Spain, despite the fact that Franquist
elites initiated liberalization and democratization, as soon as Adolfo Suarez became head of government, there was a change in upper echelon leaders, to a younger generation.

In Argentina, there has been very little continuity of the elites at any level: federal, provincial, or municipal. The only state institutions with any meaningful continuity in elites were the judiciary and armed forces. Whereas the armed forces thoroughly dominated the military regime, the new system included a significant diversity of civilian elites. In fact, this diversity of elites exceeded that of previous open competitive elections (1946, 1973) in the post-war era in that a true bipartisan system was established, with the Peronists controlling half the provincial governments and having a plurality in the Senate. The government put on trial several top leaders from the military regime because of their involvement in state terror. The policy of punishing the highest ranking military officials responsible for the state terror has been more limited than in Greece, where around thirty officers were imprisoned, and the trials have been more limited than human rights groups hoped for and expected. Nevertheless, the policy indicates some desire to redress past violations. Thus, in contrast to the Brazilian regime, where the top military leaders are still in power, some top level leaders of the Argentine regime are in prison or on trial.

Decision Arenas. One aspect of the decision arena involves the formal constitutional framework. In this regard, there is
one significant similarity: in contrast to what has happened in most transitions, neither country has had a constitutional assembly. But there are also marked differences in degrees of continuity from the authoritarian period; in Brazil, there is significant continuity, while in Argentina there is little. The Brazilian regime reformed the constitution, sometimes in illegal ways, in a more authoritarian direction, but it never did away with it. The Figueiredo government eliminated the most egregiously authoritarian aspects of the constitution but continued the practice of juridical casuistry. Thus there was some continuity both from the populist period to the military regime and from the aegis of authoritarianism to the period of liberalization and democratization.

The Argentine military regime issued the "Statute of the Process of National Reorganization," which effectively suspended the Constitution, thereby signalling a more abrupt rupture than that which occurred in Brazil. A return to any form of constitutional rule therefore implied a rupture. Yet while there was a rupture in relation to the military regime, there has been continuity in relation to past democratic traditions in Argentina, for the current Constitution, which was established in 1853, was in effect during the democratic periods of Argentine history.

In Argentina, Congress has already established a strong authority. For example, in one of the most important early votes during the Alfonsin government, the Senate voted down a law to
reform trade union structures. Despite the tenuous character of the Argentine transition, the Alfonsin government has encouraged a revitalization of representative institutions that goes beyond what Argentina has known in recent decades. This process reflects not only the president's commitment to democratic procedure, but also the fact that, in contrast to the other open competitive elections of the past four decades (1946 and 1973), there is a balance of power between the parties. The Peronist plurality in the Senate helps encourage a style of negotiations and bargaining absent in Argentina in recent decades. This balance of powers is also manifest in the composition of the Supreme Court, which for the first time since the 1930s includes judges of many political tendencies. The government has reversed the historical trend towards greater concentration of power at the federal level. Finally, it has attempted to be responsive to an amalgam of social movements, including the human rights movements.

One of the aspects of the Brazilian transition which the regime has controlled most tightly has been the style of decision making. There has been a strengthening of Congress and representative institutions, but this strengthening is more limited than in Argentina. At the federal level, the decision-making style is very closed. The executive remains powerful and has been unwilling to compromise on key issues. For example, in 1980, the executive imposed a decision to postpone the municipal elections for two years. In November 1981, Figueirdo imposed a change in
the electoral laws, again skirting Congress and the government party in doing so. As part of this pattern of diluting the character of representative institutions, the government has imposed party discipline upon the PDS, in some cases threatening to expel members who did not vote for a government project.

Until the Figueiredo period, the regime was characterized by technocratic, bureaucratic, and authoritarian decision processes. Civil society had little capacity to affect decisions, and the executive had great power. Under Figueiredo, the government moved to a more clientelistic style, but it continued to be closed, bureaucratic, and authoritarian. Whatever consideration was given to civil society occurred within the confines of the executive's office. The limited change in decision process involved a transformation from a unequivocally authoritarian style to a one which coupled authoritarian and semi-democratic practices. The autocratic decision style is particularly clearly reflected in economic policies, which have been formulated without much regard to civil society. The absence of local autonomy reinforces the weakening of representative institutions and the closed character of the decision process. Finally, the Brazilian regime has attempted to insulate itself as much as possible from social movements. Even graphically this is visible: Brasilia is an isolated capital with a history of limited political mobilization.

The Military. The Brazilian military's role in politics has changed but exhibits some points of continuity. The primary
change has been that the military institution has become more clearly separated from the military government. Presidents Geisel and Figueiredo initiated a pattern of disengaging the armed forces from government. The Figueiredo administration developed a public image which was closer to that of a civilian government than that of a military government and insisted that the armed forces return to the barracks. However, the existence of the National Information Service (SNI) has meant that the military institution still plays a major political role. The SNI, one of the most powerful information services in the world, is a state apparatus autonomous of the military services, yet controlled by military leaders who have made their career in the SNI. Its existence facilitated the separation between the military government and the armed forces as an institution, thereby enabling the military to maintain a high profile in the upper echelon of the state without politicizing the armed forces as a whole. As a result, it helped avoid the delegitimation of the armed forces which is characteristic of so many transitions from military rule. Other parts of the repressive apparatus have been partially dismantled, but the SNI has remained intact, and following the 1982 elections, DOPS (Office of Political and Social Order) was transferred from state to federal control as a means of reinforcing the regime's control over the repressive apparatus. The fact that the military no longer controls the presidential succession process is an important change but is partially offset by the fact that there has been little dis-
cussion of controlling its significant role in Brazilian politics in the foreseeable future.

Many important political measures in Brazil still require acceptance by the armed forces. Among recent transitions, the closest comparison would be Spain, where the armed forces remained an important obstacle to democratization until the failed coup in 1981. But the Brazilian military may even be in a stronger position than was the case in Spain. The Spanish military, while a powerful force in the transition, was less important as a direct actor; beginning the late 1950s, the Spanish regime gradually lost part of its military character.

No area shows so vividly the Argentine authoritarian regime's difficulties in controlling the transition and the rupture in political life as military policy. The dramatic collapse and delegitimization of the armed forces are manifest in recent survey data about public attitudes with regard to the military. The only comparable case of military collapse in recent transitions are Greece and Bolivia. The Argentine military has not been able to protect itself institutionally, nor, thus far, to be a determining factor in the political struggles.

Alfonsin has attempted to place the military under civilian control. The new government has promised to reduce the military budget, and the draft has already been reduced. The government has initiated reform of the many military schools. It has also removed from military control key institutions such as the
National Commission for Atomic Energy and a wide amalgam of military industrial firms previously under military control. This question of military policy remains a delicate balance point for the Alfonsin government. Alfonsin must equilibrate civil society's demands for justice with his desire to avoid the violent reaction which might result from a sharp attack on the armed forces.

Popular Mobilization. The space for popular mobilization also differs considerably in the two cases. The Brazilian regime successfully excluded large parts of the population and large regions of the country from the effects of political liberalization. Repression against the labor movement diminished by 1977, but the regime has continued to impose limits on popular organization and mobilization. The repression against the auto workers' strikes in Greater Sao Paulo between 1978 and 1980 was a significant example. The regime has also blocked the creation of a national labor federation, which it believes would create a more dynamic labor movement. The corporatist labor laws which have made the labor movement dependent on the state remain fully intact. The regime has also largely excluded rural areas from the impact of political liberalization. In most rural areas, the level of private and public repression against the peasants remains very high. Finally, liberalization has also been very uneven with respect to different regions of the country. Whereas the form of domination and political interaction has changed markedly in the developed parts of Southern and Southeastern
Brazil, other regions, especially the Amazon and the Northeast, remain quite repressive. In fact, according to some experts, the level of repression against peasants in the Amazon got worse rather than better during the second half of the 1970s.

The relative exclusion of the popular classes, rural areas, and the poorest parts of the country from the process of political liberalization brings up a more general point in the discussion about transitions to democracy. Most reflections about the transition process have focused on political styles in the large urban areas and on those issues which most directly affect intellectuals. In the process, there has been a tendency to overlook questions about limits of liberalization and the continuity of repressive patterns against the popular classes, in rural areas, and in certain regions. In contrast to the late 1960s and early 1970s, when democracy and institutional questions were devalued, the recent trend has focused too much on formal democratic institutions and neglected authoritarian patterns outside the large urban areas. Democracy, which had been devalued, has virtually become the only value in some discussion about the transition, while questions about repression against the popular sectors, agrarian reform, popular participation, and regional equity have been neglected. Ultimately, however, the quality of a democracy depends not only on institutional change in the urban areas which generally shape intellectual analysis, but also upon providing access to democratic participation to the popular classes, the rural areas, and the most underdeveloped.
regions. This kind of democratic participation necessarily entails a gradual reshaping of social and economic life as well as political institutions.

In Argentina, the erosion of the military regime and the democratization undertaken by Alfonsin gradually created more space for popular mobilization. Even as the military government was collapsing, the repressive apparatus remained intact, and the popular sectors retained their fear of demonstrating against the government. Nevertheless, beginning September 1982, there were some strikes and demonstrations whose very existence marked a sharp break from the aegis of military rule. During the 1983 election campaign, the popular sectors reestablished their capacity to demonstrate.

While it is early to evaluate the Alfonsin government's relationship with the popular sectors, so far it has encouraged mobilization within legal parameters, while the Brazilian regime has actively discouraged mobilization. Labor unions, which were harshly repressed during most of the military regime, have space to organize and mobilize. The government has attempted to decentralize the union structure, while under the previous regime, labor was repressed under the centralized structures inherited from the 1940s.

*Party Systems.* The different kinds of regime transitions have also influenced the party systems. In Brazil, the main division has been between opposition parties and the regime party, while in Argentina the authoritarian regime has had no
national level political party. Paradoxically, the party system in Brazil shows strong continuity from the system which existed during the aegis of authoritarianism but discontinuity in relation to the democratic regime which preceded it, while the Argentine party system shows no continuity from the military regime, when parties were effectively suspended, but significant continuity in relation to the pre-76 period.

The Brazilian authoritarian regime had the capacity to restructure the country's party system during the past two decades; the current system bears little resemblance to that which existed before 1965. But the current government party, PDS, essentially includes the same people as its predecessor, ARENA, with the exception of a limited number of defections. The major opposition party, PMDB, even borrows its name from its predecessor, the MDB. A multiparty system emerged in three leading states (São Paulo, Rio Grande de Sul, and Rio de Janeiro), but at a national level the profile has changed little.

The Argentine military regime attempted to effect an even more radical restructuring of party life by suspending the parties, yet this endeavor failed. In the aftermath of the regime's collapse, the two parties which have been dominant since 1946 re-emerged as the most significant. There were, however, marked changes in the relative position of these two parties. Even though a generally biparty system exists in both countries at the present moment, this system differs in one other important regard. In Brazil, it is easy to align the major parties along
an ideological position; on all major issues, the PDS has more progressive positions than the PDS. In Argentina, the two major parties have more similar platforms, and there is no clear pattern between the two parties in adopting more progressive positions. Paradoxically, the Radical Party, which largely draws upon a middle class constituency, is more progressive on some key issues than the Peronist Party, whose core support comes from the working class.

**Human Rights and Repression.** Despite the many significant steps towards political liberalization, at critical moments, the Brazilian regime has been willing to resort to authoritarian measures. The repression against peasants in the Tocantins-Araguaia region and other parts of the Amazon, the repression against workers on strike, the Rio Centro bomb in 1981, and the declaration of a state of emergency in Brasilia before the vote on direct elections in April 1984 are among the significant examples during the Figueiredo administration. The National Security Law remains intact and has been used to prosecute opposition leaders at different times, and the Constitution was reformed to include a provision for declaring a state of emergency, which has also been implemented or threatened at critical moments. The regime prefers to do things democratically, but whenever necessary it will resort to more authoritarian practices. In Argentina, human rights policy shows a dramatic rupture in relation to the military government. The Alfonsin administration has made a clear commitment to
protecting civil liberties and human rights, and the nation has become a member of the Inter-American Court of Justice, putting questions of human rights under international jurisdiction.

**Economic Policy.** Both countries are in the midst of terrible economic crises, and there may be significant similarities in economic policy, resulting from IMF supported stabilizataion plans. In both situations, the debate about economic policy is largely determined by the foreign debt. Furthermore, in both countries there has been significant continuity in economic policy over the past few years.

In Argentina, the economy is the most significant policy area where there has been significant continuity from the old regime. This continuity results from the extraordinary crisis, as manifested in the fantastic inflation rate, of the external debt, and the fiscal deficit. The government spent the first several months without developing a clear response to the crisis. When it finally attempted to address the situation, an impasse emerged, with some people proposing an IMF style stabilization plan and others favoring a less recessive project which would confront the international banks. In Brazil, there is significant continuity in relation to economic policies and even in relation to who makes those policies. The regime attempts to win more favorable conditions, but it unequivocally considers the debt legitimate. Some sectors of the PMDB have adopted a more critical position, but in general terms even the opposition considers the debt largely legitimate.
However, even in regard to economic policy there are differences. In Argentina, the policies of the military regime are considered illegitimate, and despite the current impasse, there is a clear break in relation to policies of the 1976-1982 period, when the debt rose at an astronomical rate. In Brazil, by contrast, the authoritarian regime's economic policies had a fairly high level of legitimacy, until 1980, notwithstanding the many criticisms leveled against those policies. According to some conventional measures (GDP growth, for example), the Brazilian regime was quite successful, while the Argentine regime was an unqualified disaster. Although Alfonsin thus far has failed to impose favorable negotiating conditions regarding the external debt, the regime's discourse has been bolder than that in Brazil, where attempts to win more favorable conditions have been pursued in strictly diplomatic channels. The debate about economic policy is more open ended (and less resolved) in Argentina. The regime would like to favor the popular sectors, whose standard of living deteriorated under the military regime, but the situation imposes sharp limits. The fact that business interests generally voted for Alfonsin tends to influence economic policy in a more conservative direction. There is a possibility of more heterodox approaches to managing the Argentine crisis, despite the support of some economic advisors for conventional stabilization measures. By contrast, in Brazil since 1982 the debate about economic policy has become fairly restricted, with more limited challenges to IMF orthodoxy.
**Foreign Policy, Culture, and Education.** In foreign policy, the Alfonsin regime is committed to peace and international cooperation, in sharp contrast to the militaristic and bellicose expansionism of the military regime. Alfonsin accelerated negotiations with Chile, coming close to agreeing with positions suggested by international arbitrators but rejected during military regime. The government has also outlined a proposal for initiating negotiations with England over the Malvinas/Falklands. In dramatic contrast to the military regime, Alfonsin's foreign policy has displayed a strong commitment to human rights, democracy, and disarmament. The military regime conflicted with the Carter administration over human rights issues, gave support to Reagan's bellicose adventures in Central America, and supported the Bolivian coup in 1980. By contrast, the Alfonsin government has adopted a policy of non-alignment, while considering itself part of the West and the South. The commitment to human rights has been manifested in the signing of the Interamerican Treaty of Human Rights and a rejection of self-interested pragmatism in favor of a more principled stand for democratic regimes.

Brazilian foreign policy shows a much higher level of continuity. Indeed, in recent decades Brazilian foreign policy has been fairly stable, while in Argentina it has depended more on regime change. The Brazilian Foreign Affairs Office (Itamarati) has historically operated with a significant level of autonomy with respect to regime changes. During the process of
political liberalization, foreign policy has become more assertive of Brazil's autonomy vis-a-vis the United States. Like Argentina, Brazil has an independent foreign policy, but it is more pragmatic, more closely linked to the United States despite criticisms of U.S. policy in Central America, and silent about violations of human rights in other countries.

Both countries have experienced a significant change in cultural and education policy. In Brazil, no area more clearly reflects the positive aspects of political liberalization than culture and education. After years of censorship and repression against institutions of higher education, Figueiredo promoted significant liberalization. He appointed a young liberal university professor as Minister of Education, brought an end to censorship, allowed university professors who had been dismissed for political reasons to reapply for their old jobs, ended the open presence of the security apparatus in the universities, permitted increasing university autonomy, and tolerated unionization and even strikes among teachers and professors.

Argentina experienced an even sharper change in cultural and educational policy. Alfonsin brought an end to censorship, allowed space for student organization, granted greater autonomy to the universities, changed the curriculum in the schools to emphasize human rights values, and allowed for the possibility of re integrating professors and teachers who had been fired for political reasons. Some people have been disappointed with the
limited resources for cultural and educational programs, but the change in relation to the military government is clear.
Prospects and Dilemmas of Democracy

In the preceding sections we have discussed various differences between the transitions towards democracy as they have occurred so far. In this concluding section we speculate about prospects and dilemmas of democracy in the two countries.

The Brazilian transition is already ten years old and has a reasonably established profile. In significant regards, the transition continues to be controlled from above, notwithstanding the areas in which the opposition has pushed the regime into deeper reforms than it initially planned. It has been a remarkably stable transition despite opposition hopes for more rapid change and despite threats from the "hardliners" to close the system and end the process of liberalization. Indeed, in comparative perspective, the ability of the regime to institutionalize elements of authoritarian rule in a more liberal system, the stability of the past decade, and the duration of the transition stand out. Between Franco's death in November 1975 and the June 1977 elections, the Spanish transition went farther than the Brazilian transition has in a decade.

Major pillars of the Brazilian regime remain committed to a semi-democratic system. The armed forces may relinquish power to civilians, but they maintain a high degree of autonomy vis-a-vis the government and are committed to preserving elements of authoritarian rule. As in Spain, the Brazilian authoritarian regime successfully created a mass party. In Spain, the UCD (Union of the Democratic Center) was committed to democracy, and
the most authoritarian regime followers voted for the Popular Alliance CAP), which failed to attract mass support. By contrast, the dissolution of ARENA into the PDS in January 1980 marked the demise of the government party’s most markedly authoritarian elements, but did not lead to a full commitment to democracy. Finally, most regional elites continue to favor a semi-democratic or openly authoritarian system. While all transitions to democracy occur in the presence of some semi-democratic and authoritarian actors, the force and magnitude of these actors in Brazil is a major deterrent to the construction of a liberal democracy.

In the South and Center South, especially the states of Sao Paulo and Rio Grande do Sul, there has been some transformation of political culture and political life. In these states, where the social movements are strongest, the prevalent political style is no longer authoritarian. Yet despite the fact that Brazil’s most modernized states have changed their political style, at the federal level the changes are slow in coming. The federal bureaucracy, where the authoritarians and semi-democratic conservatives still prevail, retains a high degree of autonomy. The regime as a whole has displayed a remarkable capacity continue the Brazilian tradition of coopting and accommodating some sectors while preserving an elitist system.

A full democratization process in Brazil will need to challenge several pillars of the authoritarian system. First, it must change the style and content of economic policy in a
period when the space for manoeuvring is limited because of the external debt. Despite political liberalization, the regime has maintained a closed process of economic decision making. Second, the sharp gap which characterizes the differences between federal politics and the politics of the most developed states will have to disappear or diminish. The regime has allowed democratization at the state level but has successfully retained control at the federal level. One of the specificities of the Brazilian transition is precisely this gap between the federal and state level. The impact of the democratization process will remain limited if the opposition cannot challenge the federal level. This will entail strengthening the parliament and curtailing the executive's authority. Third, a full democratization process would need to challenge the dominant pattern of social elitism. The huge gap between the marginalized masses and the technocratic, modernized sectors of society would have to diminish. The highly unequal pattern of income distribution which has encouraged mass marginalization would also need to change. While it is not impossible, it is difficult for a democracy to exist under conditions of such high socio-economic inequality and mass poverty. In this regard, the democratization process has been very limited, even in the states where the opposition controls the government. Finally, a full democratization process would need to find means to submit the armed forces to civilian control. The armed forces control less of the political process today than a decade ago, but they continue to be a very important
political force, with significant autonomy. Yet so far, there have been no proposals to submit the armed forces to closer civilian control, and it does not seem likely that one will appear in the near future.

Despite the regime's capacity to perpetuate mechanisms of authoritarian control, the Brazilian transition is still open ended. Some cracks continue to exist in the authoritarian system, and the opposition may be able to exploit these cracks. The movement for direct elections helped delegitimize the regime and reopened the possibility of a sharper break from the authoritarian past. It pushed the government into making meaningful concessions and strengthened the position of the opposition forces committed to a full democratization. The current struggle is to define the combination of elements from semi-democratic and liberal democracy while attempting to avert an authoritarian involution.

Where the Brazilian transition is already a decade old and has some relatively well defined features which make possible some reasonable guesses about the future, the Argentine transition is much younger, has proceeded more quickly, and is far more difficult to foresee. The relationship between authoritarians, semi-democrats, and democrats, and the possibilities for developing a democratic political culture are open questions. Nevertheless, it is possible to identify three general and related conditions which will play a significant role in determining the outcome of the transition.
A first major issue which will affect the transition is the extent to which the authoritarians are effectively marginalized and the semi-democrats are converted. Some positive signs exist in this direction; Alfonsin's election represented an unequivocal victory for the liberal democrats, and during his first months in power, the human rights organizations rather than the authoritarians presented him his greatest challenge. The military, the outstanding authoritarian actor, and the unions, the most vociferous element of the semi-democrats, suffered a major temporary setback with Alfonsin's election. During the campaign Alfonsin made it clear that he intended to attack the authoritarian elements in the armed forces and labor unions. Furthermore, the Peronists' stunning defeat could encourage a conversion in a more democratic direction; the party's debates in the aftermath of the defeat clearly raised this question.

The marginalization of the authoritarians and semi-democrats is essential if Argentina is to develop a stable democracy. While the early moments of Alfonsin's government have produced some promising signs, nobody knows how far the democratic transformation of different social actors will go. The demise of the military regime and the temporary defeat of the armed forces should not obfuscate the fact that the values which made possible the support for authoritarianism have not disappeared. Furthermore, another traditional bastion of authoritarianism, dominant class institutions such as the Argentine Rural Society (SRA), the Argentine Industrial Union (UIA), the Stock Exchange, the
Argentine Rural Confederation (CRA), and the Bank Association of Argentina remain fully intact. The Catholic Church, another traditional bulwark of authoritarianism, is also intact and shows no signs of dramatic conversion to democratic values.

Second, the factionalism which has been the core of Argentine authoritarianism may survive. To some extent, the factionalism will depend on the marginalization of the authoritarians, as noted above. Strong social movements could help change the factionalism by encouraging diversity and overcoming the idea of cultural homogeneity which has inspired the various authoritarian experiments.

A third factor which will affect Argentina's political prospects is the extent to which the Alfonsín government furthers the current sense of the legitimacy of democratic institutions. Alfonsín's leadership skills will be important in this regard, for especially in periods of transitions to democracy, the role of leadership is crucial. Effective leadership will help institutionalize democratic practices, while poor leadership could once again erode the current hopes for democracy.

One of the questions which will affect the legitimacy of the democratic regime is its efficiency. Inefficiency helped destroy democracy in the past, especially in the 1973-75 period, and in recent decades, the Argentine social consciousness has linked democracy to inefficiency. The disastrous results of the military regime broke that linkage, and at least for now there is a high tolerance of inefficiency and an acceptance of some re-
strictions. Given the widespread awareness about the profundity of the current crisis, nobody expects miracles, marking a change in expectations in relation to previous democratic governments. Nevertheless, over a period of time the government's capacity to deal efficiently with a wide range of economic, social, and political problems will affect the way different actors perceive the desirability of democracy.

Having outlined some of the major factors which will determine the future correlation between authoritarians, semi-democrats, and democrats, we must emphasize again that the outcome of this struggle is very open ended, more so than in Brazil. Whereas in the Brazilian case a marginalization of authoritarians seems highly unlikely in the foreseeable future, in Argentina, a more fully democratic outcome remains possible, as does an authoritarian involution.

Paradoxically, Argentina's great hope lies in the fact that its history has been so tragic. The catastrophic episodes of the recently deposed military government, in combination with the country's long term problems, may encourage different political forces to develop more democratic values. In this sense, Argentina is in a unique historic movement, for alongside the formidable obstacles to creating a democratic regime, there seems to be a democratic temper which the country has not known in the past. It is important to note that democracy does not require that all citizens and political forces be committed to democracy; for if this were the case, no democratic regime would ever have
emerged. Restricted democracy would imply a limited conversion of the unions and Peronist party to democratic values, a limited challenge to the big bourgeoisie, and a limited transformation of the military. In a liberal democracy, the democratic penetration of the unions, Peronists, bourgeoisie, and armed forces would be significant. The traditional parties (Radical and Peronists) would dominate the political arena, though probably not in a biparty system, and the Peronists would become committed to democratic rules of the game. A progressive democracy would entail a full marginalization of the authoritarian elements, a proliferation of social movements, and increasing diversity in political life, including the party system. Although this scenario is unlikely, it is possible for the first time in Argentine history, and would represent a qualitatively different style of democracy than Latin America has known in the past.


3. In other contexts, the term democratization could be used differently, for example, to refer to the expansion of democracy under democratic political regime.

4. An article which makes significant contributions to the comparative study of transitions is Juan J. Linz, "Some Comparative Thoughts on the Transition to Democracy in Portugal and Spain," in Jorge Draga do Macedo and Simon Serfaty, eds., *Portugal Since the Revolution: Economic and Political Perspectives* (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1981), 25-45. Alfred Stepan is currently engaged in a work on comparative transitions, including both the cases analyzed here. He shared with us a preliminary paper, "Civil Society and the State: Patterns of Resistance to Domination in the Southern Cone."

5. Nor do we discuss revolutionary transitions to democracy. The Bolshevik Revolution created a new paradigm which was fundamentally hostile to the institutions of liberal democracy. Despite the fact that many revolutionary leaders have had democratic ideals, the Bolshevik paradigm became the fundamental reference point for most subsequent revolutionary movements. With rare exceptions, revolutionary regimes have not been favorable to democratic institutions. Yet despite the authoritarian or totalitarian
record of most revolutionary regimes, the possibility of combining revolution and democracy cannot be dismissed a priori. In fact, since the 1970s, significant parts of the left in Europe and South America have reflected about the importance of democracy in a revolutionary situation.


8. A regime collapse is more dramatic than a breakdown, but for the purposes of classifying transitions, we lump the two categories together here. Collapse more fully captures the 1982-83 Argentine process.


11. While influenced by Linz's work on "Some Comparative Thoughts on the Transition to Democracy in Portugal and Spain," here we emphasize more the significance of previous political traditions than he does. Nevertheless, we recognize that regime transitions offer some possibility of a break from these previous traditions.

12. On these general patterns in Brazilian political culture, see Raimundo Faoro, Os Donos do Poder (Porto Alegre: Globo, 1958). On the weakness of liberal institutions in Brazil, see Wanderley Guilherme Dos Santos, Ordem Burguesa e Liberalismo Politico (Sao Paulo: Duas Cidades, 1978). For an important recent contribution, see Simon Schwartzman, Bases do Autoritarismo no Brasil (Rio de Janeiro: Campus, 1982).


23. There is an extensive bibliography on the Brazilian military regime. Among the most important sources are Peter Flynn, Brazil: A Political Analysis (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1979), 308-515; Stepan, ed., Authoritarian Brazil; Alfred Stepan, The Military in Politics: Changing Patterns in Brazil (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1971); Thomas


27. A rich literature is emerging on the liberalization process. Among the most important overviews and interpretations are Fernando Henrique Cardoso, Autoritarismo e Democrazia (Rio de Janeiro: Paz e Terra, 1975); Walther Guillerme dos Santos, Poder e Politica: Cronica do Autoritarismo Brasileiro (Rio de Janeiro: Forense-Universitaria, 1978); Bolivar Lamounier, "O Discurso e o Processo: Da Distensao as

28. On the regime's changing attempts to seek legitimation, see Lamounier, "O Discurso e o Processo."

29. On the regime's difficulties in creating the long term bases for stable authoritarian rule, see the prescient article by Juan Linz, "The Future of an Authoritarian Situation or the Institutionalization of an Authoritarian Regime: The Case of Brazil," in Stepan, ed., Authoritarian Brazil, 233-254. Writing at the same time, Philippe Schmitter also signaled some of the difficulties of long term institutionalization, although his assessment differed from Linz's. See "The "Portugalization" of Brazil?" in Stepan, ed., Authoritarian Brazil, 179-232.


34. For a preliminary analysis of the 1982 elections, see Robert Wesson and David Fleischer, Brazil in Transition (New York: Praeger, 1983), 109-120.


36. For various analyses of the economic crisis, see Maria da Conceicao Tavares and Mauricio Dias David, eds., A Economia Politica da Crise (Rio de Janeiro: Vozes/Achfane, 1982); Lessa, et. al., Desenvolvimento Capitalista no Brasil.


39. One of the slogans during the 1983 campaign reflected this (at least temporary) repudiation of violence: "Se va a acabar la dictadura militar; se va a acabar esa costumbre de matar." (The military dictatorship is going to end; the custom of killing is going to end).

40. This generational change is documented in Share, "Transition through Transaction: The Politics of Democratization in Spain."

41. The fact that Karamanlis is a more conservative leader than Alfonsin gave him more authority for dealing with the Armed Forces in such a way that they did not feel structurally threatened.

42. The distinction between military as government and military as institution exists in varying degrees under all military regimes. On this question, see Alfred Stepan, The Military in Politics: Changing Patterns in Brazil (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1971), 253-266.

43. For example, 65% of the people polled in one survey believed ex-President Videla deserved a death sentence, and another 33% believed he should be condemned to life imprisonment. 57% believed the armed forces should have more limited functions and attributes, and another 43% believed they should be eliminated. Only 3% responded that the military were "patriots who think about the country," while 30% said they were Fascists, 47% stated they essentially defended their own interests, and the remaining 20% stated that they did not understand what was best for the country. An astonishing 25% said that all of the armed forces should be tried for their involvement in the "dirty war." Results are published in La Semana, March 15, 1984.

44. On the difficult question of military policy during a transition from military rule, see Alain Rouque, "Demilitarization and the Institutionalization of Military-Dominated Politics in Latin America," Latin American Program, Wilson Center, Working Paper 110 (circa 1981). Manuel Antonio Garretón analyzes other elements of the difficult legacy these destructive military regimes create

45. The impact of these corporatist structures on the labor movement has been analyzed in a number of works, including Luiz Werneck Vianna, *Liberalismo e Sindicato no Brasil* (Rio de Janeiro: Paz e Terra, 1976); Philippe Schmitter, *Interest Conflict and Political Change in Brazil* (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1971); Kenneth Mericle, "Conflict Regulation in the Brazilian Industrial Relations Systems," (Ph.D. dissertation, University of Wisconsin, 1974); Kenneth Paul Erickson, *Sindicalismo no Processo Político no Brasil* (Sao Paulo: Brasiliense, 1979).

46. See the excellent works by Jose de Souza Martins on this subject, especially *Expropiacao e Violencia: A Questao Politica no Campo* (Sao Paulo: Hucitec, 1980); and *Os Camponeses e a Politica no Brasil* (Petropolis: Vozes, 1981).


48. On the unions' situation under the military regime, see Francisco Delich, "Desmovilizacion sindical, reestructuracion obrera y cambio sindical," *Critica y Utopia* 6 (1981), 79-98.

49. This capacity of the Brazilian regime to restructure the party system stands out in comparative perspective. As Arturo and Samuel Valenzuela note, the general tendency is that "once formed, party systems have remarkable endurance." See "Party Oppositions under the Chilean Authoritarian Regime," Wilson Center Working Paper 125 (1983), 17. On this point, see also Seymour Martin Lipset and Stein Rokkan, "Cleavage Structures, Party Systems and Voter Alignments," in Lipset and Rokkan, eds., *Party Systems and Voter Alignments: Cross National Perspectives* (New York: The Free Press, 1967). It is ironical that the Argentinian regime (1976-83) and most likely the Chilean one failed in their attempt to wipe out former party identities, where the Brazilian regime, which was far less ambitious in this sense, succeeded. For an interesting interpretation of elements of continuity and change in Brazil's party system, see Glaucio Soares, "El sistema politico brasileño: Nuevos partidos y viejas divisiones," *Revista Mexicana de Sociología* XLIV (July-September 1982), 929-960.
50. On the continuation of repression against peasants, see Souza Martins, Expropriação e Violência. On repression against the progressive Church, see Mainwaring, The Catholic Church and Politics in Brazil, Chapter VII; and for a journalistic account of one particular case, Rivaldo Chinem, Sentença: Padres e Possessores do Araguaia (Rio de Janeiro: Paz e Terra, 1983). Documentation on the repression against peasants and the progressive Church is available through the Comissão Pastoral de Terra; see, for example, the two volume publication, Renúncia: Caso Araguaia-Toçantis (Goiânia, 1981).


53. For an excellent discussion about the prospects for democracy in Brazil see Fabio Vanderley Reis, "Mudança Política no Brasil: Aberturas, Perspectivas e Miragens," forthcoming.

54. On this point, see Dahl, Polyarchy, 62-80.

55. The role of social movements in promoting a more democratic order is an important and relatively under studied subject. We plan to analyze this question in a work tentatively entitled New Social Movements, Political Culture, and Democracy: Brazil and Argentina.

56. In our emphasis on the importance of political leadership in transitions to democracy, we follow a number of works, including Guillermo O'Donnell and Philippe Schmitter, Political Life after Authoritarian Rule: Tentative Conclusions about Uncertain Transitions (forthcoming); Rustow, "Transitions to Democracy"; and Dahl, Polyarchy, 124-188.

57. The relationship between legitimacy and efficiency is a complex issue. For an influential treatment of this problem, see Seymour Martin Lipset, Political Man: The Social Bases of Politics (Garden City: Anchor Books, 1963), 64-86.