Alexandre Debs
Assistant Professor of Political Science
Yale University
Tuesday, February 23, 2010
12:30 pm - C103 Hesburgh Center
“Living by the Sword and Dying by the Sword?: Leadership Transitions in and out of Dictatorships”
Alexandre Debs (PhD, Massachusetts Institute of Technology) studies the political economy of dictatorship, development, and war, including the relationship between domestic politics and international conflict.
Abstract
What explains the post-tenure fate of dictators? How does the treatment of ousted dictators affect their propensity to democratize? We tackle such questions in a model, with one leader and N-1 factions. First, the leader decides whether to democratize. Second, players decide whether the leader leaves office and, if so, whether he is eliminated. Third, surviving players divide a dollar. We conclude that a leader may be eliminated because he cannot commit to refrain from using his capacity for violence in the future. The greater a leader's capacity for violence, the more likely he is to be eliminated upon his ouster. Since a dictator can remain in office unless he is threatened with violence, leaders with greater capacity for violence are more likely to lose office in a dictatorship and they are more likely to democratize. We provide support for our theory in the post-World War II period.
