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Institutions, Accountability, and Democratic Governance in Latin America

Scholars, politicians, journalists, and civic leaders met here May 8 and 9 to analyze the difficulties of producing limited yet effective government. The presentations explored mechanisms of accountability, oversight, and political control that have appeared in Latin America. Enrique Iglesias, President of the Inter-American Development Bank, received the Notre Dame Prize at the conclusion of the conference.

Kellogg Institute Director Scott Mainwaring and Associate Director Christopher Welna organized the conference, with major financial support from The Coca-Cola Company and assistance from Pedro Pablo Díaz, Vice-President, Latin America Group, The Coca-Cola Company. The US Agency for International Development provided additional support. After revisions, the conference papers will appear in a volume coedited by Mainwaring and Welna.

Argentine-born Daniel Brinks, a lawyer now completing his PhD in comparative politics at Notre Dame, was there and recorded these observations:

Achieving Accountability

Perhaps most interesting was the interaction between scholars and practitioners. Indeed, the proceedings sometimes echoed the much earlier debate by scholar-practitioners reported in the Federalist Papers.

Guillermo O'Donnell (UND/KI) opened the conference, discussing his notion of 'horizontal accountability'. He catalogued constitutional barriers that have been erected in efforts to produce limited government, sorting them into traditional Madisonian 'checks and balances' and newer 'mandated' agencies such as the ombudsman and the comptroller. He noted new concepts, such as 'societal accountability' (Smulovitz and Peruzzotti) for the actions of civil society in enforcing the rule of law and 'reverse accountability' (Fox) for the potential of the government to punish citizens for disfavored political behavior.

Several authors spoke of successful institutions. Jorge Santistevan de Noriega presented a fascinating insider account of the Peruvian ombudsman's office, which he heads. Maria Tereza Sadek (IDESP) analyzed the Brazilian Public Prosecutors' expanded powers to bring class action lawsuits. Catalina Smulovitz and Enrique Peruzzotti (Universidad Torcuato Di Tella) explored how 'societal accountability' forced courts to respond to abuses of power in Argentina. Brazilian Judge Marcos Pimentel Tamassia detailed efforts to reform the Brazilian judiciary; and Juan Méndez, Director of Notre Dame's Institute for Civil and Human Rights, catalogued mechanisms that attempt to restrain executives and strengthen courts and legislatures in Latin America.

Parchment Barriers?

But many of the politicians and activists at the conference echoed Madison's warning that: "a mere demarcation on parchmentis not a sufficient guard against those encroachments which lead to a tyrannical concentration of all the powers of government in the same hands" (No. 49). Luis Pásara, legal advisor to the UN Mission in Guatemala, argued that democratic functioning is not mainly the result of institutional design, while Beatriz Magaloni (Stanford) presented data suggesting that inequality crucially conditions the success or failure of the rule of law. Michael Dodson and Donald Jackson (Texas Christian University) showed that the public credibility of extensive reforms in El Salvador have been undermined by politics. Even Santistevan conceded that a change in leadership could reverse the role the ombudsman plays in Peru .

The legislators present agreed that what matters most is the distribution of power among elites. Ignacio Walker, a member of the Chilean Congress, emphasized the role of 'poderes fácticos', business, military, and even church leaders. Lourdes Flores Nano, a representative in the Peruvian Congress, pointed out that power has often rendered institutions in Peru powerless. Senator Adolfo Aguilar Zínser of Mexico argued that power relations among the executive ruling party leaders and legislators render his legislature impotent as an oversight mechanism. David Samuels (University of Minnesota) supported this argument with data suggesting that institutional checks matter only when the executive's partisan power is not overwhelming.

Challenging O'Donnell's presentation, Matthew Shugart (University of California) argued that 'horizontal accountability' itself is an oxymoron. He argued that accountability is inherently vertical and hierarchical, so that an empowered electorate is the only way to motivate legislators and executives not to override parchment barriers. Senator Sergio Bitar Chacra of Chile agreed that people will not get accountability unless they demand it and detailed mechanisms that foster political responsiveness. Susan Stokes (University of Chicago) pointed out a distrust of electoralist majoritarian approaches apparent to her in O'Donnell's presentation, as he focused on the potential for institutional barriers to limit government for reasons internal to the apparatus of the state, de-emphasizing the connection between state and society.

But Méndez responded to Shugart that Latin America cannot afford the luxury of waiting for an empowered electorate, adding that elements of civil society, not necessarily the electorate, can make use of legal mechanisms to create accountability. Mariclaire Acosta (Mexican Commission for Human Rights) and Jonathan Fox (University of California) each detailed the partial success of civil society using such mechanisms in Mexico, where vertical, electoral accountability is still weak.

Madison's solution,"Ambition must be made to counteract ambition" (No. 51), also resonated in the discussions. David Samuels, Charles Kenney (University of Oklahoma), and Scott Morgenstern and Luigi Manzetti (Duke) all noted the role of a strong legislative opposition party in sustaining the mechanisms that check executive power. Shugart cautioned that as long as self-interest leads legislators to be more responsive to party leaders than to the electorate, horizontal control will remain elusive. Aguilar Zínser cited the ruling party's control of the Mexican Senate as an example.

Controls vs. Governability?

Pásara, Joy Moncrieffe (London School of Economics), and Margaret Sarles of USAID argued that too much accountability among branches of government can lead to paralysis. Argelina Figueiredo (CEBRAP) explored how this tension is exposed through the variation in executive-legislative relations in Brazil since the 1988 Constitution. Overall, the conference brought new information to bear on themes that echo the concerns of the earliest constitutionalists, as they too combined scholarship and praxis.

Daniel Brinks